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Acknowledgements
A great debt of gratitude is owed by the author to the men and women employed within the USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s secret biological warfare network. In the transformed reality which resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union, many came to realise that they were no longer bound by their bonds of loyalty and allegiance to a system which had imploded and disappeared, never to return. Chief among those who wrestled with their conscience, and the highest-level and most important source for the present work, is the now-deceased Tsyren Tsybekzhapovich Khanduev. This impressive individual was representative of some of the more positive aspects of the Soviet system, especially that associated with social mobility. Khanduev was born on 17 August 1918 in Buryatia, the son of a cattle breeder. From these humble origins his career followed an astonishing trajectory, with him eventually serving as a colonel in the USSR Ministry of Defence’s Scientifc-Research Sanitary Institute (67-i km settlement, Sergiev Posad)—the Soviet Union’s lead virology BW centre—then being transferred to a major anti-livestock institute in Gvardeiskii, Kazakhstan, before fnishing his career as an Academician within the National Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan. Khanduev spent many long, highly emotional hours, considering whether, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, his oath of loyalty prevented him from telling the extraordinary story of the agricultural biowarfare programme pursued by the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. It is thanks to his courageous decision to write his memoirs that we are provided with a fascinating insight and knowledge of this highly secretive Soviet endeavour.
Another individual who made a signifcant contribution to this project is Stephen Mylrea Asbridge (1952–2015). Lacking any formal scientifc background, he had a most detailed knowledge of fermentation technology, working for many decades in this branch of the UK’s bioindustry. His main contribution to this work, however, centres on the wide network of contacts he had developed within the life sciences industry in the former Soviet Union. He was greatly loved and respected by an array of senior researchers and directors based in Moscow and many other cities across the USSR. In the chaos and disorder following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was only through these highly personal channels of communication that it was possible to schedule interviews and for former weapons scientists to be able to talk openly about their work.
Two other key individuals should be thanked for their critical contribution to the present work: Dr David Stead and Dr Robert Bolton, both formerly attached to the Central Science Laboratory (York) were fne travelling companions on several adventures across the post-Soviet space. Their expert knowledge provided fascinating insight into the programmes which had been pursued by the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, David’s fne singing voice was capable of transforming an ordinary social occasion into an extraordinary one.
Alex Donaldson and Richard Strange very kindly read and commented on the manuscript as it was being fnally prepared. Their contributions have greatly improved the quality of the book. Grateful thanks are also extended to the anonymous reviewer for Palgrave Macmillan.
Finally, a special and very personal thank you is also offered to Dr Edward Arfon Rees (1949–2019), late of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham. He was a most brilliant historian of the Soviet Union, as is evidenced by an array of superlative publications, who provided myself and very many others, with a deep insight into this fascinating period of history. He shall be most remembered by me as a very dear colleague whose enthusiasm, infectious humour and love of life brightened up many a dull day in the Russian Centre at Birmingham.
1 Introduction 1
2 Origins: The International Race to Develop Anti-crop and Anti-livestock Biological Weapons
The Initial Soviet Post-War Anti-crop Biological Warfare Programme
The Trigger: The US Offensive Biological Warfare Programme Targeting the Soviet Union
3 Codename Ekologiya: Khrushchev and the Launch of the Soviet Union’s Large-Scale Agricultural Biowarfare Programme
The Generals in Charge: Military Oversight of the Ekologiya Programme
First Steps: Pursuit of the Ekologiya Programme at the Palace on the Znamenskoe-Sadki Estate
The Concentration of Veterinary BW Facilities in the Vladimir Region
The Gvardeiskii Experimental Proving Ground: Biological Warfare on the Kazakh Steppe
An Invisible Network: Visiting Western Plant Pathology and Veterinary Specialists Are Unaware of the Existence of the New Agricultural BW Facilities
Numbers Employed in the Ministry of Agriculture’s BW Programme
The Targeting of China by the Ekologiya Programme?
