The cultural revolution and china after mao

The Cultural Revolution and China After Mao (1960-1989) Teacher Resource Guide East Asia National Resource Center

By Kelly Hammond

The Revolution Continues?

After the failures of the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership was divided over which path to take to successfully complete the revolution in China. Domestically, millions of Chinese suffered and starved during the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Great Leap Forward.

Internationally, tensions were mounting between China and both the Soviet Union and the United States. Mao, who had orchestrated the Great Leap Forward, felt threatened about his legitimacy and was concerned about maintaining his position as the leader of China. Indeed, Mao’s reputation was tarnished by the early 1960s. Other leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaopping, Chen Yun, and Zhou Enlai, who were as seasoned revolutionaries as Mao, advocated a gradual model to revolutionize China because they understood the implications of radical policies as seen in the case of the Great Leap Forward. Mao and his entourage, including his wife Jiang Qing, disagreed.

The cult of Mao. Source: Chineseposters.net

In order to consolidate his power, Mao appointed a man named Lin Biao as the new Minister of Defense, making Lin the de facto leader of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were busy stabilizing the economy after the Great Leap Forward, Mao used the army to cement his power.

Lin Biao and his faction brought together a selection of Mao’s writings and published them in what is infamously known as the “Little Red Book.” The copies of this book were distributed to all Chinese soldiers for them to memorize and study. By 1963, there were clearly two different revolutionary visions in China.

Mao, who wished to forge ahead with his revolutionary ideals, insulated himself from criticism and kept only “yes men,” such as Lin Biao, close to him because they followed Mao’s command without question. On the other hand, Deng and Liu opted for a safer and more conservative approach, and many of them paid for their criticisms; both Deng and Liu were shamed and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution.

Lei Feng: Then and Now In 1963, Lin Biao, with Mao’s full support, developed the propaganda detailing Mao’s vision for the socialist future in China. The campaign focused on highlighting a young soldier, Lei Feng, who had died for his country. When Lei Feng’s journal got published after his death, he came to represent the emblematic PLA soldier who was a selfless revolutionary completely

devoted to Mao Zedong. However, it later came to light that the diary was fake and written by the propaganda team within the PLA. Lei Feng’s Journal was a symbol of service and obedience to the Communist Party.

He was presented as an honest, if somewhat naïve, hardworking laborer who had joined the party. Lei’s family was described as having suffered under the oppression of the KMT, evil capitalist landlords as they were described, as well as the Japanese occupation. In the end, Lei’s death was presented as a selfless act in which he died heroically while trying to save his comrade. The Diary of Lei Feng was taught in elementary schools, indoctrinating young children with revolutionary zeal. Through the revolutionary martyr Lei Feng, the CCP was able to tailor their message to young children that servitude to the party should come before everything else.

Despite the fact that his diary was fabricated by the PLA’s propaganda unit, Lei Feng is still remembered as a revolutionary martyr in China today.

People perceive him as a figure who embodies the values of the “good ol’ days,” and the CCP continues to use his image to promote the idea that people should live in accordance with socialist values.

The year 2013 was the 50th anniversary of Lei Feng’s death and the CCP launched a propaganda campaign to honor him, encouraging young Chinese to become “modern-day Lei Fengs.” The party acknowledged several “selfless” teachers, doctors, cadres, and army officers, elevating their good deeds (e.g. teaching handicapped children in the countryside for almost no pay, providing free dental service to people who could not afford it).

In their effort to curb growing corruption within the CCP and increasing capitalistic characteristics in Chinese society, the CCP is actively utilizing old symbols of revolutionary zeal, promoting good deeds and good Samaritans within the community. Not all of the local population, however, views these propaganda messages with enthusiasm. Cynicism towards the CCP’s propaganda efforts certainly exists, indicating that The Diary of Lei Feng was not well received by everyone since the 1960s.

