Filings in Massachusetts Lawsuit Ask for Criminal Charges Against Perjuring Priest Bob Malm

PLAINTIFF’S MEMO IN OPPOSITION

Pleading Standard

As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings must be liberally construed. See Lamoureux v.

Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 390 Mass. 409, 410 n.4 (1983). The complaint need only contain "factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007).

Defendant Has Had Actual Notice of Service of Process

Apropos Defendant’s claims of inadequate service of process, a copy of the suit was sent months ago to the Defendant’s Virginia-based attorney. This was done at the attorney’s request, and he has acknowledged receipt, and discussed it both in court and with Plaintiff.

Further, Virginia defense counsel was notified at the time service was made, which would appear appropriate, as Massachusetts counsel had not yet been retained, and Plaintiff has no desire to have direct contact with Defendant.

A copy of the judicial summons was sent directly to Mr. Malm via overnight mail, proof of delivery requested. Thus, Plaintiff submits he has been diligent in ensuring timely notice to defendant. Plaintiff’s efforts also comport with Massachusetts precedent, which holds that, “Due process is satisfied if notice of the action was given in a manner reasonably calculated to reach it.” New Jersey St. Firemen's M. B. v.

Telco C, 1999 Mass. App. Div. 229 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

Moreover, Plaintiff stipulated a later response date in order to permit defense counsel adequate time to prepare a response, and agreed to an extension in order to accommodate defense counsel’s schedule.

Thus, Defendant has had actual notice of this action, and has been accommodated whenever necessary in order to avoid inconvenience or undue expense.

For these reasons, Defendant’s objections based on service of process should be overruled.

Defendant’s Perjury Is Outside the Scope of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute

In evaluating Defendant’s assertions, it is essential that they be viewed through the lens of his prior perjury before this court. “Perjury consists of intentional testimony by a person, while under oath, of a knowingly false statement of a material fact.” In the Matter of McCabe, 411 Mass. 436 (Mass. 1991). In the context of perjury, the test for materiality is “not whether testimony did in fact influence pertinent determination, but whether it had a reasonable and natural tendency to do so.” Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102 (Mass. 1966).

In the instant case, Mr. Malm not only committed perjury during discovery in prior, related proceedings, but when confronted about his prior fabrications, Mr. Malm proffered false testimony before this court.

Specifically, he denied committing perjury, stating:

“He says I lied about some meeting with his dead mother. It’s in some little response that a lawyer representing me and Grace Church down there had given…. No, I didn’t even know his mother’s name.”

Exhibit A.

But the original perjurious statement, included as Exhibit B, comprises Defendant Malm’s sworn, written responses to interrogatories. The defendant prepared the responses, personally swore as to their truthfulness, and notarized his sworn statement, using a church member, Jane Rosman, as notary.

Ibid. As such, Defendant’s fabrications were not the responsibility of his attorney, contrary to his false testimony before this court.

Moreover, Defendant Malm’s perjury was not just material; it was central to his claims, for it spoke to his reasons for claiming that Plaintiff’s late mother’s blog, which Defendant Malm falsely claimed was threatening, actually was written by Plaintiff.

Further, the perjury in question concerns not “some meeting,” as Defendant told this court. Instead, Defendant fabricated an alleged series of requests for meetings between Defendant and Plaintiff’s late mother. No such request ever was made, and multiple attempts to obtain documentation of Malm’s claims have been met with evasion and equivocation. Indeed, defense counsel in the present matter has been invited in writing to supply documentation of this claim, to no avail. And while the Defendant asserts that he “didn’t even know his mother’s name,” the perjurious statement in question expressly references her by name, Sigrid Yahner.1

Tellingly, in recent Virginia litigation, Defendant Malm tried to hedge his bets, saying “I don’t recall ever speaking to her,” — thus leaving open the possibility that they communicated by email, or some other method not covered in his response.

1 Of course, if Defendant has any evidence in support of his claim that he was contacted by Sigrid Yahner, Plaintiff’s

mother, even once for an appointment, or the names of any corroborating witnesses, Plaintiff would welcome such evidence and would be willing to amend his pleadings appropriately.

