Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs | Fall/Winter 2014

Georgetown Journal of

ASIAN AFFAIRS Vol. 1 | No. 1 | Fall/Winter 2014

GROWTH OF POWER China’s Policy toward Japan: Looking for a Great Power Peace in the Wrong Places Nicholas Khoo

GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY Hong Kong and the Demise of “One Country, Two Systems” Joseph Bosco

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Leadership and Mandates: India’s Prospects for Economic Reforms under Narendra Modi Irfan Nooruddin

Negotiating Growth in Asia with an introduction by Kurt M. Campbell

Published by the Asian Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Georgetown Journal of

ASIAN AFFAIRS Vol. 1 | No. 1 | Fall/Winter 2014

The Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs is the flagship scholarly publication of the Asian Studies Program housed within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Established in 2014, the Journal aims to provide a forum for scholars and practitioners in the field of Asian affairs to exchange ideas and publish research that further the understanding of the world’s largest and most populous continent.

The views expressed in this issue do not necessarily reflect those of the Journal’s editors and advisors, the Asian Studies Program, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University.

Fall/Winter 2014 [i]

editorial board Editor-in-Chief Scott Wingo Managing Editor Zi Yang Senior Editors Andy Nguyen Thomas Snyder

Assistant Editors Sasha Han Alex Rued Brian Wielk

Founding Publisher Daye Lee

advisory board Amitav Acharya American University

Philip Kafalas Georgetown University

Saadia Pekkanen University of Washington

Charles Armstrong Columbia University

David Kang USC

Jordan Sand Georgetown University

Harley Balzer Georgetown University

Christine Kim Georgetown University

David Shambaugh George Washington University

Carol Benedict Georgetown University

Joanna Lewis Georgetown University

Gi-Wook Shin Stanford University

Kurt Campbell The Asia Group

Kristen Looney Georgetown University

Sheila Smith Council on Foreign Relations

Victor Cha Georgetown University

Mike Mochizuki George Washington University

James Steinberg Syracuse University

Bruce Dickson George Washington University

Andrew Nathan Columbia University

Elizabeth Stephen Georgetown University

Evelyn Goh Australian National University

Irfan Nooruddin Georgetown University

Robert Sutter George Washington University

Michael Green Georgetown University

Michael O’Hanlon Brookings Institution

Yuhki Tajima Georgetown University

Christopher Johnson CSIS

Lynn Parisi University of Colorado

Andrew Yeo Catholic University of America

Send inquiries to: SFS Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University Box 571040, 37th and O Streets, NW Washington, DC 20057 Email: guasiajournal@gmail.com Fax: (202) 687-7397 [ii] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

contents Volume 1 | Number 1 | Fall/Winter 2014

1

Editor’s Note

3

Introduction Addressing Challenges and Opportunities in Asia Kurt Campbell

Research 5

Small State, Big Influence China’s North Korea Policy Dilemma Tianyi Wang

28

Contribution of Corporate Social Investment to Livelihoods of Lao People After Relocation Young Sokphea

49

China’s Policy toward Japan Looking for a Great Power Peace in the Wrong Places Nicholas Khoo

77 The Political Force of Cereal How Dependent are North Koreans on the State?

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Issue Survey 101 Dire Straits National Security Competition between China and the United States in the Strait of Malacca Michael Sliwinski Fall/Winter 2014 [iii]

Policy 115 Myanmar and U.S. Policy Platitudes, Progress, and Potential Problems David Steinberg

123 Leadership and Mandates India’s Prospects for Economic Reforms under Narendra Modi Irfan Nooruddin

127 Hong Kong and the Demise of “One Country, Two Systems” Joseph Bosco

135 Common Misconceptions about the China-South Korea Relationship Ellen Kim

Perspective 141 The Growth of the Chinese Military An Interview with Dennis Wilder 149 Indonesia’s Future Trajectory under Joko Widodo An Interview with Marcus Mietzner 157 Political Change in Thailand An Interview with Duncan McCargo

[iv] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Editor’s Note

Negotiating Growth in Asia Asia’s rapid growth is one of the most important stories of the twenty-first century.

Billions of people are emerging from poverty on the world’s most populous continent in what has to be considered the world’s most significant economic success story to date. The transformation of the lives of people in Asia has far-reaching effects on actors both inside and outside the region who, in turn, must try to keep pace. This issue’s theme, “Negotiating Growth in Asia,” is about how governments and citizens alike react to dynamic changes across the region.

With respect to global geopolitics, China is drawing significant attention from the international community. As the home of the world’s largest population and second-largest economy, China has a unique potential to challenge the United States as an international superpower. States in Asia thus face a dilemma in how to negotiate China’s growth—they can “bandwagon” with a rising China, lean on the United States as an offshore balancer, or pursue an in-between “hedging” strategy. In this issue, our interview with Dennis Wilder highlights China’s military modernization.

Nicholas Khoo’s article provides an in-depth analysis of Sino-Japanese relations in the context of a great power peace theory, while Ellen Kim’s piece challenges commonly held views toward South Korea’s response to the rise of China. Michael Sliwinski’s issue survey explores Sino-U.S. security tensions in the Strait of Malacca. Meanwhile, Tianyi Wang’s article seeks to explain how North Korea is able to influence China’s foreign policy despite being a much weaker state.

Fast-paced growth also places strains on domestic political systems. In many places, as wealthier and better-informed citizens exert more demands on their governments, leaders are often challenged to choose responses along a continuum between democratization and authoritarian crackdown. The recent pro-election protests in economically developed Hong Kong and the sympathetic reaction in similarly affluent Taiwan make this abundantly clear, as Joseph Bosco writes in his article. In this issue, Marcus Mietzner provides a cautiously optimistic picture of democratization in Indonesia following the election of President Joko Widodo. At the same time, in their analyses of Myanmar and Thailand, David Steinberg and Duncan McCargo respectively remind us that democratic growth is not to be taken for granted.

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Editor’s Note

Finally, economic growth itself creates a raft of issues for policymakers to negotiate. What happens when growth might benefit some more than others, as in the case of the Lao hydroelectric projects described by Young Sokphea? In other cases, entrenched interests opposing reform may create headaches for growth-minded leaders, as in the New Delhi halls of power described by Irfan Nooruddin, or for growth-minded citizens, as is happening in the North Korean food markets described by Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein. Economic growth may be a very positive process, but it is not always an easy one to navigate.

Putting together a volume exploring these topics required great effort on the part of many people, and I am deeply grateful for their contributions. Special thanks go to our authors, reviewers, editors, and advisors for working with a tough publication schedule and ensuring that our inaugural issue sets the stage for what should be a long and successful run. I would also like to thank Victor Cha, who originated the idea for an Asian studies journal at Georgetown University and whose support was crucial in its establishment, and Kurt Campbell, who graciously agreed to write an introduction for this issue. I am equally grateful for the Georgetown faculty and staff, especially Kat Harrington Fiske and Robert Lyons in the SFS Asian Studies Program, who rallied behind the idea of launching a new journal. I am also grateful for the support of the Georgetown University Library and Cenveo Publisher Services. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Daye Shim Lee for bringing her experience as an editor to build this brand-new publication.

Electronic copies of this issue will also be available online through the Asian Studies Program’s website and DigitalGeorgetown. It has been a great honor and privilege to serve as the inaugural Editor-in-Chief of the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs. I hope that you enjoy this issue and many more to come in the future.

Scott Wingo Editor-in-Chief

[2] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Campbell | Introduction

Introduction: Addressing Challenges and Opportunities in Asia Kurt Campbell

As the United States gears up for a range of complex twenty-first century challenges—such as climate change, militant Islamic trends, rising nationalism, and proliferation—the dominant storyline for global politics is likely to play out in the Asia-Pacific region. The massive area stretching from Japan to India houses the lion’s share of global wealth and the hopes of a new and aspirational generation of Asia-Pacific citizens. The United States has had a long-standing and successful strategy in the Asia-Pacific based on building strong security partnerships and engaging new regional players. For nearly half a century, the United States has provided and underwritten many aspects of Asia’s operating system, including the free flow of goods, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the maintenance of stability and security.

However, challenges to this framework are arriving on a regular and sustained basis. Matters relating to disputed maritime territories, military provocations, and economic nationalism all threaten the tranquility that has led Asia to become the cockpit of the global economy. Understanding these security trends, reflecting on them, and, finally, prescribing innovative policy approaches for this dynamic region will be the first order of business for a new generation of students and scholars focused on Asia.

No university has done more than Georgetown to address the challenges and opportunities associated with a rising Asia. With a dynamic faculty and outstanding students, Georgetown is well-positioned to consider key questions that will animate future debates on Asia. For instance, how will China’s rise impact the world? Is the region heading toward greater community, or will heightened nationalism threaten to undermine mutual progress? Where is North Korea going? How Fall/Winter 2014 [3]

Introduction

does India figure into the larger Asia-Pacific equation? And, perhaps most importantly, will the United States have the wit and wisdom to remain a dominant and engaged force for good in the most dynamic region on the planet?

These will be among the issues examined in the newly launched Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs. This timely and important initiative promises to open up new avenues of discourse and debate, and to provide a vital outlet for crucial commentary on significant matters of the day. Under the leadership of Scott Wingo, the Journal promises to be lively and relevant. This inaugural issue contains important essays on recent events across the Asia-Pacific, including developments in China-Japan relations, reflections on U.S. Myanmar policy, implications of the recent protests in Hong Kong, and the impact of corporate programs on Lao people’s livelihoods after relocation. Please continue to follow this space for fascinating reading ahead. We look forward to welcoming you to our discussions and debates here at the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs.

Kurt Campbell is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Asia Group, a strategic advisory and investment group that focuses on addressing challenges in modern Asia. From 2009 to 2013, Dr. Campbell served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

[4] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Wang | Small State, Big Influence

Small State, Big Influence: China’s North Korea Policy Dilemma Tianyi Wang This article seeks to analyze why China is reluctant to significantly change its North Korea policy, despite continued North Korean nuclear provocations that have hindered China’s own strategic and security interests. The conventional understandings of China’s desire for a strategic buffer zone, fear of refugee influx, ideological affinities with the Korean regime, and desire for trade with North Korea are insufficient explanations for China’s policy rigidity. Instead, taking literature on behaviors of small and big powers during the Cold War period as a theoretical framework, this article finds that North Korea is able to influence China’s policy options more than China is able to influence North Korea’s conduct. As a small power, North Korea can ignore its influence on international society and pursue parochial interests. On the other hand, China must consider the global implications of its policies before it reacts to North Korea’s behavior.

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted its third underground nuclear test, potentially improving its capacity to develop miniaturized nuclear devices for delivery on intercontinental ballistic missiles.1 In response to yet another nuclear provocation, then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi summoned the North Korean ambassador to China on the same day of the test in order to express China’s strong dissatisfaction and opposition, reiterating China’s consistent stance on “denuclearization and maintaining [the] peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.”2 On 7 March 2013, the Chinese government supported the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 (UNSCR 2094), which authorized new sanctions designed to dissuade North Korea from conducting additional nuclear

“Waijiaobu jiu Chaoxian disanci heshiyan fabiao shengming” 外交部就朝鲜第三次实施核试验发表 声明[Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued statement regarding DPRK’s third nuclear test],” Xinhua 新华网, February 12, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-02/12/c_114671733.htm.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Yang Jiechi jiu Chaoxian disanci heshi xiang Chaofang tichu yanzhengjiaoshe” 杨洁篪就朝鲜第三次核试向朝方提出严正交涉 [Yang Jiechi lodged solemn representation concerning the third nuclear test launched by DPRK], http://www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1013370.shtml.

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and ballistic missile activities.3 On the same day, officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) debated over whether to keep or abandon its relationship with North Korea at a session titled “Friendship with Foreign Countries,” a side session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that was open to news media.4 To many analysts, these messages indicate that China has signaled a shift in its North Korea policy and may abandon North Korea as its long-term ally.5

However, the Chinese government rejected interpretations that China may have significantly changed its North Korea policy. At a press conference during the plenary meeting of the National People’s Congress in March 2013, Yang Jiechi claimed that China’s support for stricter sanctions on North Korea should not be viewed as a fundamental shift in the direction of China’s North Korea policy.6 In addition, trade along the Chinese border has continued as usual and the public bus service between Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, China, and North Korea is still running. The bus runs from Yanji, the capital of Yanbian, to Rasong, a free-trade zone jointly developed by China and North Korea.7 Officials in Dandong, a city in China’s northeast which borders North Korea, confirmed that border trade policy remained the same and trade did not appear to have slowed down.8 In an interview with China News Network, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Liu Yuan supported UN sanctions on North Korea, but meanwhile recognized “North Korea’s need for self-protection against the United States.”9 Similarly, Luo Zhaohui, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated during an interview with Xinhua, “[China] resolutely opposes North Korea’s nuclear test, but also recognizes that North Korea has a reason to be concerned about its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “2013 nian 3 yue 7 ri waijiaobu fayanren Hua Chunying zhuchi lixing jizhehui” 2013年3月7日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会 [March 7, 2013 Regular Press Conference with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hua Chunying], http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1019372.shtml.

4 Jane Perlez, “China Says It Won’t Forsake North Korea, Despite Support for U.N. Sanctions,” New York Times, March 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/asia/china-says-it-will-not-abandonnorth-korea.html.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Charlotte So, “Business as Usual along North Korean border with China,” South China Morning Post, April 13, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1213472/business-usual-along-north-korean-border-china.

8 Ben Blanchard, “China steps up customs checks, but North Korea trade robust,” Reuters, April 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-korea-north-sanctions-china-idUSBRE93T15E20130430.

9 “Liu Yuan deng junfang daibiao tan Chaoxian wenti” 刘源等军方代表谈朝鲜问题 [Liu Yuan and Other Generals on the North Korea Problem], Zhong Xin Wang 中新网, March 8, 2013, http://www.chinanews. com/shipin/cnstv/2013/03-08/news183685.shtml.

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Wang | Small State, Big Influence

security.”10 Why does the Chinese government endorse this perplexing approach to North Korea? Why does China’s North Korea policy seem so rigid despite the fact that North Korea’s provocations hinder China’s security and economic interests?

This article analyzes China’s North Korea policy dilemma. The article endorses conventional perceptions that North Korea endures as a strategic buffer zone to some extent (particularly when there is no ongoing nuclear provocation), but also acknowledges that such thinking is becoming less influential in policy decision-making. While recognizing an influx of refugees into China as a potential problem, this paper asserts this concern alone is not sufficient to maintain China’s current support for North Korea because the regime’s nuclear provocations are far more threatening to China’s regional security. Initially, China and North Korea shared ideological affinities, but deep-rooted historical problems and the widening ideological gap since China’s economic reform suggests China is not likely to support North Korea simply because both states follow communist systems. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner, but China derives more benefit from trade with South Korea. Hence, none of these conventional understandings adequately explain China’s rigid North Korea policy.

This article employs literature on small and large power behaviors as a theoretical framework to analyze China’s North Korea policy rigidity. My argument is premised on three points. First, as a small state, North Korea cares little about the effects of its belligerent and provocative actions at the international level. Thus, North Korea actively uses its leverage to bargain with China through the states’ de jure alliance. Second, as a major power, China has more to lose than North Korea in the event of military conflict on the peninsula. Given this unbalanced relationship, China is essentially held hostage to North Korea. Third, as the United States increases its presence in the Asia-Pacific, the lack of strategic trust between China and the United States reinforces China’s policy dilemma. China is concerned with the purpose of a strong U.S. presence in and policy adjustment towards the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, the U.S. response to North Korean provocations complicates China’s policy calculation. In the next section, I discuss conventional views of China’s continued support for North Korea, despite North Korea’s increasingly provocative posture toward the region. I assess Jenny Jun, “Dealing with a Sore Lip: Parsing China’s Recalculation of North Korea Policy, 38 North, March 29, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/03/jjun032913.

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these conventional understandings and provide counterarguments. Next, I apply the theoretical framework on the behaviors and influence of big and small states to determine why China is reluctant to significantly change its North Korea policy in the face of continued North Korean nuclear provocations. Finally, this article examines China’s recent adjustment in its North Korea policy, as well as implications for future policy changes.

Conventional Answers for China’s Rigid North Korea Policy North Korea as a Strategic Buffer Zone

One conventional understanding asserts that China remains supportive of the North Korean regime because North Korea serves as a buffer zone between China and South Korea, a U.S. ally that provides bases for a U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula. China fears that in the event of a North Korean regime collapse, a strong and unified Korea would present a direct military threat on its border.11 Historically, the Korean peninsula has been a sensitive region for China.

China shares an 870-mile long border with North Korea.12 In the early twentieth century, Japan invaded China via the peninsula. In the late 1950s, a potential invasion by the United States posed a serious security threat to China.13 The China-North Korea alliance began during the Korean War. China’s decision to enter the war was not made easily; although Mao Zedong was determined to dispatch troops across the Yalu when the Korean War broke out, other senior Chinese leaders initially opposed the decision to intervene.14 Yet, the view of North Korea as a buffer zone prevailed, and Chinese “voluntary” forces were sent to defend North Korea as a buffer zone prevailed, and Chinese “voluntary” forces were sent to defend North Korea. By the end of the Korean War, more than half a million Chinese had lost their lives. The Korean War’s huge cost made it difficult for Chinese leadership at the time to make public changes to their policy of maintaining North Korea as a You Ji, “China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, No. 28 (2001): 388.

12 John Ruwitch, “Insight: China’s freeway to North Korea: A road to nowhere,” Reuters, April 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-korea-north-china-insight-idUSBRE93E16P20130415.

13 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: from Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004), 17.

14 Ibid.

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Wang | Small State, Big Influence

strategic buffer zone. In 1961, China and North Korea signed the Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, resulting in the de jure alliance between the two countries and obligating China to defend North Korea against unprovoked aggression.15 The treaty institutionalized and reinforced the view of North Korea as a valuable strategic buffer that China must defend.

However, the value of North Korea as a buffer zone has declined since the end of the Korean War. China normalized diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979. In 1991, the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Finally, Northeast Asia witnessed the normalization of Sino-South Korean relations in 1992.16 China has since achieved rapid economic growth and military modernization. Although strategic mistrust still lingers, China’s regional security environment has substantially improved from that of the Korean War and Cold War period.

North Korea’s continued nuclear tests have made the country a direct security threat to China. North Korea’s third nuclear test indicates the regime has potentially improved its capacity to develop miniaturized nuclear devices for possible delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile.17 A nuclear North Korea helps strengthen the U.S.-Japan-ROK alliances to counter provocations; increase the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula and commitment to missile defenses; enhance North Korea’s capability to deter foreign powers, including China; and bolster the potential threat of a North Korean cross border artillery attack against China (even though North Korea’s ill will and military power is concentrated more on the United States and South Korea).18 On 6 March 2014, the South Korean government reported a North Korean artillery launch minutes before a Chinese commercial plane flew in the same airspace.19 Though the incident appeared to be a The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmin gongheguo youhao hezuo huzhu tiaoyue” 中华人民共和国和朝鲜民 主主义人民共和国友好合作互助条约 [Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea], http://www.npc. gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/25/content_781.htm.

16 Tao Xie, “What’s Wrong with China’s North Korea Policy?” Carnegie Endowment, March 26, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/26/what-s-wrong-with-china-s-north-korea-policy/ftjw.

17 “North Korea conducts third nuclear test,” CBS, February 12, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ north-korea-conducts-third-nuclear-test.

18 William Tobey, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test of China,” Korea Chair Platform, March 13, 2013, http://csis. org/files/publication/130313_NorthKorea’sNuclearTestofChina.pdf.

19 “South Korea says North Endangered Airliner with Artillery Launch,” The Guardian, March 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/06/south-korea-north-airliner-artillery.

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coincidence and did not endanger the safety of Chinese flights, similar events could increase security risks in China’s Northeast region. None of the aforementioned situations serve China’s security interests.20

In addition, the third nuclear test took place along China’s border. According to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the magnitude of the 2013 nuclear test was about twice that of the 2009 test, causing a seismic event of 5.1 magnitude on the Richter scale.21 The potential for environmental contamination has led to growing Chinese public concern over China’s domestic security and social frustration regarding both the North Korean regime and Beijing’s inability to persuade Pyongyang.22 Small-scale protests and demonstrations took place all around China in days following the test. On 16 February 2013, ten protestors gathered outside a shopping mall in Guangzhou with slogans accusing North Korea of “[harming] Chinese land and [destroying] the world environment.”23 On the same day, residents living near the North Korean border protested outside a North Korean consular office in Liaoning Province. During the protest, the demonstrators shouted, “[We] urge the international community to impose harsher economic and military sanctions on North Korea’s autocratic government, and we call on the Chinese government to suspend aid for North Korea.”24 Supporting North Korea has not only failed to ensure China’s security interests, but also imposed new challenges for the domestic legitimacy of Chinese leadership. Thus, the buffer zone has become a trouble zone for China.

Some may argue that North Korea’s nuclear provocations distract major powers’ attention away from China’s military spending and regional aggressiveness and provide justification for China’s increase in military spending. However, in the aftermath of the third nuclear test, China’s military spending budget was not ignored by major powers but instead closely followed and widely reported. China’s role in the region has also been highlighted often as “Chinese aggression” in the Western media: China’s responses to the Philippines’ legal challenge over the maritime disputes was filed within a week of North Korea’s February 2013 test. The widespread coverage of China’s stepped-up patrols in disputed regions of the East and South China Seas and the occasional issues that emerge between Chinese air force and sea patrols and the U.S. military vessels traveling through China’s EEZ were also widely discussed. There is no public record in which China claims that a planned increase in military spending is due to North Korea’s nuclear provocation. As long as China stays in its de jure alliance with North Korea, it is unlikely that China will ever use North Korea’s nuclear provocations as a tool to justify increased military expenditures.

21 David Chance and Jack Kim, “North Korean nuclear test draws anger, including from China,” Reuters, February 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-korea-north-idUSBRE91B04820130212.

22 Atsushi Okudera and Kentaro Koyama, “Chinese Protests Assail North Korea for Nuclear Test,” The Asahi Shimbun, February 18, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201302180093.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

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Wang | Small State, Big Influence

Fear of the Refugee Influx

The second conventional understanding of China’s North Korea policy contends that the Chinese government fears a flood of refugees would result from North Korea’s regime collapse, which would cause an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Thus, China props up the North Korean regime to avoid this instability.25 Since the late 1990s, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 North Koreans have escaped North Korea’s stringent control and entered China in search of food, employment, or opportunities to defect to South Korea.26 The number of North Koreans crossing the Chinese border has increased as economic collapse and food crises continue to haunt North Korea. Although North Korea has strengthened patrols and border inspections, the Chinese government worries that regime collapse could result in even more North Korean refugees escaping to China and destabilizing security in Northeast China.27

Although China’s concerns over the refugee issue are legitimate, these concerns insufficiently explain the rigidity of China’s North Korea policy given the more direct and severe nuclear threat North Korea poses. The Chinese government’s treatment of North Korean defectors has not been the most welcoming. More than 75 percent of North Korean refugees in China are women, and many of them are forced to engage in prostitution or sexual slavery.28 Some female North Korean escapees were forced to live as “live-in-maids” of Chinese farmers living along China’s northeastern borders.29 The conditions of living are often too inhumane to bear, driving these women to escape to distant regions in China or travel through China’s neighboring countries, including Mongolia, Cambodia, and Vietnam, to defect to South Korea.30 In 2004, 468 North Koreans travelled through China and reached Vietnam, where they turned to the South Korean Embassy and defected to South Korea.31 Infuriated, the North Korean leadership pressured China to classify North Xie; Berry, 55; Chance and Kim (Reuters); Jeffries, 522.

William E. Berry, Global Security Watch Korea (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), 60.

27 Korea Institute for National Unification, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2011), 496.

28 Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 189.

29 Ibid.

30 Korea Institute for National Unification, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 496.

31 Berry, Global Security Watch Korea, 55.

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Korean defectors as economic migrants rather than political refugees.32 This classification allows China to repatriate North Korean refugees back to North Korea for punishment, rather than continue to offer them protection in order to meet obligations under international law. These policies mean that in the case of a North Korean regime collapse, North Koreans are likely to defect to South Korea through various routes instead of permanently staying in China.

Even if the regime collapses and large numbers of North Koreans flee to China, China and other regional powers have potential means to manage the situation. First, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can close the border or dispatch troops to North Korea for humanitarian purposes and set up shelters along the border to stem the flow of refugees. Second, other powers in the region such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Russia also cannot afford a destabilized Northeast Asia. Since China and Japan are the world’s second and third largest economies, their deceleration following a North Korean collapse would hinder global economic growth. Therefore, rather than letting China alone shoulder the burden of refugees, the United States and other powers would cooperate with China on humanitarian issues.

Ideological Affinities

The third conventional understanding of China’s seemingly unconditional support for North Korea is that both China and North Korea are communist countries. Both China and North Korea refer to the Sino-DPRK relationship as grounded in the life and bloodshed of the revolutionary pioneers.33 As two of the world’s “Last Leninists,” Beijing and Pyongyang jointly experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991. For China, North Korea is more than simply a country that shares common political views and systems; North Korea’s survival is also associated with the political legitimacy of the Chinese regime. If communist regimes continue to collapse globally, it will become more difficult for the remaining communist regimes to justify their rule.34 Therefore, Beijing would like to see the North Korean regime continue indefinitely.

Berry, Global Security Watch Korea, 55.

You, “China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” 388.

34 Scobell, China and North Korea, 2.

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However, ideological affinity between China and North Korea seems to be, at best, a myth. China and North Korea have deeply-rooted historical problems with each other dating back to North Korea’s founding period.35 Early North Korean political leaders were based either in China or the Soviet Union. During Kim Il Sung’s power struggle for leadership in the mid-1940s, Kim first rallied behind the pro-China factions. After Kim became the national leader, he joined forces with elites from the factions associated with the Soviet Union to purge leaders from the China factions. The People’s Republic of China’s founding leaders thus became greatly dissatisfied with Kim.36 Moreover, the Kim family showed pictures of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s (CPV) sacrifice during the Korean War when Chinese leaders visited Pyongyang, but the North Korean government mentioned little about China’s contribution to the North Korean populace.37 North Korea’s ideology of Juche emphasizes self-reliance. Many Chinese feel this is an insult given that North Korea relied heavily on China for economic and political support.38

As China continues with economic development and modernization, the ideological gap between China and North Korean leaders has become increasingly obvious. North Korea viewed China’s economic reform and opening up to global markets as a betrayal of communism.39 When Kim Jong Il visited China in 1983, Deng Xiaoping took him to Shenzhen, hoping that Shenzhen’s rapid development would inspire Kim Jong Il to learn from China’s reforms and conduct similar economic reform in North Korea. However, Kim never revisited Shenzhen, and instead criticized almost every major reform policy China adopted.40 Therefore, ideological affinities between China and North Korea have faded to such an extent that they cannot explain China’s current support for North Korea.

Trade The fourth conventional understanding of China’s position on the Korean peninsula is that China benefits significantly from trade with North Korea and, therefore, You, “China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” 388.

Ibid.

37 Myers, B.R., The Cleanest Race, (New York: MelvilleHouse, 2010), 130.

38 Ibid 39 Ibid., 389.

40 Ibid.

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would not take any action that could disrupt China-North Korea trade. China is the North’s largest trading partner and most generous aid donor. Recently, China has also become an emerging investor in North Korea, the bulk of which has been in natural resources. Over the past decade, China’s trade with and investment in the North has expanded substantially, rising from roughly $1 billion to more than $6 billion.

However, the North Korean economy in total has a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of only $28 billion, which is much smaller than China’s trade with South Korea.41 As China’s fourth largest trading partner, South Korea’s trade volume with China reached $207 billion in 2010.42 China benefits significantly more from South Korea purely in terms of trade volume. Moreover, investors and businessmen have found that doing business with North Korea is increasingly frustrating, even for ethnic Koreans living along China’s border with North Korea.43 Numerous Chinese businessmen have lost money due to broken promises and double-dealing by the North Korean regime.44 The more provocative North Korea becomes with its nuclear program, the less confidence Chinese investors have in the North Korean economy. In addition, Chinese investment projects in North Korea are small in scale. Most investments in North Korea involve low-level technology and labor-intensive industries, and big companies that are supported or subsidized by the Chinese government rarely invest in North Korea.45 Given these difficulties, the limited benefits that China gains from trade with North Korea is the least convincing among the conventional explanations for why China keeps supporting North Korea.

Nevertheless, there is some truth in these conventional arguments. The buffer zone mentality has remained powerful among some members of the Chinese senior leadership, especially the conservatives in the PLA.46 The scenario under which the regime would collapse or the Korean peninsula would unify still Tobey, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test of China,” Korea Chair Platform, March 13, 2013, http://csis.org/ files/publication/130313_NorthKorea’sNuclearTestofChina.pdf.

42 The U.S.-China Business Council, US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, https:// www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html.

43 David Chance and Jack Kim, “North Korean nuclear test draws anger, including from China,” Reuters, February 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-korea-north-idUSBRE91B04820130212.

44 Ian Jeffries, Contemporary North Korea (London: Routledge, 2010), 543.

45 Ibid., 542.

46 Christopher Johnson, Michael Green, and Victor Cha, “North Korea: Defining the Danger and the Way Out,” Freeman Report 9 (2013): 1.

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remains obscure; hence, refugees could be a problem. While limited in scope, there are some remaining ideological similarities. Although China’s national economy is not greatly affected by trade with North Korea, some individuals in Northeastern China benefit significantly from cross-border trade, though not nearly as much as they would from trading with South Korea. However, as North Korea’s provocations continuously hinder China’s security interests, China has already started to reconsider its political and economic security calculations on the Korean peninsula. Continuing to sustain a North Korea that could threaten China’s national security with nuclear weapons is increasingly viewed as a less viable option. Recent ongoing debate among scholars and officials confirms that the Chinese government is indeed reconsidering its policies toward North Korea.

None of the conventional understandings sufficiently explain why China is reluctant to restructure its North Korea policy. If continued North Korean provocations have pushed China to reconsider its North Korea policy, and if none of the above alone adequately explain the rigidity of China’s North Korea policy, then the question remains as to why China finds it so difficult to alter its position on North Korea.

Small State, Big Influence

Literature that covers the behavior and influence of small allies on U.S. foreign policymaking during the Cold War period, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, contributes to the understanding of China’s paradox of absolute and actual influence on North Korea. This literature also helps explain why China seems to be restricted in terms of its North Korea policy options and is reluctant to make changes. Literature on the influence of small states mainly seeks to explain how small allies of the United States were able to bargain with superpowers such as the United States in order to alter U.S. policies and achieve the small powers’ political ends While specifically designed around the U.S. alliance system, the theory can be applied in various situations because the calculation of interests, policy options, and toolkit for these small powers are not unique to allies of the United States.

In his 1971 article, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Robert Keohane offers a detailed analysis on how small allies of the United States were able to affect American policies by examining interactions between the United States and Israel, Spain, the Philippines, and Taiwan. As a central power of the West, the United Fall/Winter 2014 [15]

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States seems to possess immense power and resources to influence its small allies.

However, Keohane’s study illustrates that small states can pursue “active, forceful, and even obstreperous policies of their own.”47 Keohane finds that small states can “concentrate on a narrow range of vital interests and ignore almost everything else” and that they could “take large-scale patterns of international politics for granted, since nothing [they did could] possibly affect them very much.”48 On the other hand, beset by a variety of problems, a great power must carefully choose the issues on which it will use strong political, military, or economic pressure. And even if it wishes to act, it may discover that the force at its disposal is inappropriate to the goals it seeks.49

When analyzing the conspicuity of small states (despite increasing military and power disparity between big and small states in a nuclear age), Robert Rothstein provides a definition of “small power” as the basis for his analysis of small power behaviors. Rothstein proposes three unique aspects of a small power situation: 1) outside help is required; 2) the state has a narrow margin of safety, with little time for correcting mistakes; and 3) the state’s leaders see its weakness as essentially unalterable.50 In addition, Rothstein focuses his analysis on two types of small-state behavior: behaviors in international organizations and actions taken in “balance-of-power” situations. In his framework of analysis, Rothstein finds that small states tend to focus on current “imperatives of immediate security,” rather than long-term consequences.51 Rothstein and Keohane’s findings on small and big power behaviors serve as the theoretical framework for this paper’s analysis.

North Korea: Indifferent to the Interests of the International Community

My argument is premised on three points. First, as a small power, North Korea cares little about its influence on the structure of the international system.

Therefore, North Korea is able to employ brinkmanship strategy to the full measure, and forcefully continue its nuclear tests and missile development to ensure its own safety and interests—despite international pressure. According to Rothstein: Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, no. 2 (Spring 1971), 161.

Ibid, 164.

49 Ibid, 162.

50 Robert Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23 (March 1969), 293.

51 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968): 215.

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A Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics.52 The definition of a small power also requires that the state’s security environment is highly unstable, and that the state’s leaders do not think they can change the situation.53 North Korea fulfills all three requirements of the small power definition. North Korea is highly dependent on China and other donors for food and energy, both of which are necessary to sustain the regime. Since the Korean War ceasefire, South Korea has achieved rapid economic development and built global diplomatic relations. On the other hand, North Korea remains isolated, implements problematic economic policies, and lags increasingly far behind South Korea. Additionally, South Korea’s cooperation with the United States and the gradual infiltration of information from the outside world into North Korea make the DPRK leadership extremely insecure regarding the control and survival of the regime. Furthermore, the North Korean leadership knows that it cannot alter the situation: if North Korea chooses to reform and open, it is only a matter of time until the Northern regime is absorbed by the South.

