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The Globe: World News From All Sides

COPYRIGHTED 2008 Š Copyright Š 2008, [The Globe]. Unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved. Reproduction of any content, in whole or in part, without the express permission of the Chairman of the International Affairs Society is strictly prohibited. Violations are subject to legal action. The Globe is a production of the International Affairs Society and is a registered student organization of The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of The George Washington University, its entities, or the International Affairs Society.


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The Globe: World News From All Sides

TABLE OF CONTENTS LETTER FROM THE EDITOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND THE CHINESE CHALLENGE IN NORTH EAST ASIA BY SEAN CHEANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ALGERIA’S OIL: ECONOMIC MALAISE IN A RENTIER STATE BY DANIEL BOEHMER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO A POST 9/11 NATO BY PATRICIA PUTTMANN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 GLOBAL HIV/AIDS CENTRAL PROGRAM EVALUATION BY RICHARD B. BLOOMFIELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 THE SECRET TO STATE SUCCESS: CIVIC NATIONALISM BY KIRSTEN ORTEGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 8 AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION BY MICHAEL IMBERGAMO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26


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I am proud to present The Globe: World News from All Sides. This journal is the only undergraduate journal at the George Washington University devoted solely to International Affairs. The Globe is an amazing opportunity for International Affairs Society members, as well as Elliot School students to publish their academic papers in a professional manner. More than that it is an opportunity to open discussion, publish ideas and to think and write critically on world affairs. One of The Globe’s great strengths is that those who participate submit such a wide variety articles on a multitude of topics that The Globe becomes a great way to broaden your views and learn something new. This year is no exception, we have a variety of topics covered in this issue and each author lends us their expertise and point of view, which lends itself to informative and fascinating reading. I hope all of you enjoy this as much as I have enjoyed working on this. Congratulations to the talented authors featured in this edition, and a sincere thank you to everyone who helped make this publication happen. Best, Catherine Merino Editor-In-Chief


The Globe: World News From All Sides

American Hegemony and the Chinese Challenge in Northeast Asia By Sean Cheang Introduction If one looks through the media today, almost all major news outlets will be running something on China. Regardless of the section, from the economic to the social to the artistic, China is a topic that appears frequently. This frequency has alarmed many in the general public not to mention the numerous “talking heads” and “scribbling pens” of the media. It is assumed that a) China is mentioned a lot in the papers; therefore b) it must be doing something worth mentioning, so c) America should be worried. This train of thought is not only widely shared but has resulted in an alarmist view of China in the eyes of many. In large part, this is due to a seriously flawed adaptation of power transition theory to the situation between the US and China in the media. Power transition theory is based on the notion of an existing hegemon and a challenger to the hegemon. The theory states that as one state attempts to catch up with another, war is at its greatest likelihood. As either the existing hegemon will wage a preventive war to prevent the further rise of the challenger or the challenger will attack the hegemon to claim its place. Thus conflict is inevitable when a challenger appears on the horizon. The popular media enjoys claiming that we are reaching the point where vigilance is required if not outright war to maintain the US’s hegemonic position. While such alarmist claims clearly jump the gun, if we scale down to a more regional level, the claims begin to take on aspects of plausibility. It is thus the aim of this paper to explore to what extent China poses a danger to American hegemony in the Northeast Asian region (NEA). The region has seen struggle between the US and China before during the Korean War and is home to three of the staunches US allies in the world; Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It is a region where the possibilities of conflict or cooperation both look equally plausible. Cooperation over the North Korea issue has provided what could be a future framework for regional cooperation, while the issue of Taiwan has proved to be of far more volatile stuff. It is in this region that this paper will attempt to explore in economic and security terms whether China has begun to overtake the US as hegemon and whether the weeds of conflict are indeed sown according to power transition theory. Theoretical Framework Power transition theory is what is said to be a ‘systemic’ theory of international affairs. Its chief concerns lie with the existing order of international power, specifically around the hegemon. Yet unlike other normative tools in the realist belt, it does not draw exclusively upon power. Drawing heavily on game theory and rational actor theory,


Elliott School of International Affairs perceptions of and satisfaction with the international order plays an important role in power transition theory. In fact, these factors are weighed more heavily in power transition calculation, with state capabilities more heavily affecting the duration and intensity of a possible conflict. Thus any successful analysis will include a multi-scalar analysis of both international factors and more domestic ones. As such in this paper, we will analysis regional issues as well as peering into certain facets of internal Chinese issues. Economics The economic policy objectives in the NEA region can be seen as one of gaining and preserving market access. This can be seen through as a continuation of a historical trend beginning with Commodore Perry’s opening of Japan to US support for the open door policy on imperial China and more recently, exploring the possibility of free trade agreements (FTAs) with the states in the region. A quarter of all US trade is conducted with states in NEA and the US has traditional been the largest trading partner for all the states in the region (Moore 2006, 74). Yet China has already begun to encroach upon the economic position of the US in the region. Last year, China replaced the US as the top trading partner for all the states in the region; a position that the US has maintained since the end of the Second World War (Shaplen and Laney 2007, 83). China’s impressive economic performance in the region is bound to continue to grow at an impressive pace as it seeks to encourage greater regional economic integration through pursuing the exploration of FTAs with South Korea and Japan. The engine behind this interest in regional economic integration is largely driven by the extensive web woven by companies from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan shifting production to China. FTAs with China could diminish the importance of the US as a regional economic player. Beyond FTAs, China has been pressuring Japan and South Korea for the creation of a ‘closed’ form of regional integration, either through the ASEAN+3 format or a new regional forum. For all these issues, the position of the US is not actually as bad as it looks. While it is true that China has now gone on to replace the US as the largest bilateral trader in the region, this is not due in any part to the decline in relations between states and the US but an increase in the importance of China. With the expansion of business ties across the region, China has picked up part of the export trade that used to exist between the NEA states and the US; 65% of the value of Chinese exports can be accounted for by imported from other Asian countries (Shaplen and Laney 2007, 84). On the issue of the FTAs, past agreements that China has signed have not been very substantive (Bergsten 2006, 174). On the other hand, the US has already negotiated a very substantive FTA with South Korea and negotiations with Japan are set to start next year. If an equally substantial deal is completed with Japan, the US’s economic position in NEA is secure for the foreseeable future. It is also highly unlikely that any Chinese proposal will lead to more substantial negotiations, as there has already been significant trade friction between the states. One of the most important aspects of US economic supremacy in the region rest in the fact that the region still uses the USD as a major reserve currency in addition to a


