GW Undergraduate Review, Volume 5, Spring 2022

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Undergraduate Review VOLUME 5

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SPRING 2022

www.gwur.org

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Undergraduate Review VOLUME 5

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SPRING 2022

Thanks for the photos!

Front cover: Carol M. Highsmith Back cover: Pixabay

ISSN (print): 2578-9171 ISSN (online): 2578-9201 ©2022 The GW Undergraduate Review, The George Washington University

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The GW Undergraduate Review would like to thank Vice Provost for Research Dr. Pamela Norris, Mr. Shane Seger, Ms. Rachel Yakobashvili, and the Office of the Vice Provost for Research for their continued support and guidance for our organization. We would also like to thank the Center for Undergraduate Fellowships and Research, the Center for Student Engagement, and Libraries and Academic Innovation for promoting the journal, engaging with the undergraduate research community at large, and advising over the course of publication. Thank you to Margaret Steiner, the founder of GWUR, for setting a standard of excellence. Finally, we would like to thank the tireless work of our authors, whose efforts were invaluable to our publication.

ABOUT US

Established in 2016, the GW Undergraduate Review (GWUR) is the premier publication of undergraduate research at the George Washington University. It features a multi-disciplinary series of peer-reviewed articles from GW’s undergraduates in its annual publication. Our mission is to engage undergraduate students in research on GW’s campus and to promote the research community at large through various events and workshops alongside our journal. Our editorial boards are staffed by editors representing over twenty of GW’s departments. Our organization also publishes the GW Scope, an ongoing research-focused news blog backed by a similarly robust board. GWUR is an entirely student-run organization that works closely with and is supported by the Office of the Vice Provost for Research.

E XE C UTIVE BOAR D Jessica Bride - President & Editor-in-Chief Jaylee Davis - Layout Manager & Fall Director of GW Scope Aldonza Chavez - Lead Editor for Humanities & Events Manager Veronika Kulik - Lead Editor for Natural Sciences Eleanor Ball - Lead Editor for Social Sciences Nammu Arumugasamy - Submission Recruitment Chair Jenna Ahart - Spring Director of GW Scope Meghan Flanagan - Events Assistant

E D IT ORIAL B OAR D Alexandra Kicior Ananya Murthy Benjamin Kane Chris Luhring Daphne Ghazizadeh Elisabeth Reznikov Janavi Kanagasundaram Michael Farina Stephen Dillon-Streisel

G W SC OPE Ben Chapman Emily Mosley

L AY O UT TEAM Jaylee Davis Jessica Bride

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FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader, Welcome to Volume V of the GW Undergraduate Review (GWUR)! On behalf of our Executive and Editorial Boards, we are grateful to be celebrating this milestone for our journal. First, I want to thank my staff for their unwavering dedication. It is inspiring to work alongside undergraduates with full course loads, jobs, and other commitments yet continue to work for GWUR without monetary or credit hour compensation. Despite the obstacles of returning to campus in-person, their determination never wavered. GWUR’s fifth publication reflects our investment in the growth of undergraduate research at GW. We want to thank our Volume 5 authors and those who submitted their work to us this year. The success of our publication would not be possible without the undergraduate research community at GW — both represented in this journal and not. GWUR was created to showcase undergraduate researchers at GW, and your curiosity and passion across all disciplines continue to inspire us. Our organization is proud to advocate for students to pursue independent studies and research positions during their time in undergrad. Together, we prove that undergraduate research is not only possible and but that undergrads are also capable of producing exceptional work.

It is also important to thank the mentors that facilitate and encourage undergraduate research. Specifically, I would like to thank Jenny Kim and Dr. Turner for their support throughout my research and academic careers. Mentorship is invaluable for undergraduate students as they develop their interests and skills. It is mentors who acknowledge a student’s potential and introduce them to the possibilities of independent research, and we thank you for it.

My last three years with GWUR were filled with hard work but also lots of laughter and gratitude. I have loved learning from my staff, who demonstrate a variety of research interests. It has been an honor to work with you and serve as Editor-inChief. I hope you enjoy reading Volume V as much as we enjoyed creating it!

Sincerely, Jessica L. Bride President & Editor-in-Chief The GW Undergraduate Review

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CONTENTS Reimagining Zoos Through a Nature-Centered Approach

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TALBOT DE ST. AUBIN

Rembrandt: Seeking Closure in Classical Narratives

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PARKER BLACKWELL

Right-Wing Populism in the United States: The Intersection of Conspiracy Theories and Mainstream Political Thought

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SARAH CORSO

The Forgotten Entrepreneurs: New York City’s Irish Immigrant Peddlers in the Nineteenth Century

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KAIFENG DENG

Withholding Hope: Comparative Perspectives of the International Criminal Court’s Palestinian Investigation

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ANTHONY HU

The Gender Politics of Revolutionary Struggle in the Black Panther Party

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EMILY ALLEN

Speaking Anti-Ukrainian in English: An Analysis of Russian Narratives about Ukraine Forwarded by TASS’s English-language Online News-reporting

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KATERYNA STEPANENKO

Effects of Hydroxymethylfurfural in High Fructose Corn Syrup on Honeybee Health

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FIONA LUPI-PEATE

The Venerated and the Despised: Dualities in the Catholic Church’s Responses to Pious Women

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LAUREN KIKER

GW Scope Feature: Land of the Incarcerated, Home of the Underpaid: Looking at the History of Prison Labor

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BEN CHAPMAN

Meet the Staff

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Editorial Research Features

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6 KEYWORDS: zoos, animal ethics, zoochosis, conservation support DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).01

Reimagining Zoos Through A Nature-Centered Approach TALBOT DE ST. AUBIN BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, CCAS ‘24, tdestaubin@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT Zoos have been around for centuries, yet they rarely consider the needs of the animals within them.

Although recent changes have allowed zoos to benefit conservation efforts and species as a whole, they still harm the individuals that reside there. Therefore, zoos must be redesigned to improve conditions. This paper argues that the best way to do this is through the Nature-Centered approach. This is similar to the safari style zoo, but limits the species allowed in a location. Due to this, animals are able to live in larger enclosures with more enrichment and privacy. A larger emphasis will be placed on conservation as well.

This approach will eliminate the issues of current zoos, while simultaneously enhancing their benefits.

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INTRODUCTION Humans have always been fascinated by animals: they were painted on cave walls and even seen as divine in certain cultures. Unfortunately, this also led to them being domesticated or captured for displays, the latter of which evolved into the modern zoo. Yet rarely have the animals’ needs been seriously considered in this relationship (Foster, 1999; Tait, 2016). More recently they have entered into discussion, as the concern for animal rights and conservation has increased, but the desires of the human spectators are still more highly regarded than the needs of the animals they are viewing. This has led to most enclosures being much smaller than natural habitats, with no places to hide, creating unease and even illness in the animals (Chutchawanjumrut, 2015). This disregard for wellbeing is harmful.

Nevertheless, zoos do benefit conservation support and efforts. This is especially found in facilities accredited by zoological associations. Therefore, I would argue that an evolution of zoos is needed, not an elimination, as Emma Marris calls for in her recent New York Times article (2021). The design of zoos should be more animal-focused and naturalistic because these institutions are beneficial for conservation, but currently harmful to the individual animals in their care. In this paper, I will argue that the evolution of zoos is best done through a naturecentered approach with larger enclosures, a focus on conservation, and enrichment and habitats, including climate, that replicate those found in the animals’ natural environment. This will enhance the animals’ welfare better than other propositions.

I will start this defense by briefly looking at the history of zoos and the progress that has been made so far. Then, I will expand on the issues that continue in the current model. Next, I will introduce the Nature-Centered approach which makes zoos more naturalistic and animal-focused in order to eliminate the issues of modern zoos. I will follow this by elaborating on the current benefits of these institutions, and how this new approach will further enhance these. Finally, I will critique other possible approaches to redesigning zoos.

BRIEF HISTORY OF ZOO In order to understand the modern zoo, one must be aware of how it came to be. The first documentation of zoo-like structures is from over 4,000 years ago. Egyptian pharaohs and Mesopotamian rulers built their empires, and as part of that process created royal menageries (Foster, 1999). They collected animals from around the world as they traveled and expanded their lands. At this time, exotic animals were a symbol of status and were reserved for the elite. The rulers had private gardens of animals, but only they and visiting rulers were allowed to enjoy them. As this was a show of domination and wealth, the animals’ welfare was not the focus. They were seen as possessions instead of beings. The depictions of monkeys and bears being pulled around by leashes at this time exemplify this (Foster, 1999). The animals were only given what they needed to appear strong for their symbolic representation of the rulers, namely food and water. Their health otherwise was not considered.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 This version of zoos, where animals were kept in the private collections of the elite, was the dominant form for centuries.

The next era of zoos consisted of animal fights and traveling menageries. The former was a large source of entertainment. In the Roman empire, animal fights were open to the public, but when they became popular in Europe in the 17th century they were mostly reserved for the elite (Tait, 2016). It was expensive to replace the animals killed in battle, so only the wealthy could afford to attend. This continued the separation in who was able to view these animals, but it worsened the conditions for the animals. Instead of simply being observed or paraded, they were forced to fight to the death. Animals were now seen as a means for human pleasure, instead of objects of status. Their wellbeing was even less of a consideration as the animals did not need to be well-fed or even survive the journey to the location of their fight, as only some were needed in the arena.

In the 18th century, the viewing of animals in Europe was expanded to the public through traveling menageries (Tait, 2016). This transition made progress in terms of who was exposed to the animals, but traveling menageries still did not treat the animals well. As these exhibits traveled, the animals were kept in small caravans with bars on the sides (Tait, 2016). These enclosures did not provide any of the elements the animals would have had in their natural habitats. They were small and barren, not the ideal conditions for any species. Nevertheless, the aim of these was to display, not kill, the animals. Finally, some royals decided to open their menageries to the public, creating the more modern concept of a zoo. This shift strongly coincided with the increasing focus on pursuing knowledge, so many of these establishments viewed part of their task as scientific observation. Although this sounds promising for the animals’ conditions, many of their enclosures were purely concrete. There was no vegetation for them to hide in or to recreate their natural habitats (Elias, 2015). Therefore, the animals still suffered Unfortunately, animals were not included in the ethical considerations of any of these eras. They went from symbols to objects to specimens, but they were never full beings in the minds of those containing or viewing them.

The fact that animals are sentient should be sufficient reasoning for including them as stakeholders in ethical systems. However, if it is not, then the continuous discovery of new complexities and characteristics held by non-human animals should merit their inclusion.

For example, elephants have rituals to mourn their dead, and dolphins have a complex language including

7 grammar and names (Bradshaw, 2004; Ryabov, 2016).

These are only two examples of the vast discoveries on animal culture and abilities. These creatures are not only sentient, they are intelligent. Their capacity for culture and communication, as well as for suffering, means that they should be considered in ethics. If they are included, then very few, if any, ethical theories can justify zoos in their modern form. For example, one key aspect of Kant’s philosophy is that no one can be treated as simply a means to an end, they must also be the end1 (Kant, 1997, 37). In these historical versions of zoos, animals were nothing but a means, as they were kept in zoos purely for the pleasure of the spectators. However, if the conditions of individuals living in zoos were improved, the purpose of keeping them in zoos would be their well-being as well as their benefits to conservation. Thus, Kantian philosophy would consider evolved zoos as more ethical.

Utilitarianism would make a case for evolving zoos as well since utilitarians view something as ethical if it maximizes pleasure while minimizing pain (Mill, 1882, 9-10). Zoos currently maximize pleasure when they aid conservation efforts, but they are not minimizing pain because they do not treat the animals as well as they could. Thus, they are not ethical according to utilitarian principles. However, if zoos treated their animals better, they could be. The focus on conservation that I allude to here has started to become more common as public concern for animal welfare increases.

This rise in support has led to some improvement in zoos. One major factor in this advancement was the creation of organizations such as the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA) in 1924 and the World Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA)2 in 1935. These were created to uphold a higher standard of animal welfare.

Over time their mission expanded and for accreditation by them today zoos and aquariums must also “(a) deliver a sound conservation message, or be of other educational value, (b) focus on natural behavior, [and] (c) not demean or trivialize the animal in any way” (“WAZA,” 2003, 2).

Through these requirements, zoos are not only tasked with the improvement of their care for the animals, but also with putting an emphasis on educating the public about conservation. The creation of these organizations marked a new era for zoos where they actually benefited animals, in at least some regard. Nevertheless, these standards, although an improvement, do not sufficiently enhance the welfare of the captive animals. Thus, more progress is needed.

1 Although Kant did not view animals as rational beings, and as such did not include them in his philosophy, I am arguing under the premise of the previous sentence. Therefore, animals would be included as rational beings and would be considered in his ethical philosophy.

2 WAZA and AZA will be used interchangeably from now on as WAZA is international and bases its accreditations off of the accreditation given by the more local zoological associations. Therefore, all AZA-accredited zoos are also WAZA-accredited.

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CURRENT PROBLEMS Although animal wellbeing has increased with the evolution of zoos, there are still many issues that need to be addressed. One factor in this is that enclosures in zoos are much smaller than the territories wild individuals of the species would experience. For example, the enclosure of Gus the polar bear was 0.00009% of the size of his natural habitat in the Arctic, not an uncommon figure when comparing enclosure size to natural habitat (Chutchawanjumrut, 2015). Gus lived in the Central Park Zoo and became famous at the end of the 1900s because he would swim in figure eights for hours on end. Although this behavior may sound like a trick he was taught, it was actually a symptom of mental illness caused by his small living space and lack of stimulation. This illness is called zoochosis, a psychiatric disorder that is found in animals and caused by living in confinement (Maulana et al, 2020).

This disease is commonly compared to schizophrenia as found in humans. Animals with this condition perform stereotypical behaviors, those that are repetitive and serve no purpose. This includes, but is not limited to: pacing, bar biting, vomiting, self-mutilation, and swimming in figure eights. All of these symptoms represent distress in the animals and they are extremely common. Oftentimes zoos will start treating their inhabitants that suffer from this with medication and behavioral therapy. However, that is an expensive route to take. Gus’s treatment alone cost over $25,000 (Chutchawanjumrut, 2015). For smaller zoos, this simply is not an option, so the animals may go untreated. The animals that are treated spend their lives drugged. This is a stark difference from how they would live in the wild. Furthermore, being watched causes stress in the animals (Maulana, 2018). As zoos are still focused on the humans’ enjoyment, they try to make the animals visible at all times, giving them no place to hide. This leads to chronic stress which contributes to zoochosis.

Another common cause of zoochosis is lack of stimulation. In nature, animals must be alert and problemsolve in order to survive. Predators have to hunt for their prey and prey have to be aware of possible predators nearby. This use of mental abilities is not found in zoos.

Animals are given their meals without exerting mental effort, are safe from harm, and do not have a changing environment to keep them curious. It is thought that this lack of mental engagement is part of what causes the brain structure to shift, causing zoochosis (Grazian, 2012). One way to prevent this is to provide enrichment for the animals. This includes a wide array of tactics from sprinkling food around the enclosure to puzzle feeders to spraying perfume around in order to change the scent (Grazian, 2012). Although these additions may seem trivial, they allow the animals to forage, problem-solve, and experience something different. These are all behaviors that animals would engage in in the wild, despite using objects not found in nature. This enrichment is the best

tool for fighting zoochosis, but it is not enough to make up for the problems caused by living in small enclosures and being watched (Grazian, 2012).

An even more fatal issue in zoos is the killing of ‘surplus’ animals. When zoos have more animals than they need or can house, they euthanize the excess individuals (Browning, 2018). These animals are not put down due to illness or old age, but simply because the institution in which they live already has enough of their species. A large portion of the public finds this practice inhumane when they are made aware of it, as can be seen from the outrage after the Copenhagen Zoo euthanized one of its young giraffes in 2014 (Browning, 2018). However, despite its frequency, many are unaware of its occurrence due to a lack of discussion surrounding it. Therefore, zoos continue to perform these euthanasias, but they should not.

It is important to note that all of the problems discussed so far have been those of AZA-accredited zoos. When looking at those that are not accredited, the situation is even more dire. AZA requires its members to promote conservation education, treat the animals with high standards, and provide enrichment opportunities. None of this is required by federal law (Grech, 2004). Therefore, zoos that are not members of the AZA do not need to do any of this. In terms of conservation efforts, many zoos do not provide funding, research, or educational benefits.

Thus, non-accredited zoos tend to provide no benefits to animals. As for standards of care, the Animal Welfare Act of 1970 requires that the basic needs of the animals be met and that the mental well-being of primates is addressed (Grech, 2004). This act treats many species differently in terms of requirements and does not mention coldblooded animals at all, both of which are detrimental to the well-being of the zoo inhabitants. To demonstrate the quality of standards required, recall the situation of Gus mentioned above. He lived in an enclosure that was minute compared to his natural habitat, yet he lived in an AZA-accredited zoo. That means that his enclosure was considered to meet high standards of animal welfare.

Animals held in zoos that are not AZA-certified are allowed to live in cages even smaller than that of Gus. So, the federal standards of welfare that zoos must meet are extremely low.

Finally, enrichment is not mandated by law. Although it is the best preventative measure against zoochosis, the Animal Welfare Act only mentions the psychological state of primates. All other animals, if mentioned at all, are only promised physical necessities. Thus, non-accredited zoos may not only lack the benefits, but also exacerbate the problems. If humans want to continue viewing these species live, they should improve the conditions of zoos so as to not harm others simply for their own pleasure.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 NATURE-CENTERED APPROACH In order to best address all of the current issues with zoos, larger enclosures, a greater sense of privacy, a more naturalistic design, and better enrichment opportunities are needed. These standards were chosen as they best address the current issues in zoos and prevent zoochosis.

For this, I propose the Nature-Centered approach. This approach was designed by researching issues caused by modern zoos to see what needed to be addressed, as well as seeing how current proposals corrected these and if any fixed all of the issues. The main aspect of this proposal is founded in the current safari-style of a few zoos, in which the visitors are driven through a large area where multiple species coexist. However, there were three main distinctions added to this existing approach based on studies that found certain changes to be beneficial for the animals as well as studies that looked at the benefits of current zoos. These distinctions are: 1) Zoos will only be allowed to house animals from similar climates as they are located. This would allow all species contained in zoos to live in a more naturalistic, open setting. There will not be enclosures; instead, the species will coexist in a large plain or forest filled with flora from their natural habitats. This restriction is not to say that a zoo may only house animals native to its location, rather the climate the animals are native to must be the same as the zoo they are kept in. So, animals from the African savannah could live in a San Diego Zoo because these locations experience similar temperatures and humidity. However, sloths could not live there because they are prone to a more humid, rainforest setting.

Therefore, larger roaming areas would be provided to all animals, and the areas would closely replicate the natural environments the animals are native to.

2) Included in this effort to reproduce animals’ habitats will be more natural enrichments,3 the second distinction.

This draws from a study by Maulana and contributors where they added live fish to three captive jaguars’ ponds to initiate hunting behaviors. None of these jaguars were found to have zoochosis. The researchers attributed this to additional enrichment and a more natural enclosure in general, both of which led to more mental stimulation in the jaguars (2020). This natural enrichment will be incorporated in many ways, from planting bamboo koalas can actually scavenge off of themselves to providing a watering hole for elephants to play in. By replicating the stimulation animals experience in the wild, they will not only be kept mentally active, but the visitors will observe them doing the behaviors they actually would in nature. Instead of seeing an orangutan swing from a fire

9 hose, they will see them on a vine. This benefits both the animals and the visitors.

3) The final aspect of this approach is that it would heavily emphasize conservation. As visitors are driven through the park, their guide will not only help spot animals and give fun facts about them, but will also talk about the conservation status of that species. This will include threats they face, the causes of those threats, the consequences if the species go extinct, and how visitors can help. The captive breeding programs within the facility, those that work to breed endangered species in captivity due to the extra challenges they face towards this in the wild, will also be discussed so that it is clear the institution directly impacts these efforts. This is important as it exemplifies to the visitors that they can make a direct impact as well, even if the species in need do not live nearby. This expands upon the current benefits that zoos offer towards conservation efforts, as discussed in the next section.

This approach improves all four of the objectives discussed at the beginning of this section. The enclosures will be much larger because species are able to share them. This will allow the animals to explore and exercise in a more vast environment, without requiring the zoo’s overall area to expand much. In terms of enrichment, there will be a wide variety available. These will also be much more naturalistic than many of the current methods. For instance, the elephants will be given an actual canopy to walk under, rather than a ceiling replicating the shadows of one, like that implemented in Zurich (Maulana, 2018).

There will also be less stress caused by a lack of privacy as there will not be an endless stream of viewers surrounding the animals. Furthermore, they will be free to roam away from the vehicles if they are not enjoying the attention they are receiving. All of this works to improve the conditions that cause zoochosis in order to greatly reduce the cases of it, if not prevent them altogether. In addition, this model aims to be as naturalistic as possible. It does so by requiring a similar climate and utilizing the same plants and other landmarks of their natural habitats. All of this is centered around the animals’ needs and works to raise their quality of life. While removing the current problems of zoos, the Nature-Centered approach would also enhance the conservation benefits seen today.

BENEFITS Current zoos provide benefits for conservation, but not as much as the Nature-Centered approach would.

This conservation focus is crucial due to the estimations that if humans continue their current activities, half to

3 Enrichment is a tactic used to keep the animals mentally stimulated. How this is done varies a lot, but it all has the goal of engaging the animals’ curiosity or problem-solving skills. By natural enrichment I mean that the methods and tools for this will be natural, not man-made, items.

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two-thirds of all species on the Earth will go extinct before the end of the century (Miller et al, 2004). Thus, zoos are extremely beneficial in their work to preserve species. Their efforts at this are threefold. First, they educate the public on this topic. A study was organized

by AZA in order to find out if their efforts towards this were successful. This research collection lasted over three years and involved surveying over 5,500 visitors to AZA-accredited zoos. According to this study, over half of the visitors reported that the zoo reinforced their support for conservation, strengthened their connection to nature, and caused them to rethink their role in environmental problems to instead see themselves as part of the solution (Falk et al, 2007). Therefore, zoos are critical in gaining public support for conservation.

A day at the zoo is often considered a fun pastime with the family, but it is also an important tool in growing awareness and involvement in the public. Many people live in urban areas where they are not exposed to a great deal of animals or nature. By experiencing the majesty of these creatures first hand, they are more motivated to get involved in their preservation.

The Nature-Centered approach would further promote this. A study done about elephants in the San Diego Safari Park found that visitors had a greater intent of taking action towards conservation when they experienced the elephant up-close or saw them performing diverse types of behavior (Hacker and Miller, 2016). With the NatureCentered approach, both of these experiences will be increased. Since the visitors are driven through the park, they are able to get closer to the animals than they would in a typical zoo setting. There will be no barriers or trenches separating them from the inhabitants, only the side of the vehicle. As for the behaviors, the enrichment provided causes the animals to act in a way that is natural to them, which they would not if they were in a basic enclosure. This combined with the natural enrichment aspect will more closely reproduce their typical behaviors.

Furthermore, the general emphasis on reproducing animals’ native habitats will allow for many behaviors that ordinary enclosures would not. For instance, visitors could see zebras running through a savannah or a leopard climbing a tree. All of this will increase the engagement and enjoyment of the visitors, which will, in turn, strengthen their support of conservation. These changes are for the benefit of the animal, but many of them happen to enhance visitors’ experiences as well. Through these modifications, visitors strengthen their connection to the animal and increase their conservation efforts.

However, zoos do not only educate about conservation.

They also assist these efforts financially. It has been found that the community of WAZA members is one of the largest funders of conservation globally. In 2008 they spent well over $350 million in this area (Gusset and Dick, 2011). This funding goes towards projects all around the world that work to save natural habitats, assist in breeding

endangered animals, and protect the environment and its inhabitants. Through this, WAZA members directly make an impact that reaches far beyond their gates.

Furthermore, they help with these efforts by carrying out their own research and conservation programs. One type of program that WAZA-accredited zoos conduct is captive breeding. This is crucial in saving threatened species that are facing too much habitat destruction to breed in the wild (Conde et al, 2011). In these situations, the animals are unable to find mates due to the urbanization of their habitats and are facing new threats as foreign species are introduced to the ecosystem. However, animals do not face these same challenges in captivity and are able to reproduce, preventing the species from going extinct.

The goal of many captive breeding initiatives is to be able to maintain these populations and eventually release them back into the wild. However, this stage is not always successful. Although current zoos are large players in protecting and preserving the natural world, their design is still not ideal for the animals held within them. The Nature-Centered approach will include captive breeding programs and will educate the public on these practices.

It will enhance the benefits of the modern zoo, while simultaneously addressing the current issues.

This section not only demonstrates the ways in which this new approach magnifies the benefits of zoos, but also addresses why we should not abolish them. If zoos were eliminated completely, the public would not be as invested in animal conservation or welfare (Safina, 2018).

The studies above show the importance of seeing these creatures in order to feel connected to them; without that, the public would become distanced from this issue.

This may seem like an unsubstantiated claim, but consider how this is already true in the meat industry. Even though many people know about the cruel conditions animals are put in when they are raised to become food for humans, they continue to eat meat. Part of the reason is due to the fact that they do not see these creatures or conditions firsthand. Zoos allow people to see endangered animals in person. Witnessing these creatures first hand creates more compassion towards saving them (Safina, 2018). Without zoos, the general public could become too separated from the issue to continue supporting conservation efforts. Thus, zoos must not be eliminated.

CURRENT SUGGESTIONS Many changes have been proposed to enhance animal welfare in zoos, but none are as complete as the Nature-Centered approach. As stated above, a zoo designed according to this approach would include larger enclosures, a greater sense of privacy, a more naturalistic design, and better enrichment opportunities. There are multiple ways in which zoos can be reimagined to meet these requirements. In the examples below, a range of current possible solutions will be provided. Although all

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 of them are improvements over the current design, they are not as complete as the Nature-Centered approach.

The Philadelphia Zoo, for example, created a network of elevated walkways that the animals could use to explore all parts of the property (Chutchawanjumrut, 2015). Through this, they were given more space to walk and be active. They also get to explore different areas and choose where to go, causing mental stimulation. Finally, they are above visitors at many points which could cause them to feel less viewed and they have the ability to walk away if they are feeling stressed. Thus, the simple addition of pathways gave the animals a much better quality of life. Although this is a good option, it is not as natural as the Nature-Centered approach. The animals may be able to explore, but they are limited to caged pathways, as opposed to the open park I suggest. This option also only minorly improves enrichment, as it does not require the expansive options the Nature-Centered approach does.

The park proposed by Thorfun Chutchawanjumrut in “The Zoological Paradox” requires an even more radical shift. His goal is to not only improve the animals’ conditions but also make it a more interactive experience for humans. His suggestions for this include a wolf exhibit where the humans can race the wolves.4 This would give the wolves some exercise, which can be hard in the small enclosures of current zoos, and provides them enrichment. Another part of Chutchawanjumrut’s proposal is a lynx exhibit where every week the visitors shift the paths available to the lynx so that the animals are able to explore a new area and the visitors get to be directly involved. By providing a variety of experiences to the lynx, they will remain curious and mentally stimulated.

They will also be given more room to move about.

Although this project has not officially been accepted or built yet, it provides a great example of innovative ways in which zoos can be changed to benefit the animals. It also shows that making the zoos more animal-focused does not have to compromise the experience of the viewers.

Still, it is not a very naturalistic design. The enrichment opportunities would mainly be made with metals and the animals are not able to hide from visitors. Furthermore, while interaction with visitors can be beneficial for the animals, this is only true under specific, controlled conditions (Learmonth, 2020). So, there would have to be research conducted to see if these interactions would be good for the animals or not, as their welfare is the top priority. Moreover, the proposed exhibits are specific for each species. Thus, for each animal added, a new exhibit would have to be designed and new research would have to be done to see if that interaction benefitted the animal.

This makes it a very inefficient and costly change. The Nature-Centered approach allows for the visitors to see

11 the animals performing natural behaviors without directly interacting with them. Therefore, costly research would not be needed. The Nature-Centered Approach is also much more versatile as its enclosure is geared towards ecosystems, rather than individual species.

The final example, which addresses all four standards, is Denmark’s Zootopia. It is currently being redesigned so that there will be no animal cages at all. The park will be divided into three continents and the visitors will explore them in reflective pods. In Asia they will float along a river; in Africa, they will bike through the plains; in America, they will fly on a lift above the animals (“Zoo,” n.d.). The aim of these pods is two-part. They both allow visitors to get close to the animals without limiting the animals’ space and they are made reflective with the goal of minimizing awareness of the animals that they are being watched. For animals where these pods do not provide enough safety, such as with lions, the observation stations will be hidden within hills, behind bamboo, or within stacks of lumber (“Zoo,” n.d.). These designs are aimed at preventing stress to the animals caused by being watched. In this project, animals will be able to live in a more natural environment that includes interaction with other species and excludes metal bars. They will be able to have a greater variety of experiences, which will help with stimulation, and not be aware of their viewers. However, the level of enrichment provided by this model is only slightly greater than current designs. Providing more natural opportunities for the animals to problem-solve would enhance this option. Furthermore, there are no guides in this proposal.

The visitors are able to see the animals, but they are not being told about the importance of conserving them or how the zoo aids these efforts, as they would be in the Nature-Centered approach. So, while this solution greatly reduces the problems of current zoos, it does not necessarily enhance their benefits towards conservation.

This is why the Nature-Centered approach is needed.

CONCLUSION Animals have been held in captivity for centuries, but only recently have their interests been considered. With the growth of animal rights movements and concern for conservation, zoos have started to raise their standards of care. This has been greatly assisted by the creation of organizations such as WAZA and AZA. Currently, zoos accredited by these organizations benefit conservation efforts and provide a higher quality of life than is required by governmental laws alone. They also require enrichment to be provided for the animals, which helps maintain their psychological well-being and prevent zoochosis.

Nevertheless, zoos still put the visitors’ needs above the

4 The animals will have a track to run on between their dens and the visitors can race them on a bike from the other side of a wall that provides both visibility and protection (Chutchawanjumru, 2015).

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animals. This leads to small enclosures with no hiding places so that the animals can be viewed at all times.

Furthermore, zoos that are not accredited continue to neglect the psychological needs of their inhabitants. The priorities need to be shifted so that a zoo’s animals are considered before its visitors. The main aspects that need to be improved are the size of exhibits, the privacy of the animals, the extent to which nature is replicated, and the enrichment provided. It is also crucial that an emphasis is put on conservation education so that these institutions benefit the species as a whole. There are infinite ways in which a zoo can do this, as can be seen in the variety of examples given. Whether it is the simple addition of fish to a pond or a complete reinvention where no cages exist, these changes benefit the animals. However, many of these do not improve every aspect. Therefore, I propose the Nature-Centered approach. Zoos would be run similar to the safari style, but restricted to only species from similar climates. They must also focus on creating habitats and providing enrichments that are more naturalistic. In addition, conservation must be heavily focused on in the tours. This will enhance all four of the stated objectives. Happier, more active animals also lead to more enjoyment by the visitors, which causes them to increase their investment in conservation efforts.

Therefore, by emphasizing the animals’ needs, the visitors and the natural world in general benefit as well. Thus, zoos should be redesigned through the Nature-Centered approach to enhance current benefits while minimizing detrimental effects.

REFERENCES 1.

Bradshaw, I. G. 2004. Not by Bread Alone: Symbolic Loss, Trauma, and Recovery in Elephant Communities.

Society and Animals 12(2): 143-158. Bradshaw, I. G. 2004. Not by Bread Alone: Symbolic Loss, Trauma, and Recovery in Elephant Communities. Society and Animals 12(2): 143-158.

2.

Browning, H. 2018. No Room at the Zoo: Management Euthanasia and Animal Welfare. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31: 483-498.

3. Chutchawanjumrut, T. 2015. The Zoological Paradox.

Architecture Senior Theses 424.

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Conde, D., et al. 2011. An Emerging Role of Zoos to Conserve Biodiversity. Science 331(6023): 1390-1391.

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Elias, A. 2015. “Zoos and camouflage.” In Camouflage cultures: beyond the art of disappearance, edited

by E. Ann, H. Ross, and T. Nicholas, 33-46. Australia: Sydney University Press.

6. Falk, J. H., et al. 2007. Why zoos and aquariums matter: assessing the impact of a visit to a zoo or aquarium.

Silver Spring, MD: Association of Zoos and Aquariums.

7.

Foster, K. P. 1999. The Earliest Zoos and Gardens.

Scientific American 281(1): 64-71.

8. Grazian, D. 2012. Where the Wild Things Aren’t: Exhibiting Nature in American Zoos. The Sociological Quarterly 53(4): 546-65.

9. Grech, K. S. 2004. Detailed discussion of the laws affecting zoos. Michigan State University College of Law: Animal Legal and Historical Center.

10. Gusset, M., and G. Dick. 2011. The Global Reach of Zoos and Aquariums in Visitor Numbers and Conservation Expenditures. Zoo Biology 30(5): 566-569.

11. Hacker, C. E., and L. J. Miller. 2016. Zoo Visitor Perceptions, Attitudes, and Conservation Intent After Viewing African Elephants at the San Diego Zoo Safari Park. Zoo Biology 35(4): 355-361.

12. Kant, I. 1997. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

13. Learmonth, M. J. 2020. Human–Animal Interactions in Zoos: What Can Compassionate Conservation, Conservation Welfare and Duty of Care Tell Us about the Ethics of Interacting, and Avoiding Unintended Consequences? Animals 10(11): 2037.

14. Marris, E. “Modern zoos are not worth the moral cost.” New York Times, June 1 15. Maulana, R. 2018. Architecture for Animals: The

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Expanding Challenges of Sustainable Development. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 195.

16. Maulana, R., J. M. Gawi and S. W. Utomo. 2020. 3. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 426.

17. Mill, J. S. 1882. Utilitarianism. London, UK: London Green and Co. 18. Miller, B., et al. 2004. Evaluating the Conservation Mission of Zoos, Aquariums, Botanical Gardens, and Natural History Museums. Conservation Biology 18(1): 86-93.Ryabov, V. A. 2016.

19. The Study of Acoustic Signals and the Supposed Spoken Language of the Dolphins. St. Petersburg Polytechnical University Journal: Physics and Mathematics 2(3): 231-239.

20. Safina, C. 2018. Where Are Zoos Going—or Are They Gone? Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 21(1): 4-11.

21. Tait, P. 2016. “Ferocious lion acts.” In Fighting nature: travelling menageries, animal acts and war shows, 1-36.

Australia: Sydney University Press.

22. “WAZA code of ethics and animal welfare.” World Association of Zoos and Aquariums, November.

23. “Zoo.” Bjarke Ingels Group, accessed April 10.

About the Author Talbot is a sophomore from Milwaukee, Wisconsin majoring in Biological Sciences with a concentration in Ecology, Evolution and Environment.

Her research interests are in zoology, specifically animal well-being, human-animal relations and conservation efforts. She is a member of the Global Bachelor’s Program and is currently studying in Santiago, Chile. She is also part of the University’s Honors Program.

Mentor Details

Dr. Eyal Aviv is an Assistant Professor of Religion at the GW Columbian College of Arts and Sciences and the Honors Program. His main areas of study include Buddhist philosophy and intellectual history. His recent book is titled, “Telling Pearls from Fish-Eyes: Ouyang Jingwu and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism,” that discusses how Indian Buddhist philosophy impacted the creation of modern Chinese Buddhism.

14 KEYWORDS: Rembrandt, classics, Lucretia, Callisto, art history DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).07

Rembrandt: Seeking Closure in Classical Narratives PARKER BLACKWELL ARCHAEOLOGY & CLASSICAL and ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN STUDIES, CCAS ‘23, pblackwell33@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT In many of Rembrandt’s depictions of mythical themes, he humanized the fantastical. Through realism and austere symbology, Rembrandt innovated classical narratives. Three of Rembrandt’s late works highlight the apex of his study of the complex emotion underlying the mythical characters of Lucretia and Callisto. Both women were rape victims immortalized in moments of shame. Rembrandt’s model for Woman Bathing in a Stream, housed at the National Gallery in London, may have been his mistress, Hendrickje Stoffels, who was ostracized by society for unchaste acts. Thus, sexual shaming was a topic that interested Rembrandt both artistically and personally. This paper will draw on previous scholarship to explore Rembrandt’s inspiration for and manipulation of classical narratives. Moreover, it will consider how Rembrandt’s deeply emotional depictions of women echo the struggles pervading his personal life at the time of their creation.

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INTRODUCTION Myths are distillations of universal themes. As they age, myths take on complex personalities and carry immense pathological and rhetorical weight.

Artists often experimented with mythological themes throughout history. Although universality defines classical narrative, the spirits of myths often became lost in translation. Through time and space, classical myths, transmitted in oil rather than words, took on distinctly new meanings in 16th and 17th-century Northern Europe. Paintings of classical subjects in the Baroque period were primarily used to send moralizing messages and glorify individuals, regions, or even ideologies (Blankert & Slujite, 1980, p. 56).

While the archetypal nature of myths makes them effective vehicles for a range of themes, mythic iconography can also fall into monotonous patterns.

When this occurs, myths lose their dimensionality; characters in them become objects instead of people.

Worse still, repetitive interpretations of a myth form an echo chamber, capable of intensifying both positive and negative rhetoric. Baroque paintings of mythological subjects, especially, are some of the most telling of the artists and societies in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Of the old masters in the Baroque period, Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-1669) is one of the most celebrated because of his technical skill and innovative renditions of mythological themes. While Rembrandt also utilized mythic themes to convey nuanced messages and reflect his patrons’ values, he

often went one step further. Rembrandt imbued his paintings with emotion by inserting his own values and life experiences into subtle details throughout his work. The resulting paintings contain unusually complex, authentic characters.

Three of Rembrandt’s late works highlight the pinnacle of his pathological survey of mythological subjects. Inspired by the works of his contemporaries, his personal life, and the myths themselves, Rembrandt wrought masterful portraits of Lucretia and Callisto in Woman Bathing in a Stream (1654), Lucretia (1664), and Lucretia (1666). Both Callisto and

FIGURE 1. “A Woman Bathing in a Stream (Callisto in the Wilderness)” by Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 1654.

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FIGURE 2. “Lucretia” by Rembrandt Harmenszoon van

FIGURE 3. “Lucretia” by Rembrandt Harmenszoon van

Lucretia are historical victims of rape used as cautionary tales for the unchaste (Fig. 1-3).

Over time, these women became collateral damage to a social narrative. Artists highlighted their characteristics that fit a moralizing story and discarded the rest. Unlike his contemporaries, Rembrandt depicted Lucretia and Callisto as more than just objects of shame. One reason for Rembrandt’s inspired approach is that Lucretia and Callisto’s characters reminded the artist of his personal struggles. Rembrandt’s model for Woman Bathing in a Stream, housed at the National Gallery in London, may have been Rembrandt’s mistress, Hendrickje Stoffels.

Like Callisto, Stoffels was ostracized by society for her promiscuity. Rembrandt’s personal experience and artful approach recovered myths lost in translation and breathed renewed life into beloved classical narratives.

into the present, he also experimented with tone and emotional drama in his art. Thus, Rembrandt’s paintings are compelling, both visually and psychologically. In his classical paintings, Rembrandt drew heavily on personal experience and challenged typical ways in which artists depicted mythological subjects.

Where many Baroque artists at this time embellished mythological illustrations, Rembrandt revolutionized them. Rembrandt omitted classical iconography, applied experimental Baroque lighting, and emphasized each myth’s peripeteia, or climax. At times, these experiments yielded startling effects. Consider, for example, The Abduction of Ganymede, where Rembrandt merged the classical myth of Jupiter’s abduction of Ganymede with modern dress and unflattering realism to strange and comical effect (Fig. 4) (Russell, 1997, p. 5)

Rijn, 1664.

Rijn, 1666.

BREAKING THE MOLD Early in the 17th century, the source material for illustrations of myth was limited to a small set of illustrated copies of Ovid’s Metamorphosis. Baroque paintings of classical myths fell into a monotonous repetition of archetypes. While the Renaissance masters took on myths with fresh eyes, overwhelmingly, Baroque artists approached myths with a singular understanding. Although stylistically, depictions of myths varied, substantively, they remained the same. Baroque depictions of myth became sensationalized, preoccupied with the image rather than the narrative. As a result, mythological depictions in the Baroque period lacked sincere emotional nuance.

With each copied illustration, mythological characters became, at best, misunderstood, and worst, hollow.

Like his contemporaries, Rembrandt adopted many Baroque techniques in his depictions of myth. However, to bring the emotional implications of antique narratives

FIGURE 4. “The Abduction of Ganymede” by Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 1635.

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A practiced eye might appreciate how Rembrandt’s innovative interpretation of the narrative sought to draw the human from the myth. By humanizing Ganymede’s mythic beauty, Rembrandt made the character relatable.

Rembrandt diminished omnipotent gods to men, accessible in their imperfection. Equally impressive, Rembrandt uplifted characters that other artists satirized and turned them into multidimensional individuals, worthy of our compassion.

Rembrandt’s applications of the Baroque style in classical narratives culminated in three poignant masterpieces full of emotional drama: Woman Bathing in a Stream (1654), Lucretia (1664), and Lucretia (1666).

By the mid-17th century, when these were painted, these subjects had become emblems of shame. Renditions of Callisto’s suffering warned against lustful temptation, and those of Lucretia detailed the ideal woman as one who would die rather than dishonor her name. By this period, Callisto and Lucretia were no longer heroes or victims in their own stories but objects to be scorned, avoided, or desired. This reduction robbed these characters of their dimension and relatability. Despite the norm, Rembrandt took measures to reimagine Lucretia and Callisto as more than collateral damage in a cautionary tale.

According to the Roman historian Livy, Lucretia was the wife of the Roman Consul Tarquinius Collatinus (Donaldson, 1982, p. 3-5). One night, the Roman Emperor’s son Tarquin became incensed by his desire for Lucretia and forced himself upon her. Overcome by the shame of diminishing her family name, Lucretia committed suicide to restore her family’s honor. Witnessing her death, Brutus was inspired to overthrow the tyrannous monarchy and form the Roman Republic. Although a legend, Lucretia

remains the ideal of a dutiful Roman woman to this day.

In the last five years of his life, Rembrandt painted Lucretia twice. He completed his first painting of her in 1664 and followed up with a second in 1666. The pair represent the moments just prior to and following Lucretia’s suicide (Wheelock & Keyes, 1991). In the first painting, Lucretia is regally clad in gold and jewels. She braces herself for the impact of the blade, which she angles at her heart. Her entire body is tensed except for her head, which hangs slightly as she casts her eyes down mournfully at her resolute hand. In the second painting, Lucretia’s form is limp. All tension has moved to one hand, grasping the lone cord supporting her; she is literally hanging by a thread. The dagger is lowered, and blood stains the front of her tunic. Cold darkness fills the space as the gold brocade of Lucretia’s robe falls away, and the only light left to draw the eye reflects off of her wilting form. Lucretia’s tearful eyes have shifted, and in them, we see her reluctance turn slowly into regret.

Rembrandt’s depictions of Lucretia were in sharp contrast to the tone and style of contemporary depictions. Artists over the years exaggerated Lucretia as the ideal Western woman, simultaneously seductive and chaste. Unlike Rembrandt’s rendering, where Lucretia is fully-clothed, the vast majority of Baroque artists, including Caravaggio, Titian, and Lucas Cranach, painted Lucretia in the nude (Willis, 2000, p. 51). In Ovid’s telling of the myth, “[Lucretia’s] last thought was to wrap clothes about herself modestly as she fell” (Donaldson, 1982, p.

14). However, most artists likely learned about the myth of Lucretia through art, not literature, causing a change in the narrative. Influenced by famous works like Titian’s Tarquin and Lucretia (Fig. 5), depicting Lucretia nude became standard. Thus, Lucretia was transformed from a heroine to a pretext for a female nude. Lucretia’s

FIGURE 5. “Tarquin and Lucretia” by Titian, 1571.

FIGURE 6. “Lucretia” by Crispin de Passe the Elder, 1599.

LUCRETIA

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 nakedness ultimately detracts from her traditional exemplification of pudicitia, or sexual chastity. Consider Titian’s Tarquin and Lucretia, wherein the assaulter, Tarquin, is fully clothed and the unsuspecting victim, Lucretia, is nude. Exposed and powerless, Lucretia becomes a victim instead of an agent in her own story.

Contrary to the myth’s original message, Lucretia is needlessly demeaned and sexualized in art. Today, discourse around Lucretia disgracefully highlights the cleverly “penetrating” nature of the knife with which Lucretia kills herself (Donaldson, 1982, p. 17).

Unfortunately, given depictions such as Crispin the Elder’s near-pornographic engraving of Lucretia, such dialogue seems appropriate to the subject (Fig. 6) (Veldman, 1986, p. 124). Like many others, Crispin’s engraving is a copy of a copy, exaggerated and satirized with each iteration. In these copies, the original myth is lost, and so is Lucretia’s dignity. Thus, countless artists cheapened the honor Lucretia earned with her sacrifice. Instead, Lucretia came to represent the shame forced upon her.

Shame robs people of their humanity, and over time, that is precisely what happened to Lucretia. History forgot the depth and complexity of her strife, and with it, her heroism. Martha Hollander remarks that Lucretia was a famous subject in art “because of her shame rather than for her noble gesture” (2003, p. 1333). Hollander continues to say that in art and life, “the basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen” (2001, p.

1328). Common depictions of Lucretia were devoid of introspection because, in them, Lucretia was an object to be viewed instead of a person with whom to empathize.