4 From Estonia to Sakhalin Island: The Expansion of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s Toxic Archipelago in the 1970s and 1980s 79
The Interdepartmental Council and the New Focus on Molecular Biology 79
The Development of Linkages to the USSR Ministry of Defence, Biopreparat and Other Branches of the Soviet BW Programme 82
The Expansion of the Ekologiya Programme and the Opening of New Facilities in Estonia, Armenia and Tajikistan
84
Harnessing Virulent Plant Pathogens from the Soviet Network of Monitoring Stations and Plant Breeding Facilities 91
Africa as a Source of Novel Pathogens? The International Dimensions of the Ekologiya Programme 92
The Emergence of the New Scientifc Leadership of the Soviet Anti-crop BW Programme 94
The Maintenance of a Strict Regime of Secrecy Within the GUNIiEPU Network: Security Measures in Place at Ekologiya Facilities in Uzbekistan and Georgia 96
The Launch of the Flora Programme and the Development of Tactical Herbicides for the Military 100
Alibek’s Account of the Early Termination of GUNIiEPU’s BW Programme
5 Heart of Darkness: The Creation of Reserve Mobilisation Capacity for Production of Viral Agents
The Soviet System of Mobilisation Preparedness
The Creation of Reserve Mobilisation Production Facilities for Anti-agricultural Agents
BW Mobilisation Capacity at the Pokrov Biologics Plant
of Mobilisation Capacity at Pokrov by Western
The Nature of Activity at Pokrov: Linkages to an Alleged Soviet Variola Virus Programme
Delivery Systems for Weaponised Agricultural BW Agents
6 Through a Glass Darkly: Analysis of the Soviet Union’s Military Agricultural R&D Programmes
Western Intelligence Assessments of the Soviet Agricultural Biowarfare Programme
Central Asia’s “Sverdlovsk Incident”? The Rinderpest (Cattle Plague) Programme and the First Major Disease Outbreak from an Ekologiya Laboratory 127
The Pursuit of FMD Research Programmes by VNIYaI
Construction of FMD Vaccine Facilities by the Soviet Union
VNIIVViM’s Focus on Anthrax
R&D Programmes in Vol’ginskii and Gvardeiskii Focused on African Swine Fever (ASF) and African Horse Sickness (AHS)
Sheeppox, Goatpox and Fowlpox Viruses 139
R&D Programmes Conducted by Soviet Anti-crop BW Facilities: Rice Blast (Magnaporthe grisea) and Rice Bacteriosis (Xanthomonas oryzae)
Late Blight of Potatoes (Phytophthora infestans)
The Use of Insects to Transmit Plant Pathogens
Offence or Defence? The Conficting Narratives with Regard to the Ekologiya Programme
7 From Military to Agro-industrial Complex: The Legacy of the Agricultural BW Programme in the Post-Soviet States 155
The Collapse of the USSR and the Evacuation of Weapons Scientists to the Russian Federation 155
The Transfer to Civil Control of Russia’s Anti-crop and Antilivestock Facilities
Iran and the Proliferation Threat Arising in the Wake of the Collapse of the Soviet Union
160
From Isolated Cold War Outpost to National Lead-Edge Plant Pathology Research Centre: The “Rediscovery” of Georgia’s Soviet-Era Time Capsule 166
The Role of Kobuleti in Soviet Military Programmes
170
The UK Ministry of Defence Counters the Critical Proliferation Threat in Kobuleti: The Launch of the Pilot Biological Redirection Project 174
About the Author
Anthony Rimmington is a former senior research fellow at the University of Birmingham’s Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies (CREES), UK. He was the winner, as a postgraduate student at this institution, of the John Grayson Memorial Prize. He has written widely on the civil life sciences industry in Russia and the former Soviet Republics and is the author of Technology and Transition: A Survey of Biotechnology in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States (London and Westport, Connecticut, 1992). Other publications on this topic include Tekhnologiya i perekhodnyi period. Obzor biotekhnologii v Rossii, na Ukraine i v stranakh baltii, in Biotekhnologiya, ekologiya, meditsina: Materialy III–IV Mezhdunarodnykh nauchnykh seminarov 2001–2002, Volga-Vyatka Centre of Applied Microbiology, Kirov, 2002, pp. 75–8; Biotechnology Legislation in Central and Eastern Europe, European Federation of Biotechnology Task Group on Public Perceptions of Biotechnology’s Briefng Paper No. 9, June 1999, pp. 4; “Biotechnology and industrial microbiology regulations in Russia and the former Soviet republics”, in Hambleton, P., Melling, J., Salusbury, T.T. (Eds.), Biosafety in Industrial Biotechnology, London, 1994, pp. 67–89; “Perestroika and Soviet biotechnology”, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1990, pp. 63–79; “Soviet biotechnology: the case of single cell protein”, in Amann, R.,
The Lord will strike your grazing herds, your horses and asses, your camels, cattle and sheep with a terrible pestilence (Exodus, 9:3). I destroyed your crops with blight and disease (Amos, 4:9)
Cooper, J.(Eds.), Technical Progress and Soviet Economic Development, Oxford, 1986, pp. 75–93; and “Issues in Soviet biotechnology: the case of single-cell protein”, in Adaptability to New Technologies of the USSR and East European Countries, Brussels, 17–19 April 1985, pp. 217–234.
