PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

This is a pro se appeal of the dismissal of a federal civil rights case, docket No. 1:21cv0190 (CMHJFA), by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In summary, this is a case in which the lower courts have repeatedly refused to provide due process and the equal protection of the laws, and turned a blind eye myriad efforts on the part of the Defendants, acting in concert, to infringe Appellant’s First Amendment rights. Background In 2018, Robert Hiller Malm, an Episcopal priest then serving as rector of Grace Episcopal Church filed for a protective order against Plaintiff with the courts of the city of Alexandria VA. He did so based on allegations that: 1. Plaintiff had protested outside his church. 2. Plaintiff had repeatedly blogged about him. 3. There had been shootings at churches elsewhere in the country, including a fictional event at a church in the imaginary locality of “Sugarland Texas.” 4. Plaintiff had not “followed the guidance of the bishop.” 5. A blog published by Plaintiff’s late mother, Sigrid Yahner, was threatening, due to her use of the collective pseudonym, “The Killer B’s,” in honor of her favorite classic rock band, the Richmond Virginia-based “Killer Bees,” and a group of Pittsburgh baseball players, known as “The Killer B’s.” (When previously married, Yahner’s last name began with a “B,” as was the case with several friends.) In open court, Malm stated under oath: 1. He had not been threatened by Plaintiff. 2. He had not had contact with Plaintiff in more than a year. 3. That he had not seen Plaintiff in any public or private location in the past year. 4. That the City of Alexandria police department had not pursued any form of criminal charges against the appellant. It should also be noted that Malm made various representations to the Alexandria police and to the courts that Appellant was “dysunctional” and mentally ill in an effort to support his claims, even as he included imaginary requests for meetings with Appellant’s mother in his pleadings, references to imaginary locations and church shootings in the United States, and inflammatory claims of “domestic terrorism.” Those claims ignored the fact that, as a former police officer, Appellant is fully polygraphed, successfully passed a comprehensive background check and

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psychiatric evaluation, and has a flawless record, including no moving violations. Moreover, the relevant background check did not go back ten years, as is the case with federal government security clearances, but covered Appellant’s entire lifetime. Tellingly, in correspondence with Darlene Parsons, publisher of church abuse blog The Wartburg Watch, Malm refers to the protective order as among “disciplinary measures our leadership has decided to take with the advice of the APD.” Appellant avers that the courts and the protective order process cannot in conformity with the US Constitution be used as “disciplinary measures” for current or former church members, with or without the advice of a local police department. Indeed, this issue well illustrates the risks inherent in the City of Alexandria’s decision to wade into a civil conflict, including the constitutionally impermissible entanglement of church and state that may arise. A copy of this correspondence is included in the appendix. It is also important to the disposition of the case to note that Malm’s decision to pursue a protective order was based on advice from the City of Alexandria police department to do so, which was proferred at a meeting held at Grace Episcopal Church between Malm and one or more city police officers. The matter immediately went up on appeal to the Alexandria Circuit Court. There, Malm repeatedly made false statements under oath during discovery, including that Yahner, or someone purporting to be her, contacted him repeatedly, that Plaintiff had never served as a police officer, and more. Malm and his attorney also deployed inflammatory rhetoric in their pleadings, describing the cases as one involving “domestic terrorism.” At one point in the litigation, the Alexandria Circuit Court ordered Malm to respond to various interrogatories, including stating specifically how he believed he had been threatened. Malm ignored the court’s order. At another point, Malm offered to settle the matter in exchange for an agreement by the Appellant for a non-disclosure agreement, and to not to publicly criticize his myriad forms of misconduct. This aligns with Malm’s repeated written statements that he had not been threatened, as well as myriad efforts on his part to obtain a prior restraint on Appellant’s First Amendment rights. Indeed, at one point Malm contacted the Alexandria police department by email, expressly asking if there was some way to impose a prior restraint on Appellant’s speech. Plaintiff was forced to withdraw his appeal due to an abrupt decline in the health of his mother, who was terminally ill with a respiratory disease. In addition, Malm’s litigation strategy had been to “paper” the Plaintiff, meaning he could no longer afford the more than $25,000 in legal fees that had accrued, with his attorney projecting an additional $65,000 to go to trial. In 2020, the Plaintiff brought suit in the Alexandria General District Court, asking that the court rescind the protective order and grant other relief. In the attached pleadings, Plaintiff showed that Malm had not been threatened; had lied repeatedly, including to the courts; had violently Appeal — Bonetti v. City of Alexandria et al

