Bill of Particulars — Lawsuit Against Perjuring Priest Bob Malm by AnglicanWatch

Background 1. Grace Episcopal Church is part of the Episcopal diocese of Virginia. At all relevant times, the church was a hierarchical organization, holding a property interest in all realty and personalty held by constituent parishes. Further, per church canons, the diocese and Defendant Susan Goff, presently bishop of the diocese, have the obligation to address clergy misconduct. 2. At all relevant times, Robert H. Malm (hereinafter “Mr. Malm”) not presently named as a defendant in this action, was rector of Grace Episcopal Church in Alexandria. As such, he was fully subject to the authority of the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia and Bishop Susan Goff. 3. On or about December 2017, Mr. Malm filed a request for a protective order with this court, which was granted. First Cause of Action – Abuse of Process 1. In filing his request for a protective order, Mr. Malm made clear he acted as agent of Grace Episcopal Church and by extension, the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia. Specifically: a. In filling our his application, Mr. Malm styled himself, “Fr. Robert Malm,” a convention he never otherwise uses. b. A review of minutes from the parish vestry (board of directors) reveals that Mr. Malm twice briefed vestry members on the status of his case and included details in vestry minutes (Exhibits A and B). Plaintiff believes and avers that the vestry has not at any point repudiated Mr. Malm’s actions; thus, plaintiff respectfully submits that the church is estopped from denying that Mr. Malm acted as the church’s agent in this matter. c. In a letter to Dee Parsons, publisher of The Wartburg Watch (an online publication about abusive churches and clergy who has written about this situation) dated February 7, 2018, he cites the protective order as a “disciplinary measure our [church] leadership” has decided to take, tellingly omitting any reference to his claims he had been threatened. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit C. This further reinforces the conclusion that Mr. Malm acted with the full support of the church’s elected officers. d. Prior to filing his request for a protective order, Mr. Malm repeatedly contacted Diocesan officials, including Canon Pat Wingo (assistant to the bishop) and former Bishop Shannon Johnston for advice. In response, Diocesan officials provided Mr. Malm with access to Diocesan litigation counsel and other resources, including a letter from Bishop Shannon Johnston endorsing Mr. Malm’s actions. Thus, plaintiff respectfully submits that the Diocese is estopped from denying that he acted with the full knowledge and support of Diocesan officials. e. Mr. Malm held himself forward as Episcopal clergy throughout the case, including appearing in court in clerical garb. f. Mr. Malm sought a no-contact order for all members of Grace Episcopal Church in his petition for a protective order, versus just him and his family. This request was not granted. 2. In pursuing his claim for a protective order, Mr. Malm met both criteria for abuse of process, including: a. An ulterior purpose, and b. An act in use of process not proper in regular prosecution of proceedings. See Ely v. Whitlock, 238 Va. 670, 385 S.E.2d 893 (1989). 3. Apropos his ulterior purpose, Mr. Malm repeatedly demonstrated that his true intent and ulterior purpose in filing for a protective order was a desire to shut down online and other Bonetti v. Grace Episcopal, et al. Bill of Particulars

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criticism of his conduct as a member of the Episcopal clergy. In other words, he wished to use the instant protective order as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). a. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that he had had no contact, direct or otherwise, with plaintiff in more than seven months. Indeed, the only contact during that time occurred when plaintiff informed Mr. Malm in December 2017 that the latter was to have no contact with him following Mr. Malm’s filing of a false police report against plaintiff. (Exhibit D) b. In court Mr. Malm admitted that he had received no phone calls from the plaintiff since 2014. c. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that he had not seen plaintiff in any public space at any time relevant to the proceedings. d. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that the police had not charged plaintiff with any criminal act, including making terroristic threats. e. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that at no point had plaintiff made a threat against him or the church. f. In correspondence with the Alexandria police department both prior and subsequent to the granting of the protective order, Mr. Malm asked if there was some way to get a magistrate or judge to impose a prior restraint on plaintiff’s speech critical of Mr. Malm and the church. Plaintiff submits this illustrates Mr. Malm’s true motives (Exhibit E). g. Through his attorney, Mr. Malm repeatedly urged the Alexandria Circuit Court on appeal to implement a prior restraint on plaintiff’s speech that referenced Mr. Malm. h. Mr. Malm’s attorney repeatedly approached counsel for plaintiff in the present case, demanding that plaintiff quit writing about Malm and the church. Indeed, Mr. Malm’s counsel attempted to insist on this in order to “agree” to plaintiff’s withdrawal of his appeal to the circuit court. i. On his own initiative, shortly before instant plaintiff withdrew his appeal to the Alexandria Circuit Court, Mr. Malm offered a multi-page settlement proposal (Exhibit F) that offered to immediately drop the protective order if plaintiff would stop blogging about misconduct at Grace Church and withdraw previous written pieces on this topic. Plaintiff believes and avers that offering a settlement proposal in this manner is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he has been threatened. j. Throughout the previous litigation, Mr. Malm made multiple statements against interest, including sending an email message to Episcopal bishop Shannon Johnston in which he stated, “Than (sic) you Bishop…the hardest part is dealing with my wife and one of my daughters…they give this so much more attention than this deserves.” Plaintiff believes and avers that such statements are inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he has been threatened. k. On or about May 14, 2019, Mr. Malm approached plaintiff on Russell Road (Photo attached as Exhibit G). In doing so, he drove up slowly, carefully sized up the situation, then clambered out of his SUV, screaming threats against plaintiff. Nearby neighbors were visibly frightened, running inside their homes and locking the doors. Plaintiff called the police and filed a police report, after refusing to engage Mr. Malm in any manner whatsoever and locking himself in his vehicle for safety. Plaintiff believes and avers that such behavior is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he fears for his physical safety. l. Mr. Malm’s wife Leslie repeatedly attempted to contact plaintiff via social media following issuance of the protective order. Plaintiff believes and avers that such behavior is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he fears for his physical safety and that of his immediate family. Bonetti v. Grace Episcopal, et al. Bill of Particulars

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4. Mr. Malm repeatedly engaged in acts not proper in the regular prosecution of proceedings: a. Mr. Malm repeatedly and deliberately took words out of context in his petition for a protective order, thus knowingly committing a fraud against this court. For example: i. His reference to “psychological torture” referred to a scholarly publication, written by a licensed psychologist, and describing the psychological effects of shunning in houses of worship. No rational actor would construe this language to be a threat. (Exhibit H) ii. His reference to the “Killer B’s refers to the name of a classic rock band, “The Killer B’s,” based in Richmond VA and popular with women the age of plaintiff’s mother. As a result, she used the moniker on her blog on a regular basis, while enjoying the simultaneous reference to the Pittsburg Pirates baseball team, which also uses the phrase. No rational actor would construe this language to be a threat. iii. His reference to a “major terrorist incident” refers to a facially satirical post, in which the author refers to the mayhem that occurs when she brings her children to church. No rational actor would construe this language to be a threat. b. On appeal to the Alexandria Circuit Court, Mr. Malm committed perjury during discovery in writing, under oath, while advised by church legal counsel. Specifically, he cited as his reason for his assertion that plaintiff’s mother’s blog really belonged to the plaintiff the fact that “time after time….Sigrid Yahner (or someone claiming to be her) makes appointments (with him) that are cancelled. At no point in time did Ms. Yahner or anyone purporting to be her make such appointments, and via subpoena the church has been invited to supply evidence to the contrary in the present case. Moreover, such evidence, if it exists, should be readily available, as plaintiff has asked both Diocesan and church officials to retain all potentially relevant data, including phone logs, emails, and calendars, and journals (Exhibit I). c. On appeal, Mr. Malm attempted to issue a UIDDA deposition in violation of Pennsylvania law against plaintiff’s mother, since prior leave of court was not obtained as required by Pa R.C.P §1305. Indeed, even after being informed by her counsel that such a move violated state law and being provided the relevant legal citation, through