North Korea thus is able to act in its own interest without consideration for its responsibility in the international system. As a small power, North Korea considers going nuclear its best strategy for regime survival. Nuclear weapons increase North Korea’s deterrence capability in a way that no other weapons can.54 At this point, the motivation for nuclear tests has increased because the North Korean leaders believe they will soon succeed in obtaining usable nuclear weapons technology.55 North Korea has incorporated nuclear technology as an integral component of the regime’s survival.56 The smaller the state’s power, the more it can ignore patterns of Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968): 29.

53 Ibid.

54 Victor Cha, “The rationale for enhanced engagement of North Korea,” Asian Survey 39(6), (1999): 848.

55 You, “China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” 395.

56 Christopher Johnson, Michael Green and Victor Cha, “North Korea: Defining the Danger and the Way Out,” 2.

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of international politics and advance its own vital interests; a small state’s actions cannot substantially affect the international system.57 Thus, no matter how much North Korea depends on an external ally such as China, China will never have enough leverage to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons—precisely because these weapons are the Kim family’s only option to sustain the regime. Even knowing that a nuclear attack on any power would be suicidal, the North Korean leadership is committed to doing so should it perceive a threat to the regime’s survival.

China: Concerned About Complicated Regional Dynamics

Unlike North Korea, China is a major global power and must view the de jure Sino-DPRK alliance in the context of its regional and global security environment. A big power has diverse and complicated interests to consider, and therefore must “carefully choose the issues on which it will use strong political, military, or economic pressure.”58 Such powers must consider that the actions they take or the leverage they use may result in outcomes that do not serve their interests.59 While a big power possesses more military and economic tools in comparison to a small power, the possession of more power does not necessarily transfer into the ability to effectively use it. In terms of North Korean provocations, China is currently such a big power that it must make foreign policy decisions with extra caution.

As a big power with more influence over North Korea than any other country, China has the most leverage to pressure North Korea. However, as a country more advanced than North Korea in terms of economic development and quality of life, and as a rising power seeking national rejuvenation and recognition as a global player, China also has more to lose than North Korea does should there be another military conflict on the peninsula. North Korea is well aware of China’s concerns and actively takes advantage of China’s security interests in bargaining sessions.60 For instance, in early 1996 North Korea asked China for a large amount of grain.61 China offered only one-tenth of the requested amount in return. Kim Jong Il, infuriated by the Chinese response, threatened the Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,”162.

Ibid., 164.

59 Ibid.

60 You, “China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” 391.

61 Scobell, China and North Korea, 5.

57 58

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Chinese leadership that Pyongyang would initiate talks with Taiwan unless China offered an amount of grain even larger than the amount originally requested. Since the return of Taiwan to mainland China remains a component of China’s core interests,this threat struck a chord with Beijing. Although Beijing did not meet all of Pyongyang’s demands, the Chinese government did offer a more substantial food aid package to North Korea in order to avoid prompting discussions between North Korea and Taiwan. 62 Such has been the way that Pyongyang negotiates with China on many fronts.

The Sino-North Korea relationship is largely asymmetrical, with China meeting North Korean needs and gaining little in response. For the previous two North Korean nuclear tests, China did follow the international community in condemning the North Korean actions, but only partially supported the sanctions precisely due to China’s vested security and economic interests in Northeast Asia. China has become a hostage of North Korea. China has leverage over North Korea, but is unable to use that leverage without harming its interests in other arenas. It is due to the big power’s intensive investment and involvement in the alliance that the small state is able to influence the big state’s policy decisions.63 China fears that changing its North Korea policy without careful calculation could incur greater cost for China; Beijing is particularly concerned that if it punishes Pyongyang too severely, North Korea will retaliate against China before it acts against the United States or its allies.

The situation became even more complicated for China following North Korea’s successful third nuclear test. The continued nuclear provocations have interrupted China’s hierarchy of interests on the Korean peninsula, forcing China into a policy dilemma. China advocates for the stability of the Korean peninsula, peaceful unification between North and South Korea, and denuclearization of the peninsula.64 The top priority is still maintaining stability. However, the definition of “stability” is changing. Previously, it was easy for China to support North Korea because maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula meant sustaining the North Korean regime.

With North Korea’s development of nuclear capabilities, it has become difficult for China to define what “stability” means. It raises questions regarding what is more destabilizing: North Korea having nuclear weapons, or the collapse of the regime?

Scobell, China and North Korea, 5.

Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 162.

64 Andrew Scobell, “North Korea End-Game or Mid-Game? Some Scenarios and Their Implications for U.S.-China Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, 16 (2007): 316.

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In addition, China’s own foreign policy-making structure makes it hard for the Chinese government to change its North Korea policy—even when it wants to do so. The Politburo Standing Committee has overall control over China’s North Korea policy, although they regularly consult with the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. Policy is implemented largely through the International Department, PLA, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Staffed mostly by CCP conservatives, the International Department still views the Korean War as “the War to Resist America and Aid Korea.”65 This skews perceptions of the security environment and causes a rift between the Foreign Ministry and those responsible for relations with Pyongyang, making it difficult for experienced diplomats to exert influence on China’s North Korea policy.66 The PLA also helps protect and manage Sino-DPRK relations. The majority of the Chinese military believes that “North Korea is a strategic piece of territory for China, not in the sense that it is intrinsically valuable, but in the sense that Beijing can never allow it to fall into the hands of another.”67 Influential stakeholders’ decision-making process and divergent strategic mindsets regarding China-North Korea relations does, to some extent, inhibit the evolution of a more adroit approach to North Korea.

The United States: Lingering Strategic Mistrust with China

The Obama administration’s recent effort to strengthen U.S. diplomatic and military relations with the Asia-Pacific, also referred to as the “Pivot to Asia,” has triggered great anxiety in China. Many Chinese people, whether experts in international relations or members of the general public, worry that the U.S. “pivot” seeks to contain China’s rise in the international system. For example, as part of the “Pivot to Asia,” in 2011 the United States and Australia initiated plans for rotational deployments of U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia. Through rotational deployments, the United States is able to expand its presence in Asia beyond traditional allies.68 When asked about China’s response to the Marine deployment, Tobey, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test of China,” Korea Chair Platform, March 13, 2013, http://csis.org/ files/publication/130313_NorthKorea’sNuclearTestofChina.pdf.

66 Ibid.

67 United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Players, Testimony by Victor Cha, 2011.

68 Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, “US-China Relations: US Pivot to Asia Leaves China off Balance,” Comparative Connections, January (2012): 2.

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a spokesperson from China’s Defense Ministry stated that the U.S.-Australia military deployment “does not help to enhance mutual trust and cooperation between countries in the region, and could ultimately harm the common interests of all concerned.”69 In addition, he commented, “Any strengthening and expansion of military alliances is an expression of a Cold War mentality.”70 The recent increase in U.S. military presence in the Pacific has induced strategic mistrust between China and the United States, making practical cooperation on the Korean peninsula difficult.

Within this context, China views the purpose of the U.S. presence and adjustments in the Asia-Pacific with doubts and concern. In terms of North Korea, neither the United States nor China has chosen an enduring solution to counter North Korean provocations. China views the United States as both a stabilizer and a destabilizer on the Korean peninsula.71 The majority of Chinese analysts argue that the United States would intervene to prevent allies and partners, such as Japan, South Korea or Turkey from obtaining nuclear weapons in response to Pyongyang or Tehran’s nuclear provocations; others view proliferation threats as excuses for the United States and its allies to engage in provocative actions, thereby compromising Beijing’s greater security interests and limiting China’s growth.72 The insufficient strategic mutual trust between China and the United States serves as an intervening factor, making China even more reactive on the North Korean provocations and bound to let North Korea take advantage.

Conclusion: A Changing Future?

Taken alone, none of the traditional views—Cold War strategic mentality, potential humanitarian crisis, ideological similarities, or trade—sufficiently explain why China has continued to support North Korea. Due to the asymmetric nature of the China-North Korea alliance, Pyongyang is able to pursue parochial interests and ignore its influence in the international system, while it remains challenging for China to easily change its position on North Korea. North Korea’s Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, “US-China Relations: US Pivot to Asia Leaves China off Balance,” Comparative Connections, January (2012): 2.

70 Ibid.

71 Lora Saalman, “Balancing Chinese Interests on North Korea and Iran,” Carnegie Tsinghua Center, April 1, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/01/balancing-chinese-interests-on-north-korea-andiran/fvbm.

72 Ibid.

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significant leveraging power—the ability to bargain with China or switch sides and bargain with the United States—continuously binds China.

Recent Chinese scholarly discussions and diplomatic actions—or the lack thereof—regarding North Korea continue to challenge the aforementioned conventional understandings because they reflect not so much the four interpretations of why China has to support North Korea, but rather China’s response to the evolving and complicated security environment that China sits in today. These actions also hint at a different scenario for the China-North Korea alliance. A small state such as North Korea can take the big power’s supported institutions and environment for granted only so long as the big power remains committed to its initial policies and strategies.73 As North Korea moves forward with its nuclear programs and provocative behavior, China, although not ready to break ties with its unruly neighbor, has become less dedicated to the alliance and more willing to assert pressure on North Korea. In the academic sphere, many prominent Chinese scholars on North Korea issues have suggested that China change its policy priority on the Korean peninsula. Zhang Liangui, one of China’s most well-known North Korea experts from the Party School of the Central Committee, argues “the former administration always put ensuring the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula in first place, while the current administration sets the denuclearization of the peninsula first.”74 Shen Dingli, Vice President of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, argued in a Foreign Policy article, “Let’s face it: China has reached a point where it needs to cut its losses and cut North Korea loose.”75

Meanwhile, the Xi administration has employed a firm and pragmatic approach that prioritizes denuclearization in managing relations with North Korea. Since the third nuclear test, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespersons and officials have started to put denuclearization ahead of maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula when addressing North Korea related

Keohane, “Big Influence of Small States,” 163.

Liangui Zhang, “NK envoy doesn’t signal policy reverse,” Global Times, May 27, 2013, http://www. globaltimes.cn/content/784692.shtml.

75 Dingli Shen, “Lips and Teeth: It’s Time for China to Get Tough on North Korea,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/13/lips_and_teeth_china_north_korea.

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issues.76 Following China’s support of UN Security Council Resolution 2094, the Bank of China halted all dealings with a major North Korean bank in early May 2013.77 During the Xi-Obama meeting at Sunnylands, California in June 2013, the two leaders reached consensus that North Korea must abandon its nuclear program and agreed to jointly cooperate towards this shared goal.78 The same month, Xi Jinping and South Korean President Park Geun-hye issued a joint declaration during their first summit in Beijing, which dedicated an entire section to express Beijing and Seoul’s shared position on opposing North Korean nuclear development.79 When Xi met with North Korean envoy Choe Ryong-hae, Xi told Choe, “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and lasting peace on the peninsula is what the people want and also the trend of the times.”80 Xi’s maiden trip to the Korean peninsula as President in 2014 was to South Korea, breaking from Chinese leaders’ traditional decision to always visit the North first.

During the second Xi-Park summit, the two leaders issued a joint communiqué that once again emphasized denuclearization and promoting Sino-South Korean relations.81 While engaging with the United States and South Korea, Xi also raised important issues unrelated to North Korea. However, the emphasis on denuclearization and the lack of direct high level engagement between Xi and See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi qiangdiao zhongfang zai Chaoxian bandao wentishang sange ‘jianchi’ lichang” 王毅强调中方在朝鲜半岛问题上三个‘坚持’ 立场 [Wang Yi reiterated China’s ‘three insists’ on the Korean Peninsula], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1030840.shtml; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Yang Jiechi huijian Chaoxian waiwusheng diyi fuxiang” 杨洁篪会见朝鲜外务省第一副相 [Yang Jiechi met with Deputy Minister of DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ wjb_602314/zzjg_602420/yzs_602430/xwlb_602432/t1052414.shtml; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “2013 nian 2 yue 18 ri waijiaobu fayanren Hong Lei zhuchi lixing jizhehui” 2013年2月18日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会 [February 18, 2013 Regular Press Conference with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hong Lei], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/ fyrbt_611275/t1014544.shtml.

77 Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China Cuts Ties with Key North Korean Bank,” New York Times, May 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/world/asia/china-cuts-ties-with-north-koreanbank.html.

78 Jakie Calmes and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and China Move Closer on North Korea, but not on Cyberespionage,” New York Times, June 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/asia/obama-and-xitry-building-a-new-model-for-china-us-ties.html.

79 “China-ROK Joint Statement for the Future,” Xinhua, June 27, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/201306/27/c_116319763.htm.

80 Jane Perlez, “China Bluntly Tells North Korea to Enter Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, May 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/25/world/asia/china-tells-north-korea-to-return-to-nuclear-talks. html.

81 Jee-Hye Yoo and Won-Yeob Jung, “Experts Weigh in on Outcome of Park-Xi Summit,” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 7, 2014, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2991636.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un thus far indicate that while China is unable to completely cut off support for the North Korean regime, China is willing to be less committed should Pyongyang further hinder China’s national security interests.

China’s future North Korea policy remains an open question. In the past, China supported North Korea due to its calculation of security interests. For this same reason, China is currently rearranging policy priorities on the Korean Peninsula with great caution. In the foreseeable future, China may become increasingly adamant about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and pragmatically manage and further normalize relations with North Korea. Yet, the material support that has helped the regime to last may still continue. China’s North Korea policy will not fundamentally and rapidly change. Progress will come alongside changes in China’s foreign policy strategy, security environment, and what Beijing considers most threatening to China’s security and economic interests at an international level. However, if Pyongyang intends to sustain the North Korean regime using Chinese support, then it must not pose a threat to China’s security environment. Given North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, its ability to avoid appearing threatening to Beijing is increasingly compromised. China must prepare for a scenario in which North Korea’s threat to China’s security interests overrides the benefits that China derives from assisting in sustaining the regime.

Tianyi Wang recently received her M.A. in Asian Studies from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where she specialized in Asian political and security issues. Ms. Wang’s research interests include Sino-U.S. relations, Sino-Korean relations, and interactions between politics and economics in Asia.

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Reuters, April 15, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/ [26] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

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us-korea-north-china-insight-idUSBRE93E16P20130415.

Saalman, Lora. “Balancing Chinese Interests on North Korea and Iran.” Carnegie

Tsinghua Center, April 1, 2013. http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/01/ balancing-chinese-interests-on-north-korea-and-iran/fvbm.

Scobell, Andrew. “North Korea End-Game or Mid-Game? Some Scenarios and

Their Implications for U.S.-China Relations.” Journal of Contemporary China 16 (2007): 315-323. ______. China and North Korea: from Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.

Shen, Dingli. “Lips and Teeth: It’s Time for China to Get Tough on North Korea.”

Foreign Policy, February 13, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2013/02/13/lips_and_teeth_china_north_korea.

So, Charlotte. “Business as Usual along North Korean border with China.” South

China Morning Post, April 13, 2013. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article 1213472/business-usual-along-north-korean-border-china.

Tobey, William, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test of China.” Korea Chair Platform,

March 13, 2013. http://csis.org/files/publication/130313_NorthKorea’s NuclearTestofChina.pdf.

The U.S.-China Business Council. US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World

Trade Statistics. https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html.

The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. “Zhonghua

renmin gongheguo he Chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmin gongheguo youhao

hezuo huzhu tiaoyue” 中华人民共和国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国友

好合作互助条约 [Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual

Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/25/ content_781.htm.

Xie, Tao. “What’s Wrong with China’s North Korea Policy?” Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, March 26, 2013. http://carnegieendowment.org/ 2013/03/26/what-s-wrong-with-china-s-north-korea-policy/ftjw.

Yoo, Jee-Hye, and Won-Yeob Jung. “Experts Weigh in on Outcome of Park-Xi Summit.” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 7, 2014. http://koreajoongangdaily. joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2991636.

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Contribution of Corporate Social Investment to Livelihoods of Lao People after Relocation Young Sokphea This paper explores the impacts of multinational companies’ (MNCs’) social investment on the livelihoods of local people in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and explores the drivers that influence these impacts. The study advances an argument that MNCs’ social investment produced two distinct types of families after being relocated to new villages: poor and well-off families. The well-off families received the fewest direct benefits from the MNCs’ social investments, but with a greater degree of self-resilience than the poor families, they were able to adapt to their new environments and availed of the MNCs’ social investment to improve their livelihoods. This study concludes that the impacts of the MNCs’ social investment on the livelihoods of the affected families depend not only on the behavior and commitment of the MNCs, but also on the economic and cultural capability of the affected families to adjust to the new environment and on the commitment of the host country’s government.

Developing countries are attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from Multinational Companies (MNCs) for reasons including, but not limited to, the increasing global demand of the consumer market, the potential for lower cost of production, and the vast amount of unexplored natural resources in developing countries.1 Nevertheless, the role of MNCs’ FDI in accelerating or undermining host developing countries’ progress has been a subject of intense debate within development and corporate social responsibility studies.2

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is a land-locked country Titus Moser, “MNCs and Sustainable Business Practice: The Case of the Colombian and Peruvian Petroleum Industries,” World Development 29, no. 2 (2001): 291-309.

2 Peter Newell and Jedrzej George Frynas, “Beyond CSR? Business, poverty and social justice: an introduction,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2007): 669-81; Judy Muthuri, Jeremy Moon, and Uwafiokun Idemudia, “Corporate Innovation and Sustainable Community Development in Developing Countries,” Business & Society 51, no. 3 (2012): 355-81; Karen Paul and Robert Barbato, “The Multinational Corporation in the Less Developed Country: The Economic Development Model Versus the North-South Model,” Academy of Management Review 10, no. 1 (1985): 8-14.

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in Southeast Asia with a total population of 6,288,037. Lao PDR’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was $1,130 in 2011, with 27.6 percent of the population living below the national poverty line.3 Lao PDR has attracted a large inflow of FDI, particularly from its neighboring countries. Between 2008 and 2011, annual FDI inflows increased from $921 million to $1,071 million. FDI reached $1,374 million in 2012 and is anticipated to rise to $2,085 million by 2015. Most of these investments are in mining, extraction of natural resources, and hydropower.4 Mining and hydropower’s contribution to GDP increased considerably—from 2.6 percent of GDP in 2008 to 2.9 percent in 2012, and 0.7 percent of GDP in 2008 to 1.0 percent in 2012, respectively. Hence, GDP per capita rose rapidly from $856 in 2008 to $1,202 in 2012, and it is expected to rise to $1,653 in 2015, and $1,770 in 2016.5 Thus, FDI has contributed significantly to Lao PDR’s economic growth.6 As a result, the Government of Lao PDR (GoL) expects to advance from least developed country status by 2020, and to simultaneously become the “battery” of Asia by utilizing Lao PDR’s high potential for hydropower development.

Although the contribution of FDI to national economic growth is convincing, the impact of investment, particularly hydropower investment, on local people’s livelihoods remains contentious among academics, development practitioners, and civil society. For instance, Delang and Toro (2011) claim that local people who were relocated from dam construction areas, including Houay Ho and Xe Katam dam, have not improved their living standards.7 Virtanen (2006) asserts that the impacts of the Theun-Hinboun hydropower project on poverty reduction and social issues remain contentious.8 However, Souksavath and Maekawa (2012) and

World Bank, “Lao PDR,” in World Development Indicators (2011), accessed Feburary 10, 2013, http:// data.worldbank.org/country/lao-pdr#cp_wdi.

4 Pemasiri J. Gunawardana and Sisombat Sommala, “Trends and Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in Lao PDR,” International Journal of Business and Management 3, no. 1 (2009): 34-41; Steven Neuman and Young Sokphea, “Key Assessment Areas of Agriculture Sector for Eligibility to EU Sector Budget Support,” (paper presented in Vientiane: European Union Delegate to Lao PDR, 2012).

5 International Monetary Fund, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic-Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Lao PDR, Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement” (Vientiane: IMF, 2011).

6 Pemasiri J. Gunawardana and Sisombat Sommala, “Trends and Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in Lao PDR,” International Journal of Business and Management 3, no. 1 (2008): 41-57.

7 Claudio O. Delang and Matthew Toro, “Hydropower-induced displacement and resettlement in the Lao PDR,” South East Asia Research 19, no.3 (2011): 567-94.

8 Maarit Virtanen, “Foreign direct investment and hydropower in Lao PDR: the Theun-Hinboun hydropower project,” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 13, no. 4 (2006):183-93.

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Souksavath and Nakayama (2012) assert that both Nam Ngum 1 and Nam Theun 2 positively impacted the livelihoods of local people.9 Based on the aforementioned scholars’ conclusions, the impacts of FDI in hydropower on the livelihoods of local people in Lao PDR remain controversial. On the one hand, scholars argue that there are positive impacts, while on the other hand, some assert negative impacts. Meanwhile, drivers that determine the impacts of these hydropower investments remain unexplored. As a contribution to this, this paper studies the impacts of MNCs’ FDI in hydropower development on the affected families’ livelihoods, and explores the drivers that influence these impacts.The paper draws on conclusions from the study of the MNC-built Nam Ngum 2 (NN2) hydropower development project in Lao PDR.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section elaborates on the methodological approach and wealth assessment criteria. The third section discusses the results from the research. Lastly, the concluding section argues that the project divides local people into two socioeconomic tiers (poor and well off ) after relocation. The paper finds the main driving forces that worsen the livelihoods of affected families are: (a) the lack of effective regulatory enforcement, (b) the lack of transparency and accountability of the Government, (c) the poor quality of participation of stakeholders and affected families, (d) the ineffectiveness of MNCs’ social investment, and (e) the low degree of self-resilience of the affected families.

Methodology

This research is based on a case study of a resettlement area—Muang Feung District, Vientiane Province, Lao PDR—where 1,053 affected families were involuntarily relocated from the NN2 hydropower development reservoir in the Vientiane Province. The study utilized both primary and secondary data. To collect primary data, a participatory wealth assessment was conducted among 1,053 directly affected families. Additionally, the researcher noted observations at the resettlement site between 2010 and 2012. Thirty key informant interviews were conducted to explore Bounsouk Souksavath and Miko Maekawa, “The livelihood reconstruction of resettlers from the Nam Ngum 1 hydropower project in Laos,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 29, no.1 (2012): 59-70; Bounsouk Souksavath and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “Reconstruction of the livelihood of resettlers from the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project in Laos,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 29, no.1 (2012):71-86.

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the drivers that influence the impact of the MNCs’ social investment on the livelihood of the affected families. Secondary data, including baseline livelihood data conducted by the consultancy TEAM Group in 2005 and the project’s progress reports, were also scrutinized and compared with the prevailing livelihoods of the affected families. The study also compared and contrasted several discussions of other scholars’ findings.

A criteria for assessment was developed based on a participatory approach in order to conduct the participatory wealth assessment. The criteria consisted of (i) housing improvement, (ii) occupation and income, (iii) food security, (iv) family dependents and labour force, and (v) assets. Several stakeholders, including Buddhist monks, village heads, Christian leaders, group leaders, affected families, youth leaders, and the female leaders’ union, were invited to discuss and formulate the assessment criteria (see the detailed criteria in Table 1). Then, assessments were made based on participatory group meetings in sixteen villages in which the majority of the affected families were invited to participate.

Results and Discussions

This section begins by highlighting the background and impacts of NN2 project on local people. Following a discussion of social investment and the project’s mitigation plan, this section assesses the livelihoods of affected local people after relocation. Lastly, this section explores drivers that positively and negatively influence livelihoods of affected local people in their new environments.

The NN2 Hydroelectric Development Project and Its Impacts

The Nam Ngum 2 Dam is one of the major hydroelectric power development projects in Lao PDR. It is situated about ninety km to the North of the capital Vientiane, and about thirty-five km northeast and upstream of the existing Nam Ngum 1 dam. The dam is a concrete face, rock-fill dam, 181 meters high, with about 6,774 million cubic meters reservoir storage capacity and an inundation area of about 122 km2 at full supply level of 375 meter above sea level. The construction was completed in March 2010. The dam produces an annual energy output of 2,218 GWh

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Table 1. Criteria for Wealth Assessment

Note: Very poor and poor families earn less than $1 per day per person (about six persons per household).

Source: Author, 2012.

(615MW capacity), which is sold to Thailand.10 NN2 is developed under a thirty-year (2007-2037) concession agreement between the GoL and concessionaires (MNCs). This construction required the resettlement of 1,107 households (about 6,500 people) from sixteen villages that resided below the dam’s full supply level.

Of the 1,107 households, fifty-four voluntarily relocated elsewhere, while the remaining 1,053 households were relocated to the Feung district resettlement site in Vientiane province. The resettlement site is about 90 km from Vientiane, and about 80 km from the previous villages and dam reservoir. The relocation was fully completed in early 2010.

According to TEAM’s 2005 survey, the affected local population consists of three ethnic groups: 62.4 percent are Lao Theong (midlanders), 35.9 percent are TEAM, Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) Nam Ngum 2 Hydroelectric Power Project (Bangkok: TEAM 2005).

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Lao Loum (lowlanders), and 1.7 percent are Lao Soung (highlanders). The average household contains six persons and lives with poor access to public infrastructure and social facilities. Their livelihoods are based on cultivating crops, including rice, shifting cultivation and tree crops, as well as raising livestock, timbering, fishing, hunting, and other non-farm activities. The household annual income in 2005 stood between $58 and $107, while the expenditures cost between $25 and $51. Thus, these households can save from $33 to $56 per annum.11 Consequently, although members of these households lived with poor infrastructure conditions, they were observed to enjoy sustainable livelihoods before the relocation and construction of the dam.

Social Investment and Impact Mitigation Efforts of NN2

To obtain permission for construction, ownership, operation, and transfer for a period of thirty years, all hydroelectric power projects are required to conduct a Social Impact Assessment (SIA) and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

In addition, the projects are required to prepare a social mitigation plan, including a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). NN2’s social mitigation plan (including RAP) was developed in compliance with the GoL’s sub-decrees and regulations.12 The result of NN2’s social mitigation plan can be summarized as follows: 1. Infrastructure and public facilities

As compensation for the adverse impacts of the hydropower construction, the company constructed several ready-to-use infrastructure projects to provide services to the 1,053 households and the host villagers. These projects include a main access road of about 6.2 km, village roads totaling about 1.2 km, a water supply system with main and household distribution systems, an electricity distribution system to all houses, a health center, a cemetery, a resettlement administration office, a public hall for consultation and public meetings and activities, three village offices, a Buddhist temple, a market place, a bus station, three primary schools, a secondary TEAM, Resettlement Action Plan. These income figures include only cash income and do not include non-cash activities such as the gathering of forest products and subsistence agriculture, which in many cases make up the majority of people’s livelihoods.

12 Government of Lao [GoL], “Prime Minister Decree 192/2005 on the Compensation and Resettlement of the Development Project,” (Vientiane: GoL 2005); Government of Lao, “Technical Guidelines on Compensation and Resettlement in Development Projects,” (Vientiane: GoL 2005a).

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school, a nursery school, a cultural center, and a solid waste landfill site. Furthermore, 1,053 move-in-ready houses were constructed before relocation took place.

The project provided free electricity, water supply, and rice allowances during the first year’s transition period.

2. Relocation

Relocation was successfully completed in early 2010. Relocation was based on three criteria: (i) relocation of local people from sixteen villages had to be organized in one continuous period; (ii) that period had to avoid the rice harvesting season, the school year, and the heavy rain period; and (iii) construction of all infrastructure, supporting facilities and houses for local people were required to be completed before relocation began. A caravan of soldiers supported the transportation of all kinds of household equipment from previous villages. More than 70 percent of respondents indicated that the relocation was carried out successfully and that almost all of the affected families were satisfied.

3. Public Health

Along with the provision of a health center, a monthly incentive was awarded to a doctor who moved from an urban area to be stationed at the resettlement site’s health center. The doctor led a team of about eight nurses and health officers.

In accordance with national health center standards, the resettlement project supported the health center’s equipment with many medical instruments and facilities, including an ambulance. Key person trainings in each village were conducted, as were events to raise public awareness of dengue fever, malaria, public sanitation, vaccination, HIV/AIDs, youth health issues, early motherhood follow-up, and homebased care. The health center has been administered by the GoL’s public health system, and serves both resettlers and host villagers. As a result, the use of traditional healing and medication has declined, and basic health knowledge and sanitation have improved. The public health service in this new center is thus far better than that in the old villages as described in the 2005 TEAM baseline report.13 A majority of key informants and those who participated in focus group discussions were 13

TEAM, Resettlement Action Plan.

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satisfied with the current health center’s services and activities.

4. Education

As the schools were newly constructed, additional teachers were deployed from the provincial center and provided with homestay. School facilities were equipped and maintained regularly. Other educational assistance included teacher training, merit- and need-based scholarships, sports activities, school libraries, and mobile libraries. These programs were designed and implemented from the nursery level to the secondary (high) school level. The education program serves not only resettled households’ children, but also children from the host villages. Resettled villagers were satisfied with these services as compared to the old villages.

5. Livelihood Restoration

The livelihood restoration program commenced immediately upon villagers’ arrival at the resettlement site. The project delivered several short-term livelihood trainings, including off-farm activities (vocational training, weaving, handicraft works, small business) and farm activities (raising livestock and aquaculture, farming, breeding, fishing), to restore the livelihoods of the local people. To support these activities, the project established a village savings and lending group (a self-help group). Simultaneously, initial funding of about $50 on average was provided to each of the participants in order to start each occupation. As a part of the livelihood improvement scheme, farmland of 0.5 hectare was also provided to each household, regardless of the size of the previous farmland. The livelihood restoration program aims to restore the affected families’ livelihoods in general, and in particular, to increase the income per household per annum to $1,800 by 2015 and $2,200 by 2020 (See the next section to compare these goals to the current actual income).

In summary, with the implementation of social investment, local people received better public facilities, infrastructure, and services than existed in the old villages. However, the extent to which these activities contribute to affected families’ livelihoods is unclear. The following assessment of livelihoods of resettled people was based on the criteria set enumerated in the methodology section.

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Livelihoods of the Affected Families at the Resettlement Site

In general, slightly greater than 50 percent of the affected families had better livelihoods in terms of both income and living conditions (9.60 percent considered above well-off and 42.92 percent considered well-off compared to the situation before the relocation). The remaining affected families (10.83 percent very poor and 32.76 percent poor), were unable to restore their livelihoods (Figure 1). The rest of the families (about 4 percent) moved out from the resettlement site to live in other places by themselves. Therefore, the MNCs’ social investment created the least impact on the livelihoods of affected families, and instead created two types (poor and well-off ) after relocation. The attributions and facts that lie behind the difference in wealth can be elaborated as follows: Figure 1. Wealth of Local People after Relocation

Note: The baseline income of each wealth category before the relocation is not available.

A small proportion of the affected families (101 families, or 9.60 percent) earned within the highest income bracket of greater than $2,510 per annum. These families earned their livelihoods from trading inside and outside the resettlement site. Occupations included copper and mine traders in Attapeu province, and owners [36] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

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of grocery, repair, and construction materials shops at the resettlement site or elsewhere. Thus, the families have shown significant progress toward livelihood restoration. However, the project did not contribute to their livelihood because it did not support the capital that they invested for their livelihood. To a certain extent, the new resettlement’s location near the capital city and other provincial centers increased individuals’ opportunities to engage in trading activities in which they were already involved prior to relocation. Overall, these families exhibited a high degree of self-resilience (the ability to restore their livelihoods without extensive assistance from the project) compared to the rest of the local people.

About 42.92 percent (452 families) of the total families in the resettlement site were well-off, earning between $1,630 and $2,500 annually. They received little or no assistance from the livelihood restoration program, as the majority of them were engaged in inside and outside trading in various industries (groceries, restaurants, construction materials, butchers, etc.). Members of these families have higher qualifications and received well-paid jobs outside the resettlement village, including as skilled workers in copper and mining projects, and as government officials in other provinces or in Vientiane. These families have shown significant progress toward the livelihood restoration program’s target incomes of $1,800 by 2015 and $2,200 by 2020. However, the program’s contributions were not a major factor in their success.

The poor families totaled 32.76 percent (345 families) of the total affected population. They earned between $875 and $1,625 per annum, or less than $1 daily per person for a six-person family. These low incomes were due to a low level of education, as they had no ability to survive and to restore their livelihoods in the new villages. The unfamiliar living environment, coupled with a new livelihood based on urban resources rather than natural resources and agriculture, resulted in adverse impacts on these families, despite an increase in income. Many struggled to survive. Although significant development assistance was provided, the assistance had minimal impact. For instance, 0.50 ha (upland) was provided per family, which yields only two to three months of rice per year. Their homes in some ways looked like those of the well-off families because they spent resettlement program compensation cash on home improvement and modern luxuries, including televisions, musical instruments, and means of transport. These investments produced no longterm benefit to their livelihood restoration. As a result, they became trapped in a Fall/Winter 2014 [37]

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poverty cycle of a type which did not exist in their previous villages. Moreover, the majority of these families are from ethnic groups whose livelihoods depend on natural resources, especially non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Thus, the lack of access to natural resources in the new villages worsened their livelihoods. These families were unable to recover from the aforementioned adverse impacts—not only because they lacked access to natural resources, but also because they lacked the ability to find new means of subsistence.

The very poor families accounted for about 10.83 percent (114 families). They earned annually between $56 and $874 per family. These were the most vulnerable people in the resettled group. They had little capacity to survive after resettlement because they relied heavily on cultivation and natural resources, especially NTFPs. In the old villages, they collected NTFPs for subsistence purposes, and they earned a few dollars per month by selling the remaining products. These families tended to live as they lived prior to resettlement. However, since the resettlement site was located close to the district center, natural resources were limited. Although the implementers of the project introduced activities such as livestock raising, handicraft, small business, and vocational trainings to restore their livelihoods, the new living environment discouraged the restoration process. For instance, they previously cultivated several hectares of paddy field but were provided with only a plot of 0.50 ha in the new villages’ upland area. Adapting to the new peri-urban environment remained a challenge for them, and their livelihoods suffered despite the MNCs’ social investment. The other forty-one affected families were not available to participate in the survey as they sold or rented their houses to host families, choosing to live in other places.