threatened him in public, and otherwise evinced conduct inconsistent with his claim that he had been threatened. Moreover, Malm’s implicit claim that the blog previously referenced was actually that of the Plaintiff came undone when Malm failed to produced evidence in support of his claim that Ms. Yahner, or other family members of the Plaintiff, or someone purporting to be them, had contacted him repeatedly, only to no-show. Malm had cited this as a key reason for his claim that the blog in question was actually that of the Plaintiff — despite the fact that Yahner had made written statements against interest that the blog was hers, and the fact that the blog was not in any way threatening. At trial, General District Court Judge Haddock stated that the Plaintiff had done a good job of pleading his case, but that he did not wish to overturn his previous decision. He proferred no rationale for his decision beyond this. Subsequently, in related litigation, various emails from Malm came to light in which he expressly states he does not believe he was threatened. These are attached behind a copy of the bill of particulars filed with the Alexandria General District Court. Tellingly, these emails, along with others adverse to Malm’s claims, were not provided during prior discovery, even though they were expressly within the ambit of the Appellant’s Requests for Production. Frustrated with the irrational, arbitrary and capricious nature of the original court ruling, the refusal of the Alexandria courts to reopen the matter, and the refusal of the City of Alexandria to even acknowledge, let alone investigate multiple instances of witness tampering, concealment of adverse evidence, and perjury by Malm, Appellant filed suit in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia. There, he attempted to allege, perhaps inartfully, an informal pattern and practice on the part of the City of Alexandria, in which: - City police officers engage in what is de facto the unauthorized practice of law in recommending litigation against appellant — litigation that is neither warranted by the plain language of the relevant statute, nor the facts of the case. - The City of Alexandria impermissibly chills First Amendment rights by repeatedly stopping Appellant, demanding identification, and questioning him while engaging in peaceful protest on public fora near Grace Episcopal Church. Indeed, in several instances police officers provided facially pretextual bases for their stops. For example, in one case a police officer falsely claimed that Appellant was obstructing an empty sidewalk. On two other cases, officers claimed that Appellant was stepping in front of moving vehicles, despite the fact that he never left the sidewalk (and would not be inclined to step in front of moving vehicles, in any event). In other instance, an officer claimed that Appellant was engaging in “suspicious activity,” simply by distributing written information about his conflict with the church. - City officials at all levels, including the Commonwealth’s attorney, police officials, the City Attorney’s office, and more turn a blind eye to allegations that Malm perpetrated a fraud on the courts, repeatedly committed perjury, repeatedly concealed adverse evidence, and repeatedly engaged in witness tampering. Indeed, when Malm approached Appellant on the street and began screaming threats at Appellant, city Appeal — Bonetti v. City of Alexandria et al

police officers told Appellant to “forget about it” — a far cry from the City’s recommendation, delivered via the police department, that Malm address speech he doesn’t like by filing a bogus request for a protective order. In short, the pattern and practice is one in which City officials place a finger on the scales of justice, consistently tipping them in favor of Malm, to the detriment of Appellant’s rights to due process, the equal protection of the laws, and his First Amendment rights, all the while ignoring criminal conduct on Malm’s part.