The Globe: World News From All Sides vehicle currency in regional trade. China is in no state to begin challenging this position and even Japan, second largest economy in the world, has not tried to introduce the Yen as the main trading currency in the region. While all the countries in the region are beginning to diversify their reserve holdings, it is unlikely that the USD will become a second tier reserve currency and lose its position as the regions vehicle currency. Security NEA is an amazing region in the sense that its unbridled economic potential is only restraint by the relatively high possibility of armed confrontation between the regions powers. Two Cold War relics, North Korea (hereafter DPRK) and Taiwan still cast long shadows over the region. In addition, the region lacks an exclusively regional structured dialogue of any sort, increasing the possibility of a small tiff erupting into large conflict. The current security structure of the region is still roughly divided along Cold War lines. The US- Japanese, US- Korean bilateral security pacts remain the cornerstone of security in the region, in addition to the strategically ambiguously worded Taiwan Relations Act. In order to fulfill its commitment under these security pacts, the US currently has more than 66,000 troops stationed in the region as well as one aircraft carrier group(Kane 2006). US security preponderance manifest itself in the region in two ways, through its bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea and its superior military advantage over other states in the region. The US has been the key provider of common goods in the region since the end of World War II. It has provided security through its patrol of international waters in the region, maintained order by intervening in crisis and provided an atmosphere where trade, not security could become the chief concern of the region. The flourishing economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and more recently China stand as testament to the relatively stable environment provided by the US. Yet a preponderance is in no way absolute and is relative based on cooperation with South Korea and Japan. For example, there are still disagreements between South Korea, China and the US regarding the nuclear situation on the Korean Peninsula. Yet the DPRK recognizes US preponderance in the region and wants security assurances from the US. China provides economic support to the DPRK but knows that it cannot afford to politically or militarily support the DPRK. China has used part of the wealth brought about by its new found economic status to improve its military. A great deal of Russian hardware has been purchased to complement and provide basis for future indigenous designs. These new purchases have caused some concern in the Pacific, specifically the purchase of 4 Sovremenny- class destroyers and 10 Kilo- class submarines (Shaplen and Laney 2007, 89). These new purchases can be seen as laying the foundation for a future Chinese blue water navy that will have power projection capabilities beyond the Taiwan straits. In addition, studies are underway in China regarding the commissioning of aircraft carriers to further enhanced power projection capabilities. China has also been engaged in a massive missile buildup across from the Taiwan Strait. More than 1,000 missiles have already been deployed in the area and the figure is growing at a rate of a 100 per year (Shaplen and Laney 2007, 90). While these missiles are mostly aimed at Taiwan and complicating American


Elliott School of International Affairs involvement in a potential cross-straits conflict, some of them can be reconfigured to strike Japan. Yet, China is not merely purchasing new military hardware but is fundamentally reforming its military with one eye on potential straits conflict, and another on future power projection (Johnston 2006, 79). China currently is not able to seriously project power beyond its immediate borders, though it has already shown what it is capable of. Two years ago, a Chinese submarine managed to successfully surface within firing distance of the USS Kitty Hawk, having trailed it for a number of days undetected (Shaplen and Laney 2007, 89). Yet for all its military improvements, China is in no way a significant threat to US preponderance in the region. The Chinese military appears to be geared towards asymmetric warfare with the US in the course of conflict over the Taiwan Straits. Its military power as stated above seems to be developing with an eye on Taiwan (Mitchell 2006, 125). Thus its goal will be to disrupt and delay US involvement while neutralizing specific high value targets, like aircraft carriers or Aegis missile destroyers. As stated above, one of the pillars of the US presence in the region is the strength of its bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea. The strengthening of these ties can only improve the US position in the region. Counter intuitively, military developments in China have actually strengthened the US position as they have compelled South Korea and particularly Japan to improve their relations; as opposed to Japan and South Korea aligning with China as a realist would predict. While the US has begun drawing down forces in the region in support for its operations in the Middle East, greater steps have been taken to increase interoperability between the different militaries. These changes are largely driven by the lack of transparency and trust regarding military developments in China. For example, more people in Japan believe that Chinese actions destabilize the region greater than American actions. The US realizes that rising Chinese power in the region will eventually become a threat and has set about engaging China in security affairs. The US has promoted greater transparency for military affairs in the region and several high-level military exchanges have been taking place (Mitchell 2006, 126). For example, China now publishes a military white paper to describe its military goals (China's National Defense in 2004). In addition, China has begun sending higher level military personnel to the Shangri- La dialogues in Singapore (Eyal 2007). All these acts will only serve to stabilize the region and preserve US supremacy in security affairs in the region. However this is not to say that China is not a threat at all. China is a threat to US security primacy in the region as it is a rising power and will invariably attempt to project its new status. Yet currently as it stands, China currently poses a rather localized threat due to its lack of power projection capabilities. Focusing on current capabilities would be pure folly as we should pay equal attentions to trends. Currently, Chinese military power looks set to increase amid a possible deepening of the US- Japanese bilateral relationship. Conflict is wholly avoidable in the region, if the zero- sum realist tradition inherited from the days of the Cold War can be changed to a more liberal based approached centered on the regions burgeoning trade.


The Globe: World News From All Sides Domestic Implications While we have above analyzed some of the external motivating factors and the current capability of China, we must contextualize these actions within the realm of domestic policy. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) is based on the twin pillars of economic development and prosperity and nationalism. These forces have contributed to sometime inconsistent Chinese regional and global policies. For example, its vibrant trade relations with Taiwan but its seeming willingness to head towards the brink of war with it on irredentist grounds. The coming Olympic Games will once again highlight the balance that China currently strikes as the games will showcase its quantum leap in economic development while recent events in Tibet cast a pall shadow over the affair. Economic development naturally requires good relations with trading partners and a stable regional atmosphere. Nationalism tends to stoke the flames of suspicion in other states because of displays of irredentism and outburst against perceived foreign “enemies.” Yet while nationalism is an important tool for the CCP economic development always takes priority, as displayed by China’s constant insistence that its rise is peaceful and that it wants “good neighborly relations.” Demographically, it is essential for China to grow at this current rate for the CCP to remain in power as 7% annual growth is required to absorb those entering the workforce and prevent unrest related to underemployment (Shaplen and Laney 2007, 84). China also realizes that its current level of economic development is very low on the value ladder and seeks to diversify its economy away from the assembly and production of low end products. This will require continuing stability in the region with a strong emphasis on improved relations with its neighbors to get the technology that such development would require. Nationalism is a tool that can never be discounted when discussing China. Spontaneous nationalism help end thousands of years of dynastic rule in China as well as unite the country in its opposition to Japan. State directed nationalism in the Chinese experience, has often not worked out as efficiently; the Cultural Revolution being one of many examples. Irredentist claims on Taiwan and recent events in Tibet have shown to the world how potent a force Chinese nationalism can be. Chinese students studying abroad have tarnished the countries in image in the eyes of many nations. (The Associated Press, 2008) The Fenqing (憤青) or “Angry Youths” as they are known in Chinese have used the Internet as a new soapbox. Whether this force will take on overtones of the Cultural Revolution or the Tiananmen Protest remains to be seen. While it cannot be completely denied that the Chinese government fermented behavior of such virulent nationalism, it also cannot be claimed that it has control over this force. Nationalism has left in place a mobilizational network throughout that the country that can be used as much for government aims as against it. Conclusion While it can be argued that China is far away from being able to economically emulate the US, security wise the distinction is less clear. When a country adopts an antisymmetric approach that would mean that less resources would go into producing more


Elliott School of International Affairs effective and targeted approaches to an issue. Yet effectiveness is something that is much more difficult to empirically measure than raw manpower and bullets. Whether China has both the technological and tactical nuance to adapt to future changes in American military tactics or technology is highly doubtful. Though from the current American campaigns seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems that American tactical and technological flexibility is somewhat lagging. While many commentators will continue to focus on China’s external behavior, the inability to understand that China is indeed fragmented and has serious internal troubles will continue to lead to short sighted policy prescriptions and alarmism. China is nowhere near able to begin a sustained challenge against US hegemony. While it may give off an aura of strength and stability, it is merely a well lacquered façade. China’s strength lies in the fact that a simplistic view of power transition theory is on its way to creating a self- fulfilling prophecy of fear and doom within the American electorate and government.

