The Dark Side of Volkswagen
CONTENTS Key facts
Driving climate change
Volkswagen Group: The big player 8 1. Slow progress on emissions 10 2. Greenwashing the fleet 12 3. Lobbying against progress 14 Conclusion: Capable of better
June 2011 Published by Greenpeace International Ottho Heldringstraat 5 1066 AZ Amsterdam The Netherlands
Cover: ©Cobbing/Greenpeace Contents: ©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
KEY FACTS 1.
The Volkswagen Group is the largest car maker in Europe. One in five new cars sold in Europe is a Volkswagen brand, and by 2018, the company aims to be the biggest car maker in the world.
2. Volkswagen claims it also wants to be ‘the most eco-friendly automaker in the world’, yet the company has dragged its feet in reducing the fuel consumption of its vehicle fleet, and whilst it has developed the technologies to produce highly fuel-efficient vehicles, it has not made them widely available. 3. As the biggest car company in Europe, the Volkswagen Group has the biggest climate footprint of any car manufacturer in Europe. 4. Volkswagen penalises consumers wanting smarter, cleaner vehicles by artificially inflating their price and making them marginal to its fleet. 5. Just 6% of the Volkswagen Group’s global sales in 2010 were of its most efficient models. 6. Volkswagen has a history of diverting attention from its poor overall environmental performance by developing super-efficient prototype car designs which never come to mass production. 7.
Volkswagen were one of the driving forces in the lobbying campaign against the introduction of vehicle efficiency standards in Europe. It has also been part of efforts to oppose the introduction of strong US standards.
8. The Volkswagen Group has more positions on the board of ACEA (the car manufacturers’ association and one of the most powerful lobby forces in Europe) than any other company. ACEA has been leading the charge against strong fuel efficiency standards in Europe. 9.
Despite its green rhetoric, Volkswagen is opposing two vital climate policies in Europe which are needed to drive innovation and cleaner technology in the car sector, save drivers money, and help Europe reduce its damaging dependence on oil.
10. The company has the capacity to do so much better. If Volkswagen made the most fuel-efficient cars it produces as standard, rather than offering efficiency technology as an expensive add-on, it would be able to reduce its fleet emissions and oil consumption dramatically. If it rolled out its best technology across the fleet it would be transformational, not just to its own performance but to the European vehicle fleet as a whole.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
SUMMARY The Volkswagen Group is the largest car maker in Europe. It has repeatedly claimed that it wants to be a ‘green’ company, but has so far failed to live up to its green ambitions. It has been slow to make its fleet more efficient, despite having developed the technology to do so, and has actively worked to impede strong European climate policies. The company must change. Volkswagen’s significance in the car market should not be underestimated. By 2018, the company aims to take the number one spot from Toyota1 to become the biggest car maker in the world.2 The Group comprises nine well-known brands3 and also owns a controlling stake in Porsche. One in five new cars sold in Europe is a Volkswagen brand and the company hopes to attain global dominance by expanding sales in the US market and the emerging markets of China and India.
the bulk of the Volkswagen Group’s cars continue to be amongst the most polluting in Europe.
The company has dragged its feet in reducing the fuel consumption of its vehicle fleet, and whilst it has developed the technologies to produce highly fuel-efficient vehicles, it has not made them widely available or affordable. And despite its green rhetoric, Volkswagen is opposing two vital climate policies which
ive f n ei On
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are needed to drive innovation in Europe and cleaner technology in the car sector, save drivers money, and help Europe reduce its damaging dependence on oil. If the Volkswagen Group is to live up to its promises, the company must rapidly improve the fuel efficiency of its products, and put its weight behind strong climate change policies in Europe. In particular, public support from the Volkswagen Group for an European greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target of 30% by the year 2020 would be a powerful sign that the company wants to be a genuine leader on green issues, whilst support for stringent car efficiency legislation would show it was serious about improving the efficiency of its vehicles and driving down pollution from the car industry.
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. nd Bra n e ag w olks V a
Volkswagen speaks of being ‘determined to become the world’s leading automaker in terms of both economy and ecology’,4 and some of its models regularly feature in top ten ‘green car’ lists.5 The company emphasises its commitment to environmental protection within much of its public advertising.6 Yet the bulk of the Volkswagen Group’s cars continue to be amongst the most polluting in Europe compared to other volume brands.7
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change is fundamentally reshaping our lives. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere now exceed by far their natural range over the last 650,000 years, due primarily to fossil fuel use.8 Despite repeated debate at international summits and ongoing haggling over global agreements, the international community has so far made only tentative progress toward reducing global emissions.
The burning of oil in vehicle engines creates significant amounts of GHG emissions. While the overall emissions in Europe are falling, decreasing 11% between 1990 and 2008, those from transport increased by 24% in the same period13, and are still rising.14 The European Environment Agency estimates that cars are the single largest source of transport emissions, representing around half of the total.
Europe is currently committed to unilateral action to reduce its GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by the year 2020. Yet this target is now hopelessly out of date. It is not ambitious enough to drive much needed investments in Europe’s green economy. It does not reflect the scale and speed of the growing clean technology sector in other major economies (particularly China, now the world’s largest single investor in renewable energy). It is also insufficient to ensure the continued functioning of Europe’s flagship climate policy, the Emissions Trading Scheme; or to ensure that Europe is on target to meet its own long term goal of an 80–95% emissions cut by 2050. This year, European governments are discussing the need to strengthen the 2020 target, to a 30% cut below 1990 levels. A study commissioned by the German government concluded that such a target could boost investment in Europe’s green economy and increase European GDP by ¤620 billion by 2020.9 Agreeing a 30% target for domestic emissions reductions by 2020 is also a critical step in rebuilding confidence in the international negotiations on climate change, where this commitment would give new weight to Europe’s efforts to build a broad coalition of nations committed to action.
Currently, the EU imports around 85% of the oil it consumes. As its few domestic reserves are declining, this dependence on imports may increase to at least 90% by 2030.15 If this happens, risky and dangerous unconventional oil extraction methods like deep water drilling and tar sands production are likely to make up a greater proportion of EU oil consumption. Globally, it has been estimated that up to 13% of oil production currently comes from unconventional sources – with probably more than 75% of this coming from deep water oil, while the second largest contributor is tar sands.16 With oil companies now eyeing up potential reserves in the Arctic (which is thought to contain less than three years’ worth of oil based on current global consumption17), it could only be a matter of time before cars on Europe’s roads are fuelled by oil coming from dangerous drilling in pristine Arctic waters.
The EU currently consumes around 670 million tonnes of oil a year10 (equivalent to around 13.68 millions of barrels of oil per day11), with the EU’s transport sector using around 60% of that, a proportion that is projected to grow to 65% by 2030 without additional policy changes. Over half of the oil consumed by the EU’s transport sector is used by cars and vans.12
It could only be a matter of time before cars on Europe’s roads are fuelled by oil coming from dangerous drilling in pristine Arctic waters.