Plaintiff avers that Defendant Malm’s perjury was highly material, for had he admitted to the truth of the matter, which is that he has perpetrated a fraud upon this court, and upon the courts of Virginia, by repeatedly lied under oath, his case likely would have been dismissed out of hand and could have resulted in a finding of contempt:

Perjury of a witness in testifying before a court is not infrequently taken into account in that very proceeding. In cases where, in addition "to the essential elements of perjury under the general law the further element of obstruction to the court in the performance of its duty" is found to exist, the witness adjudged guilty of such conduct may be committed for contempt. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383, where United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. Rep. 495, is cited with approval. As before pointed out, the incidental finding that a witness has committed perjury is not infrequently the basis of the verdict of a jury. Matter of Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6, 17 (Mass.

1925).

It should also be noted that there is a pending criminal investigation by the Marion police department into Defendant Malm’s perjury. This criminal investigation is on hold pending the results of the appeal in the original case.

Plaintiff also notes the obligation of defense counsel pursuant to Rule 3.3 not to aid and abet Defendant’s perjury, to be candid with the court in cases where his client has engaged in illegal conduct before this court, and not to offer into evidence he reasonably knows to be false.

Thus, while all agree that abuse of process is an unusual remedy, it is a viable tort in Massachusetts.

Details of Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim follow, but for now, suffice it to say that Plaintiff avers that it is an appropriate remedy when, as here, Defendant has committed a fraud upon the court, and by extension on the Plaintiff.

As such, it is axiomatic that Defendant’s perjury, contempt of court, and other misconduct enjoys no First Amendment protection, and thus is entirely outside the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Defendant Evinces an Ongoing Pattern of Questionable Veracity/Abuse of Process

Similarly, Defendant Malm’s prior testimony before this court sets forth myriad examples of questionable veracity. For example, at one point Defendant asserted that Plaintiff had posted photos of Defendant’s wife on porn websites. As someone who does not visit porn websites, Plaintiff categorically denies this allegation, and demands strict proof of this claim, including the names of the porn websites on which Defendant purports to have found his wife’s image.

Similarly, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has used vulgar language vis-à-vis Defendant’s wife. Given that Plaintiff finds the word cited by Defendant profoundly offensive, and does not permit others to use the word in his presence, Plaintiff demands strict proof, both as to to Defendant’s assertion itself, and as to evidence that these alleged statements were made by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff further notes that many of Defendant’s claims appear to be associated with content on Fairfax Underground, an unmoderated bulletin board famous for freewheeling conversation, trolling, and often objectionable content. Moreover, the site receives more a million visits a month per The Washington Post. Thus, attributing content from this forum to Plaintiff without evidence of authorship is both

illogical and objectionable, and it must be noted that so-called Internet trolls often post, claiming to be other persons.

Moreover, if one contends that Plaintiff is the only person likely to post content about Defendant and his family, then it logically follows that content threatening to Plaintiff is attributable to Defendant.

Given that express threats to kill Plaintiff have been made, such a conclusion would likely give rise to criminal liability on the part of the Defendant. Exhibit C.

Defendant Has Engaged in Spoliation of Evidence and Other Indicia of Actual Malice

While of course not actionable in this action, Defendant’s litigation in other fora evinces actual malice and myriad forms of unethical conduct, ranging from spoliation of evidence adverse to Defendant to witness tampering and intimidation. This extends to 15 emails, squarely within the ambit of discovery but uncovered in subsequent ligation, including one that falsely accuses Plaintiff of embezzlement, while brazenly lying to Episcopal Bishop Shannon Johnston, Defendant’s ecclesiastical supervisor, about the timing of Plaintiff’s membership at Grace Episcopal Church in Alexandria VA. Exhibit D.2

In another document, also not provided in the original litigation but squarely within the ambit of discovery, Defendant Malm expressly stated he had not been threatened, even as he was telling the Pennsylvania courts that he considered Plaintiff’s blogging a form of “domestic terrorism.” Exhibit E.

Apropos witness tampering and intimidation, Defendant and his wife have repeatedly contacted one of Plaintiff’s key witnesses, Darlene Parsons, urging her not to support Plaintiff. This has occurred even after multiple requests in writing that this stop, including to Wayne Cyron, Esq., Defendant’s attorney in Virginia. Most recently, Defendant called Ms. Parsons on or about December 20, 2020. A copy of one effort via email to dissuade Ms. Parsons from testifying is attached as Exhibit F. Defendant is also known to have engaged in witness tampering with Dr. Bob Perry, a clergyperson who will be a witness for Plaintiff, and the Rev. Richard Wall, another witness for the Plaintiff.