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Algeria’s Oil: Economic Malaise in a Rentier State By Daniel Boehmer Historically, the positive developments associated with the petroleum industry in Middle Eastern economies have largely been overshadowed by the manner in which the emergence of a petroleum export-led economy resulted in an entrenched, systemic dependence on the oil revenues, from which efforts at diversification have mostly proved futile. In and of itself, the material existence of large petroleum reserves has the potential to act as an economic blessing; however, without significant efforts to diversify the economy, large petroleum reserves can act as a curse or hindrance to long-term development in the context of a rentier state unwilling to move out of rentier status. Although past attempts to restructure petroleum export-based economies have been limited in success, there is still potential for oil-rich states to diversify their economies to a significant degree using petroleum revenues. This may be done by investing in industries with a comparative advantage and using state-owned or controlled businesses to protect a burgeoning private sector even if the state continues to be dependent on oil revenues in the middle-term, continuing as a rentier status for a period of time. The heretofore lack of success in escaping such dependence makes apparent the fact that huge petroleum reserves, which may be positively used to fund long-term economic development projects, act as a hindrance to economic and political liberalization in the short term. Algeria, as an oil export-based economy, is subjected to a resource curse. This has hindered long term development in both the political and economic sectors. The case of Algeria is one that brings to light the true effect that an unremitting reliance on an oilbased export economy may have on an economic progress of a country. Often the elites of such nations are practically forced to make a choice between political and economic development plans because of the limited nature of the government’s scope and strength.1 Historically, the state assumed a controlling role over development first through a socialist and later a market-based framework. This led naturally to an expectation that the state would deliver on social services and the construction and protection of a working economic base.2 Social services were used to curb public frustration with the other inadequacies of the regime in power; these services were financed almost entirely with oil revenues. The legacy of the lack of services for native Algerians during the colonial period resulted in a very tangible reaction3, and Algeria undertook into a socialist development plan designed to make the government the generous provider of these services. The 1

“Algeria: Crisis, transition and social policy outcomes” by Azzedine Layachi from Karshenas, M. & Moghadam, V.M. (2006). Social policy in the Middle East: Economic, political, and gender dynamics. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan., 78. 2 ibid, 79. 3 ibid, 81.

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Elliott School of International Affairs failure of this cancerous system, the costly welfare policies engaged in, coupled with low levels of taxation provided the ruling regime with little need for accountability and little impetus to focus on developing other economic sectors based on the principles of comparative advantage.4 At that time the benefits of sovereignty, independence, and a population paid into submission seemed to outweigh concerns with development. This process, however, set in motion a pattern of spending that would limit development projects to import substitution industrialization—largely composed of unprofitable stateowned firms. Further, Algeria was thrown into debt in the 1980s when oil prices sank below the level required to finance the state’s social programs, let alone finance the development of other industries.5 In the reforms that followed, led by the new president, Chadli Bendjedid, Algeria moved towards a market economy. Ironically, the oil institutions of the foregone socialist, state-owned era remained, a nationalist legacy that was not privatized removed because of the government’s dependence on its revenues to placate the population with services and welfare programs.6 By the late 1980s, levels of authoritarian oppression and bureaucratization replaced ideology. Efforts to liberalize the political system along with the economy backfired on the FLN ruling party and resulted in Islamist in ideology Islamic Salvation Party winning in the elections. This was followed in the 1990s by a period of brutal political repression7 followed by an equally brutal structural adjustment program instituted by the IMF and the World Bank, which began in 1994, the goal of which was to reduce Algeria’s international debt. Price controls and subsidies saw themselves eliminated and the free social services which had been provided by oil revenues were replaced given fees as the norm. Many government-run firms that had clung on in the 1980s were closed, resulting in the laying off of workers, which politically backfired on the regime as well.8 These structural adjustments, though perhaps the right measures for quickly eliminating Algeria’s debt, were not all that was needed to restructure the Algerian economy away from oil. The IMF’s small government principles meant a retraction of state influence, rather than a support of private industry, coupled with a more gradual reduction in services.9 The reforms put in place by President Bouteflika since 1999 have likewise emphasized deregulation and privatization.10 Time will tell the success of these reforms; however thus far, fiscal discipline has not arisen in Algerian political culture to


Brynen, R., Korany, B., & Noble, P. (Eds.). (1995). Political liberalization and democratization in the Arab world. (Vol 1). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 292. 5 Humphreys, M., Sachs, J.D., & Stiglitz, J.E. (Eds.). (2007). Escaping the resource curse. New York: Columbia University Press. 6 ibid, 85 7 Cordesman, A.H. (2004). Energy developments in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 234. 8 Stora, B. (2001). Algeria, 1830—2000. (J.M. Todd, Trans.) Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press. (Original work published 1991-1994)., 196. 9 Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, (Eds.). (2007). 10 Cordesman, 234-5.

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The Globe: World News From All Sides the extent required to offset the fluctuating nature of the oil market and the decline of oil revenues in the long run.11 Nevertheless, promising development opportunities exist for the petroleum industry in Algeria, including the potential development of natural gas.12 Such mineral resources are never a curse in and of themselves. As long as exploitable petroleum reserves exist in Algeria, continued investment will loom large as an impetus to open Algeria’s economy to further foreign ownership.13 The problem lies not in extraction techniques, but in political ones. Algeria’s long and troubled political history is very much based on its status as a static rentier state, but the political problems relating to Islamist movements and corruption are more a legacy of Algeria’s colonial past as they are a legacy of its oil, a much more recent factor in the political equation. National oil companies were initially set up as entities designed to protect the nation’s sovereign rights over their natural resources, rather than because of an overriding desire to become a rentier bunker state.14 This was done to overcome the legacy of the colonial past in states with or without huge oil reserves. More recently, the role of these companies has evolved to supporting the private sector, protecting the domestic oil industry from outside intervention efforts, and providing a measured amount of income directly into the state’s coffers.15 These are all indicative of how a rentier state will make its decisions based on the current regimes desire to stay in power. Clearly the needs of Algeria are rapidly outpacing the oil rent. Without expansion of the industry and development of other sectors of the economy, oil revenues will be unable to support the Algerian economy to the same degree. Bonner, Reif and Tessler describe the paradigm well: “Oil rentier states, if not damned definitely by their wealth, are thought to share several failings arising from the atrophy of their tax extractive capacity.”16 The requisite level of democratization that a state must undertake in order to institute a tax structure that takes away people’s income is something risky to deal with recklessly. Efforts to diversify the economy will eventually mean embracing such a tax structure as rents decrease. Oil export-based economies do not necessarily lead to political social problems, as well as economic ones; however, historically the development path of rentier states is illfated in many cases, Algeria standing out as a paradigmatic one.17 In order for a petroleum export-based economy to function properly, political and private economic institutions need to be prepared to absorb the type of shocks that hit the economy when the price of oil falls, something that can only be done through diversification. Clement M. 11

ibid, 240. ibid, 239. 13 Majumdar, M. & Saad, M. (2005). Transition and development in Algeria: economic, social and cultural challenges. Bristol: Intellect, Ltd., 177. 14 Marcel, V. & Mitchell, J.V. (2005). Oil titans: National oil companies in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press and Chatham House., 8. 15 ibid. 8, 15. 16 Bonner, M., Reif, M. & Tessler, M. (Eds.). (2005). Islam, democracy, and the state in Algeria. Oxford: Routledge., 68 17 ibid, 68-69. 12