In its memorandum opinion, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Appellant’s case on the bases that: - Plaintiff had not articulated a pattern and practice sufficient to hold the City of Alexandria liable for violations of his constitutional rights. - The actions of Malm and the other defendants were solely private conduct. Plaintiff avers, however, that dismissal was improper on the basis that he has established a plausible case of ongoing collusion and conspiracy between Malm, Grace Episcopal Church, and the City of Alexandria to violate the Appellant’s civil rights. In other words, Appellant contends that the City cannot wade into a private dispute, favor one side over the other, and still comport with fundamental notions of due process and equal protection. Indeed, should the city decide to get involved in such a dispute, it must ensure it acts impartially. And there is ample evidence, including emails and other documentation, that the City of Alexandria has been involved in the matter on myriad levels, including the City Attorneys office, the police department, the Commonwealth attorney (which refuses to even acknowledge complaints about Malm’s obstruction of justice), and more. It also is important to note that, via an amended complaint, Appellant attempted to address his underlying concerns vis-à-vis the constitutionality of the arbitrary and capricious decision, unsupported by law or the facts of the case, of the Alexandria courts to issue a protective order. Yet the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case before the Office of Attorney General had entered an appearance or filed pleadings. Moreover, the Court’s dismissal left a motion for an injunction by the Appellant unconsidered and unresolved, while omitting any mention of at least one defendant. Thus, Appellant fears that the Court’s decision was premature and ill-conceived on multiple levels, in addition to being at variance with the law, constitutional requirements, and the facts of the case. Legal Arguments As a non-lawyer, Appellant refrains from citing specific statutory provisions or case law, as he simply does not have the expertise to adequately parse these issues. Instead, he reiterates his profound concerns about: - The arbitrary and capricious nature of the Alexandria courts’ decision, at variance with the express language of the Virginia statute and violative of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. Appeal — Bonetti v. City of Alexandria et al

The ongoing inappropriate conduct of the City of Alexandria, on multiple levels, including: o The unauthorized practice of law by city police officers. o The utter refusal of the city to investigate allegations of illegal activity by Malm and his family, including obstruction of justice and perjury. o The repeated efforts to chill Appellant’s First Amendment rights via a variety of means, ranging from a bogus protective order to pretextual stops and interrogations by the police department for doing nothing even arguably illegal. Appellant further believes that the City of Alexandria’s policy and practice of accepting at face value Malm’s myriad fabrications, while ignoring allegations of obstruction of justice and perjury on Malm’s part, and otherwise selectively enforcing the law in a manner that favors Malm and his employer is every bit as unconstitutional as would be the case if it acted in a similar manner based on race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, or other protected characteristic. While Appellant acknowledges that these categories get heightened constitutional scrutiny, failure to occupy one of these categories does not create a free-for-all, in which notions of due process and the equal protection of the laws are altogether abandoned. Appellant further avers that City of Alexandria police officers knew, or had reason to know, that their recommendation to pursue a protective order over a blog that was neither threatening nor published or authored by the Appellant was not in conformity with the law and was inconsistent with the express requirements of the relevant statute as set forth at § 19.2-152.10 et seq. Moreover, Appellant believes that discovery will confirm that the actions of the officers in question were not a case of officers “gone rogue,” but rather the result of consultations with the office of City Attorney and other city officials. Finally, vis-à-vis the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant has demonstrated no harm, he ardently disagrees. Violation of his rights to due process, the equal protection of the laws, chilling of his First Amendment rights, and imposition of a protective order with no basis in law or fact — which may prevent Appellant from returning to a career in law enforcement, one involving a security clearance, or other career choices for which he would otherwise be well-qualified — is indeed harm in every sense of the term.

Amending this Appeal In order to preserve his right to a timely appeal, Appellant is filing this document, aware that some issues may remain unresolved by the trial court. With that in mind, Appellant respectfully asks to be allowed to amend this appeal should it become necessary to do so. Relief Sought Appellant asks that the trial court’s dismissal of his case be reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration, and such other relief as the court may consider appropriate. Copies of this appeal are being sent via email and US mail to defense counsel per the following: Appeal — Bonetti v. City of Alexandria et al

Craig D. Roswell, Esquire (VSB No.: 33901) Matthew J. Youssef, Esquire (VSB No.: 85339) NILES, BARTON & WILMER, LLP 111 S. Calvert Street, Suite 1400 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (410) 783 –6357 (410) 783 –6452 cdroswell@nilesbarton.com mjyoussef@nilesbarton.com Counsel for Defendant, Grace Episcopal Church and Episcopal Diocese of Virginia Wayne F. Cyron, Esquire (VSB No. 12220) CYRON & MILLER LLP 100 N. Pitt St., Suite 200 Alexandria, VA 22314 703-299-0600 703-299-0603 (fax) wcyron@cyronmiller.com Counsel for Defendant, Robert H. Malm Alexandria City Attorney 301 King Street, Suite 1300 P. O. Box 178 Alexandria, Virginia 22313 George.mcandrews@alexandriava.gov Virginia Office of Attorney General Via email Respectfully submitted, Eric J. Bonetti Pro se plaintiff 4129 Fountainside Lane 203 Fairfax VA 22030 703-973-4984 Eric.bonetti@protonmail.com Under penalty of perjury, I swear and affirm the foregoing to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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Appendix— Bill of Particulars