In the 17th century, Lucretia was often a subject in pittura infamanta, a literal “shaming pictures” (Hollander, 2003, p. 1329). Even in Rembrandt’s renditions, the Lucretia is situated in stage-like compositions. Bed drapes echo stage curtains, and chiaroscuro, juxtaposed highlights and shadows, doubles as a spotlight, exposing the accused. Lucretia is the entertainment, and her shame is the only act. Rendered this way, her sacrifice becomes a warning instead of an inspiration. Nevertheless, for centuries, women have been left considering Lucretia shown as the perfect woman: sexual yet chaste, weak yet unflinching. Given this model, some viewers may be frightened into passivity. Others may look at Lucretia and see their own shame cruelly cast back at them. Therefore, Baroque depictions of Lucretia rob women of all periods of authentic female empowerment.

Even in light of the shameful staging of Rembrandt’s Lucretia paintings, he portrayed her with unparalleled dimensionality. Unlike his predecessors, who often minimized Lucretia’s agency, Rembrandt emphasized Lucretia’s introspection by centering the source material.

In his paintings, Rembrandt diverged from the narrative that honor is Lucretia’s sole motivator. Instead, he transformed Lucretia’s shame into humanizing guilt. In this case, Lucretia’s guilt encompasses the “psychological

17 factors of shock, depression, and humiliation that might lead a woman to suicide.” As such, Rembrandt made Lucretia a multifaceted individual (Donaldson, 1982, p.

23). Her inner conflict writhes just below the surface as self-preservation wars with duty. Her sacrifice is made more impressive by her struggle, and her humanity inspires rather than intimidates. Rembrandt’s attention to Lucretia’s deep psychological tension resulted in two paintings that empower women instead of shame them.

CALLISTO Callisto features both in Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Fasti. In the myth, Callisto begins as Diana’s favorite huntress. The story opens with Callisto taking an oath of sisterly chastity, but not long after, Jupiter comes upon Callisto and, disguised as Diana, rapes her (Ovid, 1931, p.

155). Subsequently, when Callisto hesitates to bathe with Diana and the other nymphs, the Virgin Goddess orders the nymphs to strip her. When Callisto’s pregnancy and betrayal are revealed in turn, Diana exiles her. After Callisto carries her baby to term, Jupiter’s vengeful wife Hera transforms Callisto into a bear. From Callisto’s perspective, Ovid details years spent in fear as she is hunted across her homeland (Ovid, 1916, p. 475). Callisto remains this way until, in a moment of misfortune, her son Arcas comes upon Callisto while hunting. In a moment of pity, Jupiter spares Callisto, immortalizing her as the constellation Ursa Major.

As with Lucretia, Rembrandt painted Callisto twice. He first depicted her in Diana Bathing with her Nymphs with Actaeon and Callisto (1634) in a dual scene conveying the danger of succumbing to temptations (Fig. 7) (Blankert & Slujiter, 1980, p. 58). Several years later, Rembrandt revisited the topic of Callisto in Woman Bathing in a Stream, alternatively titled Callisto in the Wilderness.

FIGURE 7. “Diana Bathing with her Nymphs, with the

Stories of Actaeon and Callisto” by Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 1634.

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Rembrandt imagines a world where Callisto finds peace after her exile in honor of Stoffel’s suffering.

Alternatively, perhaps it was Stoffel’s strength through her adversity that provoked Rembrandt to rectify Callisto’s story. Tragically, Rembrandt only referred to Stoffels as his wife after her death in 1663 (Willis, 2000, 13).

Following Stoffel’s death, Rembrandt completed two of his most sensitive and intellectual works to date, depicting Lucretia (Tuominen, 2015). Through Rembrandt’s subject matter immediately following Stoffel’s death, we see how Rembrandt himself was struggling to find emotional closure in the face of mortality. It may be that Lucretia’s turmoil and guilt reflect some of Rembrandt’s own regret for publicly denouncing Stoffels in her time of need. Alternatively, rendering Stoffels as the heroine of Rome may be a tribute to the struggles Stoffels faced in living up to the 17th-century ideal woman. Like Lucretia, Stoffels met death full of unresolved shame. This is clearly visible in Rembrandt’s 1664 painting of Lucretia. However, as mentioned, Rembrandt ultimately chose to absolve Lucretia of shame in 1666. Therefore, through art, we bear witness to Rembrandt’s pursuit of emotional closure in the last years of his life.

CONCLUSION It is clear that Rembrandt’s depictions of the myths of Callisto and Lucretia reflect sincere efforts to evaluate myths for their universal truths. Amidst a sea of superficial copies morphed to fit capricious morals, Rembrandt was original. To extract the person from the myth, Rembrandt had to consider myths in the context of his own life. The products of this reflection are unique interpretations of classical narratives populated by multidimensional, flawed characters. In them, we see every part of ourselves reflected, and in that way, they become real.

FIGURE 11. “Portrait of Hendrickje Stoffels” by

Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 16541656.

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FIGURE 10. “A young woman sleeping (Hendrickje

Stoffels)” by Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 1654.

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34. Wheelock, A.K., and Keyes, G. (1991). Rembrandt’s Lucretias, National Gallery of Art. Exhibition catalogue.

35. Zuffi, S. (2011). Rembrandt. Prestel.

About the Author Parker Blackwell is a rising Senior studying Archaeology, and Classical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies in the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences. Her research interests include the reception of the classical world and cultural heritage preservation. Ms. Blackwell recently completed a Luther Rice Fellowship concerning localized approaches for protecting cultural heritage under threat in the Republic of Cameroon. Ms. Blackwell plans to pursue this study in graduate school following her time at the George Washington University.

Mentor Details

Rachel Pollacks is an Adjunct Professor of Art History and an Instructor of Writing in George Washington’s University Writing Program. She received a MA at the George Washington University and a PhD in Art History from the University of Maryland. Dr. Pollack also holds a research position at the National Gallery of Art with research interests in Baroque fine art.

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KEYWORDS: populism, conspiracy theories, 2020 election, COVID-19 DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).02

Right-Wing Populism in the United States: The Intersection of Conspiracy Theories and Mainstream Political Thought SARAH CORSO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & FRENCH, ESIA ‘21, sarahcorso129@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT

On January 6, 2021, conspiracy theories surrounding the 2020 election and the COVID-19 pandemic culminated in the storming of the U.S. Capitol Building by right-wing insurrectionists. This paper examined the aftermath of those attacks by exploring the correlation between right-wing, national politicians’ rhetoric and the beliefs of individuals from Altoona, Pennsylvania, a small town in the Rust Belt of the United States. To study these phenomena, this paper used a two-pronged methodology of first qualitative social media research of tweets posted by Donald Trump, Marjorie Taylor Greene, Mitch McConnell, and Lindsey Graham, and second a quantitative survey of beliefs of residents of Altoona. The sampled tweets from the weeks before, during, and after the 2020 election, as well as the week of January 6, 2021, revealed trends in the propagation of conspiracy theories around the election and the pandemic, especially in tweets written by populists Trump and Greene. These tweets correlated the propagation of conspiracy theories in tweets and whether these four right-wing politicians were identified as populists. Furthermore, the survey yielded polarizing results that contribute to the current literature about a subset of populist followers who are highly educated and present low levels of trust in the government. Overall, this paper attempts to identify trends in beliefs among one ardent Republican base, and in right-wing populist politicians’ rhetoric, that correlate to a continued intersection of conspiracy theories and mainstream political thought in the United States.

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INTRODUCTION When right-wing militants and election deniers stormed the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, the American public and the world were shocked into a new awareness of a strange underbelly of political thought in our current age of misinformation.

Encouraged by various government officials’ and politicians’ lackluster denials—or outright encouragements—of the existence of fraud in the United States’ 2020 presidential election, right-wing extremists in the U.S. attempted to take the seat of American democracy by force. Many of these people attended the “Save America” rally earlier that day, where former president Donald Trump remarked that protestors should go to the Capitol and “make [their] voices heard” (Naylor, 2021). So deeply do many of these individuals believe that they are not at fault for the events of January 6, that some claim they were not part of the assault on the Capitol building at all. Instead, right-wing pundits have proposed that “Antifa,” the ever-nebulous far leftwing faction, allegedly had undercover members acting as fascists in the rally’s crowds (Grynbaum,

Alba, & Epstein, 2021).

The conspiracy theories whirling around the results of the 2020 election were not the only ones being propagated by individuals in power. Amidst the coronavirus pandemic, the reliability of vaccines has been called into question by former president Donald Trump (Stolberg, 2021), as well as by popular conservative news media personalities such as Tucker Carlson (McCarthy, 2021). As vaccines have become more widely available in the United States, vaccine skepticism continues to cast doubt upon the ability of the American public to effectively combat the virus and its variants (Russonello, 2021). The suggestion that vaccines are ineffective has transformed a public health emergency into a political debate. By using these conspiracy theories and doubts about vaccination to rally the more fervently anti-government members of their voting base, both the Republican Party and former President Trump have successfully established a foundation within the conservative wing of American politics for mistrust of the government. With conspiracy theories about the 2020 election and the pandemic in mind, this paper analyzes the question: How is the

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 rise of conspiracy theories in right-wing populism in the U.S. correlated to their implementation in mainstream politics? This research examines the correlation between populist rhetoric at the highest levels of American politics and conspiratorial thinking within a given population through a mixed methodology of qualitative analysis of tweets by four politicians and quantitative analysis of beliefs of a small city in Pennsylvania.

LITERATURE REVIEW Populism, particularly when employed by conservatives, can be conducive to inspiring conspiratorial thinking in its voting base (Sawyer, 2021; Casarões & Magalhães, 2021, p.

207; Stecula & Pickup, 2021, p. 2). Most recently, American conservative voters’ belief in conspiracy theories has been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic and the Republican loss of the presidential election in 2020.

Contemporary ideas about the correlation between populism and conspiracy theories stem from Richard Hofstadter’s (1979) foundational essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” Due to the similarities in the fundamentals of populism and belief in conspiracy theories, conspiratorial thinking often follows and intersects with populism. This literature review will also examine the scholarship about conspiracy theories in general, with particular focus on theories regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 election.

Populism in the American Right Wing Right-wing populism in the United States is a variation on what historian Richard Hofstadter (1979, p. 3) calls “the paranoid style” of American politics, “because no other word adequately evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy.”

Hofstadter’s description of the paranoid style serves well as a list of characteristics common to the populist right. The government, as an institution, is overlarge and sprawling and must therefore be contained, usually by centralization of authority in a populist politician who speaks for “the people.” Those individuals who control the government at the top constantly betray American national interests (p. 25). Lastly, American civil society, operating especially in the educational, religious, and media spheres, attempts to undermine “real” Americans (p. 26). As Grant (2019) notes, populism has frequently emerged in the United States during periods of uncertainty (p. 478). After the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, populism continued to grow during his time in office, especially in response to the uncertainty caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Populism often offers simple solutions to complex problems, and the pandemic’s extreme complexity did not stop Trump from trying his hand at a populist’s answer early in the pandemic (Casarões & Magalhães, 2021, p. 207).

21 Populist Rhetoric Common themes in populist rhetoric reflect the major characteristics of its general ideology. One of the most frequently emphasized elements of populist rhetoric in the literature is anti-elite sentiment, wherein elites are distrusted as “corrupt” and contemptuous (Sawyer, 2021). In populist rhetoric, it is not uncommon to hear accusations that members of the elite have betrayed the people, although it is never specified who “the people” are (Grant, 2019, p. 477). While both right- and left-wing populism villainize the elite, conservative populists also distrust experts (Stecula & Pickup, 2021, p. 2). This supplementary, anti-intellectual dimension of American populism deems experts as “elites” in terms of knowledge; therefore, any “elite” status in a field of study paradoxically discredits experts in the eyes of populist voters (Casarões & Magalhães, 2021, p. 197). Individuals are instead encouraged to either do their own research, or the populist right creates its own version of science as an alternative to experts’ opinions (Walther & McCoy, 2021, p. 113), which reinforces both Stecula and Pickup (2021) and Casarões and Magalhães (2021)’s claims that experts are highly distrusted by conservative populists.

This facet of populist rhetoric played an essential, detrimental role in the scattered U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic under former President Trump, who frequently contradicted the experts that comprised his own coronavirus task force (Stecula & Pickup, 2021, p. 2). Taking a cue from the recent works of Stecula and Pickup (2021), Walther and McCoy (2021), and Casarões and Magalhães (2021), my research contributes to this conversation by examining how populist distrust of the elite can be interpreted in the context of increased levels of doubt about stances taken by the U.S. government, whether they are about the validity of the 2020 election, the safety of COVID-19 vaccines, or the identity of individuals who stormed the Capitol on January 6.

Hofstadter (1979)’s paranoid-style politician and the contemporary American populist view the United States’ current political situation as utterly catastrophic (p. 29). As Hofstadter (1979) describes, “what is at stake [in American politics] is always a conflict between absolute good and absolute evil,” (p. 31), known in philosophical terms as the Manichaean dichotomy. With the corrupt elite and their supporters on the side of absolute evil and “the people” on the side of absolute good, this divide serves to further polarize populists by framing compromise as a battle lost in favor of the evil elite (Sawyer, 2021). The divisive nature of Manichaeism is a common aspect of populist rhetoric, especially because it refutes all forms of disagreement and discourages deviation from the official party line (Basit, 2021, p. 6).

Another frequent target of populist scorn in rhetoric is mass, mainstream media. Viewed as biased and “fake,” mainstream media is often disdained because it acts as

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a traditional intermediary between a populist leader and “the people.” The preference in modern populist politics to use social media to speak directly to the people constantly engages the leader’s base and reinforces the idea of the populist politician’s direct connection to their supporters. Furthermore, without mainstream media’s interceding role and with the populist base’s deepening distrust of any media that disagrees with their leader, the general public in populism’s thrall is more vulnerable to believing or considering conspiracies (Sawyer, 2021). Basit (2021) adds to this assessment that conspiratorial thinking, in turn, serves as a “multiplier” of the radicalization of individuals (p. 4).

Conspiracy Theories Conspiracy theories (CT) are often intertwined with and correlated to populist politics due to the tendency of CT to implicate an insidious elite and to distrust experts (Stecula & Pickup, 2021, p. 1). One common definition of a conspiracy theory in the literature is “an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role” (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016, p. 825). These authors state that, from the psychological perspective, belief in CT “satisfies the epistemic needs for order, certainty, and control,” and “is correlated with authoritarianism [and] feelings of alienation” (p. 825). In the current age of fake news and alternative facts, Basit (2021) posits that CT are common in the rhetoric and propaganda of violent extremists who hope to lure populists, particularly Trump supporters, to their cause through the use of politicized CT, emphasizing government mistrust as well as a Manichaean perspective (pp. 1-3). While this point of view had very visible implications on January 6, whether conspiratorial thinking and government mistrust are linked to violent extremism is beyond the scope of my research.

In the literature, one area of discussion is the profile of the most likely individual to believe political CT. In a policy brief for the Institute for European Studies, Rios (2020) claims that people “who are the most susceptible to conspiracy theories include those with a basic level of education […] who are socially marginalized or isolated, who feel unsure about their job security…[and] those with low income levels” (p. 3). However, Miller, Saunders, and Farhart (2016) contest this view by finding that “a particular type of person—one who is both highly knowledgeable about politics and lacking in trust— […] is most susceptible to ideologically motivated conspiracy endorsement” (p. 824). According to them, conservative people who know more about politics, rather than those with a basic or low level of education, are more likely to believe in CT that align with their political biases (p. 834).

The political slant of the CT is important for the rightwing populists who believe them because it aligns with

their Manichaean “us vs. them” perspective. I believe that the two profiles of populist followers can and should exist simultaneously, but studies like the one by Miller, Saunders, and Farhart (2016) are much less frequent in the literature and thus should be explored to a greater degree. The conspiracy theories that this paper studies relate to the coronavirus and the 2020 election. The population that I surveyed aligns more closely with the highly educated populist follower than Rios’ (2016) profile.

Coronavirus Pandemic Conspiracy Theories Scholarship about the coronavirus pandemic and the various conspiracies that surround it is somewhat scarce because, at the time this paper is written, the pandemic continues to evolve. Additionally, there is a considerable lack of literature regarding conspiracy theories that make claims about vaccine inefficacy; instead, the CT that have been studied thus far concern either the coronavirus’ origins or the vaccines as a ploy to microchip the population. However, former President Trump’s pandemic response is a subject of study that epitomizes the relationship between populist rhetoric and a global health crisis. Furthermore, the pandemic itself has become an element of radicalization for populists as individuals have substantially increased their online presence out of necessity.

Contemporary populist rhetoric has played a major role in the framing of the pandemic in the U.S. With the advent of “bio-geopolitics” in the wake of COVID-19, disease is now a security threat to every nation (Cole & Dodds, 2021, p. 170). This has led to increased levels of “pandemic nationalism,” wherein people from virus hotspots—such as Wuhan, China, in early 2020—are met with hostile sentiments from host populations (p.

172). Although this is not singular to the United States, the Trumpist, Manichaean sentiment against foreign outsiders feeds into conspiracies about the uncertain origin of the virus, especially given geopolitical tensions between the United States and China as well as the racially tinged perspective of Trumpist populism (Stecula & Pickup, 2021, p. 4). Another CT that has circulated widely during the pandemic is the ID2020 theory, which claims that Bill Gates is capitalizing on the pandemic to implant microchips, considered by some theorists to be the biblical Mark of the Beast, in the population (Thomas & Zhang, 2020, p. 1). QAnon anti-vaccine theories also claim that public health measures are a means of population control, and vaccines and mask mandates are attempts by “liberal politicians…[who are supposedly] members of a deep state cabal of pedophiles” to violate human rights (Walther & McCoy, 2021, p. 113).

Current literature more extensively analyzes the US presidential response to the pandemic. Casarões and Magalhães (2021, p. 199) contribute the idea of medical populism, wherein legitimate science is viewed

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 skeptically by populists to the point where they pioneer “alternative” science that relies heavily on conspiracy theories and data. Using public health crises to boost their political standing, medical populists like Trump undermine experts as populist rhetoric demands while offering simpler solutions to extremely intricate issues, such as hydroxychloroquine as a COVID-19 miracle cure.

Moreover, the circumstances of the pandemic are a radicalizing element because increased online presence has been imperative during periods of quarantine and lockdown, which draws individuals further into conspiratorial echo chambers on the Internet (Walther & McCoy, 2021, p. 113).

2020 Presidential Election—the Big Lie Conspiracy Theory The belief that Donald Trump was the real winner of the 2020 election is a conspiracy theory that the former president himself touted by claiming on Twitter months before the November 2020 election that it was going to be “stolen” and “rigged” if Joe Biden won (Canon & Sherman, 2021, p. 548). One key to this CT was the role of the pandemic and its restrictions on movement during an election year. The pandemic warranted voting by mail in massive numbers; despite the absolute absence of evidence, the former president claimed the election was overrun with voter fraud, even though he himself had voted by mail in the past (p. 550). All other CT and claims about the various types of fraud in the 2020 election were systematically disproven by basic data analysis (p.

548). In addition to the utter lack of voter fraud in the 2020 election, challenges to the election by the Trump legal team and his supporters in courts were tossed out by judges for being “untimely,” “moot,” or lacking sufficient evidence (pp. 572-573). Despite clear evidence to the contrary, the Big Lie CT holds favor with many conservatives who distrust mainstream reporting and the government itself. Indeed, in the months following the events of January 6, 2021, Canon and Sherman (2021) found that 58% of polled Republicans still described the attack as “antifa-inspired” (p. 549). My research contributes to their post-January 6 assessment by asking survey respondents to rate whether they agree that the insurrection was led by Antifa or Trump supporters.

Finally, compared to the number of “bottom-up” studies of conspiracy theories, the literature does not extensively explore the effect of “top-down” communication of CT from populist leaders and paranoidstyle spokespeople to their followers. While populists and conspiracy theorists often abhor the elite, the populist leader frequently becomes or already belongs to this upper echelon while continuing to hold influence with “the people.” The espousal of CT from the “top”—in the cases of the pandemic and the 2020 election, from the President of the United States and from several members

23 of Congress—can in turn make CT part of political elites’ rhetorical arsenal and forge connections between legitimate politicians and the conspiracy theories they either endorse or refuse to deny (Enders & Uscinski, 2020, p. 599). This paper will examine the extent to which mainstream, populist politicians in the U.S. advanced the two conspiracy theories articulated in this literature review, as well as the extent to which one population’s beliefs have been affected in the post-January 6 world.

METHODOLOGY In order to assess the correlation between the rise of right-wing, populist conspiracy theories and the proclivity of voters to believe conspiracy theories, the research was conducted using a mixed methodology.

The primary research method was a survey of citizens of Altoona, a small city of less than 44,000 people in central Pennsylvania, USA, through a quantitative method of analysis. As the major city in Blair County and as part of a community in the Rust Belt, Altoona natives represent a vital core of voters for Trump’s election in 2016 (Tackett, 2019) and are the main voters in a county that voted 71% in favor of Donald Trump in the 2020 election (Summary results report: General election, 2020). This anonymous online survey was intended to reveal numerically the correlation in this community between conspiracy theories promoted by politicians and voters’ political beliefs. Data was collected through the snowball method, wherein respondents shared the survey with others in their social network. I chose this method because it allowed me to reach and survey individuals despite the limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the anonymity of the survey allowed respondents to answer questions about their political beliefs and beliefs in conspiracy theories without fear of being judged or targeted, which several authors note is a concern among conservatives (Daniller, 2021; Inbar & Lammers, 2012, p.

1; Westneat, 2021). However, some potential biases in any study using this method of data collection include sampling bias and an unrepresentative sampling; nonresponse bias; and lack of researcher control. In addition to questions about COVID-19 vaccination status, voting choices in both the 2016 and 2020 national elections, and demographical data, respondents were asked to rate how much they agreed with statements that concerned the 2020 election, COVID-19, and the U.S. government.

Answers to these statements contributed significantly to my research in conspiracy theories in right-wing populism because these topics are, as the survey revealed, contemporary concerns within the population.

The secondary method of research involved qualitative analysis of tweets from traditional and populist rightwing politicians that showed which, if any, conspiracy theories regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 U.S. election were being propagated by right-wing

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American politicians at the national level. Tweets by politicians Donald Trump, Marjorie Taylor Greene, Mitch McConnell, and Lindsey Graham were analyzed. The former two are populists, whereas the latter two are more traditional right-wing politicians. While the first three politicians are highly visible due to either their positions— at the time, President and Senate Majority Leader—or their reactionary tendencies (Nobles, 2021), Lindsey Graham stands out as a politician who, while maintaining center-right positions, has also been able to foster favor with Trump. As Thrush, Becker, and Hakim (2021) detail in their article, Graham has a singular capacity to alter his personal platform based on the direction of public opinion that is most likely to get him reelected.

Comparing these politicians’ public stances on both the pandemic and the 2020 election revealed the extent to which these politicians promoted conspiracy theories to the general public through Twitter. This stage of research was limited to four weeks’ worth of tweets: the weeks of October 25-31, 2020; November 1-7, 2020; November 8-14, 2020; and January 3-9, 2021. During the first week, another wave of coronavirus cases was just beginning to spike; the following two weeks included Election Day on November 3 and its aftermath; and the last was the week of the attack on the U.S. Capitol Building. All of the events in these four weeks were correlated to subjects that have invited conspiracy theories about the pandemic and the election. How these politicians approached the pandemic and the election contributed to my research in right-wing populism and conspiracy theories because the way that politicians address these subjects often has implications for public trust in the government, which Klein and Robison (2020) state is a clear indicator of healthy democracies (p. 47). These authors also explain that social media, which is used by the majority of U.S. adults according to Smith and Anderson (2018), is frequently linked to political polarization in the United States, with individuals being more likely to distrust the government if their peers and “friends” on social media feel similarly and share similar posts (Klein & Robison, 2020, p. 49). Overall, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods first evaluated the correlation between populist rhetoric and the beliefs of a population of right-wing voters through the primary method of a survey. Additionally, these methods assessed the extent of the integration of conspiracy theories into right-wing, mainstream political rhetoric through the secondary method of social media E-research.

RESULTS In order to evaluate the correlation between rightwing populist conspiracy theories and the United States’ mainstream politics, I first conducted a survey of residents of Altoona, Pennsylvania, followed by an examination of tweets by four American politicians over four weeks.

From these two methods, I identified three broad themes: doubts about the 2020 election and COVID-19 vaccines; beliefs of left-wing radicalization; and mistrust in the government. I drew upon the subject matter of the survey statements in order to code the tweets. For initial coding, I identified two broad categories that are linked to the conspiracy theories of interest in this research: the 2020 election and COVID-19. Tweets regarding the 2020 election or voting (and in particular voting by mail) were coded differently from tweets regarding COVID-19 or vaccines. Not every one of the 1,808 tweets that I read was relevant to either of these subject areas; despite this, as the tables in Appendix A show, each of these four politicians tweeted about either the pandemic, the election, or both. The sample tweets in Appendix A were ones that I noted as most relevant to the study and thought best encapsulated the general tone of each politician on these issues.

In these four weeks, the four politicians tweeted from their verified Twitter accounts a total of 1,808 times. Donald Trump tweeted 998 times (Trump Twitter Archive, 2021). Marjorie Taylor Greene, Lindsey Graham, and Mitch McConnell each tweeted 548 times; 149 times, and 113, respectively (Littman, Wrubel, Kerchner, Smith, & Bonnett, 2020). All four politicians tweeted about the election, but only Trump and McConnell tweeted about COVID-19 vaccines. Greene expressed her opinions on masking protocols, whereas Graham did not tweet about COVID-19 at all in the selected four weeks.

In those four weeks, Trump tweeted explicitly about the election over 150 times, the pandemic 30 times, and leftwing radicalization over 25 times. Marjorie Taylor Greene tweeted about the election over 120 times, the pandemic 20 times, and left-wing radicalization over 50 times. The traditional politicians, McConnell and Graham, tweeted about the election a combined 30 times, and McConnell tweeted about the pandemic 16 times. The tweets from the populists contributed explicitly to the first two themes— doubts about the 2020 election and the pandemic, and beliefs of left-wing radicalization—and implicitly to the third theme of mistrust of the government.

One limitation I encountered when viewing the tweets was the fact that many of Trump’s tweets were posts without text and linked a video that had been deleted from Twitter for violating their terms of service, thus rendering it inaccessible. Additionally, the scope of my research was limited to what these politicians were directly stating in their tweets; therefore, the number of tweets that relied on links to other media discussing these topics could have been higher than what I was able to observe.

Over the three weeks that it was live, 86 residents of Altoona, Pennsylvania completed and submitted the survey anonymously. Publicly available demographic data indicates that the survey is representative of the city in

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FIGURE B1. Survey Demographics vs Public Data every aspect except for level of education; the survey respondents were disproportionately more educated than the population of the city, as shown in Figure B1.

With the survey’s subject matter informing the categorization of the tweets, I defined three themes within the research: doubts about the 2020 election and COVID-19 vaccines, beliefs of left-wing radicalization, and an overarching sense of mistrust in the government.

It is important to note differences between the tweets’ discussion of vaccines and the pandemic compared to survey responses, especially because the timings and contexts of each are different. The analyzed tweets were all posted before or amid the January 6 storming of the Capitol, whereas the survey responses were submitted several months after the events of January 6, 2021.

DISCUSSION The results from this research have implications for the intersection of right-wing populist conspiracy theories and mainstream politics in the United States. Survey data revealed clear trends toward belief in the conspiracies that this research focused on, particularly among the educated population of Altoona, PA. In addition, initial analysis of tweets by conservative politicians revealed that populist politicians—in this case, Donald Trump and Marjorie Taylor Greene—were easy to distinguish from traditional politicians due to the volume of their tweets. As the literature review stated, populists prefer to eliminate any sort of intermediary between themselves and the people. This tendency makes them much more likely to

resort to social media such as Twitter to amplify their message, rather than a traditional media press conference.

This was the initial marked difference between populists Trump and Greene and traditional, career politicians McConnell and Graham, who tweeted much less often.

Because of their infrequency in tweeting, I operated on the assumption that if the traditional politicians tweeted about something, it was significant. In this context, contemporary CT propagated by populists about the integrity of the 2020 election and the effectiveness or safety of American COVID-19 vaccines have been correlated to beliefs about left-wing radicalization and sentiments of mistrust in the government among the surveyed population.

Doubts about the 2020 Election and COVID-19 Vaccines While the literature review showed that there are conspiracy theories about many different subject areas, this research focused on the conspiracy theories regarding the results of the 2020 U.S. election and the development of American vaccines against COVID-19.

Trump and Greene tended to strongly and frequently express agreement with theories that the 2020 presidential election was “stolen” from Trump or that the results were “fraudulent.” Former president Trump tweeted about the potential for voter fraud from voting by mail before, during, and after the election, stating that mail-in ballots are the cause of “big problems and discrepancies” (see Table A1).

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Marjorie Taylor Greene echoed these sentiments in her tweets, citing “voter fraud” and casting doubt on election integrity (see Table A3). In comparison, many survey respondents—50 of the 86 surveyed (58%)— expressed agreement that Trump won the 2020 election (see Figure B2), and 71% of them (61 respondents) agreed that voting by mail was a major cause of voter fraud (see Figure B3). There is a correlation between the percentage of respondents who identified themselves as “conservative”—75%—and that of those who believed that voting by mail caused voter fraud in the United States.

These responses are correlated to frequent instances of populist rhetoric among conservative politicians advancing a conspiracy theory about the reliability of voting by mail, and it reflects previous research in the literature that conservative individuals are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories.

The statement regarding voting by mail produced one of the strongest reactions from respondents in the survey overall. As highlighted in the literature review, Donald Trump propagated the conspiracy theory that voting by mail was a major cause of voter fraud in the United States, despite numerous studies that presented evidence to the contrary. Additionally, other populists such as Marjorie Taylor Greene reiterated and amplified his claims on Twitter. The high level of agreement with this conspiracy theory among survey respondents is correlated with the power of populist leaders in influencing their supporters.

Furthermore, the fact that Lindsey Graham and Mitch McConnell, two traditional, career politicians, opted to “listen closely to” those who were “challenging the results of [the 2020] election” has implications for right-wing populism’s impact on mainstream political rhetoric (see Table A5). Conspiracy theories supported by populists can no longer be dismissed outright by traditional politicians in order to maintain their voter base; by deigning to entertain baseless claims of voter fraud in the 2020 election, career politicians have legitimized populists and their often extreme platforms. While my research contributes mainly to scholarship about the correlation between politicians’ statements and voters’ beliefs, future studies could focus on additional directional flows of influence, including the influence of voters on politicians or the cycle wherein voters influence politicians’ stances, which influence voters’ beliefs, which in turn influence politicians’ stances, etc.

In the weeks that I examined, no tweets by any of the four politicians mentioned the vaccines in anything less than a positive manner. Marjorie Taylor Greene and Lindsey Graham—a populist and a traditional politician, respectively—did not mention the vaccines at all in those four weeks. Instead, Greene expressed her distaste for masks (see Table A4), which she considered a form of oppression, whereas Graham never tweeted about COVID-19 in those weeks. Mitch McConnell and Donald Trump both tweeted optimistically about the progress on

vaccines, and McConnell stated frankly that the news of a “COVID-19 vaccine was incredibly promising. All of us have to keep up commonsense [sic] precautions in the meantime. The virus is spreading quickly…and it doesn’t care whether we’ve gotten bored with wearing masks or social distancing” (see Table A6). These positive or neutral outlooks on the vaccines align with my survey results, wherein 58 respondents (67%) agreed that “vaccines save lives” (see Figure B4).

Although he tweeted frequently about the vaccine progress in the weeks that I reviewed, Trump also claimed that real or potential delays to the vaccines were—or would be—because of many different actors besides himself, including “Fake News,” Joe Biden, and the FDA. However, in the weeks that I reviewed, he did not tweet anything that would cast doubt on the vaccines’ effectiveness under his administration. In fact, days after the election, he proudly announced, “STOCK MARKET UP BIG, VACCINE COMING SOON. REPORT 90% EFFECTIVE. SUCH GREAT NEWS!” (see Table A2). This is an area where my hypothesis was not confirmed—the majority of individuals surveyed were not skeptical that vaccines save lives. This is a limitation of my methodology: By focusing on four specific weeks at key moments in 2020 and 2021, rhetoric that disparaged the vaccines could have been missed. While Trump was claiming credit for the vaccines for political leverage during the chosen weeks, his usual encouragement of mistrust in the government did not work in his favor, particularly because, even as he touted the vaccine’s effectiveness, he was more fervently pushing the “Big Lie” about the 2020 election.

Beliefs of Left-Wing Radicalization The conspiracy theories propagated on Twitter by populist politicians often included a designated instigator, and for right-wing populists Trump and Greene, the political enemies with whom they rested blame for either questionable election integrity or vaccine delays were all liberal entities and/or had ties to the U.S. government.

Donald Trump characterized the Democratic party as an organization of “Marxists, Socialists, Rioters, FlagBurners, and Left-wing Extremists,” and he stated that Joe Biden in particular was “the candidate of rioters, looters, arsonists, gun-grabbers, flag-burners, Marxists, lobbyists, and special interests” (see Table A1). Marjorie Taylor Greene echoed these sentiments in her tweets, stating that “Antifa and BLM aren’t being funded to riot anymore since they think @JoeBiden won” (see Table A3).

This characterization of the left-wing as increasingly radicalized had repercussions in the survey, wherein 45 respondents (52%) expressed agreement that Antifa had stormed the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, and another 14 (16.3%) were not sure or had no opinion (see Figure B5). Similarly, when asked to what extent they agreed that Trump supporters had stormed the

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FIGURE B6. “The January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol

Building was carried out by TRUMP SUPPORTERS and other right-wing groups.”

Capitol, 28 respondents (33%) “strongly disagreed,” with another 33 respondents (38%) either expressing some disagreement or being unsure, as shown in Figure B6.

The responses to these corresponding questions showed a correlation between the Manichaean, “us and them” populist mentality and the ease with which Trump was able to push the conspiracy theory that Antifa attacked the Capitol Building. As the literature review discussed, populist rhetoric casts the “enemy” as inherently evil. Because they know that they are not inherently evil, survey respondents were unable to see themselves or their peers in the individuals who attacked the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021. Instead, in the context of the survey, they deflected their disgust for the events that occurred at the Capitol on the nebulous group that they believe has infiltrated liberal political bodies, the government, and even, in the case of January 6, right-wing political movements: Antifa.

Mistrust in the Government As the literature review revealed, conspiracy theories that concern the government rely upon believers’ mistrust in that institution. While Donald Trump and Marjorie Taylor Greene’s tweets casted blame upon various actors with links to the federal government, they did not directly state that the government itself was at fault for the integrity of the 2020 election or the progress of COVID-19 vaccine developments. Instead, this overarching element of belief in conspiracy theories that concern the government was witnessed in the survey.

When asked to express how much they agreed with the statement, “I trust the U.S. government,” 71 respondents (83%) either disagreed with it or were unsure. Of this number, 30 respondents (35% of those surveyed) strongly disagreed with the statement, as shown in Figure B7.

These results reveal a significant plausible reason for respondents’ lack of trust in official election results and in the effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccines: mistrust in the government. Distrust of government is frequently correlated with populist sentiment, so this final statement of the survey also could correlate to the extent of populism’s potential reach into a local population in the Rust Belt.

The survey, while representative of Altoona, Pennsylvania’s population in most respects, had a disproportionately large number of highly educated respondents in comparison to the population of the city as a whole. The fact that the results of the survey still trended toward strong sentiments in favor of populist ideas speaks to a conflicting area of interest in the literature: the profile of the populist follower. While some contributors to the literature such as Rios (2020) claim that the average populist follower has only a basic level of education, the results of this survey lend credence to other works within the literature, such as the study

by Miller, Saunders, and Farhart (2016). As they note, an individual who is likely to believe in conspiracy theories has a high level of knowledge and a low level of trust; my survey captured the views of individuals who fit

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that profile. However, that is not to say that all populist followers are highly educated; both profiles of populist followers can and do coexist in the literature. Further study could be conducted into whether level of education or level of trust plays a larger role in belief in conspiracy theories and in tendency to follow populist politicians.

Another opportunity for future research could involve surveying a larger population—the survey that I conducted fell short in the measurement of education because my surveyed population was disproportionately more educated than census data shows is average of the town. Having a truly representative survey of Altoona, Pennsylvania would be worthy of further study especially because of its stance as a small city in the Rust Belt and in a swing state. Additionally, other weeks’ tweets by the same politicians could be analyzed in future research.

The weeks I selected emphasized the 2020 election to a greater extent than they did the COVID-19 pandemic, so the pandemic was relegated to a correlating factor to the issues surrounding the election, rather than the subject of a series of conspiracy theories on its own. Additional studies in social media E-research could examine other weeks within the pandemic during the Trump presidency.

Because the pandemic continues to evolve even as of this paper’s writing, more contemporary data in terms of public belief in pandemic-related conspiracies can be drawn from future surveys.

CONCLUSION This research paper explored the question, “How is the

rise of conspiracy theories in right-wing populism in the U.S. correlated to their implementation in mainstream politics?” Through a mixed methodology of qualitative analysis of tweets by four national-level politicians and quantitative analysis of beliefs of a small city in Pennsylvania, this research has offered new perspectives on the diffusion of populist rhetoric and its correlation to conspiratorial thinking within a given population.

Taking Altoona, Pennsylvania as a case study, it appears that populist beliefs and opinions espoused by party leaders impacted respondents’ beliefs in the coronavirus pandemic and Big Lie conspiracy theories. Furthermore, the tweets that were analyzed have not been explored in depth in other literature thus far, due to how recently they were posted. This paper contributes to the academic conversation by identifying social media posts from important, defining weeks in American history that future researchers can easily access for further analysis.

This paper posits that for as long as there is extensive mistrust in the government among the general public, populism will remain a strong force in American politics.

When populists promote conspiracy theories about political issues, they pressure traditional politicians into legitimizing their claims by considering them in the first place. For this reason, my research will remain relevant for as long as there is a mix of traditional and populist politicians in public office. However, several important questions are unanswered that are beyond the scope of this paper: Will traditional politicians, both liberal and conservative, someday be eclipsed by their more

FIGURE B7. “I trust in the U.S. government.”

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 radicalized counterparts? How well will radical politicians be received by their voting base in the future, and how far will public support stretch when their conspiracy theories inevitably break down? The events of January 6, 2021,

29 loom large as a grim reminder of the fragility of liberal democracy in the world; more than ever, finding common ground in spite of political differences is essential to the continued health and strength of American democracy.

APPENDIX A: SAMPLING OF TWEETS Table A1: Sampling of Tweets by Donald Trump about the 2020 Election Date

Tweet by @RealDonaldTrump

10/26/2020, “Big problems and discrepancies with Mail In Ballots all over the USA. Must have final total on November 3rd.”

6:43PM 10/29/2020, “Your VOTE on Tuesday, November 3rd is going to SAVE OUR COUNTRY. We are going to defeat the Marxists, 2:54PM Socialists, Rioters, Flag-Burners, and Left-wing Extremists! Get out and VOTE! #MAGA” 11/1/2020, 5:35PM

“Joe Biden is the candidate of rioters, looters, arsonists, gun-grabbers, flag-burners, Marxists, lobbyists, and special interests. I am the candidate of farmers, factory workers, police officers, and hard-working, law-abiding patriots of every race, religion and creed! #MAGA”

11/2/2020, 8:02PM

“The Supreme Court decision on voting in Pennsylvania is a VERY dangerous one. It will allow rampant and unchecked cheating and will undermine our entire systems of laws. It will also induce violence in the streets.

Something must be done!”

11/4/2020, 5:44AM

“We are up BIG, but they are trying to STEAL the Election. We will never let them do it. Votes cannot be cast after the Poles are closed!”

11/4/2020, 10:17AM

“How come every time they count Mail-In ballot dumps they are so devastating in their percentage and power of destruction?”

11/5/2020, 12:21PM

“STOP THE FRAUD!”

11/7/2020, 8:20AM

“Tens of thousands of votes were illegally received after 8 P.M. on Tuesday, Election Day, totally and easily changing the results in Pennsylvania and certain other razor thin states. As a separate matter, hundreds of thousands of Votes were illegally not allowed to be OBSERVED...”

11/7/2020, 10:36AM

“I WON THIS ELECTION, BY A LOT!”

11/7/2020, 4:53PM

“THE OBSERVERS WERE NOT ALLOWED INTO THE COUNTING ROOMS. I WON THE ELECTION, GOT 71,000,000 LEGAL VOTES. BAD THINGS HAPPENED WHICH OUR OBSERVERS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO SEE. NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE. MILLIONS OF MAIL-IN BALLOTS WERE SENT TO PEOPLE WHO NEVER ASKED FOR THEM!”

11/10/2020, 10:33PM

“WATCH FOR MASSIVE BALLOT COUNTING ABUSE AND, JUST LIKE THE EARLY VACCINE, REMEMBER I TOLD YOU SO!”

11/10/2020, 9:37PM

“People will not accept this Rigged Election!”

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Table A1: Continued 11/13/2020, 10:59AM

“For years the Dems have been preaching how unsafe and rigged our elections have been. Now they are saying what a wonderful job the Trump Administration did in making 2020 the most secure election ever. Actually this is true, except for what the Democrats did. Rigged Election!”

1/3/2021, 1:24PM

“The Swing States did not even come close to following the dictates of their State Legislatures. These States “election laws” were made up by local judges & politicians, not by their Legislatures, & are therefore, before even getting to irregularities & fraud, UNCONSTITUTIONAL!”

1/6/2021, 9:15AM

“The States want to redo their votes. They found out they voted on a FRAUD. Legislatures never approved. Let them do it. BE STRONG!”

1/6/2021, 6:01PM

“These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!”

11/7/2020, 4:53PM

“THE OBSERVERS WERE NOT ALLOWED INTO THE COUNTING ROOMS. I WON THE ELECTION, GOT 71,000,000 LEGAL VOTES. BAD THINGS HAPPENED WHICH OUR OBSERVERS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO SEE. NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE. MILLIONS OF MAIL-IN BALLOTS WERE SENT TO PEOPLE WHO NEVER ASKED FOR THEM!”

Table A2: Sampling of Tweets by Donald Trump about COVID-19 Date

Tweet by @RealDonaldTrump

10/26/2020, “We have made tremendous progress with the China Virus, but the Fake News refuses to talk about it this close 6:36PM to the Election. COVID, COVID, COVID is being used by them, in total coordination, in order to change our great early election numbers.Should be an election law violation!”

10/26/2020, “The Fake News Media is riding COVID, COVID, COVID, all the way to the Election. Losers!”

7:58AM 10/27/2020, 6:31AM

“ALL THE FAKE NEWS MEDIA WANTS TO TALK ABOUT IS COVID, COVID, COVID. ON NOVEMBER 4th, YOU WON’T BE HEARING SO MUCH ABOUT IT ANYMORE. WE ARE ROUNDING THE TURN!!!”

10/30/2020, “This election is a choice between a Trump Super Boom or a Biden Depression, and it’s between a safe vaccine 4:47PM or a devastating Biden lockdown!”

11/2/2020, 4:33PM

“Joe Biden is promising to delay the vaccine and turn America into a prison state‚ locking you in your home while letting far-left rioters roam free. The Biden Lockdown will mean no school, no graduations, no weddings, no Thanksgiving, no Christmas, no Fourth of July...”

11/9/2020, 7:31AM

“STOCK MARKET UP BIG, VACCINE COMING SOON. REPORT 90% EFFECTIVE. SUCH GREAT NEWS!”

11/9/2020, 8:48AM

“RT @Reuters: Pfizer and BioNTech say their COVID-19 vaccine is more than 90% effective”

11/10/2020, 7:40PM

“As I have long said, @Pfizer and the others would only announce a Vaccine after the Election, because they didn’t have the courage to do it before. Likewise, the @US_FDA should have announced it earlier, not for political purposes, but for saving lives!”

11/10/2020, 10:33AM

“WATCH FOR MASSIVE BALLOT COUNTING ABUSE AND, JUST LIKE THE EARLY VACCINE, REMEMBER I TOLD YOU SO!”

11/14/2020, 10:44AM – series of 2 tweets in a thread

“I LOVE NEW YORK! As everyone knows, the Trump Administration has produced a great and safe VACCINE far ahead of schedule. Another Administration would have taken five years. The problem is, @NYGovCuomo said that he will delay using it, and other states WANT IT NOW... We cannot waste time and can only give to those states that will use the Vaccine immediately. Therefore the New York delay. Many lives to be saved, but we are ready when they are. Stop playing politics!”

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 Table A3: Sampling of Tweets by Marjorie Taylor Greene about the 2020 Election Date

Tweet by @mtgreenee or @RepMTG

10/31/2020, 7:07PM

“THREE DAYS! SAVE AMERICA. STOP SOCIALISM. DEFEAT THE DEMOCRATS! GO VOTE TUESDAY, GEORGIA!”

11/1/2020, 2:25PM

“I’ve made all the right enemies. The Fake News Media HATES me. Big Tech CENSORS me. The DC Swamp FEARS me. I’m running to be @realDonaldTrump’s STRONGEST ally in Congress. Too much is at stake. Vote Tuesday. SAVE AMERICA.”

11/4/2020, 5:46AM

“STOP THE STEAL!”

11/4/2020, 1:07PM

“Remember when Joe Biden said he had the most extensive voter fraud organization in political history? Turns out that was not a gaffe.”

11/4/2020, 2:20PM

“The Fake News Media wants you to believe that Joe Biden (who didn’t campaign AT ALL) isn’t involved in VOTER FRAUD. He literally said he built the “BIGGEST” voter fraud organization in American history. We aren’t going to let Democrats STEAL this election. #StopTheSteal”

11/5/2020, 4:36PM

“Every single Republican needs to be OUT FRONT and LEADING to STOP THE STEAL! Now is not the time to back down or buckle to the radical left and their allies in the Fake News Media. This is the fight of our life and we must have @realDonaldTrump’s back! We will prevail!”