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Elliott School of International Affairs Henry argues that the lack of trust between institutions predated the discovery of oil, and therefore was entrenched in Algerian political culture as an impediment to a successful rentier state before later problems arose.18 Thus, the fundamental problem lay in an inability of the government to dedicate itself to programs of economic diversification out of the petroleum industry. The orthodox explanation of the petroleum rentier state holds that large petroleum reserves will create a reliance on the rents derived from them and therefore an economic malaise, which hinders efforts at long-term to diversify. The experience of Algeria as a petroleum exporting economy confirms the difficulties such states have embarking on a successful path towards industrialization, development, diversification, and democratization based on the historical political-economic-social context of the state, which existed prior to the discovery of the oil reserves. Algeria’s oil reserves have served as a hindrance towards development in other sectors, but this does not mean such development is impossible in coordination with continued exploitation of petroleum resources. All oil-rich nations that have succeeded in developing other economic sectors with oil profits have done so with an eye to the nonrenewable nature of petroleum as a resource. Once Algeria’s reserves enter their final stage of exploitability, in all likelihood these processes will be accelerated. If the political climate permits, diversification, democratization, and industrialization will likely therefore be in the making.

A Constructivist Approach to the Post-9/11 NATO By Patricia Puttmann Is NATO performing as its creators intended? How has the NATO raison d’être changed within the post-9/11 world? Has NATO begun to decline in this new era due to dysfunction, bureaucracy, and subsequent pathologies? Through the constructivist lens of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore’s International Organization (IO) approach, I will examine the power of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its inclination toward dysfunctional and “pathological” behavior.19 Through the empirical analysis of NATO’s behavior in the post-9/11 world, this paper seeks to gauge the effectiveness of NATO’s actions as a functioning product of its creators. This paper will explore these questions through three underlying constructivist critiques: how NATO matters in world politics; NATO as an independent actor in world politics; and the efficacy of NATO. By invoking a constructivist approach, sociological and anthropological influences naturally contribute to the overall analysis of NATO’s performance within the post-9/11 world. Neoliberal and neorealist organizational theories surrounding the creation and function of IOs have disadvantaged themselves through a limited argument and 18

ibid, 69. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations (International Organizations, no. 53 1999), 699. 19

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The Globe: World News From All Sides surface analysis of IO power and influence.20 Not only have these theories failed to recognize IOs as independent agents in international relations, but they also ignore an essential viewpoint of IOs through a critical lens; the neoliberalist view is unfortunately optimistic, overlooking the dysfunction IOs face. To counter this misconception, in the article “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore take a constructivist approach, borrowing from sociology and anthropology to explore the power of IOs. Through this study of power, the dysfunctional tendencies of these global bureaucracies are revealed. Epitomizing the lacking IO efficacy in the post-9/11 world, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission in Afghanistan provides a forum from which “pathologies” have emerged. These pathologies, according to Barnett and Finnemore, are “instances when IO dysfunction can be traced to bureaucratic culture.”21 As this bureaucratic culture contributes to dysfunction, the power of NATO as a social constructor and an independent actor in post-9/11 politics is brought to question. How NATO Matters in World Politics Is NATO performing as its creators intended? According to Barnett and Finnemore’s constructivist approach, NATO matters in world politics because it can establish working actors, and create responsibilities and specific authority among them; when IOs do not posses material resources, power is gained through their ability to influence the social world.22 This power source is channeled through legitimacy from “rational-legal authority,” and the control of technical expertise and information.23 Neoliberal and neorealists examine IO power through a narrowly economic lens, believing IOs exist for the purpose of assisting states out of market failure or within collective action dilemmas.24 NATO has been granted by its member states the ability to maintain both military and social power on the world stage. As an established “alliance” in 1949, NATO’s purposive role included social requisites and expectations for inclusion, as stated under the UN Charter.25 By doing so, a strict social standard was promoted by the member states of NATO, such as the promotion of peace and the recognition of human rights.26 Furthermore, the benefits of upholding these social standards and gaining inclusion incorporated joint military protection, and access to technology and mutual information specialists. 27 This is how its formers intended it to perform. However, these benefits shifted as inclusion grew and the imminent threat of the USSR shrank. As NATO entered the new millennium and later faced 20

Ibid., 700. Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 702. 22 Ibid., 700. 23 Ibid., 710. 24 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 700. 25 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, D.C., 1949), I. 26 Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris, NATO Press, 1954), 12. 27 Ibid., 13. 21

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Elliott School of International Affairs the post-9/11 world, the security cooperation of NATO transitioned. The tangible threat of Soviet military dominance was replaced by the elusive fear of terrorism.28 From an alliance to a coalition, NATO’s role in world politics and the creators’ once mutual intentions for NATO began to adjust accordingly. NATO’s Post-9/11 Transition. The end of the Cold War held far more implications for global security than a surface analysis might invite. In addition to the unipolar system that immerged with the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO’s purposive role as intended by the 12 original members was now in question.29 With the dissolve of the collective unity amongst its members, NATO began its transition form an alliance to a coalition. Outlined within his book, NATO Renewed, Sten Rynning creates a framework encompassing four scenarios under the collective image of security cooperation: alliance, concert, collective security, and coalition.30 Within this framework, Rynning highlights the diverging political and strategic facets that make up each cooperation. It is through this framework that I argue NATO’s transition can be traced from an alliance of inclusion, to a coalition of flexibility.31 When the North Atlantic Treaty was enacted on April 4th , 1949, the world was entering a period of hope following the drafting of the United Nations (UN) Charter in the wake of WWII. 32 Although the UN offered a forum for optimism with the five remaining Great Powers contributing to its foundation, US containment policies and the power divergence between the United States, and Russia incited a stricter security and defense. Thus, when NATO was formed, it embodied an alliance. According to Rynning, an alliance forms when all states with an interest in countering another unify because the rogue state’s ability to apply and mobilize resources is seen as a threat. 33 It is essentially a unity of purpose generated by a clear threatening actor. Ideally, an alliance will further have the capacity to estimate and realize the threat, and deter or resist the threat through calculated military methods; finally, an alliance must be able to achieve these goals while maintaining the approval of the hearts and minds of society.34 When Soviet and communist dominance was a common fear amongst citizens everywhere, the goals and purposes of NATO were broadly well received by the public; typical of its social influence in world politics.35 Although NATO was able to achieve this end prior to the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, its agenda and founding fabric has changed dramatically 28

John Schmidt, Last Alliance Standing (The Washington Quarterly, no. 30, 2007), 102. Schmidt, Last Alliance, 93. 30 Sten Rynning, NATO Renewed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 14. 31 Ibid., 13. 32 Ismay, First Five Years, 3. 33 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 15. 34 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 15. 35 Ismay, First Five Years, 6. 29