Background 1. Grace Episcopal Church is part of the Episcopal diocese of Virginia. At all relevant times, the church was a hierarchical organization, holding a property interest in all realty and personalty held by constituent parishes. Further, per church canons, the diocese and Defendant Susan Goff, presently bishop of the diocese, have the obligation to address clergy misconduct. 2. At all relevant times, Robert H. Malm (hereinafter “Mr. Malm”) not presently named as a defendant in this action, was rector of Grace Episcopal Church in Alexandria. As such, he was fully subject to the authority of the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia and Bishop Susan Goff. 3. On or about December 2017, Mr. Malm filed a request for a protective order with this court, which was granted. First Cause of Action – Abuse of Process 1. In filing his request for a protective order, Mr. Malm made clear he acted as agent of Grace Episcopal Church and by extension, the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia. Specifically: a. In filling our his application, Mr. Malm styled himself, “Fr. Robert Malm,” a convention he never otherwise uses. b. A review of minutes from the parish vestry (board of directors) reveals that Mr. Malm twice briefed vestry members on the status of his case and included details in vestry minutes (Exhibits A and B). Plaintiff believes and avers that the vestry has not at any point repudiated Mr. Malm’s actions; thus, plaintiff respectfully submits that the church is estopped from denying that Mr. Malm acted as the church’s agent in this matter. c. In a letter to Dee Parsons, publisher of The Wartburg Watch (an online publication about abusive churches and clergy who has written about this situation) dated February 7, 2018, he cites the protective order as a “disciplinary measure our [church] leadership” has decided to take, tellingly omitting any reference to his claims he had been threatened. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit C. This further reinforces the conclusion that Mr. Malm acted with the full support of the church’s elected officers. d. Prior to filing his request for a protective order, Mr. Malm repeatedly contacted Diocesan officials, including Canon Pat Wingo (assistant to the bishop) and former Bishop Shannon Johnston for advice. In response, Diocesan officials provided Mr. Malm with access to Diocesan litigation counsel and other resources, including a letter from Bishop Shannon Johnston endorsing Mr. Malm’s actions. Thus, plaintiff respectfully submits that the Diocese is estopped from denying that he acted with the full knowledge and support of Diocesan officials. e. Mr. Malm held himself forward as Episcopal clergy throughout the case, including appearing in court in clerical garb. f. Mr. Malm sought a no-contact order for all members of Grace Episcopal Church in his petition for a protective order, versus just him and his family. This request was not granted. 2. In pursuing his claim for a protective order, Mr. Malm met both criteria for abuse of process, including: a. An ulterior purpose, and b. An act in use of process not proper in regular prosecution of proceedings. See Ely v. Whitlock, 238 Va. 670, 385 S.E.2d 893 (1989). 3. Apropos his ulterior purpose, Mr. Malm repeatedly demonstrated that his true intent and ulterior purpose in filing for a protective order was a desire to shut down online and other Bonetti v. Grace Episcopal, et al. Bill of Particulars