11/5/2020, 7:44PM

“We must ensure election integrity!”

11/6/2020, 12:50PM

“When America sees everything we are uncovering they will be disgusted and even the media won’t be able to pretend voter fraud isn’t real. Ending this crap once and for all will be fundamental to preserving our republic and faith in democracy.”

11/8/2020, 2:21AM

“Has anyone noticed that there aren’t any violent riots, looting, and burning of cities going on? Antifa and BLM aren’t being funded to riot anymore since they think @JoeBiden won. Meanwhile, 70 million angry Americans won’t forget. Nor will we give up! #StopTheSteal”

11/10/2020, 11:07PM

“Let’s look at some absentee voting history. 2012: Obama received 87,487 2016: Clinton received 98,417 2020: Biden received 849,182 Notice anything fishy?”

1/3/2021, 3:27AM

“Jan 6th, we #FightForTrump Be there! WE will object to protect the integrity of our elections and to defend the people’s votes. A fraudulent election is unconstitutional and must be rejected! #StopTheSteal”

1/6/2021, 12:36AM

“Any Republican speaking against our Jan 6th objection tomorrow should join the Democrats who are ready to certify a stolen election. Accepting election fraud is not “constitutional.” It’s just wrong. #SurrenderCaucus”

1/6/2021, 3:26PM

“The American people deserve elections they can trust. Thousands of sworn affidavits (at risk of JAIL TIME) were submitted confirming MASSIVE fraud. The evidence is clear. It's the duty of Congress to OBJECT to fraudulent electoral votes. Today, I will fight for our country.”

1/7/2021, 3:25AM

“I condemn the violence today, just like I've condemned Antifa & BLM riots that have burned our cities, attacked our police officers, & hurt so many people throughout the year. But that's not going to stop me from OBJECTING to fraudulent electoral votes with our #FightForTrump.”

1/7/2021, 4:13PM

“All it took to “beat” @realDonaldTrump was phony witch hunts, years of coordinated lies by the fake news media, years of censorship by big tech, a CCP pandemic, endless ANTIFA / BLM riots, and a rigged election!”

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Table A4: Sampling of Tweets by Marjorie Taylor Greene about COVID-19 Date

Tweet by @mtgreenee or @RepMTG

11/13/2020, 5:18PM

“Our first session of New Member Orientation covered COVID in Congress. Masks, masks, masks.... I proudly told my freshman class that masks are oppressive. In GA, we work out, shop, go to restaurants, go to work, and school without masks. My body, my choice. #FreeYourFace”

11/13/2020, 8:54PM

“I’m 100% pro life. Life starts at conception. My goal is to end abortion in America. Killing a baby in the womb is the worst lie sold to women and it doesn’t solve problems. Nor is it women’s “healthcare.” Mask wearing should be a choice bc if mask work, the wearer is safe.”

11/14/2020, 1:18PM

“I’m here to speak the truth. Unreliable test gives unreliable data. Hospitals got paid more for Covid coded deaths. Dems shut down states, churches, businesses, schools, sports, entertainment, & life. The media spews fear & demands masks control. Time to say enough!”

11/14/2020, 12:57PM

“Strict mask mandates & forced social distancing violate Americans guaranteed freedom of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Draconian mandates must end. Americans should be able to choose a masks or not, and more importantly how many loved ones they invite to Thanksgiving.”

11/14/2020, 2:12PM

“Watching woke white progressive blue check marks defend killing babies is like watching @SpeakerPelosi sing Jesus loves the little children on Sunday, then voting for tax payer funded murder on Monday. If you care about people dying, care about the millions of unborn PEOPLE.”

1/5/2021, 8:04PM

“If I’m forced to wear a mask in @SpeakerPelosi’s House of Hypocrites, it’s going to have a message.”

1/7/2021, 4:13PM

“All it took to “beat” @realDonaldTrump was phony witch hunts, years of coordinated lies by the fake news media, years of censorship by big tech, a CCP pandemic, endless ANTIFA / BLM riots, and a rigged election!”

Table A5: Sampling of Tweets by Lindsey Graham and Mitch McConnell about the 2020 Election Date

Twitter Handle

Tweet

10/26/2020, 6:36PM

@LindseyGrahamSC “This is a big choice election: we're voting between law and order and lawlessness, between economic shut downs or economic growth, and free markets or socialism. South Carolina needs @LindseyGrahamSC & @realDonaldTrump re-elected Tuesday. VOTE!”

10/26/2020, 7:58AM

@LeaderMcConnell

10/27/2020, 6:31AM

@LindseyGrahamSC “I do look forward to hearing from and will listen closely to the objections of my colleagues in challenging the results of this election. They will need to provide proof of the charges they are making.”

10/30/2020, 4:47PM

@LindseyGrahamSC “They will also need to show that the failure to take corrective action in addressing election fraud changed the outcome of these states’ votes and ultimately the outcome of the election.”

11/2/2020, 4:33PM

@LeaderMcConnell

11/9/2020, 7:31AM

@LindseyGrahamSC “Those who made this attack on our government need to be identified and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Their actions are repugnant to democracy.”

11/9/2020, 8:48AM

@LindseyGrahamSC “Lindsey Graham criticizes security response to Capitol siege, saying rioters could have killed lawmakers: “Black Lives Matter protests — have you seen the images on the Capitol steps where you had National Guard members in riot gear? Why weren't you as prepared this time around?””

“Here’s how this must work in our great country: Every legal vote should be counted.

Any illegally-submitted ballots must not. All sides must get to observe the process. And the courts are here to apply the laws & resolve disputes. That's how Americans’ votes decide the result.”

“I will vote to respect the American people’s decision and defend our system of government.”

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Table A5: Continued 11/10/2020, 7:40PM

@LindseyGrahamSC “I pledge to work with @SenatorTimScott and others to review voting procedures, particularly regarding mail-in ballots, so we can ensure millions of Americans who have doubt that we are not ignoring the problem.”

Table A6: Sampling of Tweets by Mitch McConnell about COVID-19 Date

Tweet by @McConnellPress or @LeaderMcConnell

10/30/2020, 6:48PM

“This month, @SenateMajLdr McConnell visited Bell County to thank #Kentucky healthcare heroes for their courage during COVID-19. Bell County has received nearly $6 million from Sen McConnell's CARES Act to beat this virus #Bluegrass120”

11/10/2020, 1:31PM

“.@SenateMajLdr McConnell Celebrates Vaccine Developments and Falling Unemployment Rate”

11/10/2020, 3:52PM

“Yesterday, we learned one COVID-19 vaccine candidate may be more than 90% effective. This huge good news is a testament to the ingenuity of the American private sector and the historic groundwork laid by Congress and the Trump Administration.”

11/12/2020, 5:30PM

“This week’s news on a COVID-19 vaccine was incredibly promising. All of us have to keep up commonsense precautions in the meantime. The virus is spreading quickly in Kentucky and nationwide, and it doesn’t care whether we’ve gotten bored with wearing masks or social distancing.”

APPENDIX B: FIGURES

FIGURE B2. “Donald Trump won the 2020 U.S. presedential election.”

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FIGURE B3. “Voting by mail is a major cause of voter fraud in the U.S.”

FIGURE B4. “Vaccines save lives.”

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FIGURE B5. “The January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol Building

was carried out by ANTIFA and other left-wing groups..”

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Tap dancing with Trump: Lindsey Graham’s quest for relevance. New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2021/08/14/us/politics/lindsey-grahamdonald-trump.html 34. United States Census Bureau. QuickFacts: Altoona City, Pennsylvania. https://www.census.gov/ quickfacts/altoonacitypennsylvania 35. Walther, S., & McCoy, A. (2021). US extremism on telegram: Fueling disinformation, conspiracy theories, and accelerationism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15(2), 100-124. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/10.2307/27007298 36. Westneat, D. (2021, July 3). ‘We are all victims’: How Republicans became the party of the persecution complex. The Seattle Times. https:// www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/ we-are-all-victims-how-republicans-became-theparty-of-the-persecution- complex/ 37. Zarefsky, D. (2004), Presidential rhetoric and the power of definition. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34(3): 607-619. doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00214.x

About the Author Sarah Corso is a Fall 2021 graduate of the George Washington University, where she double majored in International Affairs and French. She hails from Altoona, Pennsylvania, USA. A student of languages and politics, she is fascinated by populist and right-wing movements around the globe and seeks to understand what motivates individuals to support them. In the future, she hopes to continue these types of conversations in theory and in practice. Sarah currently works as Program Coordinator at the An-Bryce Foundation, an organization dedicated to serving under-resourced young people in the DC area.

Mentor Details

Claudine Kuradusenge-McLeod is a professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs. Originally from Rwanda, she specializes in Diaspora consciousness, social mobilization, and genocide prevention. She has worked in several countries in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. As a human rights activist, she has been on the front line of racial conflicts, youth education training as well as racially and culturally sensitive initiatives.

38 KEYWORDS: Immigration history, Irish American history, entrepreneurship DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).08

The Forgotten Entrepreneurs: New York City’s Irish Immigrant Peddlers in the Nineteenth Century KAIFENG DENG

ECONOMICS & HISTORY, CCAS ‘22, kfdeng28@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT How should we view the Irish who emigrated to America in the nineteenth century, and what can they tell us about immigrant entrepreneurship? Historians have traditionally viewed the transplants from Ireland as beggarly and desperate, but recent scholarships challenge this claim by looking at these immigrants’ deposit records. Although new studies reveal the surprisingly large savings of Irish-born manual laborers, they largely overlook the experience of immigrant peddlers. This paper traces the business activities of New York City’s Irish hawkers by examining banking data, census records, and newspaper accounts from the 1840s to the 1870s. It finds that the peddlers from Ireland were savvy entrepreneurs who enjoyed financial success and upward mobility. They developed creative ways to build inventories and sell goods across the city and the US. Some of them also accumulated handsome sums in the bank and moved on to more rewarding and respectable careers. The forgotten saga of the hawkers affirms that America was a land of opportunities for many Irish, but it also highlights how the country’s immigration policy, as well as the possibilities for immigrants, has changed since the nineteenth century.

• For Hugh Torpey, the year 1845 was full of misery and uncertainty. Famine, sickness, and death ravaged Mitchelstown, the small town in County Cork, Ireland he called home. After two years of hunger and hardship, he decided to emigrate to America, hoping to find relief and embrace new possibilities.

A young man with no trade, Torpey became a peddler in New York City, hawking “port-monnaie” (small pocketbooks and wallets) and perfume for a living in the 1850s. By no means was it a glamorous job, but it was better than digging foundations and hauling bricks, which were common occupations for Irish immigrants. Keeping track of inventories and managing expenses might not have been easy for a street salesman, let alone becoming successful. Yet Torpey accomplished exactly that. In 1864, he held $2,216, the equivalent of $36,500 today, in his bank account (Account 10919).1 In fact, Irish immigrant peddlers, who only made up 1% of the Irish-born population in New York in the 1850s, generally did quite well. Male peddlers who emigrated during

1

the Great Famine secured a median savings of $251.

Though a modest sum compared to Torpey’s, it was twice as much as what Irish skilled artisans and clerks in New York saved. With a median savings of $100, female Irish peddlers also accumulated more wealth than their peers who engaged in needle trades and nursing.

How did some Irish immigrants become successful entrepreneurs after coming to America?

The Irish immigrants of New York City, especially those who emigrated during the Great Famine, have traditionally been seen as beggarly and desperate.

The pioneering study on Irish immigration by Oscar Handlin concludes that the famine-era immigrants were “unemployed, resourceless proletariat” (1991), while the influential work by Kerby Miller paints “a gloomy picture of Irish-American deprivation” (1985). Recent studies on the subject, though, have challenged these pessimistic narratives.

Tyler Anbinder, along with Cormac Ó Gráda and Simone Wegge, has used the deposit records from

The account number for each bank user comes from the Depositor Database curated by Anbinder, O Gráda, and Wegge. The Depositor Database is available at http://beyondragstoriches.org/the-depositor-database.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank in New York City between 1850 and 1858 and the census data in the late 1800s to demonstrate that not all Irish were impoverished day laborers, and that a majority of them managed to accumulate sizable savings. These studies tend to focus on the top Irish-born savers, such as business owners and physicians, and on unskilled workers (laborers, porters, waiters, etc.), whose median savings actually exceeded those of tailors, carpenters, and other skilled tradesmen (Anbinder, O Gráda, & Wegge, 2019; Wegge, Anbinder, & O Gráda, 2017; Anbinder, 2012). Despite their relative success, Irish peddlers have received insufficient attention.

This neglect stands in contrast to Jewish and Greek street merchants, whose entrepreneurships are well documented. Historian Andrew Heinze has offered an in-depth analysis on the lives of New York City’s Jewish immigrant peddlers in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He points out that Jewish transplants “constituted a majority of the peddlers” in the city and “practically monopolized” the sale of merchandise other than food. These curbside businessmen dotted the streets of Manhattan and the Lower East Side with their pushcarts and hawked items that ranged from clothing and fabrics to crockery and glassware. The historian also argues that peddling served as an expression of Jewish commercial talent and a means of upward mobility. As hawkers, immigrant Jews tapped into New York’s substantial market and diverse consumer base and enriched themselves along the way (Heinze, 1989). Likewise, Lane Demas has written about the Greek street vendors in Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century. Before the transplants from Greece became business owners, he points out, they often worked as peddlers for several years to sharpen their business skills and accumulate seed money. The most prominent group of Greek peddlers in Chicago were the hucksters, who sold fruits and other produce from their carts in Chicago’s ethnic enclaves. They were known for their ability to move from selling from a wagon to selling from a shop (Demas, 2004). Just like Jewish and Greek immigrant peddlers, the Irish street merchants deserve scholarly attention. This paper thus focuses on the forgotten Irish immigrant peddlers in New York City from the 1840s to the 1870s. It argues that the peddlers were surprisingly entrepreneurial and successful by examining their bank records and other contemporary accounts. Furthermore, it contextualizes the group’s accomplishments in the broader context of changing immigration policy and growing inequality between immigrants in the late nineteenth century.

Peddling was a popular occupation for New York City’s immigrants in the 1800s, though it was an uncommon pursuit among Irish transplants. According to historian Robert Ernst’s estimate, 98% of the city’s peddlers in 1855 were born outside of the United States. Those who emigrated from Germany, many of whom were likely

39 Jewish, accounted for almost half of the immigrant peddlers in the city. The second largest contingent was Irish immigrants, who made up 39% of the foreign-born hawkers. Although Irish street vendors had a reasonably large presence in the peddling profession, they only represented a small portion of the overall immigrant population from Ireland. The Irish-born were more ubiquitous in manual occupations, with more than 25,000 of them working as servants and laborers in the city.

There were also about 7,000 Irish in the needle trades, which was 10 times higher than the number of Irish street sellers in 1855 (Ernst, 1994).

Perhaps because of the group’s diminutive size, the specifics about individual Irish-born peddlers in nineteenth-century New York City are difficult to come by. While newspapers and periodicals in the 1800s occasionally released stories on Irish hawkers and their businesses, these publications provided little information on the peddlers’ personal lives. Contemporaneous census reports conducted by New York State is a treasure trove, but tracing all Irish salesmen is a challenging task.

However, the dataset curated by historian Tyler Anbinder and his team of research assistants is particularly valuable.

It draws upon the “test books” of the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank (EISB) between 1850 and 1858 and includes a wealth of information on individual users. Established by the Irish Emigrant Society in 1850, the EISB offered banking services to Irish immigrants in New York City.

When people opened accounts at the bank, the clerk would record in the test books the depositors’ names, addresses, occupations, exact places of birth, the names and whereabouts of their parents, spouses, siblings, and children, and the dates and ports of their arrival in America and the names of the ships that carried them.

The test books were then used to verify the identities of the customers who wished to withdraw money from the bank. In addition to granular biographical information, Anbinder’s dataset contains the year when an account was opened and closed, the highest balance that it achieved, and the number of transactions during its existence. It also consists of the corresponding census information across multiple years for many Irish-born depositors at the bank. Of the more than 15,000 EISB users in the dataset, 290 were peddlers who emigrated from Ireland.

Albeit not a large sample, it can still offer unprecedented insights into the Irish-born hawkers in the 1800s.

The dataset includes rich details on the Irish peddlers’ personal lives. Those street vendors who opened accounts at the EISB were in the prime of their working years, with an average age of 38 years old. For example, Matthew Cuoniham was 34 when he made his first deposits in 1849 by selling fruits in the street. After a decade of hard work, he managed to save a handsome sum of $526, or about $18,000 today (Account 15081). Similarly, Daniel Kane, a peddler from County Tyrone, was in his late

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FIGURE 1. A page from the EISB test book from 1851. Test

books contain valuable biographical information about Irish immigrant savers.

30s when he opened his account at the EISB in 1851 and accumulated more than $600 within 5 years (Account 487). While the peddlers were predominantly men, a number of female peddlers were also customers of the bank. Teresa Mooney, a County Cork native, peddled glass for a living and maintained a modest balance of $150 in her account (Account 2921). Susan McShane, another immigrant peddler from County Armagh, dealt poultry in the city and made regular deposits and withdrawals at the bank (Account 5575). The majority of the peddlers were married, but many were single or widowed. The married peddlers usually had two or three children. However, Mary and Daniel Connolly were an exception, as they had to look after seven children when they were not toiling in the street(Account 4037).

The dataset also sheds light on patterns of emigration and residence. Although the peddlers at the EISB hailed from 30 of the 32 counties in Ireland, close to half of them were natives of Cork, Kerry, Donegal, and Limerick. This is perhaps unsurprising, since these four counties were not only among the most populous in Ireland, but also saw a large volume of emigration between 1851 and 1854. County Cork sent approximately 45,000 residents to New York, the highest among all Irish counties during this period.

Ellen Battersby, a 15-year-old Cork native, sailed across the Atlantic on board Mary Brigg in 1851. Three years later, she made her first deposit as a fruiterer at the EISB

(Account 7755). County Limerick experienced the third largest exodus to New York, with about 27,000 Limerick natives arriving in the city’s port in the early 1850s.

Among them was Cornelius Darcy, who emigrated in 1852 and enjoyed a decent career as a peddler. In 1854, he had more than $200 in his account, an above average savings among Irish-born peddlers during this period (Account 5142). A substantial number of immigrants also originated in Counties Kerry and Donegal, both of which had more than 10,000 residents crossing the Atlantic (Anbinder & McCaffrey, 2015). However, many peddlers did come from smaller Irish counties. Daniel McManus emigrated from County Longford (the third least populous county in Ireland) in 1840 and hawked crockery for a living (Account 6294). Patrick Wall, a peddler residing in the eleventh ward, was born and raised in County Carlow, which sent the smallest number of emigrants to New York in the early 1850s (Account 8053).

After disembarking in New York, immigrant hawkers scattered across 22 wards throughout the city. A majority of them resided in fourth, sixth, and fourteenth wards.

John Murphy lived on Oak Street in the fourth ward and was a toy peddler. Living in a few houses down on the same street was Honora Hickey, who operated a fruit stand on the sidewalk (Accounts 10032 & 4912). Catherine O’Brien was also a fruit seller, though her address was 5 Mission Place in the Five Points neighborhood (Account 12528).

Peddlers such as James Bresland and Edward McMenomy settled on Mulberry Street, which also passed through Five Points and extended north into the fourteenth ward.

The fifth and seventh wards were popular destinations for the Irish peddlers as well. Reade Street in the fifth ward was home to Winifred Smith and Michael Keegan, both of whom sold produce in the city (Accounts 12649 & 15050). Dennis Callanan peddled stationary and was a resident of the seventh ward (Account 6937). Where the peddlers chose to reside reflected a broader pattern for Irish account holders at the EISB, close to 60% of whom settled in the aforementioned wards. The concentration of residence likely reflects the fact that customers chose the EISB because of its proximity. Located in the sixth ward, the bank was within walking distance for those living in the first, fourth, fifth, seventh, and fourteenth wards. Moreover, the wards with high proportions of peddlers and EISB depositors tended to be heavily Irish.

Parts of the fourth, sixth, and fourteenth wards made up Five Points, which was a major Irish enclave in the mid1800s. About 46% of the first ward residents were born in Ireland, the highest among the 24 wards in Manhattan.

The seventh ward also had a significant percentage of Irish-born population. In fact, many successful Irish immigrants moved there when they could afford to leave the fourth ward (Bayor & Meagher, 1996).

What exactly did the Irish street merchants sell in New York City? The newspapers from the 1800s suggest that the hawkers dealt food, clothes, linens, and other

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FIGURE 2. The number of Irish-born peddlers and the number of Irish

immigrants from each county in New York City between 1846 and 1854.

consumer goods. One reporter from New-York Daily Tribune encountered a group of “Celtic priestess” set up “huckster-stands” outside of Castle Garden and sold lemonade made of molasses, vinegar, water, and lemon rinds. These vendors stored the beverage in wooden and tin pails and sold it for a low price to the tired and thirsty immigrants who had just landed in New York (“An hour in Castle Garden,” 1867). The Irish-born street merchants also peddled vegetables in New York City. Some simply picked up the spoils that farmers left behind in the market and in turn sold them to poor residents who might not be able to afford the freshest harvest. One writer estimated that these Irish hucksters could make about four dollars a week by selling wilted vegetables and stale eggs (“Labor in New York,” 1845).

In addition to food, some Irish peddlers sold clothing and fabric in the street. They acquired their supplies in a few ways. First, Irish peddlers could barter for used clothes and resell them after some cleaning and repairs.

They traveled throughout New York with “a basket of cheap gilt chinaware,” which they exchanged for “castoff and non-fitting clothing as the honest housewives may have to spare.” After the bargaining came to an end during the day, the peddlers prepared the old garments for future sale by washing and mending them. One reporter commented that one could hardly recognize

the coats and pantaloons that the peddlers were selling were second-hand items (“Life in the ‘Rag Lane’,” 1870).

Furthermore, Irish peddlers could obtain “silks, laces, muslins, linens, &c.” from import merchants in the city (“Merchants look out,” 1852). These merchants often hired peddlers to hawk the fabric throughout the country, and Irish textile peddlers were spotted in train cars in Pennsylvania and small towns in North Carolina (“Merchants look out,” 1852; “Hanover affairs,” 1858).

Irish peddlers also furnished customers in New York and across the United States with an array of consumer goods. These street vendors could source merchandise from the city’s auctioneers and merchants, who regularly placed advertisements in newspapers. R. H. Timpson, an auctioneer at the Merchant’s Exchange in New York, posted in The Evening Post that he was selling a supply of pocket knives, scissors, and razors. He specifically mentioned that these items were “suitable for pedlar” (“Hardware auction and cutlery sale,” 1843). Also listed in The Evening Post was import dealer Charles H. Darling’s inventory of “fancy goods,” including hair brushes, German silver spoons, harmonicas, leather purses, and more. Located at the intersection of Maiden Lane and Liberty Street, the merchant was accepting cash offers from peddlers and willing to negotiate with them to reach mutually favorable deals (“Fancy goods,” 1843).

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Auction houses and importers were not the sole locations where peddlers could source goods. A soap manufacturer on Trinity Place marketed its products in the New York Daily Herald. It informed the city’s peddlers that they could acquire “pale yellow soap” at “extremely low prices” (“Country storekeepers,” 1844). Similarly, a drug store on Chamber Street was willing to supply hawkers with various kinds of “prepared medicine,” and a bookseller on Nassau Street promised to sell cheap new publications to peddlers (“Wanted,” 1847; “Publications,” 1851).

The ample provision of merchandise throughout New York was likely to have kept the Irish peddlers well stocked and on the road. They routinely visited homes and offices in the city to sell “all sorts of things, from a patent yeastpowder to a camel’s hair shawl” (“Peddlers,” 1874). Some residents, though, viewed the “impudent importunity” of the street vendors as “an intolerable nuisance” (“Peddlers,” 1851). A number of Irish peddlers also conducted business in the southern United States. One newspaper in North Carolina observed that an “Irish pedlar” was filling the state with “articles of yankee production” and undercutting local merchants (“An evil,” 1857). Another writer from South Carolina estimated that the peddlers typically sold $50,000 worth of manufactured goods each year in the town of Chester alone and sometimes enjoyed a profit rate of up to 100% (“Pedlars and vagrants,” 1856). Other critics of Irish peddlers charged that the vendors from the North failed to pay local taxes or obtain appropriate licenses.

They called on the state government to fine violators and discouraged Southerners from patronizing the peddlers (“Swindlers,” 1861; “Irish and Dutch peddlers,” 1864).

In addition to showing the items that the Irish peddlers sold, newspaper stories reflect the group’s entrepreneurship. The hawkers relied on a variety of practices to essentially maximize profits. For instance, some engaged in forestalling and assumed the role of a middle man. The peddlers would buy up all the produce from farmers outside the city and sell it back to urban dwellers at a higher price. Observers at the time were frustrated that Irish hucksters drove up food prices and hurt both honest growers and thrifty buyers (“Our markets,” 1848). They further warned that this business strategy had “ruin[ed] Ireland” and was “daily plundering, robbing and cheating” New York (“Price of food,” 1848).

Stealing clothes was also not uncommon, and some crafty peddlers would alter the lining or size of the pilfered garments before putting them up for sale (“Life in the ‘Rag Lane’,” 1870). In doing so, not only could the dealers avoid getting caught, but they could also minimize the cost of procuring supplies. Misleading buyers was another tactic. One Irish hawker sold old garments along West Street in New York City by the Hudson River, where he targeted domestic travelers who disembarked “one of the Albany boats.” This peddler would stop potential customers and bemoan his hardships as a newly arrived transplant. He tried to persuade them to purchase a suit

from him by exciting their sympathy. One compassionate buyer fell for the peddler’s ruse and paid eight dollars for a bundle of clothes with a “glossy appearance,” but he did not realize that the garments were filled with “darns and patches.” By the time the customer returned to where the transaction occurred, the Irish peddler was “some two or three blocks” away and “looking out for another customer” (“Scene around the dock,” 1848). While these strategies might not be scrupulous, they still illustrate the Irish peddlers’ business skills. After all, the street salesmen came up with “creative” ways to distribute their wares and make money.

The deposit data from the EISB further affirm the street vendors’ entrepreneurial talent. Indeed, many Irish engaged in peddling were quite successful financially.

In their study of Irish who left for New York during the Great Famine, Anbinder and his collaborators found that male immigrant peddlers often saved a lot more than their peers in both skilled and unskilled occupations. The average highest savings that Irish peddlers managed to achieve was almost double that of tailors and carpenters.

The street sellers also accumulated more money in their accounts than office clerks and other lower-status whitecollar workers. In fact, only physicians and business owners had a higher mean balance than the peddlers. The figures for median savings tell a similar story. At $251, the median high balance for peddlers was significantly more than that for skilled and unskilled laborers. The savings that the famine-era immigrant peddlers achieved was remarkable, considering the circumstances that led to their emigration to America.

These savings did not occur overnight, however. The highest amount that Cornelius O’Loughlan had in the bank was $319.69, and it took him eight years to get to that point. A peddler originally from County Clare, O’Loughlan opened an account at the EISB with $160 in 1853. By making multiple deposits every year, he almost doubled the initial sum in 1861. While most of O’Loughlan’s transactions involved no more than $10, his consistency allowed him to build a solid saving in under a decade (Account 2981). Similarly, the highest balance that William Dugan attained was a respectable $246.30. A native of County Armagh, he took up peddling after arriving in New York in 1848. Dugan had been a regular saver at the EISB since opening his account in 1856 and amassed more than $200 in 1859 after dozens of transactions (Account 11934).

James Churchill was another peddler who did relatively well. Although his first deposit in 1852 was $90, he more than tripled that amount through frequent savings and interest by the end of the 1850s (Account 1828). The bank accounts of O’Loughlan, Dugan, Churchill, and others reflect that the peddlers had good business acumen. This acumen paid off, as it helped a number of Irish make a decent living by hawking items in the city.

Female Irish peddlers who emigrated to New York had substantial savings in their accounts as well. Women in

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Occupational Category

Median High Balance

Average High Balance

Most Common Jobs in Category

Professionals

$630

$1273

Physician

Business Owners

$389

$649

Saloonkeeper, grocer

Lower-status whitecollar workers

$207

$351

Clerk

Petty entrepreneurs

$251

$543

Peddler

Skilled tradesmen

$139

$287

Tailor, carpenter, shoemaker

Unskilled workers

$163

$294

Day laborer, waiter, porter

TABLE 1. Highest Bank Balances Achieved by Male Irish Famine Immigrants in New York City,

by Occupational Category at the Time First Bank Account was Opened

Occupational Category

Median High Balance

Average High Balance

Most Common Jobs in Category

Business owners

$230

$422

Boardinghouse keeper, grocer

Nurses

$99

$170

Hospital nurse, private nurse

Petty entrepreneurs

$100

$239

Fruit peddler

Servants

$96

$194

Domestic, cook

Laundresses

$116

$177

Washer, ironer

Needle trades

$94

$218

Seamstress, dressmaker

TABLE 2. Highest Bank Balances Achieved by Female Irish Famine Immigrants in New York City, by Occupational Category at the Time First Bank Account was Opened

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FIGURE 4. EISB account ledger of James Churchill.

the peddling profession on average had a high balance of $239. Even though this amount was lower than that of male peddlers, it was still higher than what female nurses, servants, laundresses, and seamstresses had attained. The median high savings for female peddlers was $100, which was again lower than that of their male counterpart but still higher than women in most other occupations. Laundresses and business owners were the two groups who achieved higher median balances.

Like male peddlers, many female peddlers were routine users at the EISB. Emigrating from County Cork in 1849, Catherine Connell became a fruit hawker in New York City.

She was a customer with the EISB for eight years, during which she made dozens of deposits and withdrawals and reached a peak balance of $130 (Account 16377). Likewise, Bridget Newell was a peddler who left Ireland during the Potato Famine. By selling silk and jewelry in the city, she amassed more than $110 in two years (Account 10454).

Alice Ringrose was another famine-era immigrant who hawked fruits in New York during the 1850s and 1860s.

What set her apart from other peddlers was the fact that she opened six accounts at the EISB. Her most active and successful one had $130 in savings, which was achieved through incremental deposits and interest payments between 1858 and 1861 (Account 17836). The bank records suggest that the female Irish peddlers were accomplished merchants. Through vending various items in city streets, they did better financially, at least in terms of savings, than other Irish-born women.

A small group of Irish peddlers accumulated amounts

FIGURE 5. One of the six account ledgers of Alice Ringrose at the EISB.

that rivaled the savings of physicians and saloon keepers.

The largest savings that Murty Kelleher had at one point was $2,512.06, about double that of the average high balance of immigrant professionals. He was a highly consistent saver, with 115 transactions in total across his four accounts. Most of Kelleher’s transactions ranged between $5 and $10, and the peddler always made deposits in June, July, and August (Accounts 4947, 8525, 21920, & 21921). Similarly, William Doherty’s peak balance was more than $2,700. Starting out with merely $18 in his first account in 1851, he made multiple deposits each month for seven years. Doherty became a relatively wealthy man by 1858, with thousands of dollars in savings across two accounts (Accounts 3049 & 9200). Some female peddlers were also quite well-off. Mary Dawson worked as a huckster in New York for almost two decades. An active customer at the EISB, Dawson logged 119 transactions in her account and accumulated $1,300 by 1860 (Account 6183). Catherine Murphy had a rewarding career as a fruit peddler as well. After emigrating from County Cork, she opened an account at the bank with $65 in 1851. A decade of hard work and regular deposits raised this figure to $1,024 (Accounts 554, 6620, & 11982). The substantial sums and frequent deposits in these peddlers bank accounts once more indicates that some Irish were highly competent entrepreneurs, who were able to turn selling in the street into a lucrative business.

Another marker of the Irish street merchants’ entrepreneurship was their occupational mobility, as

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 peddling served as the launching point for many to pursue better careers. Indeed, about 33% of the peddlers with accounts at the EISB moved on to other jobs in five years. More than 45% spent less than 10 years as a hawker.

Some decided to join the white-collar ranks when they stopped selling in the street. Richard Swanton became a life insurance agent after peddling for five years (Account 8732). Likewise, Joseph Haggerty found employment as a clerk at the custom house in his post-peddling days in the 1850s and 1860s (Accounts 2201 & 11257). In addition to office jobs, several ex-peddlers turned into skilled tradesmen. Patrick Cuff emigrated to America in 1849 and made a living as a peddler. He ended up becoming a machinist ten years later (Account 10805). A select few did start their own businesses. Records from the census and EISB test books show that Peter Devlin began selling charcoal when he settled in New York City’s seventh ward in 1852. He remained as a charcoal peddler for more than two decades before opening a saloon in 1880. Even though the account ledgers for when Devlin was running his saloon could not be found, such documents were available for when he was hawking charcoal. The banking data suggests that Devlin was earning a steady stream of income through peddling. Between 1854 and 1857, he made a dozen deposits that totaled $340. He also had $550 in his second account at the EISB in 1858. Devlin’s savings probably helped his bid to start a saloon (Accounts 8341 & 17377). While it is difficult to gauge conclusively if former peddlers made more money or gained greater satisfaction at work when they engaged in other occupations, peddling does not seem to have been a long-term career.

Perhaps once the street merchants accumulated enough money in the bank and felt confident with their skills, they transitioned to jobs that were more respectable and stable. This mobility also suggests that many peddlers leveraged their experience to pursue better occupations.

Yet peddling did not guarantee success for every Irish immigrant. Some had a downward career trajectory, since they switched to unskilled labor jobs after hawking goods for a few years. Maurice Ward quitted peddling after two years. He might have found that he was not a good salesman, or that obtaining inventories was challenging.

Regardless of the reasons that prompted him to stop, he could only find menial jobs. In the 1860s and 1870s, he worked as a porter, hauling cargos and deliveries in New York (Account 5046). Michael Griffin did not have good luck with selling goods either. He became a porter and then a laborer when his one-year stint as a peddler did not work out (Account 9176). Research has demonstrated that Irish menial laborers amassed impressive savings in their bank accounts, so it might not have been financially ruinous for former peddlers to enter the unskilled sector (Anbinder, 2012). Griffin, for example, had about $180 in his account, enough to keep his family of three fed during a short period of tough time. Nevertheless, some former peddlers did not manage to start their own businesses or

45 move up into more respectable professions.

The heretofore untold story of the street vendors from Ireland reveals a great deal about Irish immigration to the United States during the nineteenth century. First, the peddlers’ accomplishments supply further evidence that many Irish who fled the Great Famine were surprisingly successful. As Anbinder argues, savings are an accurate indication of achievement for transplants, most of whom cared deeply about financial security. Having enough cash to pay bills and weather life’s emergencies was a more pressing concern than the lofty leap from rags to riches. Maintaining a nest egg was also crucial to those who wanted to start a business, move into a better neighborhood, or provide better opportunities to their children (Anbinder, 2012). If one uses savings as the yardstick for success, the Irish-born street merchants who held accounts at the EISB did quite well. They were far from being wealthy, but they were no “unemployed, resourceless proletariat” either. Moreover, what the peddlers attained did not result purely from serendipity.

They worked exceptionally hard to build inventories, traveled throughout New York City and the country to dispense their wares, and came up with creative and sometimes unscrupulous strategies to make money.

In addition to worrying about their finances, the Irish peddlers had to overcome significant social obstacles to establish themselves in New York City. Historian Hasia Diner points out that the immigrants from Ireland found themselves in “a metropolis full of hostile ‘neighbors’” (Diner, 1996). Anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiments were prevalent when famine refugees arrived in the late 1840s. Politicians in the city and state of New York warned that the transplants from Ireland threatened American liberty and called to exclude them from public service employment. In the 1850s, the militant Order of the Star Spangled Banner would pick fights with the city’s Irish residents, while the Know Nothings’ nativist agenda was gaining popularity and propelled candidates associated with the party to electoral victories. Despite the enmity, many Irish peddlers still managed to run profitable businesses. In the end, the United States turned out to be the land of opportunities for the Irish-born hawkers.

They might have found that their dedication and skills were far better rewarded in America than they would have been in Ireland. The vendors’ merchandising techniques, substantial savings, and long-term mobility demonstrate that they were excellent entrepreneurs and salesmen.

They have been largely overlooked by scholars of Irish immigration, but they should not be.

Why is the history of some obscure peddlers relevant or important at all? What value does it have in this day and age? The utility of history extends beyond simply cataloging what transpired. Historical accounts highlight the complexities–unexpected twists, uneasy decisions, unmet expectations–that may be missing in popular discourse. Published in 1883, Emma Lazarus’ “The New

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Colossus” exalts America as a symbol of hope for the poor and the downtrodden. Its sestet personifies the Statue of Liberty as the “mother of exiles” who welcomed the “huddled masses” with open arms. John F. Kennedy later quoted this sonnet in his 1958 book A Nation of Immigrants, which proclaims that all Americans are immigrants and offers inspiring ideas to liberalize immigration. However, the reality was and is harsher than these sweeping romanticization. The Irish who made the trans-Atlantic voyage endured tremendous hardships in New York, and they had to and did find ways to get by through astonishing ingenuity and an enterprising spirit. The nitty-gritty details of the Irish street merchants’ business endeavors will add to the narrative about both the promises and challenges of immigrant America. Another layer of complexity that the peddlers’ experience brings up is the ever-changing possibilities for transplants. Beginning with Chinese immigrants in the late 1800s, federal legislations barred individuals from legal entry and citizenship on the basis of racial identities and national origins. Immigrants today have to navigate the bureaucratic labyrinth of passports, “green cards,” and other enforcement mechanisms. As people celebrate the overlooked entrepreneurship of the Irish-born peddlers, they should also think more deeply about how the opportunities for immigrants have changed over time.

If the United States is truly a “nation of immigrants,” the changes should always expand opportunities for people to come and remake themselves. The Irish peddlers seized the chance to lead better lives in the nineteenth century. Many are trying to do the same.

REFERENCES 1.

An evil. (1857, Jan. 29). Asheville News, 3.

2.

An hour in Castle Garden. (1867, July 25). New-York Tribune, 2.

3. Anbinder, T. (2012). Moving beyond “rags to riches:” New York’s Irish famine immigrants and their surprising savings accounts. Journal of American History, 99(3), 741-770. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jahist/jas435.

Johns Hopkins University Press.

7.

Country storekeepers, pedlars, and families. (1844, May 13). New York Daily Herald, 4.

8. Demas, L. (2004). Immigrant Entrepreneurs and the Formation of Chicago’s “Greektown,” 1890-1921. The Journal of Modern Hellenism, 21, 105-155. Retrieved from https://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/ article/download/226/229.

9. Diner, H. (1996). “The most Irish city in the union:” The era of the Great Migration, 1844-1877. The New York Irish, 87-106.

10. Ernst, R. (1994). Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825-1863. Syracuse University Press.

11. Fancy goods. (1843, Nov. 2). The Evening Post, 4.

12. Handlin, O. (1991). Boston’s Immigrants, 1790–1880: A Study in Acculturation. Harvard University Press.

13. Hanover affairs. (1858, Aug. 17). York Gazette, 2.

14. Hardware auction and cutlery sale. (1843, Sep. 4). The Evening Post, 2.

15. Heinze, A. (1989). Jewish street merchants and mass consumption in New York City, 1880-1914. American Jewish Archives, 41(2), 199-214. Retrieved from https:// sites.americanjewisharchives.org/publications/ journal/PDF/1989_41_02_00_heinze.pdf.

16. Irish and Dutch peddlers. (1864, Dec. 20). The Daily North Carolinian, 2.

17. Labor in New York. (1845, Oct. 25). Harbinger, 313-314.

18. Life in “Rag Lane:” Baxter St. and its inhabitants. (1870, Jan. 24). New-York Tribune, 2.

19. Merchants look out. (1852, Dec. 11). The People’s Press, 3.

20. McCaffrey, H. & Anbinder, T. (2015). Which Irish men and women immigrated to the United States during the Great Famine Migration of 1846-54. Irish Historical Studies, 39(156), 620-642. https://doi. org/10.1017/ihs.2015.22.

21. Miller, K. (1985). Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America. Oxford University Press.

Anbinder, T, O Gráda, C., & Wegge S. (2019). Networks and opportunities: A digital history of Ireland’s Great Famine refugees in New York. The American Historical Review, 124(5), 1591-1629. https://doi.org/10.1093/ ahr/rhz1023.

22. Our markets. (March 4, 1848). New York Daily Herald, 2.

Anbinder, T, Wegge, S., & O Gráda, C. The Depositor Database. Retrieved from http://beyondragstoriches. org/the-depositor-database.

25. Pedlars and vagrants. (1856, July 9). Edgefield Advertiser, 1.

6. Baylor, R. & Meagher, T. (1996). The New York Irish.

27. Publications. (1851, April 23). New York Daily Herald, 2.

4.

5.

23. Peddlers. (1851, July 26). New-York Organ, 29.

24. Peddlers. (1874, May 8). The New York Times, 4.

26. Price of food. (1848, Aug. 7). New York Daily Herald, 1.

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28. Scene around the dock. (1848, Aug. 20). New York Daily Herald, 3.

29. Swindlers. (1861, May 31). The Greensboro Patriot, 3.

30. Wanted. (1847, May 28). New York Daily Herald, 4.

31. Wegge, S., Anbinder, T., & O Gráda, C. (2017). Immigrants and savers: A rich database on the Irish in 1850s New York. Historical Method, 50(3), 144-155. https://doi.org/10.1080/01615440.2017.1319773.

About the Author Kaifeng Deng is a senior who majors in economics and history at the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences. He enjoys using data to tell a story, and his research interests center around immigration policy and immigrant experience in America. He is currently working on his economics thesis, which studies the effect of COVID-19 school closures on English learners’ academic performance in the US. Marshall is a member of the University Honors Program.

Mentor Details Tyler Anbinder is professor emeritus of history at The George Washington University. A specialist in nineteenth-century American politics and the history of immigration and ethnicity, he is the author of three award-winning books: Nativism and Slavery, Five Points, and City of Dreams. His latest book, This Plentiful Country, is forthcoming in 2023. Dr. Anbinder received his PhD in History from Columbia University.

48 KEYWORDS: human rights, International Criminal Court, Israel, Palestine DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).06

Withholding Hope: Comparative Perspectives of the International Criminal Court’s Palestinian Investigation ANTHONY HU

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ESIA ‘23, anthonyhu@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT Entering its 20th year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) continues to face a crisis of legitimacy.

One of the ICC’s main controversies is its history of prosecuting defendants from countries primarily in the Global South, raising concerns that the ICC may not adequately bring to justice all perpetrators of mass atrocities and war crimes. The opening of an ICC investigation into Israel and Palestine raises new questions about how the ICC is situated to help achieve peace in the Global South during an ongoing armed conflict, nonetheless. Given critiques of the ICC’s alleged bias in the Global South, this study aims to understand whether the ICC is truly representative of its victims’ interests. To this end, it investigated the Palestinian and international communities’ responses to the ICC Prosecutor’s opening of an investigation in Israel and Palestine, drawing from a social media analysis of three prominent organizations in each group.

Although both groups welcomed the move by the ICC prosecutor, Palestinians, still tainted by the ongoing armed conflict and previous instances of justice stalled or withheld, are not as optimistic about the ICC investigation as the international community is. This study offers a first look at the Israel/Palestine conflict in understanding how perspectives of justice can differ between the international community and the local victims.

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INTRODUCTION Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has had a momentous year in 2021. In February, ICC judges made history when it recognized Palestine as a state under international law for the purposes of the ICC’s preliminary examination of whether war crimes and crimes against humanity may have occurred during armed conflicts in the Gaza Strip and in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank (International Criminal Court, 2021a). A month later and against the warnings of Israel and its Western allies, the ICC announced that, after years of debate, there was indeed a reasonable basis to believe that members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israeli government, and Hamas—a Palestinian militant and nationalist group—committed these crimes (International Criminal Court, 2021c). In addition to the fact that the ICC’s investigation means the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) acknowledges Palestine to be an independent state, the opening of this investigation raises interesting questions about how the ICC is situated to help achieve peace in the Global South— let alone during an ongoing armed conflict.

In the two decades since its inception, the ICC

has garnered significant amounts of controversy regarding its role as an independent arbitrator of justice. In particular, African states have accused the ICC of having an African bias because the majority of the ICC’s cases have been within the African continent’s borders. Notably, the ICC has strayed away from cases where great powers are involved, such as the United States. In the same fashion, groundbreaking scholarship on the ICC has questioned whether the ICC can deter crime at all and whether its interests are in line with that of the victims they represent.

Given its historical record of selectively prosecuting those on the African continent, a key question facing the young ICC today is whether the cosmopolitan court can truly achieve justice for those in the Global South. Thus, with the opening of this investigation in the State of Palestine, this paper aims to address the inquiry question, “How has the ICC’s decision to investigate the situation in the State of Palestine impacted Palestinian understanding of the ICC?” I argue that the opening of an investigation does not incite as much hope and excitement for Palestinians as it does for the international community. While the international

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 community has welcomed the ICC prosecutor’s move as an unprecedented milestone in holding perpetrators of crimes against humanity to account, Palestinians perspectives of the Court are still tainted by ongoing armed conflict and previous instances of justice stalled or withheld.

However, the commencement of the investigation in the State of Palestine earlier this year posits a unique opportunity to study the issue of justice from a bottomup perspective—that is, to understand what justice means to local victims who were directly affected by the ICC crimes in question and what justice means to the international community, namely the ICC. Both states under review, Israel and Palestine, are located in the Global South; however, compared to previous ICC cases where the victims and the defendants were solely associated with the Global South, Israel is an outlier here because it has the political support of powerful Western countries like the United States.