his attorney Mr. Malm persisted in his efforts to obtain an ultra vires subpoena, haranguing the Venango County Courts with claims that he had been denied due process. d. Mr. Malm attempted to subpoena plaintiff’s mother, Sigrid Yahner, despite the fact that he knew she was terminally ill and unable to comply in any manner. Yet when local courts quashed the subpoena, Mr. Malm lied, telling the court that he was unaware that Ms. Yahner was late-stage terminally ill. Yet having by his own admission read Ms. Yahner’s blog, Mr. Malm could not have been unaware of these facts. e. Throughout his pleadings on appeal, Mr. Malm engaged in multiple fabrications, including telling the court that the plaintiff had never been licensed to practice law, and had never served as a police officer. f. On appeal, Mr. Malm engaged in a variety of other unethical conduct, including resorting to inflammatory, oppressive language and rhetoric, and refusing to comply with the Alexandria Circuit Court’s order to compel, which directed Malm to specify which statements he claimed were threatening. Plaintiff believes and avers such conduct is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he fears for his personal safety. Indeed, if Mr. Malm genuinely feared for his safety, any such evidence would Bonetti v. Grace Episcopal, et al. Bill of Particulars

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presumably have featured prominently in his pleadings, without any need to seek a court order to obtain this evidence. g. Mr. Malm also engaged in witness tampering, repeatedly contacting Dee Parsons, whom he knew was planning to testify on plaintiff’s behalf, and urging her to withdraw her testimony. A copy of her affidavit, which she intended to offer into evidence (Exhibit J), as well as one of Mr. Malm’s emails to Ms. Parsons, is attached (Exhibit K). To plaintiff’s knowledge, in every case Canon Pat Wingo or other diocesan official was copied, as well as the parish’s attorney. Thus, both the parish and the Diocese were fully involved in Malm’s efforts. h. Mr. Malm also attempted to interfere with plaintiff’s contract of employment with First Christian Church of Falls Church, emailing the pastor to inform him that I am a “domestic terrorist.” Such actions, occurring while a case was still in litigation, are highly unethical. i. Evidence suggests that Mr. Malm engaged in multiple smear campaigns directed at plaintiff, including falsely claiming that plaintiff misused church fund, and falsely claiming that plaintiff is mentally ill. Yet in no case did Mr. Malm raise such concerns directly with the plaintiff. Second Cause of Action — Negligence/Respondeat Superior 1. As a hierarchical church, the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia has an obligation to address clergy misconduct. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (1993), A.H. v. Church of God in Christ, 831 S.E.2d 460 (2019). Such a view is supported by church canon I.17.8, which states that those who serve the church do so in a fiduciary capacity, as well as church disciplinary canons, which expressly require bishops to discipline clergy who violate church policies. 2. Despite these factors, Bishop Susan Goff and the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia have repeatedly refused to address Mr. Malm’s perjury in the instant matter. Indeed, in a written notice sent to the plaintiff, the Diocese proffered the astonishing notion that it would only address clergy misconduct if criminal charges were brought. Such an approach is, at a minimum, grossly negligent. (Exhibit L) 3. Having refused to address Mr. Malm’s perjury via internal church processes, neither Bishop Goff nor the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia can now, in good conscience, avail themselves of the notion that judicial review of this matter is precluded by church canons. Moreover, having resorted to the secular courts in the first place in an effort to impose what Mr. Malm asserts is “church discipline,” the church cannot now avail itself of the notion that the actions of its agents, officers, and employees in those same courts are immune from judicial scrutiny. 4. By subpoena, plaintiff has invited the Diocese and Bishop Goff to provide any evidence that may suggest they have addressed Mr. Malm’s perjury via informal or other actions, perhaps not obvious to plaintiff. To date, no such information has been provided. 5. Based on the diocese’s multiple refusals to address Mr. Malm’s perjury and abuse of process, plaintiff therefore believes both the parish and the Diocese are legally liable under the doctrine of respondent superior. Third Cause of Action — Civil Conspiracy 1. In the event that this court does not not find the Diocese and Bishop Goff are liable as part of a hierarchical organization, then plaintiff respectfully submits that defendants are liable as a matter of civil conspiracy.