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An Arbor Research & Trading Affiliated Company Independent · Objective · Original

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The Yen Carry Trade Howard L. Simons Global Interdependence Centre June 11, 2007

Long-Term Interest Rates - 1900 to 2004


Topics ToIntr Be Covered

• Short-term (3-month LIBOR) carry trade and its components: – Interest rate spread – Spot rate changes – Total carry

• The importance of the yen carry trade to: – Emerging markets – G-10 markets

• Reading Bank of Japan policies • The Bank of Japan’s task ahead

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

2


Universe Examined •

A total of 29 different currencies have three-month LIBOR histories over the post-January 1999 timeframe

ISO Code ARS AUD BRL CAD CHF CLP COP CZK DKK EUR

Country Argentina Australia Brazil Canada Switzerland Chile Colombia Czech Rep. Denmark Eurozone

ISO Code GBP HKD IDR INR JPY KRW MXN NOK NZD PEN

Country United Kingdom Hong Kong Indonesia India Japan Korea Mexico Norway New Zealand Peru

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

ISO Code PHP PLN SEK SGD THB TRY TWD USD ZAR

Country Philippines Poland Sweden Singapore Thailand Turkey Taiwan United States South Africa

3


Constructing The Carry •

•

Spread returns for each individual currency are based on borrowing at the three-month LIBOR rate of the lower-yielding currency (LY3) and lending at the three-month LIBOR rate of the higher-yielding currency (HY3) The net carry return is the difference between the long return (top) and the short return (bottom)

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

4


Short-Term Interest Rates And Their Variance •

Even when presented on a semilogarithmic scale, short-term JPY rates are an outlier –

• •

CHF LIBOR has averaged 12.29 times JPY LIBOR since the January 1999 introduction of the EUR

Two currencies, the TRY and ARS stand out on the opposite end for having unusually high short-term rates Several G-10 countries with high-yielding currencies (NZD, AUD and GBP) have unexpectedly low σ. The opposite is true for several Asian currencies (TWD and KRW) –

One possibility here is the G-10 central banks have adopted greater transparency and hence provide fewer surprises to the markets

Three-Month Interest Rate Returns On Selected Currencies January 1999 Onwards

Standard Deviation IR Return (Right Scale)

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

JPY

CHF

SGD

EUR

TWD

SEK

HKD

DKK

CZK

USD

THB

CAD

NOK

KRW

GBP

CLP

AUD

NZD

INR

PEN

PLN

0.000%

ZAR

0.000%

PHP

0.001%

COP

0.001%

IDR

0.010%

MXN

0.010%

BRL

0.100%

TRY

0.100%

Standard Deviation Of Daily Return (Blue Line)

1.000% Average IR Return (Left Scale)

ARS

Average Daily Return (Roseate Columns)

1.000%

5


Correlation Matrix Of IR Spread Returns • •

While we might feel safe in concluding IR spreads are correlated positively (blue font, green cells) While generally true for 25 of the 29 currencies examined, it is not true for the BRL, ARS, AUD and NZD. These exhibit large swaths of negative correlation (red font, yellow cells) – All four of these currencies have had to maintain high and contracyclical interest rates

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

6


Yen Carry Risk And Return •

Let’s look at the total return of borrowing in the JPY and lending elsewhere – –

The TRY and ARS still stand out as having the highest total returns The AUD and ZAR, two currencies with heavy commodity linkage, have exceptional σ in their returns

Several currencies switched rank – –

The PLN moved higher The COP moved lower

Risk And Return In Three-Month Carry Against JPY Since January 1999

Standard Deviation JPY Carry Return (Right Scale)

Average JPY Carry Return (Left Scale)

1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7%

Standard Deviation of Daily Returns (Blue Line)

1.5%

Average Daily Return Vs. JPY (Roseate Columns)

0.10%

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

CHF

TWD

HKD

SGD

CLP

USD

EUR

DKK

THB

SEK

GBP

COP

CAD

ZAR

NOK

PHP

INR

PEN

KRW

BRL

CZK

NZD

AUD

IDR

MXN

PLN

TRY

0.01%

ARS

0.6% 0.5%

7


Decomposing The Yen Carry Trade • • • •

We can break the total return (blue line) into interest rate spread (green column) and spot rate (red column) components The TRY and ARS both had interest rate gains high enough to offset spot rate losses The BRL’s rate gains were insufficient to prevent it from sliding lower in rank The PLN’s spot rate component was positive, accounting for the aforementioned shift higher. The COP’s was a robber, though