The rationale behind a liberal cosmopolitan project such as the ICC is that it would represent all parties— regardless of its politics, geographic location, democratic status, and other factors—in the fight against impunity for egregious crimes in the international community such as genocide and war crimes. It is necessary, then, to comprehend and appreciate Palestinian perspectives and understandings of the ICC. The controversies surrounding the ICC today warrant a reevaluation of whether the Court is truly representative of all the interests in its mandate. The aim of this project is not to support a particular side of the investigation, but—insofar that Palestinian victims are involved—to illuminate the role the ICC plays in the Palestinian imagination and the extent to which the fledgling institution is seen as a practical means of obtaining justice.

LITERATURE REVIEW What is the ICC? The ICC began its operations in 2002 with a mandate to investigate and prosecute individuals accused of the gravest crimes in the international community, which are understood here as the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (About the Court, n.d.). The Court is the product of over a century of recommendations by state parties to establish an international tribunal for various international crimes (International Law Commission, 1949, p. 7). To name a few, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference initially proposed the idea of an international court to try political leaders accused of global crimes following the First World War. During the post-World War II era, two ad hoc military tribunals were established in Nuremberg, Germany and Tokyo, Japan to try military leaders in an international court (International Law Commission, 1949, p. 21).

The ICC is the first and only permanent international

49 court with similar jurisdiction to these international military tribunals. The ICC’s authority derives from the Rome Statute, a multilateral treaty signed by 123 member states to date, of which the U.S. is not a signatory party.

The Rome Statute grants the Court jurisdiction over crimes that are committed either (a) by a state party (i.e., states that have ratified the Rome Statute), (b) in the territory of a state party, or (c) referred to the ICC prosecutor by resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (International Criminal Court, 2003). The principle of complementarity, which governs how the Court exercises its jurisdiction, distinguishes the Court from other international tribunals.

Put simply, the ICC is intended to complement national criminal jurisdictions, not replace them, and it should only try cases when states lack the capacity or will to do so “genuinely” (Rome Statute, 2002). Since 2002, the ICC has tried 30 cases and issued 35 arrest warrants. After a state party or the UNSC refers an alleged crime to the OTP, the prosecutor conducts a preliminary examination to determine if there is sufficient evidence that a crime has occurred. If that threshold is satisfied, the OTP then launches an official investigation into the situation, as is the current case with Israel and Palestine, after which the prosecutor may decide whether or not to press charges and continue to trial.

Can the ICC Actually Deter Atrocities?

Recent ICC literature has taken a closer look at the assumption that the ICC is effective in its mandate to end impunity where mass atrocities are concerned.

Given that the ICC is tasked with investigating and prosecuting individuals accused of the gravest crimes in the international community, the ICC has a determining role in how international law can prevent mass crimes from being committed around the world, ideally including territories such as Palestine in the Global South (About the Court, n.d.). Thus, in 2016, Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons conducted the first systematic assessment of the ICC’s ability to deter crime following its involvement (Jo & Simmons, 2016). Their article examined whether the court has, to date, contributed to the attainment of peace and security through its envisioned global justice system.

By analyzing crime statistics of rebel groups in over 100 countries between 1989—before the court’s inception— and 2011—almost a decade since its inception—Jo and Simmons (2016) come to the conclusion that rebel groups which sought legitimacy and recognition in the international community were more likely to be influenced by the ICC. They rely on two formal theories: prosecutorial deterrence theory and social deterrence theory. The former suggests that prosecutorial actions, such as investigations and indictments, trigger a reassessment of the likelihood of punishment and can thus reinforce deterrence. The latter suggests that some

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groups are more deterrable than others depending on their need to cultivate local, regional, or international legitimacy.

The African Bias Since its inception, however, the ICC has faced and still faces a legitimacy crisis on two separate fronts. As a new international body, the ICC has generally stayed away from situations where influential players were involved.

However, its hesitation and failure to investigate reported crimes involving great powers led it to inadvertently target the continent of Africa; in fact, nine out of the ten ICC investigations in 2016 had African defendants and African victims (Situations and Cases, n.d.). One scholar, Oumar Ba, rightfully underscores that the ICC has a race problem: although the ICC has indeed fought for African victims, the fact that the ICC has only had African defendants for the majority of its history points to a glaring “gap in accountability for white/westerners who are perpetrators of atrocity crimes in international justice” (Ba, 2021, p. 385).

Notably, in 2009, the African Union (AU) spoke out against the ICC for its targeting of the African continent after the ICC attempted to arrest the sitting president of Sudan for war crimes in Darfur. Rationalising that prosecuting sitting presidents would cause more instability and violence within the region than it would prevent, then-AU President Muammar al-Gaddafi equated the ICC’s arrest warrant to “first world terrorism,” citing concerns that the ICC was acting as a tool for imperial powers (Black, 2009). Shortly after, the AU adopted a resolution that directed its members to stop cooperating with the Court, to not act on the arrest warrant, and to not transmit information to the Court on the matter (African Union, 2009, p. 2).

Holding the United States to Account As evident in al-Gaddafi’s remarks, the ICC’s inability to investigate and prosecute Western states does it no favors in counteracting its alleged African bias. Out of fear that ICC proceedings would violate their sovereignty, the United States has continuously rejected the ICC’s jurisdiction over non-state parties to the Rome Statute absent referrals by the United Nations Security Council.

Most notably, the U.S. passed the American ServiceMembers’ Protection Act of 2002 long before the ICC made public its intentions of investigating the U.S. (United States Congress, 2001). The legislation, colloquially known as the Hague Invasion Act, barred U.S. cooperation with the ICC and authorized the president to use “all means necessary and appropriate” should the ICC ever detain allied personnel.

Thus, when the ICC announced in 2019 that it was going to investigate the U.S. for alleged crimes committed

in Afghanistan, the U.S. revoked the visa of the chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and imposed economic sanctions on members of the Court’s staff (Simons & Specia, 2019). More recently, the Biden Administration revoked Executive Order 13928, which authorized the imposition of those sanctions, but continued to assert that the ICC bears no jurisdiction over non-state parties “absent their consent or referral by the United Nations Security Council” (Biden, 2021, par. 4). In other words, seeing as how the U.S. holds a permanent veto seat on the UNSC, an ICC probe of the U.S. or its allies is impossible without the U.S.’s approval. After the recent change in government in Afghanistan, the ICC relented and stated that it is no longer pursuing the U.S. for alleged crimes in the region (Deutsch & van den Berg, 2021). Put simply, both these crises—(a) the ICC’s perceived African bias and (b) its inability or unwillingness to hold world powers to account—have called into question whether the ICC is an effective mechanism to bring perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity to justice.

The ICC in the State of Palestine In response to the OTP’s decision to investigate the situation, political leaders from Israel and Palestine had radically differing responses. Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas stated that “[the ICC] is one of the few avenues he has to peacefully confront Israel” (Magid, 2021). Likewise, PA Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh said, “The International Criminal Court’s decision…is a victory for rights, justice, freedom and moral values in the world” (Abbas, 2021). Meanwhile, the United States and other Israeli allies have urged Abbas to renounce the investigation, “arguing that it exacerbates efforts to keep dimming prospects for a two-state solution alive and antagonizes Israel” (Abbas, 2021).

By and large, contemporary scholarship on the ICC’s decision to involve itself in the Israel/Palestine conflict has focused on its finding that Palestine is indeed a state under international law (Zimmermann, 2013; see also Lee, 2016). More generally and with few exceptions, recent literature on the ICC has mostly taken for granted the ICC’s ability to prosecute war criminals and deter atrocities (Jo & Simmons, 2016). However, new research has recently emerged around theories of peace versus justice in Palestine. A recent historical survey unveiled that truth and reconciliation commissions which investigated political violence and human rights violations in Palestine have systematically suppressed their findings or failed to implement significant reform (Allen, 2020).

This, then, begs the question, “Can an international court effect the reform that international commissions could not?” One the one hand, the ICC’s role as an independent third-party may incentivize and open up greater opportunities for peace processes to take place in the region, contrary to the objections to the investigation

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by Israel and its allies (Kersten, 2020). On the other hand, legal scholars have long criticized the ICC for interfering with the sovereignty of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute, another key argument Israel makes before the court (Goldsmith, 2003).

This research does not attempt to answer whether the ICC can resolve the conflict in Palestine. Instead, amidst all the controversy about whether there should be an investigation at all, it points to the need to bring victims’ voices and opinions to the table—i.e., the Palestinians’ perspectives. As previously mentioned, the peace versus justice debate is largely ignored in ICC literature. For instance, the ICC’s prosecution and conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for directing attacks against Timbuktu religious and cultural heritage sites was celebrated in the international community for moving the needle in protecting UNESCO World Heritage sites (Drumbl, 2019).

However, further research revealed that local victims were frustrated that the ICC’s sole focus in those cases was the destruction of cultural heritage rather than those killed or harmed in the process of those attacks (Ba, 2020). A retired Malian judge aptly summarizes the Malian perspective on the ICC prosecution: “Malians are not very attached to these cultural artefacts [sic]…They ask, what about the soldiers who were killed in Aguelhok?

Instead, the ICC goes after this little breaker of shrines [Al Mahdi]” (Ba, 2020, p. 8). Said otherwise, this study of the ICC’s involvement in Mali demonstrated that justice has different meanings for the ICC and the local populace in the Global South.

The situation in Palestine makes for another case in point: in a recent submission to the court arguing for its jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory, the ICC prosecutor blatantly failed to cite Palestinian sources.

In fact, out of 648 footnotes, only one mentioned in passing a Palestinian lawyer (International Criminal Court, 2020).

One scholar, Victor Kattan, argues that Palestinians are radically underrepresented in the court’s proceedings because of the politics of citation, in that scholars and practitioners will avoid citing sources associated with “emotional” causes—in this case, Palestine—to be seen as more “objective” in their stances (Kattan, 2020).

Regardless of the reasons why academics and practitioners may cite one side more frequently than another, the lack of representation of either group is problematic for a court meant to resolve justice in the international community. A greater understanding of Palestinian perspectives in the ICC’s recent decision to investigate the situation in Palestine would further illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the ICC in resolving international conflicts and not simply prosecuting individuals.

51 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS This essay aims to examine potential discrepancies between the international and Palestinian communities’ responses to the announcement of the ICC that it will be investigating possible war crimes committed in the Israel/Palestine conflict. My methodology focused on first gauging and then comparing the responses of both communities by collecting qualitative, rather than quantitative, data from various organizations representative of both groups. More specifically, my research primarily used document and social media analysis of six organizations (three from each group) to identify the language and underlying tones used in responding to the ICC announcement.

Firstly, I gauged the Palestinian community’s consensus on the decision by looking at three different civil society organizations that are either based in the occupied territories of Palestine or focused primarily on Palestinian issues: Al-Haq Organization, Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, and the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights. These three organizations were chosen primarily because they are reputable human rights organizations based in the State of Palestine and have an active web presence. In particular, Al-Haq and Al-Mezan were recommended to me by human rights scholars and researchers.

More specifically, the gathered data consisted of keywords found on statements published on these organizations’ websites and derived from their social media platforms. To reinforce the Palestinian community’s response, this research analyzed these organizations’ relevant Twitter posts because Twitter is often the main social media platform for many civil society organizations.

In particular, I surveyed all Twitter posts and statements posted by these organizations that contained the keywords “International Criminal Court,” “global court,” “international court,” “prosecutor,” or “investigation,” since the announcement of the ICC decision.

Secondly, this research attempted to gauge the international community’s response. For this, I turned to the public announcements of global institutions whose mandates are relevant to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict: namely, the ICC, the United Nations (UN), and the Council of Europe (COE). Similar to how the Palestinian community’s consensus was established, this research looked at keywords and topics in these international institutions’ public announcements regarding the ICC’s decision to investigate potential war crimes in the region.

Moreover, I analyzed the most relevant posts from these institutions’ Twitter posts, which are often the main social media platform for these global institutions as well.

To this end, I surveyed all Twitter posts and statements posted by these organizations since the announcement of the ICC decision that contained the keywords

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“International Criminal Court” and “Palestine” or “Israel.”

The key terms here differed from the key terms above because these international institutions’ scopes reach far beyond the ICC and the Israel/Palestine conflict, whereas the Palestinian human rights NGOs primarily report on developments on the conflict. As such, the key terms here require greater specificity.

While the data analyzed comprised primarily of the ICC’s language—as it is the most relevant institution to the investigation—the UN and COE were also pertinent to gauging how the international community perceived the ICC investigation, as both bodies are involved in significant activities in the Israel/Palestine conflict and represent a consensus of the states of which they are comprised.

Still, the language coming from the ICC and the OTP takes precedence here because the Court’s mandate and the reason of origin was to represent the international community as a court of last resort. Therefore, how they speak about this decision and their rationale for why they are pursuing such an investigation was the most telling of how the international community may understand the decision.

After collecting data from both the Palestinian and international communities vis-à-vis these six organizations, this qualitative data was analyzed in two steps: (1) by determining if the response is generally positive or negative, and (2) by deriving from those responses various keywords, phrases, or themes. The former established a baseline of where the Palestinian and international community stands as it relates to the ICC’s decision. It also allowed for the most rudimentary comparison between the two groups. The latter, however, allowed for a more in-depth analysis that gets to the reasoning for the overall positivity or negativity. Even if both communities’ responses were both positive or negative, looking at key phrases and themes would help explain each respective group’s rationale or skepticism for their outlook on the decision.

In order to determine the response of the Palestinian community most affected by the ICC’s decision, this research opted for a document and social media analysis rather than a survey or questionnaire due to three obstacles: (a) language barriers, (b) COVID-19 limitations, and (c) ethical concerns. At the time this research was conducted, it was not possible to hold interviews or distribute questionnaires to the local Palestinian population without funding for an Arabic-English interpreter. Moreover, ongoing COVID-19 restrictions did not allow for travel to the regions affected, further prohibiting access to local Palestinian victims. Lastly, if not most importantly, there are significant ethical concerns attached to interviewing and interacting victims of armed conflicts—let alone during an ongoing conflict. For these reasons, an analysis of human rights organizations in the region was the most practical approach because English is one of their main working languages, their materials

are accessible online, and the same ethical considerations do not apply to these organizations, especially since their data is available in the public domain.

There is also one final consideration that should be noted: the ICC’s decision to investigate the situation in the State of Palestine is still relatively recent at the time this research was conducted; less than a year has passed since the ICC made this announcement. Therefore, the data collected will be representative only of the initial reactions of these six organizations—in the Palestinian and international spheres. In a few years, the ICC may withdraw from the conflict for political or “pragmatic” reasons as it did with the U.S. in the situation in Afghanistan (Deutsch & van den Berg, 2021). Nonetheless, any similarities or differences in the reactions and perspectives of the local victims and the international community pose interesting and significant implications for the ICC as a mechanism of justice in the world going forward.

DISCUSSION By (1) determining whether or not an organization is generally positive or negative about the ICC’s decision to investigate and (2) deriving key topics and ideas discussed in an organization’s statements or Twitter posts, three main themes come to light. In particular, I looked at and compared how these organizations reacted to the ICC’s announcement, how they perceived the impact of this decision, and how relevant the ICC is to the Israel/Palestinian conflict. In the first theme, I discuss more generally how these organizations responded to the news that the ICC was finally, after years of debate, opening an investigation in the State of Palestine. In the next theme, I reflect on key tones and ideas underlying the responses of all six organizations and what they are hoping or expecting to get out of the decision. In the final theme, I consider how their responses are indicative of how they perceive the decision to have an impact on the overarching and ongoing armed conflict in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Reactions to the ICC’s Investigation First and foremost, in the Palestinian community’s case, I found that all three organizations were more-orless unanimous in their outlook on the ICC’s decision.

Namely, Al-Haq, Al-Mezan, and Addameer were all generally positive of the news when it was announced. In fact, all three organizations signed a statement welcoming the ICC decision to recognize Palestine as a state, thus allowing it to become a legitimate party to the ICC’s investigation (Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, 2021a).

Thus, it is safe to say that the ICC investigation is widely welcomed among Palestinian human rights defenders, and by extension, the Palestinian victims they represent.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 In the international community’s case, however, I found that the response has been variable across the three institutions examined. Moreover, where the reaction is positive, it is often overpoweringly so. Namely, the ICC and the OTP have been hesitant in speaking out about their decision to investigate the Palestinian situation.

Outside of official submissions to the Court, the OTP has been strategic in its response and careful not to offend either side by coming out strongly in protection of certain categories of victims—e.g., declaring the decision to be a great step for justice for Palestinians would greatly provoke the Israelis, and vice versa. To that end, the OTP made sure to include both Israeli and Palestinian governments’ statements in each of her comments and emphasized “the pursuit of peace and justice” more than anything else (International Criminal Court, 2021b).

As will be discussed in the case of Al-Bashir below, the ICC prosecutors are generally more outspoken in advocating for their cases. Moreover, given the fact that the OTP is pushing through with the investigation despite the backlash by Israel and its allies, the prosecutor’s relative quietness in this situation suggests that the OTP is still optimistic about the decision but are not at liberty to comment further than needed. For instance, the condemnation of the decision by the U.S. means the investigation and any subsequent prosecution will be highly political and contested within the UNSC, of which the U.S. is a key member. The new prosecutor, sworn in on 16 June 2021, has yet to comment or update on the investigation.

The UN, one degree separate from the ICC, was much more positive about the decision. When the ICC first announced it was just considering an investigation, UN human rights experts called it a “momentous step forward in the quest for accountability” (United Nations News, 2019). Interestingly, the COE, on the other hand, has been silent on the ICC’s decision to investigate Palestine even though the ICC has been widely discussed between COE ministers, member states, and its committee members.

In the following theme below, I discuss in more nuance the implications of these responses from the Palestinian and international communities on how they perceive the ICC itself.

Perceived Impact of the Decision Although the Palestinian community was largely positive and welcoming of the investigation, the tones underlying their responses do differ. For instance, the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights was the most enthusiastic and optimistic about the decision. On 3 March 2021, Al-Mezan said it was “a momentous day for Palestinian victims of Israel’s apparent atrocity crimes” and the decision was “a long-awaited and important step toward justice for Palestinian victims” (Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, 2021d). Notably, it is the only

53 organization that specifically talks about justice for Palestinian victims when congratulating the ICC for making such a stride. To this end, Al-Mezan’s activity suggests that their perception of justice is most closely aligned with the ICC out of these three organizations.

Al-Haq Organization’s response is better characterized as warm but cautious. In congratulating the incoming prosecutor for continuing the procedure, it stressed that the ICC must “move expeditiously” to prosecute those responsible for war crimes in the Gaza Strip (Al-Haq Organization, 2021c). Addameer, on the other hand, did not react to the decision when it was first announced outside of the joint statement. While the statement itself is positive, this may suggest that Addameer did not consider the decision to be that impactful; or perhaps it was an administrative oversight. Nonetheless, the Palestinian community’s response has been similar in that it was positive and receiving.

Moreover, in the Palestinian community’s discourse about the ICC, they either (a) stressed the urgency and necessity of the ICC’s intervention, or (b) referenced the ICC as a source of authority or legitimacy in appealing to the international community. As discussed below, the Palestinian response to the decision suggests that the ICC has yet to deliver on its promise of pursuing accountability in the situation and they are still skeptical that the ICC will be able to effectively resolve the alleged war crimes on its own.

Firstly, the pattern of urgency and necessity in each of these organizations’ statements and social media posts comes from the fact that they have been calling for ICC intervention for years. For instance, Addameer requested an ICC investigation as early as 2010, claiming that, “despite significant evidence indicating the widespread perpetration of international crimes, not once has a senior military or government official been investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the obligations of international law” (Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 2010) [emphasis added].

In 2020, the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights questioned on more than one occasion why the ICC has yet to claim its jurisdiction over the Palestinian territories using the hashtags, #OpenInvestigation and #EndImpunity (Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, 2020). It is not surprising, then, that these organizations would describe the decision as “long-awaited” (AlMezan Center for Human Rights, 2021e). Of the three organizations, Al-Haq emphasized the urgency of the move the most. On multiple occasions, it stressed that the ICC “must move expeditiously,” even calling for it to expedite its investigation several months after the announcement (Al-Haq Organization, 2021c). Put simply, despite welcoming the investigation, the Palestinian community’s response primarily emphasizes the need for urgency in this case.

Secondly, the Palestinian response carries the most

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positive and reinforcing tones when it is addressing other members of the international community and is referencing the ICC’s decision as a source of authority or legitimacy. After the Israeli state designated six of Palestine’s most prominent civil society organizations (CSOs) as “terrorists,” Al-Haq and Addameer rebuked the designation, citing the opening of the ICC’s investigation as the reason why Israel is retaliating against Palestinian CSOs (Al-Haq Organization, 2021a). Said differently, AlHaq and other organizations were implying that Israel felt threatened by the ICC working to expose alleged crimes committed by its defense forces. Thus, Al-Haq’s reference to the ICC here was more supportive and optimistic of the investigation and its potential outcomes than in its previous messaging.

The Palestinian community also cited the ICC when describing alleged Israeli crimes against humanity. In 2021, the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights wrote that “Israel’s institutionalized and systemic racial domination and oppression of the Palestinian people…constitutes a crime against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (Al-Mezan Center for human Rights, 2021c). Previously, Al-Mezan also described the Israeli bombing of the Gaza Strip as “what manifestly amounts to war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, 2021b). In doing so, Al-Mezan is relying on the ICC’s authority and legitimacy to claim that Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territories are indeed war crimes or crimes against humanity. Such discourse again reflects a more optimistic perspective of the ICC in that these organizations are confident in the ICC’s definitions of crimes in violation of international humanitarian law.

As discussed more in depth above, the ICC prosecutor’s strategic hesitancy to remark more than needed on the investigation is not necessarily indicative of a pessimistic outlook on the potential impacts of the case. Indeed, the OTP has been particularly vocal about the relevance and importance that war criminals like al-Bashir should be brought before the seat of the court in the Hague, but al-Bashir’s case in Sudan did not have the backing of large Western powers such as the U.S. Thus, the relative quietness of the Court on this decision more appropriately reflects a calculated move on the part of the prosecutor.

More than anything, the fact that the OTP is moving forward with the case, despite international pressure otherwise, is telling of the prosecutor’s hope to achieve justice for the local Palestinian victims in this situation.

While the ICC prosecutor is more reserved in what they can and cannot say, the UN has been more ambitious in its advocacy. In 2021, two UN Special Rapporteurs came out optimistically and strongly in favor of the investigation, saying that the ICC decision is a “momentous step” that “opens the door” for justice in occupied Palestine (United Nations News, 2019; see also United Nations News 2021a).

In this way, the international community is more hopeful

and forward-looking than the Palestinian community on the potential for the ICC to achieve justice in Palestine.

However, the two communities share the sense of urgency behind their response to the ICC announcement.

As the armed conflict continues to escalate after the announcement, the UN has pressed (alongside the Palestinians) for the ICC to intervene in the conflict (United Nations News, 2021b). To this end, both the Palestinian and international communities recognize that not only does the ICC have a significant crime-deterring role or capacity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, but that in the context of the ongoing armed conflict, there is a real need for the ICC to act hastily.

As for the COE, it is surprising that they have not taken a stance on the issue given that they are the European continent’s “leading human rights organization” (Who We Are, n.d.). It is not that COE’s jurisdiction does not include the ICC either; a public search of the keyword “International Criminal Court” reveals that the Court has been the topic of discussion or at least mentioned in over 2,300 COE documents. Why exactly this is the case is beyond the scope of this research, but it is telling that each international institution has had a different response to the ICC investigation. In the COE’s case, perhaps because the issue is too controversial or not in its member states’ interests, their silence hints at a tone of uncertainty in the ICC investigation’s ability to promote and protect human rights in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Relevancy of the ICC to the Armed Conflict To better understand how the Palestinian and international communities view the ICC decision to investigate the situation in Palestine through the lens of the overarching armed conflict that is still ongoing, one must look at how the ICC is discussed as a means to an end in the Palestinians’ struggle for justice.

In some cases, the three Palestinian organizations surveyed have asserted that the international community at large—that is, including the ICC—has failed the Palestinian community by failing to act on war crimes committed in the region. In May 2021, notably after the ICC decision, Al-Haq Organization penned a letter signed by over 250 legal scholars and advocates calling for the ICC to take action. The letter began by asserting, “The world is watching as a war crime unfolds in front of our very eyes, and as those who are entrusted with the upkeep of international law take no meaningful action” (Al-Haq Organization, 2021b) [emphasis added].

For the Palestinians, concrete acts—e.g., the prosecution of specific war criminals responsible for crimes against humanity in the region—must be taken in order to truly protect human rights in the region. Said differently, it may be that these Palestinian organizations were not as optimistic about the announcement as their international counterparts were because of the long history of failed

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 pursuits of justice in the Palestinian case (Allen, 2020).

It follows, then, that the positivity behind the Palestinian response is overshadowed by its calls for urgency and expedition as more war crimes are allegedly being perpetrated in the region. This call for the ICC to act more hastily is seen among each of these three organizations. In November 2021, Addameer wrote an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, saying that while they are calling for the ICC to investigate Israeli war crimes, thousands of human rights defenders are arbitrarily arrested each year (Rana & Milena, 2021). Similarly, in May 2021, Al-Haq Organization wrote to the ICC, asking the prosecutor to take action against the forced displacement of hundreds of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah (Al-Haq Organization, 2021b).

What is more telling is that the Palestinians are not alone in these calls for help. The UN has also called for urgency on the part of the ICC after witnessing further human rights violations in the region. Also in May 2021, UN human rights experts urged an expedition of the ICC investigation after over a week of rocket fire and bombardments killed more than 250 civilians and injured several thousand others. The fact that these requests came after the announcement took place suggests that, although their initial response was positive, the Palestinian and international communities are not assured that the ICC in its current state of progression alone can adequately prevent further human rights violations from taking place.

CONCLUSION All-in-all, it has been an interesting year for the ICC. Although its findings on the situation in the State of Palestine are indeed historic, the OTP should not completely celebrate just yet. As discussed above, the Palestinian community’s response was positive overall but strikingly hesitant to put all their faith in the ICC. Their calls for the ICC to act sooner and citation of the Court in appeals to the international community at large strongly implies that they do not believe the ICC alone will help bring the perpetrators of war crimes in the Gaza Strip to account. Rather, their references to the ICC’s decision to open an investigation in their appeals to other international organization suggests that at least in part, the ICC is a means to an end for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, rather than an end in-and-of-itself. Me anwhile, the international community’s response was less positive than anticipated, but when it was optimistic, it was strongly so. Although the ICC has more at stake due to the contentious politics of this particular investigation, both the ICC and COE are surprisingly quiet on the announcement. Nevertheless, the UN and the Palestinian communities both recognize the necessity of the ICC to act with urgency but diverge where the UN sees the ICC decision as a turning point in the conflict.

55 These findings suggest that without proper follow through and resolution, the ICC decision is not as much of a victory for the Palestinian community as the international community might find it to be. More importantly, this conclusion is in line with some of the more recent ICC literature in that the international community’s interests and perspectives of justice in pursuing solutions to conflicts around the world may not always be in line with that of the local victims. Thus, this research has significant implications for understanding how justice can and should be achieved for local victims in the international arena. To this end, if the ICC wishes to become truly representative of the victims it claims to advocate for, the prosecutor and the rest of the OTP must incorporate more local perspectives in its judicial processes—starting with the State of Palestine.

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Day 11 of military offensive brings 11 more deaths in Gaza, including of two children and three women,

and destruction of nine residential buildings. https://www.mezan.org/en/post/23992 11. Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights. (2021c, November 29). On the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, Al Mezan issues a new report: “The Gaza Bantustan—Israeli Apartheid in the Gaza Strip.” https://www.mezan.org/en/ post/24083 12. Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights [@ AlMezanCenter]. (2020, April 29). @WilliamSchabas1: “The #ICJ was able to distinguish between the sovereign territory of #Israel and the occupied territory of #Palestine – Cannot. [Tweet].

Twitter. https://twitter.com/AlMezanCenter/ status/1255475939145908224 13. Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights [@ AlMezanCenter]. (2021d, March 3). On this momentous day for Palestinian victims of Israel’s apparent atrocity crimes, @AlMezanCenter recalls the victims who told us their. [Tweet].

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16. Ba, O. (2020). Governing the souls and community: why do Islamists destroy world heritage sites?

Cambridge Review of International Affairs. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1784094 17. Ba, O. (2021). Global Justice and Race. International Politics Reviews, 9, 375-389. https://doi.org/10.1057/ s41312-021-00115-z 18. Biden, J. (2021, April 2). Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on the Termination of Emergency with Respect to the International Criminal Court. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2021/04/02/letter-to-thespeaker-of-the-house-and-the-president-of-thesenate-on-the-termination-of-emergency-withrespect-to-the-international-criminal-court/ 19. Black, I. (2009, March 29). Defiant Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir attends Arab summit. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/ mar/30/sudan-president-arab-summit 20. Deutsch, A. & van den Berg, S. (2021, September 27).

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 War Crimes Prosecutor Would Not Focus on U.S. Forces in New Afghanistan Probe. Thomson Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ icc-prosecutor-seeks-authorisation-resumeafghanistan-war-crimes-investigation-2021-09-27/ 21. Drumbl, M. A. (2019). From Timbuktu to the Hague and beyond: The war crime of intentionally attacking Cultural Property. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 17(1), 77-99.

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Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine. https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ CR2020_00161.PDF 25. International Criminal Court. (2021a, February 5).

Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine’. ICC-01/18143. https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record. aspx?docNo=ICC-01/18-143 26. International Criminal Court. (2021b, March 3).

Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine. https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item. aspx?name=210303-prosecutor-statementinvestigation-palestine 27. International Criminal Court. (2021c, March 3).

Summary of Preliminary Examination Findings. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/210303office-of-the-prosecutor-palestine-summaryfindings-eng.pdf 28. International Law Commission. (1949). Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1. https://legal. un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_7_rev1. pdf 29. Jo, H. & Simmons, B. (2016). Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? International Organization, 70, 443-475.

30. Kattan, V. (2020). Palestinian Scholarship and the International Criminal Court’s Blind Spot. Third World Approaches to International Law Review: Reflections, 14.

57 31. Kersten, M. (2020). No Justice Without Peace, but What Peace is on Offer?: Palestine, Israel and the International Criminal Court. Journal Of International Criminal Justice, 18(4), 1001-1015.

32. Lee, H. (2016). Defining “State” for the Purpose of the International Criminal Court: The Problem Ahead After the Palestine Decision. University of Pittsburg Law Review, 77(3), 345-384.

33. Magid, J. (2021, September 10). Biden officials privately pushed Abbas to shelve ICC probe against Israel. Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael. com/biden-officials-privately-pushed-abbas-toshelve-icc-probe-against-israel/ 34. Rana and Milena. (2021, November 6). Op-Ed: Israel just declared our human rights work ‘terrorism.’

But it won’t silence us. Los Angeles Times. https:// www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-11-06/ israel-human-rights-palestine-groups-designationterrorism 35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

(2002, July 1). A/CONF.183/9. https://www.loc.gov/ item/lcwaN0018822/.

36. Simons, M. and Specia, M. (2019, April 5). U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing Afghan War Crimes. New York Times. https://www. nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world/europe/us-iccprosecutor-afghanistan.html 37. Situations and Cases. (n.d.). International Criminal Court. Retrieved December 11, 2021, from https:// www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx 38. United Nations News. (2019, December 31). Israel/ Palestine war crimes probe “momentous step forward”, says UN rights expert. https://news. un.org/en/story/2019/12/1054541 39. United Nations News. (2021a, February 9). New ICC ruling ‘opens the door’ for justice in occupied 40. Palestine – Independent UN expert. https://news. un.org/en/story/2021/02/1084232 41. United Nations News. (2021b, May 21). Ceasefire can’t hide scale of destruction in Gaza, UN warns, as rights experts call for ICC probe. https://news. un.org/en/story/2021/05/1092482 42. United Nations News. (2021c, May 27). UN rights chief calls for inclusive peace process to end Palestine occupation. https://news.un.org/en/ story/2021/05/1092872 43. United States Congress. (2001, November 1).

S.1610 - 107th Congress (2001-2002): American

58

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44. Who We Are. (n.d.). Council of Europe. Retrieved December 12, 2021, from https://www.coe.int/en/web/aboutus/who-we-are 45. Zimmermann, A (2013). Palestine and the International Criminal Court ‘Quo Vadis’?: Reach and Limits of Declarations Under Article 12(3). Journal Of International Criminal Justice, 11(2), 303-329.

About the Author Anthony Hu is a third-year international affairs major from Alhambra, California. His research interests include human rights, self-determination movements, and international courts and tribunals. Anthony has interned and worked for the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, the Loyola Law School’s Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of State.

Mentor Details Originally from Rwanda, Dr. Claudine Kuradusenge-McLeod is a Professional Lecturer in international affairs at George Washington University and the Chair of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights M.A. Program at American University. She is also a Human Rights activist and scholar specializing in genocide studies, and in the intersection of Diaspora consciousness and social mobilization. She is the author of Narratives of Victimhood and Perpetration: The Struggle of Bosnian and Rwandan Diaspora Communities in the United States as well as articles published in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, the International Journal of Transitional Justice, and the International Studies Review.

Dr. Kuradusenge-McLeod received her M.S. and Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University.

59 KEYWORDS: Black power, women, masculinity, race, gender DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).05

The Gender Politics of Revolutionary Struggle in the Black Panther Party EMILY ALLEN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & HISTORY, ESIA 21’, emilyaallen@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT Amidst numerous radical movements in the 1960s, the Black Panther Party grew to be one of the most notable Black power groups. From being an Oakland, California-based militant organization to having 40 chapters across 28 states, the Black Panthers were dynamic in adapting to the changing needs of their members and communities. While the organization was not free from misogyny or patriarchal ideas, Panther women sought to direct more attention to women’s issues and took on many responsibilities in the wake of suppression from the FBI’s CounterIntelligence Program. First, this paper analyzes the origins and development of the Party’s gender-related ideology. Second, using primary sources, this research seeks to understand the various roles women fulfilled within the Party, in terms of militants, rank-and-file members, and revolutionaries.

•

INTRODUCTION

When asked about women’s role in the Black Panther Party, Kathleen Cleaver, the former Communications Secretary of the BPP, reflected that the only relevant question was “Where can I go to get involved in the revolutionary struggle?”

(233) in a 1998 speech on gender and the Black Panther Party. In this speech, “Women, Power, and Revolution,” Cleaver argues that gender is a lens that is often used to criticize the Panthers, rather than to celebrate the women in the wide range of ways they participated and prevailed against many layers of struggle. While Cleaver’s framing speaks to her individual interpretation of how the Panthers are framed historically, it is also valid to dissect the gender politics within the Party to both celebrate female revolutionaries and understand the ways in which patriarchy and misogyny limited them.

The revolutionary struggle began in Oakland, California, with Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale founding the Black Panther Party for Self Defense in 1966, combating police brutality in their communities with their own armed police patrols. That same year, Newton and Seale created the Black Panther Party Ten Point Program to address the needs of the Bay Area’s Black community. By early 1967, the first official Party headquarters was set up and party recruitment and expansion followed. Panther ideology intersected Marxism, Black Nationalism, and other conceptions of power structures (which will be addressed in the following section) to form their own interpretation of the conditions of the Black community in the United States. Nationwide

growth led to greater targeted attacks from police and the FBI through the FBI’s CounterIntelligence Program (COINTELPRO), forcing the Party to adapt towards the implementation of “Survival Programs,” such as the Free Breakfast Program, among others.

While popular history remembers the malecentric leadership and imagery of the Party, it’s easy to simply think of women’s roles as limited or restricted by the innate hypermasculinity of revolutionary struggle. Additionally, the Panthers were one of many radical groups that emerged in the mid- to late-1960s. Along with many other Black nationalist groups, there were many feminist women’s groups. The question often centers on why Panther women didn’t join other women’s groups or form groups of their own (Banks, 2005, 58). Oftentimes, the answer is simply that women’s liberation groups fit the needs of just white-middle class women. Typically in this context, narratives surrounding women in the BPP often center on the ways patriarchy prevailed in a group that was supposed to reject it. Narratives have centered on the experiences of individual members, notably Elaine Brown and Ericka Huggins (Spencer, 2016 and Rocker, 2020). That said, the Party, especially at its peak, was so large in its breath that there is no one narrative about women in the Party, whether it be positive or negative. This is not to say the BPP was without sexism and misogyny, but women often worked within the constraints of their environment.

There was a great deal of hypocrisy and disconnect from male leadership and rank-and-file members when it came to rhetoric around gender

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and Party practices. Patriarchal values and practices and “male chauvinism” were not simply ignored, though. The women involved in the BPP, whether they were national figures like Kathleen Cleaver, Ericka Huggins, or Assata Shakur, or the average Party member, who contributed to the publication of The Black Panther or the Free Breakfast Program, ensured that anti-sexism was a part of the revolutionary struggle. The different roles fulfilled by women in the Black Panther Party advocated for the breaking down of white patriarchal values through their various party functions, while working with their male counterparts to combat their own sexism and misogyny.

The BPP’s goal was a Black Power revolution and Black liberation, where the white bourgeois power structures would be broken down to grant societal equality. In this broader revolutionary movement, how did women express their own agency, so that societal equality would include gender equality? How did women place themselves in the revolutionary context with their male counterparts? How did women adapt their roles to suit the broader movement? Using the three commonly used roles fulfilled by women in the BPP (the Militant Woman, the Rank-and-File Woman, the Revolutionary Mother), this paper will analyze how the BPP engaged with gender and how women advocated for their role in this segment of the Black Power movement. Women’s participation in the BPP was dynamic in the ways that they responded to the varying and changing needs of the Party as a whole, but many women faced the results of their male comrades’ attitudes, which were often informed by patriarchal values.

FOUNDATIONS OF PANTHER IDEOLOGY AND ITS ROLE IN PARTY GENDER POLITICS The BPP interpreted particular concepts in application to the Party’s conceptualizations of the Black community’s experience in the United States. Panther ideology supports Black nationalism (ideas that originate with Malcolm X) and liberation as internal colonies within the U.S. and, as Bobby Seale explained in a 1967 speech, the colonial forces are “White cops [who occupy] our community like foreign troops. (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 80)” The historians Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr. explain the concept of internal colonies and the structures that enforce them: “The oppressive imperial American state denied black people political and economic power…

The police were not officers of justice- they were pigs… and foreign troops oppressing black people. Those who challenged the police were not criminals- they were antiimperialists. (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 114)” The Party “saw police, government officials, and capitalists alike as ‘pigs,’” that upheld, what was typically referred to as, the “pig power structure” that oppressed the Black community (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 388). Rhetoric of anti-imperialism often related to the experiences of other countries, who

had anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements, notably Vietnam (especially as the Party aligned with the antiwar movement). Furthermore, rhetoric using the concept of fascism was defined as “as capitalism plus racism practiced by an open dictatorship of finance capitalism.

(Williams, 2012, 34)” Finally, important concepts used in Panther gender politics are Black emasculation and male chauvinism. To start with the former, Black manhood has been historically weaponized as a tool of white supremacy, with the convergence of “political terrorism, economic oppression, and conventional codes of sexuality and morality,” making it particularly important to reclaim Black masculinity in the context of Black power (Carby, 1985, 268). Particularly, the lynching of black men demonstrated the ways in which this persecution occured. Additionally, the Black family structure, the target of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 report “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action,” informed negative stereotypes about both fathers and mothers (Spencer, 2008, 90). Notably, these stereotypes reinforced the single matriarch and the absent father.

“Male chauvinism,” on the other hand, was a term that became en vogue during the second wave of feminism “to derogate the conviction of men that they were better than women. (Mansbridge & Flaster, 2005, 261)” Male chauvinism was essentially a blanket term, utilized in both contemporary Panther language and retrospective oral histories, to address the behavior and attitudes that assumed male superiority in everyday behaviors (i.e. not formally addressing patriarchal structures or misogyny).

(Mansbridge & Flaster, 2007, 642) The popularity of this term makes it the lens for many women to describe an array of behaviors or experiences.

Although the original inception of the BPP, rooted in self-defense of the Black community, was inherently hypermasculine in nature, this identity was not static.

While the Party itself was rooted in ideas of Black Power and liberation, ideas about gender evolved as the conditions of the Party did. This evolution does, however, begin with male-centric Party leadership. Male leaders, from Newton and Seale to Eldridge Cleaver and Fred Hampton, were often the face of the Party, but the struggle for Black liberation had a larger focus on women’s issues as more and more women participated.

That said, male Panthers’ conceptions of gender issues were understood through the lens of their own struggle as Black men in the context of American capitalism and white supremacy. Party co-founder, Huey Newton, explained what is at the core of Black men’s socio-economic position across society in his 1967 article “Fear and Doubt:” “As a man, [the Black male] finds himself void of those things that bring respect and a feeling of worthiness. He looks around for something to blame for his situation, but because he is not sophisticated regarding the socioeconomic milieu and because of negativistic parental and institutional teachings he ultimately blames himself.”

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 Newton further explained the ways that Black men have internalized society’s limitations and the alternatives they may find to regain masculinity and power. He then explained how views on the gendered differences of Black people’s socio-economic abilities within the system: “In a society where a man is valued according to occupation and material possession, he is without possessions. He is unskilled and more often than not either marginally employed or unemployed. Often his wife (who is able to secure a job as a maid cleaning for white people) is the breadwinner. He is, therefore, viewed as quite worthless by his wife and children. He is ineffectual both in and outside the home. He cannot provide for or protect his family… Society will not acknowledge him as a man.”

Maureen E. Coulter (2012) interprets Newton’s argument as inherently aligning Black women with American capitalism “by presenting female breadwinners as undermining the authority of men,” (p. 20) due to the perception that Black women have a greater ability to work within that system. While Black men are excluded from entering even the American working class, Black women seemingly have the advantage, as they are both able to work in and outside of the home and enter the working class (Banks, 2009, 35). Therefore, the only solution, as Newton later asserts, is to break down the structures and institutions that uphold this oppression of the Black community through “self defense,” with Black men at the forefront.

In his 1967 article “In Defense of Self-Defense,” Newton explained that “the black colony of Afro-America” faces “the imperialistic racism of the oppressor,” with oppression also upheld by non-violent, Black “spokesmen” of the oppressor. Rejecting the non-violent civil rights movement, Newton justified self-defense as “black people realize brutality and force can only be inflicted if there is submission,” therefore to overcome this, they must follow “the principle that the oppressor has no rights that the oppressed is bound to respect. Kill the slavemaster, destroy him utterly, move against him with implacable fortitude. Break his oppressive power by any means necessary.” Essentially, equivalent use of force against the oppressor, through militancy, was the only solution left. Although this doesn’t explain patriarchal practices, this logic explains why the Panther segment of the Black Power movement was originally very malecentric. By default, it was thought to be up to Black men to break down the system that oppresses them first, which would, in turn, break down the system that oppresses Black women in different ways, as their experiences with capitalism separated them, not their experiences with racism. Furthermore, this did not assert that women had no place in the revolution, it more so implied that men would be the vanguard.

61 In early inceptions of the role of women in the BPP, Black women internalized this rhetoric, delegating themselves as support systems for the men actively participating in revolution. Two articles in a September 1968 edition of the Black Panther newspaper reinforced these ideas. Panther Gloria Bartholomew (1968) writes, “Not only do [Black women] have to stand behind our men, but we have to stand beside them… and let our Black men know that we have complete faith in them; that they will achieve the battle or regain our true identity as Black men and women, who are very damn proud of our race.”

Another contributor to this edition, Panther Linda Greene (1968), argues that the inherent identity of being a Black woman is revolutionary, but again reinforces that she acts primarily as support for the men at the frontlines: “She is what her man, and what her people need her to be, when they need her. She is the strength of the struggle. She is a worker for Black liberation. It is her goal. Within this goal lies the fulfilling of Black man in every way that they must be fulfilled in order to live and fight…. She must be committed and dedicated, because the revolution will be lost without her.” The early inceptions of Panther women reflect the priorities and rhetoric of male leadership in the way that they wanted to fight oppression. For that sake, the role of women would not be an active revolutionary.

While those attitudes may have been internalized by women, the appeal of the Panthers was the broader ideology of Black liberation. What was in question in the early years of the Party, then, was how to achieve that.

As the BPP grew nationally and evolved ideologically, women took on larger roles, as well as focused Party rhetoric around gender politics. The growth of the Party coincided with the growth of targeted attacks on the Party. Historian Donna Jean Murch (2010) argues that 1968 was a turning point for women, when the BPP turned to “Survival Pending Revolutions,” with programs such as the Free Breakfast programs and liberation schools, to garner more and more grassroots support, in the face of COINTELPRO (p. 169). By 1967, Huey Newton was arrested, leading to the “Free Huey” movement. By 1968, Bobby Hutton was killed by the police and Eldridge Cleaver went underground. By 1969, 21 Panthers from the New York chapter (known as the Panther 21) were indicted for bomb plots. The evolving needs of the Party allowed and needed women to take on more leadership roles and fulfill more roles in the Party’s day to day needs.