Numerous contributions regarding the Soviet and Russian civil life sciences industry have also been made to a number of popular scientifc publications including New Scientist, Bio/Technology, International Industrial Biotechnology, The Genetic Engineer and Biotechnologist, European Microbiology and Microbiology Europe
Rimmington has also written extensively on the Soviet Union’s offensive biological weapons programme including Stalin’s Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare (London and New York, 2018). He has completed a series of journal articles and book chapters on the subject including “From Offence to Defence? Russia’s Reform of its Biological Weapons Complex and the Implications for Western Security”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1–43; “The Soviet Union’s Offensive Programme: The Implications for Contemporary Arms Control”, in Wright, S, (Ed.), Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives, Lanham, 2002, pp. 103–50; “Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet Union’s BW Programme and Its Implications for Contemporary Arms Control”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2000, pp. 1–46; “Konversion Sowjetischer BW-produktions-einrichtungen: Der fall Biomedpreparat, Stepnogorsk, Kasachstan”, in Buder, E. (Ed.), Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Konversion von B-Waffen-Einrichtungen, Lit Verlag, Münster, 2000, pp. 245–262; “Fragmentation and Proliferation? The Fate of the Soviet Union’s Offensive Biological Weapons Programme”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 86–110; “Conversion of BW Facilities in Kazakhstan”, in Geissler, E., Gazsó, L., Buder, E. (Eds.), Conversion of Former BTW Facilities, NATO Science Series, London, 1998, pp. 167–186; and “From military to industrial complex? The conversion of biological weapons' facilities in the Russian Federation”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1, April 1996, pp. 80–112.
During the very last years of existence of the Soviet Union, Rimmington travelled to a number of research establishments at sites located across the country. Following upon the collapse of the USSR, he was allowed access to a number of former Soviet life sciences R&D institutes and manufacturing facilities with a view to assisting with their participation in international non-proliferation programmes.
list of figures
Fig. 2.1 View of Narkomzem Building in Moscow, 15:36:01, 3 September 2017, Moscow, Russian Federation. Photographer: Ludvig14 (Wikimedia Commons, https://commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/ File: Moscow_Narkomzem_1234.jpg, Accessed on the 26 February 2020) 14
Fig. 2.2 View of All-Russian Institute of Plant Protection, 20:30:00, 22 March 2012. Photographer: Grichanov (Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/ 6/6e/ VIZRbuilding1.jpg, Accessed on the 28 May 2019) 23
Fig. 3.1 Palace on the Znamenskoye-Sadki Estate, Bitsa, Moscow oblast’, 18:15:52, 30 July 2007. Photographer: Maslova, Lyudmila, Moscow (This fle is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license; This image was uploaded as part of European Science Photo Competition 2015, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ commons/e/ed/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0 %B2%D0%B0._%D0%94%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B5% D1%86_%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%8C%D0%B1 %D1%8B_%D0%97%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0% BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%A1%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B8.jpg)
41
Fig. 3.2 View of main building, Georgian Branch of the All-Union Scientifc-Research Institute of Phytopathology, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 47
Fig. 3.3 View of water tower erected in 1959, Central Asian ScientifcResearch Institute of Phytopathology, Yuqori-Yuz, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 11 December 2002. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington
Fig. 3.4 View of hazard sign “Radioactivity” at entrance to SANIIF site for testing uptake of radionucleotides in crops, Yuqori-Yuz, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 19 May 2003. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington
Fig. 3.5 View of All-Union Scientifc-Research Foot-and-Mouth Disease Institute (VNIYaI), Yur’evets, Vladimir oblast’. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington
48
50
53
Fig. 3.6 View of Soviet-era placards on display at the Scientifc-Research Agricultural Institute—one depicting NISKhI, with stylized images of a horse and a leaf symbolizing the twin activities of animal and plant science, another placard celebrating the Achievements of Science for Field and Farm, a slogan popularized by Academician Pavel Pavlovich Lobanov, President of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Sciences (1956–1961 and 1965–1978), Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Zhambul’ oblast’, Kazakhstan, 8 April 2003. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 57