40%

35%

Rate

30%

Total

35%

Spot

30%

25%

25%

20%

20%

15%

15%

10%

10%

5%

5%

0%

0%

-5%

-5%

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

CHF

TWD

HKD

SGD

CLP

USD

EUR

DKK

THB

SEK

GBP

COP

CAD

ZAR

NOK

PHP

INR

PEN

CZK

KRW

AUD

BRL

NZD

-20%

IDR

-15%

-20%

MXN

-15% PLN

-10%

TRY

-10%

ARS

Decomposition of Average Annual Return On Yen Carry Trade

40%

Average Annual Total Return On Yen Carry Trade

Analyzing The Yen Carry Trade Since January 1999

8


The Yen Carry Trade And Equity Markets •

If we map average annual stock market returns in USD terms against the average annual total return on the yen carry trade, we find a strong positive relationship (β=1.54) between equities and the yen carry once Turkey & Argentina are excluded If the total return on the yen carry trade is dependent more on interest rate spreads than on spot rate returns, we would have to conclude capital inflows outweigh the negative effects of higher interest rates Positive Correlation Between Yen Carry And Equities

Average Annual Equity Market Return, USD

30.0% 27.5% 25.0% 22.5% 20.0% 17.5% 15.0%

Turkey

12.5% 10.0% 7.5% Argentina

5.0%

25.0%

22.5%

20.0%

17.5%

15.0%

12.5%

7.5%

5.0%

2.5%

0.0%

0.0%

10.0%

2.5%

Average Annual Return On Yen Carry Trade

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

9


Decomposing Equity Market Relationship

30% 28% 25% 23% 20% 18% Turkey

15% 13% 10% 8%

Argentina

5% 3%

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

0%

Average Annual Return On Interest Rate Spread Component Of Yen Carry Trade

No Correlation Between Spot Component of Yen Carry And Equities 30%

25%

20%

15%

Turkey

10% Argentina

5%

Average Annual Return On Spot Rate Component Of Yen Carry Trade

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

10

7.5%

5.0%

2.5%

0.0%

-2.5%

-5.0%

-7.5%

-10.0%

-12.5%

-15.0%

-17.5%

0% -20.0%

Positive Correlation Between Rate Component of Yen Carry And Equities

Average Annual Equity Market Return, USD

If we exclude Turkey & Argentina from the analysis, we can see the strong positive relationship (β=1.08) between the interest rate spread component of the carry trade and equity returns (top chart) The relationship between the spot rate component and equity returns (bottom chart) is nearrandom (β= -.085) Restated, equity markets in high-interest rate spreads benefit directly from the capital inflows engendered by the carry trade. An increase in JPY LIBOR or a narrowing of the spread poses a threat to these markets

Average Annual Equity Market Return, USD


Emerging Market Equity Impact • • •

The Bank of Japan’s two moves to raise rates in 2006 and 2007 (green lines) had an immediate and visible impact on emerging market equities The BOJ moved to restore funds in its current account balance in June 2006 and assured the world no further rate increases would be coming in short order in 2007 Is there a “BOJ put” in global markets if their moves to raise rates become disruptive? And, if so, is this really a bad thing?

Short-Term Yen Rates Matter 950 900

Three-Month JPY (Left Scale)

850 800

MSCI Emerging Markets (Right Scale)

750 700

0.10% 650 600 550 500

MSCI Emerging Markets Free Index (Blue Line)

Three-Month JPY LIBOR (Thin Red Line)

1.00%

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

Apr-07

Feb-07

Dec-06

Oct-06

Sep-06

Jul-06

Mar-06

May-06

Jan-06

Nov-05

Sep-05

Jul-05

Mar-05

May-05

Jan-05

Nov-04

Sep-04

Jul-04

Jun-04

0.01%

Apr-04

450 400

11


The Yen’s Post-Yuan Peg Divergence • •

The JPY/EUR cross-rate began to diverge after the Bank of Japan ended quantitative easing in May 2006 While Europeans have been noisy regarding the JPY/EUR, the JPY/CNY cross is far more important to Japan’s global position – In a mercantilist culture within a mercantilist region, the concept of competitive devaluation is accepted – Just as in French, there is no word for laissez faire Comparative Currency Strength After Yuan Peg Loosened 107.5%

110%

Euro Index (Right Scale)