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The Globe: World News From All Sides within the post-9/11 world.36 I argue that NATO has transformed from an alliance to a coalition. Rynning’s framework further outlines the characteristics of coalitions to include a lack of strategic focus (Figure II, below). 37 States within a coalition generally cannot reach a common understanding of their interest in maintaining the status quo and therefore, cannot generate a mutual understanding of “all against one”. Neither Europe nor the United States agrees on the severity of the threats facing the post-9/11 world; this hiders agenda setting. With this diverging agenda and lack of unified concern, NATO can no longer fit the framework of an alliance. Furthermore, in the absence of consensus, the larger powers will tend to exploit their size and capabilities to influence states.38 Militarily speaking, post-9/11 NATO resembles this coalition model. The Military challenge for coalitions is one of creating internal operation functionality in terms of material and personnel because, according to Rynning, “militaries will need to cooperate in coalitions but nations will be unwilling, given the wish for flexibility, to integrate forces too far…”39 This is the plaguing reality of a coalition of flexibility versus the original alliance-intended performance of its creators. These dysfunctions that arise from the coalition model translate clearly into the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Later in this paper, I argue that ISAF illustrates NATO’s transition from a functioning alliance to a coalition of pathologies. Although a coalition need not be synonymous with dysfunction, ISAF highlights the dramatic change in performance NATO has undergone in the post9/11 world. I find these changes are detrimental to mission readiness, effectiveness, and an overall detour from the creators’ intentions for NATO’s role in world politics. NATO as an Independent Actor in World Politics How has NATO’s raison d’être changed within the post-9/11 world? Neoliberal and neorealist theorists view IOs solely as a channel through which states can act, therefore making them non-purposive.40 Interrelated to its power to influence world politics through social construction, a constructivist approach sees NATO as an independent actor. As an independent actor, NATO’s role has changed drastically within the context of post-9/11 world politics; the alliance to coalition transition accounts for this change. Like many IOs, NATO possesses both normative and material power.41 Through a constructivist lens, this legitimate power comes from NATO’s influence in the social structure and its technical knowledge, training, and expertise. This embodies NATO as an independent actor.


Martin Walker, Post 9/11: The European Dimension (World Policy Journal, no. 18, 2002), 4. “Perception of Threats.” Percentage who view each as “extremely important” threat (Rupp, NATO After 9/11, 10). 38 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 16. 39 Ibid., 17. 40 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 700. 41 Ibid., 726. 37

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Elliott School of International Affairs To a lesser extent than the UN, NATO’s normative power practices are influential. Barnett and Finnemore specifically reference the UN’s social influence as it defines words such as “refugee” and “development.”42 Looking at NATO through a constructivist lens, it is apparent that NATO’s power to construct social norms comes from its formation of cooperative security between member states and the culture this encompasses. Article five of the North Atlantic Treaty states: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked. 43 This social construction of cooperative security parallels the interactions of individuals in society. Article Five also encompasses the organization’s culture. According to Barnett and Finnemore, an IO’s culture is the rules, rituals and beliefs that are rooted in the organization; for NATO, these cultural facets are embodied in the Treaty. 44 Moreover, individuals who inhabit the organization generate understanding and meaning of the world through the IO’s cultural framework.45 NATO’s Social Influence, Post-9/11. Article V and the social implications it renders in the post-9/11 era are extensive, reaching both state interactions within NATO and individuals in society. Not 24 hours after the attacks in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania occurred, NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history.46 An attack on the United States meant an attack on all. The headline of the French newspaper La Monde read, “We are All Americans.” 47 The attack on the American people and the member states’ social reaction highlights the normative power NATO holds within the post-9/11 era. NATO’s existence as an independent actor give it these normative powers which are expressed though the cultural framework, generated by the collective understanding and meaning of the world. The US reaction and polite refusal to Article V’s invocation is representative of the present “coalition” model of NATO.48 The only state reluctant to accept NATO’s call for action following the attacks was the United States. In a political backlash, common within coalitions, the United States declared the European powers could not “reign” in any US response to the 9/11 attacks.49 As stated by Rynning, within a coalition the larger powers will seek to monopolize the power 42

Ibid., 710. NATO, Treaty, V. 44 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 719. 45 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 703. 46 Walker, Post 9/11, 4. 47 Richard Rupp, NATO After 9/11: Alliance in Continuing Decline (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 3. 43


Walker, Post 9/11, 5. Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror (Parameters, no. 32, 2003), 51. 49

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The Globe: World News From All Sides and focus of the organization.50 Fearing the European powers would seek consultation compensation in future NATO actions in return for assisted intervention, the US tried to keep the European powers at a distance.51 By doing so, the United States essentially negated the founding principles of the NATO alliance and brought the question of NATO’s existence to the forefront of debate. As an independent actor in world politics, NATO’s raison d’être is fundamentally changing due to the alteration in its normative power. Originally an “all for one, one for all” intra-member alliance, NATO has now undertaken several missions outside member state missions. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO has conducted military strikes, provided ground forces for peace support, utilized strategic lift for humanitarian aid campaigns, and expanded membership to “Partnership for Peace” nations outside the original geopolitical realm. 52 This expansion of responsibilities outside of intra-member assistance, and the lack of unified invocation of one of the founding principles of NATO place its raison d’être under scrutiny. The centrality of NATO’s mission – providing for the collective defense of all its members – is at risk (Figure III). The ISAF mission, one of the few NATO responses regarding a member state’s defense, is paramount to its performance as intended by its creators.53 Within this paper, a constructivist approach will be employed to explore NATO’s decline in the post-9/11 world, as illustrated by the ISAF mission. The Efficacy of NATO Has NATO begun to decline in this new era due to dysfunction, bureaucracy, and subsequent pathologies? The constructivist approach offers a distinctive vantage point with which the efficacy of NATO can be gauged. Noting instances in which NATO’s normative power and politics have produced disadvantageous outcomes, it would be assumed member states would prepare to dismantle the organization; however, the constructivist approach attempts to explain why this is not the case.54 Within NATO, pathologies have occurred repeatedly without consequence. Classic liberalism has long viewed IOs as a peaceful way to manage rapid globalization, far more preferable than war, its alternative; criticism, however, has been left unaddressed.55 Bureaucratic politics have always been identified as a compromising facet of organizational effectiveness, yet this understanding has yet to be applied to IOs. Barnett and Finnemore’s constructivist approach, utilizing both sociological and anthropological disciplines, highlights the paradoxical nature


Rynning, NATO Renewed, 15. Rupp, Alliance in Decline, 39. 52 Johnson and Zenko, All Dressed Up, 49. 53 Schmidt, Last Alliance, 98. 54 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 701. 55 Ibid., 702. 51

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Elliott School of International Affairs of IOs; the very features that make IOs so powerful can also be their greatest weakness.56 In the post-9/11 world, a world in which the original intent of NATO has long been laid to rest, the pathologies plaguing NATO are even more apparent. Sociologists see organizations as actors that respond to other actors, pursue material interests, but also react to cultural forces.57 Through a constructivist view, the culture that shapes NATO behavior can also cause dysfunction and inefficiently.58 This is the case with the ISAF initiative in Afghanistan. ISAF’s Post-9/11 Illustration. Currently, about 43,000 troops are deployed in Afghanistan.59 NATO member troops are deployed for the expressed goal of: Assisting the Afghan Government in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction.60 This assistance to the Afghan Government, however, is hindered by NATO member states’ implementation of “caveats.” NATO Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 336 defines a caveat as “restrictions placed on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation.”61 Germany and other nations are well known for placing caveats on their troops, limiting their efficacy in Afghanistan and placing much of the mission’s brunt power in the hands of other nations, such as Canada.62 Additionally, Rynning’s description of a coalition of flexibility further encourages this “caveat” behavior because states are “unwilling” to integrate their forces too far.63 Bureaucracies are infamous for creating policies and acting in ways that are at odds with a stated mission. 64 This dysfunction of NATO due to caveats is a result of bureaucratic culture and the social structure of NATO. NATO is a bureaucracy founded on the culture of “development of peaceful and friendly international relations” and good faith.65 As such, the culture would not allow nations such as Canada and the United States to require member states to provide troops in a manner they did not wish. However, as Resolution 336 clearly states, these caveats utilized by states pose a “significant impediment” to the combined mission of assistance to the Afghan Government.66 The drafting of Resolution 336 56

