Soviet Military Review - 1982-06

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The suprerrte Soviel ol the USSR is the highest body ol sfate authority ol the

world's first multinaiional socialist state, incarnating a new world in which triumph the relations ol unify and frafernal friendship ol free nations and ethnic groups.

The supreme Soviel is elected lor 5 years on the basis of universal, egual and direci suf{rage by secret ballot. ll consists of two chambers enjoying equal rights: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The iesilons ot the Supreme Soviet are convened twice a year.

ln the Conlerence Hall ol the Supreme Soviel [see the article "lnviolable Unity o{ fhe Soviet People")

TASS photo

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Soviet Military Revicw

Editor-in-Chiel:

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Moscow 123298, USSR Tel. 198-55-52, 198-55-30, | 98-55-65

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IilUIOLABLE UilITY OF THE SOUTET PEOPLE HE GREAT OCTOBER Socialist Revolution did

away for ever with exploiialion of man by man in Russia, eliminaied nalional inequality and created the necessary conditions for fralernal cooperalion of all the nalions on a volunfary and equitoble basis. Soviel power gave lhe working people wide righls and freedoms, opened the road to the all-round development o[ their malerial and spiritual forces and their integration in a single mullinational siate. The cenlre of such integration of the country's peoples was the Russian Soviet Federalive Socialist Republic (RSFSR) as lhe most developed republic, both economically and culturally. The Russian prolelariat, sleeled in revolutionary battles and guided by the Communist Party, paved ihe way for the formerly oppre3sed nations and ethnic groups lo a new life. Proclaimed as the law of life were friendship and fraternal relalions among the peoples who were granied the right to establish their nalional stalehood, relaining at fhe same lime their national cullure, language and mode o[ life.

The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialisl Republics (USSR) in 1922 was an important stage in lhe development and strenglhening of the first workers' and peasants' state. The republics that forrned the USSR were lhe RSFSR, lhe Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

The voluntary union of republics into a single slate was predelermined by the whole course of history and was inseparably associaled with the revolutionary socio-economic lransformations which had taken place in lhe counlry. The birlh and successful development ol the world's first state union of peoples enjoying egual righis noi only consolidated the political equality ol lhe naiions but made il possible to pool the malerial resources o{ ihe Soviet republics for use by all and in the interests ol all the peoples of the USSR. Faced with a consfanl threal on the part of world imperialism, the nations and elhnic Aroups could @ ''Sorriet Militarl' Review," No. 6,

1982.

not even have mainlained their exislence wilhout this close union.

ln the years that {ollowed the fraternal union o{ lhe peoples of the first slale of workers and peasants was growing and strengthening. ln 1924 the Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialisl Republics were formed and became constituent parls of lhe USSR on a volunlary basis. The year ,l929 wilnessed the formation of the Talik Soviet Socialisl Republic. ln 1936 the Transcaucasian Federalion, afler successfully compleling ils hislorical role in consolidating fraternal relalions among lhe peoples inhabiting it and in developing th- economy of Transcaucasia, was abolished and ihe Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian Republics, which had made up this lederation, acceded to lhe USSR as Union Republics. ln the same year the Kazakh and Kirghiz Aulonomous Republics, which had been conslituent parts o{ the RSFSR, became Union Republics. ln 1940 the Moldavian Soviel Socialist Republic, which was lormed after return of Bessarabia to the Soviet state and the reunion of the Moldavian people, joined the USSR. ln the rame year lhe Lilhuanian, Lalvian and Estonian SSR were included in the Union. ln the course of the nalional-stale construclion lhe following forms of nalional statehood have laken shape: a Union Republic a slale - rovereign within the USSR; an Autonomous Repubiic a state within a Union Republic; national-territory formalions: an Aulonomous Region - a constiluent part ol a Union Republic or Terrilory; an Autonomous Area a constituent part of a Territory or Region. -Various forms of national sialehood allow each nation to choose the form which is besl suited, in the polilical, economic, social and cullural respecfs, to the given naiioD and lo lhe common inlerests of all the peoples, fo their equal and mutually-profitable alliance in building socialism and communism.

At presenl lhe Union of SSR comprises lifteen Union Republics, twenly Aulonomous Republics,

eight Aulonomous Regions and len Autonomous Areas.

ln contrast to the Soviet Union lhe formation of bourgeois federations was based n6t on free expression o[ the will o{ the member countries but on force, often wiih resistance from part of the integrated states. Sometimes different methods ol acquiring territory (capture, purchase, elc.) were used, Bourgeois federalions are, as a rule, an administralive union rather than national-ierritory Iormations. lmperialism divides nations and gives birth to deep conllicts in relalions between them, as its syslem o[ economic and social relalions is based on exploitation o[ the working masses and oppression o[ underdeveloped nations. That is why iuch multinalional imperialist formations as lhe British Empire, Auslria-Huhgary, the Dulch and Porluguese colonial states were doomed to {ai[ure. ihe rule of the exploiter classes leads lo apartheid and bloody racial clashes in the Republic of South Africa, the anti-Arab, Zionist and ra' cist policy pursued by lsrael, and the acute racial and'nalional contradiclions which lead lo fierce struggle in the USA, Britain, Canada and other capiialist countries.

The formalion of the USSR was a radically new solulion of the nationalities question: nol lhrough separation of peoples leading lo division (as was and is ihe case under capitalism) but through their unification in a common struggle. The formation of the Soviet Federalion was one of the main [aclors that ensured, within a historically short period o[ time, the socialist transformation of society.

The man whose work contributed mosl lo ihe formation of the USSR was V. l. Lenin, leader of lhe Communist Party and all the working people' He evolved the scientific principles o[ nationalities policy and personally guided the implementation ol these principles by the Party and the Soviet

lhe creation of the single Soviet multinalional cu[lure and for the formaiion of such new lrails in lhe consciousness and behaviour of peoples as 5oviet pafriotism, socialist internationalism, the 5oviet character, lhe Soviet way of life, communist morality and ihe socialist fradilions and customs common to all the peoples of the USSR. Knit together by inviolable friendship, lhe peoples of the USSR have eliminated, in an unprecedented short period of time, the backwardness inheriled from lhe old days and risen fo lhe summit of social progress.

For example, before the revolution the overwhelming majoriiy of Uzbekistan's population were illiierate and there was no industry except gins in the country. Al present the situation is entirely different. Owing to the fraternal assistance of the Sovief peoples, the Russians above all, the republic has crealed over 100 branches of induslry and built 1,400 big interprises. During lhe years of Soviet power lhe volume o[ induslrial production has increased almosl 240Jold.

Similar striking changes have taken place. in other fraternal republics as well. ln the posl-October years they became flourishing countries wilh powerlul industry and advanced agriculfure, science and culture.

From fhe very firsl years the Communisl Parly took the course of speeding up the economic, cullural and socio-political development of lhe country's national outlying dislricts to equalise the levels of economic and cultural development of all Soviet Republics. This is one of the main

preconditions ensuring the actual equality ol nalions. Thus, in 1940 the gross industrial outpul of lhe c,ountry increased 7.8-fold, as compared wilh 1928, while in Kazakhslan it rose l4.3Jold, in Georgia 15-fold, in Tajikistan 39.5Jold. lmmense funds were allocaied for effecting an irrigalion reform in Central Asia, for implemenling the plan.of slate. converling nomads to a settled mode of life'and of The Communisi Party's consislent realisation olher measures. the Leninist principles on the nationalities ques- " The economic, political and ideological succeslion have resulted in a furiher drawing-logether gained durini prewar five-year periods laid of the unity ses of the nalions and strengthening of foundation-for the socio-political and ideou tol-id slate.