In an August 1969 edition of the Black Panther, Candi Robinson wrote the article “Message to Revolutionary Women,” arguing that women are the “equal halves of men” at all levels of the revolution. She wrote, “Sisters, let’s educate our people Combat liberalism, and combat male chauvinism. Awaken our men to the fact that we are no more nor no less than they… Far too long we have been women without men, for far too long we have been double oppressed, not only by the capitalist society, but also by our men. (Robinson, 1969)”

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Another contribution from a November 1969 edition of the newspaper by Corona Branch Secretary Jackie Harper supported the call to action, in standing with their male counterparts in the struggle against fascism, but this article also goes a step forward in abandoning traditional gender roles for the struggle: “We are to be (as well as the brother) out and out cold-blooded. [There] is no need for sewing circles and cooking duty at home. We are Revolutionaries!” Both of these women acknowledge the ways in which male chauvinism has held women back in their participation, but they both go further to say that women now have to work with men to reeducate them on gender roles. Robinson’s rhetoric of “women without men” demonstrates the ways that women alone have been fighting for their needs and that liberation should include feminism. Harper’s rethinking of gender roles can be applied to daily practices, as well as broader conceptions about Black women. Women played active roles in working to incorporate women’s issues in the Party, not just for themselves, but so that men could also acknowledge the gendered aspects of inequality.

That said, the simple act of publishing articles like these demonstrates a fluidity and flexibility in thought, as well as the urgency of mobilization in 1968 and 1969.

“CAN I HAVE A GUN?”: THE GENDERLESS, MILITANT APPEAL OF THE PANTHERS Tarika “Matilaba” Lewis is credited as the first woman to join the Panthers in Oakland and she often recounts her experience. When she first express interest at Party headquarters, she asked Bobby Seale, “Ya’ll have a nice program and everything. It sounds like me. Can I join?

‘Cause ya’ll don’t have no sisters up in here.” She then asked, “Can I have a gun? (Spencer, 2008, 94)” Lewis’ skill with guns is often told as part of her narrative as a Party member, along with the illustrations she created for the Black Panther and her work in the Oakland office.

While the way the Panthers characterized militancy was hyper-masculine, the appeal of militancy as part of their program had a broader, genderless appeal. At the core of this was the imagery that the Panthers employed for themselves. When Newton and Seale began their police patrols in Oakland in 1966, legally carrying unconcealed weapons and “[observing] police as they arrested people to make sure the officers were not breaking laws or using excessive force,” the effectiveness of their tactics became a strong recruiting tool (Spencer, 2016, 40).

To further demonstrate the Party’s organization in its tactics, they cultivated a look of “black slacks, a powder blue shirt or turtleneck, a black leather jacket, and a black beret, rakishly tilted to one side,” was “a symbol of powerful masculinity to be emulated. (Spencer, 2008, 94))” Between the look cultivated by the Panthers and their ever-growing track record of self-defense, the idea of who was protecting the Black community seemed to

lay in the hands of men, with protection being attributed to an aspect of masculinity, as referenced by Newton.

Militancy was not just applying the Panther program, but it was an active recruitment tool that could further their program.

The intention of demonstrating militancy was for both legitimacy and recruitment, not to make the BPP an exclusively male organization. As membership grew, so did the amount of women who became members. It was not just Lewis, for instance, who saw the political and militant appeal of the Party. Brenda Presley, who worked at the San Francisco office after becoming interested in the Party in 1967 said, “I liked the militancy. I liked the fact that they appeared to be disciplined and they didn’t take any mess from anybody. They were really serious and that impressed me. (Spencer, 2008, 98)” Historian Robin Ceanne Spencer argues that those early Party members who sought “to challenge police brutality and economic discrimination, and opened the doors of the organization for other women. (Spencer, 2008, 99)” This is clear in the way the Party evolved and applied this imagery to include women in the militant aspects of its program, as well as the way women grew to cultivate their own militant images. As part of a broader Black power movement, Black women increasingly wore their hair naturally. By rejecting white beauty standards in embracing their natural hair, leading to the popularity of the Afro, Black women championed “a political statement and embodied the new invention of a Black woman becoming a political subject through dressing her body in public. (Lee, 2015, 98)” Their male counterparts also embraced the Afro and the image Party promoted of itself included a sense of androgyny, which was a way they projected their image as militants. In a May 1968 volume of the Black Panther, a political cartoon depicts a group of armed Panthers surrounding a police car (labeled “Pig Dept.”) with a sleeping pig inside. Except for minor differences (jewelry on women and facial hair on men, for example), this political cartoon conveys that participation in self-defense via militancy is for everyone. Considering it was the Party themselves promoting this imagery, it is clear that the male-centric origins of the party was not a static characterization. As a recruitment tool, this paved the way for further female participation and leadership in the Party. With more women in the Party, a plurality of voices added to Party beliefs and action, but it also furthered state repression. The convergence of these events led to a far more active role for women.

BODY AND SOUL: THE RANK AND FILE EXPERIENCE At the Party’s height, it is reported to have 40 chapters across 28 states and an estimated 5,000 members (Jeffries, 2010, 8). Murch (2010) asserts that “Survival Pending Revolution” led to women making up a majority of rank

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 and file membership by 1969 (190). With this comes the more complicated narratives of gender politics in the Party. Members were expected to equally contribute and participate, whether that be in Party political education or the daily works of the Party, which often included activities like selling the Black Panther newspaper for fundraising or working the Free Breakfast Programs.

On principle, there were supposed to be no gendered divisions of labor. However, as Norma Stoke Mtume (2016), who worked in the free medical clinics in Los Angeles and Berkeley, explained, there were complications between beliefs and practices: “...we tried to make all things equal, that women could do what men could do. And the men cooked, the men cleaned. There were men assigned to the children’s centers and whatnot. But like I said, the people that were in the Party were people who were not in the Party and came into the Party, so they brought those same behaviors, and some chauvinism. Not just men in our community, but all over the world, the patriarchal societies. So, that was something that you constantly had to deal with.” (p. 13) For many members, being a Black Panther was a dayin and day-out lifestyle, especially due to the communal living situations (often called “Panther Pads”) members participated in. Ericka Huggins (2016) described the allencompassing nature of being a Panther: “We didn’t get paid for anything. We lived collectively. We just were serving the people, body and soul, our motto. (p. 20)” Communal living arrangements were supposed to offer a “freer” alternative to “‘imprisoning, enslaving, and suffocating’” nuclear and conventional family norms (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 195). However, Panther Pads often replicated these norms and increased burdens on women. In terms of family, women had to uphold all the responsibility for birth control and family planning, as well as take care of childcare, even if single (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 195). Men also often failed to do their share of household chores. For instance, Minister of Information (and later Chair of the Party) Elaine Brown “[recalled] an incident during a visit to Northern California where she was essentially pressured to cook and clean dishes along with her fellow sister comrades while the men conversed in the living room. (Alameen-Shavers, 2016, 53)” In fact, men’s household contributions were often considered exceptional, as in the instance of New York Panther Zayd Shakur, who often volunteered to cook and clean, according to Assata Shakur (Alameen-Shavers, 2016, 53). These anecdotes speak to the ways in which individual experiences were informed by the breath of the organization, in location, chapter leadership, and individual members.

Beyond the day to day lifestyle of Party members, women helped maintain Panther offices and headquarters, as well as the Survival Programs that were of increasing

63 importance. Despite intentions, it was often the case that women took on administrative or clerical work, due to external expectation of female labor that often relegated women to these types of positions (Banks, 2009, 47). A 1967 article in the Black Panther demonstrates perpetration of these gendered divisions of labor, which explained the ways women can help the revolutionary struggle in the “background:” “...there are papers to sell, donations to collect for guns; there is a lot of secretarial work that must be done in order to keep the Black Panther newspaper rolling…”

On the other hand, as the Party grew, there were opportunities for mobility in the roles women took on in the Party. Roberta Alexander was a Panther for one year, during 1969, in Oakland. She first started out by working at the free breakfast program, before leadership assigned her to type for the newspaper. In the summer of 1969, she was asked to speak at the United Front Against Fascism and focused her speech on the role of women: “[Eldridge Cleaver] had come out with ‘women are our other half, not our lesser half, but our other half,’ so that all sounded very good. But I talked some about saying and doing… I think I talked about relationships evolving.

And yes, there’s problems, but with the brothers, because part of the issue was there was the Women’s Liberation movement. And then there was questions whether or not women should be in the Black Panthers… and I believed at that time that the right place to be was in the Black Panther Party. So I gave the speech after his speech.”

(Alexander, 2016, 33-34) Alexander’s experience speaks to the ways women grew to advocate for their own positions within the Party and how gender politics played a fairly active role in their experiences. On the other hand, Alexander’s speech was a part of the visibility of women’s participation in the Party and an active role in Party discourse.

Also due to the breadth of the Party and the need for participation, women held more and more leadership positions. Frankye Adams-Johnson first met members of the New York chapter in 1968, after traveling into the city from White Plains. Since there was no White Plains branch, they asked her if she wanted to start one and she did (Adams-Johnson, 2015, 28). Later, the Central Committee moved her to the Brownsville (Brooklyn) branch as Officer of the Day, making her “in charge of all the activities that go on, and overseeing the office and the daily activities. (Adams-Johnson, 2015, 28)” Again, while national party leadership could be viewed as malecentric, female leadership was not discouraged, especially when it came to the Party adapting to external factors.

At the same time, since being a Panther was a such a large commitment, both in terms of work and personal life, sexual relationships between members often replicated the complicated nature of ideology and practice. Many

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times, this was in a negative way for women. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information and convicted rapist, claimed that women’s revolutionary power was only that of “Pussy Power,” ie withholding sex from men who are not revolutionaries: “If you’re part of the solution, what do you look like laying up with part of the problem?...

You look at these males who call themselves men, and tell them that they’re going to be part of the solution or don’t call you up on the telephone any more. (Cleaver, 1969, 143)” Women, in Cleaver’s opinion, would not be disadvantaged as there were plenty of men acting like Lenin and Mao to “come to your aid in your hour of need.

(Cleaver, 1969, 143)” Much like women internalized hypermasculine rhetoric of Newton in the early years of the Party, Cleaver’s words were acted upon as part of Party beliefs. This led to the negative experiences for women because of their male comrades. Roberta Alexander also spoke about her experience with “pussy power” in application: “One of the problems that I had in the Black Panther Party was being harassed by the guys. It was, just being harassed, you know, it was kind of the thing, like ‘we’re all revolutionaries and everything belongs to everybody including, you know, you should be doing some, you know, revolutionary sexual favors for me.’ I did not buy that. And I got into a relationship with a nice guy, but in some ways it protected me as well.” (Alexander, 2016, 32) Jakobi Williams’ study (2012) on the Illinois chapter of the BPP asserts that gender diversity and chapter leadership created an environment where, “Some women members believed that the Chicago chapter did better than other branches at trying to address the gender issue. (41)” Williams explains how sexual harassment was dealt with. One member, Brenda Harris, attested that chapter leadership “made attempts to prevent such occurrences [and] to punish those who mistreated their comrades,” while others said that leadership “made every effort to terminate individuals who refused to adhere to their policy of gender equality. (Williams, 2012, 42-43)” In certain cases, as with the Illinois chapter, issues of sexual harassment were seemingly dealt with due to individual actors. However, these patterns were replicated in various instances due to ideas about open sexuality that were weaponized, primarily against women. Additionally, a patriarchal hierarchy was inherently replicated due to presumed roles between men and women in their relationships.

As Frankye Adams-Johnson (2015) said herself, “You can’t just put Panthers in a bag and say, ‘It was bad. It was good.’ So when I try to look at that experience, I try to look at what worked and what did not work.” (p. 31) While Panther men and women worked, in theory and in application, on an equal playing field, this did not mean there was an absence of sexism towards women from

their male comrades. Conceptually, labor and communal living situations, for instance, were supposed to be rooted in equality. Yet, those standards were either not often upheld or women had to advocate for themselves. Due to the breadth of the organization, both with the scale of its membership and its chapters, there were issues rooted with how individuals operated and how broader organizational functions facilitated misogyny.

REVOLUTIONARY MOTHERS: A ROMANTICIZED NOTION Los Angeles based Panthers John Huggins and Bunchy Carter were killed in a police shootout on January 17, 1969 at the UCLA campus after a meeting of the Black Student Union. Other Panthers fled to the home of Huggins, his wife, Ericka, and Elaine Brown, which the police surrounded and arrested the 17 Panthers inside (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 219). Ericka Huggins gave birth only a few weeks prior to their daughter, Mai, whom the Los Angeles Police Department tried to create an arrest record for (Rocker, 2020, 40). John Huggins’ funeral, in New Haven, Connecticut took place on January 23, 1969 (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 247). It was in New Haven where Ericka Huggins and Warren Kimbro formed the newest BPP chapter. Shortly after the formation, an interparty dispute (along with some COINTELPRO infiltration) led to the tourture and murder of Panther Alex Rackley, of which Huggins, Kimbro, and several other New Haven Panthers were charged with the murder of (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 349). Party Chairman Bobby Seale was also arrested in Berkley, California on murder conspiracy charges (Bloom & Martin, 2013, 350).

Not only did the New Haven trial bring more attention to the Panthers’ cause (especially with the rallying cry of “Free Bobby! Free Ericka!”), but it also brought about another evolution in the way women’s participation was conceived in the Party. Three Panther women incarcerated for the Rackley murder were pregnant and Huggins was the widowed mother of a newborn.

These women were considered the Party’s first female political prisoners, which led other Panther women to “[reason] that if they were risking their lives and going to jail then it was time for them to assume or be assigned more responsibility. (Alkebulan, 2003, 157)” The same heightened COINTELPRO activity against the Panthers that required rank and file women to step up in place of their male comrades led to rethinking ideas of women as revolutionaries.Whether Huggins and her cohorts were made more sympathetic as victims due to the labels of widow and mother or not, those labels were heavily tied to their narrative. Despite the various other ways women stepped up to participate in the Party, attributing a victimhood that put them on the same level as their male counterparts still leaves a gendered way of thinking of them as revolutionaries.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 Eldridge Cleaver wrote a letter in the Black Panther in defense of the revolutionary identity of this cohort of female political prisoners. In this letter, he emphasized that Huggins’ participation in the struggle (ie her membership and activity beforehand) and her personal struggle (the death of her husband) demonstrates why male chauvinism should be eradicated from the organization, because “a vanguard organization” should be “vanguard in all our behavior, and…. Also in the area of women’s liberation. (1969” Huggins’ case demonstrated how women are targeted, therefore legitimizing their revolutionary status as something men, too, should uphold: “...the pigs recognized a revolutionary woman to be just as much a threat as a revolutionary man. (1969)” Prior to this, Huggins was celebrated for her strength in the wake of her husband’s murder (1969). While Cleaver seemingly intended to promote female revolutionaries, he created qualifications for how women can be considered revolutionaries and disregarded the multitude of ways that women contributed to the Panthers. Furthermore, this rhetoric upheld a standard for women that simply could not be applied to men, since men were inherently considered revolutionary due to attacks on male Panthers.

While Ericka Huggins’ incarceration demonstrated a legitimate female revolutionary struggle, motherhood was utilized to connect the Panthers struggle with anti-imperialism around the world, which Newton theorized as “revolutionary intercommunalism.” By 1970, intercommunalism had been a theory promoted

by Newton, that also furthered state repression of the BPP, due to the Party and members of leadership expressing support for communist countries and movements and guerilla organizations (Spencer, 2016, 102). Intercommunalism also fueled divisions within the Party, with influences from COINTELPRO. The Panthers co-opted imagery of other anti-imperialist movements to demonstrate this shared struggle and also frequently promoted the activity of other movements. For instance, a 1969 article “The Heroic Palestinian Women,” highlights anecdotes that have circulated about militant Palestinian women. One section in the article, “Heroic Mothers,” framed some mother’s ultimate heroic action as mobilizing their families or “Upon hearing the sad news of the death of their husbands or sons, many Palestinian women turned their grief into strength, took up the arms left behind by their dear ones and fought in their place.” At the top of the article is a depiction of a Palestinian woman, holding a gun, and her child, also with a gun, mimicking the same pose. What comes out of these depictions of the idea that female revolutionaries are no longer independent of their children or their identities of motherhood. Revolutionary motherhood should be aspirational. They become visual and anecdotal representatives of future generations of revolutionaries. Ultimately, this takes away from their individual struggles and identities to uphold women to figureheads beyond themselves.

65 Although revolutionary mothers were celebrated, the realities of being a mother and a revolutionary added to the workload of women. On top of the experiences of rank and file members, for instance, who already worked constantly to support the organization, motherhood added an extra, personal workload. The Party did have some childcare infrastructure, in the school’s the Party set up, but, “Many women complained about childcare issues, a shortage of time with children, and having to endure parenthood as single mothers. (Alameen-Shavers, 2016, 51)” Frankye Adams Johnson (2015) addressed the difficulty in balancing family and revolution: “When I look back in retrospect, I do think that we spent a lot of time serving the people, and kind of got lost along the way that our families were also part of the people… As a result of being married to a Panther man, many of us ended up single-parenting, because many of the Panther men ended up in jail. (p. 30)” She also recounted her experience going underground and giving birth to her youngest daughter during that time, explaining that they were put in “very dangerous and unsafe” positions out of expectations from a “romantic kind of notion” that women could “be revolutionary guerilla and mother at the same time. (Adams Johnson, 2015, 31)” Despite the Panthers’ desire to move away from traditional ideas of family, revolutionary motherhood upheld the many layers of work women took on as mothers. It also tied womanhood and motherhood together as identities and promoted motherhood in the context of the Panthers. The standards women were held up to were those that their male comrades simply could not be held to. In earlier conceptions of revolutionary womanhood, Cleaver qualified women as only being able to use “pussy power.” Meanwhile, upholding Ericka Huggins and the other women she was incarcerated with, along with global revolutionary mothers, took away from the realities of balancing participation in the Panthers and actually being a mother. This concept also towed the line of reinforcing the strong, Black matriarch (upheld in the previously mentioned Moynihan Report) that emasculates her male counterparts, while evolving identities of Black motherhood away from stereotypes making her out to be the caregiver of white children and the (at the time) emerging stereotype of the welfare queen.

Overall, conceptions of Black womanhood continued to be tied to conceptions of motherhood and added burdens that their male counterparts inherently did not have to deal with.

CONCLUSION Thinking of the question Kathleen Cleaver posed, it is easy to say that there is no one way that women participated in the revolutionary struggle. Panther women worked hand in hand with their male comrades, from everything to running Party offices to implementing

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the Survival Programs. They took up arms to defend their communities. They took on numerous leadership positions, in chapters across the country and on the Central Committee. But their revolutionary struggle was also one against the patriarchy. They upheld their male comrades to egalitarian principles and forced the liberation narrative to include their struggles as women.

Additionally, women’s participation was dynamic and adapted to the Party, as the Party itself evolved- Militancy did not take away from the work of the rank and file experience, just as being a mother did not make nonmothers any less revolutionary.

At the same time, many women struggled and dealt with misogyny, sexual harrasment or assault, and the layered burdens of womanhood. Many patriarchal and misogynistic ideas were internalized and perpetuated within the Party as an organization. On top of the attitudes that men carried while a part of the BPP, the Party did not have the means, particularly due to COINTELPRO repression, to handle the complexities of uprooting an entire system, let alone confront their own faults. It was up to many women Party members to uphold their male comrades to intersectional thinking on egalitarianism, not just when it suited their ideological goals.

Although Kathleen Cleaver, in “Women, Power, and Revolution,” explained that she did not think of the work men and women did as separate, there were distinct gendered experiences within the Party. Her overall argument, presenting the BPP as fighting against many layers of oppression, is valid, though, when she said: “...the genesis of the gender question, and this is only an opinion, lies in the way it deflects attention from confronting the revolutionary critique our organization made of the larger society, and turns it inward to look at what type of dynamics and social conflicts characterized the organization. (Cleaver, 233)” Many external forces changed the path that the BPP took as it grew, members were persecuted, and it struggled to survive. During the Party’s peak, the BPP’s goals and ideology were not always applied in a way that demonstrated egalitarianism. On the other hand, time after time, the Party demonstrated its ability to change and adapt, particularly when it came to the politics of gender.

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Duke University Press.

26. Spencer, Robyn Ceanne. (Spring 2008). Engendering the Black Freedom Struggle: Revolutionary Black Womanhood and the Black Panther Party in the Bay Area, California. Journal of Women’s History 20, no. 1: 90-113.

27. (July 3, 1967). Support the Revolution. Black Panther.

28. Robinson, Candi. (August 9, 1969). Message to Revolutionary Women. Black Panther.

About the Author Emily Allen, originally from North Conway, New Hampshire, graduated in December 2021, with a Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs and History. Her research interests include twentieth century social movements and women’s history. Emily previously interned at the Wilson Center’s Canada Institute and the Environmental Change and Security Program.

Mentor Details

Trevor Jackson received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. His first book, Impunity and Capitalism: the Afterlives of European Financial Crises, will be published by Cambridge University Press in the fall of 2022.

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KEYWORDS: disinformation, Russia, Ukraine, information warfare, TASS DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).03

Speaking Anti-Ukrainian in English: An Analysis of Russian Narratives about Ukraine Forwarded by TASS’s TASS ’s English-Language Online News-Reporting KATERYNA STEPANENKO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ESIA ‘21, kstepanenko@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT With Russia’s growing ‘hybrid warfare’ and disinformation campaigns, there is limited research into Russian news agencies and their English-language online publications. The Russian news agency TASS is a critical player in Russia’s international narrative development regarding Ukraine. This paper analyzes the rhetoric TASS uses when covering events in Ukraine in English. By surveying 120 TASS articles, the research identified eight prominent anti-Ukrainian narratives: that Crimea was rightfully reunified with Russia, that Ukraine inhibits the resolution of the Donbas conflict, that Euromaidan was a coup aimed at establishing a Russophobic regime and discriminate against Russian-speakers, that the Ukrainian government officials are nationalist extremists destroying Soviet heritage, that Kyiv caused anti-Russian sanctions, and that the Ukrainian economy needs Russian support. Due to Russia’s dominance in the English-speaking media market covering Ukraine, these narratives represent most of the information available to Western audiences.

The paper suggests that Ukrainian media cannot compete for narrative dominance. Additional research should explore the narratives promoted by other English-speaking Russian outlets or review strategies that Ukrainian media institutions can utilize to counter Russian disinformation in the West.

•

INTRODUCTION Russian disinformation campaigns are of growing concern among Western powers such as the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, and other members of the European Union (E.U.).

Disinformation is the circulation of misleading information spread through publications, social media networks, and websites, by impersonating journalistic styles and simulating objectivity (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). Russia is at the forefront of ‘hybrid warfare,’ a non-military effort to destabilize democracies, international dialogue, and public trust (Bennett & Livingston, 2018).

Since the student protests at Kyiv’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in 2014 named the Euromaidan, Russian news sources began spreading misleading information about Ukraine via the Internet. Russian news agencies such as TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) have a distinct pro-Russian bias showing prejudice for E.U. perspectives, criticizing international organizations such as the North Atlantic Peace Treaty (NATO), and vilifying neighboring countries. News agencies differ from regular publications because they are “wholesale news providers,” employing a large number of journalists to release “maximally accurate, maximally fast, and maximally factual information”

relating to a wide range of topics in a 24/7 news cycle (Boumans et al., 2017). News agencies have a uniquely vast international reach, unattainable to an online newspaper publication due to the increased frequency of reported news. While TASS employs thousands of journalists worldwide, publishes an endless stream of daily news, and utilizes an internationally recognized journalistic style, it is not journalistically objective. Post-2014 Russian media is more centralized and homogeneous compared to Soviet propaganda, outliving any attempt at independent media in Russia (Campbell et al., 2014). Given the Western uniform condemnation of Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea, this paper hypothesizes that TASS amplifies an anti-Ukrainian narrative, common in Russian domestic news outlets, in its Englishlanguage coverage. By synthesizing academic research on Russian disinformation, Russian antiUkrainian sentiments, and the Russian media market, this paper (1) establishes a historical context for changes in TASS’s editorial objectives between 1992 and 2014 and describes the ideological shift among independent online publications and news agencies in Russia. By identifying keywords, this paper (2) determines the most frequently utilized anti-Ukrainian narratives in TASS publications between March 2016 and 2021. Finally, the research

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 (3) suggests why Ukrainian online news sources cannot compete in English-speaking media and why Russian anti-Ukrainian rhetoric overshadows Ukrainian efforts in the Eastern European news market. The future research of the Russian disinformation efforts must address the reasoning of the options aimed at coping with Russian state propaganda.

METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND SOURCES USED Previous studies of Russian propaganda and disinformation analyze the formation of social media troll groups, Russian-language web publications, and the freedom of independent blogs. These studies omit an analysis of the increase in Russian English-speaking online publications and their growing influence in the news market covering Eastern Europe. The U.S. Department of State often analyzes Russian antiUkrainian disinformation via Kremlin-sponsored English TV and radio channels RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Both outlets are synonymous with explicit Kremlin information operations due to their presence in the U.S. and E.U. television spheres and social media, specifically targeting foreign audiences to change their perspective on Russia. Non-Russian media experts can easily detect Russian propaganda in English because RT and Sputnik openly disclose that they are not independent from the Russian government editorial insight (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Foreign journalists know to avoid information featured in RT and Sputnik, as Western governments repeatedly warn against these two outlets and their affiliates. RT and Sputnik do not provide an understanding into Russian domestic media, seen in TASS English-language articles or in the Kremlin domestic state media. Experts analyzing Russian domestic media such as Robert Hinck, Randolph Kluver, and Skye Cooley analyzed how Russian news broadcasting portrays the West and amplifies anti-Western sentiments to gain Russian approval for the Kremlin’s foreign policy (2018). The Kremlin’s disdain for the West is one of many targeted narratives aimed to shape the domestic audience’s perception of Russia’s place in the world. The study of domestic narratives does not analyze how strong Russian domestic narratives spill over to Western outlets to condition a greater international audience. TASS, in turn, captures both niche domestic narratives and makes them accessible to Western information market via strong use of English language.

Although TASS and other English-language outlets are not as outwardly propagandistic as Russian federal TV channels, the research argues that the English-language online publications are instrumental in promulgating Russian “soft power,” disseminating disinformation among the English-speaking international community and developing new self-serving rhetoric that discredits

69 Ukraine. The purpose of this research is to identify Russian anti-Ukrainian rhetoric topics, investigate their potential Western outreach, and analyze the effectiveness of Ukrainian counter narratives in the media.

The study establishes a historical understanding of the news agency predominately through Elena Vartanova and Andrey Vyrkovsky (2020). The paper primarily uses Vartanova’s TASS research because her research into TASS’s historical background is present in almost all Russian media investigations. Kohei Watanabe’s analysis of TASS anti-Ukrainian narratives in 2014 established the framework of “statement bias” and “gatekeeping bias,” describing the method of TASS’s disinformation (2017).

Watanabe’s survey of Russian conspiracy theories in the Western media (2018) assists in visualizing the spread of Russian hoaxes in the West. Alexander Fisher (2020), Antonio Missirolu, Jan Joel Andersson, Florence Gaub, Nicu Popescu, and John-Joseph Wilkins (2016) similarly show Russian media soft power in the West. Christina Cottiero, Katherine Kucharski, Evgenia Olimpieva, and Robert W. Orttung (2015) augments the investigation about the interconnection between Russian state media narratives on the internet and distinguishes the Kremlin’s focus on cultural destruction of World War II memorabilia.

Ihor Hurak and Paul D’Anieri (2020) summarize Russian political tactics against Ukraine, needed to interpret Russian intervention in Ukrainian media. The analysis of the ineffectiveness of Ukrainian publications and news agencies has enjoyed a minimal amount of academic research. The most credible sources in this section include the Media Ownership Monitor by non-profit organization Reporters Without Borders and USAIDsponsored Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information.

Despite an array of Russian news publications in print, online, and on TV, I selected TASS for a closer investigation.

TASS is a considerable news agency, having a greater reach than any other online Russian newspaper providing news for both domestic and international audiences.

TASS underwent a notable shift in its ideological agenda and presentation in 2014, partially returning to its Soviet format and initiating global disinformation warfare. The Kremlin likely changed TASS objectives from providing sourcing to Russian outlets to targeting Western information markets monitoring Eastern Europe, which is a historically Soviet media practice.

Given the limited amount of academic research into Russian English-language publications, I began identifying keywords or terms that appear in the text with “abnormal frequency” (Fredheim, 2016, p. 39). Using keywords, a researcher can analyze frequencies in a narrative construction. In this study, keywords are oneword to four-word phrases that appear in the English version of TASS online publication. I surveyed 120 articles discussing Ukrainian affairs to gather these terms. I used a random number generator to select two dates per month to avoid selection bias. I used a random generator

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to pick between the news stories if TASS published multiple articles on the same day. Due to TASS’s quote selection bias, the paper accounts for keywords in paraphrased sentences and quotes.

As identified by Rolf Fredheim’s research (2016) into online Russian-language publications of Lenta and Gazeta, the keyword system poses several inherent challenges. There is an endless number of potential word combinations, while the context surrounding a keyword may be irrelevant (Fredheim, 2016, p. 39).

I referenced TASS “topics” categories found through the search bar on their sites to limit my search. TASS’s sanction labels “Anti-Russian Sanctions,” “Ukraine Crisis,” and “Crimea and Sevastopol’’ allowed for a refined set of topics and maintained the general context of an article.

I implemented Fredheim’s model of including “adjacent” keywords to avoid losing context. For example, I grouped “annexation” with words such as “reunification,” “unity,” and “chose to secede” to reflect the linguistic and stylistic range. Additional computerized-content analysis used in Kohei Watanabe’s TASS study (2017a) could assist in processing identified keywords and narratives.

Contrary to research conducted by Olga Smirnova (2020) that surveyed individual narratives such as the Russian portrayal of migrants to the E.U., this research seeks to identify the most common reports covered

by TASS. The research’s time frame was limited to 2016 because there are extensive amounts of available research conducted on anti-Ukrainian narratives during the Euromaidan protests in 2014. The survey of 120 random articles allows the research to identify frequently discussed topics and note their predominance among other themes.

Adopting the Boolean Search approach for the Google browser, I obtained a precise number of times that a rhetorical keyword or phrase surfaced in TASS articles.

This research method allows for the processing of large quantities of online publications without the need for searching via the site’s search engine. I combined Boolean operator words such as “AND,” “OR,” “-,” “-site:,” and quotation marks to tailor my search to Ukraine and the online outlet. For example, to obtain the total number of the keyword “coup” usage when referencing the Ukrainian Euromaidan in TASS reports, I used the operators “site:tass.com Coup AND Ukraine.”

TASS website publishes an endless stream of articles daily, making it practically impossible to review in full without technical assistance. Based on the week of March 21 to 27, TASS published roughly two articles referencing Ukraine each day on average. Another limitation is the lack of engagement statistics on Tass.com, making it difficult to estimate the reach to the Western audiences or journalists. Further research must be conducted on an even more respected Russian source in the West, The Moscow Times. Given TASS’s Soviet legacy of being the Kremlin’s mouthpiece, it is crucial to see if credible

sources have “subliminal biases” (Smirnova, 2020, 26). A statistical analysis should be conducted to analyze the frequency of Western publications referencing TASS reporting.

Russian English-language publications use Russian transliteration of Ukrainian names, cities, and regions.

For example, TASS refers to Ukrainian ex-president Petro Poroshenko as Pyotr Poroshenko, labels Kyiv as Kiev, and spells Donbas as Donbass. To avoid confusion and maintain a consistent style, the paper adopts Ukrainian transliteration approved by the United Nations Romanization Systems for Geographical Names hearing on January 27, 2010 (Pall, 2011).

TASS History Vartanova and Vyrkovsky (2020) separate the history of Russian news agencies into three historical periods: Imperial Russia (1866-1917), Soviet Russia (1917-1991), and the Russian Federation (1991 to the present) (p. 1847). The first Russian news agency, the Russian Telegraph Agency (RTA), emerged under private control in 1866 due to mass social and economic reforms. However, the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency (SPTA) became the first governmentowned newswire service in 1904 that was able to send news abroad (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847).

During the Soviet time, the Bolsheviks nationalized SPTA and other mass media sources, creating the joint Rossiiskoe Telegraphnoe Agentstvo (Russian Telegraph Agency or ROSTA). ROSTA acquired a new name: The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), in 1925 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847). TASS became the source of Soviet domestic and international propaganda.

It was the “only source of official information and the only news service ensuring the ideologically correct and wellcoordinated functioning of the Soviet media’’ (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847). In the 1950s, TASS became one of the five most prominent news agencies in the world alongside the American Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI), as well as Britain’s Reuters, and France’s Agence France-Presse (AFP). Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev created another news agency called the Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (Agency Press News or APN) to promote the lives of Soviet citizens. By 1991, the reputation of TASS was profoundly undermined by repeated quoting for Soviet officials and publishing their statements across the globe (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1847).

Following 1991, the Russian media market became independent and privatized, while TASS rebranded into ITAR-TASS or Informational Telegraph Agency of Russia.

In an interview, Jefim Fistein said the addition of “ITAR” to the name “was to bring a kind of credibility to the old name” (Recknagel, 2014). Freedom of the press and the advent of advertising led to creating other news agencies like Interfax, which began selling subscriptions and

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 established an online presence (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). The Soviet APN transformed into the Russian International Information Agency Novosti (RIA Novosti) and became the industry’s most successful due to its heavy investment in multimedia production. Most importantly, RIA Novosti was the first agency to engage Internet users with its websiteria.ru (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). Presently, RIA Novosti is defunct and became a part of the Kremlin’s second-largest agency, RIA Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today). Unlike RIA Novosti or Interfax, TASS maintained its heavy dependence on state subsidization, and until 2012 it was seen as a dying agency. During the period, TASS had offices in only 59 countries compared to 116 during the height of the Soviet era (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). However, under a new CEO, the news agency received a substantial $101.7 million investment from the Kremlin between 2012 and 2013 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, p. 1849). In 2014, TASS dropped the ITAR abbreviation and replaced it with the Soviet name. By 2018, TASS began publishing online in Russian and English and opened new offices in 3 more countries (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, 1850).

TASS returned to being the most cited Russian source internationally by 2015 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, 1851). Thus, English programming and international focus is a relatively new development for modern TASS, suggesting further expansion of this media organization.

Several components of TASS’s history stand out. Most importantly, its competition with RIA Novosti. Vartanova and Vyrkovsky’s research hypothesized that RIA Novosti, known for its English-language propaganda channel RT, lost readership because of its “bias” that led to “loss of quality news content” in 2015 (Vartanova and Vyrkovsky, 2020, 1850). This analysis suggests that TASS had none or minimal amounts of outright propagandistic biases during a politically charged period following the Crimean annexation and war in Donbas. TASS’s official name change announcement documented on March 18, 2014, is coincidental with the timeline of the Crimean occupation timeline (“ИТАР-ТАСС,” 2014).

Additionally, English-language TASS entered Twitter in September 2013. TASS’s social media platforms Twitter and Facebook have approximately 60,900 and 63,366 followers, respectively (Tassagency_en, 2021: TASS Facebook, 2021). Officially returning to their original name in September 2014, TASS proclaimed their dedication to “professionalism” (“TASS History,” 2014). In November 2014, Rossiya Segodnya, the second-largest news agency in Russia that absorbed RIA Novosti, launched an online publication SputnikNews (Sputnik for short). The online newspaper, like TASS, adopted a name reflecting the Soviet space legacy of the first satellite with the same name.

Furthermore, it borrows its name from the Soviet color magazine Sputnik, which was often used for propaganda in Eastern Germany (Bradley, 2013, p. 519-20). The outlet broadcasts in 30 languages and has bases of operation

71 in 130 cities worldwide. Unlike TASS, Sputnik received enormous amounts of Western attention and scrutiny for its “fake news.” For example, the 2016 review concluded that Sputnik’s E.U.-based broadcasting targeted rightwing groups decrying the deterioration of Christianity, expanding LGBTQ+ rights, and increased migration from the Middle East and the Islamic world (Missiroli et al., 2016, p. 10). Based on the timeline, (focus on foreign programming by both outlets, as well as nd the revival of Soviet legacy), one can hypothesize that Sputnik serves as an outlandish propaganda source to reestablish TASS’s credibility by proxy.

RUSSIAN PRESS ONLINE It is uncertain when ITAR-TASS emerged as an online portal and there are limited research studies on the early content of TASS’s reporting before Putin’s rise to power.

According to extensive research it is unclear when the tass.com website launched. However, it is possible to investigate Russia’s experimental entrance into the online sphere through independent online publications Lenta. ru and Gazeta.ru. Furthermore, a study investigating the first two exclusively online publications illustrates the ideological shift within Russian online media in early and mid 2010s.

In the early 2000s, Russian outlets needed to adapt to the digitization of print media. Elena Vartanova (2019) argued that Russian media blindly experimented with the Internet to secure ad revenue (p. 26). Ivan Zassoursky found that the initial lack of government regulation has been “the greatest blessing for Russian Internet throughout its history” (2018, p. 33). The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, or Roskomnadzor, saw a spike in registrations for media outlets due to the growing advertising demand (Vartanova, 2019, p. 26).

Other factors, such as increasing access to the Internet and establishing the .ru Russian domain, sped up digitalization in the country (Vartanova, 2019, p. 26).

Within a decade, state-controlled and commercial online media as well as television outnumbered the circulations of prominent print newspapers. By 2017, online versions of newspapers such as Kommersant.ru and Vedomosti. ru had exceeded print readership (Vartanova, 2019, p.

30). ITAR-TASS also addressed the growing need for advertisement and subscriptions, first creating PrimeTASS business newswire in 1996, which expanded into the English-language foreign exchange market by 2003 (Sterling, 2009, p. 1376).

Among the first pioneers of Russia’s online publications were the news-aggregator, Lenta.ru, and the first fully digital newspaper, Gazeta.ru. Founder Anton Nosski established both outlets in 1999, eventually losing Lenta. ru to Rambler Media group controlled by the Putin Administration’s chief Sergei Ivanov (Fredheim, 2016,

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p. 35). Gazeta.ru also fell under political and oligarchic control, as oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky first owned it until his imprisonment in 2005 (Fredheim, 2016, p. 36).

Khodorkovsky, alongside other media magnates such as Boris Berezovsky, the former owner of the independent NTV channel, was forced into exile after refusing to surrender their outlets to Putin’s regime (Dunn, 2018, p.

50). Until 2018, Gazeta and Lenta’s shares belonged to a Russian oligarch, Alexander Mamut, who has transformed the independent publications into Kremlin-controlled outlets (Fredheim, 2016, p. 34-36). For instance, in 2014, Mamut fired Lenta’s editor Galina Timchenko for interviewing a Ukrainian nationalist and replaced her with a pro-Kremlin journalist, Alexei Goreslavsky (“Russia’s Lenta.ru,” 2014). Journalistic staff at Gazeta and Lenta also reported worsening censorship during the turbulent 2012 presidential elections (Fredheim, 2016, p. 36). An examination by Rolf Fredheim (2016) concluded that both Gazeta and Lenta underwent a “dramatic reduction” of over 65% in articles focusing on failing democratic institutions and economic challenges in Russia during the 2014 and 2015 Ukraine crisis (p. 45). Owners sought to limit the newspapers’ editorial control over Russian internal challenges and emphasize Ukraine as a state in chaos.

In sum, Lenta and Gazeta demonstrate how susceptible Russian print and online publications are to adopting pro-Kremlin narratives. Although neither outlets are in English, their dynamic shift from uncensored reporting exhibits Russia’s control of online publications and their informational directions.

RESULTS My review of 120 TASS articles between March 2016 and March 2021 identified eight repeated and consistent topics: sanctions, Donbas, Crimean reunification with Russia, coup, in addition to change of power, destruction of cultural ties, nationalism, language-conflict, and economy. Sanctions often referred to three distinct narratives, including the Ukrainian responsibility for anti-Russian sanctions, the West’s inability to solve the conflict, and Russian capabilities to negotiate and drop sanctions. TASS reports on Donbas by blaming Ukrainian Armed Forces for ceasefire violations, advocating for Donetsk and Luhansk autonomies, criticizing Ukraine for its inability to uphold the Minsk Agreements and Normandy Four negotiations, and endorsing Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk. TASS supports the legitimacy of the Crimean “reunification” by avoiding “annexation” terminology and condemning Ukrainian “occupation” of the peninsula. Coup d’etat and languageconflict coverage share a common ground, given that linguistic discrimination is often cited as the cause of the coup. TASS reports that the new nationalist government actively discriminates against all ethnic minorities in Ukraine, establishing a radical regime. At the same

time, language-conflict rhetoric features a concern for Russophobia and nationalist groups in Ukraine.

TASS’s coverage of Ukrainian nationalists discusses the history between Ukrainian nationalist groups, Nazis, and Polish populations living in Volyn during the 1940s. The nationalism topic is the most conspiratorial, suggesting that the extremist group called the Right Sector is plotting another coup and invasion of Crimea and Donbas. According to TASS, the destruction of cultural ties is a consequence of Ukrainian nationalism that led to the partitioning of the Pan-Orthodox community, disrespecting World War II achievements, and failure to recognize Ukrainian-Russian brotherly relations. PanOrthodox community refers to the cultural and religious unity among Eastern European Orthodox Christianity.

Economic narratives imply that Ukraine cannot survive without Russian assistance (Stepanenko, Table 1: 2021).

Nationalism, Donbas, and sanctions are the most frequently mentioned topics throughout 120 articles, with 36, 29, and 17 mentions, respectively (Figure 1). It is important to note that some pieces had two to three themes, given the intersectionality between keywords.

However, 10 articles discussing gas meetings, Covid-19 updates, and announcements of state visits contain no anti-Ukrainian narrative.

INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-UKRAINIAN NARRATIVES Avoidance of ‘Annexation’ Terminology and Disassociation The Boolean Search of combined terms ‘annexation’ and ‘Crimea’ across TASS English service displayed approximately 539 results. Of the results, most headlines quote a political source explaining that “annexation” is not an appropriate word to describe the Russian occupation of the peninsula in March of 2014. Throughout the entire investigation, TASS coverage of Crimea mentioned the word “annexation” only once on February 15, 2018.

TASS quoted Russian permanent representative to the United Nations Dmitry Polansky saying the Western label “annexation” disregards Crimean right for selfdetermination (“Moscow proud of Crimea’s reunification,” 2018). The statement concluded in a typical narrative that Ukrainian domestic politics such as Russophobia and the Euromaidan “riots” led to the Crimean decision to host a referendum.

TASS paraphrases quotes of Ukrainian and Western officials to embrace the Crimean “reunification” with Russia. For example, on May 16th, 2016, the English version of TASS reported on the victory of Ukrainian songwriter Jamala at the Eurovision Song Contest. The news agency decided to include an interview with Ukrainian deputy Anton Gerashchenko from Govorit Moskva radio station to discuss Ukraine, the next host country of Eurovision,

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MAIN THEME Sanctions

IDENTIFIED NARRATIVE -

Donbas

-

-

Crimean Reunification

-

Coup & Change of Power

-

Destruction of Cultural Ties

-

KEYWORDS EXTRACTED FROM ARTICLES

Ukrainian conflict is responsible for anti-Russian sanctions Sanctions will not solve a conflict in Ukraine Russia dialogues to drop sanctions -

Events in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian crisis, pinning the blame on Russia Anti-Russian sanctions, biased E.U. sanctions, blockade, negative impacts on settlements, countersanctions against Ukraine Dialogue, national interests, ease tensions

Ukraine inhibits the implementation of Minsk Agreements and Normandy Four Negotiations Ukrainian Armed Forces shell civilian populations Viktor Medvedchuk initiates dialogue and conflict resolution Self-proclaimed Donbas republics expressed their will and deserved autonomy and do not need to be reintegrated

Impossible to negotiate, new Ukrainian authorities, not motivated to solve conflict, get out of Minsk Agreements, unwillingness, undermining proposals, disengagement, deliberately blocking peace initiatives, avoids complying to obligations Destabilize, third world country, military buildup, war crimes, new phase of war, hostilities by Ukrainian Armed Forces, Ukraine violated ceasefire, open fire, shells, terrorism, civil war Ukrainian problem, humanitarian resolution, humanity and mercy, neighbor Donbas regulation, own volition, political will, Reintegration Bill, autonomy to war-torn eastern regions, rights, internal conflict

-

-

-

Crimea is willingly Russian, and the term “annexation” is not applicable Referendum results are valid, final, and must be recognized in the international law Crimeans escaped illegitimate Ukrainian occupation and Ukraine will pay for it

Crimean decision, join Russia, reunion, part of Russia, rejoined, chose to secede, reunify, reunification, Crimean Tatars, Crimean languages respected Absolutely convincing results, Russian territorial waters, Russia’s state borders, “Return” Crimea to Ukraine, fables in the West, legitimacy of authorities, occupied by Ukraine, reimburse, rebuilding, Kyiv compensate for losses, extremist activity, anti-Russian

Euromaidan was a coup designed to establish an antiRussian regime The coup aimed to hurt ethnic and linguistic minorities Euromaidan was a violent riot promoting civil unrest and destabilization

Coup d’état, de-Russification, plotted and staged, legitimacy of authorities, new Ukrainian government, burning flares and tires, corruption scheme, illegitimate, state coup, color revolutions Ethnic minorities, oppression, regional succession, violations of rights, intolerance, Hungarians and Poles, Ukrainization, political repression Riots, Berkut riot police, provocations, crackdown of riots, armed clashes, civil unrest

-

-

Ukraine is destroying the Pan- Orthodox community New officials do not respect Russian culture, World War II, or racial tolerance Ukrainians must recognize brother-like cultural ties with Russia -

Criminal and amoral, blatant betrayal, conspiracy of totalitarian regimes, seizure of churches, so-called Orthodox Church of Ukraine, religious war, so-called ‘unification’ council, believers arm-twisting its bishops, remain with Moscow Patriarchate, uncanonical and unlawful, Anti-Semitism, racism, distort the truth about WWII, justify the aggressors, blatantly violate, hatred, vandals, St. George ribbons, upsets victims of Nazism, ban events on May 9th Brotherly nations, Rossotrudnichestvo

TABLE 1. Identified Keywords and Narratives in TASS English-Language Articles

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IDENTIFIED NARRATIVE -

-

LanguageConflict

Economy

-

-

KEYWORDS EXTRACTED FROM ARTICLES

Right Sector is planning another coup Ukrainian nationalist organizations committed crimes against Western neighbors Ukrainian radical nationalists seek to invade Crimea and Donbas with NATO

-

Mounting nationalisms, neo-Nazis De-facto ties to territory, patriotic songs, torch marches, Stepan Bandera, Nazi collaborator, fascism, glorification of Nazi quisling, anti-Russian slogans, ultra-right organizations, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, slaughtering Polish settlements, reign of terror - Ze-regime, Poroshenko regime, terrorist, radicals, right-wing, provocations, martial law

The coup initiated due to language discrimination Russophobia is the driving forces of nationalist groups

-

Russian-language speakers, language activist, Russophobia, discrimination, language rights, Russian-speaking population Russophobia, remove Russian language, Crimean Tatar language

Ukraine is a failing state incapable of surviving without Russian support Lack of economic reform will lead to another power change

-

-

-

State ceased to exist in Ukraine, economic reforms, deregulation of the economy, restoring ties with Russia, Russian investment, political bankrupts Moral depravity, merely waste of money, Ukraine wasted money, economic recovery impossible

TABLE 1. Identified Keywords and Narratives in TASS English-Language Articles Continued

potentially excluding Russian performers next year. In an original interview, Gerashchenko stated that people responsible for the “seizure of Crimea and occupation of part of Donbas’’ are criminals, black-listed from Ukraine (Govorit Moskva, 2016). However, the TASS report paraphrased Gerashchenko’s statement to substitute the accusation of annexation with “Crimea’s reunification with Russia” (“Kremlin comments on Kiev,” 2016).

