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DANE C. BRAGG and DONNA BRAGG, Plaintiffs v. ANDREW REINHOLZ and HILLARY DOWLING, Defendants Preliminary Objections. The Plaintiff, a former member of the clergy of the Episcopal Church, sued the Defendants who are alleged to have made defamatory statements about him. The defamatory statements were made as part of a Church disciplinary proceeding that resulted in having the Plaintiff defrocked. The Defendants argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because of the doctrine of deference. The doctrine does not create a blanket rule that prohibits courts from resolving all church disputes, however, civil courts will not intervene where only issues of ecclesiastical law are at issue. The Court held that it could determine whether defamatory statements had been made without reference to ecclesiastical law. Further, the Court held that the Defendants were not entitled to a demurrer based on conditional privilege. Although the allegedly defamatory statements occurred during a Church disciplinary proceeding, privilege is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded in a New Matter. Bragg et ux. v. Reinholz et al.
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Pennsylvania, Civil Division—Law, No. C0048-CV2003-5897. Order of Court entered denying Preliminary Objections and Demurrer; granting Motion to Strike vague allegations. JAMES A. BARTHOLOMEW, ESQUIRE, for Plaintiffs. THEODORE R. LEWIS, ESQUIRE, for Defendants. Order of Court entered April 28, 2004 by MORAN, J. ORDER AND NOW, this 28 day of April, 2004, Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants, Andrew Reinholz and Hillary Dowling are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Defendants’ Preliminary Objection on the basis of Jurisdiction is DENIED. The Defendants’ Demurrer is DENIED. The Defendants’ Motion to Strike Paragraph 10 for legal insufficiency is GRANTED. STATEMENT OF REASONS Presently before this Court are the Preliminary Objections of Defendants Andrew Reinholz (“Reinholz”) and Hillary Dowling (“Dowling”). The Defendants argue that the Complaint, which sounds in defamation and interference with contractual relations, is insufficiently specific in that it does not specify the time, place, and person to whom the Defendants made alleged defamatory statements. Prelim. Obj. at ¶¶19-21. They also argue that this Court does not have jurisdiction because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered in the context of ecclesiastical trial proceedings. Id. at 22-24. Last, they ask this Court to grant a demurrer to the Complaint 42
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because all the alleged statements were made during a religious proceeding. Id. at ¶¶25-27. Standard of Law In ruling upon preliminary objections, we must accept as true all well pleaded allegations and material facts averred in the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom. Wurth v. City of Philadelphia, 136 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 629, 584 A.2d 403 (1990). This Court’s analysis is confined to the complaint itself. Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa. Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36 (1991). If any theory of law will support a claim, preliminary objections are not to be sustained as any doubt should be resolved against the objecting party. Foster v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 138 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 147, 587 A.2d 382 (1991). The pertinent facts, as laid out by the Complaint, are as follows. Statement of Facts At the time of the incidents that gave rise to this lawsuit, Dane C. Bragg was an ordained priest of the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Bethlehem. Complaint ¶4. As one of his duties in the priesthood, he worked with the Church’s Youth and Social Ministries. Id. The Defendants actively participated in Church’s youth programs. Id. at ¶5. On October 9, 2001, the Defendants are alleged to have made false accusations against Dane Bragg to Bishop Marshall of the Episcopal Church. Id. at ¶¶6-7. As a result of these accusations, Bishop Marshall filed Church disciplinary proceedings against Plaintiff Dane Bragg. After a church trial proceeding, Mr. Bragg was defrocked according to the Church’s canons. The Complaint contains defamatory statements that the Defendants made against Dane Bragg on August 19-22, 2002, at the Church’s disciplinary proceeding. Complaint at ¶¶8-9 and Prelim. Obj. at ¶11. The Plaintiffs also aver that the Defendants made similar defamatory statements “to other people at other times. ...” Complaint at ¶10. See also, Complaint at ¶34. DISCUSSION The Defendants assert three grounds for granting Preliminary Objections. We turn now to each. This Court Has Jurisdiction The Defendants argue that, because the allegedly defamatory statements were uttered during an ecclesiastical proceeding, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. In support of their argument, they assert the doctrine of deference. “The deference rule provides that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical policy on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” Gundlach v. Laister, 43
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155 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 319, 325, 625 A.2d 706, 709 (1993). The doctrine does not create a blanket rule that prohibits a civil court from resolving disputes involving churches. Civil courts may hear cases that do not require a determination of ecclesiastical issues. Id. at 325, 625 A.2d at 710. Thus, in order to have jurisdiction, we must determine whether the dispute in this case is one that is purely within the purview of ecclesiastical authorities or instead involves only questions of civil law. Id. at 325-36, 625 A.2d at 710. The plaintiff’s petition in Gundlach, for example, asked the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia County to issue a rule to church officials to show cause why Gundlach should not be admitted as a member of the church. The Superior Court held that whether an individual should be admitted a member of a church is a question purely of ecclesiastical law. Id. at 326, 625 A.2d at 710. The dispute in this case is whether the Defendants’ statements imputing sexual misconduct to a member of the clergy are defamatory and whether such statements interfered with Bragg’s contract rights. The only way these matters touch or concern ecclesiastical issues is that some of the alleged statements were made during a church disciplinary proceeding. In deciding whether such statements are defamatory, this Court will not construe, review, or consult Church law. Defamation and interference with contracts are purely civil matters. The only relevance that the disciplinary hearing may have to this case is that it may provide the Defendants with a privileged setting in which to make defamatory statements. Likewise, Bragg’s suit for tortious interference with contract will not require the Court to construe ecclesiastical issues. It will only require the Court to determine whether a contract existed and whether the Defendants’ alleged defamatory comments interfered with Bragg’s contract rights. In support of their argument for dismissal, the Defendants cite a case decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts with similar facts. Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 773 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 2002). In Hiles, a former priest with the Episcopal Church sued when a parishioner wrote a letter to the bishop which contained defamatory statements concerning Hiles. The letter resulted in a church disciplinary proceeding similar to, if not exactly alike, the procedure used to discipline Bragg. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the First Amendment barred the defrocked priest from suing for defamation and interference with contractual relations. It opined that, “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of internal religious disciplinary proceedings would be meaningless if a parishioner’s accusation that was used to initiate those proceedings could be tested in a civil court.” Id. at 936. In a footnote, the court limited its holding to only those statements made within the church’s internal disciplinary procedure. Id. at 936 n.12.1 “The complaint makes no allegation that Hastie repeated her allegedly defamatory statements to any other persons or in any other forum. The absolute First Amendment protec1
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In opposition to the Defendants’ motion, Bragg cites a decision of the Alaskan Supreme Court. Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993). The Marshall court reached the opposite conclusion from the Massachusetts high court. In that case, the plaintiff was an ordained Presbyterian minister. Upon leaving his parish in Alaska, he found employment in another state. After accepting the position, church officials at the Alaskan church made defamatory statements about the plaintiff’s fitness to work as a minister. His new church, upon receiving this information, refused to hire him. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued alleging defamation and interference with contractual relations. In holding that the plaintiff could maintain his suit for defamation, the court opined that the lawsuit did not concern matters of ecclesiastical concern: The court needs to determine only if Munro actually said: 1) Marshall was divorced; 2) Marshall was dishonest; 3) Marshall had throat surgery disabling him as a pastor; and 4) Marshall made improper advances to a member of the congregation. If Munro raises the defenses of truth and of privilege, the court need only determine if the facts stated were true and if Munro made the statements with malice (a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity). There is no need to determine if Marshall was qualified to be a pastor or what those qualifications may be. Marshall, 845 P.2d at 428. Likewise, concerning his suit for interference with contractual relations, the court opined: The elements of the tort of intentional interference with contract require that: 1) a contract existed; 2) Munro knew of, and intended to interfere with the contract; 3) Munro did in fact interfere with the contract; and 4) Munro’s interference caused Marshall’s damages. Marshall must also show that the statements were not privileged or justified. Id. The Marshall court also held that the church official could qualify for a conditional privilege under Restatement (Second) of Torts §596 that could be overcome if the plaintiff proved that the official acted with malice. Id. at 429. We find the decision of the Alaskan Supreme Court to be more persuasive and in accord with our own appellate courts’ precedents.2 Just as in tion for statements made by a Church member in an internal church disciplinary proceeding would not apply to statements made or repeated outside that context.” Id. 2 For a comprehensive discussion of state and federal court decisions concerning defamation against a member of the clergy, see generally, George L. Blum, Annotation, Defamation of Member of Clergy, 108 A.L.R.5th 495 (Westlaw 2004).
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Marshall, our courts have litigated tort suits when ecclesiastical law is not in issue. Rankin v. Phillippe, 206 Pa. Super. 27, 211 A.2d 56 (1965) (discussed below). We therefore find that the deference rule does not apply and hold that this Court has jurisdiction over the tort claims as alleged in the Complaint. Demurrer Due to Conditional Privilege Is Not Proper In a defamation lawsuit involving a church commission report that allegedly contained defamatory comments, our Superior Court held that church officials had a conditional privilege under Restatement (Second) of Torts §596. Rankin v. Phillippe, supra. Although the Rankin court did not address whether it had jurisdiction, it addressed whether the church officials had a conditional privilege to make allegedly defamatory statements. Regarding privilege, section 596 of the Second Restatement states: An occasion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances are such as to lead any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that facts exist which another sharing such common interest is entitled to know. Id. Comment (d) specifically states that the privilege is intended to apply to members of religious associations when they speak among themselves as to the misconduct of a member “which [would] make him undesirable for continued membership.” Id. at §596 cmt. d; Rankin, supra at 31, 211 A.2d at 58. Preliminary objections are not the proper way to determine a conditional privilege. Vitteck v. Washington Broadcasting Company, Inc., 256 Pa. Super. 427, 434, 389 A.2d 1197, 1201 (1978). Rather, the affirmative defense of privilege should be raised as a New Matter. Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a). Accordingly, we deny Defendants’ Demurrer. Motion To Strike Paragraph 10 of the Complaint alleged that the Defendants “may have repeated the aforesaid statements to other people at other times. ...” While discovery in this case may prove this to be true, such an allegation clearly runs afoul of Rule 1019(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure that requires a party to set forth material facts of a cause of action. See also, Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, 501 Pa. 306, 310, 461 A.2d 600, 602 (1983). Accordingly, we strike paragraph 10 of the Complaint. Should discovery in this case lead to new or more specific facts, Bragg may amend his pleading under Pennsylvania’s liberal rules. Halliday v. Beltz, 356 Pa. Super. 375, 381, 514 A.2d 906, 909 (1986).
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