Soviel lhe mullinational logical uniiy of lhe Soviet peoples. This unity has Thc economic loundation of the unily of the Soviet people is the socialist economic system bas- be-en deveioping and strengthening in the pro-cess of consolidation of the socialist method of ed on public ownership of the means of produclion and on the economic ties between the nati- production in all spheres of the national economy, in the process of eliminating the eristing inequalions and ethnic groups, which are being conslantty of nations and consolidating the internationaly' strengthened and develoPed. list ideology in the minds of rnullinational workThe political loundation of lhe friendship ol the ing massesl This unity has become one of the chapeoples is the Soviet social syslem and the creafeatures of socialist nations. railerislic ol sfalehood a iion'and development of socialisl The socio-political and ideological uniiy ol the all the nations of the Soviet country.

Soviet peopie was vividly demonstrated during The ideological and lheorelicC foundalion of is the the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). At the call of the {riendship among the Soviet Peoples lhe Party millions of ciiizens of the Land of Soviets Marrist-Leninist ideology. lt formed the basis for

rose as one man to defend the Socialist Mother- sible to build a mature socialist society which land. The front and ihe rear formed a single mi- conslitutes a natural slage on the way to communism and is characterised not only by a high lelitary camp.

When lhey prepared for war lhe fascists felt vel of the economy but also by mature socio-polisure that the friendship belween the peoples of tical relalions, consolidation of the unity of the Sothe Soviet counlry was unslable. But the very Iirst viet people, all-round efflorescence of culture days of lhe war showed that the enemy's conjec- and deep-going internationalisation of all aspects lures were groundless. The Communist Pariy ralli- of social life. ed the peoples of the Sovie.l Union and headed Lenin's precepts on strengihening lhe Union of lheir slrugglg'against the hated enemy.

SSR, on the really democratic combination of Thousands and thousands of representalives of common inlerests of the multinalional state as a all the nations and ethnic groups fought at the whole with the interesls of the Union Republics 'front shoulder to shoulder with the Russian peop- and on maximum slrenglhening of the unity of all le. Thus, servicemen of more than 30 nationalities the counlry's nations and ethnic groups have been selflqssly defended the Brest Fortress. The legen- embodied and consolidated in the Constilution of dary feaf of the Russian Alexander Matr6sov, who the USSR (1977). Article 70 of this Fundamental at ihe decisive moment of battle cevered the em- Law of the country reads: "The Union of Soviet brasure of an enemy pillbox with his body, was Socialist Republics is an inlegral, federal, multirepeated by the Uzbek Ch. Erjigitov, the Eslonian national slate formed on lhe principle of socialist l. Laar,'the Ukrainian A. Shevchenko, the Kirghiz federalism as a result of the free self-determinaT. Tuleberdiyev and many servicemen of other na- tion of nations and lhe volunlary associalion of lipnalities. equal Soviet Socialist Republics."

The high title of Hero of lhe Sovief Union was ln the confemporary period Soviet sociely posconferred on the sons and daughters of 60 nalions sesses all necessary prerequisiles lor a siill closer and ethnic groups. including 8,160 Russians, 2,069 alliance of its peoples, for aftaining a gualitatively Ukrainians, 309 Byelorussians, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Ar- new stage in their lraternal cooperation and comenians,.90 Georgians, 161 Tartars, etc. hesion. That is why in contemporary conditions ln the fbstwar yearr and the subsequent period we have every right to speak not only of the frian object of pride lor the of building communism the friendship ol the peo- endship of nations ples of the. USSR, their inviolable unity and cohe- Soviet people both -in the past and in the present, sion r.ound the Communist Party demonstrated bul of the considerably raised, strengthened and inviolable unily of all the nafions and ethnic their vital force. groups of the couniry. An example of this unity is Largi industrial enlerprises, power stations, transporf lines, waler-developmenl projects and a new historic communily - the Soviet people, a greaf number of works and factories were built which has been formed in the years of building soby common efforts of the workers of all the So- cialism and communism.

The indestructible friendship and unity of the viet Republics. Thus, 820 enterprises in l2 Union Soviel peoples is one of the most importanl condiRepublics and representalives of 4l nalionalities took part in the conslruction of the Kremenchug fions of the power and invincibility of lhe Soviet hydroelectric power slation. lt was precisely in Armed Forces. Soviet olficers and men are a single mullinational collective uniled by common in' this difficult period of restoration of the national economy deslroyed by the war, thal such charac- terests and understanding of their high responsileristic features of the Soviet peoples as inviola- bilify laid on them by the Soviet people for the ble alliance, dedication lo lhe Socialist Mother- defence of their Motherland and universal peace. land, selflessness and diligence became even Closely rallied round the Communisl Party, the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces fulfil their more apparent. patriotic and internalionalisl duty, lirelessacred Nalionalism, chauvinism and racial hatred are absolutely alien lo lhe Soviet people. They are sly strengthen the combat readiness of the army free from such abnorriralilies as the sense of na- and navy. lional superiority, national dislrust and exclusiThe Soviet Union, a socialirt slale ol the whole veness. Close contacts belween lhe socialisl na- people, appears now before the world as an untions, an enhanced sense of a "close-knit family," precedentedly slrong political and slale union of deep undersianding of nation-wide interestt, com- free and equal republics, as an inviolable fraternip.rehensive coordination between the Union Re- ly of socialist nations lormed in the process of publics this has become an indisputable lact their common struggle for socialism. This indisso-.all of socialist society. in the life luble socio-political and ideologica! unity of the The peoples of the Soviet Union work and live Soviet people is one of the greatesi achievemenls in friendship. Their heroic efforts made if pos- of socialism. .

PEOPLE'S

>*< nrc2Eru zAN EPSU IEiliii

REAL TTGOTES

E0ilERESS

Ye. SMIRNOV

o{ ils economic development have been higher Bourgeois propaganda, lrying to discredil the Soin the USA and remain so foday, the USSR has viel way of lile, is spreading slanderous fabricati- 'lhan not caught up with the United Slates yei in a numons about ihe Soviet people's living standards. ber o{ economic parameters, for instance, in the All sorls ol conieclures and falsifications are <ir- lotal volume of induslrial production and level of culaled" The evidence adduced is hlghly biassed: public labour producfivity on which, of course, the every*hing that festifies to achievemlnis and ad- level of public consumption depends lo a greai van'laE_er of socialism is remorselessly discarded degree. and whaf cannot be discarded is distorted.