Assuming TASS’s vast uniformity and high volume of daily publications, it is possible to hypothesize that the agency manipulates blame allocation away from the Kremlin by paraphrasing quotes.

The avoidance of legal status terminology only applies to Crimea and not any other conflict with alleged Russian involvement. Interestingly, TASS adheres to the classification of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) as “self-proclaimed” republics. However, the news agency does not label non-government-appointed republic officials as selfappointed leaders. Paradoxically, the Russian news agency establishes figures such as the “Head” of the DPR Denis Pushilin as credible sources capable of judging Ukrainian affairs (“LPR envoy accuses Kiev,” 2016). Placing a label on the “leader” eliminates the appearance of a reputable for which ostensibly no Ukrainian or Western source is available. The news agency dissociates Russia from the Malaysian Air Flight 17 tragedy when proRussian separatists shot down a passenger flight over non-government-controlled territory in Donetsk (“Maps

of the crash,” 2014, fig. 4). However, TASS specified that the plane “crashed in the Donetsk Region of Ukraine” (“MH17 crash case,” 2020). Therefore, the news agency effectively shifts the blame by creating a misleading geopolitical distinction in its explanation. Other examples of disassociation in the study include calling Ukrainians “foreigners,” directly contradicting the narrative of the “brotherhood” between Russia and Ukraine (“Foreign involved in dissemination”, 2021).

Crimea Is Willingly Russian TASS selectively interviews Russian and Western officials that have strongly upheld the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. More importantly, the English version implies that the peninsula’s status is a resolved issue, especially when compared to the instability within the Ukrainian government and the conflict in Donbas.

The persistent narrative that Russia resolved the Crimean question seeks to diminish the severity of the Crimean annexation and revert attention to Ukrainian disrespect towards Western self-determination and referendum principles.

Judging from the study, TASS increased its coverage of the peninsula between February and the end of March, reminiscent of the successful “reunification,” expressed will for self-determination, and the resistance to the new Ukrainian nationalist authorities leading the coup.

Articles published closer to 2014 contain a more detailed

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FIGURE 1. “Themes of Identified Narratives Mentioned in TASS” description of Crimean disapproval of Ukrainian change of government. For example, a 2016 report about the Venetian local council in Italy pushing to recognize Russian Crimea and alleviate anti-Russian sanctions included a distinct reasoning for the peninsula’s international illegitimacy (“Italian regional council,” 2016). TASS journalists wrote that most Crimean residents are ethnically Russian and therefore deserving of self-determination because they “refused to recognize the legitimacy of authorities brought to power amidst riots during a coup in Ukraine in February 2014” (“Italian regional council,” 2016). The article continued to announce the results and the voter turnout for the referendum, recall Russia’s reunification treaty, and compare celebratory attitudes of Crimeans to the disapproval of the West, United Nations, and Ukraine (“Italian regional council,” 2016). In this article, TASS calls out Nikita Khrushchev for transferring “Russian land” to Ukraine in 1954 and questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian claim to Crimea (“Italian regional council,” 2016). Articles between 2017 and 2021 appear to be less historically charged and thorough, often summarizing the “reunification” in a paragraph. However, all articles discussing Crimea, regardless of the publishing year, included referendum voter turnout and results statistics.

Repeated rhetorical use of numbers can enforce a sense of formality and legitimacy, aimed to soften the public’s outlook on the occupation.

Medvedchuk and Communication with Russia Western researchers and journalists must be careful

when using TASS’s government quotes. Watanabe (2017a) observed that TASS’s greatest strength as a propaganda source is its seemingly objective style of writing that presents an opinion in a factual format (p. 226). Russian media and TASS use “gatekeeping bias,” or stories quoting Russian officials who condemn any Ukrainian criticism of the pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk (Watanabe, 2017a, p. 238). However, Watanabe fails to account for TASS’s frequent use of pro-Kremlin Ukrainian sources such as Viktor Medvedchuk and his commentary concerning the discrimination of the Russian language and the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. This paper finds that Medvedchuk appeared seven times throughout the investigation.

Ihor Hurak and Paul D’Anieri (2020) argue that the promotion of pro-Kremlin oligarch and Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk is one of the six Russian political tactics aimed to destabilize Kyiv (p. 1).

Medvedchuk and his party Opposition Party – For Life encourage Ukrainian voters to support politicians willing to compromise with Russia. In turn, cooperation with the Kremlin will solve Ukraine’s domestic issues, including corruption, low pension payments, and general welfare concerns (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 5). The Kremlin has been promoting Medvedchuk as a Ukrainian political figure since Leonid Kuchma’s presidential administration as a window for communication between Kyiv and Moscow officials (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 6). Subsequently, state-media outlet TASS seeks to represent Medvedchuk as an initiator of an international dialogue. In March 2020, TASS reported on Medvedchuk’s unofficial visit to

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Russia discussing cooperation with the Kremlin in the Normandy Four talks and the Minsk Agreements, both tailored to ensure conflict resolution in Donbas (“Several Ukrainian MPs,” 2020). While the Verkhovna Rada did not approve Medvedchuk’s statements or his trip, TASS presented to its English-speaking audiences that several prominent Ukrainian politicians called for cooperation with Russia.

Moreover, Medvedchuk’s public support of Putin’s statements on diplomatic relations between “two brotherly nations” shows TASS’s gatekeeping bias framing the Ukrainian government’s interest in resolving the Donbas conflict under Russian terms (“Ukraine’s opposition politician,” 2019). TASS’s coverage of Medvedchuk’s concern over humanitarian issues alongside his frequent communication with the Kremlin suggests that TASS plays a significant role in Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare.’ Watanabe defines the political and media tactic as a non-military technique to “achieve military goals” (Watanabe, 2017a, p. 226).

The Fascist Coup and Genocide Against Russians Narrative The 2014 coup is TASS’s most versatile narrative applied to articles about Western sanctions, justifying Crimean occupation, describing emerging nationalist chaos, or suggesting oppression of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Most importantly, the keyword “coup” appears most commonly in discussion on anti-Russian sanctions and Crimean annexation, which shift Russian guilt on to Ukraine. Based on the investigation results, the “coup d’état” narrative was more detailed and more robust in 2016 than in 2021. Articles such as Putin alleging NATO involvement in the Ukrainian student ‘protests as Euromaidan were more frequent than in recent years. (“Putin thinks West,” 2016). TASS quoted Putin’s speech characterizing the Ukrainian internal political conflict as a “bloodshed,” “civil war,” and intimidation tactic towards the Russian-speaking population (“Putin thinks West,” 2016). Throughout the five years, TASS characterized the events of 2014 as a “de-Russification” campaign seeking to overthrow Viktor Yanukovych’s regime (“Street musicians beaten,” 2021). In short, TASS diminished Ukrainian protests to an act of language discrimination, Russophobia, and radicalized nationalism. Languageconflict and the rise of Nazism are almost always consistent in the coup rhetoric.

The “Nazism” and “fascism” keywords annually reemerge on TASS between January 1st and 3rd while covering the birthday of a 20th-century Ukrainian nationalist, Stepan Bandera. Although Russian politicians often use these terms to describe the Ukrainian government and antiRussian protesters, TASS only provides historical context for their terminology in early January. Every year, TASS

portrays the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as Nazi collaborators that betrayed Soviet authorities and established a Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (“Ukrainian nationalists stage,” 2019). Unlike the federal channels, TASS does not criticize the movement for its anti-Soviet ideology but instead condemns it for war crimes against the Polish population in the Volyn region, often interviewing Polish “community leaders’’ about the horrors of Ukrainian nationalism. Similarly, TASS only points out that Poland considers Bandera a terrorist in Poland (“Ukrainian nationalists stage,” 2019).

TASS overemphasizes UPA’s military strength and terror over the Red Army, Soviet authorities, and the Communist party members (“Ukrainian nationalists stage,” 2019).

Jade McGlynn’s research (2020) into domestic sources Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Perviy Kanal, and others contradicts TASS’s English-language framing of Bandera as he is seen less as an “internal enemy” and more as an anti-Western terrorist (p. 13). Bandera narratives may cast doubt in Ukrainian relations with its neighbors and seek to undermine the heritage of Ukrainian independence movements.

According to TASS, a vital framework of Ukrainian support of neo-Nazism and radical nationalism is Kyiv’s efforts to undermine Soviet achievements and offend the brotherly history. One such example is the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2018. Researchers at the King’s College London noted that TASS was a leading news source using “emotional and partisan language” when describing the schism (Ramsey and Robertshaw, 2019, p. 8). The topic of Ukraine disrupting its cultural legacy is one of the most persistent in the study, appearing five times between September 2018 and February 2020. One of the most passionate TASS reports denounced the Ukrainian church as a “so-called” Orthodox establishment. The article called the schism an unlawful seizure of property, mentioned the “2014 coup,” and discussed alleged attacks of Moscow church priests and bishops in the Rivne region (“Fourteen churches seized,” 2019).

Readers can find further emotionally charged journalism in TASS’s most recent article on the controversial topic featuring Putin. In an interview with TASS, the Russian president condemns Ukraine for misrepresenting the level of historical independence of the Ukrainian branch of the Moscow Patriarchate and for breaching cultural “cords that bind” Orthodox Christians together (“Putin says church rift,” 2020). As a result, domestic and Ukrainian publications RT, Vesti.ukr.com, Strana.ua, Podrobnosti.ua, Newsone.ua, 112 Ukraine, Korrespondent. net heavily replicated TASS’ “negative coverage” and “repackaged” Ukrainian news to fit a cultural rift narrative (Ramsey and Robertshaw, 2019, p. 8). Similar accusations of Ukrainian extremism appear in coverage of World War II celebrations on May 8th in Ukraine.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 TASS Use of Right Sector Narrative The most common use of the Right Sector narrative emerged during the 2014 presidential elections in Ukraine.

TASS directly reported it five times throughout the study.

Russian media strongly exaggerated the power and popularity of the newly formed Right Sector nationalist party in Ukraine. During this period, keywords such as “Russophobes, Nazis, and far-right nationalists” increased in Russian media (Uglvig, 2019, p. 45). Furthermore, TASS always mentions that the Right Sector is a “radicalized” and “extremist organization,” indirectly equating it to domestic terrorism (“Russian arrested in absentia,” 2017).

Many domestic outlets portrayed the leader of the party, Dmytro Yarosh, as the next president of Ukraine. TASS featured a story of Yarosh for the first time on February 26, 2014, with the announcement of his party’s formation.

Federal channels reported that Yarosh would win almost 37% of the popular vote, exposing a rift between western and eastern parts of the country (Uglvig, 2019, p. 45).

However, only 0.7% of voters cast their ballot for Yarosh, and in upcoming parliamentary elections, his party did not meet the 5% threshold to have representation in the government (Umland, 2020, p. 251). TASS did not make exaggerated predictions of Yarosh’s victory. Instead, they suggested that Ukrainian society and government allowed a neo-Nazi and internationally wanted criminal to run for president.

TASS published the most detailed article on the Right Sector on September 30th, 2016. The agency reported on Russian officials investigating Yarosh, Andrey Tarasenko, Andrey Stempitsky, Valery Voronov, and Artyom Skoropadsky for extremist crimes against “Russian-speaking civilians’’ and Russian diplomatic staff (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). TASS defined the Right Sector as a group of all organizations upholding the “ideology of radical Ukrainian nationalism, outspoken Russophobia and Nazism” (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). The publication warned that the movement has over 5,000 militants gathered in the subgroups Tryzub, UNA-UNSO, Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, UPA), Brotherhood, Social-National Assembly, White Hammer, Group S14, Carpathian Sich, and Ukrainian football fans (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). Despite the large number of groups within the nationalist network, the study showed that TASS used only the Right Sector, Svoboda, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and National Court Groups after the first part of 2016 (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016). The article also emphasized that these nationalist groups were violent against ethnic minorities such as Jews and Tatars. However, there is an academic debate regarding the levels of Ukrainian nationalism. An expert on far-right activism in Eastern Europe inference that the Right Sector, Andreas Umland defined Ukrainian nationalism exclusively based on citizenship (Stern, 2015).

77 Interestingly, the article did not characterize Russians as an ethnic minority in Ukraine, only mentioning an alleged abuse of “Russian-speakers” (“Russia opens a criminal case,” 2016).

Yarosh was an easy scapegoat for the Kremlin’s propaganda as he often called Russia an “eternal foe” and declared that war is “inevitable” between Ukraine and its neighbor (Najibullah, 2014). On one occasion, Yarosh promoted rebellion within Russia after asking Chechen warlord Doku Umarov to continue his fight against Moscow (Stern, 2015). A Moscow court arrested the nationalist in absentia, and Russian officials called on Interpol to apprehend him on account of incitement of terrorism.

After his arrest notice, TASS mostly used Yarosh’s name in association with the Euromaidan protests, identified

by TASS as “riots” (“Ukraine asks Russia for information,” 2014). TASS claimed that the Right Sector took an active part in the “deadly clashes” that resulted in over 100 deaths (“Ukraine asks Russia for information,” 2014). The Yarosh case study shows that TASS, like traditional RT and Perviy Kanal, concentrates on selecting antagonists to elevate Russian conduct in the public eye. In essence, Russia avoids addressing the situation by shifting its rhetoric to its Ukrainian counterparts. Olga Smirnova’s investigation (2020) shows similar patterns of “blame allocation” where she concluded that RT, in approximately 40% of reviewed broadcasts, and the channel directly blamed the E.U. for the migrant crisis and the rapid deterioration of European society (p. 224: fig. 5). Her analysis showed that Russian media promotes a sense of fear when discussing the E.U. through generalizations, avoidance, and stereotyping. In both instances of the presidential election and Euromaidan, the narrative of Yarosh in TASS evoked fear of the changing Ukrainian government. His last mention appeared on November 1, 2018, in a list of Russia-sanctioned individuals suggesting the shift of the “nationalist” narrative (“Russia introduces countermeasures,” 2018).

The “coup” and “riots” rhetoric seek to create instability and the illegitimacy of the current government.

Combined with the notion of nationalism, the main Russian news agency often categorized Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidencies as “regimes’’ (“Ukraine’s opposition accuses,” 2019). Although one can interpret the Ukrainian government as a democratic or hybrid regime, the word “regime” in juxtaposition with Zelensky’s name implies authoritarianism that restricts the democratic liberties of its citizens (Tansey, 2013, p.

1170). Social media networks saw a similar wave of the accumulated toxic Ukrainian nationalism, which may shed light on Russia’s overall tactic involving the Right Sector and another staged coup. In 2016, researchers found several social media groups promoting the nationalist uprising, the so-called “Third Maidan,” from a Ukrainian perspective (Helmus et al., 2018). Thus, TASS seeks to identify Ukraine as an authoritarian regime vulnerable

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to anarchic coups and power changes and incapable of international cooperation.

WHY TASS CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED AS A SOURCE OF ANTI-UKRAINIAN RHETORIC

TASS Paraphrases State-Media Narratives TASS cited Russian state-media outlets 23 times throughout the research, with Kommersant, Rossiya 1, and Izvestia referenced 16 times together (Figure 2).

The study showed that TASS articles appeared to have a stronger anti-Ukrainian narrative when citing Russian publications and federal TV channels. TASS has two formats of reciting other news outlets: Press Review and taking segments from Russian TV channels, predominantly interview fragments. Press Review is a daily overview of prominent Russian-language press publications such as Kommersant, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and Izvestia. The influence of domestic propaganda narratives on Englishlanguage publications exposes Western audiences to Russian anti-Ukrainian perspectives in a more objective manner.

In the study of 11 Press Reviews, Izvestia, ranked as the most influential Russian pro-government newspaper in the country, appeared four times when discussing Donbas affairs and Ukraine-Russia relations (Moen-Larsen, 2019, p. 126). According to the Moen-Larsen 2019 study, Izvestia had the highest coverage of Russian international affairs, including content on Ukraine, compared to large newspapers Novaya Gazeta and Rossiyskaya Gazeta (p.

137). The researcher underlined the interconnectedness of narratives in Russian TV channels and newspapers, stating that Izvestia would be more likely to maintain pro-government coverage seen on TV. In two TASS articles, the newspaper promoted Rossotrudnichestvo, a Russian federal agency advancing international humanitarian cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo, 2021).

In 2017, TASS paraphrased Izvestia’s article regarding Ukrainian nationalists’ provocations targeting the Russian diplomatic staff in Kyiv (“Press Review: Moscow’s response,” 2017). While summarizing, TASS journalists initiated a conspiracy theory stating that Ukrainian “radicals were planning something big” and violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations protocol (“Press Review: Moscow’s response,” 2017). Paraphrasing a Russian state-media source allows TASS to seemingly remain objective while delivering destabilizing conspiracy theories to the English-speaking audience. A literature review by Watanabe (2018) concluded that Russian publications often undermine Western democracies through conspiracies, especially via online outlets (p.

7). Therefore, TASS’s press review introduces greater Russian conspiracies about Ukraine by disassociating from the source.

TASS’s anti-Ukrainian narrative intensifies when the news agency quotes federal television hosts such as propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov from Rossiya-1 channel.

Kiselyov hosts a weekly hour-long show Vesti Nedeli (News of the Week). He presents his radical and unsubstantiated opinions, while serving as the general director of another Russian news agency, Rossiya Segodnya (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 3). The West sanctioned Kiselyov for his public support of Russian aggression in Ukraine, making him the only sanctioned journalist (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p.

3). Through his teacher-like authoritative demeanor and narration, Kiselyov covers current events by evoking a strong emotion among his viewers (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 4). In 2014, researchers defined Kiselyov’s coverage of the Ukrainian crisis as a tactic used to divert the audience’s attention from domestic issues (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, a study into Kremlin and Kiselyov’s framing of current events in 2014 showed a growing influence over Google searches and Russian Internet users (C. Cottiero et al., 2015, p. 19). In 2019, TASS reported

FIGURE 2. "Citations for Russian State-Media Outlets in TASS"

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 on Kiselyov’s “We Need to Talk” initiative, inviting Kyiv to chat with Moscow officials on the pro-Kremlin Ukrainian channel NewsOne (“Ukraine’s NewsOne TV,” 2019). TASS not only positively portrayed Kiselyov and Medvedchuk as initiators of dialogue between Russia and Ukraine but also condemned the Ukrainian government and “radicals” for threatening physical violence and “terrorism” against anyone seeking to discuss and resolve the Ukrainian crisis (“High treason case opens,” 2019). TASS’s incorporation of Rossiya-24, a branch of Rossiya-1 channel targeted at American audiences, also contributed to the proliferation of anti-Ukrainian conspiracies. TASS dedicated an entire article quoting a broadcast of the Rossiya-24 show which speculated about Petro Poroshenko’s religious affiliation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church or the Greek Catholic Church (“Russian Orthodox Church uncertain,” 2018). Not only were their opinions factually unfounded, but TASS also continued to suggest that a non-Orthodox cannot push for the separation of the Ukrainian Church from the Russian Orthodox Church. Concisely, TASS uses its English-language platform to spread conspiracy theories and pro-government narratives among foreign audiences, a technique highly employed by Sputnik-style propaganda.

TASS Influences Micro-Publications TASS and other state media had a significant role in contributing to the narrative of the Ukrainian plan to invade occupied territories. According to DFRLab findings, TASS quoted the self-proclaimed leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin confirming that the Ukrainian army has prepared a “massive attack” (Osadchuk, 2021). To further the rhetoric, Russian state media such as Rossiya 24 and RIA News reported that a Ukrainian explosive killed a five-year-old boy in Donetsk (Osadchuk, 2021). The Organization for Security and Cooperation was unable to link the explosion to any presence of the Ukrainian army in the region. However, DFRLab’s investigation concluded that TASS falsified an interview with UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) spokesperson Liz Throssell, who allegedly confirmed the child’s death on site. Micropublications such as UrduPoint, a Russia-leaning Pakistani source, cited that the quote originally appeared on Sputnik. Throssell has never made an official statement about the alleged tragedy, and none of the Google searches provide her original message outside of Russian media (Osadchuk, 2021). One of the articles investigated in the research, especially during the arrest of Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait in November of 2018. Russian online publications alleged that the Ukrainian martial law imposed by Poroshenko was a sign of the Kyiv attack on Russia. TASS featured a piece from Nezavisimaya Gazeta discussing how “Washington pushes Kyiv towards war with Russia” (“Press review: US hawks,” 2018). Thus, the narrative of the Ukrainian invasion is not

79 exclusive to known propaganda networks during the 2021 border conflict escalations but was in development as early as 2014.

The presence of smaller pro-Russian Englishlanguage publications such as BRICS, only distributes and verifies domestic anti-Ukrainian sentiment. In April 2021, BRICS upheld the narrative that Ukraine and NATO were planning an invasion and provoking Russia on the border (Aleksejeva, 2021). The publication justified the deployment of over 100,000 Russian troops to the Russian southwest border, promoting the narrative as early as February 2021. DFRLab, the Atlantic Council’s disinformation branch, identified that the website, also referred to as alt news, was registered under a U.S. sanctioned media group (Aleksejeva, 2021). The narrative of the invasion of Donbas and Crimea spread to academic research publications such as GlobalResearch.ca and Before It’s News (Aleksejeva, 2021).

Although most prominent Western publications rejected the Russian narrative of an aggressive neighbor, TASS as an official news agency carries immense power to influence various micro-sources. As a part of a hybrid war, Russia seeks to create a net of sources that verify each other and repeat the same views. The repetition of headlines is not a uniquely Russian tactic, as Western publications such as The New York Times, CNN, and NPR often have similar content and titles for their news stories.

However, if a publication adopts an entirely different spin on the situation, its credibility may be overshadowed by the reach of the other breaking news stories. Instinctually, people are more likely to trust repetition according to the illusory truth effect. The effect notes that real or fake statements are processed and accepted easier if repeated to a person despite their political affiliations (Pennycook et al., 2018, p. 1866). Thus, Russian sources repeating state-media viewpoints affect their growing international network of supporting websites.

TASS and Sputnik also do not use the “.ru” domain for their websites, which may further mislead Western audiences. According to Watanabe (2017), TASS is an integral part of Russian disinformation warfare as the developed “systematic bias” appears to be a stable narrative throughout the years (p. 226).

The article research results show that TASS also misleads readers by citing unknown or nonexistent news outlets. For example, on September 20, 2016, the state-run news agency reported Ukrainian party leader Yuliya Tymoshenko expressed her disappointment with Lviv residents calling for the return of ousted Viktor Yanukovych (“Ukrainian politician notes,” 2016).

According to the alleged quote from a fake Ukrainian news publication News Daily, Tymoshenko said western Ukrainians believe that the new Ukrainian government launched a “systemic genocide” against the nation (“Ukrainian politician notes,” 2016). Both the quote and the publication are intractable online, but they show how

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Russian English-language fake news disguised as a quote may sway the perception of certain Western audiences regarding Ukrainian instability. The issue of false quotes especially concerns the context of a news agency as Western publications view it as the only source of political statements from the Russian government.

Western Sources’ Careless Use of Russian News Agencies Russian disinformation, often discussed in Western academia and media, still seeps through into the Western media sphere. Researchers from Rand Corporation investigated the influence of Russian “fake news” on American and E.U. media. Through misleading and purposely confusing polls surveying the French support of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), Rossiya Segodnya news agency reported that 15% of surveyed Frenchmen backed the terrorist state (Helmus et al., 2018). French online publications adopted both the infographic and poll results, leading to the American publication Vox and micropublications spreading the misleading news and dominating the Google search results relating to France and ISIS (Helmus et al., 2018). In 2016, Russianaffiliated media sources such as Sputnik convinced at least a quarter of Czechs that NATO planned an attack on Russia from non-consenting Eastern European countries (Helmus et al., 2018). Disturbingly, Reuters reported RT’s coverage of Euromaidan and Crimean annexation, falsely claiming that Ukrainians were endangering Russianspeaking minorities (Watanabe, 2018).

The three scenarios show the vulnerability of American and European media to sloppy journalism. Additionally, given Rossiya Segodnya’s negative reputation and extensive Western research into RT, it is concerning that TASS’s disinformation is less analyzed by journalists, think tanks, and ‘hybrid war’ commissions. Like Rossiya Segodnya, Sputnik, or RT, TASS has been growing its social media presence since 2013, although at a much slower pace. Much of Sputnik’s effective disinformation stems from its largely international audience (approximately 323,100 on Twitter and 1,407,246 on Facebook). Still, the absence of prolific social media presence cannot discount that TASS, despite its relative invisibility, appears a more credible source for Kremlin quotes and interviews (Twitter, 2021: Facebook, 2021). Precisely its non-publicly controversial appearance diverts journalists’ guard from the Russian statement bias. Anti-Ukrainian narratives and the creation of doubt is an overarching agenda among Russian English-language online media, despite different delivery methods. Alexsandr Fisher (2020) concluded that the American public, primarily disengaged in Ukrainian affairs, often picks up topics about human rights violations, completely disregarding the source (p.

291). Therefore, TASS features on Donbas civilian shelling, allegedly by the Ukrainian forces, can influence careless

American or Western perception of Ukraine.

Why Ukraine Can’t Counteract These Russian Narratives Another source of Ukrainian news for Englishspeaking audiences is Euronews, which launched in 1993 to present a united E.U. perspective on European affairs (Missiroli et al., 2016, p.11). Euronews offers TV, radio, and online newspaper programming. The All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) owns a significant portion of Euronews shares, despite the European Commission being the largest financial supporter of the publication. Between 2002 and 2015, VGTRK purchased 16.94% of shares, which led to several accusations of biased reporting within the Russianlanguage programming (Missiroli et al., 2016, p.11). During that period, the Euronews Russian service repeatedly misrepresented the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the situation in Donbas. The Russian Euronews office described self-proclaimed Luhansk rebels as a “people’s militia” and a “people’s uprising” (Bunyak, Google Search, 2021). These articles are no longer available online. Like TASS’s coverage, the narrative avoids labels such as “separatists” when describing anti-Ukraine forces in Donbas.

In February 2013, a pro-Kremlin media magnate Dmytro Firtash acquired the Ukrainian Euronews service from Viktor Yanukovych’s ex-First Deputy Prime Minister, Valeriy Khroshkovskiy. The National Telecompany of Ukraine, the state television regulator, revoked the TV licensing of the Ukrainian branch (Gotev, 2015). Shortly after, Firtash abandoned the service due to lack of funding, leaving 17 Euronews journalists unemployed.

The laid-off staff accused the online newspaper of ethnic discrimination and Russian favoritism, as Russian service refused to accept Ukrainian reporters citing “cultural differences” (Gotev, 2016). One of the journalists said that the European perspective in Euronews was “brutally disappearing” at the hands of the Russian state propaganda (Gotev, 2016). Ukrainian government officials such as parliamentarian Volodymyr Ariev supported former Euronews employees by reposting their petition and imploring the E.U. to charge the Russian editors with discrimination charges. Most importantly, Ariev and the journalists warned that the E.U.’s failure to employ Ukrainian writers would lead to an imbalanced coverage when covering the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (Homon, 2016).

Even though the Russian service is primarily in the Russian language, the E.U. does not sponsor the channel (European Court of Auditors, 2019, fig. 1). Euronews regional journalists are required to publish their content instead of simply translating the English version across 12 languages. As a result, stories systematically vary linguistically, rhetorically, and contextually. In 1998

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 research, Professor Marcel Machill’s analysis of the same stories in five different languages noted reporting style difference and variance in quantities of informational content (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p. 113). National biases within the pan-national publication can explain these differences as audiences require different amounts of background information (Polonska-Kimunguyi, 2012, p.

113). The research concluded that the Euronews network is plagued with “national viewpoints” only augmented with Russia’s financial stake in the company and lack of E.U. sponsorship to the service. Essentially, Russian channels and articles can curate any pro-Russian rhetoric curated under Euronews credibility. By missing the Ukrainian service, which would report from Kyiv, Euronews allows for the rise of Russian unregulated “national viewpoints.”

Ineffective Ukrainian Online Sources The presence of English-language Ukrainian newspapers is invisible compared to Russian counterparts due to lack of government regulation, financing, oligarchic control, and Russian intervention. Online news agencies and other web newspapers emerged in response to Leonid Kuchma’s limitations on freedom of speech in the late 1990s. Like Russian Lenta and Gazeta, most web Ukrainian outlets started as one-person projects responding to the growing advertisement market and Kuchma administration’s bias. A Reporters Without Borders media monitor report showed that Ukrainian online outlets expanded faster than any other Eastern European post-Soviet nation (Reporters Without Borders [RSF], 2018a). However, the trend of online journalism slowed due to oligarchic control and investment in television networks and their websites, and social media (RSF, 2018a).

According to the Media Ownership Monitor Ukraine project, Ukraine does not have registration requirements for online publications, which would allow for the increase of numerous unregistered outlets (RSF, 2018a).

When a new online source emerges, the Ukrainian government cannot verify the site’s founders or obtain information about the origin of the project’s funding.

Since most Ukrainian online websites are in Russian, it is easy to mistake a Russian web newspaper. Most importantly, a limited number of Ukrainian sites offer English programming, forcing Western audiences to rely on Russian coverage of Ukrainian events (RSF, 2018a). The most trusted Ukrainian online newspaper is Ukrainska Pravda, which was founded in April 2000 (RSF, 2018b). Unlike oligarch-owned media, Ukrainska Pravda belongs to Olena Prytula, a journalist with over 30 years of experience. Prytula witnessed the deaths of her cofounder Georgy Gongadze in September 2000 and her civil husband Pavlo Sheremet, a prominent Ukrainian journalist, in 2016 (RSF, 2018c). The website is available to Russian and English-speaking readers, but only selected

81 articles are translated from Ukrainian. The project best describes Ukrainian inefficiency in the market as an “informational ghetto created by its own oligarchs” (RSF, 2018a).

Ukrainian English-language news agencies expressing national interests are underdeveloped and often overlooked. Kyiv has six news agencies: Ukrinform, Interfax-Ukraine, Ukrainski Novyny (also known as Ukrainian News Agency or Ukranews), UNIAN, RBCUkraina, and LigaBusinessInform. Most agencies have limited available information or academic research regarding their biases, ownership, and outreach.

Of the six, Ukrinform is the only state-controlled outlet offering programming in Ukrainian, Russian, English, Spanish, and German. Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information (IMI) ranked the agency the most reliable outlet, citing over 95% of factual reporting in 2020 (“IMI Склав Список,” 2021). As of March 2021, Ukrinform published the second greatest number of updates on the situation in Crimea concerning international support, human rights, and speeches made by Kyiv and Moscow (Institute of Mass Information [IMI], 2021). However, the news agency has less of a professional appearance demonstrated in disorganized website design and frequent grammatical errors in English. Ukrinform has no prominence in Western publications such as The New York Times, which have only used information from the agency six times in the entire archive. Meanwhile, the American newspaper quoted TASS about 875 times relating to Ukrainian news. Thus, despite the seeming credibility of the news agency, Ukrinform cannot compete with TASS’s reach in the English language Eastern European news market.

Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News or UNIAN is a prime example of both oligarchic control and the shadow of investment into Ukrainian TV channels.

The news agency is a part of the 1+1 Media Group owned by media magnate Ihor Kolomoyskyi (RSF, 2018d).

Kolomoyskyi, a member of the Dnepropetrovsk oligarch clan, purchased the 1+1 Media Group in 2010 and gained ownership of UNIAN (RSF, 2018d). As a regional politician, Kolomoyskyi committed several acts of corruption from 2014 to 2015, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken banned him from ever entering the U.S. in March 2021 (Blinken, 2021). Furthermore, the Ukrainian government launched an investigation into oligarchs’ media holdings.

They discovered that pro-Russian opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk indirectly owns 57.95% shares of Studio 1+1, a company within 1+1 Media Group (IMI, 2020).

It is not clear in research how involved Russia is in the company. Like Ukrinform, American publication The Washington Post mentioned the news agency 13 times more than TASS’s 126 results.

Media conglomerates Ukrainski Novyny, InterfaxUkraine, and RBC-Ukraina, are affiliated with Russian sponsorship. Dmytro Firtash, former owner of Ukrainian

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service of Euronews, and Serhiy Livichkin, ex-head of the Yanukovych administration, own Ukrainski Novyny under the controversial Inter Media Group (Ianitsky, n.d.).

Since 2015, approximately 29% of Inter Media Group belongs to Russian Perviy Kanal (RSF, 2018a).

Established in 1992, the Interfax-Ukraine has been a Ukrainian extension of the Interfax Russian news agency.

While the Institute for Mass Information concluded that generally, Ukrainian journalists operate both Interfax-Ukraine and RBC-Ukraina, media scholars must conduct additional research into Russian sponsorship and news coverage (Hovolenko & Holub, 2018). In 2014, Interfax-Ukraine adopted the Russian narrative by labeling Crimean annexation as “Crimea’s reunification with Russia’’ (“Tiraspol calls Crimea’s,” 2014). Articles “Tiraspol calls Crimea’s reunification with Russia just” and “Economic Policy: Medvedev’s Russia’s Reunification with Crimea Not a Subject to Revision’’ both describe the Crimean occupation as “reunification” (2014). Both articles disregarded the widely accepted “annexation” term, undermining the Ukrainian position in the conflict. Although most current Interfax-Ukraine articles embrace the use of “annexation,” on several occasions, such as January 1st, 2020, the Ukrainian news agency used Russian media rhetoric to describe Crimean status (Interfax-Ukraine, 2020).

PRO-RUSSIAN UKRAINIAN ONLINE OUTLETS The Russian takeover of Ukrainian channels and online portals 112 Ukraine (112.international or 112.ua), NewsOne, and the ZIK network is the most striking finding. TASS mentioned Ukrainian sources eight times but only quoted Ukrainian state-owned platforms once throughout the investigation (Figure 3). From 2018 to 2019, deputies from Viktor Medvedchuk’s opposition party purchased three TV channels and related websites. Ukrainian officials

launched an investigation into the outlets, concluding that most of the financing stemmed from Russia-backed Medvedchuk. Pro-Russian sponsors such as the one mentioned earlier, discussed Dmytro Firtash concealed Russian sources such as Strana.ua, NewsOne, Vesti.ua, Inter, and NTN as fully Ukrainian (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 6). The pseudo-Ukrainian channels often augment Russian narratives suggesting that Ukrainian elections are illegitimate and purposely mislead international election observers’ opinion. Hurak and D’Anieri surveyed the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018, analyzing the portrayal of the incident by both Russian and “Ukrainian” media outlets. These sources reported that the 30-day military emergency status was a hoax orchestrated by former President Petro Poroshenko to delay upcoming elections (p. 6). Their research concluded that the incident brought a “blurry” confusion regarding Kerch Strait escalations, both domestically and internationally (Hurak & D’Anieri, 2020, p. 6).

While Zelensky banned 112 Ukraine in February 2021, the channel’s English-language website became a consistent source of Ukrainian news for Western audiences. Before the ban, 112 Ukraine most frequently appeared in simple “Ukrainian news” Google searches. The website features no ads and follows a professional journalistic style, equivalent to one of TASS. The data survey shows that TASS often references interviews conducted by the pro-Russian news network alongside NewsOne. In 2017, TASS used both selective and gatekeeping biases to suggest that former Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman criticized Western representation in the Ukrainian government. Groisman’s quote, obtained from an equally misleading article by 112 Ukraine, emphasized that reforms in Ukrainian society must be determined by Ukrainian citizens, referencing several Russian and proRussian deputies in the Verkhovna Rada. Instead, both TASS and 112 Ukraine paraphrased the interview clip to

FIGURE 3. "Ukrainian Media Use by TASS"

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 insinuate that Ukrainian citizens were growing tired of only appointing Western foreigners to power following the “coup” in 2014 (“Ukrainian PM Says,” 2017).

A report conducted by Ramsay and Robertshaw also noted 112 Ukraine’s coverage of the Independence Day of Ukraine Parade in 2018. According to the study, proRussian Ukrainian websites cited radical Ukrainian politicians reposted by TASS (Ramsay and Robertshaw, 2019, p. 96). Pro-Russian outlets in Ukraine misinform the Ukrainian public and dominate the English-language Ukraine information market, eliminating actual Ukrainian voices from Western discussions. Furthermore, they provide a convenient “Ukrainian source” necessary to create an objective image for Russian news agencies such as TASS.

CONCLUSION Expanding Study of Disinformation in International Affairs Russian disinformation campaigns covering Ukraine have severe implications for expanding ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics across the globe. While the international security field allocates vast resources to counteract Russian physical hegemony, equivalent policy focus must emerge addressing Russian disinformation. Recent discussions by the Group of Seven (G7) format in May 2021 only further confirm the growing worldwide concern over the divisive influence of Russian propaganda and fake news. As a large and growing news agency, TASS holds tremendous power in the Eastern European news market, stopping the flow of factual information from the region. By casting doubt over states such as Hungary, Austria, Poland, and the U.S., Russia seeks to discredit the Western legislative and economic support of Ukraine. Moreover, future studies must juxtapose TASS to its Western competitors.

The historical evaluation of TASS revealed that the news agency recently mobilized its worldwide outreach, consistent with the timelines of other disinformation online outlets such as Sputnik. TASS’s ideological shift between the fall of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 is consistent with the government adjustment of independent news websites through pro-Kremlin private ownership. Given TASS’s partial credibility for Kremlin government statements, the news agency remains a necessary evil for Western publications.

Careless Western reporting may advance anti-Ukrainian narratives to cast doubt on the unilateral condemnation of Crimean annexation and Russian aggression in Donbas.

Researchers must conduct an additional historicalcomparative study between TASS’s reporting style and rhetoric in the early 2000s up to 2015 to evaluate the state’s propagandistic agenda.

This research identified eight repeated themes regularly reported on in TASS: (1) disruptive Ukrainian

83 nationalism, (2) unstable Ukrainian government susceptible to the coup, (3) Kyiv’s responsibility for anti-Russian sanctions, (4) Crimea is Russia, (5) proRussian politicians seek to solve the Donetsk conflict, (6) Ukrainian economy needs close cooperation with Russia, (7) Ukrainians disrespect Soviet legacy, and (8) the language-conflict promotes Russophobia in Ukraine.

Approximately ten articles of 120 surveyed reports had no anti-Ukrainian narrative, often describing upcoming events, negotiations, or meetings. The topic of nationalism is the most prevalent of TASS’s descriptions of Ukrainian society uniformly, including keywords such as Right Sector, radicals, terrorists, extremists, regime, neoNazis, and fascists. For most of the “nationalism” stories, TASS expressed “gatekeeping bias” by quoting strongly anti-Ukrainian politicians, Russian TV personalities, and misleading polls. However, TASS also portrayed “statement bias” by providing a historical background written by the news agency’s journalists featuring a onesided historical overview of 20th-century Ukrainian nationalism. Given TASS’s historical background as a Soviet news distributor, a narrative study within a more credible Russian outlet such as The Moscow Times would allow for a full assessment of the Russian international media market.

Another significant observation is TASS’s incorporation of Russian federal TV channels and newspapers in its news coverage. The research found that the most referenced TV channel was Rossiya 1, a network associated with the director of another news agency Rossiya Segodnya. The news agency owns other propaganda networks such as Sputnik and RT targeted at Western audiences. Western journalists and disinformation studies scholars must expand their Sputnik and RT warnings onto TASS. The study found that TASS displays a stronger anti-Ukrainian narrative when paraphrasing Russian state newspapers such as Kommersant, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

TASS reports, compiled in a Press Review, were more emotionally charged, and displayed an increased amount of anti-Ukrainian keywords.

The research proposes a hypothesis that TASS is growing a network of micro-publications reposting Russian coverage of world news. By establishing a network, the Kremlin can misinform smaller communities or establish a sense of credibility globally. Further research into small publications such as UrduPoint and BRICS could illustrate TASS’s reach to local American or European audiences. Meanwhile, TASS’s short-lived presence on social media requires monitoring, like Sputnik and RT, to prevent the spread of politically charged “fakes.” Further disinformation studies should investigate the Russian reporting on the Covid-19 pandemic and assess its space in post-Soviet countries. Another study into Russian domestic and international coverage during an active conflict such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 2015 Donbas escalations, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh, or April

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2021 military escalations on the Ukrainian border could show that the Kremlin uses narratives to prepare its population for Russian military campaigns abroad.

The troubling segment of the research is the analysis of Ukrainian media institutions and their invisibility in the Eastern European news market. European media such as Euronews closed its Ukrainian office entrusting Russian journalists with coverage of the broader region.

Additionally, the Russian financial backing of Euronews and several Ukrainian news agencies is another gateway for the Russian anti-Ukrainian narrative. Another observation showed that Ukrainian news agencies are several underfunded and do not match TASS journalistic appeal. Critically acclaimed sources are unable to support a consistent stream of English programming. Oligarchic

ownership reserves sponsorship for the development of domestic TV channels for marginal profits. Russia also camouflages its publications in Ukraine by using the Russian language, Ukrainian domains, and no foreign website registration law in Ukraine. The three recently banned sources, 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and Zik TV, are only a minor reflection of Russian control within Ukrainian media. The lack of substantial academic research into Ukrainian media suggests the large gap in modern counteraction of disinformation warfare. Kyiv policymakers must address the weak Ukrainian media front and consider the effects of Russian disinformation on their international appearance.

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About the Author Kateryna Stepanenko is an alumna of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University Class of 2021. Natively from Kyiv, Ukraine, Kateryna focused her academic and professional career investigating the implications of Russian hybrid and information warfare in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. She presently researches Russian war in Ukraine, Russian military advances, and the Kremlin’s domestic information space conditioning aimed at justifying war efforts. Kateryna was a GW Hatchet staff writer and a member of the Sigma Iota Rho International Affairs Honor Society during her time at GW.

Mentor Details Dr. Richard Robin is the Director of the Russian Language Program and a Professor of Russian and International Affairs at the George Washington University. Dr. Robin received his Ph.D. in Slavic linguistics from the University of Michigan. Dr. Robin focuses on Russian language teaching, publishing several widely used Russian language and proficiency-based textbooks. Dr. Robin served as the senior researcher at the National Capital Language Resource Center, and taught at University of New Mexico, State University College at Oswego, and Middlebury College.

88 KEYWORDS: hydromethylfurfural, honeybees, high fructose corn syrup DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).04

Effects of Hydroxymethylfurfural in High Fructose Corn Syrup on Honeybee Health FIONA LUPI-PEATE

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, CCAS 21’, fiona_lupi@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT Hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) is a compound that forms from the dehydration of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) in many processed foods and drinks. While the consumption of HMF is not known to be harmful to humans, many studies have found that it raises serious health concerns for honeybees. From the late summer months through the fall, foraging honeybees tend to supplement the loss of nutrients from flowering plants with other sugary sources. In urban areas, such as the George Washington University campus, the supplements come from soda cans and other sugary garbage found in trash cans. In this study, caged honeybees were fed sugar water, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew (drinks with varying levels of HFCS) to find out how harmful HMF formed from HFCS was to their health. After conducting three separate trials, I analyzed the results to find that there was a significant difference in the death rate between the control cages (sugar water) and the Mountain Dew cages in each trial. Just as expected, honeybees fed Mountain Dew had the highest death rate, followed by Gatorade. The control had the longest survival time. Caffeine was ruled out as a possible variable in death rate due to the fact that Gatorade doesn’t contain caffeine.

In this paper, I will address not only the statistical evidence for a difference in their death rates, but also certain behaviors exhibited by the honeybees.

• INTRODUCTION Honeybee Nutrition and Diet Nutrition and diet play a key role in honeybee colony health. Carbohydrates are an essential staple in honeybee diets and come from collecting nectar and honeydew from plants. Adult honeybees have low glycogen stores. Therefore, when they are in need of energy, they provision themselves by eating the honey (Brodschneider & Crailsheim, 2010). Large landscapes have been transformed into intense monocultures through agriculture (Brodschneider & Crailsheim, 2010). The lack of diversity that emerges from monoculture could leave nutritional deficits for honeybees. When honey is harvested or natural resources are limited, beekeepers must feed honeybees with supplemental provisions. These provisions include sucrose solutions, inverted sugar syrup, or high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). Sugars such as galactose, manose, and lactose have been found to be toxic to honeybees and therefore are not used as supplemental feeding (Krainer et al., 2015). In the 1970s, beekeepers reported some bee deaths from colonies fed HFCS (Ruiz-Matute et al.,

2010).

