Friday, 12th August 2016 Dear David C. Doyle, [“Dave”]
s_Holmes_i_t@hotmail.com Wigan WN1
In the matter of the Bill of Rights 1688 and in the matter of [inter alia] the Human Rights Act 2001 and in the matter of your allegations of December 2011 You alleged, in your judgement (J1149.htm) in 2011 that my statement “the tree was poisoned” containted “colourful words”. You idiot. Just as you are entitled to write – “ Unfortunately the Claimant's obsession continues and it has now become irrational; ” so I am entitled to write and publish that “First Deemster and president of the High Court, Dave, is an idiot who [in 2007] descibed a children matter as divorce proceedings.” Before that hearing (I believe – I may be wrong) I purchased a book entitled Fruit of the Poisonous Tree by Dr Kerri Mellifont from Queensland Instrutute of Technology. This book has a foreword by a man you are not capable of understanding, Hon JA Jerrard QC, Former Justice of the Queensland Court of Appeal. But I will reproduce part of the foreword in a futile attempt to educate you. This is a good book. Lawyers and non-lawyers alike will find it a pleasure to read. It takes its title from an expression used in courts in the United States of America to describe what Dr Mellifont instead calls “derivative” evidence. She defines that term to mean evidence derived from primary evidence; and primary evidence, in this book, in turn means evidence directly obtained by means of illegal or improper conduct of law enforcement officials. For example, a murder weapon found as a result of an improperly obtained confession. Dr Mellifont observes in this book that much has been written, both in Australia and internationally, about the general topic of exclusion by a judge of illegally or improperly obtained evidence in a … trial. She notes that little has been written about derivative evidence, and how it should be approached. She declared in her introduction that in this book she sought to equip practitioners with a sufficient understanding of the core exclusionary power/rules in Australia, including the theoretical framework on which they are based, and an understanding of how courts may approach derivative evidence. She wrote that she hoped to better equip law practitioners to make assessments as to whether or not to seek exclusion of the primary and/or the derivative evidence, and to better equip respondent advocates. In my opinion, her book admirably succeeds in all those goals. It will prove of particular assistance to any judge who reads it, both at trial and at appellate level. This is because of the care and precision with which she analyses and identifies those exclusionary powers and rules, and their underlying principles described by the judges, in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and in Australia, when those judges were ruling on whether illegally or improperly obtained evidence should be excluded. She identifies four separate underlying principles, variously espoused in all the higher courts of those countries. These are a “reliability” principle, that evidence should be admitted or excluded solely on the grounds of reliability; a “deterrence” principle, to discipline law enforcement officers who obtain evidence by improper means by excluding that evidence, to discourage future impropriety; a “rights protection” principle, based on the idea that courts should uphold the rights of the accused in the criminal justice system; and a “judicial integrity” principle, that illegally or improperly procured evidence should be excluded if its admission would undermine the integrity and legitimacy of the administration of justice.
Through your negligence; your incompetence and your bias, the integrity and legitimacy of the administration of justice in the Isle of Man has gone “out the window”. You are not alone in being responsible for the loss of confidence in the judicial system in the Isle of Man; your Second is hopeless, and your predecessors were negligent in keeping up-to-date with the Human Rights Compliant statutes being introduced by Tynwald – none more incompetent than AK Williamson. You “quoted” some of the “background” to what you saw as “matters” in J1149.htm but assumed that what had been written and what was stored in the Office of Records of the High Court (the General Registry) was good when it was all false derivative evidence for no registration actually took place on 28th May 2004, despite the production of FOUR documents that purportedly recorded such. If a document says “Stephen Holmes shall be an orang-utan provided he is in the Isle of Man” and such document is NOT registered in the Isle of Man High Court, what does it actually “mean”? What does it say in law? I will help you, Dave – it says nothing of legal status – it is null and void. But if there is a mantra in the High Court Office and amongst the judges that “the orders were registered erroneously,” those public officials and judges are too stupid to comprehend that a socalled order from Lancaster County Court that has “words on it” is void in the Isle of Man and so those “words” are of no legal value – they should not be repeated. There was no legitimate basis upon which the Deputy Deemster could have made the “order” which he purportedly made on 5 th November 2004 so that too was void and said NOTHING of legal value. When you blustered from the Bench on 29th November 2007 you stated that there was a “residence order” and so I interrupted your bluster; you admonished me from the Bench. But your integrity and legitimacy had been compromised – and you even stated that an order had been made in “divorce