None lhe less, actual facts refute bourgeois proThis article gives comparative income indicaiors paganda concerning the "disastrous" situation of in fhe U55R and the USA. the Soviet people. Let us compare, for inslance, ihe incomes and expenditures of a typical Sovief family and a similar {amily of an Amerif VERY chapter and every figure of the social working programme, appi'oved by the 26th CPSU can worker, tr Congress, is permeated with care for the The Sovief.worker's family. The husband works Soviet people's welfare and for raisinE iheir ma- al an enterprise and earns 180 roubles a monlh. as a typist al an lerial and cultural standards. The indicator which The wi{e also works - Their son goes toenterpria techsums up lhe sleadfasi rise in their welfare is the se and Eets 1 20 roubles. growth o[ real incomes. ln the Soviet Union it nical school and is paid a siipend o{ 30 roubles and iheir daughter attends a kindergarten. Thus possesses a number of basic {eatures: while the real incornes of all citizens are rising the incomes the family's income is 330 roubles a monlh or of people with relatively low wages are rising about 4 thousand roubles a year. After taxation Iaster. ln conlrasl io the American working peo- (which does nol exceed 10 per cent in such an ple, who have to pay {or everything, in the Soviet incomes bracket) the family still has 3,600 roubles Union the grealer part (about a quarter) of real at its disposal. incomes consists of free and privileged services Now lel us take an American working {amily of from public funds. the same size. Here only one member y7e7[s Of course, Soviet people could live better than the head of the family in the USA, as is usually. lhey do today. The severe lrials lhat have fallen the case, only a third o{ the married women ma1o lhe country's lot during the sixly-odd years of nage to find work. The worker earns 385 dollars its existence cannot be disregarded. The Civil War a week or about 20 thousand dollars a year. He and foreign intervention (1918-20) did enormous will have to pay 22 ger cent of his earnings in damage to lhe national economy. The barbarous taxes considerably more than fhe Soviet worinvasion of the nazi aggressors brought immeasu- ker. Therefore his nel earnings will be a little more rable misfortunes: during the Great Palriolic War than '1 5 and a half thousand dollars a year. Of (1941-45') the country lost a third of its national course, lhis is provided the man does not find wealth and 20 million human lives. Nalurally, the himself among the fully or partially unemployed, wars forced on lhe USSR and the time needed to the probability of which, as we know, is-not so small. ln the USA irnemploymenf grows not only heal the wounds inflicted by them and rehabilitate the ravaged economy held back the advance of in periods of crises and depressions, it persists Soviet society on the road of economic progress even during fimes of economic upsurge. Accordand raising the people's welfare. Although there ing to data published by lhe Department of Lahave never been economic crises in this country bour the number of jobless in the USA has now and there is none today and although the rates reached the 9.9 million mark.

D

Average monthly inconte of rvorkers and employees (in roubles )

lf we convert roubles into dollars according to lhe official rale o{ exchange and this preciiely whal the bourgeois propagandisls do il turns out thal a Soviet worker's family gels aboui onelhird of what an America;r family does. Bui,. as they say; the official rate of exchange has nothing to do with it. li is only used for foreign lrade furn-over and expresses lhe correlation between export and imporl prices of commodities sold on the world market. But people in every counlry have to do with the prices obtaining at ihe given moment on ihe home markei.

The main item of expenditure of the abovementioned Soviel family is food. Aboul 150 roulles a month or 1,750 roubles a year is spent on lhis. The basic food producls in lhe USSR are very cheap. ln many.cases they are sold below their cosl price, the dif{erence being borne by the state. Therefore this sum is quite enough to fully satisfy the family's food requirements. tn ttre USA the piclure is exactly the opposile: ihe prices of basic food producls are rocketing. For instance, in 1970 one kilo of white bread cost 54 cents and in 1980 1 dollar 5 cenls; one kilo of beef cost 2 dollars- 84 cents and 6 dollars 30 cents res.peclively; one lilre of milk 30 and 58 cenfs. Thus, in order to be able lo purchase the same quantity of food products an American family will have io spend about 3,750 dollars a year.

Expendilures on clothing

and footwear

will

amount lo 720 roubles a year in a Soviel lamily and on furnilure and household goods 240 rou-

- For an bles, consequenlly 960 roubles a year.

American family the same purchases will amount 720 and 300 dollars respectively, iotalling, Average rnontlrly pay on collective and state larms (in to 't ,020 dollars a year. roubles ) Both families being compared have about the same fhree-room apartmenls.with modern conveniences. But the Soviet family rents a slale-owned apartment which it has got for permanenl use free of charge. The state shoulders the bulk about two-thirds of the cost of lhe regular- mainte- dwelling. So the family does not nance of the Growth of real per capita incomes (per cent) pay much for ii: 130 roubles a year for rent, including central heating and running wafer, and 50 roubles lor electriciiy and gas. Americans rent private apartments and get .no privileges either from the landlord or from the state. The ipartment comes to 4 thousand dollars a year plus 230 dollars for electricity and gas. The difference, as you see, is very considerable.

The older children of both lamilies go to school.

For the Soviel family this does not cost a copeck.

On the contrary the pupil, as was said, receives a stipend. He is no exceplion: all types of educalion in the Soviet Union, including specialised secondary and higher, are free of charge and the overwhelming majority of sludenls of technical

schoolr and higher educalional establishments receive stipends. An American family has io pay 2 lhousand dollars a year for ihe ouite a trson in a junior college, which their JJr.atiott of iort.tpondt to a Soviet technical school' And n"turuity no allowances are paid in an American college.

ThJ upkeep of a child in a kindergarten comes to aboui 50O roubles a year in the USSR' But the family we are speaking about pays only 150 rou.bles: lhe rest is paid by the slate. And even then this is comparatively high. lf the {amily's earnings were less, ihe child;s mainlenance in a kindergarten wouli cost less and might be even quite free of charge. As lo Americans they have.to fork out t,800 d-ollars a year for the upkeep o{ their child in a day nursery school (corresponding to a Soviet kindergarten).

Medical lreatment costs a Soviet family nothing: all healih service expendilures are borne by the state. An American {amily has to pay lor everything-for a doctor's visil, for hospital and for any kinJof operafion, even for stopping a tooth' According lo data of the American Association of Hospiiils, one day in a New York municipal hospiiai in 1979 cosl a patient 280 dollars,. not counfing puy-.nt for irealment. A surgical operation .""ttt Z,SOO-1O,OOO dollars' The family' is lucky if it is insured: lhen il pays less. But fhe insurance itself is costly. Lel us not lake excepiional cases, say, trauma or some serious illness. Let us suPpose a minimum: medical ireatmenl once a year io, each member o[ a family. ln this case it will cost an American lamily 100 dollars.

Soviel people have big opportu.nities lor spendinq iheir'vacations pleasantly and usefully' They .u-n go lo any of the numerous sanatoriums, resi homJs or tourist cenires in the country' People pay 30 per cent of the accommodalion fees at these places or nothing at all, the trade unions covering the remainder or the entire amount' For inslaice, the cost for a husband and wife staying in somewhere on the Caucasian a boarding-house -amount lo only 80 roubles' Besides will coasl that they will have lo pay 160 roubles for fares from Moscow to the i"rcusrt and back if, of course, they will use air transport. And they will do so: it is cheaper by rail but faster by plane' Let us suPPose that the American family also decide io spend their holidays by the sea-side, ray, in floiida. Since i4 America. ther.e are not i"natotiu-s, rest homet or other health eslablishmenls so common in the Soviet Union, they will have to reni a room in a hotel. Such a roomr even lhe most unpreientious, is not cheap, especially during the lroliday season.- A two-weeks stay there-will cost the husband and wife not less than a thousand dollars. lf we add to that 300 dollars for lravel by railroad (the cost by plane

would be one lhousand dollars) lo Florida from New York and back lhis vacation at the sea-side would lower the family budget by '1,300 dollars al lhe least.

