Winter Storm URI 2021 by HCFMO

2021

After-Action Report

WINTER STORM URI 2021

HARRIS COUNTY FIRE MARSHAL’S OFFICE

PREFACE

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This document was developed in the aftermath of the 2021 winter storm formally named Winter Storm Uri. The contents were developed with the cooperation of Harris County fire/ EMS/dispatch centers. Participation from the various functional disciplines was coordinated by the Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office (see Methodology) within 60 days of the incident’s conclusion.

The information gathered in this after-action report is For Official Use Only (FOUO) and should be handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and stored with appropriate security directives. Reproduction or modification of the HCFMO Winter Storm Uri 2021 after action report, in whole or in part, must be approved in writing by the HCFMO. For more information please contact the following:

The views and opinions expressed within this report do not reflect the official position of the Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office (HCFMO), Harris County and its elected officials, departments and agencies. All trademarks, registered trademarks, copyrights, product names, and company names mentioned herein are the property of their respective owners. Other product and company names used in this document are used for identification purposes only, may be trademarks of other companies, and are the property of their respective owners. All information contained herein is privileged. No parts of this document may be duplicated or used without permission of the HCFMO.

Laurie L. Christensen Fire Marshal Office: 713-274-1700 Laurie.Christensen@fmo.hctx.net

Rodney Reed Assistant Chief Office: 713-274-1717 Rodney.Reed@fmo.hctx.net

Ryan Sullivan

Operations Specialist Office: 713-274-1779 Ryan.Sullivan@fmo.hctx.net

FACILITATORS Rodney Reed, Assistant Chief Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office

Ryan Sullivan, Operations Specialist Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office

Chris Turrentine, Liason Officer Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office

Erik Zugner, Training Coordinator Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office

INCIDENT SUMMARY On February 13, 2021, a frontal storm developed off the coast of the Pacific Northwest and moved inland across the Pacific Northwest, Southwest, Central Plain states, and the Southeast United States. Days later, the storm moved across the remainder of the Midwest and Northeastern United State. The storm ultimately made widespread impacts across the United States, Mexico and Canada. 1 1 Winter Storm Uri resulted in over 170 million Americans being placed on various forms of winter weather alerts issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service. Varying effects of the storm caused blackouts for over 9.9 million people in the US and Mexico, most notably in Texas. These blackouts were the most significant in the US since the 2003 Northeast blackout. The damages from the blackouts are estimated to be at least $195 Billion, making the system the costliest natural disaster in the recorded history of Texas and the United States. It is also the deadliest winter storm since that of 2007. Winter Storm Uri was in large part responsible for the 2021 Texas Power Crisis, that left over 4.5 million homes and businesses without power for several days. The storm caused record low temperatures throughout the State. Power equipment servicing the Texas Grid was not adequately winterized, which left power generation vulnerable to the freezing temperatures. 2

On February 12, Governor Greg Abbott declared Harris County a disaster area.

91%

91% of residents of Harris County lost electrical power at some point during the February 14th - 20th duration of the storm.

In that same period, 65% of Harris County residents lost running water.

65%

The impact was disproportionate to the state where only 64% lost power and 44% lost water.

WATER STATE HARRIS COUNTY

POWER STATE HARRIS COUNTY

By February 17, at least 21 people died from causes related to Winter Storm Uri. By February 19, the number of deaths attributed to the storm reached 32. Deaths from Winter Storm Uri were largely linked to carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning, vehicle crashes, drownings, house fires and hypothermia. On March 25, the death toll had increased to 1113. Harris County, Texas, had the highest proportion of deaths at 31 according to preliminary counts (reported February 11 – March 5, 2021).

“Winter Storm Uri”. Federal Communications Commission. February 2021. Retrieved March 25, 2021. 1.