Drivers Influencing Affected Families’ Livelihoods

According to the wealth assessment results, slightly more than 50 percent of affected families were able to restore or improve their livelihoods after relocation, while less than 50 percent were adversely affected. These varying impacts reflect several influential drivers, which can be elaborated as follows: 1. Self-resilience

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Families’ ability to maintain their livelihoods in the new villages relied heavily on their degree of self-resilience, or the ability to restore their livelihoods without extensive assistance from the project. Families who previously engaged in urban-style economic activities such as trading and doing small business were able to adapt quickly and even improve their economic situations. This may be due to wealth and human capital gained before relocation as well as their strong self-resilience. However, the poor and very poor families with less self-resilience encountered economic difficulties. These families follow ethnic lifestyles transferred from generation to generation. These lifestyles entail dependence on natural resources to earn a living. In the new villages, which were located in peri-urban areas, the majority of resources were already privately owned by the host villagers. Conflicts over natural resource ownership between the host and affected families were common.

Although farmland was provided for the affected families, the rain-fed farmland was located in an unfavorable area due to rocky outcrops and high elevation (about 1,200 meters above sea level). Furthermore, the plots of land were very small (0.5 ha). The lower, more cultivable land, which was slashed and burned before affected families arrived, belonged to the host villagers. The affected families who followed ethnic lifestyles were more likely to depend on the social investment assistance of the MNCs, which insufficiently aided their livelihoods. The self-resilience of the affected families proved to be more important to their livelihoods than the MNCs’ social investment activities.

2. Geographical Constraint

Other than self-resilience, the geographical area of Lao PDR is very complex, which impedes the livelihood restoration of those who are involuntarily relocated by the MNCs’ investment. Geography has a direct bearing on food security and is a major influential driver of livelihood restoration (or lack thereof ). Several hydropower projects are being constructed throughout the country, and resettlement of affected families is a recurring issue.14 Farmland for farmland compensation is a controversial issue. Arable land (about 3 percent of the entire country), particularly lower land with the potential for agricultural use, is hard to find for the affected families.

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Bounsouk Souksavath and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “Reconstruction of the livelihood of resettlers.”

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Though the population density in Lao PDR is low, agricultural land is already scarce.15 In this study, relocating the affected families, especially those whose living conditions depended on farmland and paddy, to locations without abundant arable land or paddies impaired the affected families’ livelihoods. In the Feung resettlement site, farmland or paddy became a major issue, resulting in increasingly frequent disputes between resettled families and the host villagers. Consequently, affected families were compelled to carry out contour (upland) cultivation, which produced insufficient yields to serve annual families’ rice demands and resulted in a several-month rice shortage.

3. Corporate Responsibility and Effectiveness of Social Investment of the MNCs

In addition to the above two drivers, cost-ineffectiveness and corporate irresponsibility on the part of the MNCs were major drivers of adverse impacts on the livelihoods of the affected families after relocation. First, the MNCs pledged to invest $22 million to restore the social and economic situations of those affected by the hydropower project via a thirty-year long resettlement action plan of social investment. Yet, a profit-making firm was contracted to implement the resettlement action plan, which brings the cost-effectiveness of MNCs’ social investment into question. The affected families claimed that they received insufficient initial support to start up off-farm and on-farm activities. For example, the contractor did not provide enough funding to start small businesses or purchase livestock, or enough farmland to engage in farming. On average, most key informants claimed that each family received about 20 percent (about $50) of the fund offered by the MNCs and endorsed by the government. The contractor did not follow through on its initial commitments, and the government failed to force them to do otherwise. As a result, the affected families, particularly the poor and very poor families who depended on the MNCs’ social investment, experienced hardship. This is different from the Nam Theun 2 dam project, which was driven by development agencies such as the World Bank and likely generated more positive than negative impacts.16

Second, the MNCs’ corporate irresponsibility worsened the situations of the marginalized affected families. Profit from selling electricity to neighboring 15 16

Claudio O. Delang and Matthew Toro, “Hydropower-induced displacement.”

See Bounsouk Souksavath and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “Reconstruction of the livelihood of resettlers.”

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countries takes priority over socio-economic and environmental issues for the MNCs. As a result, MNCs did not appear to regard restoration of livelihoods as important. The affected families, especially the poor and very poor families, faced several livelihood constraints due to the MNCs’ inattentiveness. The GoL PDR did not effectively enforce the commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) of the newly-emerged, wholly foreign-owned company involved in the NN 2 project.

Nattavud Pimpa’s study (2013) on CSR in Laos finds that it is rare for the wholly-owned foreign companies or joint venture companies to have self-implemented CSR.17 This reflects a government strategy to attract foreign investors to invest in Laos and to become Asia’s electricity-exporting “battery.”

It is apparent that CSR was not well incorporated in either the newly registered firm in Lao PDR or in the home country of the MNCs. This pattern did not help, and sometimes hurt, the affected families’ livelihoods. The new firm’s commitment to social responsibility lagged behind that of development agencies and development banks, as was seen in the case of the development-bank-financed Nam Theun 2 hydropower project.18 4. Regulatory Enforcement, Transparency, and Accountability of the Government

In addition to the above drivers, the impacts of MNC investment on the livelihoods of the affected families depended on the host government’s enforcement of regulations and its level of accountability and transparency during the implementation of MNC-funded social investment. To a certain degree, GoL has enforced related sub-decrees and regulations, including the EIA, SIA, RAP, and the social mitigation plan, to regulate MNCs’ handling of social and environmental issues caused by the NN2 project. Nonetheless, despite these procedures being followed, proper regulatory enforcement was not observed and social investment quality remained a concern.19 To a certain degree, the socio-economic impacts of NN2 were not properly studied, but the project was accepted by GoL nonetheless. It appears that Nattavud Pimpa, “Comparing corporate social reponsbilities in Lao PDR and Thailand: International Business and Poverty Allieviation,” International Journal of Studies in Thai Business, Society & Culture 2, no. 1 (2013): 47.

18 Marrite Virtanen, “Foreign direct investment and hydropower.”

19 International River, “The Xayabouri Dam: Looming Threat to the Mekong River,” http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/The%20Xayaburi%20Dam_Eng.pdf; and Maarite Virtanen, “Foreign direct investment and hydropower.”

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GoL was less focused on the livelihoods of the affected families than on attracting foreign capital to develop the hydropower sector and achieve the government’s goal of graduating from a least developed country by 2020. In this sense, economic growth is a priority area for policymakers and political leaders, but local socio-economic and environmental issues are left behind.20 This results in wide income inequality between the rural and urban areas (a Gini index of 32.6).21 GoL is adopting a race-to-the-bottom strategy to attract FDI for economic and financial benefit.22 This led the government to not adequately enforce their regulations and eventually exacerbated the poor economic situations of the affected families after investment, as was the case in this study.

The transparency and accountability of the host government in managing the social investment fund provided by the MNCs is another influential driver. This caused considerable adverse impacts on the livelihoods of the affected families. As mentioned earlier, a budget of $22 million had been reserved to improve affected people’s livelihoods. However, livelihood restoration expenses were not made transparent to civil society or the affected families. Compared with the Nam Theun 2 case, RAP did not work as effectively with regards to financial management and livelihood restoration monitoring.23 It is likely that government officials as well as the contractor took advantage of MNCs’ social investment fund, according to key informants. Explicitly, neither the government nor the MNC’s conducted financial auditing. Most of the key informants confirmed that there was no transparency regarding selection of the contractor to carry out the social investment program.

Awarding the contract to implement the social investment fund could possibly have been made through social connections, rather than through cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and fair competition. So, the lack of government transparency in managing the social investment fund caused considerable adverse effects on the livelihoods of the affected families in the new villages.

Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams, Human Security and Regional Stability (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010).

21 World Bank, “Lao PDR.” 22 See Catherine Benson, “Conservation NGOs in Madang, Papua New Guinea: Understanding Community and Donor Expectations,” Society & Natural Resources 25, no.1 (2011): 71-86; and Ozay Mehmet and Akbar Tavakoli, “Does Foreign Direct Investment Cause a Race to the Bottom? Evidence from Four Asian Countries,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 8, no. 2 (2003): 133-56.

23 Duke Center for International Development, “Some Cross-Cutting Lessons,” in Doing a Dam Better: The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Story of Nam Theun 2, ed. Ian C. Porter and Jayasankar Shivakumar (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011).

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Besides the transparency issue, the government was also not properly held accountable to the affected families regarding livelihood restoration as prescribed in the related regulations. The sub-decree on compensation and resettlement of the development project defines the rights of affected persons in relocation, livelihood development, local culture and traditional matters, grievance procedures, and budgetary consideration.24 In addition, the national resettlement policy and guidelines indicate that resettlement should result in improved living conditions and standards.25 Yet, the host government was likely not held accountable for the affected families’ livelihoods in accordance with these regulations. In comparison, according to Souksavath and Nakayama (2012), the Nam Theun 2 Dam’s resettlement project mostly complied with these regulations.26 In this regard, the lack of accountability of GoL did to a certain degree impair the livelihoods of the affected families in the new villages.

5. Participation of Stakeholders

Stakeholders’ participation in all processes (EIA, SIA, and RAP preparation) of hydropower project development significantly influenced affected families’ livelihoods. However, some of the affected people were not aware of dam construction or the EIA and SIA studies, even prior to relocation, and local people had no chance to participate in the process.27 In Lao PDR, the main constraint of affected communities’ participation was the absence of popular political participation and representative government.28 In the NN2 case, although affected families were invited to participate in SIA and RAP preparation, the affected families were not satisfied with the quality of the RAP. Key informants alleged that items proposed in the social mitigation plan, including RAP, were not fully complied with by the MNCs (NN2). As a result, the participation of the affected families was low; the NGOs who empowered local people’s voices were not involved in all processes, including the SIA, EIA, and preparation of the social mitigation plan of NN2.29 Government of Lao, “Prime Minister Decree 192/2005 on the Compensation and Resettlement.”

Government of Lao, “Technical Guidelines on Compensation and Resettlement.”

26 Bounsouk Souksavath and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “Reconstruction of the livelihood of resettlers.”

27 Claudio O. Delang and Matthew Toro, “Hydropower-induced displacement.”

28 Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, “Mekong Tipping Point.”

29 Ibid., 28.

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The lack of effective participation, including stakeholders and the affected families, worsened the livelihoods of affected families in the new villages. Projects such as the Nam Theun 2 Dam, which was co-funded by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, involved civil society and local people in RAP, SIA, and EIA preparation, and local livelihoods benefited as a result.30 Unfortunately, the NN2 project did not follow this precedent.

Conclusion

This paper discusses the impacts of MNCs’ FDI on national economic development in Lao PDR. MNCs’ FDI may contribute to national economic growth in general, but FDI’s contribution to local livelihoods is debatable and remains particularly tenuous in the hydroelectric sector. Previous scholars have taken both optimistic and pessimistic views of the impact of hydropower FDI on livelihoods, but have not substantially analyzed the drivers behind such impacts.

This study empirically shows that in the case of the NN2 hydropower development plant, the contribution of MNCs’ FDI to physical infrastructure development was significant. The project provided a number of higher-quality infrastructure items, facilities, and public services compared to the old villages. However, the contribution of this project to the livelihoods of the affected families was not borne out in the participatory wealth assessment, at least not in the relatively short period of time that has so far elapsed since relocation. Only 52.52 percent of the affected families were able to recover their livelihoods above the poverty line, while 43.58 percent of affected families were left below the poverty line. Though 52.52 percent of affected families’ livelihoods were significantly improved, these families received minimal benefits from the project’s social investment, although they did benefit from basic infrastructure services at the new villages. Moreover, their livelihoods were better because the majority of these families were engaged in small businesses or other activities such as employment (skilled workers, government officials, etc.)

Bounsouk Souksavath and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “Reconstruction of the livelihood of resettlers”; Patchamuthu Illangovan, “TN2: Transformative Endeavor,” in Doing a Dam Better: The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Story of Nam Theun 2, ed. Ian C. Porter and Jayasankar Shivakumar (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).

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in Vientiane or elsewhere before relocation to the new villages. Thus, the project brought them closer to their business partners and centers, which created further opportunities. This type of livelihood was made possible due to their self-resilience.

Unfortunately, 43.58 percent of local families remained below the poverty line. Several drivers influenced these families’ situations, including weak self-resilience, the ineffectiveness of MNCs’ social investment, the lack of government transparency and accountability, the lack of stakeholder participation, and geographical constraint. First, a majority of these families prefer livelihoods based on natural resources, specifically collecting NTFPs for daily food consumption and rice cultivation, rather than other off-farm activities. The new villages are located in urban areas without an abundance of natural resources. Moreover, resources are a subject of dispute between the host villages and resettlers (affected families). The provided half-hectare of farmland was located in non-arable areas characterized by high elevations and rocky outcrops. Though cash compensation was provided, the affected families spent the cash on modern household materials, such as TVs, DVD players, and fridges, which generated no return to long-term livelihood restoration.

Low levels of self-resilience and education were harmful to these families. Second, MNCs’ FDI in hydropower focused mainly on financial benefits. Social investment to mitigate adverse impacts was not a priority of the MNCs, and many affected families were left in vulnerable conditions. Third, the government did not care for affected families’ livelihoods as implied in several regulations and guidelines. This was due to the host government’s weak regulatory enforcement, lack of accountability to the affected families, and lack of transparency in managing social investments.

Fourth, although the affected families were involved during public consultations, the majority of livelihood issues were not addressed by the MNCs’ social investment. Furthermore, powerful civil society actors, such as advocacy and development NGOs, were not involved. In this instance, the voice of affected families was limited. Lastly, Lao PDR’s geographical conditions constrained the relocation of affected families to places where paddy fields and arable land were not available, resulting in severe negative impacts on livelihoods. These driving forces together worsened the livelihoods of the affected families, especially the very poor, after relocation.

Above all, this study concludes that the MNCs’ FDI in the NN2 hydropower project created a noticeable gap between the poor and the well-off.

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This conclusion differs from that of Virtanen (2006), Souksavath and Maekawa (2012), and Souksavath and Nakayama (2012), who highlight the positive impacts of hydropower development projects in Lao PDR.31 The well-off families received fewer direct benefits from MNCs’ social investment, but they gained improved access to social services and infrastructure. In addition, the well-off families availed themselves of the economic benefits of being relocated to a site closer to major urban areas. At least in the short term, the new village’s physical infrastructure, including education and health facilities, roads, and access to markets, has not yet economically benefited poor families. This was due to several influential drivers as discussed in section 3.4. As a contribution to the aforementioned literature, this study affirms that the impacts of MNCs’ FDI on affected families’ livelihoods depends heavily on the ability of the affected families to adjust to their new living environments, the commitment of MNCs to livelihood restoration of the affected families, and the behavior of the host government. These findings are worth considering in future studies and policy debates surrounding MNCs’ FDI in hydropower development and corporate social responsibility in developing countries.

Young Sokphea is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Mr. Sokphea specializes in agricultural and rural development, local governance, corporate social responsibility, and environmental impact assessment and resettlement development.

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Understanding Community and Donor Expectations.” Society & Natural Resources 25, no.1 (2011): 71-86.

Maarite Virtanen, “Foreign direct investment and hydropower in Lao PDR”; Bounsouk Souksavath and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “Reconstruction of the livelihood of resettlers”; Bounsouk Souksavath, and Miko Maekawa, “The livelihood reconstruction of resettlers.”

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Cronin, Richard, and Timothy Hamlin. Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams,

Human Security and Regional Stability. Washington, DC: The Stimson

Center, 2010.

Delang, Claudio, and Matthew Toro. “Hydropower-induced Displacement and Res

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Compensation and Resettlement of the Development Project.” Vientiane:

GoL, 2005.

———. “Technical Guidelines on Compensation and Resettlement in

Development Projects.” Vientiane: GoL, 2005.

Gunawardana, Pemasiri J., and Sommala Sisombat. “Trends and Patterns of

Foreign Direct Investment in Lao PDR,” International Journal of Business

and Management 1 (2009): 34-41.

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Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.” Vientiane: IMF, 2011.

International River. The Xayabouri Dam: Looming Threat to the Mekong River. http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/The20Xayaburi%20Dam_Eng.pdf.

Mehmet, Ozay, and Akbar Tavakoli. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Cause a

Race to the Bottom? Evidence from Four Asian Countries.” Journal of Asia

Pacific Economy 8, no. 2 (2003): 133-156.

Moser, Titus. “MNCs and Sustainable Business Practice: The Case of the

Colombian and Peruvian Petroleum Industries.” World Development 29,

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Muthuri, Judy, Jeremy Moon, and Uwafiokun Idemudia. “Corporate Innovation

and Sustainable Community Development in Developing Countries.”

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Union Delegate to Lao PDR, 2012.

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DC: World Bank, 2011.

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Developed Country: The Economic Development Model Versus the North South Model.” Academy of Management Review 10, no.1 (1985): 8-14.

Pimpa, Nattavud. “Comparing corporate social reponsbilities in Lao PDR and

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settlers from the Nam Ngum 1 hydropower project in Laos.” International

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of Resettlers from the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos.”

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Last modified 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/country/lao-pdr#cp_wdi.

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China’s Policy toward Japan: Looking for a Great Power Peace in the Wrong Places Nicholas Khoo While their reasons differ, scholars as varied as G. John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth have seen eye to eye on the reality of an extended period of peace among great powers, of which China and Japan are, to varying degrees. A not insignificant number of scholars of the Asian region endorse this perspective. Yet, to concur with this consensus requires one to make some brave assumptions about the troubled Sino-Japanese relationship. Contrary to claims in the literature, left to their own devices, a great power peace between Beijing and Tokyo is unlikely to emerge. A more accurate and compelling way to characterize this bilateral relationship is through the realist concept of a power transition, emphasizing different rates of economic growth and competing state interests. Here, China is an unambiguous rising great power, and Japan a declining one, whose future at once hinges on how China interacts with it, and on the existence of a robust U.S.-Japan alliance.

While their reasons differ, scholars as varied as G. John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth have seen eye to eye on the reality of an extended period of peace among great powers, of which China and Japan are, to varying degrees.1 A not insignificant number of scholars of the Asian region endorse this perspective.2 Yet, to concur with this consensus requires one to make some brave assumptions about the troubled Sino-Japanese relationship.

G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs 87, no.1 (January/February 2008): 23-37; William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 5-41; for a definition of a great power, which emphasizes power and interests, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 49.

2 Benjamin Goldsmith, “A Liberal Peace in Asia?” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007): 5-27; Benjamin Goldsmith, “The East Asian Peace as a Second Order Diffusion Effect,” International Studies Review 16 (2014): 275-289; Timo Kivimaki, “East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 11 (2011): 57-85; Stein Tonnesson, “What Is It That Best Explains the East Asia Peace Since 1979?” Asian Perspective 33, no. 1 (2009): 111-136; Richard Bitzinger and Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival 50, no. 6 (December 2008-January 2009): 195-218.

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Contrary to claims in the literature, left to their own devices, a great power peace between Beijing and Tokyo is unlikely to emerge. Chinese and Japanese analysts appreciate this reality.3

A more accurate and compelling way to characterize this bilateral relationship is through the realist concept of a power transition, emphasizing different rates of economic growth and competing state interests.4 Here, China is an unambiguous rising great power, and Japan a declining one, whose future at once hinges on how China interacts with it, and on the existence of a robust U.S.-Japan alliance.

The argument is laid out in the following manner. In section one, we review four influential perspectives that point toward a great power peace emerging between China and Japan. These highlight the role played by the variables of trade, identity, socialization, and domestic politics. In section two, an alternative neo-realist understanding of Chinese policy toward Japan is presented. Here, differences in Chinese and Japanese capabilities and interests, in the context of a power transition, have been responsible for generating friction and accompanying spiral dynamics in bilateral relations. In section three, Chinese policy toward Japan from 2001-2007 is explored. Section four focuses on the 2008-14 period. Section five evaluates the case for a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations advanced in the existing literature. The conclusion sketches the outlines of a realist-based great power peace, and suggests possibilities for future research.

Four Non-Realist Views of Peace in Sino-Japanese Relations: Trade, Identity, Socialization, Domestic Politics

The notion that a non-realist-based great power peace can exist in Sino-Japanese relations is consistent with a variety of influential interpretations in the Chinese foreign policy scholarship. These perspectives variously emphasize the role For a Chinese analyst’s view, see Zhang Lili, Xin Zhongguo he Riben guanxi lishi [A History of New China’s Relations With Japan] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2010); Akio Takahara, “A Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise and the East Asian Order,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), 218-237; see Sutter’s conclusion after consultations with Japanese analysts in Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promise and Perils (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 146-150.

4 On the economic sources of great power politics, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13-15, 24, 31; Jonathan Kirschner, “The Political Economy of Realism,” in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 69-102.

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played by trade, identity, socialization, and domestic politics in Beijing’s international relations.

Advocates of what is best called the trading state viewpoint contend that trade has had a significant effect in promoting pacific tendencies in Chinese foreign policy.5 Thus, Ikenberry claims that while the international system benefits from China’s economic dynamism, “the existing trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so.”6 In this view, “Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system…that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in.”7 Giovanni Arrighi expands on this view by positing that the Chinese are part of a larger and “ongoing revival of the East Asian tradition of relying primarily on the economic sources of power.”8 China specialist David Shambaugh has identified expanded economic relations between China and its Asian neighbours as one of the four pillars of a more active and successful regional policy.9 He notes that “the most noteworthy dimension of China’s new engagement with the Asian region is in the economic domain.”10 A robust trend of “growing interdependence and cooperation among both states and non-state actors–with China increasingly at the center of this activity” is identified.11

At face value, the case for viewing China as a trading state is a strong one.

China’s trade has grown at an annual rate of 15-17 percent for almost 30 years. In 1979, exports and imports accounted for 14 percent of China’s GDP. By 2006, exports and imports accounted for 70 percent of its GDP.12 As a recent International Erich Weede, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” International Interactions 36, no.2 (2010): 206-213; Woo Wing Thye, “The Economic Impact of China’s Emergence as a Major Trading Nation,” in Lok Sang Ho ed., China, Hong Kong and the World Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 65-86; James R. Mason, “Analysing China’s Economic Interdependence and its Political Relations With its Neighbours,” China Information 26, no. 3 (2012): 3-33; Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg, “International Trade and U.S. Relations with China,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 217-236.

6 Ikenberry, “The Rise of China,” 32.

7 Ibid.

8 Giovanni Arrighi, “Reading Hobbes in Beijing: Great Power Politics and the Challenge of the Peaceful Ascent,” in Mark Blyth ed., Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation (London: Routledge, 2009), 179.

9 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no.

1 (Winter 2004-05): 83.

10 David Shambaugh, “Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century,” in David Shambaugh ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 36.

11 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 65.

12 David Zweig, “The Rise of a New Trading Nation,” in Lowell Dittmer and George T.Yu eds., China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 39.

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Monetary Fund report noted: Few countries have so obviously gained from integration into the open world trading system as China, its growth coinciding with its ascendancy as an exporter and manufacturer. China is now the first or second largest trading partner of 78 countries with 55 percent of global GDP (versus just 13 countries with 15 percent of global GDP in 2000).13 Indeed, recent research on international perceptions of China’s role in world politics has found that its perceived influence has been strongest within the economic sphere.14 At face value, the applicability of the trading state perspective in analyzing Sino-Japanese relations has some resonance, since Japan is China’s second largest trading partner.15

Another identifiable group of analysts whose views point in the direction of a non-realist-based great power peace between China and Japan see value in the concept of identity. Identity theorists credit positive changes in China’s identity with a shift to a more pragmatic and benign Chinese foreign policy.16 Arguably the most prominent articulation of this perspective is laid out by David Kang in China Rising and a variety of closely-related writings over the last decade.17 Kang contends that a region-wide understanding that China is resuming its traditional role as the “dominant state in in East Asia” has accompanied China’s rise. According to this analysis, fears over China’s rise are “empirically unfounded.”18 In this view, present-day Asian actors, including Japan, have reverted to pre-colonial era conduct that identified

International Monetary Fund, “People’s Republic of China, Spillover Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Selected Issues,” IMF Country Report No. 11/193 (Washington, D.C.: July 2011), 3.

14 Gregory G. Holyk, “Paper Tiger? Chinese Soft Power in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no.

2 (2011): 223-254.

15 Nicholas Khoo, “The False Promise of Economic Interdependence: Chinese Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” in Andrew H. Tan ed., East and South-East Asia International Relations and Security Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), 47-55.

16 David Kang, China Rising: Power, Peace and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Rex Li, A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security (New York: Routledge, 2009); Peter Hays Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 235-265.

17 Kang, China Rising.

18 Ibid., 10.

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Chinese regional hegemony with stability.19 For Kang, “it is interests and identity, not power that are the key variables in determining threat and stability in international relations.”20 Notwithstanding the reference to interests in the argument, it is the convergence of national identities in post-Cold War Asia that plays a particularly significant role in the analysis.21 On this basis, Kang generates optimistic insights on the region’s future international relations, including Sino-Japanese relations.22 Thus, he predicts a regional dynamic toward “accommodation” of China’s central position, rather than a posture of balancing against it.23 Consequently, a shared regional understanding about “China’s preferences and limited aims short-circuits the security dilemma.”24

A third view that is highly relevant to the notion of a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations is advocated by Alastair Johnston, who conceptualizes China as a social state. Johnston is particularly interested in behavioral change as a consequence of China’s participation in a variety of international institutions since the 1980s.25 The contention is that Chinese involvement in these institutions has been led to the activation of micro-processes of socialization, including mimicking, social influence, and persuasion.26 These alter the behavior of participants, resulting in a “convergence of preferences and beliefs, and conformist behavior.”27 In a related study, Johnston has evaluated China’s compliance with five major international normative regimes, specifically, sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self-determination, and human rights.28 China emerges in this analysis as a state that is quite comfortable in the U.S.-constructed international order, with little evidence found of Chinese activity designed to balance “very vigorously” against the United States.29 While Johnston has not written specifically on Sino-Japanese relations, the implications of his David Kang, “Hierarchy in Asian International Relations,” Asian Security 1, no. 1 (2005): 53-79.

Kang, China Rising, 9.

21 Ibid., 4, 9, 11, 20-21; Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong,” 66-70.

22 Kang, China Rising, 63-66, 153-182.

23 Ibid., 4.

24 David Kang, “Why China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asian Region,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 552.

25 Alastair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 40-41.

26 Ibid., xxv.

27 Ibid., 20.

28 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no.4 (2003): 5-56.

29 Ibid., 49.

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analysis are clear. As China and Japan engage in greater institutional interaction, and particularly in various East Asian regional fora, the socializing mechanisms he identifies should ameliorate tensions between the two countries.

A fourth interpretation that is relevant to our discussion of a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations emphasizes the role played by domestic politics.30 In a recent book, James Reilly develops a cyclical public mobilization wave and ‘responsive authoritarian’ model, as a counter to previous studies which contend that public opinion does not influence the foreign policy of authoritarian states, and China in particular.31 In this view, when the Chinese leadership has been divided, public opinion, albeit of an illiberal variety, matters as a distinct variable in China’s foreign policy, and its Japan policy more specifically.32 When the leadership has been united, public opinion has had a much more muted impact. Ultimately, the Chinese state is viewed as a strategic actor, successfully exercising control over public opinion, and committed to stability in Sino-Japanese relations. If true, this would form the basis for a great power peace in Sino-Japanese relations. What about nationalism? Reilly argues that rising Chinese nationalism is not correlated with military aggression, a pattern he expects to continue.33 Thus, it is contended that the prospects for the Sino-Japanese relationship are “far brighter than most analysts have assumed.”34 The Realist Alternative: A Surprising Neglect

In the midst of this proliferation of perspectives on Chinese policy toward Japan, a standard perspective used to understand great power politics, neo-realist theory, has been strangely neglected.35 In the general literature on Chinese foreign policy, James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); see also Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: National Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

32 Reilly, Strong Society, 27.

33 Ibid., 2-6.

34 Ibid., 8-9.

35 First articulated by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, neo-realism (also known as structural realism) emphasizes the role of structure, defined in terms of the distribution of material capabilities, in determining relations between states. While initially developed to explain broad outcomes in international politics, notably great power balancing and security maximizing activity, it can also be used as a theory of foreign policy.

See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Waltz is associated with defensive realism. For the subsequent development of offensive realism, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, New York: 2001). For elaboration on neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, see Colin Elman, “Horses For Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?”

Security Studies 6, no.1 (1996): 7-53.

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one can easily point to realists who are central figures, such as Robert Ross and Thomas Christensen.36 Neo-realists who analyze Japan’s China policy can also be identified.37 However, there is no contemporary analyst who explicitly adopts a neo-realist perspective in analyzing China’s Japan policy. Wan Ming comes close, but ultimately finds neorealism “indeterminate.”38 Richard Bush accepts the relevance of the security dilemma concept emphasized by neo-realists, but finds it “only moderately helpful.”39 He supplements his analysis with two factors: interactions and history.40

The gap in neo-realist attention to China’s Japan policy needs to be filled.

Utilizing neo-realism in its capacity as a theory of foreign policy, our narrative focuses on Chinese capabilities and interests in generating security dilemma dynamics.41 As China’s relative power capabilities have risen, it has naturally begun to assert its security-based interests in East Asia, its traditional sphere of influence.

As Beijing has pressed its position, Tokyo has resisted.42 Here, a distinct pattern in Chinese policy toward Japan can be identified. Increasing Chinese capabilities and declining interests in minimizing conflict have generated spiral dynamics in the Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995); Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

37 Michael Green (Georgetown University) and Richard Samuels (MIT) come to mind.

38 Wan Ming, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006), 201-232.

39 Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010), 24.

40 Ibid., 24-25.

41 Elman, “Horses For Courses”; The security dilemma is a central concept in the neorealist understanding of international politics. To appreciate its dynamics, we must start with the distinguishing difference between international and domestic politics, which is the concept of anarchy, or lack of an international sovereign in world politics. Given this structural condition, which heightens uncertainty, in a hypothetical two-state model, the self-defensive efforts by State A to increase its security by arming itself are viewed by State B as being offensive in nature. This generates fear in State B, compelling a response. An action-reaction spiral process occurs. The end result is that the security of both states is reduced below levels which existed prior to the start of interaction. Significantly, this process explains how heightened possibility of conflict occurs even when neither state intends it. That said, co-operation under the security dilemma is possible when offensive and defensive weapons can be differentiated, and when defense has the advantage over the offense. Under such circumstances, “security seeking” states can potentially, if not necessarily easily, differentiate themselves from non-security seeking and revisionist “power maximizing” states. While the security dilemma can be moderated through these variables, it cannot be eliminated. See Robert Jervis, “Co-operation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214; Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587-623; Waltz, Theory, 186-187.

42 For an authoritative assessment of the Japanese reaction to China emphasizing security dilemma dynamics, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 166-171.

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form of an interactive process of conflict escalation.

Between 2001 and 2007, Chinese policy toward Japan reflected the workings of growing Chinese military capabilities underpinned by robust economic growth.43 As we shall see in the next section, during this time, Beijing began to challenge Japan for slights it previously minimized.44 This dynamic was nevertheless kept in check by Beijing’s understanding that its interests dictated some measure of restraint in pursuing conflict with Tokyo. A qualitative change in Chinese policy can be detected in the period beginning in 2008, when China began to behave more assertively, and bilateral relations deteriorated.45 What explains this change in the Chinese stance? Again, capabilities and interests are critical. This period has been marked by the distinct reality of rising Chinese economic power in the face of apparent dramatic (if overstated) U.S. decline, exemplified in the U.S.-centered great financial crisis of 2008-2009.46 Though not without its own financial weaknesses, at least in the short-run, China emerged relatively unscathed.47 At the same time, China’s interests in restraining conflict with Japan have weakened over time.

As Beijing’s military strength has grown, it has perceived a Japanese intent to alter the status quo in the East China Sea.48 Thus, Beijing has begun to challenge Tokyo more forcefully, and for longer periods than in the 2001-2007 period. The alternative perspectives on China’s Japan policy summarized above are really only able to explain periods of relative peace and co-operation in Sino-Japanese relations, and have severe problems adequately explaining conflict. Only the neo-realist perspective is able to explain the full record of Chinese policy toward Japan.

China’s Japan Policy, 2001-2007

Between 2001 and 2007, China maintained a distinct trajectory of robust

Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007).

44 Reilly, Strong Society, 129-155.

45 Ibid., 179-206.

46 See World Bank figures for the Chinese economy from 2008-present available at: World Bank, “China,” World Bank Data (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/country/china; Daniel Drezner, “Global Economic Governance During the Great Recession,” World Politics 66, no. 1 (January 2014): 123-164.

47 Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 7-45.

48 For further discussion of the concept of interests see Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 30.

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economic growth, which fueled an impressive military modernization.49 This set the background for the Chinese response to the policies of Japanese Premier Junichiro Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006).50 Koizumi’s relationship with China started poorly. Beijing was appalled by his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 13 August 2001, which contains the remains of fourteen Class A Japanese war criminals.51 This was interpreted by the Chinese as a touchstone of the Japanese leader’s intentions and stance toward the Chinese, whose views on such visits are well-known. The Japanese Premier was to repeat these visits during every year of his tenure.52

Even as he did so, a series of incidents over the 2004-2005 period reflected a particularly alarming deterioration in relations.53 Here, events surrounding the behavior of Chinese fans toward the Japanese national soccer team during the Asian Cup soccer finals held in China are noteworthy. The Japanese team was subjected to sustained abuse and vitriol as it played its preliminary group matches in various parts of China. The full-scale rioting by disgruntled Chinese soccer fans following the Japanese team’s victory over China in the final in August 2004 turned out to be a harbinger.54 In November 2004, a Chinese submarine was detected in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Later that month, Chinese drilling teams were dispatched to inspect for oil and gas deposits within the Japanese EEZ.55 In response, China was formally declared a security concern in Japan’s December 2004 National Defense Program Outline.56 In mid-February 2005, the U.S. and Japan met for their annual defense consultations. In an unprecedented move reflecting increasing Japanese concern at China’s foreign policy, Tokyo agreed to mention the Taiwan issue in the joint statement at the end of the consultations.57

These events led to a spike of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. In late March 2005, a grass-roots campaign to protest Japan’s efforts to secure a permanent Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Richard D. Fischer, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), 66-122.