©Arthur J D/Greenpeace
DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
Above: Greenpeace scientists research depletion of Arctic sea ice. ©Cobbing/Greenpeace Right: As the ‘easy to reach oil’ is running out, oil companies are turning to tar sands – the dirtiest of all oil – to meet the demand. ©Rezac/Greenpeace Far right: BP’s Deepwater Horizon explosion caused the worst oil spill in US history, killing 11 workers and leaking millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. ©The United States coastguards
These marginal barrels are expensive to extract, commanding a high oil price to be profitable. High oil prices in turn contribute to economic and geopolitical instability, both by driving up transport costs for businesses, and by contributing to higher food prices and increased military tensions in producer regions. At the same time, high oil prices increase the risk of a return to recession during a fragile economic recovery. Regardless of their price, burning through the world’s remaining fossil fuel reserves also exposes us to the risks of catastrophic climate change. In the most recent World Energy Outlook published by the IEA, the ‘business as usual’ scenario (including ‘business as usual oil consumption’) is shown to be consistent with a six degree increase in global average temperatures.18 The potentially devastating impacts of higher atmospheric CO2 levels, combined with higher global temperatures, are likely to be far reaching and could lead to the extinction of many species, reduced diversity of ecosystems,19 and adversely affect hundreds of millions of people.20 The alternative is clear – the world needs to go beyond oil by putting in place policies which will dramatically reduce consumption of oil. The IEA World Energy Outlook suggests that global oil consumption must peak in 2018 and drop below today’s levels by 2030 (alongside cuts in emissions from other sectors) if we want to prevent the worst impacts of climate change.21 One important step, along with other policies, is to improve the fuel efficiency of vehicles and shift to smaller vehicles.
EU legislation passed in 2009 requires an ongoing improvement in the fuel efficiency of new cars sold in Europe. Despite strongly opposing the introduction of the legislation, the car sector has since shown that fuel consumption can be dramatically reduced, simply through the deployment of existing technologies. Several car makers are now on track to meet their mandatory 2015 targets ahead of time, with Toyota having already almost met its target six years early – yet Volkswagen has consistently lagged behind.22 Car makers have also shown they are capable of producing electric vehicles that produce no emissions at all, if they are powered from renewable energy sources. Tough but achievable vehicle efficiency standards of 50g CO2/km for cars and 88g CO2/km for vans by 2030 could reduce the oil consumption of the EU’s transport sector by around 13%, or 1.1 million barrels a day, compared to business as usual. 23 This is equivalent to approximately the total petroleum consumption of Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Norway and Finland combined24 and would represent an economy-wide reduction of 8% in the EU.25
DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE
MEASURING EMISSIONS: WHAT THE NUMBERS MEAN About 70% of the world’s transportation GHG emissions are now under regulation by national governments. The United States, European Union, Japan, China, Australia, Canada and South Korea have all adopted vehicle efficiency standards. In some cases these standards began as voluntary guidelines; all but Australia’s are now mandatory. Mexico plans to announce fuel efficiency standards soon, and India, Indonesia, and Thailand are drawing up regulations.26 Around the world, the fuel efficiency of vehicles is measured in different ways. In Europe, vehicles are rated by how many grams of CO2 they emit for every kilometre they are driven. This is described as XXg CO2/km. Measurements are mandatory for all models and carried out according to an EU procedure. In Germany, it is also common to describe a car’s efficiency by how many litres of fuel it consumes for every 100km travelled, shortened to X L/100km.
The two values can be converted using a simple calculation since one litre of gasoline produces, when burned, approximately 2.3kg of CO2 (petrol) or 2.6kg of CO2 (diesel) respectively. For example, the usual way of describing the fuel consumption of the ‘Golf 1.4 with 59kW’ is to say it emits 149g CO2/km, or consumes 6.4 litres of gasoline. In the US, vehicles are rated by how many miles they will go for every gallon of fuel, described as XXmpg. Measurement procedures differ so numbers cannot easily be converted and compared with European values. However, these are the approximate comparisons to help the reader: EU
4.1 L/100km (petrol) 62mpg
5.6 L/100km (petrol) 52mpg
SEVERAL CAR MAKERS ARE NOW ON TRACK TO MEET THEIR MANDATORY 2015 TARGETS AHEAD OF TIME, WITH TOYOTA HAVING ALREADY ALMOST MET ITS TARGET SIX YEARS EARLY WHILST VOLKSWAGEN HAS CONSISTENTLY LAGGED BEHIND.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
volkswagen group: the big player
Part owned by state-owned oil company, Qatar Petroleum,27 and the German state of Lower Saxony, the Volkswagen Group operates 62 production plants in 15 European countries and in the Americas, Asia and Africa.28 In 2010, the Group increased the number of vehicles produced to 7.2 million, giving it an 11.4% share of the world passenger car market.29 The Volkswagen Group sold nearly three million passenger cars in Europe in 2010, meaning that one in five new cars (21%) was a Volkswagen brand.30 This dominance is even more pronounced in particular segments of the car market. Across Europe, the ‘compact’ or small family car is now the most popular size of car in terms of sales. In Germany, the biggest car market in Europe, the compact class has, according to the German Federal Motor
Transport Authority (KBA), a share of nearly 28% of the total market.31 In this segment in Germany, every third car is a Volkswagen.32 The Volkswagen Golf is so popular that the whole class is often referred to as the ‘Golf class’.33 The Volkswagen Group’s size, power and influence all make it a major player in global car markets, and the dominant player in Europe. That in turn means that its influence can be used for good or ill when the need arises for car manufacturers to shoulder their environmental responsibilities. In recent years, despite claims to the contrary, Volkswagen has used that influence to stand firmly against action on climate change. It has done so in three key ways.
VEHICLE EFFICIENCY LEGISLATION In 2009, a continental car efficiency standard was put in place by the EU. It required that by 2015 the average emissions from all cars sold in Europe must not exceed 130g of CO2 per km driven. Under the legislation, each manufacturer was allocated a different target, reflecting the differences in average weight and CO2 performance of vehicles at the time of the introduction of the law. The targets were based on the average weight of the cars produced by each manufacturer. So, for example, BMW‘s target is 138g CO2/km as they make big, heavy cars, whilst Fiat has a target of 116g CO2/km, reflecting the fact that they make small vehicles. Overall, the system is designed so that across the whole European fleet, the average emissions of new vehicles should be 130g CO2/km by 2015. Volkswagen were one of the driving forces in the lobbying campaign against the introduction of these vehicle efficiency standards. On 26 January 2007, Volkswagen joined other German car companies to send a letter to European Commissioners asking them to reconsider proposals to impose a mandatory target of no more than 120g CO2/km for new cars sold in Europe by 2012.
The companies claimed that this target was ‘technically not accomplishable’ and would constitute ‘a massive industrial political intervention at the expense of the entire European, and especially the German, automobile industry’. They did not hesitate to evoke the spectre of massive industrial destabilisation. ‘The direct consequence would be the migration of a large number of jobs from European production plants of automobile manufacturers and the supplier industry’.34 From a huge employer such as Volkswagen, this statement could be construed as a serious threat, particularly as it came only two months after the company had announced restructuring plans that could result in the loss of up to 4,000 jobs in the Brussels region.35 In reality, these threats were unfounded. Several car makers are now on track to meet their 2015 targets ahead of time, with Toyota having already almost met its target six years early.36 When the vehicle efficiency legislation was set, a more ambitious medium term target of 95g CO2/km was also included for 2020. The details of how that target must be achieved will be decided in a review in the next couple of years. A new target also needs to be set for 2025.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
Volkswagen has used its influence to stand firmly against action ON climate change.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
1. Slow progress on emissions The Volkswagen Group has the biggest climate footprint of any car manufacturer in Europe. Figure 1 estimates that the new cars sold by the company in 2009 emitted over five million tonnes of CO2 per year,37 representing an estimated 23% of the total oil use and related CO2 emissions of new European cars.38 The sheer scale of Volkswagen’s carbon footprint means that any changes it makes have a big impact on European vehicle emissions as a whole. Yet despite the company’s claims to leadership, its performance to date has been poor.