106.5%

108%

106.0%

106%

105.5%

104%

105.0% 102% 104.5%

Yen Index (Right Scale)

100%

104.0%

98%

103.5%

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

Mar-07 Apr-07

Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07

Dec-06

Oct-06 Nov-06

Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06

Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06

92%

Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06

102.0%

Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06

94%

Nov-05

102.5% Dec-05 Jan-06

96%

Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05

103.0%

Yen andEuro, July 20, 2005 = 100% (Thick Blue And Hatched GreenLines)

Yuan Index (Left Scale)

Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05

Chinese Yuan, July 20, 2005 = 100% (Thin Red Line)

107.0%

112%

12


The Yen Carry And Long-Term Treasury Rates: Long View •

The yen carry, as measured by the forward rate ratio between JPY LIBOR and ten-year UST, reached its apex equilibrium in late 1995 – Ten-year UST rates continued their secular decline – Modest flattenings (arrows) in mid-1998 and late 2000 preceded global equity market downturns, but had no negative impact on ten-year rates

The multi-generational low in ten-year UST (green line) occurred three years before the carry started to decline Did The Carry Trade Matter In The Long-Term?

U.S. Ten-Year Notes (Thin Red Line)

9.00%

1.0275 USD 10-Year Notes (Left Scale)

8.50%

1.0250 1.0225

8.00%

1.0200

7.50%

1.0175

7.00%

1.0150

6.50% 1.0125

6.00%

1.0100

5.50%

1.0075

5.00%

1.0050

4.50%

1.0025

4.00%

3.00%

JPY 3-Mo - USD 10-Yr FRR (Right Scale)

Nov-89 May-90 Nov-90 May-91 Nov-91 May-92 Oct-92 Apr-93 Oct-93 Apr-94 Oct-94 Apr-95 Oct-95 Apr-96 Oct-96 Apr-97 Oct-97 Apr-98 Oct-98 Apr-99 Oct-99 Apr-00 Oct-00 Apr-01 Oct-01 Apr-02 Oct-02 Apr-03 Oct-03 Apr-04 Oct-04 Apr-05 Oct-05 Apr-06 Oct-06 Apr-07

3.50%

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

JPY 3-Mo - USD 10-Yr FRR (Thick Blue Line)

9.50%

1.0000 0.9975

13


The Yen Carry And Long-Term Treasury Rates: Short View •

If we confine our view to the period after the CNY began to revalue, we see a complete lack of connection between the yen carry and ten-year UST yields – Prior to May 2006, UST rates rose in a wide carry – Between May 2006 and February 2007, UST rates fell and rose parallel to a flattening and widening yen carry – After February 2007, UST rates rose and that kept the carry positive Rising U.S. Note Yields Keeping Yen Carry Positive 1.02600 1.02575 U.S. Ten-Year Notes (Thin Red Line)

5.125%

1.02550 JPY 3-Mo - USD 10-Yr FRR (Right Scale)

5.000%

1.02525 1.02500 1.02475

4.875%

1.02450 4.750%

1.02425 1.02400

4.625%

1.02375 1.02350

4.500%

1.02325 4.375%

1.02300 1.02275

4.250%

1.02250

USD 10-Year Notes (Left Scale)

4.125%

1.02225

JPY 3-Mo - USD 10-Yr FRR (Thick Blue Line)

5.250%

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

Mar-07

Jan-07

Mar-07

Jan-07

Nov-06

Dec-06

Oct-06

Sep-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Jun-06

Apr-06

May-06

Mar-06

Feb-06

Jan-06

Dec-05

Oct-05

Nov-05

Sep-05

Jul-05

Aug-05

1.02200 4.000%

1.02175

14


Forward Yen Demand

Yen volatility has tracked the yen itself closely since the May 2006 withdrawal of liquidity by the Bank of Japan

20%

18% 1.0255 JPY 3-Mo - USD 10-Yr FRR (Left Scale)

1.0250

16%

1.0245 14%

1.0240

Quantitative Easing Ended

1.0235

12%

1.0230 10%

1.0225 1.0220

8% 1.0215

Yen Volatility (Right Scale)

1.0210

6%

Little Fear Of Yen Appreciation 108

10.75%

Yen Volatility (Right Scale)

110

10.25% 9.75%

112 9.25% 114

8.75%

116

8.25% 7.75%

118

Yen (Left Scale)