2. “Why Winter Storm Uri Caused Millions of Power Outages in Texas”. weather.com. Retrieved March 25, 2021. 3. “Texas death toll from February’s winter storm and power outages surpasses 100.” Abc13.com. March 25, 2021 Retrieved March 30, 2021

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HCOHSEM), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated from February 14, 2021 through February 26. 2021. The Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office staffed the EOC Fire Desk 24 hours/day for the duration of the activation. Personnel assigned to the Fire Desk represent the fire/rescue/EMS response community of Harris County inside of the HCOHSEM incident command structure. HCFMO is charged with serving 54 independent fire departments responsible for fire, rescue, and EMS response during emergency incidents. Following the incident’s conclusion, HCFMO command personnel and personnel assigned to the fire desk during the incident conducted a series of after action “workshops” to solicit anecdotal information from the agencies involved in response operations during the incident. Those workshops included breakout sessions with representatives from three functional disciplines represented by four Emergency Support Functions (ESF) as defined by the National Response Framework: • • •

ESF 4 & 9 – Firefighting and Urban Search and Rescue ESF 8 – Emergency Medical Services ESF 2 – Communications [including Dispatch]

Participants of the workshops contributed their observations, experiences, lessons learned, recommendations for future improvements and remaining challenges during the informal sessions conducted via Zoom Video Communications, INC. For the purposes of this report, the participants will remain anonymous. This report summarizes the discussions facilitated by the HCFMO.

AAR METHODOLOGY The HCFMO employed the series of after-action review workshops as a means to collect data from those directly involved with response operations to Winter Storm Uri. The workshops were informal and did not follow a specific agenda or respond to line items. Rather, a facilitated conversation was held, wherein respondents were asked to discuss incident management plans, operations plans, communications, unexpected issues/failures, and creative solutions to preserve for future incident planning. Participants included representatives from the functional disciplines fire/EMS/dispatch. Many participants were represented in more than one discussion, and significant data was reported

across emergency support functions. The byproduct from each of the workshops were preserved by the HCFMO facilitators and contributed in large part to the creation of this report. The views and opinions expressed within this report do not reflect the official position of the Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office (HCFMO), Harris County and its elected officials, departments and agencies, or the departments and agencies who contributed to the workshop process. All information contained herein is privileged and considered For Official Use Only (FOUO).

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ESF 4 and 9: FIREFIGHTING AND URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE Incident Management Plans:

Multiple participants in the Firefighting and Urban Search and Rescue workshop reported bringing shifts in 12 hours before normal assignment, to immediately put personnel on a mandatory work/rest cycle. This ensured that a fit crew would be immediately able to supplant the working crew without travel time. Most agencies activated their internal emergency operations plans, and many stood up Department Operations Centers. These incident management practices aided in the use of the ICS Command Structure, with operational briefings at the beginning of each operational period. Many of the participating departments utilized an IAP Software Suite. The use of an IAP Software Suite assisted in acquiring a common operating picture for the Harris County Emergency Operations Center and Fire Desk personnel. All participants in the response events implemented facility hardening/ winterizing plans with various degrees of success.

Operations Plans:

Winter Storm URI produced uncommon roadway conditions for the Southeast, Texas. Harris County rarely experiences significant snowfall, and experiences hard freezing roads with even greater infrequency. Driver/operators in the fire service are at a significant disadvantage when operating under these weather conditions. Both lack of experience in the driving conditions and uncertainty of road conditions were reported as significant issues. Many of the workshop participants prioritized dispatching light utility vehicles rather than heavy apparatus to more easily navigate the roadways in appropriate responses. Most agencies discontinued the use of emergency lights and sirens in order to minimize impacts on other drivers. All respondents reported call prioritization as an operational necessity. Evaluation of the incident location, nature, and level of acuity dictated the appropriate degree of response throughout the incident. Participants were in agreement that apparatus’ with access to water keys were of value as water infrastructure began to be impacted in residential and commercial properties. Lesson learned was that all apparatus’ shall be equipped with durable water keys.

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ESF 4 and 9: CONT’D Operations Plans Cont’d:

In addition to facility hardening/winterizing, prepositioning certain resources can be an invaluable practice in anticipated weather events. Access to fuel, potable water, porta-johns, and other infrastructure is critical when demand on those resources will be high. All departments should rely upon the economy while resources remain commercially available. State resource requests should be limited to critical need when commercially unavailable. The Winter Storm Uri incident occurred while Harris County remained activated in response to the COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020/2021. Existing protocols for preventing the spread of COVID-19 remained unchanged and in place.