Between 2006 and 2009, Volkswagen managed to reduce its fleet’s average per-kilometre emissions by 7.8%, whereas rivals BMW and Toyota achieved reductions of 18% and 14% respectively. Preliminary figures for 2010 show that Volkswagen slightly accelerated progress during 2010, lowering the CO2 emissions of its European fleet by about 5%, but the company still lags behind most of the other volume brands.39 Whilst this progress should be recognised, it is important to remember that the company has reacted late and only moved
FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED EMISSIONS OF NEW CARDS SOLD IN EUROPE IN 2009
Greenpeace calculation based on T&E data.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
to do the absolute minimum necessary to comply with EU legislation, of which the company was a powerful opponent before it was agreed.40 Volkswagen only stepped up its game on CO2 reductions once a legal framework was put in place that forced all companies to make cleaner cars. When compelled to improve its technology, Volkswagen proved that its own objections to current standards were unfounded.
Volkswagen only stepped up to reduce CO2 reductions once a legal framework was put in place that forced companies to do so.
figure 2: Car manfacturers’ progress in reducing average fleet emissions Reduction in CO2 emissions between 2006–2009 (%)
Bubble size refers to amount of annual sales.
General Motors PSA Peugot-Citroen
2 0 0
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 Distance from 2015 emissions target in 2009 (g CO2/km)
Volkswagen’s position in figure 2 shows it is both further away from its 2015 emissions target and has made less progress in reducing emissions than other volume brands Source T&E.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
FIGURE 3: Volkswagen GROUP EUROPEAN CAR SALES IN 2009 BY EFFICIENCY RATING 100 90 80
Percentage of car sales
70 60 50 40
30 20 10 0
11% Less than 121g/km
More than 121g/km
CO2 emissions EU commission, 2009, Monitoring of CO2 emissions, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/cars_en.htm Source EU Commission.
2. GREENWASHING THE FLEET Volkswagen may have been slow at reducing its fleet’s emissions, but it’s not slow to boast about its supposed green credentials. The company claims it wants to be ‘the world’s leading automaker in terms of both economy and ecology’,41 and its 2009 Sustainability Report went so far as to say: ‘We aim to be the most eco-friendly automaker in the world!’ 42 According to the same report, this will be achieved by ‘setting new ecological standards in automobile manufacturing in order to put the cleanest, most economical and at the same time most fascinating cars on the road.’43 Yet these words are not matched by actions. Official EU Commission figures for 2009 show that 88% of their vehicles emitted over 120g CO2/km, and that the company sold over twice as many cars emitting over 160g CO2/km than they did of cars emitting under 120g CO2/km (see figure 3). The Volkswagen Group’s models which regularly feature in top ten ‘green car’ lists,44 and are used in company advertising to emphasise its commitment to environmental protection45 are limited versions of standard models – not representative of the bulk of its actual sales. In its 2010 Sustainability Report, the company itself admits that ‘(b)etween 2007 and 2010, worldwide sales of efficiency models of the Group’s Audi, Volkswagen, Volkswagen Commercial Vehicles, SEAT and Škoda brands rose by a factor of 12, from 32,500 to 402,400 units’. 46 These brands make up 99% of the company’s global sales, which means that even with this increase, only 5.6% of the total sales for these five brands (and 6% of its total global sales) were of models incorporating its most efficient technology and standards.47 Currently, the Volkswagen Group does not apply its most efficient technology and standards to all its vehicle models. Only particular models are available as ‘efficiency models’, and these are sold under additional brands.
For example, the most efficient Škoda models are badged as ‘greenline’ models, whilst particular models of Volkswagen cars can be bought with added ‘BlueMotion’ technologies which make them more fuel-efficient. There are nearly 70 different variations of the Volkswagen Golf. Its most efficient ‘BlueMotion’ model has an efficiency rating of 99g CO2/km (3.8 L/100km, diesel). But the majority of the Golf models without BlueMotion emit more than 130g CO2/km (petrol) and 120g CO2/km (diesel), with some variations emitting as much as 199g CO2/km (8.5 L/100km, petrol). The cheapest and most basic model of the Golf emits 149g CO2/km – emitting 50 grams more CO2 per km than the most efficient BlueMotion version on the market.48 Volkswagen’s ‘efficiency’ versions of their cars are also sold at a much higher price than the standard models. In Germany, the Golf BlueMotion 1.6 TDI 77 kW is sold at ¤21,850, whereas the comparable Golf 1.6 TDI 77 kW without BlueMotion costs ¤20,825, a discrepancy of nearly ¤1,000. Comparing costs for the Volkswagen Polo, this discrepancy is even bigger. The Polo 1.2 TDI (99g/km) is sold at ¤15,050 where as the 1.2 TDI BlueMotion version (87g/km) is sold at ¤16,675 – a difference of ¤1,625.49 The actual cost of the technology package, according to leading technology consultants PA Consulting, would only be ¤260, suggesting that Volkswagen is adding a considerable mark-up for the BlueMotion brand.50
Just 6% of THE Volkswagen Group’s global sales in 2010 were of its most efficient models.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
If Volkswagen incorporated the efficiency technology and specifications of its current greenest cars ‘as standard’ rather than offering it only as an add-on and charging a premium for it, the company could dramatically reduce the carbon footprint of its vehicles, help consumers to reduce their motoring costs and the oil dependence of the economy. Continued innovation and investment in the development of cleaner car technology and new hybrid and electric engines can cut oil use and reduce emissions much further. Other car companies are already demonstrating this. Instead Volkswagen penalises consumers wanting smarter, cleaner vehicles and makes them marginal to its fleet.
Rolling out BlueMotion standards across all the models of these brands would considerably decrease oil consumption and CO2 emissions. According to Volkswagen’s own numbers the full implementation of the existing BlueMotion package in the Golf saves almost one litre of fuel per 100km or 20g CO2/km.51 This is a dramatic difference in oil consumption, and would save drivers significant amounts of money on the cost of fuel, particularly at a time when fuel prices are high, and expected to get higher.
Volkswagen penalises consumers wanting smarter cleaner vehicles and makes them marginal to its fleet.