50 For an examination of the period from 1949 to 1999, see Reilly, Strong Society, 55-97.

51 James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Trouble starts with ‘T,’” Comparative Connections: A Quarterly e-journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 3, no. 2 (July 2001): 93-103.

52 Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 235-261.

53 For a Chinese assessment of the damage inflicted on Sino-Japanese relations during Koizumi’s tenure, see Zhang, Xin Zhongguo [New China], 256-260.

54 “So Hard to Be Friends,” The Economist, March 23, 2005, 23-25.

55 Bush, Perils of Proximity, 76-78.

56 “So Hard to Be Friends,” The Economist, March 23, 2005, 23-25.

57 For the text of the joint statement see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html.

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seat on the UN Security Council garnered an estimated 22 million signatures.58 Soon after, a wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations, which the Chinese government did little to stop, targeted Japanese businesses and government offices in Beijing, Shanghai and southern China. That said, Tokyo was not without its share of blame for the deterioration in relations. The 5 April 2005 publication of an official school textbook glossing over Japan’s World War II-era atrocities in China and Korea contributed to a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment.59 Koizumi eventually delivered an apology for his country’s wartime behavior in Jakarta, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung conference.60

In any case, Tokyo lodged a formal protest with China concerning the demonstrations, and requested an apology. The Chinese response was a counterproductive one.61 On 12 April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao added fuel to the fire by strongly implying that China was opposed to Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.62 Tokyo then announced that it was starting to review applications to drill for gas in areas in the East China Sea that are in dispute between Japan and China.63 During a hastily arranged two-day visit to Beijing

by Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing rejected any idea of a Chinese apology.64 Then, on 19 April, Beijing effectively halted the anti-Japanese protests.65 Commerce Minister Bo Xilai warned that a campaign to boycott Japanese goods would jeopardize China’s economic growth, and expressed confidence that Sino-Japanese economic relations would be unaffected by these events.66 The Chinese decision to halt the protests reflected a desire to ensure a modicum of stability in relations ahead of a meeting between Hu and Koizumi on 23 April.67 Joseph Kahn, “If 22 Million Chinese Prevail at the U.N., Japan Won’t,” New York Times, April 1, 2005.

Bush, Perils of Proximity, 208; Norimitsu Onishi, “In Japan’s New Texts, Lessons in Rising Nationalism,” New York Times, April 17, 2005.

60 Raymond Bonner and Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan’s Chief Apologizes for War Misdeeds,” New York Times, April 23, 2005.

61 Bush, Perils of Proximity, 207-210.

62 Philip Pan, “Chinese Step Up Criticism of Japan,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2005.

63 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Asian Giants Keep Up War of Words,” BBC News, April 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4443307.stm.

64 Joseph Kahn, “China’s Top Diplomat Offers No Apology for Anti-Japan Protests,” New York Times, April 17, 2005.

65 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Official Orders End to Anti-Japanese Demonstrations,” New York Times, April 20, 2005.

66 Jim Yardley, “China Moves to Crack Down on Protests Against Japan,” New York Times, April 23, 2005.

67 Bush, Perils of Proximity, 209.

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From mid-2005 to mid-2006, the Chinese began to challenge Japanese policy in the East China Sea. This included an emphasis on military measures, including the dispatch of air force fighters and naval vessels.68 However, just ahead of Koizumi’s departure from office in September 2006, the Chinese made a decision to lower tensions. Simply stated, the Chinese had made clear their opposition to Koizumi, and state interests in preventing further escalation pointed in favor of moderation. As diplomatic negotiations continued though 2006, the Chinese accepted a Japanese proposal to establish a mechanism to address incidents in the East China Sea.69 In July 2007, the Japanese Coast Guard and the Chinese State Oceanic Administration met, but negotiations stalled. The subsequent agreement reached in June 2008 satisfied neither side.70 China’s Japan Policy, 2008-Present

Even as U.S. economic growth and prestige took a direct hit from the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy experienced only a relatively modest dip.71 Certainly, its military spending remained impressive.72 The continued rise in Chinese military capabilities occurred in the context of a series of perceived Japanese challenges. Critically, Chinese interests in restraining conflict with Japan weakened during this period. Here, the Japanese were viewed by the Chinese as seeking to revise a previously stable (if far from satisfactory) status quo in the East China Sea. Accordingly, Beijing began to challenge Japan more forcefully and in a more sustained fashion than in the 2001-2007 period.

On 8 September 2010, a collision between a Chinese trawler and a Japanese coast guard vessel near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea led to the imprisonment of the trawler’s Chinese fishermen for 20 days. Beijing subsequently cancelled scheduled talks on the joint exploration of a gas field in the East China Sea, summoned the Japanese ambassador on repeated occasions, and demanded an apology.73 As tensions flared, China reportedly blocked the shipment Bush, Perils of Proximity, 78.

Ibid., 79.

70 Ibid., 79-80.

71 Drezner, “Global Economic Governance.”

72 Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner eds., Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s Military Challenge (Seattle and Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012).

73 Agence France-Presse, “Japan-China Summit this Month: Reports,” Straits Times, October 15, 2010.

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to Japan of rare earths, which are critical components in the production of high technology products. On this issue, the Japanese sense of vulnerability is particularly acute since China controls approximately 95 percent of the global supply of rare earths.74

As events unfolded, interventions by Chinese and Japanese government officials exacerbated tensions. Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara accused China of “extremely hysterical” counter-measures.75 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu then claimed that Maehara’s comments were “absurd,” and that “China is not to be blamed.”76 A short ten-minute meeting between the Chinese and Japanese Prime Ministers at the East Asian Summit in Hanoi at the end of October failed to stabilize bilateral tensions.77 Protests by Japanese right-wing groups extended to throwing flares into the compounds of the Chinese consulates in Fukuoka and Nagasaki. On the Chinese side, anti-Japanese protests persisted both on the Internet and on the ground, even after the Chinese authorities attempted to quell them. At one point, an estimated 30,000 took part in protests in Chengdu in Southwest China.

During August-September 2012, developments centering on Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands represented an important watershed and the beginning of a second phase of conflict. The catalyst for rising tensions came in the form of then Tokyo mayor and right-wing nationalist Shintaro Ishihara’s attempt to purchase three of the islands from a Japanese family. Seeking to forestall this development, which would have severely de-stabilized relations, the Japanese government instead nationalized the islands in question. However, the move backfired. Beijing interpreted the move as a calculated insult, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry demanded that the Japanese government “stop actions that violate Chinese sovereignty.”78

These developments fueled anti-Japanese resentment across China.

Throughout September, Japanese-themed shops, restaurants and consulates were vandalized. As with earlier demonstrations in 2005, the Chinese authorities “Tokyo Urges Beijing to Resume Rare Earth Exports,” October 25, 2010..

Associated Press, “Japan’s Hawk’s Remarks ‘Shock’ China,” October 20, 2010.

76 Ibid.

77 Agence France-Presse, “Asian summit held amid China-Japan feud,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 29, 2010.

78 Kathrin Hille, “Anti-Japanese Protests Sweep China,” Financial Times, August 19, 2012.

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eventually suppressed the protests. Nevertheless, at the same time, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a speech asserting that China “will never budge, even half an inch, over the sovereignty and territorial issue.”79 Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng reinforced the message, observing that China was “watching closely…and reserve[d] the right to take reciprocal measures.”80 Commenting on the situation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta deemed the situation sufficiently troubling to express official concern that the accidental use of force could occur.81 Continued Escalation

A third phase in the escalation process was to occur, highlighting the seemingly intractable state of bilateral relations. In December 2012, eight Japanese F-15 fighters scrambled to intercept a Chinese marine surveillance aircraft from the State Oceanic Administration, which was flying over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. This happened again on 11 January 2013, when the Japan Air Self-Defense Force responded to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force J-100 fighters operating near the islands. On 19 and 30 January 2013, the Japanese Defense Ministry claimed that a Chinese PLA Navy vessel had activated its missile guidance system and “painted” a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel. Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera claimed that Japan had “irrefutable data” on this incident and considered that Chinese actions amounted to threatening the use of force.82

On 16 April 2013, Beijing released a white paper which identified Japan as “making trouble over the Diaoyu islands issue.”83 The next day, a PLA Type-052 Lanzhou missile destroyer and Type-054A Hengshui missile frigate entered waters near the contested islands. This occasioned an escalating process of action and reaction.

On 21 April members of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s cabinet visited the

Chico Harlan and Jia Lynn Yang, “China Sends Patrol Ships to Contested Islands after Japan Buys Them,” The Washington Post, September 12, 2012.

80 Ibid.

81 Julie Makinen, “Anti-Japanese Protests in China Spread,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 2012.

82 Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan Defense Chief: Could Have Pre-Emptive Strike Ability in Future,” Reuters, February 15, 2013; Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Chinese Target-locked MSDF Ship, Chopper,” Japan Times, February 6, 2013.

83 Information Office of the State Council, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” (Beijing: 2013).

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Yasukuni shrine. On 23 April, 170 members of the Japanese Diet and a small flotilla carrying 80 Japanese nationalists visited waters off the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.

Reacting to this provocation, on 26 April, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman allegedly asserted that “the Diaoyu islands are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it’s China’s core interest.”84

Watching from the sidelines with increasing concern, the United States finally acted, though with less effect than intended. At a two-day informal meeting in California, President Barack Obama urged his counterpart President Xi Jinping to “deescalate” the conflict with Japan.85 The United States also communicated assurances to Japan that the United States would honor its alliance commitments.

However, neither China nor Japan has demonstrated an interest in following U.S. counsel. The Japanese Defense Ministry’s annual White Paper, released in July, proposed an increasingly hardline stance towards China.86 This was coupled with expressions of serious concern that the United States might not be able to match the rhetoric of its policy of rebalancing to Asia with appropriate funding. Commenting on this Japanese activism, the Chinese Defense Ministry contended that Japan was compromising regional stability.87 China’s ADIZ Declaration

China’s 23 November 2013 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea represented a fourth phase in the escalation process.

There is a 50 percent overlap between China’s and Japan’s ADIZs. Under the terms of the Chinese ADIZ declaration, China requires aircraft to “identify themselves and maintain contact with the Chinese authorities when flying through it. Aircraft must report flight plans and follow instructions; failure to do so,” the Chinese warned, could elicit “emergency defensive measures.”88 The United States immediately challenged

Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 41 (2013): 1-27.

85 Matt Spetalnick, “Obama Urges De-escalation, Dialogue in China-Japan Maritime Row,” Reuters, June 8, 2013.

86 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Warns of China and North Korea as Security Threats,” New York Times, July 9, 2013.

87 Jane Perlez, “Japan and China Trade Sharp Words Over Islands,” New York Times, July 13, 2013.

88 Hou, Qiang, “Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone of the P.R.C.,” Xinhua News Agency, November 23, 2013.

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this declaration by flying two B-52 bombers through the ADIZ without notifying Beijing. Seoul and Tokyo followed suit with their own sorties through China’s ADIZ.

Beijing’s announcement came just days before a trip by Vice-President Joseph R. Biden Jr. to the region. While in Tokyo, Biden stated that the United States was “deeply concerned by the attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea.”89 Yet, critically, while the Vice President stated that the United States “did not recognize the zone,” he did not ask President Xi to rescind the ADIZ declaration.90 On 6 December, the lower house of the Japanese Diet passed a resolution urging China to abolish the ADIZ. During a Japan-ASEAN summit in mid-December, Prime Minister Abe criticized the ADIZ, “demanding China rescind all measures like this that unjustly violate the general rule [regarding freedom of navigation].”91 Predictably, Beijing slammed this idea, characterizing it as “malicious slander.”92 Just a day later, Secretary of State John Kerry, in a visit to Hanoi, advised Beijing that ”the zone should not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions elsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea.”93 Escalating Sino-Japanese Tensions and U.S. Drift

In any case, Prime Minister Abe has not showed much restraint in his actions, even going against U.S. advice to de-escalate tensions with China and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on 26 December 2013. Indeed, speaking off the record, in an exasperated tone, one American official observed that Abe’s Yasukuni visit made Biden’s China diplomacy “useless.”94 The shrine visit led a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman to take the unusual step of directly criticizing Abe for honoring “fascists” and the “Nazis of Asia.”95 Concerns about Abe’s revisionist interpretations of history are such that on 4 March 2014, Premier Li Keqiang pointedly warned that David Nakamura, “In Tokyo, Biden blames China for Raising Tensions in Northeast Asia,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2013.

90 Barbara Demick and Paul Richter, “Biden Holds Lengthy Talks in Beijing Amid China Air Zone Dispute,” Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2013.

91 Lucy Hornby, “China Attacks Abe Air Defence Zone ‘Slander’ at ASEAN,” Financial Times, December 15, 2013.

92 Ibid.

93 Associated Press, “U.S. Takes Aim at China, Ups Naval Aid to SE Asia,” December 17, 2013.

94 Kyodo Press, “Japan PM Ignored Washington to Visit Shrine, U.S. Official Says,” Japan Times, December 27, 2013; Embassy of the United States, Tokyo, Japan, “Statement on Prime Minster Abe’s 26 December Visit to Yasukuni Shrine,” December 26, 2013, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131226-01.html.

95 Edward Wong, “No Meeting With Leader of Japan, Chinese Say,” New York Times, December 30, 2014.

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China would not allow any country “to reverse the course of history.”96 Significantly, on 9 March, the Abe government had to issue a statement affirming that it had no intention to revise its apology for women forced to work in Japanese military-controlled brothels during World War Two. This welcome statement was repudiated by claims from some Japanese politicians that these widely-acknowledged historical facts were “a total lie.”97

More broadly, new features in Japan’s defense-related policy are emerging under the Abe government, raising Beijing’s ire. In late February 2014, the Abe government announced a reversal of its predecessor’s 2012 “escape from nuclear” energy policy commitment.98 On 13 March, an end to a longstanding ban imposed in 1967 on Japanese military exports was declared. On 19 April, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera announced that construction work would begin on a military radar station on the Yonaguni Island, Japan’s westernmost island, just 150 kilometers from the Senkaku island group, and 108 kilometers from Taiwan. According to Onodera, the purpose of this facility is to “defend islands that are part of Japan’s territory.”99

For their part, the Chinese appear to be taking steps to revise previous agreements reached with Japan. This is suggested by the Shanghai Maritime Court’s April 2014 decision to seize a Japanese cargo ship in response to alleged unpaid compensation for Chinese ships used by the Japanese in 1936. The issue of wartime reparations was previously believed to have been settled in a 1972 agreement. The foregoing has occurred against the backdrop of a United States that is refocusing its attention on the Asia-Pacific region, even as it remains distracted by events in the Ukraine and the Middle East. Thus, President Obama’s late April 2014 trip to Asia, when he explicitly stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are covered by the U.S-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, was a welcome, if belated, move to contain Sino-Japanese tensions.100

However, U.S. actions continue to be challenged. On 5 February 2014, while Demitri Sevastopulo and Charles Clover, “China Ramps Up Rhetoric Battle With Japan,” Financial Times, March 5, 2014.

97 “Accusations Over Wartime Sex Slaves a Total Lie, Say Japanese Nationalists,” South China Morning Post, March 4, 2014.

98 Jonathan Soble, “Japan in U-Turn Over Nuclear Policy,” Financial Times, February 25, 2014.

99 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Japan to Build Military Site Near Disputed Senkaku Islands,” BBC News, April 29, 2014.

100 Geoff Dyer, “Barack Obama Says Disputed Islands Covered by Japan Pact,” Financial Times, April 23, 2014.

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testifying to Congress, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Russel rejected China’s ADIZ claims. Yet, China continues to operate with impunity in the zone. As recently as late May, in an apparent escalation, a pair of Chinese Su-27 fighters flew within one hundred and fifty feet of a Japanese YS-11 reconnaissance plane in an area of overlap between the two sides’ ADIZs. The increasing tensions came to a head at the annual IISS Shangri-La meeting in Singapore in late May 2014.

At the meeting, Prime Minister Abe stated Japan’s intention to play “an even greater and proactive role” in sustaining peace in Asia.101 In an obvious insertion of Japan into the increasingly conflictual Sino-ASEAN disputes over territories in the South China Sea, Abe offered Japan’s “utmost support for ASEAN member countries to ensure the security of seas and skies and rigorously maintain freedom of navigation and overflight.”102 Rightly or wrongly, this stance signifies a Japanese intention to expand its conflict with China. Meanwhile, one can only hope that Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s strong stance at the Singapore meeting on Chinese policy toward the territorial disputes in the South China Sea represents a positive turning point in U.S. Asia policy.103 It bears noting that Abe and Koizumi’s views were strongly contested by the Chinese representative at the forum, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, the deputy chief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army.

General Wang conveyed a Chinese perception that the United States and Japan were co-operating to target China at the meeting.104 Beijing’s anti-Japanese stance has continued. In a visit to South Korea in early July, President and Communist Party leader Xi Jinping underlined China’s role in repelling a Japanese invasion of Korea in the 1590s.105 Meanwhile, during German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Beijing, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang directly criticized Japan for its wartime aggression against China.106 As such, it comes as little surprise that the Japanese Defense Ministry specifically identified China as a security concern in separate reports in 2014.107 Martin Fackler, “Japan Offers Support to Nations in Disputes with China,” New York Times, May 30, 2014.

102 Ibid.

103 Gopal Ratnam, Sharon Chen and Isabel Reynolds, “Hagel Says China’s Action in South China Sea Destabilizing,” Bloomberg, May 31, 2014.

104 Demitri Sevastopulo, “Beijing Hits Out at US and Japan Alliance,” Financial Times, June 1, 2014.

105 Choe Sang-Hun, “Chinese Leader, Underlining Ties to South Korea, Cites Japan as Onetime Mutual Enemy,” New York Times, July 4, 2014.

106 James T. Areddy, “China Criticizes Japan’s Wartime Past During Merkel’s Visit,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2014.

107 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2014); Ministry of Defense of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, 2014 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2014).

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Evaluating the Sino-Japanese Great Power Peace

The critical conclusion to draw from the narrative above is that Chinese policy toward Japan has not conformed to the expectations of either trading state, social state, identity state, or public opinion theorists. This finding has serious consequences for the notion that a great power peace will characterize Sino-Japanese relations on the bases prescribed by these perspectives.

China’s relationship with Japan is the most striking example of a trend that contrasts starkly with the trading state perspective. In short, China’s major trading partners are also the states that view it as their major source of strategic concern.

Japan is at once one of China’s major economic partners and the central focus of Chinese nationalism. Over the course of the 1992-2013 period, Japan was consistently either China’s number one or two trading partner.108 Yet, this has done little to prevent the episodes of intense anti-Japanese outbursts which we explored above.

Ultimately, economic factors in China’s foreign policy are subordinate to wider political dynamics. This crucial point is obscured in the trading state perspective.

Moreover, there appears to be little if any evidence for China functioning as a social state. Rather than being socialized into more benign and regularized patterns of behavior, China has confronted Japan and the U.S. at the East Asian Summit and various ASEAN-related meetings, in full view of the other participating states.109 More broadly, the institutionalist literature, be it of a constructivist or a neo-liberal variety, obscures conflict within institutions.110 This is a promising area for future research in realist theory.111

Recent research has also contradicted Kang’s sweeping and premature claims that China’s rise has not generated fear, balancing, and security dilemma dynamics in the East Asian region.112 This article complements and extends this research, Khoo, “False Promise,” 47-55.

Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 39-140, 142.

110 As an example, Beijing’s central role in a prominent international institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), can just as easily be interpreted as a building-block for a balancing coalition against the United States.

111 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

112 Denny Roy, Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Nicholas Khoo, “Fear Factor: Northeast Asia and China’s Rise,” Asian Security 7, no. 2 (July 2011): 95-118.

108 109

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making it abundantly clear that the Chinese view Japan as a threat to their security, and vice versa. China correctly understands that Japan will challenge a potential Chinese bid for a regional sphere of influence. Presently, Tokyo is bolstering its military capabilities and adjusting its diplomacy to obviate this outcome. The foregoing therefore raises serious doubts about Kang’s explanation of China’s regional policy and Sino-Japanese relations, which focuses heavily on a transformed Chinese identity.113

In respect to Reilly’s emphasis on the role of public opinion in Chinese foreign policy, that perspective is also at variance with the recent history of Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, the claim that rising Chinese nationalism is not correlated with military aggression requires interrogation.114 Moreover, Reilly’s characterization of the Chinese leadership as pragmatic, nuanced, sophisticated, and committed to stability in Sino-Japanese relations is highly questionable.115 Contrary to Reilly’s assessment, the overwhelming evidence suggests that China’s leadership, particularly during the current Xi Jinping regime, has been united, but that this has been associated with an increase in Sino-Japanese conflict.116

The contention of this article is that Chinese policy is more persuasively explained by the neo-realist alternative laid out above. In positing both China and Japan as security maximizers, and focusing on the twin variables of capabilities and interests, we have outlined an explanation for Chinese policy toward Japan. Since 2001, an identifiable pattern of rising Chinese capabilities and diverging interests with Japan has been evident. Security dilemma dynamics, in the form of an interactive process of conflict escalation, have intensified. Looking to the future, a continuation of China’s rise will have predictable consequences. Rising Chinese capabilities will dovetail with compelling interests in favor of establishing a Chinese sphere of influence in East Asia. Accordingly, relations with Japan will be associated with varying degrees of friction and even intense conflict. From a neo-realist perspective, the only surprise is that analysts are surprised with such developments, which were foreseen even before the current spike in tensions.117 Kang, China Rising, 64.

Reilly, Strong Society, 8-9.

115 Ibid., 2, 7, 21, 159.

116 See authoritative analysis by Alice Miller, “How Strong is Xi Jinping?,” China Leadership Monitor (2014): 1-12.

117 Nicholas Khoo and Michael L.R. Smith, “China Engages Asia? Caveat Lector: A Response to David Shambaugh,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 196-205.

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Conclusion

As we move forward, what are the implications of Chinese foreign policy for the great power peace in Asia? Whatever we may call it, the Sino-Japanese relationship is not an example of a great power peace. The optimistic view offered in various strands of the literature—be it of the trading state, identity state, social state, or domestic politics variety—that China’s self-styed peaceful rise will invariably stabilize the region because of variables they emphasize is misplaced. Indeed, if not correctly managed, China’s rise presents the distinct prospect that a great power peace will not occur in Asia in the twenty-first century. That said, few would deny the merits and desirability of a great power peace in Asia.118 How can we possibly achieve this outcome? This is an area of potentially fruitful future research, and a few preliminary ideas can be briefly sketched here. For a great power peace to emerge and be consolidated, it has to be based on regional power realities. Growing Chinese power needs to be balanced by a robust American-led alliance network. In such a regional order, the United States must emphasize its strengths as a maritime power, even as China’s sphere of influence covers mainland Asia.119 In this emerging bipolar system, American and Chinese alliance policies will require management to ensure that entrapment does not occur, triggering alliance security dilemma dynamics.120

Further research needs to address these issues. A few questions suggest themselves. What are the sources of stability (and instability) in a system in which a rising power is a continental power and the hegemon is a maritime power? What is the role of technology (including missile defense systems) in affecting the security dilemma in such a structural setting? What is the role of alliance management in the nascent bipolar system that is emerging between the United States and China?

While rare, a great power peace predicated on realist premises is not without precedent. It operated in nineteenth century Europe, which experienced an extended

Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (2002): 1-14.

119 Robert Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in T.V. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 267-304; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 7-43.

120 Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461-495; Glenn Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 103-123, and 118-122 in particular.

118

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period of relative great power peace in an era of dramatic change.121 Whatever the case, such an arrangement is a surer basis for regional peace and stability than the alternatives reviewed here.

Nicholas Khoo is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy, the international relations of Asia, and international security. He is the author of Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance (Columbia University Press, 2011). Dr. Khoo holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

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The Political Force of Cereal: How Dependent are North Koreans on the State?

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein This paper uses yearly crop and food assessments of North Korea provided by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program to evaluate how dependent North Koreans are on the government for the provision of food, and to what extent private sources prevail.

Based on a numerical analysis of harvests and caloric consumption, as well as a geographical analysis of food distribution, this paper advances an argument that sources other than the government are responsible for food supply in North Korea. Although the government remains an important source of food through the Public Distribution System, its crippled capacity to provide resources for survival is likely to have an impact on the strength of bonds between citizens and the state, and ultimately on the political legitimacy of the North Korean regime among the public.

Dictatorial regimes depend on firm oppression and control for their survival. However, the carrots are often as crucial as the sticks. North Korea is no exception. In the North Korean social model, the regime derives much of its legitimacy from providing its people with their everyday needs.1 Heonik Kwon and Byung-ho Chung call this the “moral economy” of North Korea. In this social model, the

Leader takes on the responsibility of providing for the people, who in return owe him their hard work and boundless loyalty.2 I am grateful to Jerome Sauvage for valuable comments and suggestions. All mistakes and errors are my own.

1 For more on the politically motivated organization of the North Korean economy, specifically on workplace allotment, see the Korean Institute for National Unification, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (Seoul, South Korea, 2008); for an in-depth discussion on the North Korean system for social stratification, see Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun. North Korea’s Social Classification (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), Kum-son Lee, “Bukhan Chominui Kâcho, Idong: Siltae Mit Byonhwachonmang [The Residence and Migration of North Korean Citizens: Current Situation and Changes],” Research paper 07-19 (Seoul, South Korea: Korean Institute for National Unification, 2007); for a discussion about North Korean totalitarianism, see Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, “North Korea: Fading Totalitarianism in the ‘Hermit Kingdom,’” North Korean Review 6 (2010): 40-54.

2 Byung-ho Chung and Heonik Kwon, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 151-173. *

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In the 1990s, however, the North Korean economy collapsed. Given the moral aspect involved in economic management, the collapse led to two separate crises: one of food and resources, and one of politics. The North Korean economy rests on a social contract between the state leadership and the people.3 With the collapse of the economy, the state reneged on its part of the contract. The public distribution system for the allocation of food and resources (PDS) broke down in the early 1990s, and, at times, ceased to function altogether.4

Since the early 1990s, the North Korean economy has been characterized by a constant game of tug-of-war. On one side are markets, which exist in both official and unofficial forms. Markets arose spontaneously in the early 1990s as a response to the state’s inability to provide food and other necessities. On the other side is the PDS, which still operates, but with crippled capacity. The state has tried several times to restore the PDS to its previous position as the main provider of food the North Korean people. One of the strongest examples occurred in 2005, during which the state implemented a series of reforms aimed at adjusting the official price level to meet market prices. Later in 2009, the state implemented a currency reform aimed at wiping out the savings of middle class citizens engaged in market trading.5 Neither of these attempts managed to restore the PDS to its previous position as the sole provider for the people. Today, the PDS continues to play a role in food provision, but its capacity is severely constrained by the extent to which the government can mobilize food inputs. The government’s capacity to provide food depends on how much domestic production, imports, and aid resources are available. For many North Koreans, particularly those who live in the countryside, private plots, kitchen gardens, and hillside slopes have become important alternate sources of food.6

However, it remains unclear who currently has the upper hand in this tugByung-ho Chung and Heonik Kwon, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 151-173.

4 Ibid; Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), Chapter 3.

5 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “The Winter of Their Discontent: Pyongyang Attacks the Market,” Policy Brief PB10-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2010.

6 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 45-77; United Nations, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Rome, Italy, 2011; United Nations, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Rome, Italy, 2012; United Nations, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Rome, Italy, 2013.

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of-war between the state, the market system, and other private sources. According to some studies, North Koreans depend on sources other than the state and the PDS for the vast majority of their food consumption requirements. Meanwhile, analysts such as Andrei Lankov estimate that 85 percent of all food is still produced by the state.7

These are the figures that I attempt to outline in this paper. In this study, I use the yearly crop and food security assessments by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, as well as the World Food Programme (WFP), to explore how dependent North Koreans truly are on the state. The assessments are compiled by these UN agencies through survey interviews conducted in North Korea. Although these studies depict the sources of food available to the North Korean public, they do not specifically indicate the gap between the PDS and private sources. The main purpose of this paper is to attempt to provide an estimate of the difference between the amount of food North Koreans receive from the state and the amount of food they require.

This degree of dependency on the PDS is a crucial question for the future of the North Korean political system. If North Korean citizens are no longer dependent on the state for their welfare, the state has not only failed to live up to a core tenet of the ideological foundation for a communist society, but also lost an indispensable tool for totalitarian control.8 The government’s inability to provide for its people during economic crises has tarnished its ideological image and diminished its political legitimacy. The degree to which the public remains dependent on the state will hopefully elucidate the extent to which the state still maintains legitimacy.

Public dependence on the state has major implications for the direction of the North Korean state and the internal policy decisions it makes. The regime’s most important economic reforms, most notably those of 2002, have historically come as responses to the growth of markets.9 If we examine historical precedents Haggard and Noland, Witness to Transformation, 52; Peter Ward, “A Primer on North Korea’s Economy: an Interview with Andrei Lankov,” Sino-NK, October 11, 2013, accessed November 30, 2013, http://sinonk.com/2013/10/11/a-primer-on-north-koreas-economy-an-interview-with-andrei-lankov.

8 According to Andrei Lankov, the quality of food rations corresponds with one’s place of residence, which, in turn is heavily correlated with one’s political status. See Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 35; Collins “Marked for Life,” and Lee “A Life Dedicated to Solving the Food Problems in North Korea.”

9 Haggard and Noland “The Winter of Their Discontent,” chapter 7; Gwan-hee Yoon, “Why Don’t North Koreans Fight Back?” DailyNK, December 29, 2009, accessed December 16, 2013, http://www.dailynk. com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=5755.

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set in other nations with similar mechanisms for food distribution, we find that when these markets become increasingly prevalent and necessary for providing food, the regime is more likely to implement reforms that accommodate the marketization. According to Andrei Lankov, reforms like these would make North Korea a more “normal” regime.10 Indeed, one could imagine a scenario in which reforms eventually go so far as to increase North Korean dependency on international trade.

This, in turn, could make it so the repercussions and opportunity costs of the nuclear program and other points of conflicts in the international arena would incentivize North Korea to ratchet down its militarism and soften its aggressive diplomatic tone.11 Up until now, the markets have been the main arena in which occasional instances of defiance against authority have taken place.

Yet, there is reason to doubt the validity of optimistic projections like these.

Predictions about the future of North Korea are made quite often, yet many of these predictions turn out to be unfounded. Indeed, developments inside North Korea may not fit any of the models used for other countries, and the logic of decisions made by the government may be beyond our comprehension. Nevertheless, the ongoing battle between markets and the state will continue to be critical in shaping the direction of the country. The goal of this study is to further our understanding of the current state of the battle between markets and the state.

Literature Review

Issues surrounding food, power, and political control in North Korea are by no means unexplored. Flake and Snyder study the issue in terms of foreign aid and non-governmental organization (NGO) engagement in North Korea during the aftermath of the famine.12 They discuss the dilemma that NGOs faced when attempting to adhere to their own standards of ethics while working in a society where access to food was—and to a large extent still is—determined by political status, rather than actual need. Lintner similarly revisits a debate on food aid that raged in the late 1990s and early 2000s.13 Andrei Lankov, “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism,” Asia Policy (January 2006): 95-121.

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Engaging North Korea: The Role of Economic Statecraft,” Policy Studies 59 (2011): 1-96.

12 Scott Snyder, “The NGO Experience in North Korea,” in Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea, ed. Gordon L. Flake and Scott Snyder (California: Praeger, 2003).

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raged in the late 1990s and early 2000s.13 In this debate, institutions like the WFP were accused of “becoming a part of the system of oppression� because they channeled food through the official state system.14 Hazel Smith uses her vast personal experience working with international development agencies in Pyongyang to explain how social structures were altered drastically as a result of the famine. Smith shows how market mechanisms changed the rules and incentives for people involved in agriculture in North Korea. Smith also discusses in detail the methods the WFP uses to create a system for gathering data in North Korea.15 Her account clearly demonstrates the lengths that UN agencies go to in an attempt to overcome the obstacles of collecting information about food distribution in North Korea.16

It is no secret that scholars researching the country seldom rely on official data published by the North Korean government. Whenever it is cited, the contents must be qualified because they are often either incomplete or inaccurate. Nicholas Eberstadt has discussed this issue at length.17 According to Eberstadt, official North Korean data is often fraught with numerous methodological inconsistencies. Reports published before 2000 show especially unclear data. Some deficiencies even indicated outright manipulations.18 Though the quality of data coming out of North Korea has significantly improved over the years, there is still good reason to critically approach both reports released by the government and any information gathered within the country. Since the regime still severely restricts the freedom of movement of foreign visitors inside the country, any study relying on data gathered inside North Korea needs to address these constraints. Thus, I begin with a discussion on the accumulation of source material.

Sources: Can the WFP and FAO Assessments be Trusted?

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WFP conduct

Bertil Lintner, Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the Kim Clan (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004).

14 Ibid., 51.

15 Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 77-101.