Ibid., 701. Ibid., 703. 58 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 717. 59 Tim Johnston, Australia Says NATO Needs New Strategy in Afghanistan (The New York Times, 13 Feb. 2008). 60 NATO, International Security Assistance Force Mission Statement (ISAF Homepage, 06 Feb. 2008). 61 NATO, Resolution 336: Reducing National Caveats (Brussels: Belgium, 15 Nov. 2005), 1. 62 Johnston, Australia Says New Strategy. 63 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 17. 64 Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 715. 65 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, II. 66 NATO, Resolution 336, 6. 57

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The Globe: World News From All Sides is evidence of the dysfunction of ISAF as it seeks to remedy the hindrance national caveats cause the mission. The enduring debate regarding caveats within NATO is representative of a constructivist “pathology.” The dysfunction of NATO is gauged though its contradictory actions toward the stated mission. As stated by Barnett and Finnemore, the liberal and realist theories would trace this dysfunctional behavior to material forces outside the IO. 67 As demonstrated through a detailed analysis using both sociology and anthropology (not limited to economics), the dysfunctional ISAF mission is a clear example of “bureaucratic culture:” a combination of both cultural and internal consequence.68 The publicized mission of ISAF is the vantage point with which its efficacy can be gauged. As seen in Resolution 336, the bureaucratic culture of NATO has created a forum from which pathologies have emerged. Furthermore, it is made apparent that pathologies created by caveats are not solely applicable to ISAF dysfunction; in clause 3 of Resolution 336, the NATO mission in Kosovo is distinctly mentioned as suffering from the inefficiency of these troop restrictions.69 It has been noted that these caveats undermine the stated mission and goal of ISAF. These disadvantageous outcomes have been repeated and without consequence. Conclusion NATO’s current performance is not as its creators intended. The transition from an alliance of inclusion to a coalition of flexibility has fundamentally changed its raison d’être, and produced pathologies that are detrimental to effectiveness. Through this constructivist study of NATO’s power influence in world politics and as an independent actor, I have found the post-9/11 NATO lacks effectiveness as a functioning product of its creators. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991 NATO did not follow, but the alliance’s unifying threat and subsequent agenda did. As the new millennium approached and NATO’s interactions on the world stage changed, so did its performance as an alliance. Increasing divergences as a result of expansion and flexibility led NATO to a coalition of cooperative security and consequently abandoned action as an alliance. As a coalition, NATO lacks a unified agenda and strategic focus. However, how NATO matters in world politics is not entirely dependent upon its ability to employ military might. According to Barnett and Finnemore, despite NATO’s lacking material power, it still retains the ability to influence social structure. The constructivist critique “how NATO matters in world politics” reveals that NATO is no longer performing as its creators intended. When the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, Article V – the central principle of NATO’s existence – was invoked. The United States, the targeted beneficiary of 67

Barnett and Finnemore, IOs, 717. Ibid., 716. 69 NATO, Resolution 336, 3. 68

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Elliott School of International Affairs the action, declined the assistance and went as far as to deny them involvement in US reaction to the attack. The poor response to Article V’s invocation epitomizes the decline of the NATO alliance model and highlights the coalition. NATO’s social construction, however, still remains intact as the creators intended. The constructivist critique of NATO as an independent actor additionally highlights the ways in which NATO’s raison d’être has changed in the post-9/11 world. As an independent actor, NATO has the power to incite social structure and a “bureaucratic culture.” Although this structure is effectively realized within the organization through individuals and their interactions, the culture has also encouraged the caveats plaguing the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, NATO as an independent actor on the world stage can be seen in its current and past initiatives. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO has conducted military strikes, provided ground forces for peace support, utilized strategic lift for humanitarian aid campaigns, and expanded membership to “Partnership for Peace” nations outside the original geopolitical realm. Originally an “all for one, one for all” intra-member alliance, NATO has now undertaken several missions outside member state interests. Performing now as a coalition rather than an alliance – a deviation from the creators’ intensions – NATO’s raison d’être in world politics is under scrutiny. The constructivist critique of NATO’s effectiveness can be gauged in its ISAF mission. When the ISAF mission was eventually undergirded to NATO, the coalition model hindered efficacy as the motivation for flexibility (Figure I) encouraged national caveats. This paper argues that these discrepancies are illustrative of the coalition’s dysfunctional behavior, but not necessarily representative of its decline. Although NATO no longer performs in the way its creators intended and its raison d’être has changed in a way nonconductive to NATO’s founding objectives, ISAF’s pathologies are a natural occurrence of the coalition model, but more inevitably, a result of the dysfunction international organizations face as bureaucracies on the world stage.

Global HIV/AIDS Central Program Evaluation By Richard B. Bloomfield Global HIV/AIDS is a systemic risk to the health of the world. Programs to halt its spread and help those already affected must be on a similar scale. Several world wide programs exist already. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and The World Bank’s Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action are the largest. A single guiding program is the most effective way of combating HIV/AIDS and PEPFAR should lead the way. Global HIV/AIDS is one of the most challenging health battles the world has faced. In 2007 33 million people were living with HIV and 2 million people died of

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The Globe: World News From All Sides AIDS. Less then one in five of individuals at risk of HIV had access to prevention services and less then 30% of needy individuals had access to HIV treatment. The world has taken a stance against the spread of AIDS with the adoption of The Millennium Development Goal Number 6 (MDG6). There are two targets for this global goal. Target 1 is to have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS. Target 2 is to achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it. In order to “achieve the most effective and efficient use of resources, and to ensure rapid action and results-based management” The United Nations has created the “Three Ones" principles. The Global Task Team (GTT) was asked to develop a set of recommendations on improving the institutional architecture of the response to HIV and AIDS and determined there is an urgent need for greater support and collaboration with heavily-affected countries and to avoid duplication and fragmentation. The GTT recommended there be: one agreed HIV/AIDS Action Framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners, one National AIDS Coordinating Authority, with a broad-based multisectoral mandate, one agreed country-level Monitoring and Evaluation System.i This idea works at a global scale as well. A central coordinating body like The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS(UNAIDS) is not enough. The adoption of a sole plan and strategy is necessary to successfully achieve MDG6. The UN has an existing framework for evaluating national programs which can be applied when weighing global initiatives. The criteria the UN uses are: national ownership, inclusiveness and participation, commitment to results by all participants,impartiality, evidence informed, enhancing national planning, sensitivity to gender and human rights. These criteria can be compared with the goals of PEPFAR and GHPA, then the efficacy of each program can be analyzed to determine which is the proper central program.ii There are two main initiatives to combat Global HIV/AIDS that directly provide health interventions and financing at local levels but at a global scale. They implement programs to change HIV/AIDS status at community levels but as a part of a world-wide counter-pandemic agenda. These programs are also the closest in line with the UN’s criteria for good global initiatives. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was launched in 2003 and is the largest effort to combat a single disease in history. PEPFAR was reaffirmed this year with the commitment of up to $48 billion over the next 5 years to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The World Bank’s Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action is a systemic analysis and plan for integrating and reforming national programs across the world. The goals of PEPFAR are: treatment for at least 3 million people, prevention of 12 million new infections, care for 12 million people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. The World Bank’s Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action has less direct goals, they focus on improving existing programs. The World Bank’s goals are: to assist countries to strengthen strategic, prioritized costed national planning, as agreed by the GTT, fund national and regional HIV/AIDS programs and health sector strengthening, support to accelerate project implementation, strengthen country