Fig. 3.7 View of greenhouse facility on site at Scientifc-Research Agricultural Institute, Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Zhambul’ oblast’, Kazakhstan, 9 April 2003. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 58
Fig. 3.8 View of a centrifugal freeze dryer manufactured by Edwards High Vacuum Ltd. (Crawley, UK)—part of the historical large-scale installation of the latest Western equipment at NISKhI, Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Kazakhstan, 13 September 1999. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 59
Fig. 4.1 View of dedicated storage area housing 15,000 wheat varieties, Laboratory of Plant Immunity, Scientifc-Research Institute of Agriculture, Gvardeiskii, Kazakhstan, 13 September 1999. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 85
Fig. 4.2 View of road sign for Kamara, location of former Experimental Station, Estonia, 3 July 2002. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 86
Fig. 4.3 View of block of fats constructed for Experimental Station, Kamara, Estonia, 3 July 2002. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 87
Fig. 4.4 Elaborate security system preventing unauthorised access to offces and laboratories at Georgian Branch of VNIIF, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 98
Fig. 5.1 View of bunkered facilities at Pokrov biologics factory, Vol’ginskii, Vladimir oblast’, Russian Federation. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 115
Fig. 6.1 Rinderpest outbreak in South Africa, 1896. Photographer: Unknown, public domain, created on the 17 February 2011, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:Rinderpest_1896-CN.jpg#/media/ File:Rinderpest 1896-CN.jpg
127
Fig. 6.2 View of containment system employed within Georgian Branch of VNIIF’s greenhouse, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is incorrect) 143
Fig. 7.1 View of entrance to All-Russian Scientifc-Research Institute of Animal Health (VNIIZZh), Yur’evets, Russian Federation, 1994. Photographer: Alex Donaldson (used with author’s permission) 158
Fig. 7.2 View of concentric rings of security walls in place at anti-crop BW facility, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is incorrect)
168
Fig. 7.3 View of nameplate of the renamed Plant Immunity Research Institute, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is incorrect) 169
Fig. 7.4 View of greenhouse complex, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 170
Fig. 7.5 Georgette Naskidashvili, Director of Institute of Plant Immunity, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is incorrect)
Fig. 7.6 View of Soviet-era bioreactors at NISKhI, Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Kazakhstan, 9 April 2003. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington
172
179
Fig. 7.7 View of Soviet-era phytotrons at the Institute of Genetics and Plant Experimental Biology, Yuqori-Yuz, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 11 December 2002. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 184
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In August 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the USSR Council of Ministers, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, issued decree No. 909-426 “for strengthening work in the feld of microbiology and virology” and embarked upon the largest agricultural biowarfare programme the world has ever seen.1 Embracing defensive and offensive components, six institutes were initially created and placed under the control of a secret department, the Main Administration for Scientifc-Research and Experimental-Production Establishments (GUNIiEPU) within the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The secret programme operated under the codename Ekologiya (Ecology), which was also referred to as Problem “E”. For more than three decades the new Soviet BW facilities were to focus their research on a range of pathogens with utility as anti-crop and anti-livestock weapons. By the time the programme had terminated in 1991, the network, with its store of highly dangerous pathogens, had the capability to infict enormous damage on Western agriculture.
An array of Western scholars and journalists and high-level Soviet defectors have alluded to the secret Soviet agricultural network, which, at its height, embraced around 10,000 personnel, equating to a quarter to a sixth of all those who were employed within the USSR’s vast BW programme. This agricultural biowarfare workforce eclipses the numbers employed in historic BW programmes pursued by other countries. It
A. Rimmington, The Soviet Union’s Agricultural Biowarfare Programme, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73843-3_1
A. RIMMINGTON
exceeds that of the entire US BW programme, fewer than 8000 people; the Japanese BW programme, which employed fewer than 5000; and the British and Canadian BW programme, employing fewer than 3000 personnel. The Soviet weapons scientists worked within a network which consisted of 15 anti-crop facilities, 4 anti-livestock facilities, 1 institute embracing both animal and plant BW programmes and at least 3 dedicated proving grounds, alongside an unknown number of reserve mobilisation BW production units.