In comparison, Ford has said that one of its principles is to provide ‘near-term solutions that are affordable for our customers and available in high volumes.’52 Ford’s new Focus model, the main competitor to Volkswagen’s Golf, will come at less than 95g CO2/km in 2012.53
VOLKSWAGEN: A HISTORY OF GREENWASH Volkswagen has a history of diverting attention from its poor overall environmental performance by developing super-efficient prototype car designs that result in the production of more headlines than actual vehicles. The most prominent of these was the 3-litre Lupo, launched in 1998. With fuel consumption of 2.99 litres of diesel per 100 km and emissions of 81g CO2/km, it was a genuinely efficient car. Two years earlier Greenpeace had helped to demonstrate that affordable, efficient cars were possible by developing the SmILE (Small, Intelligent, Light, Efficient) concept car, which emitted only 75g CO2/km. The SmILE project showed that the then existing technology could be used to halve the fuel consumption of a car without any loss of power, performance and comfort, and importantly, without additional cost.54 Yet Volkswagen marketed its efficient vehicle at such a high price that it simply didn’t sell. Today the failure of the Lupo is often cited by Volkswagen to argue that customers don’t want to buy fuel-efficient vehicles, but it is reasonable to argue that they set it up to fail. In 2005 at the Frankfurt International Motorshow, Volkswagen then presented its version of the SmILE concept. But instead of halving consumption, the new vehicle maintained the same fuel consumption, using the efficiency savings of the new technology to double the car’s performance in terms of horsepower,
acceleration, and speed. Thus the Volkswagen TSI, mass produced from 2006, used cutting-edge efficiency technology to make no carbon savings whatsoever. In 2002 Volkswagen had presented the 1-litre CCO which needed 1 litre of fuel per 100km driven. Company chairman Ferdinand Piech arrived at that year’s AGM in one of the concept vehicles. It never entered into mass production. At the 2009 Frankfurt motorshow Volkswagen exhibited the 1-litre CCO’s successor, the L1. Piech claimed that it was this car, with a consumption according to Volkswagen of 1.38 litres of diesel per 100km that was intended to be the basis for a mass production vehicle in 2010. Again, the car never made it to the mass market. At the Qatar motorshow in January 2011, yet another new version of the car was unveiled: a plug in diesel hybrid rated at 0.9 L/100 km or 24g CO2/km. This time the concept was called ‘near to series’ and Volkswagen claimed that this model would enter mass production in 2013. According to reports however, this is not the case and only a limited number will be produced.55� It remains to be seen whether Volkswagen will ever become serious about bringing genuinely high efficiency cars to the mass market, and rolling out its BlueMotion standards across its fleet, instead of only at the margins.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
3. Lobbying against progress The EU is committed to reducing its GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. This year, European governments will consider whether to strengthen this by moving to a 30% reduction target. A growing movement of leading European businesses, the European Parliament and Environment Ministers from Denmark, UK, Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Germany and Spain, have called for a move to a 30% domestic emissions reduction target for Europe, arguing that it will boost the European economy, keeping it competitive, drive investment in new technology and help improve global efforts to prevent dangerous and damaging climate change. Over 90 major companies such as Google, Ikea, Sony, Unilever and Philips support a 30% target, many of whom have signed public statements in support of this more ambitious target.56 Companies, politicians and academics say the targets can set the right incentives for businesses to spur innovation and investment and create millions of new jobs in a low carbon economy. Many of the businesses have described a stronger target as a ‘win-win-win’.57
A 30% domestic emissions reduction target for Europe could boost the European economy, drive investment in new technology and help improve global efforts to prevent dangerous and damaging climate change. These companies are acting with the support of their customers. According to the latest Eurobarometer opinion poll, a majority of Europeans consider that not enough is being done to fight climate change and almost two-thirds think that fighting climate change can have a positive impact on the European economy.58 Several studies, including the European Commission’s own analysis, demonstrate that Europe’s unilateral commitment to reducing emissions by 30% by 2020 is not only possible and affordable, it is necessary to create new green jobs, guarantee Europe’s energy security, improve air quality and ‘avoid stranded costs and very steep reductions to be needed later on’59 which would be much more costly.60
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
Over 90 major companies such as Google, Ikea, Sony, Unilever and Philips support a 30% emissions reduction target.
Left: Clean graffiti by the European Parliament demands more efficient cars. ©Reynaers/Greenpeace Above: Greenpeace activists accuse car companies of driving climate change. ©Beentjes/Greenpeace
Campaigning against change Yet despite this clear popular and business demand, Volkswagen has been actively lobbying against this crucial policy through the European Automobile Manufacturer’s Association (ACEA).61 In another letter dated 1 February 2011, replying to a Greenpeace request to explain Volkswagen’s stance on the 30% proposal, the company described it as a policy which ‘puts jobs at risk and results in de-industrialisation in Europe’, reminiscent of language it used when lobbying against the current vehicle efficiency standards. The company were wrong about efficiency standards then, and their position now on a future 30% target contradicts the findings of many of the most respected bodies that have conducted extensive analysis into the impacts of the target. The mainstream view makes the case that benefits of the target could include new jobs, increased investment, as well as increased GDP.62 Volkswagen seems increasingly isolated in its stance, however, as other car companies appear to take a different view. For example, General Motors (GM), despite stating that they were ‘not in a position to speak for other industries and as a consequence has no position on the 30% reduction ambition level as such’, say that they, ‘agree with the need to further reduce GHG emissions in road transport and are involved in EU policies and legislation aimed to develop a strategy to decarbonizes [sic] transport by 2050’.63
Renault meanwhile has said it ‘brings its support to the European Commission, in order to evaluate the possibilities, the benefits and the different impacts on the competitiveness of an EU 30% emission cut’.64 The Renault-Nissan alliance is a member of the Prince of Wales EU Corporate Leaders Group on Climate Change (EU CLG) whose mission is to ‘communicate the support of business for the European Union to move to a low carbon society and low climate risk economy and to work in partnership with the institutions of the EU to secure the policy interventions that are needed to make this a practical reality’.65 Renault have signed a joint statement in support of a higher 2020 target,66 but haven’t yet openly supported a 30% reduction target. Even BMW (a high end premium brand) says it is making the changes to its fleet so that it will ‘contribute substantially to the European Union’s existing 20% CO2 reduction target.’ It also says that ‘the 30% target under discussion for Europe ... might be attainable, but only as long as other industry sectors pull their weight in equal measure and provided that the policymakers of the individual member states strengthen their efforts to work together in a more integrated way.’67
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
Right: Former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and VW Board Chair Ferdinand Piech admiring the VW Phaeton at a production factory in Dresden.
Volkswagen is openly opposed to an existing democratically established standard that benefits motorists, the economy and the environment.
But Volkswagen is not only opposed to the 30% emissions reduction target – the company also argues that the EU’s existing CO2 reduction target for new cars sold by 2020, set at 95g CO2/km, is too challenging. This target was adopted in 2009 as part of Europe’s climate and energy legislation. Again, two of Volkswagen’s major competitors, BMW and GM, appear to accept this target as a legal obligation that should stay in place.68 But the Volkswagen Group describes the target as ‘not based on sound impact assessment nor on a realistic appreciation of the costs and technical progress necessary to meet the goal within the timescale.’69 It is not inconceivable, given its past record, that Volkswagen is lobbying, or will lobby, to get this target weakened in the upcoming review of its implementation.