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Elliott School of International Affairs monitoring and evaluation systems and evidence-informed responses, knowledge generation and sharing, impact evaluation and analytic work, to improve program performance. These goals are very different but work to the same overreaching end, MDG6. Both programs have been successful in achieving benchmark targets thus far. PEPFAR has: reached an estimated 58.3 million people through community outreach programs to prevent sexual transmission using the ABC approach, supported life-saving treatment for more than 2.1 million men, women and children worldwide through September 30, 2008, including more than 2 million in the 15 focus countries, supported care for more than 10.1 million people affected by HIV/AIDS worldwide, including more than 4 million orphans and vulnerable children, from FY2004 through FY2008, PEPFAR supported an estimated 3.7 million training and retraining encounters for health care workers. To date, much of the World Bank’s work is difficult to evaluate, but their direct involvement has included: US$ 2 billion through grants, loans and credits for programs to fight HIV/AIDS, US$ 1.2 billion to 29 countries to fight HIV/AIDS in the Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) for Africa which was launched in September 2000, The US$ 60 million Treatment Acceleration Project (TAP) was approved in June 2004 to accelerate program development. The TAP's grants to Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mozambique are using public sector/civil society partnerships to scale up treatment. Both PEPFAR and The World Bank’s program seek to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS but PEPFAR has direct goals with tangible results. The program addresses precise problems and specifically works to accomplish MDG6. Its approach is culturally sensitive and its american oversight makes it transparent. The World Bank should continue to support anti HIV/AIDS programs around the world but in cooperation with PEPFAR. The objectives and methodology of PEPFAR will lead to a quicker achievement of MDG6.

The Secret to State Success: Civic Nationalism By Kirsten Ortega Since the advent of the modern state, leaders, policy makers, and political philosophers alike have struggled with the question, what makes a state effective? From providing security to establishing a strong economy, there are a wide range of factors that can help (or hinder), the state in maintaining effectiveness. But which route is most valuable? Which is the key that unlocks the door to state success? While other factors are contributors, the most essential key to an effective state is a strong and developed sense of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism, as defined by Gustavo De Las Casas in his article Is Nationalism Good for You?, is “a sense of collective unity” that goes “beyond one’s immediate family and friends” (De Las Casas: 52-53). Directed towards the civic nation, this form of nationalism is inherently political and focuses on the loyalty of citizens to their state (O’Neil: 47-48). Although there have been some extreme cases in history in which nationalism has been cited as the culprit in acts of barbarism, these are rarities. As De Las Casas points out, in and of itself, civic

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The Globe: World News From All Sides nationalism “does not manufacture hatred for others, just concern for one’s fellow citizens” (De Las Casas: 53).Through it, people can form a national identity under a common set of political aspirations and values, which in turn, creates a strong sense of fraternity among citizens. It is the strength of this national bond and all of its positive repercussions in social interactions, the economy, and the rule of law that make a state truly effective. One central way in which civic nationalism makes a state effective is through its impact on the people of the nation themselves. In most cases, civil nationalism, and the fraternity it arouses, creates a population of selfless individuals willing to sacrifice anything for the good of the state and the wellbeing of their people. By believing that everyone is in “it” together and working towards a common goal, citizens value each other’s welfare as well as their own, transforming the “I” into “we.” They consider their wellbeing just as important as that of their fellow compatriots. Therefore, civic nationalism not only fosters selflessness, but generosity and loyalty to the community as well. Such devotion to each other and to the state is key in maintaining an effective state and a successful society. In addition to inspiring trust and communal sentiments among the people, civic nationalism also helps develop a strong economy, an important contributor to state effectiveness. According to De Las Casas, “when citizens are nationalistic, those who might cheat will face an unpleasant trade-off: to help themselves at the expense of their brethren” (De Las Casas: 53-54). In states with a developed sense of nationalism, the harm done to their comrades outweighs the possible gains from cheating, deterring them from dishonesty in business, and thus promoting fair economic interaction. De Las Casas also states that “without nationalism, citizens do not hesitate to abuse each other” for the focus is on individual benefit and not national advancement. The threat of “underhanded cheating” destroys “the trust necessary for economic development” (De Las Casas: 54) and prevents a state from reaching the next level. To further demonstrate the economic benefits that come with civic nationalism, De Las Casas provides data from the International Social Survey Programme which shows that nationalistic countries are consistently wealthier. When a state possesses a strong sense of civic nationalism, and its citizens believe that they are all working toward the common goal of bettering society, the populace is spurred to work harder, and productivity sky-rockets. The greater the productivity, the more income generated and the wealthier the nation becomes. In this, the state receives more revenue, enabling it to provide the “positive political goods,” that Robert Rotberg argues are an essential component of an effective state (Rotberg: 85). With all members mindful of the group’s well-being and working towards a common goal, it is easy to see why nationalist economies are more successful. Another area in which civic nationalism makes a state effective is the elimination of corruption and creation of a society that diligently obeys the rule of law. According to statistics from the World Bank, “corruption is consistently lower in countries with higher levels of nationalism” (De Las Casas: 55). Just as nationalism creates an unsavory

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Elliott School of International Affairs tradeoff for those in the business world, it also affects the decision making of public officials and civil servants. Although corruption can profit an individual’s career or pocketbook, it is at the expense of fellow nationals—a sacrifice that citizens in a state with a strong sense of civic nationalism are not willing to make. Bureaucrats in such a society are less prone to abuse public office than those in states with low levels of civic nationalism. Thus, a nationalistic public effectively keeps corruption in check and promotes government transparency. Furthermore, citizens with a strong sense of civic nationalism care more about each other, making them less likely to break laws or violate the rights of others. Since the state is a part of the nation and consists of fellow nationals, the populace largely sees the state, and its governing members, as a legitimate source of power. This leads them to regard the rule of law with great respect and trust that the policies put in place are in the best interest of society as a whole. A population that cooperates with their government, respects their laws, and holds their officials accountable by checking corruption, enables the state to act effectively and achieve societal success. Due to its benefits in the social, economic, and political spheres, civic nationalism is the fundamental key to an effective state. It fosters loyalty to the state and amongst its people, creates selfless citizens that work together towards the common good, strengthens support for state policies, minimizes corruption, and upholds the rule of law. Civic nationalism is the foundation of an effective state and is the most vital component to its success. Its generalizability is apparent in that the benefits it brings are not nationspecific. Regardless of time or place, civic nationalism is the key to an effective state.