A Soviet family spends about 100 roubles a year for city transportation, mainly lor going lo ind from work. An American family has io lay aside nol less than one ihousand dollars a year for the same purpose. A cinema ticket costs 50 copecks in Moscow and 3.5 dollars in New York. That means that in fhe USSR it will cost 24 roubles a year for the Soviet family io go io ihe cinema once a monlh and nearly 170 dollars for ihe American ' {amily.

It turns out that all the expenditures of each {amily amount to almost the whole of their earnin's: the Soviet family will still have approximalely 200 about 300 roubles left and lhe American family first faThus, the ouilays. other various dollars for mily on its 3,600 roubles and ihe second on its 15 and a half lhousand dollars could have, in one year, the same number of the same goods and services. Now, after all the above, can it be asserted, as bourgeois propagandists do, that a Soviet worker livei worse than an American worker?

All these calculations refer to the present lime' And what are the prospecfs? What awaits the ciiizens of the USSR and the USA in lhe Iuture? We know that the 26th CPSU Congress mapped out an extensive programme of further raising of the Soviet people's living standards. ln accordance with its direciives, for inslance, ihe people's average monthly wages or salaries will go up by the yJar 1985 from tiO to 195 roubles, while in indusiry they will be still higher. And since a policy of stabte prices for basic-foodstuffs and manufactured goods is being implemented in lh" Soviet UniJn, the people;s purchasing capacity will also rise. A .ontid"iuble inctease in the production of foodstuffs and articles of general consumption planned Ior the Eleventh Five-Year-Plan period will coniribute lo this. But that is not all' Also envisaged is a substantial growih of public consumption-funds. Therefore thL Soviet people have all reason to look lo the future with optimism' Bui the ordinary American working people. deserve sympathy. For them the future does not hold out pleasant prospects. Unemployment, even ac.ording to the bourgeois economists' lorecasls, witl no"t diminish. lnfi-alion, which today too has reached unheard-of dimensions, will seize Ame,i.in ,.ro.kers by lhe throat in a deadly grip' The economic programme advanced by Presidenf Reagan mean, a new offensive on lhe working p""ii"'t rights. lt only enriches the milifary-indusioiut' ,onofolies. ln a word the poor.in America are becoming Poorer all the time and the richricher.

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TANEPSU

LIQUID FI.JEL FROM GOAL: PROBLEMS

AND PROSPHCTS chief of the chemisrry Deparrm."i },ihttlllsri State Commifiee lor Science and TechnoloEy, D. 5c. (Chemistry), professor

r-0!tt cPSt'! congress outlined Goncrete fasks the coumtry's ecomosmie and sociai developrmemi for the Eleventh FiveLte _o^f Year'Flan period and {or- the period ending in 1990, end epdmeJ *ia*'p.rupu.tives for eoft.lwruaisf comstrueil-on. Arnono rnany other .problems set by fhe. congress-before sovieg ,iience were aiso tasks the fimal solutio-o ;i'ffiiJ";;""HH? of a rnore dislant {uture. Gne of.th-er,i is fhe productio- ,l 1lilj'r"il luor niil."ii commiflee to the Parlv cengres: L. !. Erezhnev said in this conniction: "t{ we ta&e l'rr*'reiJi or *,* cpsu cenrral long-t[rn vlew, the queslion ol liquid ftrel pioductlon on tlre-uaiii'oi coal trosy! #,* K;;;i'-1;rrl-*-t-icilla"a rn-u#li*"ll* be care{utly sru-

;YSf,9,u.

The prelent a#icle discusses ihis problern.

ff N OUR

ffi

days, when ihe motor car has become on indisOensabie item of everyday life, when aircraft are used on a m.rss scale and their routes literally encircle ihe

globe, when lhe level of iechnical developmeni of a

coun_

try or region is ludged by the amount of energy generated in it, there is no need lo emphasise fhe tremendous signi{i_

ture. Eut this will not alter the real state of e{fairs: oil re_ serves are relatively low and before they are completely exhausted preparations, bofh scientific and technological, must be rnade for producing syntheiic oil frorn coal. The geological resources of coal are almosi 30 limes those of

oil, i.e. coal reserves will suffice {or rnany centuries. That is why the problem of producing liquid fuels from coal is

cance o{ the most iimporlant energy source _ oil and lhe liquid fuels produced from ii.

For almost a decade the prices of oii in the world mar_ ket have been rising, while ils prospected reserves are increasinE more end rnore slowiy and the cost of iis pro_ duction is conslently growinE. Speculaiion on when oil re_ sources will be exhausted is rife, but the majority of fo_ reign experts consider that at the contemporary annual le_ vel of oil produclion the available reserves will suffice for

annual ly).

be found and broughl into exploitalion in the near

The problem seems to have been solved, il is enough to simply follow the known iechnology described in special monographs and even in text books.

only.fhiriy years.

Certainly, it is quile possible lhat new oil deposiis will

8

fu_

gaining in importance.

This problem is not a new one. The firsl paients for ihe technological developments in fhis field date back lo the end of the l9th century. By the beginning of the Second World War nazi Germany, cul off from the world,s main oil producing areas, had begun industrial produciion of pelro_ leurn and diesel fuels from coal (up to about 4 million lons

ln fact, the old fechnology, which was nol paying even in the ,l940s, is completely inapplicable to lhe coniemporary level of production and consumption of petroleum' producfs. To understand this essence

it is necessary lo consider lhe

of lhe lechnological process for converling

coat

into liquid fuel.

Coal is much poorer in hydrogen than oil, but il may conldin a great amount of oxygen (up lo 25 per cent in brown coals), of . which there is hardly any in oil. But lhc main lhing is that even lhe most careful cleaning of coat does nol rid if of mineral impurities.

To converf lhe organic mass of coal into a pelroleumlike subslance il is nec6ssary lo solve al leasi lhe three.

.1"1+*i

"u**"

:

-Wtit

following chemical problems:

l. To remove lhe oxygen and ils harmful admixlures. This requires great expenditure of hydrogen, lhe content of which in coal is very low.

2. To add hydrogen to the organic mass unlil ils hydrogen/carbon ralio becomes the same as in oil.

3. To break up the macromolecules of the organic masr until lheir molecular weight is equal lo lhal of oil components.

Of all these problems lhe last is the simplesf. Processes in which oscillalory molion of aloms in molecules increales under the action of heal, which resulfs in lhe breaking

of lhe least slable chemical bonds and the conversion of large molecules inlo small ones, have long been used in. processing mineral fuels. By ensuring appropriate processing conditions and selecting proper catalysts it is possible to control lhese conversions and to obtain, for inslance,. eddiiional amounts of petroleum, diesel fuels, aviation fuel, eti. from oil heavy fractions.

Addilion of hydrogen, i.e. hydrogenation, is a much nrore difficult process. To. produce hydrogen requires expenditure of addilional amounts oI coal. As a resull the whole process becomes more complicefed, since it musl includo in addition lhe stages of gasification, carbon monoxida conversion and cleaning of technical hydrogen.

The addiiion of hydrogen lo the complex organic compounds the coal consisls of, is a difficuli and slow process requiring effective catalysls (lransition melals, as a rule).

Bul in lhe process of coal liquefaction lhe calalysl is inevitably mixed with lhe ash and must be elecled iogether

with if.