The European Commission for Industry and Enterprise, in a report about European industries post-recession, recently reported that the car sector is structurally unprepared for the future. They said, ‘demand is increasingly shifting towards more fuel efficient vehicles and vehicles with alternative power trains […] The issue of further restructuring in favour of more fuel efficient vehicles and vehicles with alternative power trains still needs to be faced. Existing capacities thus feature significant structural weaknesses. […] Growing competition from third countries producing cheaper cars and limited access to emerging markets are key issues as well. The need to continually improve the environmental, energy and (active) safety performance of vehicles leads to both new challenges and new opportunities for the sector.’72�
Yet research shows that the shift to tighter fuel economy standards can create jobs, drive innovation and foster high-tech industries supplying additional manufactured components, as well as reducing consumption of expensive and polluting oil. As chairman and CEO of Cummins, the US diesel engine manufacturer explains, ‘tighter regulations are a fact of life. Back in the ‘90s we saw this as burdensome, but we now see this as an advantage. If we have the advantage, either in fuel economy or emissions or both, we’re going to gain market share, we’re going to be able to enter new markets. As a result, we secure employment and grow the business.’70 Former Vice-Chairman of General Motors, Bob Lutz, argues that part of the reason why GM failed in the US was because of poor US fuel economy standards.71
The truth is that the Volkswagen Group has lagged behind its competitors for years. It only stepped up progress on CO2 reductions once a legal framework was put in place that forced it to do so. It has shown no ability or willingness to voluntarily deliver the innovation or technology changes required. Now Volkswagen is openly opposed to the agreed 2020 standard that would benefit motorists, the economy and the environment. In taking this stand, the company not only betrays the fact that it would rather keep its own vehicles’ emissions high, but also threatens to undermine the framework which will help the whole car manufacturing sector to clean up its act.
THE 30% TARGET: POWERING INVESTMENTS By 2050, Europe has committed to reduce its climate emissions to close to zero, by cutting them by between 80 and 95% below 1990 levels. Currently, it has a legally binding mid-term target of a 20% reduction by 2020. EU leaders are now discussing whether this should be tightened, to drive investment into the vital clean technology sector, and ensure that Europe is on the most cost effective and secure pathway to achieve its long term goals. This discussion is taking place against the backdrop of an economic and energy crisis. Spiking fuel prices, energy risks, climate change, resource constraints and increasing competition with emerging economies should mean that ‘business as usual’ is not an option for the European economy. To secure our future energy security, and build a prosperous and resilient European economy, we need policies that will drive investment into green technologies, goods and services, including renewable energy and efficient, and ultimately zero carbon, transport. Europe’s current climate target is not strong enough to deliver that investment. Instead, the mountain of unused emission allowances in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, the result of a weak target and too many free allocations to polluters, means that at present there is little reward for efficiency, action and innovation. Only a tougher climate target – a minimum 30% domestic emissions reduction by 2020 – can restore confidence in Europe’s clean technology sector, and create the industries and jobs of the future. Findings from a study73 in March 2011 commissioned by the German environment ministry and conducted by researchers from across Europe found that a climate target of 30%, if accompanied with adequate and consistent policies, could:
P Boost European investments from 18% up to 22% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); P Create up to six million additional jobs; P By 2020 increase European GDP by ¤620 billion or by 0.6% above business as usual trends; P Help European industry to maintain and enhance its competitiveness. These gains would come irrespective of an international climate agreement, and show that the green economy is more than another fashionable phrase. In fact, in 2010 the clean energy sector grew globally by 30% and delivered a record ¤168 billion in investments.74 In addition, the EU Commission has calculated that stepping up to a 30% target would save the EU about ¤40 billion in oil and gas imports by 2020, and this is assuming a very conservative oil price projection of 88 USD by 2020.75 On the international stage, it is also vital that Europe is seen to be implementing and benefiting from the climate policies it advocates globally. Demonstrating commitment to a green economy, and showing leadership in supporting low carbon technologies, is the surest way to restore trust and confidence in negotiations on climate change. Ultimately, the success of these negotiations remains vital if we are to ensure that action keeps pace with the risks posed by rising temperatures, and that this action is transparent, effective and just. In the run up to the next round of climate talks in Durban in South Africa in December 2011, a new European target would be a significant step towards a functioning and constructive global dialogue on climate change.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
Volkswagen has an ongoing close relationship with the German government: Above: Chancellor Angela Merkel poses for cameras in a VW UP at the International Automobile Trade Fair in Frankfurt. ©Frank May/Picture Alliance Right: Former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder awards VW Board Chair Ferdinand Piech a state medal. ©Holger Hollemann/Picture Alliance
As one of the most powerful companies in Europe, Volkswagen spends at least ¤2.3m per year on EU lobbying alone. Lobby groups and revolving doors The Volkswagen Group is not just a big economic player in Europe, it is a political player too. Its executives are warmly received in European halls of government, particularly in their home country, Germany, where Volkswagen is part-publicly owned by the state of Lower Saxony, which has a 20% share of the company’s voting rights and two places on its supervisory board. As Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, this meant that Gerhard Schroeder sat on Volkswagen’s board before he became Chancellor. Volkswagen demonstrates a classic example of a revolving door arrangement, in which the relationship between government and business is extremely close. Government members and officials are hired at Volkswagen, while former Volkswagen employees go on to work in politics. For example, a former spokesman for the German Federal Ministry of Transport, Hans-Christian Maaß, is now the Head of Volkswagen‘s Representative Office in Berlin, while Reinhold Kopp, a former Minister of Economy in the federal state of Saarland, then became Head of Government Relations for Volkswagen. The former Head of Volkswagen’s Liaison Office in Brussels, Elisabeth Alteköster, went on to become the Director of Transport Policy at the General Secretariat of the Council until 2010. As one of the most powerful companies in Europe, Volkswagen spends at least ¤2.3m76 per year on EU lobbying alone. Due to the restricted nature of the information, it is hard to know the full extent of their lobby efforts, but Volkswagen has a history of lobbying against climate legislation both independently and through the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), the car industry’s manufacturers’ association.