The Cultural Revolution Lei Feng poster. Source: Chineseposters.net

The Cultural Revolution in China is a period of time that is still not thoroughly

understood. Most of the information about the period available in the West comes from Chinese defectors or questionable sources. Because the Chinese government has not released the archives from this period, if there are any, a lot of the information we have is confusing, confounded, and hard to corroborate. The general view of the Cultural Revolution in the West is that China was in complete chaos and anarchy during this period.

However, there are some indications that despite the overall violence and ruthlessness, chaos might not be the best way to describe the period. For example, during the same time as the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government undertook several enormous infrastructure projects, such as the construction of the Beijing Metro. This tells historians that China was not in a complete state of anarchy as some sources suggest, though it is clear that there were many problems in the country at the time.

The bottom line is that we might never know what actually happened during the Cultural Revolution and given the paucity of sources, so it is wise to keep an open mind and place the events of the Cultural Revolution into a larger historical context rather than viewing them individually as an isolated incident.

Throughout the early 1960s, intellectuals continued to find ways to criticize the party, using allegory and metaphor to write stinging critiques. Mao was at a loss for what to do and in 1965 he declared that there would be a new campaign against “reactionary bourgeois ideology.” However, the response to the campaign was weak

and Mao grew even more frustrated with the lack of revolutionary zeal for his ideas to create a socialist utopia in China. In tandem with Mao’s frustration, Lin Biao reformed the army and in a drastic move abolished all insignia on uniforms, making generals, officers, and low-level infantry indistinguishable from each other. At the same time, Mao’s wife upped her revolutionary propaganda campaign in the realm of theatre and arts, having cadres perform plays and revolutionary operas throughout the country. By 1966, she secured her influence over the Ministry of Culture.

Poster depicting children respecting and praising Mao. Source: Chineseposters.net

By 1966, Mao and his supporters were ready to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to promote his

revolutionary vision. From the beginning the movement was divided between the more radical Shanghai Faction, which included Mao’s wife, and the less radical faction of intellectuals who supported the revolution but did not agree with some of the methods that Jiang Qing employed.

These factional cleavages grew deeper as disgruntled urban and educated youths who were frustrated at the lack of jobs and the campaigns to send them down to work in the countryside chose sides. Students quickly took up the revolutionary cause and were given red armbands, declaring them to be part of the “Red Guards”. As the revolutionary fervour grew, the more radical factions called for purges, subjecting many older revolutionaries and their families to intense criticism and humiliation.

Propaganda during the Cultural Revolution.

Source: Chineseposters.net

Leaders of the Cultural Revolution attacked what they called the “four olds” of Chinese society: old customs, old habits, old culture, and old thinking. As you can see, these phrases were ambiguous and open to interpretation, and the Red Guards were able to manipulate them in any way they wanted. There was widespread fear and violence throughout the country as Red Guards attacked anyone who they decided still adhered to the four olds or those who directly or indirectly questioned the authority of the Red Guards. The extent of the violence suggests the real frustrations that the younger generation of Chinese felt with the problems in society. By the end of 1967, the CCP realized that they needed to reign in the Red Guards, who were wreaking havoc throughout the country. They were beginning to fight one another in factional battles throughout the countryside. It took the party almost a year to get them in check.

One of the lasting legacies of the Cultural Revolution was that it completely fractured the education system in China.

During this time, most universities were closed and college students became Red Guards. They were “sent down” to the countryside to learn from the peasants.

However, an entire generation of elites essentially lost out on their university education. There were many victims in the Cultural Revolution, and the time was definitely tumultuous. After the failures of the Great Leap Forward and the unhinging of youths who ran-sacked the countryside unchecked for a few years, Chinese people sought stability, and were

also looking to their leaders to head them in a direction that would increase their standard of living. By 1969, Mao’s authority within the upper echelons of the party was severely damaged, yet it was not until his death in 1976 and a changing of the guard that China would emerge from the problems orchestrated by a small group of Mao’s supporters.