The agricultural BW technology developed by the Soviet Union would make tempting targets for nations wishing to acquire their own such capability or for terrorist groups seeking to infict damage on Western agricultural targets. As Colonel Robert Kadlec has indicated, the consequences of such a strike could be catastrophic: “Agroterror offers an adversary the means to wage a potentially subtle yet devastating form of warfare, one which would impact on the political, social and economic sectors of society and potentially threaten national survival itself”.2 Two key factors exacerbate the problem of countering the use of such agents. The frst concerns the relative ease with which agricultural pathogens can be weaponised and disseminated. Work on such agents may also require far lower levels of biosafety than that required for mainstream BW programmes aimed at human targets. And the second concerns the plausible deniability with regard to accusations that a nation or terrorist group had employed such weapons. Against a background of a dramatic increase in natural outbreaks of novel plant diseases over the past decade for example, a food crop epidemic initiated by a BW attack might never be detected, freeing the covert aggressor from blame and repercussion.3 There is also a reduced moral and ethical burden associated with the use of such agents.4 In addition, the geographical distribution of Soviet-era agricultural BW facilities is a matter of some concern with respect to the possible proliferation of agriculturally directed biological weapons. For the network was dispersed across a vast geographic area encompassing sites in Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This greatly complicated the task of Western agencies seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons technologies associated with the Soviet programme.
A number of recent reports have highlighted the vulnerability of Western agriculture to attack by a variety of pathogens and causative agents. The high health status of agricultural crops, combined with the extensive use of monoculture in modern agriculture across vast areas, means that plants present a particularly vulnerable target. A National
Academy of Sciences study, “Genetic Vulnerability of Major Crops” published in August 1972, warned that US crops were “impressively uniform genetically and impressively vulnerable”.5 Once infection has developed, it is often too late in the growing season to plough it in and plant a resistant alternative.6 The livestock sector in the West has also become more vulnerable to attack, experiencing both a decrease in genetic diversity and a signifcant concentration of production (in 1970, e.g., there were about 500,000 dairy farms in the United States, with this number decreasing to 160,000 by 1988).7 As one US expert noted, “for the user of biological agents, the trend to concentration has reduced the target’s geographic area, increased the potential for spread of infectious agents, and magnifed the impact of limited use”.8
Attacks on agricultural crops and livestock with BW agents could lead to potential economic losses of immense proportions. In the nineteenth century, coffee leaf rust caused by the fungus Hemileia vastatrix destroyed coffee plantations worth millions of dollars in South-East Asia and for the past two decades has been a pressing problem in Latin America. In 1970 in the United States, Southern corn leaf blight (SCLB), caused by the fungus Bipolaris maydis, devastated 15 per cent of the maize crop, reducing the average national corn yield from 83.9 to 71.7 bushels per acre and costing farmers about US$1 billion in losses.9 More recently in 1996 a limited outbreak of Karnal bunt (Tilletia indica)—a fungal pathogen of wheat— in the American Southwest led to an estimated US$250 million in loss. In this case although the actual extent of the infections was limited, other countries enacted trade embargoes in order to prevent imports of infected wheat.10 A January 2001 report produced by the US Department of Defence estimates that an attack utilising Asian soybean rust (caused by the fungus Phakopsora pachyrhizi) could potentially result in American losses for farmers, processors, livestock producers and consumers of up to US$8 billion per annum.11 The deliberate deployment of anti-crop agents could also be highly effective in causing mass casualties in civilian populations. During the period 1845–1846, for example, late blight of potatoes, caused by the fungus-like microorganism, Phytophthora infestans, was one of the primary causes of the Irish famine which resulted in the deaths of about one million people and forced another one million to emigrate. Again in 1942–1943 the brown spot disease of rice was partially responsible for the Bengal famine in India in which more than two million people starved.12
A. RIMMINGTON
Potential economic losses associated with attacks on a country’s livestock sector could be just as severe. In 1997 in Taiwan, for example, an outbreak in pigs of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is estimated to have probably cost tens of thousands of US dollars in direct losses. However, the costs of eradication and disinfection amounted to US$4 billion, alongside a cumulative US$15 billion in lost export revenues.13 The FMD outbreak in the UK in 2001, meanwhile, led to losses to agriculture and the food chain amounting to about £3.1 billion. In addition, businesses directly affected by a loss of revenue as a result of reduced numbers of tourists visiting the countryside are estimated to have lost a similar total amount of between £2.7 and £3.2 billion.14
It is evident from the above descriptions that the USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s anti-crop and anti-livestock BW programme and its subsequent unravelling was a matter of great importance to Western governments. The BW technologies and strains of pathogens developed by the Soviet Union made tempting targets for nation states or terrorist groups wishing to acquire an anti-crop or anti-livestock capability. The acquisition of production technologies and highly pathogenic agents from former Ekologiya facilities might have offered one of the least complicated and risk-free routes with which to attack Western targets. Evidence is presented that Western nations, especially the US and UK, acted effectively to stem the fow of these pathogens and technologies to states wishing to enhance their own biological weapons capabilities. Their intervention provided a fnancial lifeline to former Soviet agricultural BW facilities and personnel in the wake of a suspension of orders from the military and massive reductions in funding for research and operating budgets. It is also apparent that, during a period of improved international relations with the West, Russian and post-Soviet institutions, formerly engaged in the Ekologiya programme, were active collaborators with an array of Western agencies seeking to sponsor projects intended to beneft both agriculture and wider civil society.