European car companies are supposedly unified behind one industry-wide lobby group: ACEA, which is one of the most powerful lobbying forces in the EU. Of the 16 companies that are members of ACEA, three belong to the Volkswagen Group, and each of them – Volkswagen, Porsche and Scania – have a place on ACEA’s Board of Directors. Volkswagen Group therefore has more positions on ACEA’s board than any other company. ACEA says that all companies pay ‘a standard fee’ to join, but would not disclose the exact figures. We have therefore assumed that, because it has three companies involved, Volkswagen contributes three times the amount of money to ACEA’s lobbying work compared to other member companies. If so, we have calculated that last year the company spent more than ¤2m on its contributions to ACEA alone.77 As the biggest contributor, we can assume that Volkswagen has a powerful influence over ACEA’s activities. In addition, the Group, being part of ACEA’s ‘A members’ (as opposed to non-European companies who are classed as ‘B members’ like GM, Ford and Toyota), also regularly seconds its staff to the ACEA secretariat in Brussels. Peter Kunze from Audi is currently Director of Environmental Policy for ACEA. ACEA has consistently opposed CO2 emission targets for the car industry. When, after years of voluntary targets being ignored by car companies, the EU Commission decided in 2007 to propose mandatory targets, ACEA made a case that their failure to meet their voluntary targets was caused by external factors: bad regulation on recycling, low demand for efficient vehicles and poor car sales.78 In other words, it was not the fault of their members. They also suggested that politicians should seek emission reductions elsewhere other than the car sector.79
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
Greenpeace calls on MEPs to vote for cleaner, more efficient cars and stronger targets. ©Reynaers/Greenpeace
ACEA lobbied hard against the introduction of the standards and the Commission then decided to water down the proposed target from a maximum of 120 to 130g CO2/km for EU average CO2 emissions. ACEA called even this lenient target ‘arbitrary and too severe’.80 In the negotiations with the EU Member States and Parliament, the standard was eventually delayed by three years. After it successfully managed to weaken proposals to reduce CO2 emissions from cars, ACEA set to work trying to water down new CO2 emission targets for vans, which were proposed by the European Commission in October 2009.81 When the proposal was put forward, ACEA called for a delay to the proposed introduction of the new rules.82 They complained that the Commission’s proposal ‘does not ensure sufficient industrial lead-time and proposes an unfeasible 2020 limit value’.83 Eventually the proposed legislation was delayed and the 2020 limit value watered down substantially. In fact, none of ACEA’s complaints have been borne out in reality. In 2009, when the finally agreed car targets were known, manufacturers reduced average CO2 emissions from cars by over 5%,84 and new figures show they have been equally successful in 2010.85 On vans, major manufacturers including Volkswagen had already made good progress on individual van models by the time the CO2 standard for vans was proposed. The new T5, launched in 2009 had about 10% lower CO2 emissions than its predecessor.86 ACEA, like Volkswagen itself, has also taken an obstructive position on the proposal to increase the EU carbon emissions reduction target to 30%. In January 2010, ACEA joined other industry lobby groups in calling on EU bodies to make no further commitments to emission reductions until ‘it is certain that
other major economies have also made substantial and binding commitments’.87 They argue that ‘Copenhagen has demonstrated that [other countries] are not willing to take comparable or equivalent actions to those proposed by the European Union. It is, therefore, evident that any increase in the European Union’s proposed target will not have any impact on the decision of other countries to reduce their own emissions.’ Evidently, ACEA are downplaying or ignoring evidence of the benefits to the European economy and European competitiveness of a stronger climate target, that would be gained independently of an international post-2012 climate agreement, and do not consider it important for Europe to adopt a cost effective pathway to meeting its commitment to an 80–95% cut by 2050. Volkswagen also has a history of opposing fuel economy standards outside of Europe. The US equivalent of ACEA, the National Automobile Dealers Association, of which Volkswagen is a member, have vigorously opposed congressional efforts to pass legislation to curb GHGs from cars, and other industrial sources, saying it would harm the economy. But a recent challenge by the Association against California’s right to bring its own strong CO2 standards to car emissions recently failed when the court ruled that the car makers had failed to prove the standards would result in economic harm.88 In contrast, it has been reported that Toyota has commended the Obama administration’s preliminary proposal to increase fuel economy standards,89 which could be set at 62mpg for 2025 vehicles if the most fuel-efficient proposal is adopted.90
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
CONCLUSION: CAPABLE OF BETTER Volkswagen likes to boast of operating ‘binding global environmental principles’ by which each model of car produced must outperform its predecessor in all environmental areas, including fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. Moreover, the company’s stated aim is to ‘lead the field in terms of fuel consumption in every class of vehicle’.91 Yet despite these claims the company has been slow off the mark to make necessary changes to drastically reduce its fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. It has developed the technologies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles, but it has not yet made these widely available at an affordable price. And it has lobbied hard against necessary change. But it has the capacity to do so much better. If Volkswagen made the most fuel-efficient cars it produces as standard rather than offering efficiency technology as an expensive add-on it would be able to reduce its fleet emissions dramatically. If it rolled out its best technology across the fleet it would be transformational, not just to its own performance but to the European vehicle fleet as a whole. As the single biggest car player in Europe, what Volkswagen chooses to do has a significant impact across the whole European economy. The European climate footprint of new cars being produced should be zero before 2040. This would ensure that by 2050, GHG emissions from car use will be almost zero, as new cars powered by renewable energy replace existing oil-powered ones on the roads. To achieve this, car companies must fast-track efficiency increases on conventional vehicles, and turn to alternative propulsion technologies that will permit the use of sustainable renewable energy in the long term. Large companies like Volkswagen can and should exploit economies of scale to improve faster than others. While the company has begun to develop and make marketing for their first serial electric car, the e-up! which they say will enter the market in 2013, this cannot be a substitute for drastically reducing the oil consumption across the far larger segment of its conventional fleet in the short term. If the Volkswagen Group really is aspiring to be the leader in environmental performance that it claims it wants to be, the company must push the EU to establish the most ambitious climate change policies in the world, to stimulate the market
in efficient and low carbon technology. It must also support tougher car standards to ensure that all car manufacturers have to improve their fleets together to the highest shared goal rather than staying at the lowest common denominator. Greenpeace is calling on Volkswagen to live up to its stated ambition and become a genuine leader in both policy and practice – supporting policymakers who want to move the wider economy forward with higher standards, and changing its own technology to meet those standards. In doing so it will bring innovation and competitiveness back into the European economy, help reduce European oil dependency, cut the cost of motoring and play a huge role in reducing Europe’s climate changing emissions. Specifically Greenpeace is calling on the Volkswagen Group to: P Stop lobbying to oppose key European energy laws designed to reduce our dependence on oil and: . Publicly support the EU target of 30% emissions reductions by 2020. . Publicly support the agreed vehicle efficiency fleet average target for new cars of 95g CO2/km by 2020, and go further to support even stronger targets for cars of 80g CO2/km by 2020 and no more than 60g CO2/km by 2025. P In line with this stronger target, commit to making significant year-on-year reductions so that its average fleet emissions are no more than 80g CO2/km by 2020. P Roll out full BlueMotion across its Volkswagen fleet and fit its best efficiency technologies as standard across all other brands, without increasing weight or power of the vehicles. P Ensure the next best-selling Golf (VII) consumes less than 78g CO2/km (3 litre/100km, diesel). P Set out its plan to make its entire fleet oil-free before 2040. Volkswagen has the ability and the size to make a difference. It has the responsibility to do better. It has the responsibility to help lead Europe and the world away from oil.