Reopening the Doors to the West: Nixon in China During the Cultural Revolution, China was closed to the outside world. China was hoping to make its own way and provide a model for other countries to follow its path to socialism without the help of the Soviets or aid from the United States.

However, the Chinese leaders quickly realized that they did not have the proper technology or resources to carry out some of the advanced projects, such as offshore drilling, oil refining, and large construction like the Three Gorges Dam. By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP agreed to hold a meeting with then U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1972 to discuss transfers of technology. Some hard-liners within the CCP were opposed to this move, arguing that China should focus on developing models of socialist self-reliance. However, in the end, the reform-minded members won; these reformers were more in touch with the Chinese public, which was growing intolerable of Mao’s vision for revolution.

Mao and Nixon.

Source: White House Photo Office

Since the establishment of the PRC, China had lobbied hard for a seat on the UN Security Council, which was held by the KMT government in Taiwan. By the end of the 1960s, the PRC had enough support from non-aligned countries, to an extent that the United States could no longer oppose Chinese entry, resulting in Taiwan’s forced withdraw from the UN. The United States was also interested in creating a diplomatic relationship with China. China and the United States knew that the two countries had a common concern, which was curbing the Soviet Union’s monopolistic power in global affairs. Under the Kennedy administration, high-level diplomatic exchanges occurred between the United States and China and secret meetings were held in Warsaw, Poland. In the 1970s, China became increasingly concerned about Soviet troop build-up along the border in Xinjiang and asked Nixon to visit China to discuss the matter. Henry Kissinger, who was the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, secretly headed to Beijing to meet with Zhou Enlai to plan Nixon’s visit to China. Nixon’s trip

was a great success from both a diplomatic and public relations standpoint. It resulted in a joint communiqué from the two nations, in which they addressed issues involving Vietnam and the Korean peninsula. The two governments also discussed the status of Taiwan, which was a crucial question since the United States had continued to support Chiang Kaishek’s increasingly oppressive regime in Taiwan. Most importantly, the two countries agreed on scholarly and technological exchanges and to work towards the normalization of their relationship. Nixon’s visit to China is considered as one of the most important diplomatic manoeuvres of the twentieth century.

The Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four At the end of 1974, Mao became severely ill and the CCP prepared for a leadership change. Zhou Enlai, who was orchestrating policies from behind the scenes, was also suffering from cancer. At a micro level, China was running a deficit since they began to import technology from the West. This alerted many of the party’s “radicals,” such as Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, who criticized reformers for bowing to the imperialists and worshiping foreign goods rather then concentrating on taking care of domestic issues. By the beginning of 1976, Zhou Enlai had died of cancer and it was clear that Mao would soon die, too.

Mao’s inner circle worked tirelessly to

ensure that Hua Guofeng, Mao’s chosen successor, would replace Mao after he died.

In the meantime, Deng Xiaoping and his economists worked to fix the economy. In an effort to consolidate his power, Hua Guofeng purged Deng and ostracized him from the party for the second time (Deng was purged during the Cultural Revolution as well). This effectively removed Deng from power for a short period before Mao’s death. While this political turmoil was occurring behind the scenes, the July 1976 earthquake hit China, one of the largest earthquakes in its history. The death toll reached approximately 800,000.

China declined assistance for the humanitarian crisis from the UN and had the PLA step up to help with the rescue efforts. This helped to improve the PLA’s reputation, which was tarnished by the Cultural Revolution, in the eyes of the Chinese public. Two months after the earthquake in September 1976, Mao died and a week-long mourning period was instituted.

The Gang of Four.

After Mao died, Deng quickly worked within his extensive and expansive political networks to root out the party radicals who had purged him twice and disregarded his economic advice since the late 1950s. Deng and other high-ranking PLA members who were ready for change managed to convince Hua Guofeng to have Mao’s wife and her cronies arrested

and tried for the crimes of the Cultural Revolution. They became known internationally as “the Gang of Four.”

CCP. In the next few years, Deng would work to push out Hua Guofeng and implement his macro-economic vision for a new and changing China.