Similarly, Mr. Malm has contacted Plaintiff on multiple occasions, even after been told in writing not to do so. In one case, reported to the Alexandria VA police, Defendant drove up to Plaintiff in a blue Ford Explorer, sized up the situation carefully, emerged from the vehicle, and began screaming threats at the Plaintiff, sending bystanders scrambling for the safety of their homes. A photo of Defendant’s vehicle is attached as Exhibit G.

As to Defendant’s pleadings in the instant case, Plaintiff believes and avers that his claims about the Plaintiff’s blog are inaccurate and potentially perjurious and demands strict proof, including the names of parishioners Defendant references in his pleadings. Plaintiff also notes that Defendant evinces a curiously spotty recollection, repeatedly claiming that he cannot recall the names of witnesses who can support his claims, all while being able, for example, to remember the exact dates of his 2015 vacation.

2 Contrary to the Defendant’s statement, Plaintiff’s issues with Ms. Gable occurred while both were members of

the the Virginia church at which Defendant was previously employed. Nor is this an innocent misrepresentation, for Defendant spoke with Ms. Gable, Elizabeth Legere, and others about the situation. Thus, this is a flagrant lie, which likely accounts for Defendant’s failure to produce the document during litigation. Tellingly, in Virginia litigation, Defendant asserts he cannot remember the names of parishioners who believe Plaintiff “hacked into our systems,” even as he recalls the exact dates of his 2015 summer vacation.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s blog referencing St. Gabriel’s, which discusses the ethical and reputational issues inherent in hiring a priest, the Defendant, who commits perjury, contains an express disclaimer that it is not, in any way, associated with the church.

Nor is the content such that any rational actor would conclude that it is a church publication. Moreover, Plaintiff has received no indication in any form, from any party, that the website was ever taken down, or that it would be taken down. The only time it was briefly offline is when Plaintiff transitioned the site to a Wordpress-based platform. Indeed, Plaintiff’s blog remains online and continues to condemn before the court of public opinion the Defendant’s abusive conduct and myriad fabrications/perjuries.

And the ability to communicate with the public about Defendant’s misconduct is the very sort of activity that the First Amendment protects., even if profoundly unpopular. Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232 (Mass. 2013).

Plaintiff also notes that Defendant’s failure to sue for defamation is telling. Given Defendant’s hostility to the Plaintiff, it is fair to assume that Defendant will and would pursue any potential means to obtain a litigation-related advantage. Indeed, during prior litigation before this court, Plaintiff invited Defendant to file suit if the latter does not agree he has committed perjury. Not surprisingly, Defendant has brought no such claim, and undoubtedly has been told by legal counsel that any such effort would simply strengthen Plaintiff’s hand.

Defendant’s Comments, Even to the Police, Are Fabrications and Thus Not a Form of Protected Petition

In his pleadings, defense counsel invokes Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP statute and its protection of First Amendment freedoms. Leaving aside the irony of the assertion, as Defendant’s efforts to obtain an HPO are a facially obvious attempt to infringe Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, any analysis of this claim must begin with Defendant’s voluntary reports to local law enforcement.

In such cases, the Massachusetts courts draw a distinction between the absolute privilege afforded statements made in the course of an ongoing police investigation, and the qualified immunity granted voluntary reports made to police. Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 318 (1991). This qualified privilege can be lost when a party abuses it, as by actively and improperly seeking criminal charges. Conway v.

Smerling, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)

In the instant case, Marion police officers have stated that Defendant Malm has told them that Plaintiff has “threatened,” “harassed,” and “stalked” him and his family. This is neither true nor possible, for the parties have had no contact whatsoever, except in court, since Defendant drove up to the Plaintiff and began screaming threats at him over a year ago.