Although many sugar syrups are used for supplemental feeding, some contain a substance that is toxic to bees. This substance is called hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF). HMF is a chemical compound that forms under thermal or acid catalyzed degradation conditions of carbohydrates such as fructose (Krainer et al., 2015). Many studies have been conducted to detect levels of HMF in different sugar solutions. There are three documented methods for HMF detection outlined

by Krainer et al. (2015): high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC), spectrophotometric White, andWrinkler’s spectrophotometric method (Krainer et al., 2015). HMF is found in many foods containing sugar, including the sugar syrups that are used for provisioning honeybees.

The presence of HMF in honey and different sugar solutions has been well documented in numerous studies. Leblanc et al. (2009) found the HMF concentrations in different commercially used HFCS brands, as well as the formation of HMF in several samples of HFCS at varying temperatures.

They found that the range for HMF in commercial

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89 only produced in the spring and summer for reproductive purposes and have a lifespan of approximately 21 to 32 days. Worker bees’ (non-reproductive females) lifespans depend on the season. A worker bee can survive anywhere between 15 to 38 days in the summer, 30 to 60 days in the spring and fall, and 150 to 200 days in the winter. Foraging worker bees can fly up to 21 km in search of nectar and pollen for the hive (Remolina and Hughes, 2008).

Formation of Hydroxymethylfurfural

The chemical structure of HMF consists of one furan ring with two functional groups (aldehyde and alcohol).

The conversion of the fructose in HFCS to HMF occurs from the dehydration of fructose facilitated by a Brønsted acid (Menegazzo et al., 2018). Many common sodas, such as Mountain Dew, contain sodium benzoate. Under the right conditions (i.e., temperatures > 20°C), this acid can act as a catalyst in the formation of HMF (Leblanc et al., 2009).

HFCS in the United States FIGURE 1. Survival of caged bees over a 25 day period when given varying concentrations of HMF (Krainer et al., 2015).

brands of HFCS was between 3.1 and 28.7 ppm in fresh syrups (Leblanc et al., 2009). Results from testing HMF formation from HFCS under varying temperature conditions showed that constant high temperatures can cause high formation of HMF. Samples tested at a temperature of 49°C showed HMF presence at 200 ppm over the course of 36 days (Krainer et al., 2015). In short, HFCS that is subjugated to higher temperatures over a sustained period will have a stronger presence of HMF. Krainer et al. (2015) found that the survival rate of adult honeybees noticeably decreases when fed 2000 or more ppm HMF (Figure 1), making it evident that higher concentrations of HMF are more toxic to bees.

Honeybees have insulin-like signaling pathways which regulate their metabolism, development, and longevity.

Nutrition plays a large role in the expression of these pathways, which in turn affects longevity (Remolina and Hughes, 2008). The correlation between nutrition and longevity is relevant to the present study because each treatment used will vary in how it affects the honeybees’ insulin-like signaling pathways. While this is not explicitly measured in this study, it would be interesting to further investigate in the future.

Colony Lifespan Dynamics Honeybees are social insects with a caste system within the hive. Each caste is assigned a different role in the hive and may differ in lifespan. Drones (males) are

Due to the caloric value and inexpensiveness of HFCS, these added sugars are now present in thousands of foods globally (Duffey & Popkin, 2008). In the United States, HFCS has become widely used in various processed foods, drinks, and sweeteners. The two primary manufactured forms of HFCS in the US are HFCS-42 and HFCS-90, which contain 42% and 90% fructose, respectively. HFCS-55 is formed by combining HFCS-90 with HFCS-42. This form has an advantage in cooler climates because it contains less glucose, and is therefore less likely to crystallize (Leblanc et al., 2009). Due to its increased caloric value and lower glucose levels, HFCS-55 is used in most HFCSsweetened beverages (Duffey & Popkin, 2008).

Many everyday foods are processed, including baked goods, dairy products, chocolate, soft drinks, and coffee.

These foods undergo thermal treatments which aid in the preservation process. When foods containing HFCS undergo these thermal treatments, their nutritive value is compromised and the HMF compound is commonly formed . This compound arises when HFCS is reduced in a heating process where temperatures reach up to 48°C. While trace levels of HMF have little effect on humans, they have detrimental effects on honeybee health (Shapla et al., 2018).

In Shapla et al.’s 2018 study, the authors observe the effects of differing levels of HMF in foods on humans and honeybees. They hypothesized that HMF causes detrimental effects on the honeybee gastrointestinal tract. Brodschneider and Crailsheim (2010) have suggested how to provide supplemental food to honeybees when nutritional deficits occur. They refer to a study done by German researchers Jachimowicz and El Sherbiny (1975), who found that caged honeybees fed sugar solutions containing 150 ppm HMF had a 58.7% mortality rate in the span of 20 days. Caged bees who were fed 30 ppm HMF

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SPRING 2022 • THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

FIGURE 2. A depiction of the formation of HMF from HFCS (Menegazzo et al., 2018).

only had a 15% mortality rate in the same 20-day period.

Their study supports the idea that higher levels of HMF will lead to a higher mortality rate in honeybees.

Between the months of June and October, Mid-Atlantic urban areas, such as Washington, DC, can experience temperatures that range between 20°C and 35°C. Large cities tend to have limited greenspaces suitable for pollinators; therefore when resources become scarce starting in late July to early August, they search for nutrients in other areas. One of these observable areas is inside of trash cans. In these trash cans, pollinators can find waste from processed foods, including leftover soda and other sugary beverages.

It is believed that these beverages are heated by high ambient summer temperatures in the trash cans, stimulating the production of HMF that is then consumed by foraging honeybees. We also believe that HMF could form in honey when the bees use the HFCS in the sugar they foraged to make it. We hypothesize that the consumption of HMF is causing detrimental effects on individual bee health and even hive mortality. In this study, we will examine the mortality rate of honeybees exposed to varying levels of HMF found in sugar water (used as a nutritional supplement in the winter months), Gatorade, and Mountain Dew. There is a positive correlation between the concentration of fructose and the presence of HMF, as seen in Figure 3 (Tschirner et al., 2018). We hypothesize that honeybees fed with high levels of HFCS will have a higher mortality rate due to the increased presence of HMF in those drinks. The findings from this study will give us better insight into how we can maintain the health of honeybees in urban areas.

MATERIALS AND METHODS Materials

FIGURE 3. Effects of varying fructose concentrations on HMF yield (Tschirner et al., 2018).

Each honeybee cage was made up of four sides of wood along the top, bottom, and two sides with the front and back panel made of mesh. The back side was left untouched while the front side had a flap cut out to ensure the formation of a door to insert the feeders. On the top of the box was a circular opening that was used to insert the bees into the cage. A piece of cardboard was placed on each panel to make the cages dark for the bees, so as to not overstimulate them and recreate an environment similar to that of a natural hive. Each cage contained one petri dish for water and one bird feeder for either sugar water (control), Gatorade, or Mountain Dew. Each feeder was a cylinder 9 cm in length by 3 cm in width with a dispenser width of approximately 1.2 cm.

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FIGURE 4. The concentration (g/L) of free fructose in beverages labeled “HFCS” (Walker et al., 2014).

FIGURE 5. Deaths each day for the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew groups in trial 1.

Every feeder could hold up to 60 ml of liquid. In the first trial, a piece of drawn-out comb from the hive was added to all three cages. This was not repeated in the other two trials because it was not effective nor detrimental to the experiment.

Gatorade and Mountain Dew were chosen as the experimental treatments due to their concentrations of HFCS and caffeine content. Mountain Dew contains the most amount of HFCS, but it also contains caffeine.

Gatorade has a lower concentration of HFCS than Mountain Dew, but a higher concentration than the control, making it an intermediate treatment. The intermediate treatment of Gatorade was chosen due to its lack of caffeine. This was done to compare both treatments to the control and each other.

Each treatment (including the sugar water control) was boiled in a pot then cooled before being placed in

each bird feeder. Water boils at 100°C, making it a safe temperature to ensure the production of HMF when fed to the bees without altering the integrity of the substance. Before placing it in each cage, the Mountain Dew was stirred and left to sit for one day to remove the carbonation.

To ensure consistency, the bees in each trial belonged to the same hive each . Trial one contained bees from hive one, trial two contained bees from hive two, and trial three contained bees from hive four. In order to place the bees into their respective cages, a frame was pulled out from the hive. The frame was then sprayed lightly with sugar water onto an empty lid so that the bees could not fly away. Then, using a hive tool, five scoops of bees were placed into the cage. The bees left on the lid were placed back into their hive. This was repeated for each cage in each trial. The randomness of the bees used in

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SPRING 2022 • THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY TRIAL 1: Solutions Day:

Control Deaths per day

Gatorade Total Population Deaths per day per day

Mountain Dew Total Population Deaths per Total Population per day day per day

1

1

156

4

161

2

211

2

3

155

15

157

1

209

3

2

152

4

142

9

208

4

2

150

5

138

6

199

5

4

148

36

133

25

193

6

5

144

23

97

32

168

7

6

139

26

74

18

136

8

27

133

0

48

99

118

9

1

106

5

48

12

19

10

0

105

0

43

7

7

11

8

105

6

43

-

0

12

11

97

37

37

-

-

13

13

86

-

0

-

-

14

8

73

-

-

-

-

15

10

65

-

-

-

-

16

21

55

-

-

-

-

17

14

34

-

-

-

-

18

20

20

-

-

-

-

19

-

0

-

-

-

-

TABLE 1. Total deaths per day and total population left each day for

each of the cages fed the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew in trial 1.

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TRIAL 2: Solutions Day:

Control Deaths per day

Gatorade Total Population Deaths per day per day

Mountain Dew Total Population Deaths per Total Population per day day per day

1

8

187

2

197

2

192

2

6

179

10

195

4

190

3

2

173

0

185

2

186

4

3

171

5

185

11

184

5

2

168

9

180

21

173

6

4

166

21

171

38

152

7

0

162

5

150

58

114

8

0

162

25

145

48

56

9

0

162

37

120

3

8

10

6

162

16

83

5

5

11

13

156

26

67

-

0

12

9

143

9

41

-

-

13

7

134

6

32

-

-

14

33

127

8

26

-

-

15

15

94

5

18

-

-

16

23

79

13

13

-

-

17

16

56

-

0

-

-

18

19

40

-

-

-

-

19

21

21

-

-

-

-

20

-

0

-

-

-

-

TABLE 2. Total deaths per day and total population left each day for

each of the cages fed the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew in trial 2.

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SPRING 2022 • THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY TRIAL 3: Solutions Day:

Control Deaths per day

Gatorade Total Population Deaths per day per day

Mountain Dew Total Population Deaths per Total Population per day day per day

1

5

248

7

213

8

255

2

1

243

9

206

9

247

3

0

242

19

197

39

238

4

0

242

23

178

93

199

5

3

239

45

155

77

106

6

35

204

50

110

26

29

7

5

199

25

60

3

3

8

1

198

1

35

-

0

9

9

189

17

34

-

-

10

36

153

5

17

-

-

11

40

113

9

12

-

-

12

53

60

3

3

-

-

13

17

43

-

0

-

-

14

8

35

-

-

-

-

15

9

26

-

-

-

-

16

14

12

-

-

-

-

17

10

2

-

-

-

-

18

2

2

-

-

-

-

19

-

0

-

-

-

-

TABLE 3. Total deaths per day and total population left each day for

each of the cages fed the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew in trial 3.

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TOTAL POPULATIONS ACROSS ALL THREE TRIALS Day

Control

Gatorade

Mountain Dew

1

591

571

658

2

577

558

646

3

567

524

632

4

563

501

582

5

558

468

472

6

549

378

349

7

505

284

253

8

494

228

174

9

466

202

27

10

456

143

12

11

414

122

0

12

353

81

0

13

280

32

0

14

243

26

0

15

194

18

0

16

160

13

0

17

102

0

0

18

62

0

0

19

21

0

0

20

0

0

0

TABLE 4. The total population of honeybees each day, totaled across all three trials.

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SPRING 2022 • THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY TOTAL POPULATIONS ACROSS ALL THREE TRIALS Day

Control

Gatorade

Mountain Dew

1

2.3%

2.27%

1.823%

2

1.7%

6.09%

2.17%

3

0.7%

4.389%

7.9%

4

0.88%

6.586%

18.9%

5

1.6%

19.23%

26.05%

6

8.01%

24.86%

27.51%

7

2.17%

19.71%

31.23%

8

5.66%

11.4%

84.48%

9

2.145%

29.2%

55.55%

10

9.21%

14.69%

100%

11

14.7%

33.6%

12

20.67%

60.49%

13

13.21%

18.75%

14

20.16%

30.77%

15

17.52%

27.78%

16

36.25%

100%

17

39.21%

18

66.12%

19

100%

TABLE 5. Percentage of bees across all three trials that were lost each day, based off of added totals.

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FIGURE 6. Deaths each day for the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew groups in trial 2.

FIGURE 7. Deaths each day for the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew groups in trial 3.

the experiment was to ensure an even age distribution.

Collecting only foragers who were flying outside the hives would have given the experiment an older age group, skewing life expectancy and death rate data. While it was difficult to ensure the exact number of honeybees taken for each cage, the total in each cage was counted on the first day of the experiment. To avoid using absolute numbers, the data was later analyzed in percentages.

HFCS and HMF Concentrations Each solution had to be heated to stimulate the production of HMF. The possible HMF values were estimated based on the temperatures and other literature.

A limitation to this experiment was the inability to apply a High performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) to determine the exact concentration of HMF in each solution before placing it in each cage. The concentrations of HFCS in each drink are based on the results from a study shown in Figure 4 (Walker et al., 2014) . Gatorade, which

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FIGURE 8. Total population remaining each day for the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew groups in trial 1.

FIGURE 9. Total population remaining each day for the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew groups in trial 2.

FIGURE 10. Total population remaining each day for the control, Gatorade, and Mountain Dew groups in trial 3.

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FIGURE 11. Non-clustering, fanned out behavior. This photo is from trial 3, Mountain Dew cage.

FIGURE 12. Honeybees still exhibiting clustering behavior on day 14. This photo is from trial 1, control cage.

FIGURE 13. An example of what strong clustering behavior looked like during the trial period. This photo was taken from trial 3, control group.

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contains 42.19% fructose, has a fructose:glucose (F:G) ratio of 23.19:24.58 g/L, whereas Mountain Dew, which contains 59.48% fructose, has a F:G ratio of 72.31:48.21 g/L (Walker et al., 2014). Based on Figure 4, it is safe to assume that Mountain Dew would have the highest HMF formation, since it has the highest F:G ratio (g/L).

Most HFCS manufacturers report mean levels of HMF between 11.09 - 33.80 ppm, which tend to be below the lethal amount for honeybees (Ruiz-Matute, 2010). While these manufactured concentrations may not be harmful to honeybees alone, when they are added to products which are then processed by thermal methods, the formation of additional HMF may be stimulated. The pH, temperature, and presence of a Brønsted acid can aid in the formation of HMF in a given solution.

bees in the Mountain Dew and Gatorade groups.

OBSERVATIONS In Figure 13, the honeybees congregated into a distinct cluster rather than being randomly distributed across the mesh of the cage. (Figure 12 shows this cluster behavior to a lesser extent than Figure 13.) This visible behavior was observed for a long period of time (past week one) in only the control group cages. Bees fed Gatorade showed this behavior briefly within the first few days of the experiment. Bees fed Mountain Dew hardly exhibited this behavior at all. Along with this cluster behavior, the bees were loudly buzzing. The cages that lacked clustering were far quieter than the cages showing it.

RESULTS

DISCUSSION

Collected Data

Clustering Behavior

Tables 1-3 show the number of deaths and the total population on every day of each treatment. It is evident that the honeybees fed Mountain Dew consistently died at a faster rate than both the control and Gatorade solution (shown in Tables 1-3). An ANOVA test in R was used to analyze the relationship between treatment type and the number of bees living at the end of the study. Using the control as the base variable, treatment was measured with a variable for Gatorade (1 if Gatorade, 0 if not) and for Mountain Dew (1 if Mountain Dew, 0 if not). The resulting P-value was 0.04684. These results suggest a significant difference between the death rates of the honeybees fed Mountain Dew and the control. The statistical differences between the death rates of the control and Gatorade, as well as Gatorade and Mountain Dew, were not statistically significant. Bees fed Gatorade survived longer than bees fed Mountain Dew, but shorter than the control in every single trial (Tables 1-3).

Figures 5-7 show that the control group lived significantly longer than both the Mountain Dew and Gatorade groups. The Mountain Dew treatment groups all show a large spike in deaths right before the entire population crashes. Both the control groups and the Gatorade groups have a more gradual death rate.

Figures 8-10 show the total population in each cage throughout the trial. In all three trials, the Mountain Dew cages show a similar trend. They start with gradual loss in the population, followed by a larger drop in population number right before the gradual dwindling in the final days. The control groups all show a consistent decrease in population until the population is gone.

Table 5 shows the percentage of bees lost each day based on the totals across all three trials. This was measured to account for the different starting number for each population in the study. Bees in the control group were still proportionally lost at a slower rate than

Honeybees exhibit a behavior known as “clustering” when ambient temperatures drop below approximately 13.9ºC . When temperatures are warmer, honeybees disperse throughout the hives. When temperatures drop to the 13.9ºC marker, they begin to form a spherical mass.

To regulate the temperature of the cluster, the bees in the interior produce heat by micro-shivering their flight muscles (Mangum, 2016). Bees on the exterior of the cluster serve as an insulation layer. The lab temperature where the cages were stored was approximately 15ºC, which explains the clustering observed among many of the bees in the trials.

Figures 11-13 show photos of observations made during the trial period. In Figure 11, in a Mountain Dew cage from trial 3, the honeybees are fanned out and randomly distributed across the cage. The same fannedout behavior was observed in all of the Mountain Dew cages beginning in the early days of the trial period. The Gatorade cages eventually began to show this behavior a few days into the experiment, whereas the control cages avoided this behavior the longest. The cages showing this fanned-out behavior also lacked buzzing and movement— they could be described as lethargic.

Mortality Rate Honeybees fed Mountain Dew had a significantly higher death rate than those fed sugar water. Honeybees fed sugar water consistently outlived both the bees given Gatorade and the bees given Mountain Dew, which indicates a strong correlation between the presence of HFCS and the shortened lifespan of a honeybee. This conclusion is reinforced by the P-value of 0.04684, which shows that all three groups have a significant variance in death rates. In contrast, if there were no difference between the sugar used for the sugar water solution and

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 the HFCS found in Gatorade and Mountain Dew, then it would be expected that all three groups would have a relatively similar lifespan when kept in captivity.

Possible Implications for Thermoregulation There are a few possible explanations for how behaviors such as clustering and buzzing may be correlated to the presence of HMF in a honeybee’s system. Upon taking photos and noting this behavior throughout the experiment, I noticed that the healthy bees all had something in common: they clustered together. After observing this for a few days, it was clear that the bees clustering past the third day were all from the control groups. Some bees in the Gatorade cages showed this clustering, but this pattern disappeared in each cage as the honeybees inside died out. The bees in the cages containing Mountain Dew showed clustering for the least amount of time in all three trials, whereas the control bees exhibited this behavior for the majority of the trial period. In trial 1, for example, a loose cluster was still visible in the control group up until day 14 of the trial.

Honeybee thermoregulation does not rely on communication between bees. It is believed that thermoregulation occurs from the collective action of individual bees (Watmough & Camazin, 1995). Watmough and Camazine (1995) created a model for honeybee thermoregulation based on five assumptions: 1. Each bee bases her behavior on the temperature she experiences.

2. Within the cluster, the individual bee will move around based on her own temperature.

3. The heat production of each individual bee is related to her metabolic rate.

4. The cluster is spherical.

5. Conduction aids heat transfer throughout the cluster.

Based on these assumptions, I maintain that only healthy honeybees are capable of thermoregulation. In the present study, clustering was visible in the control groups, and persisted up until the end of the honeybee lifespan. The treatment groups, though, did not clump and appeared to be weak and unhealthy. There appears to be a visible correlation between clustering and buzzing behaviors and healthy bees.

From these observations, it is nearly impossible to definitively say whether HMF affects individual honeybee thermoregulation. However, these unexpected, additional observations are a great opportunity to follow up with additional research in the future, to test how exactly HMF affects honeybees within their bodies. In an experiment done to test the correlation between neonicotinoids (pesticides) and thermoregulation, Tosi et al. (2016) found

101 that African honeybees given neonicotinoids were less able to thermoregulate. While neonicotinoids aren’t the same as HMF, this gives precedent for the possibility that HMF could also have a neurogenic effect on thermoregulation. One can envision future experiments that test whether HMF has an effect on the honeybee nervous system.

The possibility that HMF affects thermoregulation abilities would explain why some hives in urban areas do not survive through the winter. Based on these findings, it may be suggested that foragers are exposed to HMF in processed foods found in the garbage in the fall, when resources are scarce, and it ultimately ends up in their honey after they bring it back to the hive. The bees eat this honey throughout the winter, when they cannot leave their hives, but end up getting sick and possibly dying as a result of the HMF. Winter honeybees have a lifespan of up to 200 days. No eggs are laid in the winter, so if the population gets sick it is difficult to recover. A study done by Jachimowicz and Sherbiny, G. (1975) found large traces of HMF in harvested honey from hives in countries throughout Europe and Asia. The results of this study, in conjunction with other research on the effects of HMF on honeybee health, could explain one possibility for the mass decline in the honeybee population over the last few decades.

Protection of Urban Apiaries Moving Forward Urban honeybees are routinely exposed to sweetened beverages and processed foods in trash cans. The results from this experiment not only contribute to the wealth of knowledge surrounding this topic, but provide urban apiaries suggestions on how to protect their honeybee populations from these contaminants. Commercial beekeepers tend to feed their honeybees HFCS for overwintering due to its economic benefits. Using sugar water as an extra supplement in the winter months could potentially help honeybees survive, without adding unnecessary HFCS to their bodies. In areas like the George Washington University campus, it would be beneficial to install more closed-top trash cans. This would limit the amount of foraging honeybees that have access to the contaminants in processed foods, benefitting the colonies. Working towards creating a safer foraging environment for honeybees does not have to be costly or time consuming, and it can help stabilize a currently declining population.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS It is evident that there is a significant difference in the death rate of honeybees fed sugar water (control) and Mountain Dew in each trial. Unexpectedly, we also learned more about how the presence of HMF may alter honeybee behavior in terms of clustering in colder

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temperatures.

This experiment provides the context for further investigation into how exactly HMF affects honeybee health. In the future, it will be important to measure the exact HMF production in Mountain Dew and Gatorade using a high-performance liquid chromatography method. This will help determine whether or not there is enough HMF present to cause harm. Additionally, it may be important to compare similar drinks to ensure that other ingredients are not actually the ones causing harm. In this research, Gatorade was used to rule out the effects of caffeine, but it is not impossible that another contaminant in Mountain Dew caused a higher death rate. Another avenue could be to directly feed the honeybees HFCS solutions with varying amounts of HMF. Although this research lends insight into the toxicity of these specific drinks to honeybees, there is still much more work to be done. As research on this topic continues, more will be learned about honeybee health and nutrition, enabling safer beekeeping practices on a larger scale.

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Ihle, K. E., Baker, N. A., & Amdam, G. V. (2014). Insulinlike peptide response to nutritional input in honey bee workers. Journal of Insect Physiology, 69, 49–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinsphys.2014.05.026

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6. Krainer, S., Brodschneider, R., Vollmann, J., Crailsheim, K., & Riessberger-Gallé, U. (2015). Effect of hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) on mortality of artificially reared honey bee larvae (Apis mellifera carnica). Ecotoxicology, 25(2), 320–328. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10646-015-1590-x 7.

LeBlanc, B. W., Eggleston, G., Sammataro, D., Cornett, C., Dufault, R., Deeby, T., & St. Cyr, E. (2009). Formation of hydroxymethylfurfural in domestic high-fructose

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5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) production from real biomasses. Molecules, 23(9), 2201. https://doi. org/10.3390/molecules23092201 10. Remolina, S. C., & Hughes, K. A. (2008). Evolution and mechanisms of long life and high fertility in queen Honey Bees. AGE, 30(2-3), 177–185. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11357-008-9061-4 11. Ruiz-Matute, A. I., Weiss, M., Sammataro, D., Finely, J., & Sanz, M. L. (2010). Carbohydrate composition of high-fructose corn syrups (HFCS) used for bee feeding: Effect on honey composition. Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, 58(12), 7317–7322. https://doi.org/10.1021/jf100758x 12. Shapla, U. M., Solayman, M., Alam, N., Khalil, M. I., & Gan, S. H. (2018). 5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) levels in honey and other food products: Effects on bees and human health. Chemistry Central Journal, 12(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13065-018-0408-3 13. Tosi, S., Démares, F. J., Nicolson, S. W., Medrzycki, P., Pirk, C. W. W., & Human, H. (2016). Effects of a neonicotinoid pesticide on thermoregulation of

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African honey bees (Apis mellifera scutellata). Journal of Insect Physiology, 93-94, 56–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jinsphys.2016.08.010 14. Tschirner, S., Weingart, E., Teevs, L., & Prüße, U. (2018). Catalytic dehydration of fructose to 5-Hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) in low-boiling solvent hexafluoroisopropanol (HFIP). Molecules, 23(8), 1866. https://doi.org/10.3390/ molecules23081866 15. Walker, R. W., Dumke, K. A., & Goran, M. I. (2014). Fructose content in popular beverages made with and without high-fructose corn syrup. Nutrition, 30(7-8), 928–935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nut.2014.04.003 16. Watmough, J., & Camazine, S. (1995). Self-organized thermoregulation of Honeybee Clusters. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 176(3), 391–402. https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.1995.0207

About the Author Fiona Lupi-Peate graduated in May 2021 with a bachelor’s degree in Biological Sciences and a concentration in ecology, evolution, and environment. She spent three years as a beekeeper for the GWU apiary and has done research on native and non-native plants and pollinators in the DC area. She is currently working as an Environmental Educator at the Butterfly Pavilion in Westminster Colorado and hopes to continue doing work promoting the conservation of invertebrates.

Mentor Details This thesis was prepared with mentorship from Hartmut Doebel, an assistant professor of biology at the George Washington University. He earned his PhD at the University of Maryland. Doebel is an ecologist with special research training in insect biology. He has worked extensively on tritrophic interactions of herbivorous insects and their arthropod predators in intertidal marshes on North East America and rice agro-ecosystems in the Philippines. At GWU Doebel oversees various research projects on honeybee biology and helped facilitate a partnership with a local restaurant, Founding Farmers.

104 KEYWORDS: Catholicism, women, saints, heretics, religious power DOI: https://doi.org/10.4079/2578-9201.1(2022).09

The Venerated and the Despised: Dualities in the Catholic Church’s Responses to Pious Women LAUREN KIKER

PSYCHOLOGY & HISTORY, CCAS ‘23, lkiker25@gwu.edu

ABSTRACT

Throughout the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church remained a pervasive force in Christian society, setting social and religious standards for the laity by canonizing spectacular examples of devoted Christians. At the same time, the Church also faced a battle against those seen as a threat to their recently stabilized authority. Receiving very different treatment for their actions, women put in both of these categories, saints and heretics often violated the same authority and autonomy norms. These differences can be seen between the treatment of saints Christina Mirabilis, Clara of Assisi, and Catherine of Siena and women in the Cathar, Beguine, and Waldensian heresies. Sainted women took on religious authority that went against traditionally gendered roles, but instead of being punished for it as many women deemed heretical were, the Church saw value in the work of these women, choosing instead to praise them. Similarly, the women viewed by the Church as heretics and saints often took severe poverty vows. Interestingly, only those seen as heretical were persecuted for their beliefs. Violation of social autonomy norms also led to different treatment, with women seen as heretics persecuted heavily taking on roles of authority without the supervision of male Church leaders but women declared saints were praised despite often operating independently without male authority. Through examining these women’s stories, it can be seen that the Church’s decision to persecute or praise these women was not random, but originated in the Catholic Church’s perception of how useful the women’s narratives were to achieving the Church’s goal: maintaining authority.

•

INTRODUCTION Over a thousand years after the death of Christ, another resurrection story found its way into Biblical texts, but this time centered on a woman. Dead at the age of twenty-one, Christina Mirabilis was laid to rest in a coffin that was moments away from burial.1 However, before the priest could close the coffin, Christina burst forth, levitating in the rafters above the congregation to the amazement and confusion of all below.2 After the priest performed an exorcism, Christina returned to the ground and spoke of her travels to Purgatory and Heaven, revealing that she was sent back from heaven in order to reduce the discomfort of those trapped in Purgatory.3 This was only the start of Christina Mirabilis’ peculiar second life. Accounts tell of Christina jumping into

fires, baking herself in ovens, and enticing dogs to attack her, leading her to suffer much physical pain, however none of these encounters resulted in physical wounds on Christina’s body.4 The spectacular life of Christina Mirabilis is only one of many examples of marvelous women in the Middle Ages whose lives take on a supernatural character through their piety. The accounts of these women, selected by the Catholic Church and often recorded by male Church officials in Saints’ Lives, survive to serve as examples of women in the Middle Ages whose remarkable lives left a lasting impression on medieval society and Christianity.

At the same time as miraculous women, such as Christina Mirabilis, were amazing crowds, the Catholic Church was grappling with a very different issue: heresy. During the beginning of the Middle

1 Thomas de Cantimpré and Margot H. King, The Life of Christina Mirabilis (Toronto, Ont.: Peregrina, 1995).

2 de Cantimpré and King, Christina Mirabilis.

3 de Cantimpré and King, Christina Mirabilis.

4 de Cantimpré and King, Christina Mirabilis.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 Ages, heretical practices were less of a concern for the Catholic Church, with efforts focused on converting pagans and implementing basic religious and social structures.5 As the Church’s political and social authority solidified in the twelfth century, the presence of variants of Catholicism became an increasing topic of concern to their goals of uniform authority.6 The Catholic Church deeming a person or group “heretical” was not a common experience, and many laypeople with deviating beliefs were left unbothered by Church officials, who instead sought to focus on those willfully and knowingly holding beliefs in opposition to the Catholic Church.7 According to the Catholic Church, groups such as the Cathars, Beguines, and Waldensians were heretical sects of Catholicism, purposely adhering to incorrect beliefs and practices. However, these distinctions between heresy and orthodoxy are exaggerated. Heretical groups and the Catholic Church both believed in the same tenets of Christianity and heretics often saw themselves as Catholics who were addressing wrongs in the Church by more strictly adhering to pillars of Christianity.

In each of these groups identified by the Church as heretical, women took on extraordinary roles, sometimes living separately from male authority or taking on active roles in religious organizations. While an examination of these heresies may indicate that the Catholic Church persecuted these groups due to deviations of the religious and social norm, further analysis reveals that the accounts of venerated women show similar patterns of digressions from the norm. This inconsistency in response was far from random. Rather, officials in the Catholic Church deliberately chose their response to spectacular women, both saints and heretics, based on the Church’s ability to adapt these women’s messages to further support their authority. This is apparent in the Catholic Church’s differing responses to the Cathar, Beguine, and Waldensian heresies as compared to their response to Christina Mirabilis, Clara of Assisi, and Catherine of Siena on the issues of authority and autonomy.

THE RISE OF “HERESIES” In the medieval period, religion played a central role in the life of many, providing hope for escape from a miserable life in the next world. During this period, a number of saints’ joined the Catholic Church’s pantheon of important religious figures, inspiring the laity with their piety and sacrifice. With the addition of saints came the addition of remembrance days, festivals, and special masses to recognize each saint’s contribution to Catholicism. However, the Catholic religion was far from static in this period, but was rather being actively 5 Jennifer Kolpacoff Deane. A History of Medieval Heresy and Inquisition. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), 10-20.

6 Deane, History of Medieval Heresy, 10-20.

7 Deane, History of Medieval Heresy, 12-25.

105 shaped by both the Church officials who preached Catholicism and the laypeople that interacted with this religion in everyday life.8 Through the end of the Middle Ages, Catholicism was a shifting force and respected Church officials held and debated different opinions.

Theologian and cardinal Pierre d’Ailly opposed the expanding number of festivals and saints along with the introduction of new hymns, imagery, and special masses, which he saw as indicative of pride and excess among priests and laypeople.9 However, these practices continued throughout the Middle Ages, supported by many Church officials who saw them as opportunities to appease laypeople and deepen connections between the laity and the Catholic Church.10 Disagreements over these topics indicated that even among Church officials, there was significant variation in beliefs surrounding what religious practices the Church should emphasize and how to incorporate these practices into everyday religious life.

Given debates between respected Church officials on which aspects of and how to implement the Catholic religion, the differentiation in lay people’s worship practices seems natural. During the early Middle Ages, this deviation was not the Church’s major concern, as they were mainly focused on converting the masses and ingraining Christian doctrines into pagan societies.

11 Around the turn of the century, when Catholic authority became more stable and powerful, the Catholic Church began to recognize new forms of lay piety that contrasted with the established orthodoxy.12 However, in many cases, these new forms of worship did not spell trouble for the Catholic Church or dissenters. Unorthodox beliefs were far from uncommon among the laypeople and the clergy normally adopted policies of gentle correction and forgiveness for those who at least appeared to right their ways.13 True problems arose when laypeople resisted correction in the eyes of the Catholic Church and knowingly continued to practice unorthodox beliefs.

14 These groups of laypeople who, according to the Catholic Church, flouted the word of God and mocked the Christian religion, would become one of the main antagonists of the Church during the Middle Ages.

Throughout the high medieval period, several groups with unorthodox beliefs caught the attention of the Catholic Church, resulting in periods of persecution and inquisition. One of the first groups of concern 8 Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, trans.

Rodney J Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 170-185.

9 Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, 170-85.

10 Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, 175-90.

11 Deane, History of Medieval Heresy, 10-20.

12 Deane, History of Medieval Heresy, 10-20.

13 Deane, History of Medieval Heresy, 22, 25-36.

14 Deane, History of Medieval Heresy, 20-22.

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was the Cathars. Against many Catholic teachings and rejecting the power of the clergy, the Cathars believed that human bodies were not sacred, but that the souls were angels who had fallen from Heaven, imprisoned in mortal bodies, and trapped in a physical world made by the devil.15 In a monthly confessional required of the most pious individuals, the perfecte, Cathar leaders ask God to “Have no pity on the flesh, born of corruption, but show mercy to the spirit which is imprisoned.”16 Believing the physical world to be an unholy prison, Cathar men and women turned against anything involving the material realm, rejecting the authority of the clergy, believing in no physical attachment to the world, and believing procreation to be trapping more divine souls on Earth, choosing instead to remain unmarried and celibate.17 Rejecting the authority of the Catholic Church’s clergy and many important sacraments which gave the Church power over laypeople, the work of Cathars risked undermining the Catholic Church’s power. Cathars also held many other interesting beliefs, including that both holy men and women, called “perfects,” could teach and spread religious ideas.18 This contrasts with Catholic orthodoxy which did not allow women in many religious authority roles and these teachings could threaten the Catholic Church’s power hierarchy built on male authority.

At the same time the rise and spread of Cathars concerned the Catholic Church, another group the Church identified as a heretical sect was already forming, devoted to reforming lay religion. This sect, the Waldensians, were not seen as heretical from the start, but were rather first praised by the Catholic Church for their devotion and beliefs in poverty.19 Waldensians held many similar beliefs with the Cathars, including the belief that women could act as religious educators, but were especially problematic for the Catholic Church due to their refusal to obey Catholic authority and rejection of the validity of sacraments performed by corrupt priests.20 Waldensians also renounced wealth and earthly possessions in favor of absolute poverty, relying on charity to survive while preaching.21 Compared to the Cathars, the Waldensians 15 Carol Leroy Lansing, Power and Purity: Cathar Heresy in Medieval Italy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3-15.

16 Lo Servissi, 2.20, trans. Lance S. Owens, (1991) 17 Lansing, Power and Purity, 3-20.

18 Lansing, Power and Purity, 3-20.

19 Claire Taylor, “‘Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa’: Southern French Waldensians and the Albigensian Crusade.” (French History 32, no. 3 (2018): 327–49. https://doi.org/10.1093/fh/ cry065. ) 20 Peter Les-Vaux-de-Cernay, The History of the Albigensian Crusade: Peter of Les-Vaux-De-Cernay's Historia Albigensis, trans. W. A. Sibly and M. D. Sibly (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2000), xix-xxxv.

21 Taylor, “Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa,” 327-49.

have a slightly more complex history with the Catholic Church, first praised by the Church but warned not to preach without Church permission.22 This warning was especially pressing for women, who were both preaching without Church permission and preaching as women.

However, the Waldensians continued to preach and were eventually pronounced heretical by the Catholic Church.23 Once holding the Catholic Church’s favor, the Waldensian heresy presented a threat to the Catholic Church due to their rejection of religious norms, but also their subverting of Catholic authority through continuing to preach. As a result of this threat, the Catholic Church turned against these men and women, persecuting them for their deviating beliefs.

While the Waldensians had a more complicated history with the Catholic Church than the Cathars, the most complex relationship can be found in the Beguines.

Made up of women, Beguines developed independent communities that worshiped through establishing charitable houses and maintaining chaste and poor lives.

24 Similar to Waldensians, the Catholic Church did not persecute these women at first and they operated for an extended period without the intrusion of the Church.

25 In some cases, Beguine women were praised for their devout nature and pointed to as examples for laypeople in the face of rising religious dissent.26 Importantly, Beguines did not disagree with the Catholic Church on any major sacrament or protest against the corruption of priests. Rather, Beguines sought to utilize an existing religious system to benefit themselves, choosing to live in all women communities, harmonious with the missions of the Catholic Church and society.27 The admiration of the Catholic Church did not stand, however, although attitudes towards Beguines are less clear. Rather than being declared as a heretical group, like the Cathars and Waldensians, some Beguines were declared heretics and would be persecuted for their beliefs and the Church began to regard these communities with suspicion.28 Attitudes towards Beguines would oscillate slightly from century to century, and traces of Beguine communities, although often adapted into other religions or converted to community service centers, continue to exist in modern times.29 While far from the only groups deemed heretical 22 Taylor, “Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa,” 327-49.

23 Taylor, “Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa,” 327-49.

24 Julie Neuffer, “The Beguines of the Middle Ages” (dissertation, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2000), 1-10.

25 Neuffer, “The Beguines of the Middle Ages,” 1-15.

26 Tanya Stabler Miller, “What's in a Name? Clerical Representations of Parisian Beguines (1200-1328),” Journal of Medieval History 33, no. 1 (2007): pp. 60-86, https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jmedhist.2007.01.005.

27 Neuffer, “The Beguines of the Middle Ages,” 8-25.

28 Neuffer, “The Beguines of the Middle Ages,” 8-25.

29 Christine Guidera, “The Beguines: An Overview of Their Life, Work and Spirituality” (dissertation, National Library of

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 in the Middle Ages, Cathars, Waldensians, and Beguines were prominent groups whom the Catholic Church directed significant attention to and who demonstrate overarching themes of treatment of women identified by the Church as heretical.

FEMALE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH In the high medieval period, women’s authority was limited, especially in political and legal spheres, but gendered opportunities for power remained. Public authority was particularly limited from women in the Middle Ages, with very few options for the average laywomen to directly engage in politics and most women possessed limited legal rights.30 Women were, however, able to obtain some authority in the home, with control over family life, household functions, and the raising of children.31 However, society limited even this gendered authority, and patriarchal authorities, such as husbands or fathers, could overrule women’s decisions. Another venue of power for medieval women was the medieval parish. The social structure of the parish allowed for women to distinguish themselves from their piety while engaging in collective action with other parish members and interacting with other women as support systems.32 However, Church officials also limited this form of authority, such as through restricting women from purchasing pews and by confining women to secondary roles as cleaners and laundry attendants, rather than administrative positions open to men.33 Though limited, women were not powerless in the Middle Ages, but rather possessed conditional authority that the Catholic Church and societal norms restricted to gendered spheres, such as the home and family.

In groups identified as heretical by Catholic officials, women transgressed both the gendered boundaries of authority and the limits on the degree of authority women could possess, resulting in strong reactions from the Catholic Church. A frequent deviation of these authority norms was female involvement in preaching and spreading beliefs. This can be found in both the Cathar and Waldensian sects, with women taking on active roles as preachers and religious leaders. In the Cathar sect, women could obtain roles as perfectae, which involved blessing bread, preaching, and teaching others how to make the melhorament, which means making improvements or Canada, 1992).

30 Mary Carpenter Erler and Maryanne Kowaleski, Gendering the Master Narrative: Women and Power in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

31 Erler and Kowaleski, Gendering the Master Narrative, 4-17.

32 Erler and Kowaleski, Gendering the Master Narrative, 4-17.

33 Erler and Kowaleski, Gendering the Master Narrative, 4-17.

107 corrections to the self and others.34 In the Cathar Rite of Baptism, Elders are instructed to tell their followers during the ceremony, “And if there are Believers present, let them perform the act of Peace as well. And if there are women Believers present let them perform the Act of Peace.”35 This ritual, performed to baptize a Believer and transition them to a perfectae, explicitly involved women in the process and dedicated a space for female followers to operate. Peter Waldo’s followers also violated this norm, with Waldensians involved in spreading the Word, sometimes hearing confessions and leading communion, while refusing to accept the need for an episcopal license to preach.36 While both Waldensian men and women would be violating this restriction by the Catholic Church, the Waldensians defended women’s ability to preach and the role of women in the Waldensian heresy seemed to be of particular concern for male Inquisitors.37 Reinarius Saccho writing in 1254 claims that one of the Waldensians’ major faults was claiming “that every layman, and even woman ought to preach,” specifically drawing attention to the role of women as a significant error of the Waldensians.

38 Women in both the Cathar and Waldensian sects violated gendered distinctions of authority, maintaining active roles in religious spheres, preaching and performing religious rites traditionally restricted to men.

In reaction to these deviations, the Catholic Church launched harsh responses in the form of inquisition and crusades, causing the deaths of many men and women.

Imprisoned and questioned over multiple months, Agnes Francou, a suspected Waldensian, refused to swear an oath or recant her faith and Church officials sentenced her to be burned at the stake along with her companion, Raymond Gasc.39 Cathars faced similar persecutions, notably in the form of the Albigensian crusade and the Great Inquisition, which saw the relentless persecution of Cathars and resulted in the mass murder of men and women.40 While women in these heresies did violate the orthodoxy established by the Catholic Church, their 34 William G Edmundson, “The Participation of Women Believers and the Family in Later Languedocian Catharism, 1300–1308.” (Dissertation, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2020) 2-10.

35 Rite for the Ministration of the Consolamentum, 4.57-4.58, trans. Lance S. Owens, (1991). https://www.cathar.info/doc_ lyons_ritual.htm#baptism1 36 Taylor, “Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa,” 327-49.

37 Shulamith Shahar, Women in a Medieval Heretical Sect: Agnes and Huguette the Waldensians, (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2001), 46-65.

38 Reinerius Saccho, "Of the Sects of Modern Heretics" (1254), in S. R. Maitland, trans. History of the Albigenses and Waldenses (London: C. J. G. and F. Rivington, 1832), pp. 407-413.

39 Germain de Castelnau, “Confession of Agnes Francou” (1319), trans. Nancy P. Stork (1996).

40 Mark Gregory Pegg, The Corruption of Angels: The Great Inquisition of 1245-1246 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

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actions did not directly violate the tenets of Christianity.

Rather, these women pushed against social norms of authority by taking action in public religious roles and acting outside of male Church authorities. Operating without Church consent, and sometimes in direct violation of commands by Church officials, the actions of these women posed a threat to the authority of the Catholic Church and the social patriarchal systems of power that benefited the Church. As a consequence of violating these social and religious authority norms, Church officials persecuted and murdered women they identified as heretical.

Women in groups deemed heretical by the Catholic Church, however, were not the only people who violated social and religious authority norms. Women identified by officials as saints also transgressed these norms but were met with a much different reaction from the Catholic Church. Catherine of Siena operated as a very active agent in spheres that were commonly off-limits to women. Catherine took on many political and religious roles, writing to scribes, traveling to inform laypeople on religious norms, corresponding with Pope Gregory XI, acting as an ambassador to Florence, and working in Pope Urban VI’s court.41 Writing personality to Pope Gregory XI many times, Catherine communicates informally with him, telling him that to chase the “demons out,” referring to corruption in the Catholic Church, he must accomplish a “return to Rome and uplifting of the standard of the most holy Cross,” directly involving herself in an ongoing political debate surrounding the Avignon papacy.42 Following her death, the Catholic Church canonized Catherine, and the Bull of Pius II declaring her canonization specifically mentions her roles in numerous political conflicts.43 Acting with considerable authority, Catherine of Siena was an active political and religious figure during the Middle Ages but her actions were largely supported by the Church.

Christina Mirabilis also possessed religious authority outside of the gendered norms of the Middle Ages. After her dramatic return to the living, Christina Mirabilis practiced harmless self-harm and other miraculous feats, drawing the attention of the Catholic Church.44 Through her physical suffering, Christina’s followers believed she was able to relieve others suffering in Purgatory, giving her a Christ-like role in relieving the pain of others through 41 Diana L. Villegas, “Catherine of Siena’s Spirituality of Political Engagement,” HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies 77, no. 2 (May 2021), https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v77i2.6319.

42 Catherine of Siena, “Letter to Pope Gregory XI” (1377), trans. Vida Dutton Scudder, (2004).

43 Pope Pius II, Bull of Pius II for the Canonization of Saint Catherine of Siena, Centro Internazionale di Studi Cateriniani website.