Deng Xiaoping and the Four Modernizations: A New Revolutionary Path?

Anti-Gang of Four poster.

Source: Black and White Cat

Their trial provided some closure for the party for the disgraces of the Cultural Revolution and in some ways provided the necessary scapegoats to begin the process of reconciliation. Although the most destructive events of the Cultural Revolution took place between the chaotic years of 1966-1969, some scholars argue that the Cultural Revolution was not really over until the end of the trial of the Gang of Four, which placed the blame squarely on certain radical members of the party for the events of the previous years. As Deng worked to bring about massive changes to the economy from behind the scenes, Hua Guofeng continued as the Chairman of the Central Committee of the

Deng was a survivor of the Long March and had been central to the party apparatus for almost six decades. He had survived the Pacific War, the Civil War, the turmoil of the first years of the PRC and the Cultural Revolution. He was an adept political strategist and an incredible macro-economist. After Mao’s death, he planned his comeback quietly and carefully. In 1977, Deng was reappointed as the Vice-Premier of the Politburo and controlled the CCP from behind the scenes, although Hua remained the face of the party. Under the surface, there were incredible struggles over the future of the party and the direction China should take with regards to both foreign and domestic policies.

By the late 1970s, the reliance on the collective was slowly being replaced with individual and local initiatives. These policies, known collectively as the four modernizations—encompassing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense—required foreign investment in China and training of

Chinese students overseas. This policy was called “socialist modernization” and was meant to bring about the changes needed to institute a communist society more slowly, as Marx had intended. Small-scale entrepreneurs were closely monitored by the state, but pilot projects allowed them to test the waters of the free market.

Farmers were allowed to sell their surpluses on the market, and small-scale mom-and-pop shops opened. The economy was still tightly controlled, with the party keeping a firm grip on the prices of commodities, but the groundwork had been laid for change.

from the changes to economic policies— the elites of the previous generation—had been pardoned by the party and were ready to make their re-emergence on the economic and social scene in China. In essence, the party knew that it needed the connections, business savvy and cultural capital of these people in order to implement some of the economic changes it envisioned.

Deng Xiaoping with Jimmy Carter during his visit to the United States.

Source: White House Photo Office

A Fifth Modernization?

Deng Xiaoping. Source: Wiki Wargame

At the same time, the Party went about rectifying some of the damage it had done to intellectuals and landlord since the anti-rightist campaigns, offering apologies to families and those who had suffered.

This meant that as China entered a new era, those equipped to benefit the most

People in China referred somewhat sardonically to a “fifth modernization”—or democracy. People had grievances that they did not feel were being addressed by the party. After the trial of the Gang of Four helped to put the Cultural Revolution behind them, regular citizens began to air their grievances in public. In Beijing outside of the Forbidden City, a large wall was covered with posters and came to be known as “the Democracy Wall” where

citizens wrote large character posters that criticized the party and their lack of foresight in planning the economy. This harkened back to the May Fourth Movement and people drew on the symbols of this important event in Chinese history to indicate that this was a moment for change. The posters had an important impact, but one in particular stood out. It was by a man named Wei Jingsheng and he wrote that in order for the Four Modernizations to work, China needed to embrace democracy where there were free elections and people could choose their own leaders—or a fifth modernization.

As Deng Xiaoping left for a tour of the United States, the PLA cracked down on the growing democracy movement in China. By the beginning of 1979, a number of people, including Wei Jingsheng were arrested. Wei was tried and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The crackdown essentially quelled any more dissidence from society, and as people began to reap the benefits of more liberal economic policies in the 1980s, they were less likely to complain about some of the draconian techniques the party used to suppress the voices of their own people. The movement left its mark on the party and the people and echoes of it would reverberate all the way down to the Tiananmen protests ten years later. The government also realized that in order to keep the people happy, they needed to push full speed ahead with the four modernizations. Maybe people would stop asking for the fifth modernization if the economy was doing very well?