Until the publication of this present study, our knowledge and understanding of the Ekologiya programme has rather resembled the nature of that concerning the case of dark matter. For until now, this globally signifcant project has remained impervious to any penetrative investigation. All the leading academic authorities are agreed upon the fact of its existence and its huge scale but, thus far, there has been no adequate description and analysis of its aims and objectives or its constituent parts in any detail at all. This situation is alluded to by Leitenberg and Zilinskas, who, in
their magisterial account of the Soviet BW programme, state that “due to the lack of adequate information, we decided not to address … the Soviet programme headed by MOA (USSR Ministry of Agriculture) to produce biological weapons against animals and plants”.15
The present study seeks to address this critical gap in the scientifc and military history of the Soviet Union and to fully assess its signifcance with regard to the global development of biological weapons.
One of the most severe obstacles to gaining an understanding of the secret programme is the fact that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former agricultural BW facilities are now subordinate to a multiplicity of agencies in many different newly independent countries. In addition, several military agricultural facilities have now been amalgamated with civil R&D institutes which further prevent any reliable analysis of the original military-focused GUNIiEPU network. Another fundamental block to gaining an understanding of the Ekologiya programme is the continuing secrecy surrounding historical Soviet BW activities. For analysts seeking information on national BW programmes, both here in the UK and in the US, numerous documents have been made available in the respective national archives, accounts written by the lead scientists themselves, and a voluminous secondary literature has been published. Meanwhile, no corresponding access for Western researchers has been provided to primary materials relating to the USSR’s military biological programmes. Moreover, there has been a continuing attempt at disinformation, with the repeated appearance of publications arguing the case that the Soviet Union’s BW programmes were of a defensive nature.
The absence of any substantive written account of the programme combined with the lack of access to secret archives means that in order to generate a historical narrative, this study relies upon a forensic reconstruction. Rather like the pieces of a jigsaw scattered across a board the size of the USSR, the author has gathered together as many critical pieces of historical evidence as could be mustered. As is inevitable, in the complete absence of offcial accounts regarding Ekologiya, there is still much that remains subject to conjecture and educated guesswork. To address this gap in knowledge, multiple interviews were undertaken with senior scientists over a period of more than a decade, at facilities located at sites separated across huge distances. As a result, a recognisable shape and design of the programme has been compiled from the dispersed fragments and many of the key personalities and secret locations have emerged from the shadows.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Comfortable Mrs. Crook, and other sketches
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
Title: Comfortable Mrs. Crook, and other sketches
Author: Ruth Lamb
Release date: May 8, 2024 [eBook #73569]
Language: English
Original publication: London: The Religious Tract Society, 1888
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK COMFORTABLE MRS. CROOK, AND OTHER SKETCHES ***
Transcriber's note: Unusual and inconsistent spelling is as printed.
Fanny brought in the tea-tray to the minute.
COMFORTABLE MRS. CROOK AND OTHER SKETCHES.
BY RUTH LAMB AUTHOR OF
"Look on the Sunny Side," "Taught by Experience," etc.
LONDON:
THE
RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY
56, PATERNOSTER ROW; 65, ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD; AND 164, PICCADILLY.
CONTENTS
COMFORTABLE MRS. CROOK
CHAPTER I. KEEPING TO HERSELF
CHAPTER II. THE SILENT MESSENGER
CHAPTER III. READY AND UNREADY
CHAPTER IV. NOT WITH EYE-SERVICE
CHAPTER V. THE INVITATION ACCEPTED
CHAPTER VI. WAITING AND TRUSTING
CAN'T AFFORD TO PLAY
WALKING TOO BIG WINKLES
COMFORTABLE MRS. CROOK.
CHAPTER I.
KEEPING TO HERSELF.