16 Ibid., 14-17.

17 Nicholas Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 17-61.

18 Ibid., 17-61.

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what is arguably the most comprehensive study on food security in North Korea currently available to an international audience. Beginning in 1995, these organizations have made broad assessments of the North Korean food situation and foreign assistance needs through mission trips to the country. The mission teams visit North Korea at the invitation of the government. The purpose of these visits is to assess the crop harvest of the previous year and project the harvest for the following year. They also calculate how much North Korea needs to receive in imports and foreign aid.19 This paper will focus on the most current available report, published on 28 November 2013, which takes into account the 2013 food situation and crop harvest and makes projections for the following year.20 In order to place the current situation within a broader context, the reports from 2011 and 2012 will also occasionally be referenced.

The assessment teams conduct their studies in close cooperation with the North Korean government. As such, they must work under the same restrictions to movement that all foreign visitors in the country face. This is important to bear in mind given that North Korea has previously been suspected of systematically manipulating the estimations of its need for aid in order to increase donations.21 For most cases, the UN uses figures provided by statistical authorities in each country when presenting its own data. Though much has improved over the years, North Korea’s statisticians fail to sufficiently generate the information that the UN agencies require in order to assess the need for food assistance. Therefore, in the case of North Korea, the UN deems it necessary to do their own on-site assessments.22

The UN agencies still do not have access to all of North Korea, and are still unable to move freely around the country. Notwithstanding this constraint, conditions for the crop and food assessments are reported to have significantly improved over time. In recent years, the teams have been able to conduct studies through their own Korean-speaking staff. In 2012 and 2013, they were able to observe the prices of basic goods at some markets in the country. The mission teams typically conduct the studies by interviewing individual households with a structured questionnaire, and the type of household to be visited is chosen at the specific UN, Special report, (2013).

UN, Special Report, (2013).

21 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “The Logic and Illogic of Food Aid,” 38North, April 13, 2011, accessed November 30, 2013, http://38north.org/2011/04/foodaid.

22 For example, see Carl Bialik, “Statistical Diplomacy in North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2013, accessed October 12, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/statistical-diplomacy-in-north-korea-1205.

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request of the assessment teams.23 The number of households studied ranges between seventy-seven and ninety-five for the years from 2011 to 2013. In addition to households, the teams also visit hospitals, nurseries, and schools to estimate the food need. They make harvest assessments through visits and by performing soil tests at collective farms.24

However, there are still reasons for concern about the validity of the studies, particularly with regards to the scope of the sample. The UN emphasizes that the sample of households studied is not selected in a statistically randomized manner.

The sample size is also too small to be representative, and thus should only be seen as indicative. Furthermore, though the reports do not state this outright, the individuals interviewed still seem to be selected by the North Korean government.25 This could potentially give the government some ability to steer the results in a direction favorable for its purposes.

In addition, geographical bias may impact some of the assessments. For example, in the 2013 report, Onsong County was the only county visited that directly borders China.26 Yet, the border region is where most cross-border trade to and from the markets takes place. Therefore, the overall importance of the markets may have been underestimated.

Bearing in mind these warnings about the lack of reliable data when it comes to North Korea, this paper now turns to an analysis of the UN’s 2013 crop and harvest assessment. The analysis is divided into different categories of figures that can tell us something about how dependent the North Korean public is on the state.

Analysis: How Dependent are North Koreans on the State?

Harvests, Imports, Supply, and Demand

It is important to first consider the conditions under which the capacity of

In the overview of the PDS, two types of households are studied: collective farm households, which are not dependent on the PDS, and urban households, who are supposed to receive food from the PDS; UN, Special Report (2013).

24 UN, Special Report (2011, 2012, 2013).

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

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the PDS is determined. The PDS only operates and delivers when the state manages to procure food. The system has existed since the earlier days of North Korea, but temporarily broke down in certain years during the 1990s due to a lack of food going into the system.27 The operational capacity of the PDS also varies depending on the time of year. Inputs may be available at one point in the year but absent in another.

A good starting point for analyzing how much North Koreans depend on the state for food provisions is to look at official overall figures of harvests and food imports, and to compare these with estimated food needs. While this method of analysis is too simplistic to provide a full picture, it does provide an indicative measure.

According to the 2013 UN assessment, overall crop production in 2013 and 2014 is estimated to have increased by 5 percent from 2012 to reach a total of 5.03 million tons in cereal equivalent.28 This means that in order to reach the basic supply requirement as determined by the UN agencies, North Korea only faces a food gap of 40,000 tons when the scheduled government imports of food are taken into account. Imports have remained fairly constant over the past two years, but more than doubled in 2011.29

This overall harvest figure does include production in home and kitchen gardens belonging to government institutions, such as hospitals and factories.

Whether or not to consider the latter as part of government-controlled production poses a tricky question. While these institutions are government-controlled, production is meant only for the staff and workers of the individual institutions, which are not part of the centrally planned distribution system. Since the food produced in these gardens does not reach the PDS, I count this type of production as separate from the state-distributed harvest. By this reckoning, the total production from non-private sources ends up at around 4.22 million tons. Furthermore, based on the estimated sizes of their respective plots, production in private home gardens is around twice as high as that of government-owned gardens.30 One could also argue that production on sloping land should be discounted since these lands make up a Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, 58–62.

UN, Special Report (2013), 4.

29 UN, Special Report (2012), 7; UN, Special Report (2013), 8; UN, Special Report (2011), 4.

30 UN, Special Report (2012), 14.

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significant part of North Korea’s mountainous terrain, which, according to the UN, is cultivated by “individuals,” who are presumably outside of state control. However, this cultivation has been increasingly formalized, and much of it probably occurs within the official government economy.32 Therefore, this paper does not discount this production in the overall estimate of PDS-supplied harvest crops. However, it should be mentioned that this sort of production is estimated to generate around 220,000 tons of food according to UN estimates of the productivity of the soil and the total area of cultivated sloping lands.

Given these specifications, my calculation is made by dividing the remaining crop production figure, roughly 4.22 million tons, by North Korea’s total population of approximately 24.1 million. This leaves around 159 kilograms of food per person produced in the country overall. Again, there are several problems with this type of measure. For instance, we do not know specifically how the government-controlled domestic food supply is allocated. For example, the songun policy, or “military-first policy,” states that the military should be given priorities in all resource allocation.

Historically, the army has most likely been provided with disproportionately large distributions when compared to the general population. Food distribution has also varied heavily between provinces that are generally considered less politically and socially favored and those that have higher standing (most notably favored is the capital city of Pyongyang), particularly during the famine.33 Despite these caveats, the figure of 159 kilograms per person can be seen as indicative of a rough per-capita production figure.

The calculation of the gap between official food production and consumption can be made by subtracting this figure from the annual per capita consumption of basic food commodities, all of which are products grown in the country, calculated by the UN mission to be 174 kilograms per person. This leaves a gap of 15 kilograms, or 8.6 percent, between what the state puts out and what the public consumes. Given the very unequal distribution of food in North Korea, the share of the consumption of food not provided by the state is probably much higher for most of the general public.

32 33

UN, Special Report (2013), 23.

Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, 69–69.

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Consumption Projections through Caloric Counts

Another way to sketch out a rough image of the gap between what the state produces and what people consume is to look at the difference in caloric measure between officially estimated consumption and daily human need. North Korean caloric consumption is probably lower than the WFP estimate of what an average person needs to consume to “live a normal, healthy life” of 2,100 kcal per day.34 However, North Korea is not currently experiencing any major food crisis or widespread starvation. Therefore, the difference between this benchmark and estimated actual consumption could give an indication of how much food comes from sources other than the PDS.

According to a 2013 estimate, a typical person consumes 350 grams of grains per day. This translates into an average per-capita caloric consumption of 1,640 kcal per day.35 The figure is slightly lower for PDS-dependent households, where the average person is estimated to consume 310 grams per day. This places the caloric consumption of an average person in a PDS-dependent household at 1,250 calories per day. For such households, this leaves a gap of 30 percent between state-provided consumption and required consumption. Even though farming households have an estimated consumption of 400 grams per day, this also falls short of what the WFP uses as a daily-recommended intake.

This leaves us with the following situation: either the PDS-dependent population has a caloric consumption of 30 percent below what is required for a “normal” life according to WFP-standards, or part of the gap is filled by food from other sources. The assessment team believes the latter, and assumes that this gap is filled by “limited quantities of available fish, poultry, meat, sweet potatoes, vegetables, fruits, and other wild foods.”36

Having established that there is probably a significant gap between calories received from the state and calories actually consumed, this begs the question: what is the source for the supplementary food? The UN assesses that 38 percent of PDS-dependent households have access to kitchen gardens, which produce

World Food Program, “What is Hunger,” http://www.wfp.org/hunger/what-is.

UN, Special Report (2013), 25-27.

36 Ibid., 25.

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8 percent of their cereal supply and 98 percent of their vegetables.37 Interestingly, in the 2012 assessment, PDS-dependent households and 30 percent of cooperative farmers were estimated to be growing 12 percent of their own food. This is a significantly higher figure than in 2013.38 However, the majority of this year’s sample, 62 percent, does not have access to kitchen gardens. Within this population, 16 percent reported that gifts and exchange provided 16 percent of total cereal supply and 52 percent of vegetable supply.39 Moreover, PDS-dependent households reported receiving 24 kilograms of cereals through social support networks like relatives and friends on cooperative farms. Over 90 percent report that they rely on such a support network over the lean season months between May and early August.40

It is difficult to draw precise and clear conclusions from these figures. While many North Koreans most certainly consume well below the recommended 2,100 calories per day, not a single respondent reports having had no food of any kind during the 30 days before taking the survey.41 Less than 40 percent of respondents report eating fewer meals, and only a little over 40 percent report eating smaller meals during this period.

Again, posing the question on how this food gap is filled, one natural source to assume would be the markets. Households interviewed claim to only have visited the markets two or three times per month. However, this is probably an underestimate, particularly given the emphasis that the UN places on the markets’ role in food supply in this year’s report. There are several potential reasons for this underestimate. One could attribute some of it to sample skew, where households receiving food assistance are disproportionately overrepresented. This was probably the case for the 2012 study.42 Another reason could be the still somewhat murky legal status of the market system. While a significant portion of the general market system that sprung up as a response to the famine has been legalized and operates openly with the consent of the authorities, the sale or exchange of grains is still prohibited.43 UN, Special Report (2013), 35.

UN, Special Report (2012), 26.

39 UN, Special Report (2013), 35.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 34.

42 Marcus Noland, “The Latest FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment,” Witness to Transformation Blog, November 15, 2012, accessed November 30, 2013, www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=8099.

43 Philip H. Park, “Economic Reform and Institutional Change in the DPRK,” in The Dynamics of Change in North Korea: An Institutionalist Perspective, ed. Philip H. Park (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2009); UN, Special Report (2013).

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Indeed, the report describes how households being interviewed were “uncomfortable describing exchanges of cereal and other agricultural commodities as gifts or barter.”44 Even though markets may in general operate openly, exchanges of goods such as cereal are still illegal. This has probably caused the market’s role in filling this 30 percent caloric gap to be underestimated. While markets do not fill the entire gap, UN assessments suggest that a significant share probably is. However, UN’s assumption, which implies the gap is covered by foraging for meat, vegetables, and other foods that can be found in the wild, is questionable. These foods are not easy to acquire in North Korea, particularly since the opportunity cost of foraging and other activities is probably higher than for market trading.45 The market is a much more likely source for at least a partial coverage of this nutrition gap. These quantitative findings are summarized in the table below: Table 1. Summary of Numerical Figures Statistic

Non-private cereal production total for 2013

Figure

4.22 million tons

Non-private cereal production per capita for 2013

159 kg

Cereal consumption per capita for 2013

174 kg

Gap between state supply and consumption

15 kg (8.6%)

Caloric consumption, PDS-dependent households, per day

1,250 kcal

Necessary amount of calories per day, WFP-benchmark

2,100 kcal

Gap between state supply and caloric benchmark

850 kcal (30%)

Source: Author’s calculations based on UN, Special Report (2013)

Delivery Patterns of the PDS

As previously noted, the PDS operates when inputs exist, and ceases to operate when inputs are lacking or absent. So far, this paper has looked at supply from a yearly and overall point of view. However, seasonal variation also provides an interesting point for analysis. The UN agencies study how consumption patterns vary UN, Special Report (2013), 10.

Randall Ireson, “The New Crop Assessment Report: What it says about North Korean Farming,” 38North, December 18, 2013, accessed August 15, 2014, http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813.

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across seasons. When they use this method of analysis, they reach their strongest conclusions about the importance of markets and other unofficial channels.

The summer months make up the so-called “lean season,” or the time when access to food is particularly difficult. Households reported that their food situation improved in late August. Meanwhile, PDS deliveries continue to decline from 320 grams in the second half of August to a low-point of 310 grams for September.

PDS-distribution does not catch up until October, when it increases to 390 grams per day.46 As the UN assessment concludes, this is a strong indication that mechanisms other than government-controlled ones provide an especially critical base for food procurement during these months.

Which are these supplementary mechanisms? As noted earlier, social support networks such as relatives on cooperative farms matter immensely for a significant part of the population, as do markets. There is probably significant regional variation here. PDS dependents with close proximity to the Chinese border, where supply could be increased through legal or illegal imports, are probably more dependent on markets to supplement their consumption during periods when distribution is lower. Meanwhile, people closer to North Korea’s southern agricultural regions may be more dependent on relatives and other forms of unofficial social support networks.

Presently, we do not know the exact proportions of the supplementary sources. Still, an indicative degree of reliance on sources other than the state can be calculated for the months when PDS-deliveries are low but households still report an improving situation. According to government figures, excluding the “lean months” of June and July, the average PDS-delivery during 2013 was a ration of 400 grams per day.47 With deliveries as low as 310 grams, around 22.5 percent of the North Korean public’s food consumption during these months is derived from other sources than the PDS. Stunting Rates and Delivery Patterns

The incidence of stunted growth among children in a country is a common measure of access to nutrition. According to the World Health Organization 46 47

UN, Special Report (2013), 29.

Ibid., 29.

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(WHO), the rate of stunted growth among children within a specific geographical area reveals much about the local socio-economic conditions and about access to food for pregnant mothers and young children.48

Stunting rates in North Korea increased dramatically during the famine of the 1990s. While these numbers are still high they are beginning to decline. In 2004, it was reported that less than 40 percent of children’s growth was considered stunted. This is in contrast to 65 percent of children in 1998.49 These rates vary dramatically between regions, with a current overall prevalence of 27 percent. In addition to a map describing the regional incidences of stunting, the 2013 assessment also contains a map with information provided by the North Korean government that describes patterns for food flows into and within North Korea.50

This provides an interesting opportunity for a non-quantitative comparison.

Logically, if the official food supply matches consumption, provinces that receive relatively little food from the government should have high rates of stunting, and vice versa. However, the maps available from the UN reports indicate that mechanisms other than the PDS are strong enough to have created structural differences in stunting. North Hamgyong province, one of the first provinces where food deliveries ceased preceding the famine of the 1990s, provides an illustrative example.51

On the map where the balance account for food is shown, provinces range from having a “surplus” to a “major deficit” of food. Much of North Hamyong is shown as having a “major deficit.” In other words, according to North Korean data, the official system does not allocate nearly enough food to the province. Figure 1 shows two provinces, North and South Hamgyong, that both have vast areas classified as “major food deficit”:

Monika Blössner and Mercedes de Onis, WHO Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1997).

49 Haggard and Noland (2007), 196.

50 As is evident from the map in UN, Special Report (2013), 37.

51 UN Special Report (2013), 31.

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Figure 1. Food Deficits in North and South Hamgyong Provinces

Source: Created by Author using Wikepedia Commons image provided by “NordNordwest”; UN, Special Report (2013), 31.

However, stunting rates in North Hamyong are classified as “medium prevalent.”

Meanwhile, stunting rates in South Hamgyong Province, which has a comparable food deficit, shows “high prevalence.” Figure 2 shows illustrates these differences:

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Figure 2. Stunting Rates in North and South Hamgyong Provinces

Source: Created by Author using Wikepedia Commons image provided by “NordNordwest”; UN, Special Report (2013), 37.

The market seems to be a plausible explanatory factor here. North Hamgyong borders China, which makes it an easier destination than most provinces for both legal and illegal imports. This follows an old pattern in North Korea, where provinces that are closer to China tend to fare better than many that are closer to the privileged capital city of Pyongyang.52 Based on assessments of earlier years, Hazel Smith makes a similar observation, which confirms that the structural irregularity of North Hamgyong is not a one-time phenomenon for this year.53 Though this does not tell us much about how dependent the individual North Korean citizen is on the state, it does show that other supply mechanisms besides the PDS are significant enough to affect the prevalence of stunted growth among North Korean children.

Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, 199.

Hazel Smith, “North Korea: Market Opportunity, Poverty and the Provinces,” New Political Economy 14 (2009): 231-256.

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The table below summarizes these findings: Table 2. Summary of Non-Quantitative Findings Evidence (1)

Evidence (2)

Discrepency between (1) and (2)

Households reported food situation improving in late August

PDS-deliveries do not increase until October

Households report food situation improving before DPS-deliveries pick up

Official food deficit in North Hamgyong and South Hamgyong, among other provinces

Stunting rates are lower in North Hamgyong than in Southern Hamgyong and other provinces

Stunting rates are lower in North Hamgyong than in other provinces with comparable food situations

Source: Author’s inferences from UN, Special Report (2013).

Discussion: Where is Food in North Korea Coming From?

Thus far, it has been taken for granted that much of the food that the state does not supply should logically come from the markets. This assumption needs to be qualified. First, it is worth repeating that the UN reports cited in this paper clearly highlight the role of the markets, even though these have not been studied in detail by the assessment teams. There is, however, a wide range of literature dealing with these markets that provides evidence of their increasing role in the North Korean economy. Most available scholarship concludes that the market system has been the primary mechanism for survival and sustenance when the state’s capacity has dwindled.54 With regards to how market trade occurs and how the products sold on the markets are produced, a number of anecdotal sources describe varying degrees of entrepreneurial activity taking place in North Korea. Private citizens can grow food or manufacture goods with whatever means available and sell what they can on the markets.55 It is here that the aforementioned kitchen gardens almost certainly play a key role. It is also clear that China is playing a large role in North Korea’s food provision. China acts both as an official exporter food to North Korea Park, The Dynamics of Change in North Korea; Smith, Hungry for Peace; Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea; Haggard and Noland (2011).

55 See Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2010).

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and as the focal point for unofficial trade going across the border to North Korea’s northern regions. While figures for official trade with China are widely available, it is virtually impossible to calculate the scale and value of unofficial cross-border trade to North Korean markets.56 Cross-border trade by actors other than the state still holds a murky legal status. Any official, legal food imports from China that are channeled through the official system for food provision have most likely been included in the total figures in the UN reports on what the public receives through the PDS. Though it is unclear whether imports from China are already included in the UN figures on total production of cereal per capita, such imports would almost certainly not have impacted information on caloric consumption or on patterns of food distribution in North Korea. This data shows the quantities and distribution pattern of the PDS as a whole. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that any official imports from China that go to the general public have already been included in these figures.

Conclusion

How dependent are North Koreans on the state? To attempt to answer this question, I first summarize the latest UN study of the North Korean food situation.

Table 3 provides a brief summary of the core results: Table 3. Summary of Results Evidence (1)

Evidence (2)

Gap

159 kg per capita in nonprivate cereal production

174 kg per capita in cereal consumption

15 kg (8.6%) low-range estimate

1,250 kcal distributed through PDS

2,100 kcal as benchmark consumption for normal, healthy life

850 kcal (30%)

Household food situation improving in late August

PDS-deliveries increasing in October

Food situation improving before PDS-deliveries

Food deficits in both North and South Hamgyong provinces

Stunting rates lower in North Hamgyong than South Hamgyong

Stunting rates lower in North Hamgyong than in other comparable provinces

“N. Korea’s grain imports from China halve in H1,” Yonhap News, July 7, 2014, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/07/30/89/0401000000AEN20140730005300315F.html.

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Examining these results reveals the following: 1) There is a gap of 8.6 percent between state distribution and public consumption, as measured in kilograms of food. However, given the unequal distribution of food in North Korea, this is likely to be a conservative estimate.

2) Based on the estimated daily human need of 2,100 calories and as measured through caloric consumption, there is a 30 percent gap in food consumption for PDS-dependent households. This gap is likely to be filled to an extent, but probably not completely. Here, the market is likely playing a key role, but private food cultivation and welfare networks are also crucial.

3) The PDS is not only compromised by the lack of inputs, but also heavily constrained by the dilapidated infrastructure of the country. Significantly late deliveries occur regularly. During these times, market mechanisms probably provide crucial replacement.

4) The fact that North Koreans in the survey report that their food situation is improving after the lean season much earlier than when the PDS-deliveries increase can be seen as evidence of the prominence of market forces.

5) The rate of stunted growth in North Hamgyong is significantly lower than in neighboring provinces, even though state deliveries of food show equally great deficits. This suggests that the market system, at least in this province, may have become a fundamental and well-integrated part of the food economy. The strong role of the market system seems to have had a fundamental and lasting impact on the physical health of the province’s inhabitants. This process is very likely driven by the province’s close proximity to China.

6) Several findings underscore the importance of the market system: the general observations of the assessment mission, the impact that markets seem to have on dietary diversity in the country, and the fact that markets are so widespread that the average North Korean is estimated to live less than 5 kilometers from one. Moreover, such scattered findings indicate that the PDS has not been able to be revived, despite government attempts.

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Only a few of these observations are quantitative, and according to these observations, the estimate of how much of food consumption is provided by the state ranges between 15-20 percent on the lower end of the spectrum and 91.4 percent on the higher end. Both ranges are probably exaggerated, and the truth probably lies somewhere in between. Given the variation of food distribution by the state, it is impossible to sketch out a single average figure for the entire population. Distribution varies with profession or region, between urban and rural populations, by season and, not least of all, by the general availability of inputs for the PDS. For example, distribution to households on cooperative farms is not only more abundant, but also functions in a completely different manner from distribution to urban households.

Future crop and food security assessments will, hopefully, contain more detailed information on food sources in North Korea. A more detailed breakdown of data indicators would also be useful in determining the differences between population groups.

What is clear according to almost all indicators, however, is that the North Korean public is dependent on mechanisms other than the state for much of their food consumption. As such, the state will have to adapt to its diminished role in an economy where markets are beginning to play a more integral role. All attempts by the state to regain the initiative in the micro-economy have failed. Some attempts, like the 2009 currency reform, were so disastrous that the government deemed it necessary to publically express regret for its measures in order to retain political legitimacy.57 The regime seems to have learned its lesson. WFP reports show that harvests have consistently increased since 2011. Still, the government has held off on launching large-scale attacks on the markets. Even though the state should be more confident in cracking down on the main private source for the provision of food, it has chosen not to because the state’s own production has gone up. Either the government lacks the capacity for a full-scale crackdown or it is choosing not to pursue it. Regardless, the message remains the same; private sources for food are here to stay, and the regime will probably leave continue without interference for the time being.

The execution of Pak Nam-gi, former finance and planning department chief for the Korean Worker’s Party, was said to have been conducted by the regime because of Pak’s responsibility for the 2009 currency reform, which hit hard the savings of the market-trading classes. See Sang-hun Choe, “N. Korea Is Said to Execute Finance Chief,” New York Times, March 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/world/ asia/19korea.html.

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For a self-proclaimed communist society, the loss of control over the distribution of food is the loss of a powerful political weapon. It is also the loss of control over one of the most basic human needs—the ability to sustain oneself and to survive.58 The very design of the North Korean “family state,” where the leader functions as a form of collective parent for the people, is contingent on the state being able to provide for the citizens, or, as the people are sometimes called, the state’s “children.”59 The breakdown of the economy meant the “breakdown of the moral authority of the Worker’s Party in relation to the general population.”60 As this paper has shown, the state and the Party have not been able to fully recover this moral authority.

In a similar theoretical perspective, the breakdown of total official control over the economy meant the loss of one of the very key traits of a totalitarian society (as described by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl J. Friedrich in their classic outline of the functioning of the totalitarian system).61 That does not mean to imply that North Korea is no longer a harshly governed society. However, the loss of control over essential parts of the economy does mean that the regime has at least partially lost its hold over a crucial sphere of society. Though the regime appears to be stable at present, this loss of economic authority may become a larger problem in the future. North Korea has yet to see large-scale protests like those of the Arab Spring, but these markets inside the country have been the primary arena for the various forms of protests that have occurred against government authority.62 As long as the markets stay—and it looks as though they will—the tension between regime control and the markets will also remain.

The North Korean regime is rather unpredictable, but a stark generational difference seems to be emerging. This shift will probably have a strong impact on the shape of North Korea over time. The young generation is growing up in a very different society from the one that molded the mindset of the previous generation.

North Koreans today need to put their hopes in completely different institutions Hazel Smith (2009) claims that food distribution has generally been relatively equal in North Korea.

While this may be true, according to sources such as KINU 2008, Collins 2012 and Lee 2007, quality of food is highly correlative with geographical place of residence, which is in turn a function of one’s political status.

59 Chung and Kwon, North Korea, chapter 6.

60 Ibid., 163.

61 Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl J. Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

62 Yoon, “Why Don’t North Koreans Fight Back?”

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than their parents did for the provision of something as basic as food, whether that be in the market, in the unofficial welfare support networks, or even in a single garden plot behind the house. The character of the North Korean state was shaken to its core during the 1990s, and to this day it still has not returned to normal. Without the capacity for a functional system of distribution like it once had, the North Korean government’s monopoly over cereal has certainly lost much of its political force.

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein is a graduate student in International Relations and International Economics at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. Silberstein is also a freelance writer specializing on the Korean peninsula.

References Bialik, Carl. “Statistical Diplomacy in North Korea.” Wall Street Journal, January

18, 2013. Accessed October 12,, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/ statistical-diplomacy-in-north-korea-1205.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Carl J. Friedrich. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.

Blössner, Monika and Mercedes de Onis. WHO Global Database on Child Growth

and Malnutrition. Geneva: World Health Organization, 1997.

Choe, Sang-hun. “N. Korea Is Said to Execute Finance Chief.” New York Times,

March 28, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/world/asia/19korea. html.

Chung, Byung-ho and Heonik Kwon. North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics.

New York: Rowman and LittleField Publishers, 2012.

Collins, Robert. Marked for Life: Songbun: North Korea’s Social Classification.

Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.

Demick, Barbara. Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. New York:

Spiegel and Grau, 2010.

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Katzeff Silberstein | The Political Force of Cereal

Eberstadt, Nicholas. The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

Flake, Gordon, and Scott Snyder, ed. Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO

Experience in North Korea. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2003.

Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. ______. “The Winter of Their Discontent: Pyongyang Attacks the Market.” Policy

Brief PB10-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2010. ______. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea.

Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011. ______. “Engaging North Korea: The Role of Economic Statecraft.” Policy Studies

59 (2011): 1-96. ______. “The Logic and Illogic of Food Aid.” 38North, April 13, 2011. Accessed

November 30, 2013. http://38north.org/2011/04/foodaid.

Ireson, Randall. “The New Crop Assessment Report: What it says about North

Korean Farming.” 38North, December 18, 2013. Accessed August 15, 2014. http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813.

Katzeff Silberstein, Benjamin. “North Korea: Fading Totalitarianism in the ‘Hermit Kingdom.’” North Korean Review 6 (2010): 40-54.

Korean Institute for National Unification. White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea. Seoul, 2008.

Lankov, Andrei. “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism.” Asia Policy

(2006): 95-121. ______. The Real North Korea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Lee, Kum-son. “Bokhan Chominui Kâcho, Idong: Siltae Mit Byonhwachonmang

[The Residence and Migration of North Korean Citizens: Current

Situation and Changes].” Research paper 07-19, Seoul, South Korea:

Korean Institute for National Unification, 2007.

Lee, Min-bok. “A Life Dedicated to Solving the Food Problems in North Korea.”

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Noland, Marcus. “The Latest FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment.”

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Park, Philip H., ed. The Dynamics of Change in North Korea: An Institutionalist Perspective. Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2009.

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and Social Change in North Korea. Washington, DC: United States

Institute of Peace, 2005.

Smith, Hazel. “North Korea: Market Opportunity, Poverty and the Provinces.”

New Political Economy 14 (2009): 231-256.

United Nations. Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment

Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Rome, Italy, 2011. ______. Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment

Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Rome, Italy, 2012. ______. Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment

Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Rome, Italy, 2013.

Ward, Peter. “A Primer on North Korea’s Economy: an Interview with Andrei Lankov.” Sino-NK, October 11, 2013. Accessed November 30, 2013. http:// sinonk.com/2013/10/11/a-primer-on-north-koreas-economy-an interview-with-andrei-lankov/.

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29, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900& num=5755.

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Sliwinski | Dire Straits

Dire Straits: Naval Security Competition between China and the United States in the Strait of Malacca Michael Sliwinski The Strait of Malacca is a point of convergence for the dynamic environment of piracy, terrorism, energy security, and naval cooperation in maritime Asia. In order to understand the various forces shaping the security situation in the Strait, this paper analyzes the roles that China and the United States play in the region. It advances an argument that Chinese expansion will lead to a comparative rise in China’s position, but that ultimately the Strait will remain a theater for international balancing. A careful analysis of Chinese naval doctrine, as well as examination of secondary sources that explore regional military engagement and economic factors, present the Strait of Malacca as a passageway of wary stasis between the two superpowers.

China’s “blue-water” naval ambitions within the context of its growing global presence have been the focus of strategists on both sides of the Pacific for at least the past two decades.1 There is a wide variety of opinions on what this much-touted development means on the ground, ranging from those who believe that it is a futile effort which cannot hope to match the modern naval capacities of the United States, to those who assert China already has startling capabilities which could pose a material threat to even an advanced navy.2 These strategic analyses lie within the greater scope of security in the Asian naval theater, a multifaceted issue, which touches on energy security, transnational threats such as piracy and terrorism, and international cooperation in naval affairs. Given its geopolitically vital location, the Strait of Malacca is an area of unique convergence for these diverse forces.

This study is situated amidst a complex web of military capabilities, national See You Ji and You Xu, “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1990s,” The Pacific Review 4, no. 2 (1991): 137-149; Zhan Jun, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17 no.3 (1994): 180-208.

2 Robert S. Ross, “Assessing the China Threat,” National Interest 81 (2005): 81; Howard J. Dooley, “The Great Leap Outward: China’s Maritime Renaissance,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 26, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2012): 66-67.

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interests, and security threats with the goal of understanding where China and the United States currently lie. By tracking the developments of these nations, particularly China’s emerging military, official policy, and situational concerns, this paper will examine the following two questions: (1) what are the roles of China and the United States in the Strait of Malacca and (2) where will this relationship go in the future? Ultimately, this study argues that although the transnational issues of piracy and terrorism remain a concern for day-to-day operations in the Strait, China and the United States will implement their involvement around a grander strategic framework of regional stability and trade security. In practice, this means that China’s maturing naval doctrine will call for ways to expand the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into a standing peacetime force by framing the security of trade routes through the Strait as a national interest, while the United States will have to find ways to maintain its strong foothold in the region against a comparatively rising China through greater direct naval presence and diplomatic cooperation.

Pirates or Pragmatism? Why the Strait Matters

The Strait of Malacca is among the most vital trade channels in the world.

Situated at the nexus of the Indo-Pacific region, the Strait is the longest major navigational strait in the world. It is safer to navigate than the neighboring Sunda Strait, while offering a route that is 1,600 nautical miles shorter than the alternative Lombok-Makassar Straits route.3 The Strait of Malacca sees traffic in excess of 60,000 ships a year, carrying cargo ranging from crude oil to finished industrial products between East Asia, the West, and the Middle East. In comparison, the Suez Canal sees less than half of this level of traffic, and the Panama Canal sees about a third.4 While Thailand has considered building a canal across the Kra Isthmus for the purpose of reducing traffic along this route, no efforts for such a project are currently underway, leaving the Strait of Malacca as one of the safest, most efficient, and consequently most highly-utilized highways for major naval traffic in the region.5 Mokhzani Zubir, The Strategic Value of the Strait of Malacca (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004), 2.

4 Ibid., 1.

5 Felipe Umaña, Threat Convergence: Transnational Security Threats in the Straits of Malacca (Washington: The Fund for Peace, 2012), 6.

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For these reasons, the security of the Strait extends beyond the littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, attracting the attention of major global powers.

Piracy and terrorism in the Strait are two distinct, yet related, threats that have earned the attention of both China and the United States. These transnational threats are detrimental to all nations affected, and therefore cooperation on such issues is both advisable and conceivable given the convergence of interests. Overall, efforts to combat piracy, both unilaterally and through multilateral organizations, have been successful. From February 2007 to October 2014, there were only about thirteen incidences of attempted or successful piracy or armed robbery per year.

Only five of those incidences were classified as Category 1 (Very Significant) by the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, an international piracy monitoring organization which collects information throughout the Indo-Pacific.6 Moreover, the incidences decreased in severity over the course of this time period, with both fewer successful attacks and less significant attacks.7 Property theft is reason enough to warrant preventative measures given the sheer volume of goods passing through the Strait, but the threat of terrorist hijackings makes such attacks even more worrisome. The United States in the post-9/11 era, along with its regional allies, has taken a strong interest in ensuring that commercial transportation cannot be used for terrorism, and it views Malacca as a prime target for commandeering a ship to assist in a global terrorist attack.8

China, in particular, has vested interest in ensuring the safe passage of cargo through the Strait of Malacca. China’s expansion as an exporting power has necessitated the transport of Chinese goods around the world in the most efficient manner possible. Malacca has thus become the gateway to reaching major markets such as India or Europe. Furthermore, China is heavily dependent on oil flowing through the Strait. Since 2003, China has been a net importer of energy, and 75 percent of China’s oil imports pass through this single geographical chokepoint.9 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, “Consolidated Incident Reports,” ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (February 2007-October 2014). https://portal.recaap.org/OpenMap. 7 Ibid.