Special Economic Zones and the Development of China As China embarked on a new economic course in the late 1970s, its leaders needed to figure out what to do about their relationship with Taiwan. It was agreed between the United States, Taiwan, and the PRC that they would begin to “normalize� their political relationships.

The PRC needed connections to wealthy Taiwanese businessmen for investment and bean to reach out to the KMT government in Taipei.

Special Economic Zones in China. Source: BBC

Another challenge that the CCP faced was how and where to institute the reforms of the four modernizations. China was still largely an agricultural society in the late 1970s. The CCP focused on developing and

reforming urban centers, designating a number of special economic zones (SEZ) throughout China. The first SEZs were opened in southern China: Zhuhai was just across the border from Macao, Shenzhen was across the border from Hong Kong (which remained part of the British Commonwealth until 1997), and Shantou and Xiamen were facing Taiwan and had been treaty ports in the past. All of these cities were along the southern coast of Guangzhou and Fujian provinces.

These SEZs offered cheap labour and thus low costs, as well as tax incentives for foreign investors. Soon, foreign investors (at first mostly Taiwanese and Japanese) came to the mainland and the SEZs became a manufacturing hub for the world.

As the manufacturing sector began to grow, the government shifted its focus to agriculture. They began to import agricultural technology and invested in large-scale infrastructure programs such as irrigation system that would increase yields and change agriculture in China from a venture of sustenance into agribusiness. There were some ups and downs at the beginning of the 1980s, but as the economy gradually improved owing to the development in the new SEZs, the government was able to divert fiscal resources to improve living conditions in the countryside. People in China were beginning to feel the benefits of the revolution, but how socialist it was is still questionable.

Amid all these new developments, Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power. By the

early 1980s, Deng, with the support of the army and the intellectuals, as well as his protĂŠgĂŠs Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, had manoeuvred Hua out of power.

The One-Child Policy By 1982, the census confirmed that the population of China had reached a billion people. This had a profound impact on policymakers who were well aware that if the population kept growing at the same rate, there would be nothing that the country could do to support it.

Furthermore, the growing population in China was accompanied by gender imbalance and the young age of the population. At the same time, life expectancy was rising rapidly. Sex ratios were skewed heavily in favour of boys, who were preferred because they were not married out of the family. Although the CCP had issued several laws concerning the size of families in the 1950s, but the famines and general turmoil in the countryside throughout the 1950s and 1960s managed to keep birth rates low. In general, fertility rates were around 2.2 percent in 1980, which was much lower than those in poorer countries.

However, this was not low enough. In 1980, Hua Guofeng made a speech stating that families should strive to have only one child, emphasizing the importance of family planning in China’s long-term economic goals. Part of this strategy was to increase the average age for men and women to get married by a few years, and

to tell couples to wait a year or two after marriage before having children. This generally decreases the number of years a woman is fertile, a method that has long been used for population control in poor countries. Ethnic minorities were exempt from such policies, which generated resentment among the Han population.

Some communities were quite strict with the policy, enforcing sterilization of women who had more than two children.

Other communities were more relaxed and in some places the policy became known as the “three strikes your own.�

Families were allowed to keep trying to have a son, but if their first three children were girls, then they had to stop there.

A poster encouraging people to have one child per household. Source: Alamy

The CCP also introduced financial penalties for people who violated the onechild policy. In general, people who had more than one child were made to pay a large fine, and then had to pay for their children to attend school and for their medical bills (rather than a state public school and state funded medical care).

This resulted in an urban-rural divide; wealthier people in the cities were capable of and willing to pay the large fines to have more than one child, whereas people in

the countryside could not afford to do so.

Although the policy did manage to curb the growing population, some demographers argue that the long-range implications of this policy are yet to be felt.

As China’s population ages, there are less young people to take care of the elderly.

This is, of course, a serious issue that many other countries face today, but the scale and magnitude of the problem in China is much grander given its size. It will be interesting to see how China deals with its aging population in the coming years as the Chinese government began to re-assess the one-child policy.