IF Mrs. Jemima Crook happened to be in a very good temper, when taking a cup of tea with some old acquaintance, she would sometimes allude to her private affairs in these words: "I don't deny it; Crook has left me comfortable." This was not much to tell, for Mrs. Crook was not given to confidences, and a frequent remark of hers was: "I know my own business, and that is enough for me. I don't see that I have any call to fill other people's minds and mouths with what does not concern them."
Seeing, however, that Mrs. Crook's own mind and heart were entirely filled by Mrs. Crook herself, it was perhaps as well that she should not occupy too much of the attention and affection of her neighbours.
It is a poor narrow heart, and a small mind, that find Self enough to fill them; but these sorts are not unknown, and Mrs. Crook's were a sample of such.
When she spoke of having been left "comfortable" by her deceased partner, there was a look of triumph and satisfaction on her face, and a "No thanks to any of you" kind of tone in her voice, that must have jarred on the ear of a listener.
No one ever saw a tear in Mrs. Crook's eye, or heard an expression of regret for the loss of "Crook" himself. He had been dead, and out of sight and mind almost, these ten
years past. He was merely remembered as having done his duty in leaving his widow "comfortable." People were left to speculate as they chose about the amount represented by the expression. It would not have been good for the man or woman who had ventured to ask a direct question on the subject, but everybody agreed that Mrs. Crook must have something handsome. Surely "comfortable" means free from care, both as regards to-day and to-morrow: not only enough, but a little more, or else anxiety might step in and spoil comfort.
If Mrs. Crook had more than enough, she took care not to give of her abundance. Neither man, woman, nor child was ever the better for the surplus, if such there were. One of her favourite expressions was, "I don't care for much neighbouring; I prefer keeping myself to myself."
"And you keep everything else to yourself," muttered one who had vainly tried to enlist her sympathy for another who was in sickness and trouble.
Mrs. Crook had a pretty garden, well stocked with flowers according to the season. She was fond of working in it, and might be seen there daily, with her sun-bonnet on, snipping, tying and tending her plants.
Children do so love flowers, and, thank God, those who live in country places have grand gardens to roam in, free to all, and planted by His own loving hand. But in town it is different, and Mrs. Crook lived just outside one, far enough away from its smoke to allow of successful gardening, not too far to prevent little feet from wandering thither from narrow courts and alleys, to breathe the purer air, and gaze with longing eyes at the fair blossoms.
It always irritated Mrs. Crook to see these dirty, unkempt little creatures clustering round her gate or peeping through her hedge.
"What do you want here?" she would ask, sharply. "Get away with you, or I will send for a policeman. You are peeping about to see if you can pick up something; I know you are. Be off, without any more telling!"
The light of pleasure called into the young eyes by the sight of the flowers would fade away, and the hopeful look leave the dirty faces, as Mrs. Crook's harsh words fell on the children's ears. But as they turned away with unwilling, lingering steps, heads would be stretched, and a wistful longing gaze cast upon the coveted flowers, until they were quite lost to sight.
There was a tradition amongst the youngsters that a very small child had once called through the bars of the gate: "P'ease, missis, do give me a f'ower." Also that something in the baby voice had so far moved Mrs. Jemima Crook, that she had stopped to select one or two of the least faded roses amongst those just snipped from the bushes, and given them to the daring little blue eyes outside, with this injunction, however:
"Mind you never come here asking for flowers any more."
This report was long current among the inhabitants of a city court, but it needs confirmation.
Mrs. Crook objected to borrowers also, and perhaps she was not so much to be blamed for that. Most of us who possess bookshelves, and once delighted in seeing them well-filled, look sorrowfully at gaps made by borrowers who have failed to return our treasures.
But domestic emergencies occur even in the best regulated families, and neighbourly help may be imperatively required. It may be a matter of Christian duty and privilege too, to lend both our goods and our personal aid.
Mrs. Crook did not think so. Lending formed no part of her creed. If other people believed in it, and liked their household goods to travel up and down the neighbourhood, that was their look out, not hers.
"I never borrow, so why should I lend?" asked Mrs. Crook. "Beside, I am particular about my things. My pans are kept as bright and clean as new ones, and if my servant put them on the shelves, as some people's servants replace theirs after using, she would not be here long. No, thank you. When I begin to borrow, I will begin to lend, but not until then."
Mrs. Crook's sentiments were so well known that, even in a case of sickness, when a few spoonfuls of mustard were needed for immediate use in poultices, the messenger on the way to borrow it, passed her door rather than risk a refusal, whereby more time might be lost than by going farther in the first instance.