120

7.25% 6.75% 6.25%

Jul-05 Aug-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Mar-07 Apr-07

122

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

15

Three-Month JPY Volatility (Thick Blue Line)

1.0260

JPY-USD 3-Month Volatility (Thick Blue Line)

1.0265

Jan-99 Apr-99 Jul-99 Oct-99 Dec-99 Mar-00 Jun-00 Sep-00 Dec-00 Mar-01 Jun-01 Sep-01 Dec-01 Mar-02 Jun-02 Sep-02 Dec-02 Mar-03 Jun-03 Sep-03 Dec-03 Mar-04 Jun-04 Sep-04 Dec-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-05 Mar-06 Jun-06 Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07

– The drop in the yen carry to ten-year UST after May 2006 had no significant effect on yen volatility (top chart) – If there was a panic to unwind the yen carry trade and sell long-term UST in the process, it was invisible in the data

Reduced Carry Leads To Reduced Demand For Yen

FRR, 3-Mo. JPY to 10-Yr. USD (Thin Red Line)

Yen borrowed in a carry trade have to be repaid

JPY Per USD, Inverse Scale (Thin Red Line)


Forward Yen Demand: The Longer-Term View • •

Over a longer period of time, the volatility on three-month JPY forwards has led changes in the yen by 23 weeks on average As the yen carry trade was years in the making, we should expect to see a long-term rise in this volatility lead any immediate change in the yen

Price Of Insuring Against JPY Appreciation 20% Quantitative Easing Ended

Three-Month JPY Volatility (Right Scale)

105

19% 18% 17%

110

16% 15%

115

14% JPY Per USD Led 23 Weeks (Left Scale)

120

13% 12% 11%

125

10% 9%

130

8%

Three-Month JPY Volatility (Thick Blue Line)

JPY Per USD (Thin Red Line, Inverse Scale)

100

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

Dec-06 Mar-07

Sep-06

Mar-06 Jun-06

Jul-05

Sep-05 Dec-05

Dec-04 Apr-05

Jul-04 Oct-04

Apr-04

Jan-04

Oct-02

Jan-03 Apr-03 Jul-03 Oct-03

Jul-01

Oct-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02

Apr-01

Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01

Jan-00

Jan-99 Apr-99 Jul-99 Oct-99

7% 135

6%

16


The BOJ’s Situation •

The world became addicted to cheap yen – When low rates failed to stimulate the Japanese economy, quantitative easing (green lines) was employed

The first yen carry shock in May 2006 was far more a response to reduced quantity of yen (red columns) than higher price (blue line) – The BOJ restored ¥10 trillion in June 2006; this ended the first shock

The second yen carry shock was solely a price affair and ended as soon as the BOJ signaled a lack of hostile intent Price And Quantity Of Yen

32.5

27.5

22.5 0.10% 17.5

12.5

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

Mar-07

Dec-06

Jun-06

Sep-06

Jan-06

Mar-06

Jul-05

Oct-05

Apr-05

Jan-05

Jul-04

Apr-04

Oct-03

Jan-04

JPY LIBOR (Right Scale) Aug-03

May-03

Nov-02

Feb-03

Aug-02

May-02

Nov-01

Aug-01

Mar-01

May-01

Dec-00

Jun-00

Sep-00

Mar-00

2.5

Current Account (Left Scale)

Oct-04

7.5

Three-Month JPY LIBOR (Blue Line)

1.00%

Feb-02

BOJ Current Account Balance, ¥ Trillion (Roseate Columns)

37.5

0.01%

17


Conclusions • •

The yen carry trade is very real A wide range of global equity market returns have a strong positive beta to the interest rate spread between local currencies and the JPY – Capital inflows outweigh high local interest rates – This is prima facie evidence of yen-dependence

• •

Surprisingly, the carry to long-term UST is unimportant in the course of U.S. interest rates Two different attempts by the Bank of Japan to reduce its impact have contributed to global financial shocks – Both shocks were ended quickly by the BOJ itself, giving rise to the moral hazard of a “BOJ put” in world markets

The ease with which both shocks ended is consistent with a negativesum game reaction by markets to a perceived danger. It is neither the level of the yen carry nor the quantity of yen provided that are important, but rather a sense no one else has an incentive to panic The BOJ needs, therefore, to engage in a policy of “deposit insurance,” a public signal it will not engage in injurious policies. Then a restoration of normal interest rates in Japan can proceed

Bianco Research, L.L.C June 11, 2007

18


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