Critical Improvement Areas:

Countywide, many skilled nursing facilities and long-term care facilities failed to heed advanced warnings regarding the inclement weather event. As such, many facilities failed to test backup power generation in advance of the storm. Many were left without sufficient fuel supplies, or functional generator power. As the incident progressed, power was lost across the County, with millions of customers impacted by power outages. This resulted in the loss of power and water infrastructure in facilities that would otherwise have functioning backup power generation capabilities. Other facilities, such as independent living facilities, failed to have onsite staff available to address immediate needs. Many of the fire/rescue calls for service related to securing utilities in facilities that failed to have staff on location to coordinate care and facility recovery. Many of the respondents reported challenges with the distribution of resources to in-home medical patients. Patients with O2 concentrators need to access power supplies occupied numerous transports throughout the incident. O2 cylinder resupply to patients without access to power presented significant challenges to the fire/rescue services. Commercial cellular service providers and their system resilience was universally reported as a critical failure.

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ESF 4 and 9: CONT’D Unexpected Issues:

Prior to the arrival of Winter Storm Uri 2021, the HCFMO made plans to utilize Harris County Precinct camp sand trucks to deploy base layers of sand on iced roads to make conditions more favorable for fire/EMS apparatus. Participants in the after-action workshop reported incidents, where upon request, sand trucks faced road condition delays to service apparatus in the field or in station. It was recommended that in future hard freezes where sand trucks are utilized for this purpose, trucks be pre-positioned in order to provide timely response. Stations where bays are located on an incline made frequent requests to sand the grade in order to pull apparatus back into the bays. Pre-sanding in advance of road degradation is also recommended. The unanticipated loss of adequate water supply was of significant concern during this after-action workshop. Entire municipalities, critical infrastructure locations, and other areas where water supply is mission critical were left on reserve tanks that quickly ran dry. The first recommendation from this unexpected challenge was to pre-stage water tenders at critical locations in anticipation of loss of supply. Road conditions statewide grounded commercial water supply tankers, and critical infrastructure throughout the county turned to the fire service for aid. Departments facing municipal or district water supply failures were also challenged to respond to structural fires occurring during the incident. Three primary recommendations emerged to include in structural firefighting emergency planning: 1. 2. 3.

Review mutual aid agreements and identify regional tenders available to provide tanker water for fire suppression; Identify industrial partners with access to water supplies, and invest in modified fittings to access those supplies; and Train personnel on drafting from alternative sources (pools, ponds, etc)

Lastly O2 cylinders/concentrator failures were universally identified as a critical failure throughout the incident. Planning for cylinder resupply operations, or emergency power generation for concentrators is recommended.

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ESF 4 and 9: CONT’D Improvement Plan:

Significant discussion emerged relating to a perceived cultural change required in the incident command structure: go/no-go for response. Command officers need to make determinations as to whether calls for service require a response or can be triaged for the safety of responders. Command officers need to make these decisions in advance using the risk/benefit decision matrix. Recommend standardizing matrix across regional response partners for consistency. Departments should work with their local utility providers (water, power, etc) prior to weather events. It is in the best interest of the department to leverage a working relationship with the local water districts to ensure that backup power generation is available in the event of a power failure; working with CenterPoint directly to ensure primary point power is provided to the department’s facilities; preplanning for fuel resupply for facility backup power. Critical infrastructure facilities should examine and improve the resiliency of backup power. Maintenance to primary backup systems, and investment in secondary backup systems are recommended. It is broadly perceived that Harris County should work in collaboration, rather than in competition with, the City of Houston. Competition for resources, and failure to share information/pre-plans were identified as problematic from the field perspective. Fire department access to real-time TranStar video received consensus support. Other jurisdictions across the country were cited for providing real-time public access to traffic camera systems, which would assist response agencies with reviewing road and traffic conditions during emergency incidents.

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ESF 8: EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES Incident Most participants in the Emergency Medical Services workshop implemented Management some sort of staffing early action plan. Some participants engaged local hotels Plans: to house staff which had dual benefit; reducing station overcrowding and positioning personnel in proximity to their duty station when recall/all-hands status was activated.