According to the old technology this contradiclion could be overcome by using iron oxide. a cheap. calalysi wasfe. material from ihe process ol recoVering aluminium from bauxifes. To compensale for lhe low aclivily of this catalysf, use was made ol high pressures (up to 700 atm) .nd temperatures (up to 45G,f8fC). Buf even in these condiiions lhe organic mass could not be complelely freed of harmful admixlures when being converled to fhe liquid siaie. To get rid ol lhem required additional operalions, 5o, lhe production process consisted of fhree successivo slages, not counling many addilional operalions. The bulky cquipment was very expensive and lhe complicaled lech-

The Kansk-Achinsk coalf iel& Coal is loaded.off 2 SMR No.

6

,tlrltS

r\s

nological process did not allow more fhan 35-40 per cent of lhe energy coniained in coal io be converted inio {inal

liquid products.

Due lo the above-meniioned difficuliies fhe production

of synlhetic {uels had io be drscontinued and the plants producing them io be converled inlo petroleum refineries and petrochemical plants. 8ut scientific invesfigation in this {ield was continued, and 5ince the beginning of the so-called "energy crisis" irr 1973 n has developed with unusual rapidity. This research is now carried out under special programmes generously subsidised by the governments.

At ihe same iime a certain confradiction is seen in ihe approach 1o lhis problem abroad: on the one hand neither

lhe governmenis nor the big corporations of developed capitalist countries begrudge fhe money {or research and development work in this field: it has been repeatedly reporled ihaf conlracts had been signed for the developmeni of projects and the construction of enlerprises. But on ihe other hand, ihe main induslrial realisalion of lhese governmental programmes in ttre USA, ihe FRG and Brilain has been postponed for years.

Disregarding political and economic consideralions, il may be supposed that the most probable cause of delay in lhe conslruciion of plants in those counlries lies in the use of traditional mefhods, which in many respects repeat the iechnological process described above.

The high level of capital investment and lhe necessity recc.-rp expendilures in a reasonably short lime determlne lhe high cost o{ synthetic fuels. One should also bear in mind thai the rise of prices for oil entails a chain reaciion of the growth of prices not only for indusirial equipmenl but also for coal. Therefore the conslruction of industrial enlerprises designed lo produce synthetic fuel is most likely in areas where coal deposifs allowing open

to

casf mining are available,

The Soviet Union has juch a unique coal{ield _ the

Kansk-Achinsk basin which extends over 500 kilometres along the Trans-Siberian railway. Coal seams more .lhan 70 m ihick iie here lilerally on fhe sur{ace. The deposils of cheap coals will suffice to produce syntheiic fuel for many cenluries. In accordance with the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the rich deposits ol lhis coalfield will provide a basis {or organising liquid Iuel producfion.

Proceeding from lhe decisions o{ lhe 26th parly Congress lhe instilutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the research insliluies ol separate industries have developed and lhe USSR State Commifiee for Science and Technology logether with the Siate Planning Commitiee and lhe presi_ dium of the USSR Academy of Sciences has approved a specilic complex programme for 1981-g5 and {or lhe period ending in .l990 aimed at developing processes and equip_

ment for the production of synihetic liquid and gaseous Iuels from coal and olher non-pelroleum raw materials.

The purpose of this programme is to creale a scientific and lechnical basis lor a new branch of national economy synthetic fuel production. About 20 ministries and departments lake part in fhis interindustry programme, which provides for testing in lhe l9g0s dilferenl solutions

10

of lhis lechnical problem on large pilot plants, {or carrying out feasibility studies on the conslruclion o{ lhe first in_ dustrial enterprise and for slarting its conslrucfion. lt will be the first step lowards constructing a series ol enlerprises whose products, obtained through hydrogenalion and gasilicaiion of coal, will replenish {uel resources and lhe

raw material resources for fhe chemical indusfry. The programme is aimed lirst of all at processing ihe cheap Kansk-Achinsk coals, and lherefore lhe bulk of the work will be done.in Siberia.

The programme provides for the conslruciion of big experimenial plants. One of lhem is intended {or flash pyrolysis of coal and will have special shops lo process ihe pyrolysis producls semi-coke and lars. Data oblained during iis operation- will be used io develop melhods {or combining pyrolysis with energy produclion and tor using the products obtained as chemical and raw materials. lt is planned to build a plant designed to lique{y coal by hydrogenation. The experience gained during its operation will make it possible to choose the best method for producing syntheiic oil or synthetic petroleum on a cornmercial scale. Besides,

it is planned to build a coal gasif ication

plant in which ihis process will be combined ,rilh g.nu."lion of electric energy.

Combining the process o{ coal liquefaclion and gasi{ication wifh produclion of energy or other power processes makes it possible to raise the effectiveness of the procesj

and to reach an energy-producing efficiency of lhe order of 70-80 per cenl wilhoul conl.minaf;ng the afmosphera with harmful products of coal combuslion.

Of course, to solve the problem of producing liquid synthelic fuels from coal and other non-petroleum energy sources on an industrial scale will require great efforts and a Iong lime. Bul a slart has been made. The pilot plants mentioned above are under conslruction now, lhe erection of a flash pyrolisis plani is nearing complelion in Krasnoyarsk. The semi-industrial plants for

oil shale proces-

sing are being maslered now in lhe Eslonian SSR. lt has been decided io build a coal gasificalion plant, a plani for recovering high-octane petroleum from melhanol and olhers.

The scale of the country's economy necessilales the consiruction of large faclories. ln fact, a new branch of industry is to be created. This requires tremendous capital inveslmenls and implemenlation ol measures providing for their ralional use. For example, lo produce 't00 million tons of synfhetic oil annually will require a minimum of 30 thousand million roubles for capital outlays, and even a l0 per cent reducfion in these investments due lo scienlific and lechnological innovations will result in an economy of lhousands of millions,

lmplementaiion of lhis specific complex programme is based on new principles of controlling lhe chemical and physicochemical processes used lo convert lhe organic mass ol coal inlo liquid fuel. That is why it is hoped to find

more econoilic and more effeclive technological melhods, which will provide lhe basis lor the qualitatively new solulion of this old problem.

Colonel A. BABAKOY, Cand. 5c. (Hisiory) HEN the Great October Socialist Revolution

