Plaintiff’s Memo in Opposition Filed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

ERIC J. BONETTI, Plaintiff,

CIVIL Case No. 1:21cv0190 (CMHJFA)

vs.

EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA, ROBERT HILLER MALM, CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ST. GABRIEL’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, Defendants

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MALM’S MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Eric J. Bonetti, and files this memorandum in opposition to defendant Robert Hiller Malm’s motion to dismiss.

1. Defendant has raised a number of pretextual alleged bases for dismissal of the current lawsuit against him.

2. Apropos Defendant’s assertion that the decision of the Alexandria Circuit Court not to enjoin Defendant from witness tampering somehow speaks to the merits of this case, the assertion is a logical fallacy. When, as here, Defendant has committed perjury in legal proceedings (Exhibit A), and engaged in witness tampering (Exhibit B) and fraudulent concealment of adverse evidence during discovery (Exhibit C), the proceedings in which this conduct has occurred are by definition violative of Plaintiff’s rights, and form the basis of this legal action. Thus, using the result to defend the result is the very definition of circular reasoning.

3. As to the decision of the Alexandria Circuit Court itself, Defendant Malm and his wife are known to have contacted the following persons they know, or have reason to know, will be witnesses in the upcoming trial, with a view towards influencing the outcome: The Rev. Richard Wall, rector of Plaintiff’s former church; Dee Parsons, Plaintiff’s friend and publisher of church abuse blog

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The Wartburg Watch, and Rev. Bob Perry, who at the time was the Plaintiff’s employer.

Moreover, Ms. Parsons has expressly stated in writing that she wishes no contact from the Defendant. Thus, the Alexandria Circuit Court’s decision speaks not to the merits of Defendant’s case, but to its failure to recognize the importance of ensuring a fair, unbiased proceeding while discouraging the Defendant from engaging in conduct harmful to his case and that could result in criminal penalties. As such, this decision may well violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by depriving him of the due process and equal protection of the laws.

4. Plaintiff further notes that the Alexandria Circuit Court’s decision is now on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court.

5. As similar logic pertains to the Alexandria Circuit Court’s decision not to grant an injunction preventing Defendant from contacting the Plaintiff under Virginia’s anti-stalking legislation as set forth at Va Code § 18.2-60.3. Because stalking is a crime with a definition all too often is “in the eye of the beholder,” the Virginia legislature specifically defined any contact after receiving actual notice that the victim does not wish to be contacted as prima facie evidence of stalking.

Specifically:

If the person contacts or follows or attempts to contact or follow the person at whom the conduct is directed after being given actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed, such actions shall be prima facie evidence that the person intended to place that other person, or reasonably should have known that the other person was placed, in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to himself or a family or household member.

Note that there is no time frame specified in the above legislation.

In the instant case, both current defense counsel and the prior attorney representing Defendant have been repeatedly asked, in writing, and with specific reference to the

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relevant Virginia statute, to ensure no further contact from Defendant and his family (Exhibit D).

6. Defendant also received actual written notice repeatedly from Plaintiff to have no further contact (Exhibit E).

7. Defense counsel also falsely characterizes his client’s conduct along Russell Road in Alexandria, in which he claims that his client approached Plaintiff to inform him that he appeared to be violating the protective order, which Defendant had obtained through lies, false testimony and perjury. Setting to one side for the moment whether any rational actor would approach someone for such purposes, after telling the courts that he was in imminent fear for his life or safety, Defendant’s screaming and other noisy antics sent nearby residents scrambling for safety.

8. The sort of menacing conduct described above, in combination with Defendant’s calling the Plaintiff’s house of worship during the course of litigation, and his then employer, evinces a worrisome trend.

9. Moreover, the identity of Plaintiff’s employer was not public knowledge, suggesting a curious interest in the matter on the part of the Defendant. Tellingly, Defendant now claims under oath not to remember how he obtained that information.

10. Thus, while Plaintiff has not appealed the decision of the Alexandria Circuit Court to enjoin Defendant from further contacting or threatening Plaintiff, he believes the Court’s decision to be a mistake, unhelpful to either party, and one that reflects bias towards the defendant.