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criticism of his conduct as a member of the Episcopal clergy. In other words, he wished to use the instant protective order as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). a. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that he had had no contact, direct or otherwise, with plaintiff in more than seven months. Indeed, the only contact during that time occurred when plaintiff informed Mr. Malm in December 2017 that the latter was to have no contact with him following Mr. Malm’s filing of a false police report against plaintiff. (Exhibit D) b. In court Mr. Malm admitted that he had received no phone calls from the plaintiff since 2014. c. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that he had not seen plaintiff in any public space at any time relevant to the proceedings. d. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that the police had not charged plaintiff with any criminal act, including making terroristic threats. e. In court, Mr. Malm admitted that at no point had plaintiff made a threat against him or the church. f. In correspondence with the Alexandria police department both prior and subsequent to the granting of the protective order, Mr. Malm asked if there was some way to get a magistrate or judge to impose a prior restraint on plaintiff’s speech critical of Mr. Malm and the church. Plaintiff submits this illustrates Mr. Malm’s true motives (Exhibit E). g. Through his attorney, Mr. Malm repeatedly urged the Alexandria Circuit Court on appeal to implement a prior restraint on plaintiff’s speech that referenced Mr. Malm. h. Mr. Malm’s attorney repeatedly approached counsel for plaintiff in the present case, demanding that plaintiff quit writing about Malm and the church. Indeed, Mr. Malm’s counsel attempted to insist on this in order to “agree” to plaintiff’s withdrawal of his appeal to the circuit court. i. On his own initiative, shortly before instant plaintiff withdrew his appeal to the Alexandria Circuit Court, Mr. Malm offered a multi-page settlement proposal (Exhibit F) that offered to immediately drop the protective order if plaintiff would stop blogging about misconduct at Grace Church and withdraw previous written pieces on this topic. Plaintiff believes and avers that offering a settlement proposal in this manner is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he has been threatened. j. Throughout the previous litigation, Mr. Malm made multiple statements against interest, including sending an email message to Episcopal bishop Shannon Johnston in which he stated, “Than (sic) you Bishop…the hardest part is dealing with my wife and one of my daughters…they give this so much more attention than this deserves.” Plaintiff believes and avers that such statements are inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he has been threatened. k. On or about May 14, 2019, Mr. Malm approached plaintiff on Russell Road (Photo attached as Exhibit G). In doing so, he drove up slowly, carefully sized up the situation, then clambered out of his SUV, screaming threats against plaintiff. Nearby neighbors were visibly frightened, running inside their homes and locking the doors. Plaintiff called the police and filed a police report, after refusing to engage Mr. Malm in any manner whatsoever and locking himself in his vehicle for safety. Plaintiff believes and avers that such behavior is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he fears for his physical safety. l. Mr. Malm’s wife Leslie repeatedly attempted to contact plaintiff via social media following issuance of the protective order. Plaintiff believes and avers that such behavior is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he fears for his physical safety and that of his immediate family. Bonetti v. Grace Episcopal, et al. Bill of Particulars

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4. Mr. Malm repeatedly engaged in acts not proper in the regular prosecution of proceedings: a. Mr. Malm repeatedly and deliberately took words out of context in his petition for a protective order, thus knowingly committing a fraud against this court. For example: i. His reference to “psychological torture” referred to a scholarly publication, written by a licensed psychologist, and describing the psychological effects of shunning in houses of worship. No rational actor would construe this language to be a threat. (Exhibit H) ii. His reference to the “Killer B’s refers to the name of a classic rock band, “The Killer B’s,” based in Richmond VA and popular with women the age of plaintiff’s mother. As a result, she used the moniker on her blog on a regular basis, while enjoying the simultaneous reference to the Pittsburg Pirates baseball team, which also uses the phrase. No rational actor would construe this language to be a threat. iii. His reference to a “major terrorist incident” refers to a facially satirical post, in which the author refers to the mayhem that occurs when she brings her children to church. No rational actor would construe this language to be a threat. b. On appeal to the Alexandria Circuit Court, Mr. Malm committed perjury during discovery in writing, under oath, while advised by church legal counsel. Specifically, he cited as his reason for his assertion that plaintiff’s mother’s blog really belonged to the plaintiff the fact that “time after time….Sigrid Yahner (or someone claiming to be her) makes appointments (with him) that are cancelled. At no point in time did Ms. Yahner or anyone purporting to be her make such appointments, and via subpoena the church has been invited to supply evidence to the contrary in the present case. Moreover, such evidence, if it exists, should be readily available, as plaintiff has asked both Diocesan and church officials to retain all potentially relevant data, including phone logs, emails, and calendars, and journals (Exhibit I). c. On appeal, Mr. Malm attempted to issue a UIDDA deposition in violation of Pennsylvania law against plaintiff’s mother, since prior leave of court was not obtained as required by Pa R.C.P §1305. Indeed, even after being informed by her counsel that such a move violated state law and being provided the relevant legal citation, through his attorney Mr. Malm persisted in his efforts to obtain an ultra vires subpoena, haranguing the Venango County Courts with claims that he had been denied due process. d. Mr. Malm attempted to subpoena plaintiff’s mother, Sigrid Yahner, despite the fact that he knew she was terminally ill and unable to comply in any manner. Yet when local courts quashed the subpoena, Mr. Malm lied, telling the court that he was unaware that Ms. Yahner was late-stage terminally ill. Yet having by his own admission read Ms. Yahner’s blog, Mr. Malm could not have been unaware of these facts. e. Throughout his pleadings on appeal, Mr. Malm engaged in multiple fabrications, including telling the court that the plaintiff had never been licensed to practice law, and had never served as a police officer. f. On appeal, Mr. Malm engaged in a variety of other unethical conduct, including resorting to inflammatory, oppressive language and rhetoric, and refusing to comply with the Alexandria Circuit Court’s order to compel, which directed Malm to specify which statements he claimed were threatening. Plaintiff believes and avers such conduct is inconsistent with Mr. Malm’s claims that he fears for his personal safety. Indeed, if Mr. Malm genuinely feared for his safety, any such evidence would Bonetti v. Grace Episcopal, et al. Bill of Particulars