44 Sarah Macmillan, “Invisible Injuries: The Salvific and Sacramental Roles of Christina Mirabilis,” (Medieval Feminist Forum 52, no. 2, 2016) 44-69.

her own sacrifice.45 Through acting in this role, Christina took on authority outside the social norm, taking control of people’s suffering and putting it on herself. Christian committed these feats without Church approval and acted without the protection of a monastery or clerical authority.46 Acting as an independent agent, Christina’s practices could have been a source of major concern for the Church but officials made little moves to stop her.

The Church remained supportive of Christina Mirabilis’s acts, admiring her for her piety and devotion to ending others’ suffering in purgatory, and declared her a saint after her death in 1224.47 Despite obvious violations of religious authority norms, the Catholic Church accepted Christian Mirabilis and the Church incorporated her story into their religion to perpetuate her messages.

While women the Catholic Church identified as heretical and saintly pushed boundaries on authority and power in similar directions, the Church responded very differently to these women. Preaching without Church authority and living independent of a male religious advisor, the heretical deviation from the norm posed no benefit to the Catholic Church. Women whom Church officials identified as saints, on the other hand, deviated from authority norms in ways the Catholic Church could use to their benefit. Catherine of Siena’s work advocating for clerical reform and helping to settle the issue of the Western Schism assisted the Catholic Church at the time this assistance was very much needed. While not acting under the authority of a male religious figure, Christina Mirabilis’ authority did not exactly threaten the Catholic Church and the message she instilled on the real and terrifying nature of purgatory was extremely beneficial at a time when this aspect of Catholicism was increasingly called into question.48 The concept of Purgatory was important to the Catholic Church, not only to sell profitable indulgences but also to keep the laity concerned and dependent on the Catholic Church for absolution so that they could escape spending time in this middle ground.49 While Christina’s work led her to gain a degree of authority outside of the social norm, she was not directly asserting herself as an authority figure, such as through becoming involved in preaching, but rather was using her suffering as a tool to help other people. By supporting the messages of Christina Mirabilis and Catherine of Siena, the Catholic Church was able to further its personal agenda of strengthening its authority in the political sphere and over everyday life.

On the other hand, the messages sent by women deemed heretical, though involving similar deviations of authority norms, directly undermined the Church’s authority and power, resulting in differing responses to the two groups 45 46 47 48 49

Macmillan, “Invisible Injuries,” 50-69. de Cantimpré and King, Christina Mirabilis.

Macmillan, “Invisible Injuries,” 44-69.

Macmillan, “Invisible Injuries,” 44-70.

Macmillan, “Invisible Injuries,” 44-70.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 as officials in the Catholic Church modulated their responses to these women to best fit their own goals.

FEMALE POVERTY CHURCH

AND

THE

CATHOLIC

Differences in responses by the Catholic Church to women deviating from norms of authority are also seen in issues revolving around beliefs in poverty. Many Christian religious texts emphasize the importance of poverty in religious leaders, with Jesus quoted as telling his followers “Blessed are you who are poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.”50 Apostolic poverty was an important concept in the medieval period and increasingly became a cause for debate. Imitating the life of Jesus and his apostles, adhering to strict standards of poverty became popular among some lay members and a way for some to connect to religion outside of the institution of the Catholic Church.51 The Church, however, which was steadily gaining wealth and power throughout the Middle Ages, was less supportive of this form of worship. Through supporting and drawing attention to tenets of poverty in Christianity, the paradox of the Catholic Church as both a religious institution and an economic and political power became increasingly apparent.52 In response to this, the leaders of the Catholic Church carefully chose their reaction to groups supporting extreme levels of poverty and were reactive to criticism of their role in the economic sphere.

In groups deemed heretical by the Catholic Church, specifically the Cathars and Waldensians, beliefs surrounding poverty played a central role in the formation of the groups’ classification as heretical. While Cathars did occasionally participate in economic spheres, they took extreme vows of poverty, believing that the devil created the physical world and all worldly possessions were unholy.53 In a prayer written by leaders and used only among the perfectae, Cathars swore to “live only from water and wood,” meaning living off water and vegetables, and to “not abandon [their] body to any form of luxury.”

54 Waldensians held similar beliefs, emphasizing the role of voluntary poverty in worship and denying ownership and indulgence, dressing in plain clothing and sandals, visible traits they became known for.55 Waldensians were also 50 Luke 6:20-21 ESV 51 Jerry B. Pierce, Poverty, Heresy, and the Apocalypse : The Order of Apostles and Social Change in Medieval Italy 12601307 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2012) 80-90.

52 Pierce, Poverty, Heresy, and the Apocalypse, 80-90.

53 Edmundson, “The Participation of Women Believers,” 2-10.

54 Rite for the Transmission of the Prayer, 4.58, trans. Lance S. Owens, (1991) https://www.cathar.info/doc_lyons_ritual. htm#transmission 55 Shulamith Shahar, Women in a Medieval Heretical Sect: Agnes and Huguette the Waldensians (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2001), 1-25.

109 especially critical of the Catholic Churches involvement in activities such as landowning and the selling of indulgences, significant forms of profit and power for the Church.56 Neither of these groups violated Christian principles, with their strict adherence to poverty more in line with the message spread by Jesus and his apostles than the Catholic Church’s idea of poverty. Regardless, the Church declared Cathars heretical at the Third Lateran Council and heavily persecuted them, although the Church would not declare Waldensians heretical until the Fourth Lateran Council and they faced less heavy persecution.57 By operating in the same religious spheres, the definition of religious poverty supported

by Cathars and Waldensians clashed with the type of religious poverty the Catholic Church was presenting.

As a major landowner and economic agent, the Catholic Church disagreed with the position taken by these heretics and it stood a chance at reflecting badly on the Catholic Church.58 In response to this threat, the Catholic Church turned against these groups, depicting them as a dangerous “other” by declaring them as heretical sects despite the true nature of these groups being closely aligned with Christian commandments.

In contrast to women seen as heretics, saintly women that took on extreme vows of poverty received very different treatment by the hands of the Catholic Church, often rewarded for their piety and devotion. Clare of Assisi founded the Order of the Poor Ladies, a female monastic religious organization, and wrote the rules these religious women were to adhere to.59 Church officials repeatedly praised Clare for her devotion and for taking extreme vows of poverty which she would maintain throughout her life.60 Towards the end of her life, the Catholic Church granted Clare an allowance to live a more comfortable life at the behest of those concerned over her wellbeing and many Church officials urged Clare to renounce her strict adherence to her vows of poverty as her health rapidly declined.61 Clare refused and would pass away following a long period of poor health, with the canonization process starting soon after her death.62 Shortly before her death, Clare would write The Testament, a work including her own beliefs and guidance for her sisterhood after her death. In this, Clare writes, “I have always been most zealous and solicitous to observe and to have the others observe the holy poverty that we have promised to the 56 Shahar, Women in a Medieval Heretical Sect, 1-25.

57 Shahar, Women in a Medieval Heretical Sect, 1-25.

58 Pegg, The Corruption of Angels, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) 20-50.

59 Gabrielle E. Sutherland, “Clare of Assisi: Shaping a New Paradigm of Sainthood.” (Dissertation, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2009), xxi-xxiii.

60 Vanessa Diane Cash, “Clare of Assisi: Image and Reality” (dissertation, University of Bristol, 2010).

61 Cash, “Clare of Assisi,” 1-10.

62 Cash, “Clare of Assisi,” 1-10.

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Lord … let the others who will succeed me in office always be bound to observe it… that we would never in any way turn away from her [poverty].”63 Clare’s dedication to holy poverty can be seen in her writing, where she stresses the establishment of poverty as a tenet for the Order of the Poor Ladies and begs her successor to follow through by ensuring the Order remains devoted to religious poverty.

Alongside her political engagement, Catherine of Siena would also maintain extreme vows of poverty throughout her life, leading to praise from the Catholic Church. In the Bull declaring Catherine a saint, Pope Pius II reveals that “Catherine’s abstinence was surprising, and her austerity prodigious. She rejected the use of wine, of meat and every kind of seasoning. She finished by depriving herself of vegetables, and took no other bread, than that heavenly Bread.”64 This extreme form of poverty and denial of basic nutrition needs as a form of worship was recognized by the Catholic Church and applauded by Pope Pius II. Despite worries from those in her sisterhood and others in the Church over her extreme fasting and an order from a male Church official to end her fast, Catherine would continue this extreme form of fasting through the end of her life.65 While both Clare and Catherine continued to adhere to strict poverty vows despite direction from the Catholic Church to stop, the reaction towards these women differed greatly from the reaction towards women seen as heretics. Instead of being persecuted, the Church admired these women for their piety and devotion.

These similar beliefs in poverty led to different attitudes towards women identified by the Catholic Church as heretical and saintly. Heretical women were critical of the Catholic Church’s position on poverty, enforcing a more strict version among their group members and preaching their interpretations to others. These groups, especially Cathars and Waldensians, saw poverty as an essential commandant for religious officials to follow, extending poverty vows outside of themselves to impact methods of worship in Christianity as a whole. The Catholic Church saw this as a direct challenge to its orthodoxy, resulting in heretical persecutions. These groups were also often critical of the Church’s landowning and economic activity, especially those identified as Waldensians who argued against corrupt priests seeking financial gain.66 In contrast, women identified as saints rarely extended ideas of poverty outside of themselves or their immediate context, choosing extreme poverty vows as an individual form of worship rather than a way of life for all Church members.67 This was not a threat to the Catholic Church 63 Clare of Assisi, The Testament, (1247-1253), trans. Franciscan Intellectual Archives.

64 Pope Pius II, Bull of Pius II. 65 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 66 Taylor, “Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa,” 327-49.

67 Anna Minore, “Julian of Norwich and Catherine of Siena:

and, given that most of the lay population was also poor, was a way for the Catholic Church to inspire the laity and minimize questions of Church authority in times of economic hardship. Rather than taking one position on strict poverty vows, the Catholic Church adapted their attitudes towards those supportive of poverty as a form of worship depending on the threat or usefulness of those maintaining the vows. These resulted in distinctions often between individual and group worship, with vows maintained by individual saints posing little overall threat to the Catholic Church but poverty vows made by heretical groups in connection with their criticism of the Church presenting an opportunity to undermine the Catholic Church’s authority.

FEMALE AUTONOMY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH Alongside poverty, autonomy was also a realm in which similar deviations resulted in different reactions from the Catholic Church. In the Middle Ages, marriage norms were strongly enforced for women, used as a way to control female power, autonomy, and sexuality.68 Often living under their father’s control until marriage, women possessed little autonomy before marriage and had little legal rights along with the inability to participate in politics.69 After marriage, female social autonomy was still extremely limited, tied to their husbands, women remained second-class citizens with little legal rights, had reduced abilities to participate in the economic sphere, and remained locked in patriarchal systems of power.70 Through reducing women’s independent rights and abilities, medieval society assured that many women would be dependent on relationships with male relatives to survive. In some regions, widowed women possessed a greater degree of autonomy than was traditionally allowed to them, able to live independently and have control over property and money.71 However, even this remained limited and women often felt pressure to remarry to ensure security for themselves and their children.72 Through confining women to roles as secondclass citizens with few rights or abilities to function independently, medieval society assured a dependence on male authority figures and established control over female autonomy and sexuality.

In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church maintained Pain and the Way of Salvation.” (Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures 40, no. 1, 2014), 44–74.

68 James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 1-9.

69 Shulamith Shahar, The Fourth Estate : A History of Women in the Middle Ages. (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003.)

11-26.

70 Shahar, The Fourth Estate, 11-26.

71 Shahar, The Fourth Estate, 11-26.

72 Shahar, The Fourth Estate, 11-26.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 power over marriage, an essential limit to female social autonomy. At the start of the twelfth century, the Catholic Church redefined marriage in words of free choice rather than sexual consummation, a reaction against heretical beliefs against marriage and political pressures.73 At the 1184 Council of Verona, the Catholic Church introduced marriage as a sacrament, writing that all those who deny “the remission of sins, matrimony, or any other sacrament of the Church” are worthy of the Church’s disdain.74 At this council, Church officials confronted heretical beliefs and established a firm policy against them, specifically calling out Cathars and Waldensians for their beliefs, declaring them “to lie under a perpetual anathema.”75 Shifting the definition of marriage and directly condemning heretical beliefs, the Catholic Church fostered further division between orthodoxy and heretical groups.

Women deemed heretical by the Catholic Church deviated from social autonomy norms in many ways, but most importantly through rejecting or denying the sacrament of marriage and the need for male authority figures. Cathars were particularly known for their views of marriage and sexuality. Cathars believed that souls were genderless trapped divine beings and that these beings could be reincarnated in any form, man or woman, resulting in women being seen as equals to men.76 Believing the physical world to be a creation by the devil to trap fallen angels, Cathars believed that procreation trapped more souls in the physical world and subjected them to the torture of the mortal world.77 Due to this, Cathars rejected the sacrament of marriage which often led to child production, and leaders discouraged their followers from getting married, resulting in women possessing a larger degree of autonomy than in traditional social mores. This rejection of marriage was concerning from the Catholic Church, as marriage was a way to assert power over both the average person and major political leaders who still required the Church’s approval on matters regarding marriage to produce legal heirs. In reaction to this, the Catholic Church began shifting its definition of marriage from a relationship confirmed by sexual consummation to a sacrament involving a free choice between two consenting parties.78 This political manipulation of marriage frustrated many and, ironically, may have made Cathar teachings more appealing to those annoyed by the Catholic Church’s increasingly political role.79 By rejecting marriage, Cathars presented a major challenge to the Catholic Church’s authority over 73 Lansing, Power and Purity, 106-34.

74 Pope Lucius III, Ad Abolendam, Synod of Verona, 1184.

75 Pope Lucius III, Ad Abolendam, Synod of Verona, 1184.

76 Lansing, Power and Purity, 3-20.

77 Lansing, Power and Purity, 3-20.

78 Lansing, Power and Purity, 106-34.

79 Lansing, Power and Purity, 106-34.

111 the masses and especially over powerful political figures, resulting in both the persecution of the Cathars and also a shift in the Church’s definition of marriage.

Alongside Cathars, Beguines also presented a challenge to female social autonomy norms through challenging conceptions of marriage. At the start of these groups’ organization, Church officials often widely defined Beguines in documents, with the term “beguine” applied to a variety of groups of women and sometimes men.80 As the definition of Beguines became more concrete, often groups of religious women living together but very active in nearby community life, the Catholic Church first presented these communities with praise for their devotion and charity to others.81 Battling religious disagreements in the laity, Church officials praised Beguines as models of obedience and devotion, with early Beguine leader Marie D’Oignies canonized by the Catholic Church.82 However, these views of Beguines began to change as the Church became increasingly aware of the threat they posed to established Catholic authority. While unmarried nuns lived with male overseers, Beguines were both unmarried and unsupervised, living outside of male control in communities that often saw interaction with the laity through charity work.83 Interacting with communities and not confined to a specific location, Beguines also violated enclosure norms the Church established for religious women, free to move in and out of communities without Church approval. Enclosure norms stressed the importance of confining female religious groups to a Church-approved physical location in which they would be required to stay and overseen by a male preacher.84 Independent of male control, the novelty of the Beguine way of life became an increasing cause for concern for the Catholic Church as the power of this religious group increased with their growing autonomy.

In response, the Church would brand some Beguines as heretical and began the process of persecution, despite their general popularity as a result of their charitable works.

While living outside of male control was a flashpoint in the Catholic Church’s relationships with women identified as heretics, many saints who did not marry or had little male oversight were ultimately met with a very different response. Clare of Assisi left the traditional path of marriage laid out for women in the Middle Ages, choosing instead to follow Francis of Assisi, seeking to roam freely in the tradition of the Franciscans.85 However, the Catholic Church rejected this, pushing against the ability of women to freely move in society without a 80 Miller, “Clerical Representations of Parisian Beguines.”

81 Miller, “Clerical Representations of Parisian Beguines.”

82 Miller, “Clerical Representations of Parisian Beguines.”

83 Guidera, “The Beguines,” 1-10.

84 Guidera, “The Beguines,” 1-15.

85 Sutherland, “Clare of Assisi,” 1-10.

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system of patriarchal power to retain them, an issue it would again face with the Beguines. After a period of tension, Clare of Assisi compromised, devoting herself to leading a monastery, known as the Order of Saint Clare after her death.86 While Clare never married and sought to live independently of the Catholic Church, which threatened the traditional social autonomy allowed to women, Clare’s eventually compromised to enclosure, living in a physically defined Church-sanctioned religious group. This ensured that she would still have continuous contact with male authority figures and would still be involved in patriarchal systems of power. Although Clare’s original stance caused tension with Catholic officials, her eventual agreement to revert back to a more comfortable social norm resulted in her identification as a saintly woman.

Christina Mirabilis would also never marry and, unlike Clare, would not perform her miraculous acts under the supervision of a male confessor, but she would spend her final days in a monastery where religious officials reported that she was humble and obedient.87 Christina also violated the concepts of enclosure that both Clare and the Beguines pushed against. In her biography, Thomas de Cantimpré writes of her movement between communities, such as Wellen and Loon, interacting with men and women along the way and regularly begging in towns and along roads, all without male oversight or Church approval.88 However, even though she was not always directly under the control of a male authority figure, Christina’s deviations from social autonomy norms presented little threat to the Catholic Church, as she did not directly advocate for autonomy or present an example of groups of women successfully living without male control.

These differences in responses to women’s violation of social autonomy norms are a result of the Catholic Church’s need to maintain its authority over the masses in response to shifting pressures. Pushing against the sacrament of marriage, Cathars risked undermining a major source of Church authority over the laity, including the poor and powerful. Beguines similarly presented a challenge to Church authority, forming their own free-moving communities with women from various backgrounds that did not rely on male overseers or Church approval. Providing medical care and other charitable services, these women were often well-liked by the communities they were embedded in, presenting a problem for the Catholic Church to maintain authority.

While many saints also refused marriage, by continuing relationships with male confessors and operating in Church-approved religious communities, they did not present a threat to Church approval, but rather helped to 86 Sutherland, “Clare of Assisi,” 1-10.

87 Macmillan, “Invisible Injuries,” 44-69.

88 de Cantimpré and King, Christina Mirabilis.

increase Church authority. This indicates that violations of social autonomy norms by women were acceptable to the Catholic Church as long as the Church could maintain its authority over women through enforcing close patriarchal relationships with Church officials.

LIMITATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS While the Middle Ages saw the emergence of many more heresies and the canonization of many more women than discussed here, these groups of women present interesting examples that represent larger themes in attitudes towards women as heretics and saints.

Limited by the available documents preserved from the Middle Ages, often selected by the Catholic Church for preservation, this topic reveals that deviation from social and religious norms was not the main cause for concern for the Catholic Church. Rather, Church officials judged cases on a more individual basis to determine the degree of threat or benefit these women could provide for the Church. However, this is not meant to undermine the work and roles of these women in medieval society, but to point to inconsistencies in the way the Catholic Church depicted and treated these women. This essay also draws clear distinctions between heretical beliefs and orthodox Catholicism when more similarities than differences existed between the two. Also, terms used in this essay, such as Beguines, Waldensians, and Cathars, were in use by Church officials during the Middle Ages to refer to the heretical groups but these groups did not see themselves as separate from the Catholic religion, often believing that their methods of worship were more in line with the original aims of the founders of the religion. The distinctions made in this essay are meant to allow for a better understanding of the cause for the inconsistencies of treatment of heretical and canonized women. This allows for researchers to better understand how the lives of women have been depicted throughout history, sometimes subject to biased interpretations at the hands of male authority figures.

CONCLUSION Receiving very different treatment at the hands of the Catholic Church, officials responded to women identified as heretical and saintly based on the usefulness of their deviations to the Church’s mission to maintain authority.

Deemed heretics or saints by the Church, these women took on roles in religious organizations and politics not expected for women in the Middle Ages while maintaining strict poverty vows despite disapproval or discouragement from the Catholic Church. Women placed in heretical and sainted groups by the Church also both violated autonomy norms for women in the medieval period, often rejecting marriage in favor of a life of religious devotion. Reactions to these women varied based on their perceived threat to the Catholic Church’s authority. Involved in politics

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5 and extreme poverty vows, saints violated the same norms but because they were still under the control of male Church officials, these women were seen as less of a threat than heretical women who were actively involved in spreading the religion and supporting strict poverty vows while living outside of male authority. Through this, it can be seen that the reactions to these women were not based on the norms they violated, but rather based on the way in which they violated these norms and the usefulness of their message to maintaining the Catholic Church’s authority. These findings indicate a possible trend of religious institutions claiming women’s stories to achieve their goals and warrants further research on the topic to understand how women’s history has been shaped by these narratives.

REFERENCES 1.

of Assisi, Clare. The Testament, (1247-1253), trans.

Franciscan Intellectual Archives. https://www. franciscantradition.org/clare-of-assisi-earlydocuments/the-testament-clare-f-assisi/235-caed-1-page-59

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Brundage, James A. Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

3. Bynum, Caroline Walker. Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to 4.

Medieval Women. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010.

5.

Cash, Vanessa Diane. “Clare of Assisi: Image and Reality.” Dissertation, University of Bristol, 2010.

6. de Castelnau, Germain. “Confession of Agnes Francou.” 1319, trans. Nancy P. Stork (1996).

7.

de Cantimpré, Thomas, and Margot H. King. The Life of Christina Mirabilis. Toronto, Ont.: Peregrina, 1995.

8. Deane, Jennifer Kolpacoff. A History of Medieval Heresy and Inquisition. Lanham, MD: 9. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011. Accessed November 18, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

10. Edmundson, William G. “The Participation of Women Believers and the Family in Later Languedocian Catharism, 1300–1308.” Dissertation, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2020.

11. Erler, Mary Carpenter, and Maryanne Kowaleski.

Gendering the Master Narrative: Women and Power in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

12. Guidera, Christine. “The Beguines: An Overview

113 of Their Life, Work and Spirituality.” Dissertation, National Library of Canada, 1992.

13. Huizinga, Johan. The Autumn of the Middle Ages.

Translated by Rodney J Payton and Ulrich 14. Mammitzsch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

15. Lansing, Carol Leroy. Power and Purity: Cathar Heresy in Medieval Italy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

16. Les-Vaux-de-Cernay, Peter. The History of the Albigensian Crusade: Peter of Les-Vaux-De-Cernay’s Historia Albigensis. Translated by W. A. Sibly and M. D. Sibly.

17. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2000.

18. Macmillan, Sarah. “Invisible Injuries: The Salvific and Sacramental Roles of Christina Mirabilis.” Medieval Feminist Forum 52, no. 2 (2016): 44–69. https://doi. org/10.17077/1536-8742.2032.

19. Miller, Tanya Stabler. “What’s in a Name? Clerical Representations of Parisian Beguines (1200-1328).”

Journal of Medieval History 33, no. 1 (2007): 60–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmedhist.2007.01.005.

20. Minore, Anna. “Julian of Norwich and Catherine of Siena: Pain and the Way of Salvation.” Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures 40, no. 1 (2014): 44–74. https://doi.org/10.5325/jmedirelicult.40.1.0044.

21. Neuffer, Julie. “The Beguines of the Middle Ages.”

Dissertation, ProQuest DissertationsPublishing, 2000.

22. Pegg, Mark Gregory. The Corruption of Angels: The Great Inquisition of 1245-1246. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

23. Pierce, Jerry B. Poverty, Heresy, and the Apocalypse : The Order of Apostles and Social Change in Medieval Italy 1260-1307. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2012. Accessed December 9, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

24. Pius II, Bull of Pius II for the Canonization of Saint Catherine of Siena, 1461, Centro Internazionale di Studi Cateriniani, https://www. centrostudicateriniani.it/images/documenti/ Bull_of_Pius_II_CANONIZATON_OF_SAINT_ CATHERINE_OF_SIENA.pdf 25. Pope Lucius III, Ad Abolendam, Synod of Verona, 1184. http://professor-moriarty.com/info/files/ resources/verona1184.txt 26. Rite for the Ministration of the Consolamentum, 4.57-4.58, trans. Lance S. Owens, 1991, https://www. cathar.info/doc_lyons_ritual.htm#baptism1

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27. Rite for the Transmission of the Prayer, 4.58, trans. Lance S. Owens, 1991, https://www.cathar.info/doc_lyons_ ritual.htm#transmission 28. Saccho, Reinerius. “Of the Sects of Modern Heretics” (1254), in S. R. Maitland, trans. History of the Albigenses and Waldenses. London: C. J. G. and F. Rivington, 1832. Pp. 407-413.

29. Shahar, Shulamith. Women in a Medieval Heretical Sect: Agnes and Huguette the Waldensians. Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2001.

30. Shahar, Shulamith. The Fourth Estate: A History of Women in the Middle Ages. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003. Accessed December 10, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

31. of Siena, Catherine. “Letter to Pope Gregory XI,” 1377. trans. Vida Dutton Scudder, 2004.

32. Sutherland, Gabrielle E. “Clare of Assisi: Shaping a New Paradigm of Sainthood.” Dissertation, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2009.

33. Taylor, Claire. “‘Sunt Quadraginta Anni Vel circa’: Southern French Waldensians and the 34. Albigensian Crusade.” French History 32, no. 3 (2018): 327–49. https://doi.org/10.1093/fh/cry065.

35. Villegas, Diana L. “Catherine of Siena’s Spirituality of Political Engagement.” HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies 77, no. 2 (2021). https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v77i2.6319.

About the Author Lauren is a third year undergraduate student at GWU originally from South Carolina and double majoring in Psychology and History. Her research interests include the history of women’s interactions with religious institutions and the effects of these interactions on women’s perceptions and mental health. Lauren is a research assistant at the Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project and in Dr. Le’s Mothers and Babies: Mood and Health Research Program.

Mentor Details An Assistant Professor in GWU’s History department, Dr. Agresta specializes in medieval European and Mediterranean history, with an emphasis on environmental history, urban history, and history of public health. Dr. Agresta earned her Ph.D. in history from Yale University and is a recipient of the Bishko Memorial Prize and is a George Washington University Humanities Center Fellow. Dr. Agresta’s current project, God, Humans, and Nature in Late Medieval Valencia, examines how rulers of religiously mixed Valencia, Spain understood the relationship between God, humans, and the natural world.

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the gw

SCOPE The GW Scope is the online news edition of the GW Undergaduate Review, keeping the George Washington University up to date with important events and advancements in science and policy, including related research at GW. We seek to engage the GW community with the intersection of science with modern society, including policy, culture, and the future.

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Land of the Incarcerated, Home of the Underpaid: Looking at the History of Prison Labor

BY BEN CHAPMAN

In October of 2021, a federal jury in Washington state ruled that immigrant detainees in a private detention center in Tacoma, Washington, were eligible for $17.3 million in back pay for illegal wages. The GEO Group, a private for-profit prison group that runs the US Immigrant and Customs Enforcement facility, was determined to be in violation of Washington’s minimum wage law by paying detainees only $1 per day for participation in their Voluntary Work Program. The federal judge and jury in the case identified over 10,000 former and current detainees who would be eligible for back pay and ordered GEO to pay Washington’s minimum wage ($13.69/hour) going forward. Part of GEO’s defense was the fact that Washington doesn’t even pay minimum wage for incarcerated people in staterun facilities. In fact, inmate wages in Washington range from $0.65 to $1.75 an hour along with policies in place that could increase sentences for inmates who refuse to work while incarcerated. Although the case is a landmark ruling in favor of detainees and incarcerated people in the future, it unearths an ugly underside of our country

through the history and present-day use of prison labor.

The thirteenth amendment monumentally ended slavery within the United States--for almost everybody.

The amendment reads: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” While outlawing slavery for most, the thirteenth amendment effectively legalized slavery for people convicted of crimes. The amendment reads:

“

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

As a result, states recognized that incarcerating individuals presented a new potential market for cheap labor. Southern states quickly enacted laws targeting freed slaves, even going so far as requiring freed slaves to work for white farmers at risk of being incarcerated. Prisons, particularly within the South, began leasing inmates to plantation owners to provide cheap labor. These inmates were treated with even less respect or care than formal

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slaves, deemed as expendable and replaceable criminals rather than personal property. Upon seeing the profits that farmers would make from utilizing inmate labor, some states began buying plantations to subject prisoners to work on and made massive profits as a result.

The practice of grossly underpaying prisoners for their labor hasn’t stopped, but rather found a new form over time. Presently, all states have laws in place specifying the wages inmates are capable of earning. However, the average wages that inmates have earned have actually decreased in recent years, with the average hourly prisoner wage decreasing from 93 cents per hour in 2001 to 86 cents as of 2017. Some states even have laws implementing a maximum daily or monthly wage that prisoners cannot exceed, and many of these maximum wages allotted have been lowered by states over time. As a result, the average maximum daily wage for prisoners has declined even more significantly from $4.73 in 2001 to $3.45 in 2017. Within federal prisons, inmates only earn between 12 to 40 cents an hour for jobs servicing the prison itself.

Increasingly in recent decades, corporations have sourced cheap labor from prisons. This work is typically known as Federal Prison Industries or Correctional Industries at the state level. On average, these jobs pay slightly more than non-industry jobs within the prison (such as laundry, cleaning, and serving meals). The pay, however, is still dismal--ranging from 23 cents to $1.15 per hour. The Prison Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) provides certification for prison work programs that meet specific criteria--such as paying local wages-yet these criteria are often unregulated, ignored, and openly defied across the country.

“

The pay, however, is still dismal--ranging from 23 cents to $1.15 per hour.”

Corporations often rely on obfuscating supply chain information available to the public through establishing joint ventures or relying on subcontractors to distance themselves from the name being attributed to prison labor.

Some notable examples include McDonald’s underpaying inmates to process beef, JCPenney underpaying inmates to sew garments, and IBM underpaying inmates to create circuit boards. In recent years, some corporations that previously relied on prison labor have ceased ties after public outcry--such as Victoria’s Secret, Starbucks, and Whole Foods.

After earning such low wages, prisoners are potentially subject to various fees, directly subtracted from their paychecks, depending on the state they’re incarcerated

in. In Massachusetts, up to half of the inmates’ paychecks could be put aside to cover expenses upon release, while New Mexico takes away anywhere from 15 to 50 percent of an inmate’s paycheck to put towards their Crime Victims Reparations Funds. Increasing reliance on restitution as a form of compensation for victims has led to increases in the fees taken out of prisoners’ pay. After these deductions, inmates often find themselves unable to afford goods deemed a “luxury” from the commissary-such as paying up to 21 cents an hour for a phone call or $5.50 for two tampons.

It’s difficult to determine whether prison labor will be addressed federally in the near future. In order to end the practice, Congress would need to introduce a Constitutional amendment finally closing the loophole presented in the 13th amendment. Attempts have been made to propose resolutions suggesting such an amendment but have yet to gain substantial support from Congress. That, however, should not understate the significance of the GEO ruling for immigrant rights going forward. The legal reasoning behind the ruling was the fact that immigrant detainees are incarcerated on civil charges rather than criminal, preventing GEO from utilizing the 13th amendment as a defense. Although GEO is appealing the decision and temporarily suspending their Voluntary Work Program, which will hold up the ability to provide back pay, this ruling opens up any immigrant detention center to be similarly sued and found to be in violation of the law. Going forward, immigrant detainees have a likely chance of fighting for a fair minimum wage rather than continuing the practice of legal slavery-otherwise known as prison labor--in the United States.

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Institution for Social and Policy Studies. https:// isps.yale.edu/news/blog/2013/10/time-to-reckonwith-prison-labor-0 Goldberg, E. (2018, December 20). Women Often Can’t Afford Tampons, Pads In Federal Prisons.

That’s About To Change. HuffPost. https://www. huffpost.com/entry/the-new-criminal-justicebill-provides-free-tampons-pads-in-federalprisons_n_5c1ac0a0e4b08aaf7a84ac38 Kaste, M. (2021, October 29). Thousands of former detainees will receive back pay in $17.3 million settlement. NPR. https://www.npr. org/2021/10/29/1050520220/detainees-whoearned-just-1-a-day-are-owed-17-million-in-backpay-a-jury-orders Opinion: The Washington state education system’s dark ties with the prison industrial complex. (2021, November 12). The Seattle Collegian. https:// seattlecollegian.com/the-washington-stateeducation-systems-dark-ties-with-the-prisonindustrial-complex/?utm_source=rss&utm_ medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-washingtonstate-education-systems-dark-ties-with-theprison-industrial-complex Prison wages: Appendix. (2017, April 10). Prison Policy Initiative. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ wage_policies.html Sawyer, W. (2017, April 10). How much do

incarcerated people earn in each state? Prison Policy Initiative. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ blog/2017/04/10/wages/ 11. Valverde, M. (2020, June 22). Instagram post shares misleading information about 8 companies, prison labor. PolitiFact. https://www.politifact.com/ factchecks/2020/jun/22/instagram-posts/ instagram-post-shares-misleading-informationabout/ 12. Wagner, P., & Jones, A. (2019, February). State of Phone Justice. Prison Policy Initiative. https://www. prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_justice. html 13. Wu, C., & Brady, P. (2020, August 5). Private Companies Producing with US Prison Labor in 2020: Prison Labor in the US, Part II. Corporate Accountability Lab. https://corpaccountabilitylab. org/calblog/2020/8/5/private-companiesproducing-with-us-prison-labor-in-2020-prisonlabor-in-the-us-part-ii

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MEET THE STAFF EXECUTIVE BOARD Jessica Bride (President & Editor-in-Chief) Jessica is a senior from Charleston, South Carolina, double-majoring in Psychology and Criminal Justice. Since 2020, she has been a research assistant in the RW Turner Lab at the GW School of Medicine & Health Sciences. She was selected as a 2021-2022 Luther Rice Research Fellow, and won for Graduate Health Sciences and Public Health at GW’s 2021 Research Showcase. Jessica is also editor-in-chief for Capitol Letters, GW’s literary magazine.

Jaylee Davis (Layout Manager & Fall Director of GW Scope) Jaylee Davis is a sophomore from Atlanta, Georgia, majoring in English. She is a member of the University Honors Program and currently works as a research assistant for Dr. Randi Kristensten in the University Writing Department.

Aldonza Chavez (Lead Editor for Humanities & Events Manager) Aldonza is a senior from Truro, Iowa, double-majoring in English and Biology with a concentration in Ecology, Evolution, and the Environment. She currently works at the Wilbur V. Harlan Greenhouse aiding in botanical and ecological research preparation and initiatives. Previously, she was an assistant in various ecology labs on the GW Foggy Bottom campus. She is also a social media and events manager for the GW Greenhouse Club.

Veronika Kulik (Lead Editor for Natural Sciences) Veronika is a senior from Portland, Oregon, majoring in Biological Anthropology. She is a member of Dr. Chet Sherwood’s Evolutionary Neuroscience lab, where she studies aging and neurodegenerative diseases. Prior, she worked in Dr. Colin Young’s lab at the GW School of Medicine & Health Sciences, investigating the role of the brain in metabolic diseases. Veronika is a member of the University Honors Program and a combined degree student who will stay at GW to receive her MS in Human Paleobiology.

Eleanor Ball (Lead Editor for Social Sciences) Eleanor is a senior from Des Moines, Iowa, double-majoring in Public Health and English. Previously, she’s worked with the Polk County Health Department to research local economic and health inequities impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Her other research interests include queer approaches to English Renaissance drama and Medieval poetry. Eleanor is also the Executive Producer of the GW Shakespeare Company and plans to pursue a Master’s in Library Science next spring.

Nammu Arumugasamy (Submission Recruitment Chair & Social Sciences Editor) Nammu is a senior from Seattle, Washington, majoring in Political Science and minoring in Criminal Justice. She plans to pursue criminal/civil law and is currently a member of GW’s Pre-Law fraternity, Phi Alpha Delta. Nammu is a part of GW’s Women’s Club Lacrosse and is an orientation leader for GW.

Jenna Ahart (Spring Director of GW Scope & Natural Sciences Editor) Jenna is a freshman from West Chester, Pennsylvania, who majors in Journalism and Mass Communications with a minor in Astronomy and Astrophysics. She is a member of the University Honors Program and currently works as a communications assistant for the Corcoran School of the Arts and Design.

Meghan Flanagan (Events Assistant) Meghan, originally from Houston, Texas, is a first-year studying Political Science and History at GW. She is currently serving as a US House of Representatives Intern, and is also involved with Phi Alpha Delta, the Pre-Law Fraternity.

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EDITORIAL BOARD Alexandra Kicior Alexandra is a sophomore from West Orange, New Jersey, double-majoring in International Affairs and Geography.

She is currently the Head Project Manager at the Friedlander Group, where she leads the Iran Congressional Gold Medal Project in communicating with House and Senate representatives and serving as a general resource for all other interns. She is also the co-chair of the Program Innovation Board for the LEAP Advisory Council at the Elliott School, and she recently joined Sigma Iota Rho, the International Affairs honor society at GW.

Ananya Murthy Ananya is a senior from Pearland, Texas, majoring in International Affairs and Economics. She is currently serving as a Public Affairs Intern at the US Trustee Program in the Department of Justice. She is also logistics officer for GW Mock Trial. Her social sciences interests include law and economic development.

Benjamin Kane Ben is a sophomore from Sharon, Massachusetts, double-majoring in Philosophy and Political Science. He currently serves as an Undergraduate Research Fellow at the National Churchill Leadership Center, and his piece “Due Process on the Nuremberg Trials” was published in the GW Undergraduate Review in the Spring of 2021. His research interests include political and legal theory, as well as religious philosophy.

Chris Luhring Chris is a junior from Indianapolis, Indiana, majoring in Political science with a concentration in Public Policy and Economics. He has done research on the correlation between the decline of low-skill manufacturing and national mental health conditions. He is also a former legal intern at the Madison County prosecutor’s office where he assisted in about six major felony trials. He has also done political research for a congressional campaign and political action committees. He plans to pursue a joint masters in public policy and a law degree.

Daphne Ghazizadeh Daphne is a freshman from Orange County, California, double-majoring in Criminal Justice and International Affairs.

In the past, she has served as a research assistant in the UCI Astrophysics Department studying AGNs and mergers.

Currently, she is a campaign intern for Tanaka for Congress.

Elisabeth Reznikov Elisabeth is a freshman from Vienna, Virginia, double-majoring in International Affairs and Russian with a minor in Spanish. She is currently volunteering as a research assistant for United Help Ukraine, a non-profit organization working to help those affected by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, including refugees, civilians on the ground, and military personnel. In addition, she is currently working on a research project regarding the ethics of medical practices that were implemented in Germany under the Nazi party.

Janavi Kanagasundaram Janavi is a senior from Lansdale, Pennsylvania, majoring in International Affairs and Economics with a concentration in the Middle East. Previously, she worked as a research assistant on a project detailing South Asian American women writers and filmmakers and as an economics tutor at Academic Commons. She is also a member of the PreLaw Student Association and the University Honors Program.

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Michael Farina Michael is a senior from Westchester County, New York, with a major in Biology and minor in STEM Teaching. He is currently taking a research course through the biology department in which he and his classmates are collaborating with professor Arnaud Martin to determine how CRISPR gene knockouts affect butterfly patterns. He is also an EMT on EMERG and for the GW MFA and a patient care tech at Medstar Urgent Care. He hopes to attend physician assistant school next year and aims to be a PA.

Stephen Dillon-Streisel Stephen is a sophomore from Secaucus, New Jersey, with a major in Psychology and a minor in Public Health. He is currently a research intern at the GW Autism and Neurodevelopmental Disorders Institute and a Research Assistant at the GW Addiction Sciences lab. Stephen is also the Clinical Assistant for the Meltzer Community Health Center while working as a biology tutor. He hopes to further his career in Psychology by attending a Clinical Ph.D. program in the future and working as a certified clinical psychologist.

GW SCOPE Ben Chapman Ben is a fall 2021 graduate from Colchester, Connecticut who majored in Political Science and minored in Criminal Justice. Previously, he has interned on Capitol Hill for two members of the House of Representatives. He enjoys writing about policy and politics, particularly as it relates to social issues. In the future he hopes to work in the area of NGOs and nonprofits aimed towards criminal justice reform.

Emily Mosley Emily Mosley is a senior from Waco, Texas, majoring in International Affairs with a concentration in Security Policy. She is also a recipient of the Congressional Gold Medal and the George H.W. Point of Light Award for her political activism and philanthropy. Ms. Mosley enjoys writing about social justice topics, world news, and women’s studies. When she isn’t studying or writing, you can find her at a local coffee shop or visiting an art museum. Post graduation, she hopes to pursue a career in law or journalism.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5

Editorial Research Features See what the GWUR team is working on!

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SPRING 2022 • THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Veronika Kulik

Major in Biological Anthropology Columbian College of Arts and Sciences Class of 2022 Where did/do you conduct research? What is the overarching goal of that organization?

I’m a member of Dr. Chet Sherwood’s Evolutionary Neuroscience lab, which is a part of the Center for the Advanced Study of Human Paleobiology. We study the brains of all sorts of mammalian species and use a comparative approach to investigate the evolution of behavior, communication, cognition, neurodegeneration, and more.

What was/is your specific project? Why is this important?

The project I worked on last semester was completed for my undergraduate honors thesis and had to do with the evolution of human language and complex tool use. Language and complex tool use are often cited as behaviors unique to humans and may be evolutionarily linked owing to the underlying cognitive processes they have in common.

I investigated the coevolution of language and tools in the brain using a quantitative activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis on previously published neuroimaging studies. This meta-analysis was meant to identify what areas of the brain are activated during syntactic processing and/or tool use. Significant clusters related to syntactic processing were identified in areas known to be related to language production and comprehension, including bilateral Broca’s area (inferior frontal gyrus). Tool use activation clusters were all in the left hemisphere and included the primary motor cortex and premotor cortex, in addition to other areas involved with sensorimotor transformation.

Activation shared by syntactic processing and tool use was only significant at one cluster, located in the left inferior frontal gyrus. This minimal overlap between syntactic processing and tool use activation from our meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies indicates that there is not a widespread common neural network between the two. Instead, Broca’s area may serve as an important hub that was initially recruited in early human evolution under the context of simple tool use, but was eventually co-opted for linguistic purposes, including the sequential and hierarchical ordering processes that characterize syntax.

What has been the most valuable experience thus far doing research as an undergraduate?

Working on my own project has given me important insight into what goes into academic research, from planning the study to submitting for publication (which we hope to do soon with my undergraduate thesis). Also beneficial has been just the opportunity to shadow others in the lab and learn more about their projects. Hearing about what others are working on can be a source of inspiration in and of itself, and seeing how my project may connect or build on others’ work has also been very helpful, since collaboration is a crucial aspect of science.

What are your plans for the future? How has your research experience prepared you for them?

I’m a combined degree student, so I will continue at GW for another year to get my M.S. in Human Paleobiology. Already being familiar with many of the protocols I will need for my master’s thesis research makes me feel more prepared to take on this next challenge.

Any advice for people looking to get involved in undergraduate research?

Ask to shadow someone in a lab whose research interests align with something you’re passionate about! Even if you don’t end up with a position in that lab, you’ll still have gotten the chance to see what doing work in that field would involve.

THE GW UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • VOLUME 5

Jessica Bride

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Majors in Psychology & Criminal Justice Columbian College of Arts and Sciences Class of 2022

Where did/do you conduct research? What is the overarching goal of that organization?

The Luther Rice Undergraduate Research Fellowship is offered through the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences to support undergraduate research at GW. I’m conducting my research as a research assistant in the RW Turner Lab. What was/is your specific project? Why is this important?

As a Luther Rice Fellow, I am completing a project titled “Psychosocial Impacts of Leaving High-Level Sports”. I seek to answer the question: what specific factors influence the degree of difficulty of their transition? Furthermore, what psychological and emotional barriers inform their behavior? In summer 2021, I interviewed former NFL players and former D-1 college football players. I participated in interview protocol development and was responsible for transcription, coding, and conducting a cross-case analysis to compare the athlete’s transition experiences within and between cohorts. The former athletes described their experiences across three themes: identity, communication patterns, and health. Half of the former athletes chose a negative adjective to describe their transition. Some players expressed that the hardest part of transitioning into private life was “Replacing the Thrill” of playing. They expressed frustration with losing the structure of a routine and the camaraderie of team sports. Their efforts to create a meaningful lifestyle centered around practices first learned from sports, such as exercise regimens. Families were the most common social network they relied on for support, but some former athletes experienced negative social impacts.

I’m currently working on a manuscript, and I hope that this study contributes to improving the well-being of former athletes. Furthermore, I hope to define the relevance of these dimensions for former NFL players and contribute to the evaluation of strategies to improve their help-seeking behaviors. This data will aid the design of programs to help players navigate the transition. This project is an extension of my lab’s Athlete Brain Health and Aging Study.

What has been the most valuable experience thus far doing research as an undergraduate?

My most valuable experience has been integrating myself into GW’s research community because I have grown personally and professionally. I’ve been lucky to conduct multiple independent research projects during my time as an undergrad. These opportunities have come from classes, talking with other students about research opportunities, and using GW’s resources. Learning from other researchers and research orgs inspired me to continue my own work.

What are your plans for the future? How has your research experience prepared you for them?

After graduation, I will be working in my lab full-time during my gap year before pursuing a postgraduate degree in psychology. I frequently attend professional workshops and lab-sponsored training sessions that cover topics such as data analysis, interview training, and healthcare outcomes. Working directly with community members has improved my interpersonal and reflective listening skills, which will be valuable as a qualitative researcher.

Any advice for people looking to get involved in undergraduate research?

I’m sure you’ve heard it before but network! Reach out to your professors and ask if they have any research they’re currently doing. Or, look into research at GW that interests you and contact the faculty involved. It can’t hurt and, even if they don’t have spots, they may know of other opportunities for you.