Moreover, Defendant’s fabrications are not protected by the First Amendment, for they were voluntary reports made on the Defendant’s own initiative. Indeed, it is well settled that First Amendment protections do not extend to perjury. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535 (Mass. 2003). Nor is a tort of defamation inconsistent with the right of petition. Nicholson v. Woolf, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017)

Further, to the extent that Defendant’s slanderous statements might otherwise be conditionally privileged, any such privilege is lost upon a showing of actual malice or express malice. Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., Petitioner, 342 Mass. 515 (Mass. 1961) In this regard, Defendant’s false police

reports, his allegations of criminal conduct by the Plaintiff as set forth in the video on the St. Gabriel’s parish website, his perjury in proceedings before this court, his myriad instances of litigation-related misconduct; and his ad hominem attacks on the Plaintiff, including false allegations of mental illness, evince the “spiteful, malignant purpose” required under Massachusetts law for actual malice. Boothby v.

Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468 (Mass. 1993)3 . Thus, Defendant’s effort to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute fails due to his actual malice.

Moreover, Defendant’s invocation of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute fails to comport with the first prong of the Duracraft burden-shifting analysis. Under this first prong, the Defendant invoking the anti-SLAPP statute must show that his/her actions are “solely based on [the moving party's] own petitioning activities." Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 159, 75 N.E.3d 21. (Emphasis added) Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., 483 Mass. 200, 203 (Mass. 2019). But perjury is not a protected form of petitioning. Nor are untruthful libelous/statements published on the church website. And by the Defendant’s own admission, set forth in his pleadings, his fabrications impinged on Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, for they caused another person at St. Gabriel’s to call the police over conduct exclusively within the purview of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of petition. Indeed, no rational actor would call the police over the presence of a peaceful protestor on public property absent Defendant’s malice-based web of fabrications.

Further, Defense counsel attempts to sidestep the “solely based” language of the Duracraft test by trying to minimize Defendant’s defamatory statements on the St. Gabriel’s website. But no amount of minimization overcomes the fact that Defendant’s statements on the church website lack any basis in fact, and have been seen by Plaintiff’s peers in Virginia and elsewhere. Indeed, Plaintiff’s friend Heather Hardy, a resident of Alexandria VA, first alerted Plaintiff to Defendant’s slander/defamation as set forth on the church website, and is prepared to so testify at trial. And Ms. Hardy immediately recognized that Defendant’s statements were directed at Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also notes that he has suffered actual damages due to Defendant Malm’s perjury and fabricated police reports, including extensive legal fees. This is in addition to the reputational damage caused by Defendant.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s legal objections to Defendant’s conduct extend far beyond any protected petitioning activity, and extend to Defendant’s contempt of court and perjury. And while Plaintiff full recognizes the high standard of proof when it comes to allegations of fraud, he avers that the current situation comports with the touchstone enunciated by the Massachusetts courts:

A ‘fraud on the court ’ occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Mt. Ivy Press, L.P. v. Defonseca, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 349 (2010), quoting Rockdale Mgt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank,

3 Defendant’s intimations of mental illness are also objectionable on the basis that they attempt to trade on

outdated stereotypes and stigma associating mental illness with a propensity for violence. Virtually all competent authorities reject this notion, and it is profoundly offensive to Plaintiff and others who have loved ones who struggle with mental illness. Trading on such stereotypes is particularly offensive when, as here, it comes from a clergy person occupying a position of trust in the community.

N.A., 418 Mass. 596, 598 (1994). Cited in Saninocencio v. Pierce & Mandell, PC, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020)

Defendant’s Defamation

In his pleadings, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a claim of defamation.

While Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and without assistance of counsel, he believes the case at hand is akin to the holding in Patriot Grp. v. Edmands, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 478 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019), which stated:

Even applying the heightened pleading requirements of rule 9 (b), it was sufficient for Patriot to plead "generally" that Edmands had acted with malice and knowledge that Fustolo was using Edmands's false statements in the May 9 letter to defame Patriot. Mass. R. Civ. P. 9 (b) ("Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally").

Moreover, even if Plaintiff fails to demonstrate actual malice, it is the well-settled that “An imputation of crime is defamatory per se” Jones v. Taibbi, 400 Mass. 786, 792 (Mass. 1987). See also Bander v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 341 (Mass. 1943) (“Charges of crime are slanderous and actionable per se without proof of special damage. Friedman v. Connors, 292 Mass. 371, 373, 374.”)

For these reasons, Defendant’s objections to the instant suit should be denied.

Plaintiff Demonstrates all Three Prongs of the Tort of Abuse of Process

In order to make a valid claim for abuse of process, Massachusetts requires three showings, per Jones v.