As the single biggest car player in Europe, what Volkswagen chooses to do has a significant impact across the whole European economy.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
1 www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/24/toyota-world-number-onecarmaker 2 Statement by Martin Winterkorn, CEO, October 2010. http://timesnewsworld. com/072119/volkswagen-car-maker-plans-to-be-number-one-in-the-worldby-2018 3 Volkswagen, Audi, SEAT, Skoda, Volkswagen Commercial Vehicles, Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborghini and Scania. 4 VW report, Looking back to the future, p26. www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/ vwcorp/info_center/en/publications/2011/04/looking_back_to_the.-bin.acq/ qual-BinaryStorageItem.Single.File/110421_VW_TE_engl_BRO_DINA4_lowres.pdf 5 For example, The Green Car Website currently lists the VW POLO DIESEL HATCHBACK 1.2 TDI BlueMotion 3dr within the top 10 green cars. www.thegreencarwebsite.co.uk/top-10-green-cars.asp 6 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2010/02/ think_Blue.html 7 In terms of CO2 averages only Nissan, which has much lower sales, performed worse out of the non-premium volume brands in 2009. ‘How Clean are Europe’s cars? An analysis of carmaker progress towards EU CO2 targets in 2009’. Transport & Environment, November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/ prep_hand_out/lid/610 Figures for 2010 suggest VW is still lagging behind other volume brands despite modest progress. ‘Rich nations falling behind Europe on car CO2 emissions’. JATO. March 2011. It is important to note that JATO figures do not include figures for the entire VW Group. www.jato.com/PressReleases/Rich%20 Nations%20Falling%20Behind%20Europe%20on%20Car%20CO2%20Emissions. pdf 8 IPCC, ‘Key findings and uncertainties contained in the Working Group contributions to the Fourth Assessment Report’, 2007, p5. www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf 9 Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. A New Growth Path for Europe – Generating Growth and Jobs in the Low-Carbon Economy. Synthesis report. March 2011. www.newgrowthpath.eu/ 10 DG TREN, 2008, European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 – Update 2007. This anticipates that in 2010 the EU would consume 674 million tonnes of oil. This is consistent with recent actual figures from BP which estimated the EU’s oil consumption in 2009 to be 670.8 million tonnes. BP 2010a. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010. www.bp.com/statisticalreview 11 2010 figures, CIA factbook. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2174.html 12 DG TREN, 2008, European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 – Update 2007. 13 European Commission www.vwec2010.be/notulen/VWEC2010_sessie_3_Tom_ Van_Ierland.pdf ; European Environment Agency (EEA) www.eea.europa.eu/ data-and-maps/indicators/transport-emissions-of-greenhouse-gases/transportemissions-of-greenhouse-gases-7 14 EEA, 2010, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2008 and inventory report 2010. www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-uniongreenhouse-gas-inventory-2010 15 IEA, 2009 World Energy Outlook, 2009; DG TREN, 2008. (IEA 2009 says 91% by 2030, and DG TREN 2008 says 95% by 2030). 16 Skinner, I., 2010, Steering clear of oil disasters. www.greenpeace.org/raw/ content/eu-unit/press-centre/reports/steering-clear-of-oil-disaster.pdf 17 The United States Geological Survey estimates that there are 90 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil in offshore reservoirs in the Arctic. Gautier, D.L. et al. 2009. Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic. Science 29 May 2009 324: 1175-1179. Global oil consumption is approximately 85 million barrels a day. 18 IEA 2010 World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris. 19 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds.), ‘Ecosystems and biodiversity, Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate Change’ Schneider, S.H., S. Semenov, A. Patwardhan, I. Burton, C.H.D. Magadza, M. Oppenheimer, A.B. Pittock, A. Rahman, J.B. Smith, A. Suarez and F. Yamin. 20 Nature 470, 316. 2011. Increased flood risk linked to global warming, February 2011, doi:10.1038/470316a ; IPCC (2007). ‘5.2 Key vulnerabilities, impacts and risks – long-term perspectives’. In Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.). Synthesis report. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
21 IEA 2010 World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris. 450 Scenario. 22 Transport & Environment press release, ‘Carmakers exaggerated time needed for CO2 cuts’, 4 November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/news/2010/11/ carmakers-exaggerated-time-needed-for-co2-cuts 23 Skinner. Op Cit. This assumes that no additional policy interventions are implemented in the EU to reduce CO2 emissions or the consumption of oil. 24 US Energy Information Administration. www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view= consumption#countrylist In 2009 Austria consumed 0.27 million barrels of oil per day, Denmark 0.17, Portugal 0.27, Norway 0.22 and Finland 0.20, which in total was 1.13 million barrels. 25 Skinner. Op Cit. This assumes that no additional policy interventions are implemented in the EU to reduce CO2 emissions or the consumption of oil. 26 ICCT, The Regulatory Engine: How Smart Policy Drives Vehicle Innovation, January 2011. www.theicct.org/2011/01/the-regulatory-engine/ 27 Qatar Holding owns 12.3 % of the Volkswagen AG and has 17% of voting rights in the board. The company is a ‘fully owned affiliate of Qatar Petroleum’. Qatar Intermediate Industries Holding Co. Ltd., ‘Qatar Intermediate Industries Holding - Welcome page,’ 2011, www.qh.com.qa/qh/index.aspx (accessed February 10, 2011). Their vision is ‘to become the Middle East’s leading manufacturer and marketer of intermediate petrochemical and non-hydrocarbon products.’ Qatar Intermediate Industries Holding Co. Ltd., ‘Qatar Holding - Vision And Mission,’ 2011, www.qh.com.qa/qh/content.aspx?secid=5&parentid=1 (accessed February 10, 2011). Qatar Holding said ‘the state is set to take a seat on its supervisory board, underlining the more active role Gulf states are playing in the German auto industry.’ ArabianBusiness.com, ‘Qatar becomes major shareholder in Volkswagen Energy,’ December 19, 2010, www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-becomes-majorshareholder-in-volkswagen-9923.html (accessed February 9, 2011). 28 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/content/en/the_group.html 29 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/content/en/the_group.html 30 ACEA, ‘New Vehicle Registrations by Manufacturer’, passenger cars. www.acea. be/images/uploads/files/20110221_07_2010_vo_By_Manufacturer_Enlarged_ Europe.xls 31 www.kba.de/cln_015/nn_124384/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/ Segmente/2010__b__segmente__kompakt.html 32 www.kba.de/cln_015/nn_124384/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/ Segmente/2010__b__segmente__kompakt.htmlKBA Mit 3,8 Millionen Einheiten trägt jeder 3. Wagen in dem Segment das Wolfsburger Emblem. 33 www.kba.de/cln_015/nn_124384/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/ Segmente/2010__b__segmente__kompakt.htmlKBA Die Kompaktklasse wird auch gern als ‘Golfklasse’ bezeichnet. 34 German carmakers’ letter to the European Commission, 26 January 2007. 35 This restructuring had nothing to do with environmental measures and came at a time where Volkswagen’s profits continued to rise. 36 Transport & Environment press release, ‘Carmakers exaggerated time needed for CO2 cuts’, 4 November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/news/2010/11/ carmakers-exaggerated-time-needed-for-co2-cuts 37 For simplicity, this notion of ‘climate footprint’ is based solely on the CO2 emissions that are caused by the use of the companies’ products. It excludes emissions from the production and disposal of cars, and from the production of the fuel used, which typically adds another 30% to the emissions from the ‘use phase’ (EEA 2010). 38 Greenpeace calculation based on T&E data, ‘How Clean are Europe‘s cars? An analysis of carmaker progress towards EU CO2 targets in 2009.’ Transport & Environment, November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/ prep_hand_out/lid/610 39 Ibid. Figures for 2010 suggest VW is still lagging behind other volume brands despite modest progress, JATO, ‘Rich nations falling behind Europe on car CO2 emissions’, March 2011. It is important to note that JATO figures do not include figures for the entire VW Group. www.jato.com/PressReleases/Rich%20Nations%20Falling%20 Behind%20Europe%20on%20Car%20CO2%20Emissions.pdf 40 German carmakers’ letter to the European Commission, 26 January 2007. 41 Volkswagen report, Looking back to the future. Op Cit. 42 Volkswagen, Sustainability Report 2009, p9 www.volkswagenag.com/.../ sustainability_report0.../VW_Sustainability_Report_2009.pdf 43 Ibid, p10
REFERENCES 44 For example, The Green Car Website currently lists the VW POLO DIESEL HATCHBACK 1.2 TDI BlueMotion 3dr as within the top 10 green cars. www.thegreencarwebsite.co.uk/top-10-green-cars.asp 45 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2010/02/ think_Blue.html 46 Sustainability Report 2010, p47. www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_ center/en/publications/2011/05/Report_2010.-bin.acq/qual-BinaryStorageItem. Single.File/VWAG_Nachhaltigkeitsbericht_online_e.pdf
70 ICCT, Op Cit. 71 www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110523/OEM02/30523996 1/1432#ixzz1NBkqyFJV 72 DG Industry & Enterprise, ‘EU Manufacturing Industry: What are the Challenges and Opportunities for the Coming Years?’, April 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/ enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/economic-crisis/files/eu_ manufacturing_challenges_and_opportunities_en.pdf 73 Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. Op Cit.