Participants generally adjusted their staffing model, the most frequently employed was 2 shifts/72 hours. 72 hours of food/supply was stocked at most stations for EMS providers. It was generally reported that command and control lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey were not implemented to assist the incident command personnel. Command personnel again found themselves failing to observe an adequate work/rest cycle. The consensus agreement is to increase professional development to fill incident command positions to allow for adequate work/ rest cycles. All participants in the response events implemented facility hardening/ winterizing plans with various degrees of success.

Operations EMS personnel participating in the Emergency Medical Service workshop Plans: identified driving skills and vehicle choice as a strategic decision point in

determining response resources. Like other emergency service disciplines, EMS providers on the whole discontinued the use of emergency lights and sirens to minimize impacts on roadways and drivers. By placing Medical Directors or authorized Paramedics in the Dispatch Center patients were triaged to determine dispatch prioritization. Dispatch prioritization was generally triaged by diverting as many low priority patients to nurses/doctors via telemedicine. Discussion included planning for response to mass casualty incidents or incidents with multiple patients in proximity. First, regional AMBUSes were in theater for the duration of the incident, and were activated for multiple incidents where patients from long term care facilities required group transport. A concept to utilize Independent School District (ISD) transportation was field tested with varying reports of utility and success.

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ESF 8: CONT’D Operations Plans Cont’d:

In incidents where multiple patients were identified in close proximity, EMS providers worked with low acuity patients to obtain permission to cohort transport. Each patient provided consent to be transported with another low acuity cohort patient with a high degree of success. Personnel management plans included infield staff swap outs for personnel and equipment; assigning paramedic-to-paramedic transfer of patients at hospital to return ambulances to service; requesting hospital space to provide continuity of provider care; staging rehab units at hospitals for personnel. The Winter Storm Uri incident occurred while Harris County remained activated in response to the COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020/2021. Existing protocols for preventing the spread of COVID-19 remained unchanged and in place.

Carbon Monoxide Incident within the Incident :

Following the massive power loss residents across the county lost primary residential power, and therefore residential heat. Under the extreme cold, home temperatures dropped to uncomfortable and sometimes hazardous lows. CO exposure/inhalation calls for service exponentially increased. At its peak, EMS service providers were stretched to critical mass, and hospital systems countywide went on drive by status. Public officials urged residents to discontinue unsafe practices for home heating. Workshop participants made note of the failure of “new” media to adequately educate the public during a power failure; persons with the power necessary to consume “new” media were not those in need of public education. Participants in the workshop noted anecdotally that it was not until the community witnessed hazardous CO exposure first hand that call volume for CO exposures subsided. Generally, respondents chose to only transport patients to primary point hospitals, or freestanding emergency centers connected to hospitals. In response to mass casualty CO exposure/inhalation incidents, EMS providers stocked O2 load out kits and EMS providers on ISD buses to load O2 mass casualty patients. A chase medic unit was paired with the ISD bus for any patient whose status degraded requiring critical transport.

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ESF 8: CONT’D Critical Respondents universally reported critical shortages of general equipment Improvement and O2 cylinder replacements for patients without access to functioning O2 Areas: concentrators. Countywide, skilled nursing facilities and long-term care facilities failed to heed warnings regarding the inclement weather event. As such, many such facilities failed to test backup power generation. Many were left without sufficient fuel supplies, or functional generator power. As the incident progressed, power was lost across the County, with millions of customers impacted by power outages. This resulted in the loss of power and water supplies in facilities that would otherwise have functioning backup power generation capabilities. EMS personnel fielded responses to O2 calls for patients that would not otherwise require emergency medical response. To manage those calls, some providers used ambulance or utility vehicles to deliver a single O2 unit to the patient and arrange for their mass transit via ISD buss or AMBUS at a later time. Critical care air ambulance services were grounded as a result of freezing temperatures and conditions. Level 1 and 2 facilities were left w/o aircraft to respond to critical transports.