Tiananmen Square and the Crackdown on the Democracy Movement By the late 1980s, it was apparent that some people were benefiting greatly from the economic reforms, while people in the countryside continued to toil in poverty.

The government was faced with the task of controlling over one billion people, regulating foreign investment, revising the school system that had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and rehabilitating Chinese academics and intellectuals in ways that they could be of service to the state. It was a daunting task, but the government had a large bureaucracy behind it, and the people knew from their recent past that the government was not afraid to suppress any forms of dissent if needed. There were claims of corruption among party officials

and people began to call for more transparency. There were also calls for more even distribution of wealth, as people in some of the SEZs amassed great fortunes, and for the first time ever the China announced a trade surplus in 1982.

In 1989, tensions reached a breaking point, and by mid-May, over one million Chinese from all spheres of society assembled in Tiananmen Square, demanding a dialogue with the CCP leaders. The protesters, who were mostly students, wanted to bring an end to corruption and begin talks about instituting some democratic reforms in China. At the time, then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was making a historic visit to Beijing after thirty-three years of strained relations between the Soviet Union and China. Students filled Tiananmen Square, some of them going on a series of hunger strikes. The Western media was already in China for Gorbachev’s visit and many of the reporters quickly began to cover the protests in Tiananmen, bringing international attention to the movement.

The Chinese government responded to the protests by declaring martial law but the people of Beijing remained defiant, blocking the entrance of the army into the city. Finally, on June 3, 1989, hard-liners in the CCP ordered that tanks and riot police be sent in to smash through the crowds. Many people were killed, and ringleaders of the demonstrations were rounded up and jailed. In the aftermath, Deng Xiaoping offered thanks to those in the PLA, whom he said had fought bravely to protect their nation. This comment solidified in the minds of the Chinese people that Deng fully supported the government crackdown on Tiananmen, and in fact, might have ordered it personally.

Tanks in Beijing. Source: Politics in Spires

Tiananmen Square, Beijing. Source: Cross Map

In the end, many dissidents were jailed, protesters were killed, and the party lost its legitimacy. Soon after, Deng, a revolutionary from the Long March, stepped down and ushered in a new era of Chinese politics under Jiang Zemin. It was the first time that a leader in China since the 1940s had not been part of the revolutionary struggle or the Long March, but was a product of it. The changes that China underwent in the 1990s and 2000s

were sweeping, and the shape of the revolution continued to change as China adapted to its new place in Asia. However, the echoes of Tiananmen are still felt in China, and people know that their leaders are capable and willing to suppress opposition movements. For the meantime, it seems that if the country continues to prosper economically, the fifth modernization will wait, and the Chinese Revolution under the Chinese Communist Party continues, albeit in a different form.

Useful Websites China Overview from the World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china /overview Information about the Cultural Revolution http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/cultural _revolution.htm University of Washington website about the Cultural Revolution http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph /9wenge.htm Propaganda Posters from the Cultural Revolution http://chineseposters.net/themes/culturalrevolution-campaigns.php Three-page downloadable PDF from Stanford about the Cultural Revolution http://iisdb.stanford.edu/docs/115/CRintro.pdf BBC Website about the Cultural Revolution http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/speci al_report/1999/09/99/china_50/cult.htm Documentary on YouTube about the Cultural Revolution http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPuvFXv 8Gos

New Yorker article about Lei Feng http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/eva nosnos/2013/03/fact-checking-a-chinesehero.html Remembering Nixon in China—Forty Years Later. Article from the NY Times with good videos http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/2 1/recalling-nixon-in-china-40-yearslater/?_r=0 Information from the US Government about Nixon’s Visit to China http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/modern/j b_modern_nixchina_1.html Recordings and Documents from the Nixon Library about his trip to China http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/t apeexcerpts/chinatapes.php Postings from the National Security Archive about Nixon’s Trip to China http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/N SAEBB106/press.htm National Archives Teaching Module about Nixon in China http://docsteach.org/activities/13326/detail PBS website about Nixon in China http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/sfeat ure/nixon.html University of Washington website about the Four Modernizations http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph /9confour.htm Economic development in China after Mao— presented by Economics professor in the UC system http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/china2. htm Quick notes about China under Deng Xiaoping http://ibguides.com/history/notes/chinaunder-deng-xiaoping-economic-policies-andthe-four-modernizations