Many were the invitations Mrs. Crook received to take part in the work of different societies.
One lady asked her to join the Dorcas meeting.
"You can sew so beautifully," she said, "you would be a great acquisition to our little gathering."
The compliment touched a tender point. Mrs. Crook was proud of her needlework, but to dedicate such skill in
sewing to making underclothing for the poorest of the poor! The idea was monstrous!
Mrs. Crook answered civilly, that she could not undertake to go backwards and forwards to a room half a mile off. It would be a waste of time. Besides, though it was probably not the case in that particular meeting, she had heard that there was often a great deal of gossip going on at such places.
The visitor was determined not to be offended, and she replied gently, that there was no chance of gossip, for after a certain time had been given to the actual business of the meeting, such as planning, cutting-out, and apportioning work, one of the ladies read, whilst the rest sewed.
"But," she added, "if you are willing to help us a little, and object to joining the meeting at the room, perhaps you will let me bring you something to be made at home. There is always work for every willing hand."
Then Mrs. Crook drew herself up, and said she did not feel inclined to take in sewing. She had her own to do, and did it without requiring assistance, and she thought it was better to teach the lower classes to depend upon themselves than to go about pampering poor people and encouraging idleness, as many persons were so fond of doing now-a-days. No doubt they thought they were doing good, but, for her part, she believed that in many cases they did harm.
The visitor could have told tales of worn-out toilers, labouring almost night and day to win bread for their children, but unable to find either material for a garment or time to make it. She could have pleaded for the widow and the orphan, if there had seemed any feelings to touch, any
heart to stir. But Mrs. Crook's hard words and looks repelled her, and she went her way, after a mere, "Good-morning. I am sorry you cannot see your way to help us."
No chance of widows weeping for the loss of Mrs. Crook, or telling of her alms deeds and good works, or showing the coats and garments made for them by her active fingers!
It was the same when some adventurous collector called upon Mrs. Crook to solicit a subscription. She had always something to say against the object for which money was asked.
If it were for the sufferers by a colliery accident, or for the unemployed at the time of trade depression, she would answer—
"Why don't they insure their lives, like their betters? Why don't they save something, when they are getting good-wages? I am not going to encourage the thriftless, or help those who might help themselves, if they would think beforehand."
If it were to build a church that money was being sought, Mrs. Crook instantly replied, that they had more need try to fill all the places of worship that were half empty, Sunday after Sunday.
It did not matter in the least to her that these places were many a mile away from the people who had none within reach. She would not be convinced because she did not want to be.
Ask her for a missionary subscription, and she said: "There are heathens enough at home without sending men to be killed by savages in foreign parts;" and if some one hinted that she might then visit some of these native
English heathens, she replied, "I do not care to have people that I know nothing about coming to my house, and I am not going to push myself where I might not be wanted."
At length every one gave up trying to enlist her services, or to obtain contributions from her, for the support of any good cause. And Mrs. Crook bestowed all her thoughts, her affections, her time, and her means, on the only person she thought worthy of them all—namely, Mrs. Crook herself.
IT may be doubted whether, under these circumstances, Mrs. Crook was truly "comfortable." Probably many poorer people, on whom she would have looked down—if she had condescended to look at them at all—would not have cared to change places with her.
Mrs. Crook tried to think that she was very wise and prudent in thus caring for her own interests, and did not believe it possible that she could be mistaken. Yet there were times during the lonely hours—of which, by her own choice, she had so many—when a voice would seem to whisper, "Is your life the happiest you can possibly lead in this world? Has Time nothing better to give? Days and years are passing. Death must come to you as to others. What about eternity?"
When this last question recurred, Mrs. Crook tried to put it out of her mind. It was the one she disliked more than all the rest, yet it was the one which would repeat itself again and again, and for which she had no answer ready. She found her greatest comfort in thinking that she belonged to a very long-lived family.
Her grandmother had died at eighty-three; her mother at eighty-seven; and some of her relatives had attained still greater ages. Why not she?
"Let me see," said Mrs. Crook, when one day this unpleasant question had persisted in obtruding itself upon her loneliness: "I am just fifty-eight, and I feel as strong as ever I did in my life. I cannot remember having had a week's serious illness in all those years. I am a far stronger woman than mother was, and she lived to be nine-andtwenty years older than I am now. There is no reason why I should not reach ninety, or even a hundred. But if it were,