Brockton Public Markets, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 389 (Mass. 1975):

In Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 426 (1963), we stated: "To constitute a cause of action for abuse of process `it must appear that the process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.' Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 236 [1949], and cases cited." Furthermore, "[d]amage is an essential element of the tort." Id. at 427. Ledgehill Homes, Inc. v. Chaitman, 348 Mass. 777 (1964). Thus, to avoid dismissal under Rule 12 (b) (6), a plaintiff must allege facts which are sufficient to support the propositions that: (1) "process" was used; (2) for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose; (3) resulting in damage.

In the instant case, Defendant has attempted to use the HPO system to infringe Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and to damage Plaintiff’s reputation. In this regard, Defendant does not deny that there has been a use of process. Thus, the first showing for a claim of abuse of process has been met.

As to the ulterior or improper purpose, the Defendant’s perjury, in which he made facially untrue statements under oath to this court, speaks to his motive and ulterior purpose. Simply put, persons who have actually been threatened or harassed should be prepared to make their case without resort to perjury. Nor can they:

1. Make false allegations of stalking and other criminal activity to the police with impunity.

2. Engage in spoliation of evidence, as Defendant has done in prior litigation.

3. Refuse to respond to interrogatories (tellingly, in one instance, Defendant refused to explain the fabrications set forth in his previously concealed email to Bishop Shannon Johnston on the basis that only his attorney had a copy. (Exhibit H) 4. Offer to drop the matter in exchange for a non-disclosure, anti-disparagement agreement (Exhibit I).

5. Expressly tell family members via email he has not been threatened, even as he tells courts the exact opposite, then conceal the document during discovery (Exhibit E, previously noted).

And when, as here, Defendant chooses to engage in such behaviors, he demonstrates his improper purpose, which is to use the protective order system as a SLAPP, to intimidate Plaintiff, to cause him mental distress, and to try to discredit the Plaintiff. Thus, the second prong of the Jones test is met.

As to damages, the third requirement for a showing of abuse of process, Defendant’s perjury and myriad fabrications have cost Plaintiff more than $35,000 in legal fees in this and other jurisdictions, reputational damage, and more. Thus, the third prong of the Jones test is met.

It should also be noted that Plaintiff’s suit was filed only after multiple requests to St. Gabriel’s parish and the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts to take down the offending video. In every instance, the parish and the diocese have refused to address Defendant’s conduct. Indeed, while this court cannot consistent with the First Amendment inquire into matters of internal church decision-making, Plaintiff notes that the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia, in which Defendant is canonically resident, has refused to address or investigate Defendant’s multiple perjurious statements on the disingenuous grounds that no criminal charges have been issued. Thus, Plaintiff has gone to court only after exhausting every other possible means to deal with Defendant’s conduct through less extreme measures.

Defendant Fails to Make Any Showing that He Did Not Commit Perjury Before This Court

One of the most telling things about Defendant’s pleadings is what they do not say. Specifically, they make no effort to disprove Defendant’s perjury. Instead, they resort to circular reasoning, claiming that this court’s issuance of a harassment protection order somehow validates Defendant’s conduct.

But the whole crux of this lawsuit is based on Defendant’s perjury, his false police reports, and his tortious fabrications that Plaintiff has engaged in criminal activity, made both independently and in conjunction with the prior proceeding before this court.

Moreover, Plaintiff avers that both evidence now available and discovery will make clear that Defendant acted with actual malice. Thus, the prior decision of this court should be understood not as evidence adverse to Plaintiff’s claim, but in part as the basis for Plaintiff’s claim.

Defendant’s Conduct May Constitute Criminal Contempt

Plaintiff further notes that, in addition to perjury, Defendant may have engaged in criminal contempt per Miaskiewicz v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass. 153, 157-58 (Mass. 1980):

A person who lies under oath may be guilty of criminal contempt without meeting the technical requirements of perjury . "The crime of perjury in a judicial proceeding occurs whenever one `willfully swears or affirms falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question.' G.L.c.

268, § 1." Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63 (1970). On the other hand, perjury

alone does not constitute criminal contempt; there must be the further element of obstruction of the court in the performance of its duty. Blankenburg v. Commonwealth,272 Mass. 25, 31-34 (1930), cert. denied 283 U.S. 819 (1931). See Katz v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 305, 316 (1979); cf. Fay v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 498, 502 (1980). The petitioner argues that no such additional element was shown here. But, as the court pointed out, much more than mere perjury of a witness was shown. The petitioner, as plaintiff, initiated a civil action supported by a "tissue of fabrications." (emphasis added).