8 Umaña, Threat Convergence, 8, 14, 18.

9 M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, “Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving Interests and Potential Influence,” The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 63.

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Despite efforts to diversify its sources of energy, a disruption of this supply would have disastrous repercussions for China. In this sense, China’s interest in Malacca echoes its dedication to maritime claims in the South China Sea, which some analysts argue is driven by both the natural resources found in the area and the need to secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for ships transporting vital goods to and from China.10 Chinese interest in the Strait of Malacca as a critical passageway for commerce appropriately contributes to this narrative of achieving energy security in the Indo-Pacific.

Similarly, the United States sees the Strait of Malacca as a critical juncture of international trade. Presently, the United States provides valuable support to security efforts in the Strait, ranging from the donation to Malaysia of advanced radar systems that monitor the Strait, to the coordination of joint naval exercises with Malaysia and Singapore.11 This cooperation in intelligence, technology, and operations signifies more than just assistance for the benefit of these littoral nations. The United States works to keep Malacca safe in order to protect ships that are headed for U.S. shores and to keep an open sea lane between its fleet stationed in Japan and the Persian Gulf.12 The United States, like China, is willing to make a significant investment in protecting the Strait of Malacca, and does so for its own specific reasons.

Straight from the Dragon’s Mouth

An analysis of Chinese naval doctrine reveals that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s view of itself is undergoing a period of metamorphosis.13 This new sense of self can be understood as a shift from a standing military force awaiting a crisis to an active defensive presence protecting China in the worldwide economy. On the whole, the PLAN is increasingly dissatisfied to see its purview and, consequently, its share of the budget, limited to matters of conventional military defense. As analysts Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman put it, “Overall, the M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (2011): 296.

11 Caroline Vavro, “Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,” Canadian Naval Review 4.1 (2008): 15.

12 Fravel and Liebman, “Beyond the Moat,” 66.

13 Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun, 中国人民解放军海军.

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PLAN seems to be casting itself not only as a consumer of China’s rapid economic growth, but as the protector of and potential contributor to that economic growth.”14 The Strait of Malacca serves as the testing grounds for a more internationally-oriented Chinese naval agenda.

Military authorities are expanding the scope of China’s “maritime rights and interests” (haiyang quanyi, 海洋权益) in order to reflect what they see as the PLAN’s calling in the modern era. Liu Xuxian of the Academy of Military Sciences (Junshi Kexue Yanjiuyuan, 军事科学研究院, or AMS) argues that “[the PLAN’s] main tasks in warfare are shifting from protecting the country’s landmass towards maritime territory, from defeating an enemy attack in nearby waters towards protecting our country’s rights and interests at sea.”15 Trade, resource exploration, and law enforcement are just such interests, according to Zhang Shiping, also of AMS. He outlines a comprehensive naval architecture dedicated beyond China’s coastal area, ranging from aircraft carriers to fishing and exploration ships, as included in “the basic tasks of our navy.”16 These perspectives reveal that China understands haiyang quanyi to be a flexible term open to interpretation—one that the PLAN has used to frame its naval ambitions ideologically and broadly, as opposed to a concrete reactionary call for action against a particular issue. While the PLAN certainly has an organizational interest in arguing for the general expansion of the navy for budgetary reasons, such accounts lend strength to the notion that there is a genuine doctrinal development in the PLAN’s strategic outlook.

China does not stand alone in seeking to defend its economy on the seas.

The PLAN’s shift in perspective shares strong similarities with the visions of other major maritime powers, including the United States. If China’s statements are to be taken seriously, they represent a policy foray into major international stakes. This raises the question of whether China views its involvement as that of a stakeholder in a cohesive international order or simply as a defender of its own narrow share within the larger system. Trade stability may be a collective goal, but how that ideal is achieved by military means poses the potential for a security dilemma between China and the United States. Perceptions of naval coexistence are key in understanding how the relationship between the United States and China will proceed.

Fravel and Liebman, “Beyond the Moat,” 75.

Liu Zhenhuan, et. al., “Zoujin haiyang shiji qiangda Zhongguo haijun,” 走进海洋式机枪打中国海军 [Enter the New Century of the Ocean, Strengthen China’s Navy] Dangdai Haijun 当代海军 1 (2000): 5.

16 Ibid., 6.

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The Strait of Malacca shines a light on China’s sweeping naval doctrine and provides insights into the PLAN’s view of competition with the United States.

Some within the PLAN view the U.S. anti-terrorist agenda as a pretense for interference in the Strait. Chen Angang and Chen Wuming argue in Modern Navy (Dangdai Haijun, 当代海军), the PLAN’s party committee publication, that the United States perceives “the entire world [as] a terrorist world,” and that protecting security in the Strait of Malacca is the “perfect excuse for some countries [i.e. the United States] to interfere” in China’s naval ambitions.17 Though this view may appear to be alarmist, such authors are not alone in their interpretations.18 Perhaps the Chinese navy ought to be concerned by a robust foreign military presence in the Strait of Malacca. Chen and Chen go on to say that “whoever controls the Malacca Strait can control China’s strategic oil lifeline, and can thereby threaten China’s energy security at any time.”19 Such threats would certainly fall within the Chinese strategic vision of “maritime rights and interests” in its increasingly expanded sense.

The Staying Hand of Capacity and Business

Chinese concerns with American presence in the Strait of Malacca, while theoretically justifiable in terms of trade and energy stakes, lose traction in light of the real situation of what China and the United States are currently capable of doing as regional players. Even putting capacity aside, pragmatic analysis shows that there is ultimately little reason to fear a serious disruption of trade caused by the United States or China. The combination of these realities provides insight into the future of Sino-U.S. naval relations in the Strait.

Ambition may outpace ability in China’s current naval situation. While credible and comprehensive sources of Chinese naval capacity are not readily provided Modern Navy is treated herein as a general indicator of PLAN opinion, not an official source of policy. The publication is directly connected to the PLAN and written by PLAN officials, both military and civilian. As this study is concerned with both official policy and perception, it serves as a useful primary source to understand Chinese naval strategic perspectives beyond official rhetoric; Chen Angang and Chen Wuming, “Mei yu zai Maliujia haixia bushu jundui” [America Is Trying to Deploy Troops in the Malacca Strait] Dangdai Haijun 当代海军 7 (2004): 58.

18 See also Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi” 东南亚海上通道安全与 大国博弈 [The Security of Southeast Asia’s SLOCs and the Great Power Game], Dangdai Haijun 当代海 军 7 (2006): 33, 35.

19 Chen and Chen, “Mei yu zai,” 58.

20 U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013” (Washington: Department of Defense, 2013): 39.

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by the Chinese government, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) analyses illustrate that China’s naval capacity in the Strait of Malacca, while growing, will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Notably, the DoD cites “limited logistical support” as “a key obstacle preventing the PLA Navy from operating more extensively beyond East Asia,” including the Strait of Malacca and as far east as Guam.20 Such arrangements would be critical to the refueling, restocking, and rearmament of naval operations that take place far away from the Chinese mainland. A U.S. Congressional Research Service report notes that China is beginning to address this challenge with a “places not bases” approach, wherein arrangements are made for naval voyages to make port in the Indo-Pacific region as needed.21 Although this has enabled recent naval tours by the PLAN, this type of access still “fall[s] short of U.S.-style agreements permitting the full spectrum of support from repair to re-armament,” and could be subject to revision if China’s allies in Southeast Asia and around the Indian Ocean perceive an overextension of Chinese interests as threatening.22 Finally, China’s naval developments still remain primarily focused on the quality of its platforms, meaning that building new, modern technology from scratch remains a secondary avenue for naval expansion.23

Compilations of U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) data indicate that from 2010 to 2020, China expects to increase its number of diesel attack submarines, nuclear-powered attack submarines, destroyers, and frigates by 8, 2, 7, and 7 ships, respectively. These numbers, though fairly unremarkable, are complemented by the PLAN’s modernization agenda. ONI estimates that 75 percent of diesel attack submarines, 100 percent of nuclear-powered attack submarines, 85 percent of destroyers, and 85 percent of frigates will meet modern design standards by 2020, up from the year 2010 when only 50 percent, 33 percent, 50 percent, and 45 percent, respectively, qualified as “modern.”24 This confirms the notion that China’s naval power expansion is focused on improving existing platforms, not dramatically expanding the gross tonnage of its navy. The implication of this reality is that power projection is simply not technologically possible right now.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013): 39.

21 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014): 35.

22 U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress,” 39.

23 O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” 3.

24 Ibid., 43.

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China’s naval systems are in the process of modernizing—a process which, if the calls for development found in Modern Navy are to be understood as more than bureaucratic posturing, is still somewhat neglected. Even once the drive for modernized platforms yields results, the PLAN is ultimately working with a finite number of ships sufficiently modernized to match up against advanced naval systems in the field. While sheer naval tonnage does not fully capture the capability of a navy, it is still an important indicator of the scope of the navy’s possible operations.25 In other words, without expanding its numbers, China will have a navy that is more skilled at certain existing combat strategies—such as anti-access area denial—but not necessarily in new forms of naval operations or in the scope of its presence.

Doubts regarding U.S. capacity in the Strait are focused less on their power as a military force and more on the international repercussions of a Malacca contingency. The United States may have extensive naval port access and power projection technology in the Pacific, but these are still not U.S. waters. Issues of sovereignty and interference remain salient for the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca. For instance, Malaysia and Indonesia vetoed a 2004 effort to place U.S. troops directly in the Strait, a rebuff succinctly summarized by the Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s quip: “I think we can look after our own area.”26 As mentioned previously, cooperation exists in the form of technology and training for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures. However, without a standing naval presence in the Strait beyond its existing arrangements and with limited plans for direct expansion, the United States does not possess the immediate capacity or clout to dictate who comes and goes in the Strait of Malacca.27 The notion of the United States imposing its naval fleet stationed in Japan against the wishes of the littoral states without any immediate threat to the area is also extremely unlikely. It would take a major, most likely state-driven, threat to the Strait to warrant such drastic action.

Even if one were to suppose that China or the United States could block off the Strait of Malacca in the event of a larger conflict between the two powers, the likelihood of either doing so is mitigated by the vital trade that passes through the Strait, both in strategic goods such as energy resources and in the sheer mass of

O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” 45-47.

Vavro, “Piracy,” 15; Sudha Ramachandran, “Divisions over Terror Threat in Malacca Straits,” Asia Times, 16 June 2004.

27 See the next section.

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ships, as discussed above. No navy can perform an effective blockade on a trade route of this magnitude without seriously slowing the passage of third-party goods.

Identification and inspection are too costly and slow.28 If China were to attempt such an action to punish U.S. or Western markets, they would be hampering their very own flow of oil, incurring massive costs to efficiency beyond the disruption of trade.

While the United States is less dependent on the Strait, there would still be similar unnecessary costs to trade as a result of slowing commercial shipping traffic, even if the effects on trade in and out of China provided a significant strategic advantage.

Both nations would face equally strident international outcry over impeding global trade, not just from the littoral states whose sovereignty would be infringed, but also from industrial producer nations and recipient nations around the world. Though it is not inconceivable that China or the United States would take an economic hit to harm the other, such a contingency remains highly dubious.

The Trajectory of the PLAN and U.S. Navy in Malacca

With the current realities laid out and improbable events accounted for, the question remains: what does the future hold for China and the United States in the Strait of Malacca? While overt conflict will most likely be avoided, China will continue to improve its naval capabilities and understand that it is responsible not just for the defense of the Chinese mainland, but also for its growing trade interests abroad. This growing presence will not go unnoticed by the United States. The United States will seek to counter with increased naval concentration in both the Malacca Strait and the Western Pacific, particularly in places where the United States already has bases and agreements, as well as develop a growing sense of wariness for Chinese naval forces. The end result will be raised tensions in the region as a whole and perhaps even a comparative decline for the United States as the PLAN expands its operations and ability in the Strait at a relatively faster rate.

Chinese doctrinal position on haiyang quanyi has proven to be vague for the purpose of flexibility. The increasing rhetoric of the PLAN as a force to protect China’s international interests may be more bark than bite right now, as is evident from the primary sources examined, but it will almost certainly solidify as the nation 28

Fravel and Liebman, “Beyond the Moat,� 72.

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finds more of its economic activities focused abroad—including expanding trade routes, growing demand for natural resources, and even Chinese investments in high-priority regions like Africa and the Middle East.29 If China is to understand itself as a global superpower, these arguments must sooner or later gain validity and yield greater percentages of military spending going to the PLAN’s projects.

An expanded Chinese naval capacity would enable more exploration and exploitation of natural resources in China’s exclusive economic zone, as well as renewed maritime law conception and enforcement to accompany such initiatives. It would also place a high priority on the Strait of Malacca for Chinese influence in the form of greater standing provisions arrangements for naval forces passing through and perhaps even bases of operation in the long term. Nowhere are China’s commercial maritime interests more pressing than at this chokepoint. In protecting the Malacca Strait, China would be stepping up as a power in its own right, capable of defending its own national interests far from home and providing international trade stability through this vital channel.

There is little the United States can do to change China’s perception of international trade security, particularly in the case of the Strait of Malacca. President Obama’s strategic rebalance to Asia has broadly included the U.S. Navy. Plans for future U.S. naval involvement in the Pacific include increasing the percentage of ships docked in the Pacific from 55 percent to 60 percent by 2020, placing the Navy’s best personnel in the Pacific region, and expanding troop deployments in Guam, the Philippines, and Australia.30 Yet these ventures are broad and will not curtail Chinese naval expansion in general or specifically in Malacca. On the contrary, they may actually encourage such balancing measures. Beyond stationing up to four Littoral Combat Ships—advanced models used in coastal missions—in Singapore by 2017, the United States has few options to improve its position relative to China’s in the Strait of Malacca.31 Fortunately for the United States, it will maintain an unshaken absolute advantage in military terms over the Chinese for years to come, and if littoral states in the Strait view Chinese expansion as threatening, the United States may stand to gain greater diplomatic arrangements with these states as a Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Dragon boats: assessing China’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.” Defence & Security Analysis 26, no. 2 (2010): 213-230.

30 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 47.

31 O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” 54.

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counterbalance to the Chinese.32 In all, the United States is not likely to consider China’s endeavors in the Strait of Malacca as an effort to become a responsible international stakeholder, but rather will feel the pressure of competition.

Conclusion

The Strait of Malacca’s geopolitical importance serves as a focal point for the expanding presence of China and the United States in the Pacific. Measures against piracy and terrorism, though by no means concluded, have diminished in urgency in light of their own success. Protecting the steady trade that flows through the Strait is now at the center of attention. As Chinese naval doctrine expands to include trade security as a principal national concern, the People’s Liberation Army Navy will have the chance to materially improve its standing in the Straits pursuant of that goal. The United States, though framed by an ambitious “rebalance,” will continue its presence as an important contributor to the defense of the Strait more or less as usual without mitigating China’s ability to expand its own influence.

In the context of this bilateral struggle, it is important to keep in mind the role the littoral states play in diplomatic and military dealings. Some commentators see the positions of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore as rather difficult, buffeted on both sides by the jostling of international power players.33 Yet in reality, they have demonstrated both room for cooperation and remarkable agency in maintaining their sovereignty on matters of Strait security and military presence. Going forward, these states potentially stand to gain by allowing competition for security services to bring in advanced technology, useful logistical insight, and training —all paid for by foreign powers.34

Ultimately, the Strait of Malacca will continue to serve as a crucial international trade route. While Chinese expansion may raise American concerns, both powers will work to keep the Strait open and safe for the passage of commerce.

However, if rising tensions prove stronger than the incentive of economic stability and competition boils over into conflict, the Strait of Malacca may prove dire indeed.

O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” 18, 27, 30, 44.

Zubir, Mokhzani Zubir and Mohd Nizam Basiron, “The Strait of Malacca: The Rise of China, America’s Intentions and the Dilemma of the Littoral States,” Maritime Studies 141 (2005): 24.

34 Umaña, Threat Convergence, 14.

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Michael Sliwinski is pursuing a degree in International Politics with a concentration in Security Studies and a certificate in Asian Studies from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

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机枪打中国海军 [Enter the New Century of the Ocean, Strengthen

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O’Rourke, Ronald. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy

Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.” Washington DC:

Congressional Research Service, 2014.

Raymond, Catherine Z. Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved. London: Corbett Center for Maritime Policy Studies, 2009.

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Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery

Against Ships in Asia. “Consolidated Incident Reports.” ReCAAP

Information Sharing Centre. https://portal.recaap.org/OpenMap. Ross, Robert S. “Assessing the China Threat.” National Interest 81 (2005).

Ramachandran, Sudha. “Divisions over Terror Threat in Malacca Straits.” Asia Times, June 16 2004.

Umaña, Felipe. Threat Convergence: Transnational Security Threats in the Straits

of Malacca. Washington DC: The Fund for Peace, 2012.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013.”

Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2013.

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington DC:

Department of Defense, 2006.

Vavro, Caroline. “Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait.”

Canadian Naval Review 4 (2008): 13-17.

Zhan, Jun. “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the

South China Sea.” Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (1994): 180-208.

Zhang Gang. “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi” 东南亚海上

通道安全与大国博弈 [The Security of Southeast Asia’s SLOCs and the

Great Power Game]. Dangdai Haijun 当代海军, no. 7 (2006).

Zubir, Mokhzani. The Strategic Value of the Strait of Malacca. Kuala Lumpur:

Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004.

Zubir, Mokhzani, and Mohd Nizam Basiron. “The Strait of Malacca: The Rise of

China, America’s Intentions and the Dilemma of the Littoral States.”

Maritime Studies 141 (2005): 24-26.

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Steinberg | Myanmar and U.S. Policy

Myanmar and U.S. Policy: Platitudes, Progress, and Potential Problems David Steinberg

It is not hyperbole to describe U.S. policy toward Myanmar for the last two decades as ineffective ossification. From 1988 to 2008, both the executive and legislative branches of the United States maintained a rigid position in response to the tragic, horrendous deprivation of the rights of the Burmese peoples. U.S. policy became entrenched in support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) after the party swept a free election (80 percent of the seats, 57 percent of the votes, although its Secretary General Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest at the time) in 1990, but whether those elections were for a government or a constitutional convention is disputed. U.S. policy was defined by regime change in favor of the NLD. It was a mantra of isolation as sanctions were morally intensified and subsequently exemplified by the symbol of the suffering and sacrifice of Aung San Suu Kyi, the courageous daughter of the founder of modern Burmese independence. She came to symbolize democracy and human rights even beyond Myanmar during this period and was awarded the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize.

Platitudes: “Boutique” Foreign Policy and Absence of Debate

U.S. policymakers from both the right and left (the Clinton and two Bush administrations) agreed that the military junta, which had come to power in September 1988 after brutally suppressing a people’s revolution in the streets, should be removed. Condoleezza Rice described the junta as an “outpost of tyranny” in her confirmation hearing as Secretary of State.1 Yet, that junta had simply replaced an “Rice Names ‘Outposts of Tyranny’,” BBC News, January 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4186241.stm.

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equally repugnant military-dominated regime that had lasted almost three previous decades and to which the United States had provided assistance.

In Washington, Burma policy remained a “boutique” foreign policy issue; it was a passionate cause among a relatively small group of aficionados, human rights organizations, and Burmese expatriates who commanded the high moral ground and effectively organized themselves as a lobbying force with widespread access to all administrations and Congress.2 U.S. policy was completely devoted—with almost missionary zealotry—to the installation of democracy and improved human rights in that society, and the U.S. government officially supported Burmese dissident groups in Thailand. This provided a stark contrast to U.S. policy toward many other authoritarian societies in East Asia, which (e.g., China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) exemplified diverse U.S. interests, such as economics, security, and other factors. Negative policies toward Myanmar also affected U.S. interests in the broader Southeast Asian region. For example, the United States, over vociferous objections by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, did not consider signing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for over a decade because Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997.

The Burma policy issue was more polarized than any other foreign policy debate in the United States during that period. In fact, there was no substantial policy debate, only a rigidity of state press releases. Although academics could raise policy concerns in other fora, there was no public dialogue in Washington, in contrast to the vigorous debates on policies toward North Korea, Iran, Palestine, and other difficult political venues. Conferences held were essentially one-sided sessions, necessary, perhaps, to shore up morale among dispirited Burmese expatriates, but hardly conducive to rethinking premises that had become questionable. Aung San Suu Kyi’s views, and those purported to be hers as stated by her supporters when she was under house arrest (and therefore could not communicate), made U.S. policy.3

David I. Steinberg, “The United States and Burma/Myanmar: A ‘Boutique Issue’?” International Affairs 86 (2010); the United States continued to officially call the country “Burma,” largely with Aung San Suu Kyi’s prompting, after the government changed the country’s name to an older form, “Myanmar,” in 1989.

3 David I. Steinberg, “Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy toward Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, September 2010.

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Progress: An “Illegitimate” Regime’s “Legitimate” Reform Agenda

It was only after the Obama administration was inaugurated in 2009 that U.S. policy toward Burma was reconsidered, even though the sanctions policy had already been deemed ineffective by 2007.4 The U.S. government began to conduct an intensive review of “Burma” policy. Until classified sources are released, the origins of such change will remain obscured: signs from the Burmese about their discontent (in spite of international opinion, many leaders were intensely patriotic), “low-hanging” policy fruit (policy changes which could most easily gain passage), U.S. frustration with previous lack of progress, potential economic interests, concerns about the vastly expanded role of China in Myanmar, or some or all of the above may have been contributing factors.5

March 2009 saw signals from the Burmese indicating interest in change, and those signals, at least in part, prompted an intensive policy review. A new policy was announced in September of that year. Under “pragmatic engagement,” as it was called, high-level dialogues would take place and sanctions would remain in force, but the United States would soften its stance and repeal sanctions step-by-step in response to positive Burmese initiatives. This policy was recognition that a complete break in U.S. sanctions would not be politically tolerated in the Congress, and as a former congressman said, “No one can be seen as voting for a pariah regime.”6 As a “boutique issue,” no administration could use up too much political capital on Myanmar questions, when there were other, far more important worldwide issues that required congressional-executive branch negotiations.

A new Burmese administration was inaugurated in March 2011 after the May 2008 constitutional referendum and the November 2010 elections, both of which were considered by most Western states to be blatantly manipulated by the Burmese authorities. The new government immediately initiated progressive reform and an open set of policies that have astonished both Burmese and foreign observers with their breadth, speed, and intensity. Those favoring sanctions began to claim Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2007).

5 Of course, the Chinese seem to believe that the U.S. policy shift toward Myanmar (later broadened and officially titled the “pivot,” and then renamed as “rebalancing” to Asia) was in effect part of a concerted U.S. effort to “contain” China.

6 The author’s personal communication.

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credit for the changes, denying that the Burmese had the capacity or interest in national progress to enact reforms and thus had to rely on foreign pressures. This assessment, a form of hubris, ignores the intense nationalism and patriotism (sometimes misguided) of the Burmese military.

The United States, the members of the European Union, and Japan all reacted positively. As a result, foreign assistance from bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental sources came pouring into a state that had severely limited capacity to absorb it. Visits by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama (the first sitting U.S. President to visit the country) reflected the positive state of relations.

The distance between the state and the individual has vastly increased as a result of freedoms that had not been seen in that society for over half a century.

A vigorous legislature, lack of most censorship, ability to form labor unions and publicly protest, promises of an independent judiciary, economic reforms, and other rights have become evident. While both the Burmese government’s constitutional provisions and electoral irregularities have been branded internationally as “illegitimate,” the government has at the same time pursued a “legitimate” reform agenda.

Potential Problems: Lingering Authoritarian Tendencies

Severe problems remain, as attitudes, institutional histories, and individual memories are not all in concurrence. Many people still question the new course of reform. Authoritarian tendencies inculcated for over half a century are not easily removed, as is often the case in societies undergoing rapid governmental and economic transitions.

While some internal forces question the reforms as potentially undercutting rent-seeking and private prerogatives, many foreign observers who have advocated regime change have been critical that reforms have not moved swiftly enough and that certain issues of significance have not effectively been resolved. Many foreign and internal elements demand the ability of their icon, Aung San Suu Kyi, to run for the presidency or vice presidency from which she is constitutionally disbarred because of the foreign nationalities of her children. This is not constitutionally new in Burma/Myanmar, although there seems to be little doubt that the 2008

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constitutional provision to bar people with close family members with foreign nationality from public office was personally directed.

The most intransigent problem facing the state since independence in 1948 has been that of majority-minority relations. The dominant, almost imperialist, role of the Burman two-thirds majority over a myriad of ethnic groups has been the major issue of the state—it is not yet a nation with an overarching national ethos.7 A former head of state said that one million people have been killed in ethnic and political insurrections since independence in 1948. Dozens of ethnic rebellions along the Myanmar periphery have seen occasional cease-fires but no lasting peace treaties. This is the task the present administration is pursuing with more understanding and vigor than any previous government. The minority issues are compounded by strong anti-Muslim sentiment among the highly nationalistic Buddhist sangha (clergy) population, particularly against the Rohingya (called illegal Bengalis by the majority Burman ethnic group) along the Bangladeshi border. They are considered stateless in Myanmar and unwanted by the Bangladeshi government.

The ability to address governance and minority issues, including Muslims throughout Myanmar, is held hostage to the planned 2015 national elections from which a new government will evolve. How they are held, who can run, how votes are counted, how the constitution might be amended to deal with proposed changes are all elements that will affect internal dynamics and external relations.

The Dilemma for the United States

Barring a major natural disaster such as the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, any attempt to postpone the elections would elicit an outcry from the West that could lead to the reimposition of some U.S. sanctions, elements of which remain in force against some individuals and institutions. However, the greater concern, perhaps because it is more likely, would be if significant elements of the population were prevented from voting or if the votes were not tallied in accordance with international norms. But if one agreed that campaigning for the elections were balanced, that those who wanted to vote could freely vote, and that the votes were counted accurately, would the results of the elections internally and externally then be David I. Steinberg, “The Problem of Democracy in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Neither Nation-State Nor State-Nation,� Southeast Asian Affairs, 2012.

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considered legitimate?

One would think so. But there are indications from both the human rights community and some U.S. (and UK) official sources that they would not be regarded as such. In addition to a solution to the almost intractable minority questions, some in the United States want several important changes before the elections: that Aung San Suu Kyi be allowed to run for the presidency or vice presidency (a previous military candidate for the vice presidency was denied approval because his child had married a foreigner); that the 25 percent of active-duty military members appointed by the military be removed from the legislatures at all levels for they control any veto over constitutional amendments; and that the military be placed under civilian control. Legislation was introduced in the Congress in April 2014 calling for civilian control or stopping all security assistance to that government. Burmese minorities want constitutional changes for more autonomy and a greater share of their natural resources.

For the United States to take the position that the candidates for office be inclusive (i.e., that Aung San Suu Kyi should be able to be president or vice president—she is now and still can be a member of the legislature) or the elections will not be considered free or fair is an important policy dilemma for the United States.

Perhaps only the United Kingdom might back that position. If so stipulated, the United States’s favorable position in that society—the best since independence in 1948—would decline and with it any potential influence it might have on further reforms. There would likely be congressional cries for the reimposition of some sanctions, and this would be considered blatant interference in the internal affairs of Myanmar—a charge that would carry considerable weight among the military, youth, and others in that nationalistic environment.

The near future of Myanmar hinges on the 2015 elections. The only “success” of U.S. foreign affairs in East Asia during the Obama administration, if there are successes in foreign policy, has been that of Myanmar. The improvement of ties between the United States and ASEAN was dependent on the improvement in U.S. relations with Myanmar. President Obama mentioned this himself in his State of the Union speech and his May 2014 West Point talk on foreign policy. However, should progress be delayed (there are already many media reports of U.S. and foreign dissatisfaction with the current state of play), or should reforms falter or backslide, the Myanmar “boutique” issue could play a [120] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Steinberg | Myanmar and U.S. Policy

negative role in the assessment of the Obama administration’s Asian “pivot.”

David Steinberg is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Asian Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Visiting Scholar in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

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CALL FOR PAPERS The Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs is now accepting research papers for Volume 2, Number 1 (Spring/Summer 2015). Established in 2014, the Journal publishes the views of policymakers as well as peer-reviewed research articles written by both young and experienced scholars from around the world.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Submissions should be emailed to guasiajournal@gmail.com in a form of Word document. Please do not submit in PDF format. All submissions must include an abstract (100-200 words). Authors should include a short bio in the email text, but should avoid any self-identification in the manuscript as we send our articles out for anonymous review.

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Nooruddin | Leadership and Mandates

Leadership and Mandates: India’s Prospects for Economic Reforms under Narendra Modi Irfan Nooruddin

India’s sixteenth parliamentary general elections have been described variously as historic, landmark, and groundbreaking. In May 2014, with over 800 million people eligible to vote in the world’s largest democratic exercise, the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the right to form the largest majority government since 1984. The party’s leader Narendra Modi campaigned on a platform of governance and development, trumpeting the success of his home state of Gujarat during the three terms he served as its Chief Minister. For the most part, commentators have endorsed this interpretation of Mr. Modi’s success. They suggest that the resounding mandate given to his party reflects a deep desire by India’s citizens for bold economic reforms that will return India to the days of per capita GDP growth rates of 8 and 9 percent.

India has had a halting relationship with economic reform over the past fifty years. The 1991 economic reforms enacted under the threat of national bankruptcy are often thought to have ushered in a period of rapid economic growth and to have lifted hundreds of millions of India’s citizens out of abject poverty. Yet, economists and investors alike bemoan the lack of continued reform efforts by recent governments, and the hope is that Prime Minister Modi will use his political capital to enact far-reaching economic reforms to jumpstart India’s economy.

Early signs of Mr. Modi’s intentions yield mixed signals at best. Observers have been disappointed by the lack of dramatic reforms in the first few months of his administration. During this time, Mr. Modi has preferred to focus on high-profile visits to Japan, the United States, and Australia, each of which involved meetings with the Indian diaspora, business leaders, and government officials to seek commitments to invest in India. On the home front, there have been small-scale

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reforms, including enforcing better work habits for India’s bureaucratic classes, continuing the previous government’s efforts to deregulate diesel prices, and a recent announcement to streamline the process of receiving permits complying with India’s numerous labor regulations. The appointment of Arvind Subramanian as India’s Chief Economic Advisor has also encouraged pro-reform advocates to expect bolder steps in Modi’s first budget, which he is due to present to Parliament in early 2015.

Can Mr. Modi fulfill the desires of pro-reform advocates in India and abroad? On the one hand, the fact that he heads a majority government in a parliamentary system permits him legislative powers of which his predecessors over the past twenty-odd years could only have dreamed. Similarly, a drop in world oil prices has boosted India’s economy and its budget situation, giving its leaders room to maneuver on economic reforms that might have been less politically palatable had oil prices stayed high, such as deregulating the price of diesel. On the other hand, there are several indications that Mr. Modi’s powers are not unlimited, and that he must tread cautiously as he moves forward with his agenda.

The main limitation is that while Mr. Modi’s BJP party did win a majority of the seats in India’s parliament, it did not win a majority of the votes. In fact, just 31 percent of India’s voters cast their ballots in favor of the BJP.1 Alternatively, over two-thirds of all voters preferred a party other than the BJP. I do not stress this point to detract from the achievement of securing a parliamentary majority, but rather to indicate that this mandate is perhaps less secure and emphatic than Mr. Modi’s ardent supporters might wish to believe. Perhaps as important, the citizens who support the BJP tend to be better off than those that do not, and tend to be less dependent on large state programs that might need to be curtailed for Mr. Modi’s reforms to work.

A brief analysis of the 2014 National Election Study (NES), which uses a representative sample of over 22,000 Indians, underscores these points. First, while media pundits have been quick to attribute the BJP success to the apparent failure of the incumbent Indian National Congress-led United Progressive Alliance to generate high rates of economic growth during its second term in office (2009-2014), a clear majority of the NES respondents state that they think India’s “India’s next prime minister: The Modi era begins,” The Economist, May 18, 2014, http://www.economist. com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/indias-next-prime-minister-0.

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economic situation is better today than it was five years ago, and that their personal economic situations had similarly improved. If anything, what has been popularly termed the “aspirational voter” was disappointed not with India’s economic performance, but rather with its relatively slow growth rates compared to the heady days of much of the 2000s, during which the country experienced unprecedented and sustained near-double-digit growth rates. The consequent generation of employment opportunities raised expectations to arguably unrealistic levels, and the pressure now falls on Modi’s BJP government to meet them.

Second, fully one-fifth of participants in the sample say that they personally or someone in their family has benefited from a major government initiative such as home loan subsidies, pension programs, national health care missions, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Given the size of India’s population, this group of beneficiaries is, at a minimum, over two hundred million strong, but a majority of these beneficiaries did not vote for the BJP in the recent election, and any efforts by Mr. Modi to cut benefit schemes as part of his reform initiatives will galvanize a currently dispirited opposition into action.

Third, it is unclear that reform has a popular mandate, even though development does. It remains an open question as to whether citizens will support difficult reform policies that will result in short-run dislocations in exchange for the promise of long-term benefits to the economy. India’s high levels of electoral volatility and anti-incumbency voting reflect an electorate impatient for results and unwilling to give politicians long honeymoon periods to deliver. On this front, two signal reforms are worth keeping an eye on. First, will Mr. Modi be able to generate the political will to enact genuine reforms of India’s labor laws that make it virtually impossible for firms to fire employees and that consequently have been seen as a major impediment to the generation of new jobs? A super-majority of the NES respondents say that employment and job security are primary concerns and will be wary of any reforms that threaten their livelihoods, even if those reforms are endorsed by technocrats in Delhi or D.C. Likewise, will Mr. Modi be willing to backtrack on his refusal to negotiate multilateral trade treaties such as the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round unless granted provisions to continue food subsidies and India’s present patent regime? Also, will India’s citizens be willing to accept higher food and medicine prices in exchange for greater trade facilitation?