could crush socialism and reverse lhe course of triumphed in 1917, lhe young Soviet Re- history. public was confronted wiih the fask of Today, condilions inside the USSR no longer requiring ihe rnaintenance of armed forces, their .creating ihe military means lo defend fhe people,s achievements. V. l. Lenin, leader of ihe_prolelarian exislence and developmenl are determined, lo a revolution, produced a doctrine on lhe armed de- decisive degree, by the balance of military-polifence of fhe Socialist Homeland in which he gave lical lorces in fhe world, by the character and acua scienlific substantiation of the socio-political ieness of the threat of war from imperialism and content and jusi characler of wars in defence of by the USSR's inlernational commitments. working people's achievements and set forth the The supreme principle of Soviet military deveways and {orms of defending ihe new-born so- lopment is guidance ol the Soviet Armed Forces cialist state. Lenin's ideas were of {undamental im- by the Communist Party. This lollows from the portance in {ormulating the aims, lasks, and con- leading role lhe CPSU plays in the life of Soviet ient o[ the Soviet Republic's army and the princi- sociely as the core of its political syslem, a role ples governing its development. which is acguiring mounling imporlance, by the The Leninist principles of development of the character and specific features of fhe USSR's deSoviet Armed Forces are scientifically substantiat- Ience measures and fhe historical purpose of a ed proposilions and conclusions verified by prac- socialist stafe's army and by the advantages of tice, which delermine the line pursued by the ihe socialist syslem which should be effectively Communist Party of the Soviet Union in guidance used for the preservation of peace. The Party of society, its defence and the relations between deals with the military lasks in keeping with lhe lhe army and fhe state authorities. They reflect Soviet people's basic inlerests. These have been processes that actually fake place in objective Iormulated in ihe Party's key documents, such as hislorical reality. Their purpose is lo ensure the ihe Programme of the CPSU, decisions of party unity of the Soviet Union's entire military esta- congresses and Central Commiftee plenary meelblishment so lhat its development will conform fo ings. The status of the Armed Forces is legislaiilhe laws governing the historical process and the vely consolidated in the Consiitution of ihe character of modern warfare. The social and class USSR. essence, character and specific leatures of these The role of the Communist Party Central Comprinciples are determined by lhe nalure of the so- mittee and ils Politbureau in the development of cialist system, its economic, scientific, iechnologi- the army and navy is of cardinal importance. Their cal and cultural basis. decisions on military mafters are executed throThe Leninisi principles for lhe crealion of a so- ugh bodies of stafe power the USSR Supreme cialist army have successfully slood the iest of Soviet and USSR Council of- Ministers, and in lhe time. The Soviet people's viclories in the Civil event of war through exlraordinary Party-state War and against the foreign military intervention bodies set up for the period of armed slruggle. in '1918-20 and later in the Greaf Patriotic War And it is ihe lop stale and military leadership that against the Hitler bloc in 1941-45 convincingly is immediately responsible for ihe execution of proved that lhere is no force in the world that lhe lasks of developing the Soviet Armed Forces.

2*

ll

The principal lask of the CPSU in this

field is lo

coordinate all economic, socio-political, militaryfechnical, educalional and purely military measures in order lo maintain the USSR's de{ence capacily.and combal readiness of its Armed Forces at a llvel ruling out the possibilily of an unrequited aftack of an-aggressoi on the USSR or any other countries of the socialist communify' fhe class and PariY principle reflecls the socio-

political nature of the Soviet slate and its army, ihe leading and guiding role of the working class and its ealty in society' All the measures for the counlry's defence, {or the improvement of the army and navy are carried out in conformity wilh the CPSU's general line of communist cons[ruclion, strengt6ening of the positions of .the forces of peace, derocri.y and socialism in the international arena and of fulfilling its internationalisl duly to the peoples {ighiing for their nalional liberalion and social emanciPation, This principle is implemenled ihrough polilical, organisational and educalional work in the masses wh-ich enables the people and the personnel of ihe army and navy lo realise the great humane mission of socialism in history, and the sacred duty to defend socialism against any possible ag-

gression by imperialist powers. This. ensures the Juo*ed class character of the Armed Forces, unity o{ Party and mililary guidance,. selection and appointment of leading Personnel in the military establishment on lhe bisis o{ their political qualities and general efficiency, and effective functioning of a iamified network of polilical organs and Pa-rty organisations in the Armed Forces' The m-oral-polilical cohesion of Soviet society is mani{est in the principle of the unity of lhe army and the people. V. l. Lenin wrote that a socialist army "is not divorced from the people,.as was lhe old'standing army, but very closely bound up with the pe6ple."' With the building of advanced socialist iociety the Armed Forces of the USSR have becom. ior.., of the whole people' They rely on the Soviet people as a new historical internaiional communitY. The unity of the army and the people is expressed in the participalion of army and navy personnel in lhe country's socio-political life, in lhe assistance servicemen render to the people in accomplishing many vital economic tasks. Army and navy unils inaintain very close and constantly developing contacls with local government and Party bodies and public organisations.

The Soviet Armed Forces are also built on the principle of socialisf internationalism' Represe.niatives of all nations and ethnic groups in the uSjR-t".r. in them, sharing equal rights and dulies. V. l. Lenin wrote thaf all military forces sn"rta be rallied into "a mighty international Red Army." The supreme exPression of inlernati-

onalism is joint defence of socialist achievemenls by the working people of various counlries' The preseni military-political cooperation belween the fralernal socialist countries within the framework of ihe Warsaw Trealy Organisaiion and bilaleral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mulual assistance has enabled the CPSU and other Marxisl-Leninisl parties to work out ioint measures {or coordinating economic, poliiical, diplomatic and defence efforts. ln developing the Armed Forces of the USSR the Party takes account of the country's economic level and poteniial, the condition of its transport system, scientific and lechnological achievements, size and composition of the population, ils geographical position, lhe equipment and. weaponry 5f tnu armies of ooleniial enemies and other laclors.

Knowledge of ihese factors provides the basis for the orginisational principles to be implemented in devlloping lhe Soviet Armed Forces. Proceeding from'these principles the army and navy ur" tuplpli.d with lhe latest equipment and weaponry, ih"it orgunisational slructure and conlrol iyste- are impioved, the fighting services, {ighting arms, special forces and services are developuJ hurrnoniously. These principles serve as a guide in recruiiing and stationing forces, in malerial and technical supply, in building up manpower reserves and mob'ilisation stores, in training and educating servicemen, and maintaining units and ships at ihe required level of combat readiness' ihe organisational principles of the Soviel Armed Forcles are implemented in keeping with the lheory and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, ihe laws of natural, technological and social sciences, including the science of war, and also in keeping with practical requirements' These principles ire based on the iremendous possibilities by the achievemenls of the scientific and "[.nud revolution combined with the adtechnological vantages of mature socialism. The CPSU closely coordTnates its military-technical policy wiih economic strategy. ln doing so the Party concentraies the maintffort on eionomic development and improvement of ihe Soviet people's. living standards. However, at the same time it develops unJi.pt"ues lhe maierial facilities for the USSR's defence potential, for providing lhe army and navy with the latest equipment and weaponry' ln conformity with Lenin's reminder that policy must be formuialed taking into account the hisiorical conditions, the Partf and Government develop the Armed Forces- on the principle of maintainiiig-isa slanding, regular army' At present when a dangJr of imperialism unleashing 9ethere neral or local w:ars, the armed forces are supplied *ifn ftignty sophisticated and costly .equipment and we-aponty. ln these conditions the mainte-

of standing, regular Armed Forces recruited on the basis of universal military service has nance

acquired decisive importance.

The Soviet Army and Navy have been formed on ihe principle of harmonious and balanced development of all their elements. As a result, lhe best struclure of the fighting services and arms has been worked out and is maintained to meet lhe requiremenls o{ modern warfare, the level of mililary lechnology, the quantity and quality of weapons and economic potential o{ the counlry.

The need for constanf improvement of the army's and navy's structural elements, differenliation and specialisalion developing wilhin them are taken into account. This helps elaborate the mosl effeclive methods for strategic, operalional-tactical employment of the Armed Forces, methods of coordination and cooperation and raises the proficiency of the personnel in the handling of new weaponry and combat equipment.