Thus, while Plaintiff recognizes that perjury is a serious claim, not to be made lightly, it is part of a larger pattern of conduct by the Defendant that includes defamation, contempt of court, abuse of process, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other conduct that shocks the conscience and constitutes a “tissue of fabrications.” Or to use the words of one diocesan official about the Defendant’s lies, “Bob’s like a fish, caught in a net as a result of his lies, and flopping to get loose.”

For these reasons, Defendant’s objections should be dismissed in their entirety, and Defendant’s fabrications either forwarded to law enforcement for investigation and criminal prosecution, or made the subject of contempt charges before this court.

A copy of Plaintiff’s affidavit in this matter is attached. Various statements against interest by the Defendant are included in Appendix J.

Respectfully Submitted,

Eric Bonetti Pro Se Plaintiff 4129 Fountainside Lane #203 Fairfax VA 22030 703-973-4984 Eric.bonetti@protonmail.com

Exhibit A

Exhibit B

Exhibit C

Exhibit D

Exhibit E

Exhibit F

Exhibit G (Defendant’s foot can been seen on the driver’s side of the vehicle as he returns to vehicle after threatening Plaintiff)

Exhibit H

Exhibit I

Exhibit J

Affidavit

Plaintiff’s Affidavit

Plaintiff makes the following statements under oath, subject to penalty of perjury.

1. Defendant’s statements, both publicly and to the police, that Plaintiff has harassed, threatened and stalked Defendant are false.

2. No one connected with Plaintiff has harassed, threatened or stalked Defendant, or any person connected with him.

3. Defendant has repeatedly lied to police, church officials, church members and the courts about Plaintiff and his conduct.

4. Plaintiff has not impersonated the St. Gabriel’s website, and his blog has at all times included an express disclaimer that his blog is neither an official church publication, nor affiliated with the church.

5. Plaintiff has no evidence, anywhere, in any context, to suggest that his blog was ever taken offline by any other person or entity, or that such action was ever planned or intended.

6. Plaintiff has not, at any point in time, posted any images of Defendant’s wife on any porn websites, contrary to Defendant’s claims before this court.

7. Defendant testified falsely before this court when he denied committing perjury in prior related litigation.

8. Defendant and his wife have repeatedly contacted Plaintiff’s witnesses and attempted to influence them on at least 5 occasions, most recently on or about December 20, 2020.

9. In one instance, Defendant’s wife Leslie told a witness that I had admitted in open court to threatening Defendant. When asked for evidence to support this claim, Ms. Malm fell silent.

10. Defendant has contacted Plaintiff on multiple occasions after being provided actual notice via email that Plaintiff wanted no further contact from Defendant.

11. On one occasion after receiving actual notice that he should have no further contact, Defendant drove up to Plaintiff and began making terroristic threats, including to have Plaintiff “dragged away.”

12. Defendant later attempted to portray this as “telling him that he was closer than 1,000 feet to the church.” That is both a fabrication and inconsistent with his claim that he feared for his safety.

13. In related litigation, Defendant failed to provide to Plaintiff various statements in writing that were squarely within the ambit of discovery. Two of the documents concealed during discovery were statements against interest, with one expressly stating that Defendant had not been threatened.

14. In related litigation, Defendant refused to specify how he has been threatened, or to identify threatening language.

15. On multiple occasions, Defendant has attempted to get the courts and law enforcement officials to impose a prior restraint on Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to publicly criticize Defendant’s perjury and other misconduct.

16. There is a pending criminal investigation into Defendant’s perjury before this court.

Signed and sworn before me, this ____ of August, 2021:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

Comes now Plaintiff Eric Bonetti in the above-captioned matter, and respectfully moves that Defendant’s objections to his complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff further moves that Defendant’s perjury in his prior testimony before this court be referred for criminal prosecution, criminal or civil contempt, or such other consequences as this court may, in its discretion, determine to be appropriate.

Plaintiff asks for all such other relief as the court may determine appropriate, including award of attorney’s fees.

Respectfully submitted,

Eric J. Bonetti