Finally, it is unclear just what type of reformer Mr. Modi aspires to be.

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Proponents of deeper reforms might be mistaken if they assume that Mr. Modi is a pro-market reformer. Rather, his record in Gujarat suggests that, like most Indian politicians, Mr. Modi is very comfortable with a strong state and sees the role of the state as facilitating business activity. In Gujarat, he courted investment initiatives by big business and provided deep tax concessions as well as generous investment subsidies, enabling access to cheap credit and land, and fighting unions to provide business-friendly labor regulations. It is likely that his efforts to invest in India’s ailing public infrastructure will see similar business-government linkages at the expense of market competitiveness. However, even if we leave aside the question of whether such pro-business (as opposed to pro-market) reforms are positive, we must confront the reality that the landscape for enabling big business initiatives around India will likely prove harder than it did in Gujarat, where he brooked little opposition, enjoyed a favorable budget situation, and had a pliant civil society.

In Coalition Politics and Economic Development (Cambridge University Press, 2011), I make a somewhat contrarian argument, especially in light of this essay.

Contrary to its detractors, I argue that the era of coalition government in India was good for its economic development because its reforms, while constrained by the reality of having to compromise with coalition partners, were more credible for having the support of a large number of parties representing distinct swathes of India’s diverse electorate. Mr. Modi does not have to deal with coalition partners, but he is well advised to heed the diktats of coalition dharma (the rules of coalitions): rather than spend his political capital rashly, he should be bolstered by his victory and emboldened to pitch a big tent into which he invites his would-be opponents to craft a reform agenda that enjoys broad bipartisan support. The next generation of reforms to India’s economy requires strong leadership of the kind willing to accept criticism and generate partnerships. Whether Mr. Modi is that sort of a leader remains to be seen.

Irfan Nooruddin is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He specializes in economic development, democratization, and civil conflict in the developing world. Dr. Nooruddin holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan.

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Bosco | Hong Kong

Hong Kong and the Demise of “One Country, Two Systems” Joseph Bosco

Hong Kong’s students, joined by large segments of the territory’s population, have taken to the streets to protest Beijing’s reneging on its promise of local political autonomy. Since 1997, Chinese authorities have offered to Hong Kongers the “universal suffrage” denied to the rest of the Chinese population. But the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced in August that voters can only choose from chief executive candidates approved by the Chinese Communist Party. The left hand took away what the right hand had given: authentic political choice.

Deng Xiaoping first announced the promise of local autonomy after a decision of the Sixth National People’s Congress in May 1984, which he said was affirmed in “[t]he contents of the Sino-British talks.”1 Deng’s purpose in declaring the policy was two-fold: to facilitate the British hand-over of Hong Kong in 1997 and to entice the people of Taiwan to accept eventual unification with China.

We are pursuing a policy of “one country, two systems” . . . [T]his means that within the People’s Republic of China, the mainland with its one billion people will maintain the socialist system, while Hong Kong and Taiwan continue under the capitalist system.2 Deng considered “one country, two systems” not only innovative for China, but also Deng Xiaoping, “One Country, Two Systems,” June 22-23, 1984, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ dengxp/vol3/text/c1210.html.

2 Ibid.

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somewhat self-servingly a potential model for other nations to emulate: The successful settlement of the Hong Kong question may provide useful elements for the solution of international questions. Has any government in the history of the world ever pursued a policy as generous as China’s?3 Deng understood that unification with Taiwan was a long-term project, and that Hong Kong’s integration would have to be accomplished first: China has not only the Hong Kong problem to tackle but also the Taiwan problem . . . There are 13 years left until 1997. We should start working now to gradually bring about a smooth transition.4 Deng stressed that the first and overriding principle in applying “one country, two systems” to Hong Kong was for both China and the West to recognize the local population’s inherent capacity for self-government: We should have faith in the Chinese of Hong Kong, who are quite capable of administering their own affairs. The notion that Chinese cannot manage Hong Kong affairs satisfactorily is a leftover from the old colonial mentality . . . We are convinced that the people of Hong Kong are capable of running the affairs of Hong Kong well.5 The Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region codified Deng’s commitment: The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.6 The 1997 Law also reflected Deng’s professed confidence in Hong Kong’s self-governing talent when it described “the method for selecting the Chief Executive in Deng Xiaoping, “One Country, Two Systems,” June 22-23, 1984, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ dengxp/vol3/text/c1210.html.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” Article 1, Section 5 (1997), http://www.constitution.org/cons/hongkong.txt.

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Bosco | Hong Kong

accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress”: The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.7

The smiling, diminutive Deng seemed beneficent enough when he made these pledges to the people of Hong Kong and Taiwan. As he dramatically liberalized China’s own economy, all three societies pondered with cautious fascination the possibilities Deng’s reforms seemed to offer. Even Mainland Chinese began to hope that some of Deng’s professed tolerance for limited democracy might rub off on his rule of the broader China.

However, on 4 June 1989, their collective dreams were shattered under hails of machine-gun bullets and the crush of rolling tanks as Deng, the Chinese Communist Party, and the People’s Liberation Army made war on the Chinese people precisely because they had dared to seek a measure of political freedom. The world took note, but the citizens of Hong Kong and Taiwan remember. Every year on the anniversary of Tiananmen Square, crowds of people of all ages gather in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park and Taipei’s Liberty Square to commemorate the tragic events with flowers, signs, and speeches. This year’s twenty-fifth anniversary drew huge throngs of people in both places.

After a subsequent quarter-century of economic growth in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Mainland, it seemed to China’s leaders and many Western scholars that the luxury of democratic governance had fallen safely behind economic prosperity as the public’s dominant aspiration. Neither the Chinese government nor the Chinese people would allow human rights to disrupt business as usual. Similarly, in the United States, mounting reports of China’s human rights abuses did not dissuade Republican and Democratic presidents and secretaries of state from pursuing normal relations with China on a range of economic and geopolitical issues.

During that period, Taiwan’s government entered into a number of economic arrangements with Beijing and many observers saw the prospect of peaceful, consensual political unification as only a matter of time. Western governments welcomed and even urged growing cross-Strait ties as the way to ease political “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” Article 45 (1997), http://www.constitution.org/cons/hongkong.txt.

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tensions.8 Chinese leaders and Western experts seemed hardly to notice what polls were telling them over and over: the Taiwanese identity among the people was growing stronger every year and would ultimately affect Taiwan’s relationship with China. In a 2011 poll, 72 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, while only 17 percent saw themselves as Chinese.9

Instead of accepting this reality and its long-term implications, self-proclaimed political realists (i.e., experts who believe in the inevitability of Taiwan’s “peaceful” acquiescence to political union with China) reassured themselves with polls showing small minorities of Taiwanese favoring either formal independence or unification while an overwhelming 80 percent preferred the status quo.10 The conventional illusion was that the glass was three-fourths full when it was actually three-fourths empty.

The numbers, properly read, told a more sobering story for China and Western advocates of unification; almost 80 percent of Taiwanese want either de jure or de facto independence (i.e., the status quo). China’s Anti-Secession Law (discussed below) makes clear that neither is acceptable to Beijing.

Moreover, for years, pollsters ignored an underlying reality: the percentage of those supporting the status quo over de jure independence was always skewed because people were answering the question strategically, factoring in China’s threatened use of force. When recent polls explicitly or implicitly removed war with China as a hypothetical possibility, support for unification declined to as low as 7 percent, with independence support creeping up to 24 percent and 66 percent preferring the status quo.11 When respondents were asked to eliminate the status quo as an option, the results were 71 percent for independence and 18 percent for unification.12 See, for example, David B. Shear, “Cross-Strait Relations in a New Era of Negotiation,” (Speech, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 7, 2010).

9 TVBS Poll Center, “Ouhuhui hou meizhongtai guanxi mindiao” 歐胡會後美中台關係民調 [Popular Survey of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations after the Obama-Hu Summit], February 2011, http://www1.tvbs. com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/rickliu/201102/rickliu-20110201165030.pdf.

10 “Between 1994 and 2001, an average 78 percent of Taiwanese preferred maintaining the status quo, 4.5 percent supported immediate independence, and 2.6 percent favored immediate unification.” Tsai Chiahung, Wang Ding-ming, and Livianni S. Tossutti, “Between Independence and Unification: An Ordered Probit Analysis of Panel Survey Data on Taiwan’s Constitutional Future,” Issues & Studies 44, no. 4 (December 2008): 74.

11 “Taiwanese prefer independence over unification: survey,” Taipei Times, October 31, 2013, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/10/31/2003575806.

12 Ibid.

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Bosco | Hong Kong

A 2014 poll showed the dramatic influence of changing demographics. 47.8 percent of participants in the poll said that “Taiwan should declare independence and become a new country.”13 But among those in the 20-to-29 age group, the number rose to 68 percent.14 Similarly, 64 percent of participants overall opposed unification, compared to 82 percent in the younger age group.15

With the ascendency of the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan, some Chinese officials began paying attention to the demographic realities. In a private conversation in 2003, a Chinese embassy official told me that, contrary to conventional wisdom, he thought time was not on China’s side, precisely because of a growing Taiwanese identity. “Every day,” he said, “people on Taiwan with loyalties to China are dying, and every day people are born who will know only Taiwan as their motherland.”

Confirming the official’s pessimism, Beijing began to prepare for the reality that, for its purposes, Taiwan’s status quo is unsustainable over the long run. In 2005, it passed the Anti-Secession Law.16 The ASL served four objectives: (1) To issue a severe warning to President Chen Shui-bian that a declaration of independence or substantial moves in that direction would invite a Chinese attack; (2) To create a “legal” counter to Washington’s Taiwan Relations Act, which established a statutory basis for U.S. security aid to Taiwan, including the sale of defensive arms; (3) To reaffirm the “one country, two systems” promise as long as unification is achieved peacefully; and (4) To disabuse Taiwan’s people of the notion that the status quo could go on indefinitely. If a peaceful avenue to achieve unification were “exhausted,” the ASL declared, China would resort to force anyway. De facto independence, in other words, is ultimately just as unacceptable to Beijing as a formal declaration would be. To avoid the resort to “non-peaceful means,” the ASL proposed “personnel exchanges across the Straits . . . in steps and phases.”17

American officials and China experts pressed Taiwan to work out a political accommodation that would satisfy Beijing. Henry Kissinger warned Taipei at the

“Majority rejects unification: TISR poll,” Taipei Times, February 23, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/front/archives/2014/02/23/2003584139.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 National People’s Congress, People’s Republic of China, “Anti-Secession Law,” March 14, 2005, http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html.

17 Ibid.

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Asia Society in 2007 that “China will not wait forever.”18 During Taiwan’s presidential election the following year, Beijing and Washington made clear their preference for a Kuomintang (KMT) victory as the way to improve cross-Strait relations damaged under Chen.19 Their hopes were restored with the election of President Ma Ying-jeou, who vigorously pursued ever deeper economic ties with China. The two capitals again put their thumbs on the scales of Taiwan’s 2012 election, helping to ensure four more years of the KMT’s hold on power and continued efforts to move closer to China.20

While Taiwan was holding its election, student protests were breaking out in Hong Kong, ostensibly the model for Taiwan’s political reconciliation with China. The issue was an official revamping of the public school curriculum to align it with the “patriotic education” taught in Mainland China. Hong Kongers were irate that “The China Model” handbook—which criticized multiparty systems, such as the very system promised Hong Kong—had been rushed through without public consultation. The demonstrations, numbering in the tens of thousands, forced the government to back down and withdraw the proposed changes. The events were fully reported in the Taiwan media, though not in mainland China.

After his reelection, Ma moved aggressively to expand China-Taiwan economic cooperation through a series of trade and technical agreements. In February, his administration also intensified political talks with China by participating in the first official meeting between the two governments’ representatives. Beijing hailed this as the start of a “first step, second step, third step” process toward political reconciliation.21 It would move the parties forward in the “steps and phases” toward peaceful unification envisioned in the ASL.

However, when a cross-strait service trade agreement was quickly passed in the Legislative Yuan earlier this year without full vetting by the political opposition or the public, Taiwan’s young people rose up. The Sunflower Movement occupied government buildings and held massive street demonstrations to protest Taiwan’s inexorable march toward economic dependency on China. The students, and the Henry Kissinger, interview with Orville Schell, Asia Society, January 30, 2007, http://fora.tv/2007/01/30/ Henry_Kissinger.

19 Richard Bush, “Taiwan’s Elections and United States Interests,” Brookings Institution, September 15, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/09/15-taiwan-presidential-election-bush.

20 Ibid.

21 “Taiwan, China exchange views on potential presidential meeting,” China Times, February 14, 2014, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140214000072&cid=1101.

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thousands of workers and professionals who joined them, had seen how, two years earlier, the people of Hong Kong had successfully defied and reversed an official fiat from Beijing. Taiwan’s protesters only had to overcome resistance from their own elected government, and they ultimately did, with no violence on either side.

In a reversal of roles, the young people of Hong Kong were now paying attention to what was happening in Taiwan, the other member of Deng’s one country, two systems fraternity. They could see that while Hong Kong was supposed to be moving closer to Taiwan’s political model, its societal freedoms were under increasing pressure from Beijing. Meanwhile, Taiwan was becoming ensnarled in the same economic net that bound Hong Kong to China and—Taiwan’s students feared— would lead to political subservience.

Still, Hong Kong’s hopes for preserving its Western-style freedoms and way of life rested on Deng’s promised political autonomy, scheduled to go into effect in 2017 with the direct election of the city’s chief executive. Yet, in August, the Chinese Communist Party abruptly snatched that democratic lifeline away, declaring that only Beijing-selected and-vetted candidates could compete for the position. This announcement ignited the latest protests. As with Hong Kong’s earlier education protests, Taiwan’s Sunflower movement, the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, and other mass protests in Chinese history, this latest one started with students but soon swelled with participants from the general population.

Taiwan’s people and government have publicly sided with their democratic brethren in Hong Kong.22 In both societies, Beijing has lost whatever moral credibility it may have retained after Deng’s “one country, two systems” pledge was tarnished by his Tiananmen Square catastrophe and subsequent human rights abuses.23 Taiwan’s President Ma has flatly declared: “The one country, two systems formula practiced in the special administration region is not acceptable to Taiwan.”24 But the Taiwanese look beyond Hong Kong to democratic development in China itself.

As Ma has repeatedly said, only when “mainland China moves toward democracy and allows more freedom to its people” would Taiwan seriously consider closer Cindy Sui, “Watching Hong Kong: Taiwan on Guard against China,” BBC News, October 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29592881.

23 Benny Avni, “Beijing’s Crushing of Democracy in Hong Kong Sends Chills through Taiwan,” Newsweek, October 20, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/31/beijings-crushing-democracy-hong-kongsends-chills-through-taiwan-278455.html.

24 “Ma Reaffirms Policy on Cross-Straits Relations,” Taiwan Today, November 4, 2014, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=223693&CtNode=414.

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political association.25

The question for Xi Jinping—widely seen as the strongest, most capable Chinese leader since Deng—is whether he will honor his renowned predecessor’s democratic promises or repeat his authoritarian mistakes.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic, the default response of China’s leaders to any internal challenge has been Mao Zedong’s teaching that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The question is whether Xi will follow the Maoist model as faithfully as he has adopted some of its ideological rhetoric. If so, Beijing will authorize a stronger use of force to prevent Hong Kong’s people from getting the new autonomy Deng promised and ultimately to take away the independence Taiwan already has. Alternatively, Xi has the opportunity to demonstrate that China has finally reached a higher level of maturity, self-confidence, and humanity. The people of Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and the world await his response.

Joseph Bosco is Senior Associate for the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, he taught at Georgetown University and served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also served as special assistant to Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe. Mr. Bosco holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a B.A. in Government and International Relations from Harvard College.

“Ma Reaffirms Policy on Cross-Straits Relations,” Taiwan Today, November 4, 2014, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=223693&CtNode=414.

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Kim | Common Misconceptions

Common Misconceptions about the China-South Korea Relationship Ellen Kim

There is no question that the current bilateral relationship between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is at its best since normalization of ties in 1992. In less than two years since South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in early 2013, bilateral cooperation between the two countries has flourished and expanded across the board. High-level dialogue channels were established in order to enhance and regularize strategic communication between Seoul and Beijing. As a result, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and South Korean Chief of the Presidential Office of National Security Kim Jang-soo held their first strategic talks in November 2013.

A month later, government officials from the two countries also held the first Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue. In a sign of growing military cooperation, South Korea and China agreed to move forward with an agreement made in 2011 to set up a direct military hotline between their defense ministers. The only other country with which South Korea has such a high-level military hotline is the United States, which buttresses the significance of this development. The hotline also demonstrates increased Chinese willingness to cooperate with South Korea on contingencies in the Korean Peninsula. On the economic front, President Park and President Xi agreed to conclude negotiations of the Korea-China bilateral free trade agreement by the end of 2014. While the prospect of concluding the agreement by the deadline remains to be seen, the successful conclusion of the agreement would definitely give a boost to the two countries’ already substantial economic relationship.

Above all, the growing ties between South Korea and China is highlighted by the two summits between the nations’ leaders in just over a year. Japan is *

The author thanks Andy Lim for research assistance.

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traditionally South Korean leaders’ choice for the second overseas visit after the United States. Thus, President Park’s decision to go to China in June 2013 for her second overseas state visit demonstrated her administration’s resolve to revitalize Sino-ROK relations and strengthen their strategic cooperative partnership. Beijing welcomed South Korea’s overture, and President Park’s first successful summit with President Xi helped set a positive tone for relations between the new governments.

The unilateral Chinese declaration in late November 2013 of a new air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which overlapped with South Korea’s existing ADIZ around the Ieodo/Suyan Rock, created a hiccup in bilateral relations. Yet, the second summit between the two leaders in Seoul in July 2014 dispelled doubts of an early end to the honeymoon phase of their relationship. President Xi’s trip was significant in that it marked the first time a Chinese leader visited South Korea before North Korea. Additionally, in the almost three years since Kim Jong-un assumed power in North Korea, Kim has yet to host a Chinese head of state or visit China himself.

This unprecedented Chinese gesture elevated South Korea’s hope for change in China’s North Korea policy, but enthusiasm turned to disappointment when China remained opposed to including an explicit statement on the denuclearization of North Korea in the summit joint statement.

There is a common misconception about the growing relationship between South Korea and China. Despite the unprecedented summits and gestures of friendship, South Korea’s expanding ties with China do not signify an emerging shift in its foreign policy. They rather reflect South Korea’s diplomatic strategy in dealing with its inherent strategic dilemma vis-à-vis China. On one hand, China has become an important economic partner for South Korea, and cultivating and deepening ties with China has thus been an important policy objective. South Korea’s need for Chinese cooperation in resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea and achieving Korean reunification has also provided a major impetus for its engagement with China. On the other hand, South Koreans also perceive significant economic and security threats from China due to growing economic dependence, geographical proximity, and an expanding power gap.2 According to a recent public opinion survey, more than 60 percent of South Koreans believe China’s rise poses

Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “Between Rocks and Hard Places: South Korea’s Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States,” forthcoming.

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Kim | Common Misconceptions

both economic and military threats to South Korea.3 In addition, while China continues to rank as the second most favorable country after the United States, the South Korean public exhibited less trust in China than in the United States.4 Undeniably, Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign policy only serves to deepen South Koreans’ concern about China’s rise. Meanwhile, South Korea remains a key U.S. ally in Asia, and much of South Korea’s national security is rooted in its military alliance with the United States. All of these geopolitical, economic, and security considerations contribute to South Korea’s dual strategy of maintaining its security alliance with the United States while placing its economic future with China. As a result, South Korea’s China policy has a tendency to fluctuate as it adjusts to and balances against a rising China.

The Xi government’s charm offensive toward the Park government is no less strategic. Engaged in a growing competition with the United States for global leadership and embroiled in tension with Japan in Asia, China saw in the Park administration’s extended hand a window of opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: to pull South Korea closer to China and away from the United States, and to undermine the U.S.-ROK-Japan security triangle, which Beijing has always perceived to be aimed at containing China. China’s icy relations with North Korea also provided an opening for warmer relations with South Korea than had previously been possible. Certainly, Beijing’s cool attitude towards and distant relationship with Pyongyang altered the strategic calculations of regional countries, including North Korea. But China’s changed attitude largely stems from its deep frustration with Pyongyang and is not indicative of a larger shift in its North Korea policy.

Rather, Beijing’s strategy is to take advantage of the currently weak Sino-DPRK relationship in order to win over South Korea—without giving up its core geostrategic interest in North Korea.

What, then, do South Korea’s growing ties with China mean for the United States and the region?

To some American politicians and policymakers, South Korea’s warming Kim Jiyoon et. al., “One Bed, Two Dreams? Assessing Xi Jinping’s Visit to Seoul,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief, July 16, 2014, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/one-bed-two-dreams-assessing-xijinpings-visit-to-seoul.

4 Kim Jiyoon et. al., “Public Opinion on the Korea-China Summit, Favorability of the Leaders of Neighboring Countries, Attitudes on the Minimum Wage,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Public Opinion Brief, July 1-15, 2013.

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ties with China amid growing Sino-American rivalry are a clear cause for concern, particularly as the United States rebalances to Asia. The Obama administration affirms the U.S.-ROK alliance as a “linchpin of peace and security in the Asia Pacific region” and an important foundation of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia and beyond.5 Some in Washington may interpret South Korea’s policy oscillation between the United States and China as a problem that could undermine U.S. strategy in the region, especially considering that U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation has been stagnant over the past few years. This has been largely due to the deteriorating relationship between South Korea and Japan over resurgent historical and territorial disputes. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 and his recent attempt to reinterpret the Kono Statement on comfort women have further aggravated ROK-Japan relations. Additionally, the two leaders have yet to meet in a state summit since they took office. South Korea’s closeness with China amid this continued diplomatic freeze between South Korea and Japan is viewed as a worrisome development that could endanger the U.S.ROK-Japan trilateral relationship. Others argue that the repercussions of South Korea’s tilt towards China will have a destabilizing impact on the balance of power and regional alignment in Asia. Certainly, all of these are valid claims that should not be ignored.

However, the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance is not as dim as people might think. Although some presume that South Korea’s warming ties with China may have weakened its relationship with the United States, such presumptions underestimate the reservoir of deep trust and friendship between the United States and South Korea. In South Korea, the United States continues to rank more favorably than China in opinion polls and remained a preferred cooperative partner even when Sino-ROK relations were buoyant after the July Park-Xi summit.6 In the 2014 Chicago Council survey, American favorable views of South Korea also set a new record high, reaching a rating of 55 from the previous record of 52 in 2010.7 The White House, “Joint Fact Sheet: The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: A Global Partnership,” April 25, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/joint-fact-sheet-united-states-republic-korea-alliance-global-partnership.

6 Kim Jiyoon et al., “Issue Brief: One Bed, Two Dreams?”

7 The rating is on a scale of 0-100 with 100 being the most favorable feelings toward other countries. In comparison, Canada ranked highest in country favorability with a rating of 79 followed by Great Britain (74), Germany (65), and Japan (62); Dina Smeltz and Ivo Daalder et al., “Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy,” 2014, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2014_CCS_Report_1.pdf.

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Kim | Common Misconceptions

The United States and South Korea have cemented a robust relationship under the Obama and previous South Korean Lee Myung-bak governments. Highlights of this relationship include close cooperation and coordination on North Korea in the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, as well as the conclusion of the bilateral Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).

These bilateral accomplishments and strong solidarity reflect years of successful U.S.-ROK relations. Against this backdrop, the two summits between President Obama and President Park also demonstrated the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and that Seoul-Washington ties remain steady. In October 2014, the Obama and Park administrations came to an agreement on another delay of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean troops from the U.S.-led UN Command to South Korea. Although Washington shared Seoul’s concern that the previous transfer schedule of 2015 needed to be reconsidered following North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, postponing the planned OPCON transfer that had already been delayed once in 2011 was not an easy task. The final decision to delay the OPCON transfer reveals the strength of the ties between the two allies.

Nevertheless, South Korea’s growing tilt toward China needs to be properly managed because of its long-term geostrategic implications. South Korea’s inclination toward China is not a transient trend given the geopolitical and economic dilemmas that the country faces. Unlike Japan, which views China more as a competitor, South Korea faces a policy challenge to coordinate and synchronize its U.S. military alliance with its evolving strategic cooperative relationship with China.

However, as Victor Cha argues, South Korea’s strategic value and leverage vis-à-vis China rests on and is derived from its strong relationship with the United States.8 As a result, South Korea’s lean toward China must be matched by concerted efforts from South Korea and the United States to continuously shore up and deepen the U.S.-ROK comprehensive strategic alliance. For instance, the two countries must update their alliance vision statements to meet present and future security realities in Asia. South Korea’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would also be a positive development. In addition to implementing KORUS, joining a U.S.-led regional trade agreement would balance against South Korea’s decision to sign a “韓·美 멀어지면… 中, 오히려 한국을 경시할 것 [If ROK-U.S. Alliance Weakens, China Will Not Take South Korea Seriously],” Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2014, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_ dir/2014/07/18/2014071800344.html.

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bilateral free trade agreement with China and participate in the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

The United States should also play a more active role as a mediator between South Korea and Japan to diffuse tension between its two key allies. At the same time, the United States, South Korea, and Japan should enhance U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation through regular trilateral meetings, which would help prevent South Korea from sending unintended messages to the United States and Japan as it seeks to enhance ties with China. Although the political environments in Japan and South Korea are still not ripe for a summit to take place between President Park and Prime Minister Abe, the two countries must work harder to resolve thorny issues and invest political capital to improve the relationship, thereby setting bilateral relations on a more positive course. Similarly, South Korea should carefully manage expectations and perceptions of both China and the United States. A U.S.-ROKPRC trilateral strategic dialogue would be a good confidence-building measure that could avoid potential miscommunication, enhance member states’ respective understanding of each other’s intentions, help reduce the risk of miscalculations, and facilitate cooperation on issues of common concern and interest.

Sino-ROK relations have had a strong start under Park and Xi because the two countries’ strategic interests have converged under Asia’s current security landscape. But the future trajectory of bilateral relations remains yet to be seen.

While there are opportunities for cooperation for South Korea and China to explore, challenges also lie ahead as both countries define their strategic interests and realize the limitations of their relationship.

Ellen Kim is Assistant Director and Fellow in the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Her research focuses on U.S.-ROK alliance and Northeast Asian Security. Ms. Kim holds a B.A. in International Relations and Japanese Studies from Wellesley College and an M.P.P. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

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Wilder | The Growth of the Chinese Military

The Growth of the Chinese Military An Interview with Dennis Wilder

The Journal sat down with Dennis Wilder to hear his views on recent developments within the Chinese military—including the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army—and their implications for security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. Mr. Wilder began his career with the U.S. government as a China military analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency. He then helped shape U.S. policy toward China and East Asia as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asian Affairs on the National Security Council. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Journal: You served on the National Security Council (NSC) staff between 2004 and 2009. What did your work entail and what were some challenges you faced during your tenure in the White House? What role did the NSC play in shaping the George W. Bush administration’s worldview and foreign policy approach towards Asia?

Wilder: The role of the NSC, which was established in 1947, is not to implement foreign policy, but rather to coordinate foreign policy. In the U.S. government, you can argue that the lead agency in foreign affairs is the Department of State. However, there are many other departments that also engage in foreign policy implementation. There is the Office of the Trade Representative. There is the Department of Defense. There is also the Department of Commerce. In some cases, you even have the Department of Energy. There is a myriad of people and organizations with a role Fall/Winter 2014 [141]

Perspective

in foreign affairs. What the NSC tries to do is take the president’s instructions, which are best spelled out in the president’s national security strategy, take the core principles of a president’s foreign policy and ensure that, as the agencies execute foreign policy, they are keeping within the guidelines of what the president is trying to do. In other words, the NSC tries to make sure that the priorities of the president are the priorities of the various agencies of government.

For example, what were the priorities of President Bush in East Asia? First, it was to keep our alliances strong. I thus spent a great deal of time during my tenure at the White House making sure that our relationships with the allies in East Asia were kept in good order and that we had robust contact with them. When the president went to visit these countries, we had a set of programs and deliverables that we were going to move forward in those relations.

Second, in East Asia, we obviously have the problem of North Korea: the dangers of North Korea as both a nuclear power and a proliferator. The members of the NSC spent a lot of time figuring out ways to engage the North Koreans while also keeping them from proliferating. The issue of China’s rise and how the United States was going to deal with that was also a very important part of our work. What you will find at the end of the East Asia section of the National Security Strategy report in 2006 (released by The White House) is the word “hedging.” What we designed was a policy of hedging. Hedging implies that we do not know what course China is going to take in the future. The Chinese may continue to develop their military capability as they become a status quo power in the system. In other words, they may buy into the international norms that have been in place since World War II. If so, we welcome a prosperous, strong China.

What if the Chinese in the future decide they are a non-status quo power, though?

What if the Chinese decide that the rules that the world has lived by since 1949, for whatever reason, do not suit them? In that case, we are going to have to be in a position of being able to confront China on that. That is where the hedging strategy comes in. So, building the American alliances in East Asia, keeping a strong, robust American military presence in East Asia, and keeping our economic engagement with East Asia strong are all part of that, and that was a big part of my job at the NSC. [142] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Wilder | The Growth of the Chinese Military

Journal: You are currently teaching a course on the growth of the Chinese military at Georgetown University. What do you see as the primary driver behind the expansion of military investment and development in China?

Wilder: There are two ways of looking at the question. First of all, there is no doubt that China is making an enormous military investment. They have gone from about $22 billion to at least $130 billion in defense spending over a decade, if not more.

On the one hand, we can say that this is a natural development of a country that has become, over that decade, much more economically viable. As the economy has grown the defense budget has grown as well. The Chinese will point to the fact that the percentage in GDP used on defense has not significantly changed over that decade. The real dollars spent on defense obviously have grown quite tremendously, and yet the Chinese will say, “Well, but the price of labor is higher. There are a lot of reasons for this.”

My concern, however, is not that China has increased its defense spending. I am worried about the lack of transparency with regards to the objectives of increased defense spending in China. For example, in the South China Sea, the Chinese have been very ambiguous about the nine-dash line. Does the nine-dash line mean that China proposes that the entire South China Sea is theirs, and therefore every nation who has somebody on one of those islands out there—be it the Philippines or Vietnam—has to leave those islands? Or is the nine-dash line merely an indication of China’s interest in the South China Sea? It is very unclear, and the Chinese have made their neighbors extremely nervous with their lack of clarity as well as the aggressive manner in which they seem to be moving ahead in that area.

Journal: Where do you see Chinese nuclear capabilities heading? Will China’s expansion of nuclear weapons capability lead to tensions within the region, such as a nuclear rivalry with India?

Wilder: In the nuclear arena, it appears China continues to have a “deterrent force,” not a “first strike force.” The Chinese believe that because they are a smaller nuclear power, they need to have the capability to strike back against a country that uses nuclear weapons against China. I have a hard time believing the Chinese would be Fall/Winter 2014 [143]

Perspective

first to use nuclear force though. So I think their “no first use” policy is still credible.

If you look at what the Chinese are doing in nuclear development, they are apparently building a new ballistic missile submarine, and they may build several of these ballistic missile submarines. However, that is to make sure that they have a triad, and that they have missiles that cannot be found, so that they survive a first strike from another power. I am not too worried about that. I do not see the Chinese massively building up their nuclear capabilities. Now, that is from an American perspective, because obviously we have tremendous capabilities in this area. If I were viewing this from India’s perspective, I imagine this would make the Indian leadership very nervous. Modernization of the Chinese nuclear force does mean that China has a capability against India that is bigger and better than what the Indians have against China. So they have to worry more about the notion that China might change its “no first use” policy at some point.

Journal: What remains your most outstanding concern regarding the growth of the Chinese military?

Wilder: Again, it comes back to this question of transparency. When you look at what China’s neighbors do in defense, they publish white papers. They publish on defense budgets and plans that are available for public scrutiny. The Japanese do. The Australians do. The South Koreans certainly do. The Chinese white papers—while they have improved over the last few years—are not what you would call transparent documents. They pull their punches. They do not explain everything China is doing, and they certainly do not explain some areas of great concern.

For example, I mentioned the ballistic missile submarines. One of the concerns that anybody should have about a country with ballistic missiles or countries with nuclear weapons on board subs is what the fail-safe mechanisms are. We are quite open about the fact that we have clear fail-safe mechanisms on our nuclear weapons. It is easy to do on land. It is harder to do at sea. So I think the Chinese need to come forward once they start to deploy these nuclear ballistic submarines with a better explanation of how you keep from having accidental launches, or how you keep them from a rogue submarine commander. This is not to say that I think that the Chinese are going to have this kind of problem. However, you always have to [144] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Wilder | The Growth of the Chinese Military

be prepared for the worst, and I think the Chinese have not been clear and up front enough about nuclear command and control.

Journal: China is often viewed as the de facto leader of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose member states have protested the idea of new missile defense systems being set up by U.S. allies in the region. What role does the SCO play in shaping the future of the regional security architecture in Asia?