Another principle of lhe Armed Forces is cenlralism and one-man Gommand, which ensure effective control of the forces. The top command echelon bears complete responsibility for the slate of ihe armed forces and the effectiveness of measures {or their development and combat lraininE. Centralism is combined with the exisfence and strengthening of collective control bodies, such as military councils in the higher operalional and strategic organisational elements of the army and navy. As V. l. Lenin put it, this syslem forms a very strong aspect in lhe organisalional struclure of lhe forces. lt implies that all formations are subordinated to cenfral milifary-political bodies, lhe supreme command and their respeclive commanders.

The emergence of new weapons has laid special emphasis on lhe principle of conslant Gombal readiness of the Armed Forces. lts observance calls for a streamlined organisational structure of ihe forces, and planned, inlensive combat lraining of servicemen, creative enrichi'lrent o[ Soviet military art, improvement of lhe level of field and air training and -seamanship, lhe development of high morale in the servicemen, and their provision with political knowledge and development of the psychological qualilies, intelleclual abilities and physical filness essential in battle. ln working oul their policy in the military field and implementing the above principles the CPSU and Soviet slale take into accounl the complicaled international situalion, lhe lensions existing between lhe two social systems and lhe aggressive ambitions of the USA and NATO. The Weslern powers have launched anolher round of the arms race lo develop and produce newer weapons of mass desfruction. The plans Ior deploying new medium-range nuclear missiles in the WeslEuropean counlries constitute a grave threal to

peace. lmperialism is responsible for lhe emergence of centres of mililary conflicts in various parts of lhe world. Having circulated another myth about a "Soviel miliiary threat" the aggressors have been building up the striking power of the armed forces of the counlries in the imperialist military blocs.

The CPSU has carefully analysed the change in lhe balance of social class forces in the world and has duly appraised lhe trends and prospects in imperialist preparation for war. The Soviet Union does nol seek lo secure military superiority or to upset lhe balance of military forces thal has taken shape in the world today. However, it cannot indifferently watch the efforts of the NATO militarisls. lt has been forced to take additional mearures to develop the army and navy. The USSR's military policy consists essenlially in ensuring efIective defence and nolhing more. The Soviet Union has never engaged in armament for the sake of armament, it never has and never will insligate lhe arms race.

Being an ardent advocale of reduction of armaments and armed forces the USSR has advanced, in lhe postwar period alone, over 100 conslructive proposals to this effect. lts purpose has been to ensure peace. The Soviel Union has broached the historic task o{ prevenling the oulbreak of world war and ruling war out of the life of sociely as a practical undertaking. lt is aclively working lo curb the strategic arms race and lo esiablish the principles of peaceful coexislence. This effort has made it possible 1o break the lragic cycle of the past, when peace was only a respile between destructive global wars. This is one o{ ihe most impressive resulis o{ world developmeni since the roul of {ascism. lt has confirnred the soundness of CPSU policy in developing ihe Armed Forces, its effectiveness and fruitfulness.

The implemenlation o{ Lenin's principles in building up the Soviet Armed Forces has paved lhe way for lheir expedient improvement. The experience the USSR has accumulaied in military development is of outslanding importance. The fraternal socialist counlries and the working people fighting lor lheir national liberalion and social emancipalion study il and apply it to fheir practical needs.

I

---r-

voMBAr I TRA|N|NO I

rrrrrrt rrt rurrrrrrt /u/rt

rrrr

)rurrr.

wilh ihe use of conventional

Terrain is lhe mosl importanf fa<-

/

tor in selecling an objeclive lor massing men and equipment. lt musl ensure massive use of the mosl diverse types of weapons and equip-

YIASSING TIEN

ANDUQIIIPMfrNT

ment and {avour broad manoeuvre. ln a word, when choosing the direcfion on which concenlrate thc main effort, one must lake into consideration ihe characler of the terrain and its traf{icability. Underestimalion of lhis faclor can lead lo undesirable consequences. Here is e case in point.

A reinforced motorised

Colonel Y. YAREMKO THE PRINCIPLE of massing men I and equipment stilI occupies a leading place in ihe defeat of the lt consisls esseniially in ihe fact lhat in order to win one must nol disperse one's men and equipmenl evenly along the enlire fronenemy.

lage. Mosi of them are concentraied in the rnost importanl direction or seclor and al lhe required lirne. ln lhe secondary directions one can

limit oneself to minimal {orces. The directioni in which massing is carried out is als6 lhe direction of the main

ln the direction of the.main

wea-

Pons only.

blo\.y

blow. The issue of the battle depends to a decisive degree on how skillully it has been chosen. The

choice of direction is delermined first of all by purposes o['fhe bafile and fhe situation. The most advantageous direction in lhe offensive, {or example, is considered io be the one which allows the aftacking subunits to reach lhe mosi vulnerable places in lhe enemy defences, whose capture would violaie lheir stability.

Such decisions are usually taken when combat actions are carried ouf

Photo by V. Vladirnirov

in{anfry

baftalion, pressing home lhe aftack, approached the key posilions of the "enemy" FEBA, where ii was sfopped by organised {ire. ln order lo penelrale lhe defences and exploil lhe success aftained, lhe baftalion commander Captain S. Ryabov decided to concentrate lhe main efforf in ihe direction ol lhe limiiing point ol two "enemy" strong.poinls. However, lhe baftalion's lirst aflempt to break down the resislance of lhe

subunils in defence failed. . Some lanks and APCs were pul out of action by anlilank fire and lhe resl gol stuck in a marsh. ln the practice of combat iraining one comes icross quile a {ew cases when the direction of ihe main blow is chosen in almost inaccessible areas unfit for broad use of variout combal equipmenl. But the commanders iake chances tor lhe sake of achieving surprise and success along with it. True, the massing. of men and equipment under such conditions entails great difficuliies.

Extremely indicalive is the skilful

choice of lhe direction of the main blow in almosf inaccessible regions made by Lieulenanl-General P. l. Balov, Commander of the 65ih Army, in the Bobruisk olfensive operation.

On the face of if the mosi advantageous direction in which it would have been expedienl lo deliver lhe main blow was the direclion in which the lerrain made il possible lo use all arms of lhe service without exceplion and in greal numbers al lhat. However deep analysis of lhe situaiion led lhe Army Command lo

the conclusion thal here it was impossible lo expect a rapid movemenf of lhe forces because all lhe dominaling hills were held by the enemy, and the density of fire weapons was high. On the olher

noliced in ihe immediate proximily to lhe lront line. The speed of

movemenl of infantry units and subunils did not exceed 4-6 kmih. ln presenl condiiions, because o[ ihe greaily increased combat capabiliiies of the forces and their grea-

hand an aftack on marshy ground Iavoured achievement of surprise, though it involved great difficulties, particularly for the tanks and arlillery. Nevertheless it was decided

io deliver the main blow

ter mobility, ihe massing of derably quicker.

During the war it was fypical to concentrate great numbers.of infantry, lanks and artillery and fo achieve a mani{old superiority in

ihrough

swamps and marshes. This iurned oul io be ihe shortesf way io achieve victory in the operation.

manpower. ln the Berlin offensive operation, for example, up to 270 artillery pieces and morlars, over 80 tanks and 50 rocket launchers were used per one km of the breaklhrough sector. ln ofher words, the Command siaked on numbers. Today ihe accent in ihe principle of massing has shifted {rom the quanlitalive to the qualilative side. This is based on the possibility to use new, extremely power{ul and long-range means of struggle in battle, superiority gver the enemy being achieved

Not ihe leasl o{ the faciors deiermining the choice of this or that direction {or massinq men and equipmenl is also its capacity and accessi-

biliiy, i.e. ihat it should permil a constant increase in ihe power of blow and an advance at high speed

ihroughoul ihe enlire ciepth of m iss

the

ion.