Short online article about the Four Modernizations http://www.chaos.umd.edu/history/prc4.htm l Modern Chinese Literature resources—online bibliography http://mclc.osu.edu/ Google LIFE magazine image search http://images.google.com/hosted/life Online primary sources from Fordham University http://www.fordham.edu/HALSALL/eastasia /eastasiasbook.asp#China Since World War II Maps of China—all kinds of political and social maps from the UT collections http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/china.html Princeton University hosts a nice explaination about the Gang of Four http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/w iki100k/docs/Gang_of_Four.html Asia for Educators—the Fifth Modernization http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/wei_ji ngsheng_fifth_modernization.pdf

History Channel “On this Day” about Tiananmen Square in 1989 http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/tiananmen-square-massacre-takesplace National Security Archives articles hosted by George Washington University about Tiananmen Square and what the United States knew about it. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/N SAEBB16/ BBC “On This Day” June 4, 1989—video and history of Tiananmen Square Incident http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/st ories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm Atlantic article “Tiananmen Square, Then and Now” by Alan Taylor—photo journal essay http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2012/06 /tiananmen-square-then-and-now/100311/

Suggestions for Further Reading

Maps of China’s Special Economic Zones http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5e n/conc5en/China_SEZ.html

Ashiwa Yoshiko and David L. Wank. Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Princeton hosts a short essay about China’s Special Economic Zones http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/w iki100k/docs/Special_Economic_Zone.html

Baranovitch, Nimrod. “Others No More: The Changing Representation of Non-Han Peoples in Chinese History Textbooks, 1951-2003.” The Journal of Asian Studies 69.1 (February 2010): 85-122.

Article about governing China using the model from the Special Economic zones from the Economist http://www.economist.com/node/21540285

Baum, Richard. Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party and the Peasant Question, 1962-66. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

Article from the World Bank about China’s Special Economic Zones http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk /china-s-special-economic-zones-andindustrial-clusters-success-and-challenges

Belléer-Hann, Ildiko. Community matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949: towards a historical anthropology of the Uyghur.

Boston: Brill, 2008.

Bennett, Gordon. Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership.

Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California Press, 1976.

Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Bianco, Lucien. Peasants without the Party: Grass-Root Movements in TwentiethCentury China. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001.

Bianco, Lucien. Rural Disturbances on the Eve of the Chinese Revolution.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Brown, Jeremy and Paul G. Pickowicz.

Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Brugger, Bill, and David Kelly. Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Chan Anita, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger. Chen Village Under Mao and Deng. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992.

Chan, Alfred L. Mao’s Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China’s Great Leap Forward. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Chan, Anita. Children of Mao: personality development and political activism in the Red Guard generation. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Chang, Liu. “Making Revolution in Jiangnan."

Modern China 29 (January 2003): 3-37.

Clayton, Cathryn H. Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chinessness.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Cohen, Paul. “The 1949 Divide in Chinese History,” in Jeffrey Wasserstrom (ed.)

Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Cohen, Paul A. Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Cohen, Paul. “The Post-Mao Reforms in Historical Perspective.” Journal of Asian Studies 47 (1988): 518-540.

Dahpon, David Ho. “To Protect and Preserve: Resisting the Destroy the Four Olds Campaign, 1966-1967,” in The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.

David Apter and Tony Saich. Revolutionary discourse in Mao's Republic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Dryer, June Teufel. “China’s Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution.” China Quarterly 35 (1985): 96-109.

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