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11. To the extent that related litigation and events have bearing on the merits of this case, it is worth noting that, inter alia, the US Attorney’s Office and the Department of Justice have been invited to intervene in light of the clear civil rights violations that have occurred, as well as the repeated illegal conduct on the part of the Defendant.

Moreover, the Marion Massachusetts Police Department is awaiting the outcome of related litigation before taking up possible criminal charges against the defendant for perjury in the Massachusetts courts. These developments underscore the serious nature of defendant’s perjury and other litigation-related misconduct.

12. Plaintiff further notes that Defendant likes to trade upon his status as an Episcopal priest in this matter, appearing in court in clerical garb and sometimes signing documents as “Fr. Robert Malm,” a convention he almost never otherwise uses. Such conduct, which seeks to wash Defendant in a level of credibility not warranted by his conduct by trading upon innate deference to religious communities, and by trading upon the tendency of many faith communities to protect the reputation of the organization first, at the expense of those it has injured, is abuse at its worse and at the heart of the abuse scandals rocking many faith communities. But the fact that the Defendant is an Episcopal priest does not overcome the fact that he has repeatedly committed perjury, lied under oath, misled the courts and more. Indeed, it makes Defendant’s conduct all the more egregious and worthy of criminal and civil penalties.

13. While defense counsel offers conclusory denials of the above, he has yet to offer any evidence to refute these conclusions. And while defense counsel says he disagrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that his client’s perjury is material, the reality is it is central to his

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case, for it goes to the heart of his claim that Plaintiff’s late mother’s blog – which wasn’t actually threatening to begin with — somehow actually belonged to the Plaintiff.

Thus, Defendant’s entire case rises and falls on this perjury.

14. While not specifically raised by defense counsel in the instant motion to dismiss, Defendants like to claim that no damages have been shown. But it is well established that violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights is per se a showing of damages.

A copy of this pleading is being sent to defense counsel by email this 7th day of May per the following.

Craig D. Roswell, Esquire (VSB No.: 33901) Matthew J. Youssef, Esquire (VSB No.: 85339) NILES, BARTON & WILMER, LLP 111 S. Calvert Street, Suite 1400 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (410) 783 –6357 (410) 783 –6452 cdroswell@nilesbarton.com mjyoussef@nilesbarton.com Counsel for Defendant, Grace Episcopal Church and Episcopal Diocese of Virginia

Wayne F. Cyron, Esquire (VSB No. 12220) CYRON & MILLER LLP 100 N. Pitt St., Suite 200 Alexandria, VA 22314 703-299-0600 703-299-0603 (fax) wcyron@cyronmiller.com Counsel for Defendant, Robert H. Malm

Alexandria City Attorney 301 King Street, Suite 1300 P. O. Box 178 Alexandria, Virginia 22313 George.mcandrews@alexandriava.gov

Respectfully submitted,

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Eric J. Bonetti

Pro se plaintiff

4129 Fountainside Lane 203

Fairfax VA 22030

703-973-4984

Eric.bonetti@protonmail.com

Under penalty of perjury, I swear and affirm the foregoing to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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Exhibit A — Defendant Malm’s Perjury — Virginia Perjury

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Exhibit A, Defendant Malm’s Perjury, Cont’d — Massachusetts Perjury

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Exhibit B — Defendant Malm’s Witness Tampering — Ms. Darlene Parsons

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Exhibit B — Defendant Malm’s Witness Tampering, Cont’d — Plaintiff’s Church and Employer

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Exhibit C— Fraudulent Concealment of Evidence — Defamatory Email Expressly Within Ambit of Discovery, Not Produced in Initial Litigation

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Exhibit C — Fraudulent Concealment of Evidence — Statement Against Interest, Expressly Within the Ambit of Discovery, Not Produced During Initial Litigation

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Exhibit D — Notice to Prior Defense Counsel to Cease all Contact

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Exhibit E — Actual Notice to Defendant to Cease all Contact

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Exhibit E — Defendant Malm’s Perjury, Massachusetts Courts

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