47 VW Annual Report 2010, p154. www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_ center/en/publications/2011/03/Volkswagen_AG_Geschaeftsbericht_2010.-bin. acq/qual-BinaryStorageItem.Single.File/GB_2010_e.pdf The total sales of those five brands in 2010 were 7.134 million whilst the company’s total global sales were 7.203 million. 48 www.volkswagen.de/konfigurator 49 VW Konfigurator. www.volkswagen.de/de/CC5.html 50 PA Consulting group, cited according: E.Wimmer/M.Schneider/P.Blum, ‘Antrieb fuer die Zukunft’, 2010, Schaeffer-Poeschel- Verlag. They have estimated that adding BlueMotion would cost the company 260 EUR per car, on the basis of the Golf 1,4 TSI. 51 Volkswagen Konfigurator. www.volkswagen.de/de/CC5.html The Golf 1,6 TDI 77 kW (Blue Motion Technology or full Blue Motion) = 119 grams; Golf 1.6 TDI 77 kW ‘Blue Motion Technology’ = 107 grams; Golf 1,6 TDI 77 kW ‘Blue Motion’ = 99 grams. (As a comparison: The basic Golf 1.4 Gasoline 59 kW needs 6,4 Liters gasoline and emits 149 grams of CO2). 52 ICCT, The Regulatory Engine: How Smart Policy Drives Vehicle Innovation, January 2011. www.theicct.org/2011/01/the-regulatory-engine/ 53 www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/8432669/80mpg-Ford-Focus-for-2012.html 54 www.greenpeace.de/themen/verkehr/smile/ 55 www.independent.co.uk/life-style/motoring/volkswagen-to-power-up-newhybrids-from-2013-2281799.html 56 See for example, Joint Declaration of 3 business leaders’ groups: www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/JointBusinessDeclaration-June-3.pdf (Greenpeace has no association with The Climate Group and does not endorse all of its policy positions). Also: FT: Business backs higher emissions goals. 20 July 2010. 57 The Climate Group, EU 30 per cent initiative, statement by businesses, ‘Increasing Europe’s climate ambition will be good for the EU economy and jobs’. www.theclimategroup.org/EU-30-per-cent-initiative 58 Eurobarometer: Climate change the second most serious problem faced by the world today. http://tinyurl.com/33gacpp majorities from 55% to 72% think that not enough is done to fight climate change. 59 Communication of the European Commission (2010): Unlocking Europe’s potential in clean innovation and growth: Analysis of options to move beyond 20%. (‘Stranded Costs’ describes existing investments which may become redundant in a competitive environment). 60 The International Energy Agency estimates that in the energy sector each year of delay will cost an extra ¤336 billion globally. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009. 61 ACEI (The Alliance for a Competitive European Industry) letter, 21 January 2010. The letter called on the Council, Parliament and Commission to stick to a 20% target. ACEA is a member of ACEI, and ACEI lobbies on their behalf. 62 Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. Op Cit. 63 Letter to Greenpeace, 21 December 2010. 64 Letter to Greenpeace, 26 January 2011. 65 www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Leaders-Groups/The-Prince-of-Wales-Corporate-LeadersGroup-on-Climate-Change/EU-CLG.aspx
74 The PEW Charitable Trust. Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race? 2010 Edition. www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/G-20ReportLOWRes-FINAL.pdf 75 CEC, 2010, Analysis of options to move beyond 20% GHG emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage. COM (2010) 265. Brussels, 26.5.2010. 76 This figure is the estimated VW Group spend on ACEA (ACEA’s yearly income is ¤10,112,343, divided by 15 members – there are now 16 members, but Volvo only joined in October 2010 - plus their declared spend on lobby interests, which for 2009 was ¤200,000– ¤250,000 for VW itself, excluding contributions to groups like ACEA. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/ consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=6504541970-40. This does not include any internal figures, or fees to Weber Shandwick, the lobby company they use in Brussels. According to an industry insider, it is highly likely that contributions were much more than this, but ACEA refuse to give Greenpeace actual figures. ACEA themselves refused to tell Greenpeace the exact spend of each company, but said each member pays ‘a standard fee’. 77 See above. 78 Committed to reducing CO2, ACEA website, accessed 15 March 2007. 79 ACEA stated: ‘Reducing further CO2 emissions through vehicle technology only is the most expensive and least cost-effective option for society. (…) More can be done for the environment, at lower costs’. ACEA press release, ‘Car industry wants fact-based policy on CO2 reductions’, Brussels, 26 January 2007. 80 Ibid. 81 European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/ vans_en.htm 82 ACEA press release, ‘Auto industry pushes hard to reduce CO2 emissions and needs supportive, realistic legislative framework to succeed’, 28 October 2009. www.acea.be/index.php/news/news_detail/auto_industry_pushes_hard_to_ reduce_co2_emissions_and_needs_supportive_real 83 ACEA press release, CO2 proposal for light commercial vehicles must be modified, Hanover, 21 September 2010. www.acea.be/index.php/news/news_detail/ co2_proposal_for_light_commercial_vehicles_must_be_modified 84 European Commission, 2010, Monitoring the CO2 emissions from new passenger cars in the EU: data for 2009. 85 JATO Consult, Rich Nations Falling behind Europe on Car CO2 Emissions. Op Cit. 86 www.volkswagen.co.nz/media/country/nz/x/company.Par.0054.File.pdf/ vwmr0909_new_generation.pdf 87 ACEI letter. Op Cit. www.eurofer.org/index.php/eng/content/ download/8541/44459/file/2010-01-21ACEIOpenLetter.PDF 88 See http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2011/04/california-auto-cleancar-standards.html and www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentID=4192 89 www.autospies.com/news/Toyota-s-Jim-Colon-praises-US-government-sproposal-on-fuel-economy-standards-61281/ 90 EPA/NHTSA Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking to Establish 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and CAFE Standards. www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/420f10051.htm 91 VW sustainability report 2010, Op Cit.
66 www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Leaders-Groups/The-Prince-of-Wales-Corporate-LeadersGroup-on-Climate-Change/~/media/Files/Resources/Press_Releases/8th_ March_EU_CLG_Press_Release.ashx 67 Letter to Greenpeace, 3 May 2011. 68 Letters to Greenpeace: BMW, 8 July 2010; GM, 20 August 2010. 69 Response to Greenpeace, 14 June 2010.