Improvement Respondents noted that planning for future events should identify and Plans: leverage alternative resources for non-emergency assistance. EMS providers

were consistently forced to triage patient transport and care with nonemergency assistance requests that could be diverted to additional resources. Discussion included recommendations to request Texas Military Department deploy resources to assist with O2 bottle distribution, welfare checks, water distribution missions, etc. A continued gap exists in the fundamental command training and professional development of additional personnel to alleviate the burden on command and allow for adequate work/rest cycles. Military aircraft should be worked into emergency pre-plans to transport patients to Level 1 and 2 facilities in theater, or out of jurisdiction if conditions call for long distance. US Coast Guard Air Station Houston confirms that air transport resources are available in inclement weather, and deployable under emergency/governors/presidential declaration.

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ESF 2: COMMUNICATIONS AND DISPATCH Incident Respondents in the Communication and Dispatch workshop universally brought Management personnel in to staff Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) well in advance of Plans: the arrival of freezing temperatures. Centers reported implementing staffing models between 8-12 hour revolving shifts.

PSAPs across the county increased the number of answering points in each of their respective communications centers. This lesson was directly derived from the Hurricane Harvey (2017) after action report that identified PSAPs were overburdened with calls for service during that event. Although communications managers were able to split consoles to increase answering points, multiple VESTA Terminals were recalled prior to the storm, and not returned to service until after the incident’s conclusion. It was generally reported that command and control lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey were implemented to assist the incident command personnel. Command personnel found themselves largely able to observe an adequate work/rest cycle. Command personnel set a 12-hour operational period allowing decision makers to seek relief from other communication managers. Communications managers reported information sharing pre-incident was integral to preparing command and control plans that ensured readiness for the incident.

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ESF 2: CONT’D Operations Plans

Due to the nature of the incident and the anticipated volume of calls for dispatch, the communication managers from the various PSAPs utilized the PSAP TALKGROUP (regional radio system) to overcome cross dispatch communications challenges; downed towers resulted in dispatch misrouting. All participants in the response events implemented facility hardening/ winterizing plans with various degrees of success. Many centers faced the same challenges experience by other emergency response facilities; namely, loss of water, power and sanitation. In addition to facility hardening/winterizing, prepositioning certain resources can be an invaluable practice in anticipated weather events. Access to fuel, potable water, porta-johns, and other infrastructure is critical when demand on those resources will be high. All departments should rely upon the economy while resources remain commercially available. State resource requests should be limited critical need when commercially unavailable. Most respondents determined early on that backup power generation would remain in full operation of their facilities for the duration of the incident. Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS), generator power and secondary backups were critical in the continuity of operations. Power instability led most centers to operate on some form of backup power for up to a five-day period. The Winter Storm Uri incident occurred while Harris County remained activated in response to the COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020/2021. Existing protocols for preventing the spread of COVID-19 remained unchanged and in place. Generally PSAPs managed the high rate of call volume by utilizing ProQA for all fire and EMS calls, and assigned a CAD code to all calls for water-related response.

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ESF 2: CONT’D Critical Improvement Areas:

Anecdotally, respondents reported calls intended for, or better suited for, 3-11 were being answered by the PSAPs. These calls included roadway conditions and closures, public utility outages, water-related calls for services, etc. Downed communications towers, and tower emergency power generation supply, stretched the communications network in the most perilous periods of the incident. Many of those issues were resolved by reliance on the PSAP TALKGROUP to re-route calls to the appropriate answering point. Prior to the incident (OOA Jan 25, 2021), Greater Harris County 9-1-1 (GHC911) recalled multiple VESTA Terminals from Harris County dispatch centers for routine maintenance, greatly reducing the number of answering points available to the centers. Some of those assets were unable to be returned to the PSAPs prior to the onset of this incident, reducing answering points. Throughout Harris County telecommunications carriers experienced district wide outages, greatly impacting both the PSAPs and consumer emergency communications. There was not notification to GHC911 when district wide outages occurred, and therefore the communications/dispatch centers remained unaware when an outage would affect their response jurisdiction.