Wilder: East Asian security architecture has vexed many foreign policymakers in the United States. Unlike in Europe, where you have a lot of commonalities between countries in terms of heritage and culture, in East Asia, all of these nations have quite distinct heritage and culture. Consequently, when you are trying to find an overarching architecture for the region, it is very difficult. We have not found it yet. Henry Kissinger’s latest book, which came out a few months ago, is very interesting in that it addresses this question of world architecture. He asks, “What is security architecture in the twenty-first century?” Increasingly, we have a networked world—a world in which it is not just nation-states, but all kinds of different networking going on because of the computer age. Human beings are now also in touch with each other in ways that they never were before. What I find interesting about Kissinger’s book is that he lays out the problem terrifically and criticizes the G8, G20, United Nations, and many of these international organizations. He identifies that these organizations are not doing as well as they need to. Interestingly though, by the end of the book, he does not actually offer a solution. That is somewhat disappointing from Kissinger because I look to him for great models and great thinking. I think that shows how difficult this problem of architecture is, not just in East Asia, but around the world. We are at a point where the old models are falling apart, and we do not have any new models to replace them. Perhaps it is the next generation of Asia scholars who will have to develop new models. My generation may have failed on this point, so it may be that the next group will have to take up that torch and figure out a new architecture for East Asia and for global security.

Journal: Recently, there was an incident during which a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft had a close encounter with a Chinese jet fighter in the South China Sea. What kinds of steps can China and the United States take to reduce the likelihood of such Fall/Winter 2014 [145]

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incidents occurring?

Wilder: This is where we have struggled to engage the Chinese military. The Chinese military, of all the elements in China, has been the least willing to engage in direct relationships with the United States and the neighbors in East Asia. For very real reasons, the economic side of the Chinese government has been very open to relationship with the outside world, though it was necessary for economic reform. The political side has been willing to engage because, obviously, as China has become a player in the world, it needs to engage heavily with the world. The military has not felt that need. In fact, the military has felt that engagement is rather dangerous for them in the sense that we would be able to see their weaknesses, their areas of vulnerability, and consequently, they have been very parsimonious in their willingness to engage. One area, for example, is that if you look at the history of U.S.-China military-to-military ties—and with most countries—China only sends the top generals for these discussions. There is very little that goes on at the colonel-to-colonel, the major-to-major, or captain-to-captain level. That is a problem because at the lower levels of the Chinese military, unfortunately, they are still indoctrinated to believe that the United States is the adversary. I think that the more exposure we can get for those lower-level officers to our side, the more they will learn that we are not the adversary they think we are. Moreover, by engaging with us, they begin to establish relationships and friendships. As they move up the command structure, these relationships would be helpful in overcoming some of these problems.

Journal: In what areas do you think China and the United States can or should develop military cooperation amidst all of the challenges you mentioned?

Wilder: There are many areas in which the United States and China would be able to cooperate. I am cautiously optimistic that Chairman and President Xi Jinping has pushed the military forward in regard to military-to-military cooperation with the United States. I always felt during the Bush administration that President Hu Jintao was interested in improving the military-to-military relationship, but he did not have the kind of influence with the Chinese military to actually make that happen. It appears that what we are seeing now is a greater willingness on the part of Xi Jinping. Xi seems to recognize that there [146] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Wilder | The Growth of the Chinese Military

needs to be, as he calls it, a new “great power relationship” between the United States and China. He is beginning to impress this view on the Chinese military.

For example, we have recently seen four visits to the United States by the Chinese naval commander. I think that is a very positive sign. However, as I mentioned earlier, we need a robust discussion on the nuclear side, as well as an extensive discussion of rules of engagement off of the Chinese coast. One major issue is that the Americans and the Chinese have never sat down to have a discussion about the rules of engagement in detail. We need some rules of the road so we do not have these problems in the future. These are two pressing areas on the nuclear side and on the maritime side. I was always impressed with what Colin Powell said regarding the need for lower-level military contacts. Powell made the point that the people he met as a young officer were terribly important to him when he became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because they also had moved up their command structure. He thus had a long history with these individuals and understood them well. That is what I hope to see between the United States and China in the future—that we begin to have those kinds of personal relationships between military officers so that someday, sources of tensions can be much better managed than they are today. This is because I think fundamentally—and this is my personal view—that the Chinese and the Americans are not that different. We actually share a lot of traits in common. We are both industrious peoples. We certainly are peoples who enjoy a good joke, who enjoy a good meal. I think the more we get to know each other the more it will work to the betterment of the relationship.

Dennis Wilder was interviewed by Thomas Snyder, Brian Wielk, and Zi Yang on 23 September 2014.

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Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

CALL FOR PAPERS The Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs is now accepting research papers for Volume 2, Number 1 (Spring/Summer 2015). Established in 2014, the Journal publishes the views of policymakers as well as peer-reviewed research articles written by both young and experienced scholars from around the world.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Submissions should be emailed to guasiajournal@gmail.com in a form of MS Word document. Please do not submit in PDF format. All submissions must include an abstract (100-200 words). Authors should include a short bio in the email text, but should avoid any self-identification in the manuscript as we send our articles out for anonymous review.

Length: Manuscripts should be 5,000-7,000 words in length Format: Please use Times New Roman, 12-point font size, and 1-inch/2.5-centimeter margins on all sides Style: Authors should follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed.

Citations: All citations should be formatted as footnotes. Please also include a full bibliography at the end. *Submissions must not be plagiarized, copyrighted, or under review elsewhere.

Mietzner | Indonesia under Joko Widodo

Indonesia’s Future Trajectory under Joko Widodo An Interview with Marcus Mietzner

After an intense election campaign, Indonesia’s constitutional court confirmed Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s electoral victory on 21 August 2014. In this interview, Marcus Mietzner, Associate Professor at the Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific, shares his thoughts on Indonesia’s future under President Jokowi. Dr. Mietzner discusses Indonesia’s political landscape, the resilience of its democracy, and the challenges Jokowi must confront in the years ahead.

Journal: Your primary research interests include political parties, elections, and the role of the military in Indonesian politics. What sparked your interest in the region?

Mietzner: Through personal connections, I first came to Indonesia as a teenager in 1986. Suharto, Indonesia’s long-time autocrat, was at the height of his power then.

He had the backing of the military, and had designed a political system that conveniently perpetuated his hold on the presidency. Nevertheless, it was clear already in the mid-1980s that many Indonesians wanted democratic change. The year 1986 was also when Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos fell, demonstrating to the Indonesians that authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia were not invincible. Thus, I became very interested in the tension between increasing pressures for a democratic opening in Indonesia and Suharto’s determination to cling to power. This interest became my motivation to study and do research on Indonesian politics.

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Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia (University of Hawaii Press, 2013). What are some unique aspects of the political landscape in Indonesia? Are political parties in Indonesia a reliable liaison between the citizenry and the government?

Mietzner: Let us start with the not-so-unique aspects. Like their counterparts around the world, political parties in Indonesia struggle with their reduced influence in society. Across the globe, parties see their membership declining, voter turnout falling, and party identification (i.e. the percentage of voters who closely identify with a certain party) hitting record lows. When it comes to channeling the aspirations of the citizenry, parties face a serious challenge from a wide range of other societal actors: the media (especially social media), think tanks, non-governmental organizations, universities, grassroots activists, and religious groups. Indonesian parties are no exception to this trend. However, it appears that Indonesian parties are more solid than their equivalents in other Asian, especially Southeast Asian, countries. In Thailand, for example, most parties are very short-lived and often only serve the interests of a particular leader. The same is true in the Philippines and South Korea. In Indonesia, by contrast, a number of parties are deeply rooted in societal networks, with some of them operating since the 1920s. This makes the party system in Indonesia more stable than those in Thailand, the Philippines, or South Korea, while leading to less volatility in electoral results. In the parliamentary elections of 2014, all nine parliamentary parties of the previous term made it into the new parliament, and there was only one new entry. Hence, in terms of their stability, Indonesian parties are more comparable to those in Latin America and Eastern Europe than to parties in other Southeast Asian countries.

That said, political parties in Indonesia suffer from significant structural weaknesses. Chief among them is their continued entanglement in patronage, clientelism, and corruption. This, in turn, has made them deeply unpopular. To some extent, this is hardly surprising. Indonesia has an utterly dysfunctional party and campaign financing system. The state provides almost no public funding to party headquarters, and legal donations are rare and not encouraged by existing regulations. Therefore, the vast bulk of political financing is drawn from illicit sources, including kickbacks for government permits, bribes for the approval of certain budget items, the sale of bureaucratic positions, and the misuse of state funds for political purposes.

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Mietzner | Indonesia under Joko Widodo

At the same time, we have seen more and more oligarchs taking over political parties. It is of utmost importance, then, that Indonesia reforms its political finance regime. This should not only include the introduction of significant public funding (as has been the case in many Latin American and Eastern European countries), but also incentives for donors to make legal donations, which then need to be publicly scrutinized. Without such reforms, it is difficult to see how illicit fundraising can be neutralized as a key element of party politics and political corruption in Indonesia.

Journal: Do you consider Indonesia to be a mature democracy? What is your take on the possibility of authoritarian backsliding in Indonesia?

Mietzner: Indonesia is not a mature, consolidated, or liberal democracy. Those scholars who have claimed that it is have often used a minimalist definition of a “mature” or “consolidated” democracy. Political scientist Samuel Huntington, for instance, insisted that a democracy can be called consolidated if it passes the “two-turnover test,” that is to say if the democracy has seen two peaceful power transitions after the initial regime change. Applying this measure, Indonesian democracy would have to be described as consolidated. In recent years, however, scholars have taken a more substantive view of democratic consolidation and progress. Political sociologist Larry Diamond, for example, developed a catalog of criteria that polities need to fulfill if they want to be considered a liberal democracy. Among these criteria are strong rule of law and low levels of social inequality. I endorse this substantive understanding of a liberal democracy over the purely procedural one and therefore do not view Indonesian democracy as consolidated. The rule of law is so weak and poverty still so widespread, that many citizens cannot fully participate in the political process. 43 percent of Indonesians continue to live on less than two dollars a day, and while they have made extensive use of their voting rights, their ability to become politically active remains limited.

Indeed, given its many weaknesses, it is surprising that Indonesia’s electoral democracy has been so resilient. In the presidential election of 2014, we have seen a major populist challenge launched against the democratic status quo—and it failed.

Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of Suharto and one of his key generals, promised to return Indonesia to its pre-democratic constitution, which would have Fall/Winter 2014 [151]

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done away with crucial reforms such as direct presidential elections. Instead, Indonesians opted for Joko Widodo, or “Jokowi,” a furniture businessman from Central Java who was first a small-town mayor and then governor of Jakarta. He is a product of democratic local elections, and thus a defender of the existing democratic regime. Nevertheless, 47 percent of Indonesians voted for Prabowo, suggesting there is a large constituency from which future attacks on democracy can draw. At the same time, the coalition that nominated Prabowo controls a large voting bloc in parliament, handing it significant powers to push for anti-democratic policies even during Jokowi’s presidency. Accordingly, the risk of democratic backsliding remains considerable. Ironically, this risk is not caused by the military’s alleged ambition to return to power (as most observers would have thought only a few years ago) but by the political maneuvers of civilian populists with deeply entrenched anti-democratic attitudes.

Journal: What are the most important issues that Indonesia needs to tackle in the coming years? What reforms or changes should be made to address them?

Mietzner: Outgoing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has left a stable but stagnant Indonesia to his successor. Behind the facade of stability and growth, Yudhoyono piled up a huge amount of unresolved problems that will now become Jokowi’s responsibility to tackle. To begin with, the solid economic growth over the last ten years (annual gross domestic product growth rates of around 5 to 6 percent) was largely the result of the commodities boom, not of sound economic management. Yudhoyono has done nothing to reduce Indonesia’s dependence on oil, gas, mining products, and timber, and this is now coming back to haunt the country as the commodity boom ends. Indeed, the manufacturing sector declined under Yudhoyono—a development Jokowi will have to reverse. Second, Yudhoyono leaves behind a rotting infrastructure. During his presidency, investment in infrastructure was half of what it was under Suharto and half of what it is in China. Jokowi will have to launch significant infrastructure projects in order to address years of neglect. Third, Yudhoyono failed to reduce energy subsidies—one of the biggest obstacles to better budget management. In 2014, Indonesia spent a record $33 billion, or 21 percent of its budget, on energy subsidies, most of which benefited the middle and upper classes. Jokowi has announced that [152] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Mietzner | Indonesia under Joko Widodo

he will reduce these subsidies to a minimum, and the success of his presidency in its early period will be measured by his ability to fulfill this promise. Jokowi has indicated that he wants to shift the funds freed by the reduction of subsidies into developing the health and education sectors, areas that also need urgent attention.

In the area of political reform, Jokowi will not launch new reforms so much as he will have to fight attempts by his opponents to roll back already achieved democratic change. Prabowo and his allies have announced that they intend to review many of the pro-democratic reforms implemented through the 2002 constitutional amendments. This intended review includes the role of the Corruption Eradication Agency, the Constitutional Court, and direct presidential elections. Even before Jokowi’s inauguration, Prabowo’s parliamentary coalition succeeded in passing a law (with Yudhoyono’s acquiescence) that abolished direct elections for local government heads—a reform that had been introduced in 2004 and was widely seen as a major step forward in Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. While it is unclear at this stage whether the law passed by Prabowo’s coalition will actually be implemented, it is symptomatic of the kinds of battles Jokowi will have to fight. Unfortunately, this will leave him with only limited opportunities to fix the dysfunctional political finance regime—which would have to be done in order to reduce political corruption and strengthen political parties institutionally. Jokowi fully understands the issue—he ran the first semi-meaningful fundraising campaign in Indonesian history, and he is also in favor of increasing state subsidies to parties. But I doubt he will be able to spend much political capital on this.

Journal: You have written extensively on Jokowi. What is Jokowi’s vision for Indonesia? What domestic—and international, if applicable—obstacles will he likely face in implementing his political agenda?

Mietzner: Jokowi is not a visionary in an ideological or conceptual sense. He is a technocratic pragmatist who wants to deliver better public services to the citizenry.

He wants better health care, better education, better public transport, better government services, quicker processing of business permits, and so forth. During the campaign, this focus on technocratic aspects of government effectiveness made him vulnerable to accusations that he had no bigger vision, and that almost cost him the Fall/Winter 2014 [153]

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election. But he pointed out that voters who wanted to understand his vision should just study how he led Solo (the Central Javanese town where he was mayor) and the capital Jakarta. There he had introduced successful reforms in the areas of health and education, launched major infrastructure projects, insisted on transparency in all government processes, sacked corrupt officials, defended Christian bureaucrats when Muslim mobs demanded their removal, selected government employees through a competitive selection process, and defended the rights of citizens to elect their leaders in a democratic way. Eventually, the majority of voters were convinced by this, although his campaign team was often frustrated that he couldn’t verbalize these achievements in a more conceptual manner.

Undoubtedly, Jokowi will face countless obstacles in implementing his technocratic agenda. For instance, the bureaucracy—which will have to implement many of Jokowi’s ideas—remains one of the least reformed political actors in Indonesia. In fact, it forms the core of a “deep state” that has resisted many reform initiatives before. Jokowi’s plan of competitive recruitment for bureaucratic posts challenges traditional conceptions of seniority and established hierarchy within the civil service, and opposition to this idea is certain. Second, as I previously mentioned, Jokowi faces significant opposition in parliament, where pro-Prabowo parties are strongly represented. Parliament could potentially refuse to pass Jokowi’s budgets and new legislation, leading to political deadlock. Third, Jokowi also has little experience in managing the military and the police. As a former ex-general, Yudhoyono enjoyed some natural respect within the security forces, but Jokowi will have to establish his authority first before he can implement reforms in these two notoriously reform-resistant agencies.

Internationally, Jokowi may face resistance as far as his program of economic nationalism is concerned. In fact, as an entrepreneur who has run a successful export business, Jokowi is not a fanatic economic nationalist. But the general mood in the population and the elite, as well as the ideological disposition of his party (Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), led him to adopt some elements of economic nationalism into his platform. For instance, he promised to achieve Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in food supply within four years of coming to office. It is highly unlikely that he will achieve this, and it is not desirable either. Food [154] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

Mietzner | Indonesia under Joko Widodo

prices would go up, and Indonesia would be in the awkward position of wanting to export its products to other markets but closing itself down for imports. International investors and trading partners are set to be up in arms about this intended policy, which will make it even less likely to materialize.

Journal: Jokowi’s administration and the United States seem to share views on issues concerning human rights and democratic governance. Could these areas of common ground potentially provide a foundation for a strengthened relationship with the United States? In what other areas should Jakarta and Washington develop further ties?

Mietzner: First of all, the United States should be relieved that Prabowo wasn’t elected as president. He would have been a nightmare to deal with, potentially whipping up nationalist, anti-American sentiments whenever he needed to distract from domestic political problems. Prabowo also would have destabilized Indonesian democracy, bringing political uncertainty to the entire region. Jokowi, by contrast, is a moderate, soft-spoken pragmatist who has no interest in nationalist grandstanding. It would be wrong to assume, however, that Jokowi will usher in a new era of improved relations with the United States. Jokowi’s administration is likely to be more inward-looking than Yudhoyono’s, and that also means that the influence of the United States in Indonesia might decline as a result. Jokowi’s political priorities are building a better health care system and providing better educational services.

He is much less interested than Yudhoyono in shining on the international stage and contemplating how Indonesia could help solve conflicts in the South China Sea or the Middle East.

Thus, while Indonesia will remain a reliable partner for the United States, and Jokowi’s foreign minister will implement the country’s traditional “free and active” foreign policy, Washington will encounter a president who would rather pay an impromptu visit to a village in order to check on the progress of a development project than attend an international summit. Indeed, if Washington is interested in building stronger ties, it should offer increased cooperation in the areas in which Jokowi is interested: opening U.S. markets to Indonesian products, sharing insights into the complexities of health care reform, and offering expertise in the Fall/Winter 2014 [155]

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development of an effective bureaucratic apparatus.

Marcus Mietzner was interviewed by Scott Wingo and Alex Rued on 5 October 2014.

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McCargo | Political Change in Thailand

Political Change in Thailand An Interview with Duncan McCargo

The Journal sat down with Duncan McCargo, Professor of Political Science at the University of Leeds, to hear his views on the 2014 Thai military coup and learn more about his current research projects. Dr. McCargo has a shared appointment at Columbia University and is also the president of the European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EuroSEAS). In this interview, Dr. McCargo discusses his work on the nature of power and political elites, the prospects for political growth in Thailand, and the future of academic research on Southeast Asia.

Journal: The majority of your scholarly work is focused on the nature of power and political elites. Please tell us about your research.

McCargo: I have been looking at different kinds of political elites and modes of power since writing my Ph.D. about Major General Chamlong Srimuang, a former military officer who eventually became Deputy Prime Minister. He was probably best known, however, for his role in big political protest movements, such as those in May 1992, and later the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in 2006 and 2008. From that project, I sought to look at different kinds of power, be it military power, institutional power, or what I call “rally politics,” how people take to the streets. From there, I looked at a number of different topics, including media and the whole political reform process in Thailand, which was a huge issue in the 1990s when they produced the People’s Constitution.

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Later on, I did some work on the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. I wrote a book about him with a Thai colleague and started to think in terms of different types of power networks that were developing in Thailand. On the one hand, there has been an emphasis on the Thaksin network that I talked about in our book, the Thaksinization of Thailand (NIAS 2005). At the same time, I also wrote an article in 2005 which talks about the idea of network monarchy and tries to unpack what kind of political power or influence the Thai monarchy exerts. I think people have been overly fixated with the extremely traditional notion that the king exercises certain powers, whereas actually I believe that there is a network of people who have a connection with an institutional monarchy who try to influence what is going on in a variety of different ways. In all, it is fair to say those two projects about Thaksin and the monarchical network probably caught people’s imagination more than the work that I had done prior to that.

Journal: You received your first degree in English Literature. What inspired you to make the transition to study political science? What led you to look at Asia—especially Thailand—as your region of specialty?

McCargo: It was a very curious business. I was studying English literature at the University of London, and I had this chance to spend an exchange year—what you would call a JYA junior year—abroad at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst. While I was at UMass Amherst, I took a class at Smith College in Japanese literature. I was very interested in Japan and really wanted to go there, but traveling to Japan was not a cheap thing to do back then, especially as it was during the height of the rising yen.

In 1985, after working for the first half of the summer, I went to Thailand and Burma because they were in the same general direction of Japan, but cheaper. At the time, I did not know much about Southeast Asia and had no idea what I was getting myself into. I got off the plane in Bangkok and thought “this place is seriously hot and I don’t know what I’m going to do here.” It was in some ways a perverse choice for me—I am a guy from the North of England who is not crazy about hot weather, and can’t really take the sun—but for one reason or another I became very intrigued by the people. During that two month trip, I traveled around the country [158] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

McCargo | Political Change in Thailand

by myself and met all kinds of people. There was actually a military coup attempt in September of 1985, my first exposure to a Thai coup. In all, I really got a feel that summer for how fascinating Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries could be.

After that, I still wanted to go to Japan, so after I finished my degree, I went off to teach English in a Japanese high school under what later became the JET program.

Although that was a fascinating experience, I could never really get to grips with the language, and I never had the feeling that Japan was quite my place. So when I was in Japan, I made a couple of trips back to Southeast Asia. I travelled to the Philippines and then decided to go back to Thailand and thought, “I am going back to Thailand again, and I want to do what I did not do in Japan. I am going to live with a local family and immerse myself in the language.” While in Thailand, I embedded myself in Thai society by living with my amazing host family (with whom I remain in close touch) and spent all day, every day studying Thai. After that, I went back to London and did a Master’s degree in Southeast Asian Studies. One thing led to another and I did a Ph.D. about Thai politics.

If you told me in the beginning that I was going to do a Ph.D. on Thai politics and later become a professor of political science, I would have been very amused.

Looking back, I have no idea what I would have done with my adult life if I had not discovered Southeast Asia during my student days.

Journal: Thailand has recently undergone yet another military coup. How does this coup differ from the one in 2006? What were the most important underlying issues?

McCargo: The biggest difference between the 2006 coup and this one is the determination of the current coup leadership to suppress dissent and get everyone on board, using whatever means that are at their disposal. If we go back to 2006, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who staged that coup, came across as a reluctant coup-maker. He arrested only about four people and very quickly handed over the day-to-day power to a government that they appointed. You did not get the sense that they were really trying to hang on to power. They just wanted to deal with what they saw as a specific set of issues, which were about the over-dominance—as they saw it—of pro-Thaksin forces in Thai society and the Thai state.

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If we fast forward to 2014, we now have a coup group that has been much more hardline and dogmatic. Hundreds of people have been detained either formally or informally for long periods of time. This is a far more rigid and extended control of activities, censorship of media, and suppression of academic discussions. Just recently, some very distinguished friends of mine were dragged off from the Thammasat University campus down to the police station for “illegally” holding a seminar that was going to touch on political issues. In all, this is a very hardline way of handling things, and it differs quite considerably from the approach they had last time.

Unfortunately, the 2014 coup makers persist in believing that 2006 was a “soft” coup, which is why it failed. My interpretation, which I have written about in a couple of common pieces, is rather different. The coup in 2006 did not succeed because the goal of reorganizing Thai politics and society is beyond the capacity of the military, and just trying to act tougher than last time is not going to work. Therefore, I am afraid that the present coup group is quite misguided. They really seem to believe that they can restructure the nature of Thai politics. Anybody who has seriously and objectively studied the situation will understand that you cannot intervene militarily and get everybody to embrace “national happiness,” create reconciliation, and bring everyone to one notion of what Thailand should be about, because it is a very complex, large, diverse, dynamic, and messy country. In all, I am afraid that the coup leaders have some rethinking to do. It is just a matter of when they are going to come to terms with the reality that this coup is just not going to work out.

Journal: General Prayuth Chan-Ocha recently became the new Prime Minister of Thailand and offered a possible return to democratic rule. What are some prospects of political growth in Thailand?

McCargo: The prospect of a return to democratic rule keeps rolling further away.

They started off thinking maybe to have an election in a year, and now this timeline has become rather vague: “We are not going to be held to a timetable,” “It is a question about when we are ready,” “Do not rush us,” and so on. I think that it is a bit difficult for people because Thailand has had many military coups and crises, and usually people can see a positive end in sight. That was very much the case in 2006 when the military said from the very beginning: “We will draft a new constitution.

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McCargo | Political Change in Thailand

We will have a new referendum on it, and once the referendum goes through we’ll be able to go back to politics as usual.” Therefore, we had a much clearer sense of a timetable last time and indeed in 1991.

I think this is what creates the difficulty. The coup is now over five months old, and we still do not have a really clear sense of what the plan is. It is obvious that the military does not want the pro-Thaksin forces that successfully won every conventionally staged election from 2001 to the present to win again. It is very difficult to see how the military believe that that they can reorganize the political system in such a way as to change the outcome. How could this be the case unless you are going to, in some way, dramatically reduce the level of popular participation or change the rules of the game such that you can be sure of winning that game? A lesson of 2006 was that simply taking a certain amount of limited action—freezing Thaksin’s assets, banning his political party, and changing some bits and pieces of the constitution— did not stop the pro-Thaksin party from coming back in subsequent elections.

This, I think, is the problem. The military have an objective. They do not explicitly say our objective is to stop the pro-Thaksin forces from coming to back power, but that appears to be the objective. It is not a very realistic objective unless you are going to roll back the electoral democracy quite substantially for the Thai people, who are used to having ample opportunity to express their opinions. Recent political history does not support simplistic culturalist notions about the Thai people being very sweet and passive. Thais love to get out on the streets and express their opinions – and this includes people from both sides of the political spectrum. I think it is going to be very difficult for the current government to keep everyone happy. When people are used to having a lot of political space, closing down that political space for a limited period is one thing, but closing it down for an indefinite period with no clear end game in sight is going to get much more difficult. The level of public skepticism about this process is already growing, and looks unlikely to decline.

Journal: In your latest book, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict (NIAS Press, 2012), you explore the relationship between the Thai state and organized religion. Do you think the regime change in Thailand will have any significant impact on the ongoing unrest plaguing the country’s southern region?

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McCargo: There are a lot of problems in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat (plus four districts of Songkhla) in the southernmost part of Thailand, where I had the opportunity to spend a year doing fieldwork a few years ago and about which I have written a couple of books.

The first book that I wrote about this conflict, Tearing Apart the Land (Cornell, 2008), is subtitled “Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand.” In this region, eighty percent of the people are Malay Muslims. They are not “Thai” in the sense of being Thai Buddhists who speak Thai as their first language. These people are culturally, ethnically, and religiously very different from the majority of the people in Thailand. What you normally do when you have a culturally distinct minority that has its own specific identify and is geographically concentrated in one area, is open up the political system to accommodate that area of the country by giving some kind of decentralization or autonomy. This is the whole problem. What has happened instead is that successive governments—although occasionally flirting with the idea of some sort of decentralization of power—have actually been unable to mainstream that agenda. One of the reasons why civilian governments have not been able to push for some form of autonomy is resistance from the military for whom Thailand’s southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are functioning as a kind of army colony. The army has long controlled this region, and they do not want to see the decentralization of power. For them, this is a symbol of maintaining a notion of Thailand as a unified nation, but the way in which they are thinking about it is a very Cold War or even pre-Cold War notion of what “nationhood” is all about. Therefore, to have the military come back into power is, from the point of view of the southern border provinces, a very retrograde step. While any peace talks may not be completely successful or coherent, at least they could still talk about a process that could move towards a redefinition of the identity of that part of Thailand whilst retaining it within Thailand.

The argument was moving in favor of that discussion during the Yingluck period (2011-14). It took a number of years to get there, but people were coming to a consensus that the Deep South is a political problem that needs a political solution.

Now that the military is in charge, however, it is once again a security problem, which needs a security solution. But a security solution is not going to work in this [162] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

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situation. You might be able to impose your will on a minority of the population but you cannot impose your will on eighty percent of the population. Of course, the number of people who are actively fighting the Thai state is very small, but they are getting a lot of tacit support from the wider Malay Muslim community. Although the military can continue to pursue security strategies—they can talk about development, which they see in Cold War terms as a process where military units go in and promote development projects that will make people in the southern border provinces happy—this whole way of thinking is actually completely nonsensical and has very little to do with the reality on the ground.

In all, the military is in denial about what the problem is and is overconfident and confused about what the solution is. The sooner we can return to civilian rule and start discussing the conflict in the south as a political problem and not just a security problem, the better.

Journal: In the past, you boycotted studying Myanmar because you were unable to visit the country. Why is it so important for someone doing social science research to be in the field?

McCargo: When I was “boycotting” Burma, as I continue to call it, I would not go there because I was unhappy with the political situation. I did not really accept the legitimacy of the military regime after August 8, 1988 and for many years I declined go to Burma. I made a week-long tourist trip Burma in 1985 and went back for my second short visit in December of 2012 when a colleague asked me speak to some political activists as part of a training project. However, I still do not feel desperately excited about going to Burma, just for a holiday or something like that, but I would go if somebody asked me to do something that I considered to be useful.

Certainly, during that period when I was not going to Burma—for what were essentially political reasons—I could not imagine doing any research about the country because the whole way that I work is based on a fieldwork approach. I was trained, as it were, at the School of Oriental and African Studies, which is a place that tends to emphasize the importance of fieldwork for Ph.D. students. Typically you would spend several months, or ideally up to a year, in the country or area that you were Fall/Winter 2014 [163]

Perspective

working on in order to collect information and talk to people. That is how I have always worked, starting with my Ph.D. project and then with a project I did with the Thai press in the 1990s, and later on with a project I did in Pattani. Most recently, I spent a year observing the workings of the legal system in Thailand, including doing field work in police stations and in courts.

This inductive, fieldwork-based approach is the only way I know how to work. I am not someone who starts with a theory and then finds some examples to illustrate or contradict it. I am the sort of person who has to go and immerse themself in the situation under study. Therefore, I would not be able to do any serious work on a country that I was not visiting. Although I can also write general overviews and literature review pieces, if you are talking about a really substantive article or a book project, it is always going to have to be based on fieldwork and complete immersion in the country for me. This is by no means an easy option. To become a specialist on Thailand, you need to invest two to three years of your life just to get started— learning the language, travelling around the country, and getting to know people as well as you can. Although there are other ways of working, if you want to get a really rich and nuanced insight into a complicated country, like Thailand, I think that this is the best way to do it.

Journal: Given recent developments in Southeast Asia, can you comment on the future of academic research on this region?

McCargo: On the one hand, this is a great time to be doing research on Southeast Asia because so much is happening. We just had an incredibly exciting election in Indonesia. There are transitions taking place in Burma and another electoral process that is set to happen there. We have had a very troubling military coup in Thailand.

We had interesting political developments in Cambodia last year. In all, there is a raft of things—the geopolitical tensions around the South China Sea, the regional dynamics, and the move toward ASEAN integration—happening throughout the region, and it is an exciting time to be studying it. Yet, the number of Southeast Asia centers in the United States or even in the United Kingdom and other parts of the world is relatively limited. The idea of fieldwork- and-area based knowledge that I am talking about is not very fashionable in terms of the way that social science [164] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs

McCargo | Political Change in Thailand

is being constructed and understood, especially in the United States, but to some extent in other countries as well.

Therefore, we are in a slightly ironic situation. There are more exciting issues to study and more opportunities than ever. The region is much more open to researchers than it has ever been. In places like Indonesia, people were constantly being kicked out fifteen or so years ago. Now it is fairly easy to go there and find out all sorts of interesting information with very little hindrance. But at the same time, the kind of work that I am talking about does not always seem to be appreciated by people who are more concerned with disciplinary developments.

I think what we need now is to think about new ways of doing Southeast Asian studies because the old model of stand-alone Southeast Asia centers is not delivering enough high quality work. We have to find ways of creating linkages and working with local scholars. I have done a lot of coauthoring of articles and even a book with colleagues in Thailand. I have supervised, to completion, more than twenty Ph.D. dissertations about Southeast Asia, most of them by people from the region. There is all this work that needs to be done in collaboration with people in Southeast Asia and other places, and we need to find new ways of working where we can make use of the power of technology and internet to communicate information. Today, technology makes things much easier than when I was doing my Ph.D. A lot of what I did as a graduate student—such as reading through piles of old Thai newspaper articles in the Thammasat University Library—I can do now from my desk in New York or Leeds. I do not need to go to Thailand at all. In the future, we need to find new ways of working that not only take advantage of those opportunities, but also allow us to get out into the region and to explore all of these things that are happening.

There is now a massive shift in the nature of the study of a region like Southeast Asia. Although I think that this is the case for other regions too, it is much clearer in the case of Southeast Asia, which is such a messy place to study. There are ten different countries, many different languages, and lots of different kinds of political systems. There is no nice, easy, one-size fits all paradigm that you can wheel in.

This makes it much more difficult than Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East, Fall/Winter 2014 [165]

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to generalize about. Southeast Asia, on the one hand, is really a region of opportunity in terms of what is happening there. It is easier to work there than before and there are so many exciting things going on, but our ability to train students to do this kind of work is not supported by the way that academia has been moving. In the future, we need to find new ways of doing Southeast Asian studies in order to engage with all of these developments. I think that is the big challenge for all of us in this field now.

Duncan McCargo was interviewed by Andy Nguyen and Sasha Han on 24 September 2014.

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ALSO IN THIS ISSUE

Myanmar and U.S. Policy: Platitudes, Progress, and Potential Problems David Steinberg

Small State, Big Influence: China’s North Korea Policy Dilemma Tianyi Wang Contribution of Corporate Social Investment to Livelihoods of Lao People After Relocation Young Sokphea

Common Misconceptions about the China-South Korea Relationship Ellen Kim

INTERVIEWS WITH

Dennis Wilder on The Growth of the Chinese Military Marcus Mietzner on Indonesia’s Future Trajectory Under Joko Widodo Duncan McCargo on Political Change in Thailand

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Asian Studies Program http://asianstudies.georgetown.edu