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presumably have featured prominently in his pleadings, without any need to seek a court order to obtain this evidence. g. Mr. Malm also engaged in witness tampering, repeatedly contacting Dee Parsons, whom he knew was planning to testify on plaintiff’s behalf, and urging her to withdraw her testimony. A copy of her affidavit, which she intended to offer into evidence (Exhibit J), as well as one of Mr. Malm’s emails to Ms. Parsons, is attached (Exhibit K). To plaintiff’s knowledge, in every case Canon Pat Wingo or other diocesan official was copied, as well as the parish’s attorney. Thus, both the parish and the Diocese were fully involved in Malm’s efforts. h. Mr. Malm also attempted to interfere with plaintiff’s contract of employment with First Christian Church of Falls Church, emailing the pastor to inform him that I am a “domestic terrorist.” Such actions, occurring while a case was still in litigation, are highly unethical. i. Evidence suggests that Mr. Malm engaged in multiple smear campaigns directed at plaintiff, including falsely claiming that plaintiff misused church fund, and falsely claiming that plaintiff is mentally ill. Yet in no case did Mr. Malm raise such concerns directly with the plaintiff. Second Cause of Action — Negligence/Respondeat Superior 1. As a hierarchical church, the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia has an obligation to address clergy misconduct. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (1993), A.H. v. Church of God in Christ, 831 S.E.2d 460 (2019). Such a view is supported by church canon I.17.8, which states that those who serve the church do so in a fiduciary capacity, as well as church disciplinary canons, which expressly require bishops to discipline clergy who violate church policies. 2. Despite these factors, Bishop Susan Goff and the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia have repeatedly refused to address Mr. Malm’s perjury in the instant matter. Indeed, in a written notice sent to the plaintiff, the Diocese proffered the astonishing notion that it would only address clergy misconduct if criminal charges were brought. Such an approach is, at a minimum, grossly negligent. (Exhibit L) 3. Having refused to address Mr. Malm’s perjury via internal church processes, neither Bishop Goff nor the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia can now, in good conscience, avail themselves of the notion that judicial review of this matter is precluded by church canons. Moreover, having resorted to the secular courts in the first place in an effort to impose what Mr. Malm asserts is “church discipline,” the church cannot now avail itself of the notion that the actions of its agents, officers, and employees in those same courts are immune from judicial scrutiny. 4. By subpoena, plaintiff has invited the Diocese and Bishop Goff to provide any evidence that may suggest they have addressed Mr. Malm’s perjury via informal or other actions, perhaps not obvious to plaintiff. To date, no such information has been provided. 5. Based on the diocese’s multiple refusals to address Mr. Malm’s perjury and abuse of process, plaintiff therefore believes both the parish and the Diocese are legally liable under the doctrine of respondent superior. Third Cause of Action — Civil Conspiracy 1. In the event that this court does not not find the Diocese and Bishop Goff are liable as part of a hierarchical organization, then plaintiff respectfully submits that defendants are liable as a matter of civil conspiracy.