Improvement As power and water supplies failed, the communications centers were receiving Plan fire suppression system alarm notifications from across Harris County. Those

alarms were simultaneously dispatched to HCFMO Investigations and Inspections personnel (as is the course during non-emergency dispatch) for a response. As call volume exponentially increased, the decision was made to disregard HCFMO dispatch/notification and refer all incidents for follow-up. PSAP managers noted this helped to alleviate the burdensome call volume. Discontinuing certain non-emergency dispatch should be considered in preplanning. In large part, PSAPs were tasked with triaging calls, including non-emergency calls for welfare check, assist the citizen, public utility, etc. Implementing a 3060 minute notification for “assist the citizen” calls, and closing out tasking with field confirmation assisted in managing communications/dispatch triage. Respondents universally agree that increasing the number VESTA Terminals throughout the county to increase the number of answering points will continue to benefit the communications/dispatch function during large scale events.

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LESSONS LEARNED AND SOLUTIONS This document captures many of the lessons learned from the response to the Winter Storm Uri 2021. Certain lessons have been preserved specific to the functional discipline that responded in their respective workshop. The following lessons have been culled from those responses because of the universal application to the fire/EMS/dispatch emergency functions:

Cultural change in response decision matrix:

RECOMMENDATIONS Local response agencies conduct workshops to establish go/no-go matrix for responses to common disasters/incidents experienced in the region. Matrix should be adopted by all response agencies to ensure consistency across Harris County.

Inspect and invest in power generation for critical infrastructure:

Critical infrastructure facilities should examine and improve the resiliency of backup power.

RECOMMENDATIONS Maintenance to primary backup systems, and investment in secondary backup systems are recommended. Additional stand-alone tertiary power sources should be acquired and maintained for critical infrastructure to maintain response capability.

Command and control - train line officers to relieve command staff:

It was generally reported that command and control lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey were considered, but not consistently implemented to assist the incident command personnel for incidents spanning multiple operational periods. Some command personnel heeded the lessons from previous incidents and found themselves largely able to observe an adequate work/rest cycle. Others failed to implement those strategies.

RECOMMENDATIONS All response personnel should pursue command training and professional development of qualified personnel to alleviate the burden on command, and allow for adequate work/ rest cycles. page 14

LESSONS LEARNED AND SOLUTIONS CONT’D

Real time access to traffic and roadway conditions:

Real-time access to TranStar and other sources of roadway and traffic video should be widely available to the first responder community. Other jurisdictions across the country are cited for providing real-time public access to traffic camera systems, which would assist response agencies with reviewing road and traffic conditions during emergency incidents.

RECOMMENDATIONS Working with the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HCOHSEM) to validate feasibility with providing live access to TranStar cameras in designated department operations centers (DOC).

City-County cooperation:

It is broadly perceived that Harris County should work in collaboration, rather than in competition with, the City of Houston. Competition for resources, and failure to share information/preplans were identified as problematic from the field perspective.

RECOMMENDATIONS Harris County Firefighters Association (HCFFA) should facilitate discussion with Houston Fire Dept. Command Staff to develop cooperative relations for resource and information management.

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CONCLUSION Winter Storm Uri 2021 once again tested the resilience of Harris County, TX in the face of natural and/or man-made disaster. The effects of freezing temperatures, roadway impasse and subsequent infrastructure failures had broad reaching and costly impacts on the County. The costliest natural disaster in the State of Texas also took the lives of up to 111 residents in the State. Harris County fire/EMS/dispatchers played the primary role in responding to the citizen calls for service in both emergency and non-emergency capacities. First responder adaptability continues to be the first and foremost success in response to largescale incidents such as Winter Storm Uri. This report serves to preserve many of the unexpected challenges, critical failures, creative solutions and lessons learned from the incident. Adapting the culture of response and adequately preparing future command officers should occupy the consideration of today’s incident command officers. Investing in best practices for maintaining and strengthening infrastructure should include preparations for winterizing and hardening facilities. Improving communication and leveraging relationships between government, industry, NGO and faith-based organizations will improve response to incidents. Harris County’s fire/EMS/dispatch community should continue to heed the lessons outlined in this, and past, after action reports.

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The Harris County Fire Marshal’s Office would like to express thanks to the agency representatives that contributed to the development of this after-action report.

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7701 Wilshire Place Drive Houston, TX 77040 2318 Atascocita Road Humble, TX 77396