California’s Proposition 8 As a Human Rights Violation By Michael Imbergamo Last November, the state of California had a general election ballot proposition vote on whether to change the state Constitution to redefine marriage as between a man and a woman. The proposition (8) added section 7.5 to the Constitution that reads “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California” (United States, 128). Amending the state Constitution took solely a majority vote, and passed on November 4, 2008 by a vote of 7 million for and 6.4 million against. Immediately after the vote, the state of California stopped issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Following the election, mass protests broke out in the streets of Sacramento and other major Californian cities. On Sunday November 9, estimates of one mass protest counted more than 4,000 people demonstrating in front of the State House. The demonstrations were not limited to California however, the story soon received national attention and protests broke out around the country. In New York City, more than 10,000 protestors took the street in Time Square. Television personality Keith Olbermann brought the issue to the national spotlight when he addressed supporters of Proposition 8 on his show “Countdown.” In a special comment at the end of his show Olbermann said, “In a time

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The Globe: World News From All Sides of impermanence and fly-by-night relationships, these people over here want the same chance at permanence and happiness that is your option. They don't want to deny you yours. They don't want to take anything away from you. They want what you want -- a chance to be a little less alone in the world. Only now you are saying to them -- no. You can't have it on these terms” (Olbermann). This was then followed by a YouTube viral video created by the Producer of the Broadway hit “Hairspray” about Proposition “Hate.” The video starred celebrities like Jack Black, Neil Patrick Harris and John C. Reilly. California’s Proposition 8 had sparked a nationwide debate on gay marriage. The Human Rights Campaign, American Civil Liberties Union and the National Council for Lesbian Rights then took up arms and filed a lawsuit that invoked human rights violations that “conflicts with the California Constitution’s core commitment to equality for all” (HRC). The Human Rights Campaign claimed that the new law eliminated the fundamental right of equality under the law from one group of people. In its reasoning for filing the lawsuit, the National Council for Lesbian Rights, claimed that the ballot initiative may have passed, but a simple majority vote cannot be enough to invalidate something that contradicts underlying Constitutional provisions and must be carried out through legislature at the least. The NCLR also invoked human rights by stating, “If voters took away the right to free speech from women, everyone would agree that such a measure takes away from the basic ideals of equality. Proposition 8 suffers from the same flaw, it removes a protected constitutional right here, the right to marry, not from all Californians, but just from one group of us” (NLCR). The Human Rights Campaign posted on their website, “This constitutional amendment would deny gay and lesbian couples the right to marry, a fundamental right that the Supreme Court recognized in its landmark ruling” (HRC). The question at hand here is whether or not the denial of gay and lesbians the right to marry by law is a violation of human rights. To start, one must first ask his or her self what rights are being violated? If one cannot find a human right that is being impeded on, then naturally no human rights violation can occur. The United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are inherently entitled. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights addresses marriage directly stating: “ 1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution” (United Nations). Many make the argument that it is clear in the UDHR that marriage is between a man and a woman, because the limitations do not fall into the category of sexual orientation. However, Article 7 states “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law” (United Nations). This distinction would mean that the lack of a sexual orientation qualifier in Article 16 is a mere oversight, and that all are supposed to be equal before the law. This answers the question of what right has been violated, the right of equality before the law. The world has gone through a period of having to equate groups that were

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Elliott School of International Affairs previously considered inferior before the law. The best example of this comes from the feminist movement to make women’s rights universal. Gayle Binion, author of “Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective,” wrote, “While the focus is on women’s experiences, the feminist approach may have immediate implications for the rights of disempowered peoples and raise questions about social organization generally” (Binion). Binion argued that equality needed to be obtained in a legal matter for “if principles are not legalized… their abuse can be subjected to nothing more than ad hoc expression of moral outrage expressed by those who disagree” (Binion). Binion could not have been more correct in this observation. When the demonstrations and protests started, the opposition dismissed the manifestations as the uprisings of a small community trying to destroy the sanctity of marriage, that didn’t get their way. Binion characterized the necessity of law by stating, “Human rights advocates maintain that ‘law’ nevertheless is a critically important arrow in the quiver” (Binion). Lucinda Joy Peach, when addressing whether women could be included in human rights, wrote that one must recognize “the validity of women’s human rights…as only one of a number of potentially applicable approaches for empowerment” (Peach). Peach adhered to what she called “feminist pragmatism” which worked to determine the best way to empower women and end oppression. The same can be applied to the Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Transgender (GLBT) community. Although they are covered in the equality clauses of the UDHR, the GLBT community cannot expect the same equal rights as everyone else because they were not taken into account when it was written This does not mean that they should be excluded from being considered human in the UHDR, “the lack of a an indigenous recognition of women’s rights should not automatically rule out the appropriateness of a woman’s human rights strategy in a particular cultural location” (Peach 173). If one applies Ms. Peach’s idea to the GLBT community, then one cannot argue that just because they weren’t being thought of when written about, doesn’t make these rights any less transferable. The main argument that the supporters of Proposition 8 had for the denial of the right to marriage for gay/lesbian partners was that it deteriorated the culture that was previously established, and would make a mockery of the institution of marriage. In response to the question of whether cultural differences around the world make women’s or anyone else’s rights non-universal, Binion wrote “Under principles of ‘custom,’ in many societies women are deprived of custody of their children, left destitute by divorce, or killed by their husbands who face no sanctions for this act. One also must wonder why racially based slavery and apartheid are so roundly condemned despite their entrenchment in culture, while women who live under purdah--the denial of the right to vote, travel, work, drive, own property, or control their own fertility--are seen as voluntary participants in their ‘cultures’” (Binion 521). One cannot deny rights that we consider universal to one group based on the culturally different role of that group around the world. There will always be different roles for different groups cross-culturally, but this cannot be the excuse to deny universality of human rights. The final argument the supporters of Proposition 8 give for the denial of gays and lesbians the right to marry in California is that although it may not be called marriage, the

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The Globe: World News From All Sides rights that they receive as domestic partners remain the same. One may wonder how if the rights remain the same for both heterosexual and homosexual partners, how can there be a human rights violation? The answer goes back to the Binion quote on principles being legalized. By treating homosexuals differently under the California Constitution, the GLBT community becomes demoted to a second-class citizen. Article 7 claims that all must be equal before the law, and the idea of equal rights before the law even dates back as far as 1789 with the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which states “Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the same enjoyment of the same rights” (DRM). The existence of married homosexuals does nothing to harm heterosexual partnerships, thus they should be extended the enjoyment of the same rights. If one doesn’t believe that equality before the law is an important enough qualifier to allow the marriage of gays and lesbians, then the argument can also be made that there is a legitimate difference between domestic partnerships and marriage. The right for someone in a domestic partnership to make life or death situations for their partner is often questioned due to legal concerns that they are not the true authority, whereas married couples are allowed by law to make these decisions unquestioned. Even the President of the California Family Council, a leader in the fight to ban gay marriage, Ron Prentice, states that marriage is “an essential institution of society.” Mr. Prentice is essentially stating that he is ok with providing an essential societal institution for some and not for others, which breaks Articles 1, 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The evidence is overwhelming against denying gays and lesbians the right to marry. Differentiating entitlements under law for some and not others breaks the wellestablished notion that we are all equals under human rights law. Even if one believes that there is no difference in the rights provided to a heterosexual married couple and a homosexual domestic partnership, the denial of rights for some under law is a clear violation of human rights under Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and violates the overarching purpose of universal human rights that establishes that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

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The Globe: Winter 2009 1st Edition  

The Globe | International Affairs Journal A Publication of The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs and The...