In the defensive ihe massing of men and equipment is mainly carried ouf in areas where an enemy blow is expecied. ln this case it is imporlant to reveal the enemy inientions in good iime in order by a reso-

irst of all by concentraling powerful fire.

Due regard for the combat situation and, firsi and foremosf, the cha-

f

Iule manoeuvre lo seize initiaiive, strike a lelling blow at the enemy and finally achieve the sel objective.

A certain lime is needed to concentrate men and equipmenf in the

racter of probable enemy actions plays an exceptionally important role

in carrying oui the principle

chosen directions. This may lasl frorn several minutes to several days.

o{

massing men and equipment. l{, for example, the enemy concenlrales lhe main effori within the limits of ihe forward edge and organises a powerful antitank de{ence there, it is

All depends on ihe siiualion, ihe character of enemy acfions, the scale o[ massing and the mobility of the

obvious that the mein link of his delence is antitank weapons, wilhout whose destruction one cannol count on success. Proceeding from this, the massing of men and equiprnent is carried out in such a way

{o rces.

During World War ll fhe build-up o( forces and equiprnent took many days and even weeks. This was due

io the necessity lo bring up disperse large masses of

men

and equipment is carried out consi-

end lroops un-

lhat it is possible, first of all. lo reliably deslroy lhe enemy anlilank {ire syslem and fhen, increasing lhe power of the blow, lo press home the allack and to achieve viclory.

The nrain content of lhe commander's decision is lhe intenlion, whlch

defines the direclion o{ lhe main blow and the baftle order. ln it lhe way of realising the principle of massing rnen and equipment lirsf takes shape.

If during the breakthrough of the the aftackers, instead of exploiting ihe success afiained, lei

defences

themselves be carried away and begin to deslroy lhe remaining cnemy

groups (a malter of minor importance) and ihus scatter lheir forces.

they will not fulfil lheir mission.

At a laclical exercise a Mls lnf Bn advancing in lhe direclion o{ the reginrent's rnain attack was assigned

lhe mission to break through

.

tlre

"enemy" defences and capture

an

important road iunction. When the defences were broken through, the baitalion instead of rapidly advancing into fhe deplh, concenlrafed the main effort on deslroying the "enemy" in a company strong point. As a resull the specif ic mission was Iul-

{illed, but the baflalion did noi achieve lhe purpose ol the of{ensive by the sel lime.

On the battle{ielo' lhe righi to choose lhe place, lime and melhod of concentrating the main ef{ort of

ihe forces belongs to the

der. To carry out

comrnan-

successfully the

principle o{ massing {orces he possess high lactical

must

skill and perlect

knowledge of the enemy's tactics and armameni and the possibilities of own forces.

3/r/t/rrrr///aa,///rt rtt tarrtat SUBSCRIPTION

TO "SOVIET MILITARY REVIEY/" MAY BE PLACED }VIT!{ THE FOLLOWING FIRMS:

Xew Era Bookshop

5ill George

Slreel,

Sydney 2000

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AUSTRALIA

New World Booksellers 125 Pitl Stieei, Sydney, X.S.\tr. 2qrc 7/7/v

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Spring Bookshop Room 5,

{rf Floor, 37 Swanrlon

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THE FIRST ASHORE Before

fhe main forces began

to

operale, a support unit under Senior Lieutenanl V. Yakovlev was {o reconnoilre approaches io the coast

lhoroughly, to detecl all

obsiacles

which the "enemy" could use lo check the landing and the advance of lhe Marines and prevenl them {rom capiuring a beachhead. All work to make passages on the approaches to the coast and possible demining had to be done secrefly, quickly and reliably.

In ihe pre-dawn gloom iombat

engineers approached . rocky coasl

'Metre by melre they probed lhe stony ground, demining it and designating gaps with stakes.

Nothing was to prevent lhe landing cautiously.

party from fulfilling ils mission.

Following lhe reconnaissance party the landing ships noiselessly approached ihe calculaled poinl. The launching ramps were lowered and ianks and APCs rushed to the shore.

Fighting ensued. Despite still "enemy" resisiance a beachhead capiured and held.

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Clearing lanes in a mine Iield

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Photos by V. Chilikin and P. Skuratov 3 SMR No.

6

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4

cPCf,lElfrr'S TAfiTICAL rRAiNtff#ffi Colonel V. GARNOY

ACTICAL training is the main component of combat training for air defence subunits, in parlicular their CP crews. The purpose of missilemen's training is lo teach lhem io be highly aclive in any combat siluation in order to cope with the missions assigned.

All the threads of battle control, so to speak, in repulsing enemy air raids are concentrated in the missile baftalion CP and especially in the hands of fhe firing officer. After the CP commander has estimated lhe siluation and taken a decision, the CP crewmen proceed to {ulfil their combat mission. The success of lheir actions will naturally depend on their tactical proficiency, the criterion of their mastery.

The CP personnel are considered tactically ready for action if they have a sound knowledge of the weaponr and equipment and can handle them without a hilch according to the requirements of lhe situation. To gain lhe necessary skills, the missilemen undergo regular training by means o{ lactical tasks and practice. ln the course o[ lraining they enhance lheir self-confidence and will-power, becoming tnore resolute and skilful enough lo operate success{ully in a complicated situalion.

This article deals with lhe practical activity of an air defence missile baftalion commander and his officers for improving their subordinaies' laclical training slandard.

The commander strives, in lhe first place, lo organise combai lraining so as fo achieve the besl

resulls. All must be prepared for training in advance, including working places, fo avoid any wasle o{ time. CP crew training is usually suPervised by officers proficienl in method and by experienced specialisis.

Tactical drills and briefings, very important for improving crewmen's pro{essional knowledge and skills, are carried oul regularly according to lhe relevant schedule. The commander, acling usually as an instructor, makes sure that the lrainees meet ihe specified iime standards and strictly observe the sequence of operalions. This kind' of lraining is important when a crew is to begin its tour of duty and especially to prepare for firing practice on the firing range.

When training to prepare the guidance station for operation the CP officers work up deteclion and inierception skills on the aclual equipment.

The work usually begins with a check of the condition of lhe control systems. When the missile battalion commander has made sure that both men and equipment are ready {or operalion, he announces lhe training theme. lf, for instance, a CP crew has to operale in conditions of "enemy" iamming, the instructor briefly acquaints lhe trainees once again with ihe characteristics of air atiack weapons and the methods of iheir destruction. At a critical moment of the "battle" the {iring olficer is given a narrative informing him that the "enemy" is using jamming.

Depending on the situalion, he takes the decision

lo

use lhis or lhat lactical manoeuvre with men

and equipment and does all he can to put it completely into e{fect.

Field firing and lours of duty are lhe most imporianl slages of missilemen's iraining for improv-

ing lheir professional and laclical skills. Modern battle is fluid and dynamic, the situaiion sometimes changing radically in secon.ds. Crewmen's successful operalion depends on their teamwork. ln these circumslances the commander cannot rely

on experienced specialists' replacing young ones or on the use of stereolyped decisions. The most essenfial thing is high tactical skill of every crewman and his abilily to ful{il his mission in any siluation.

The exercise director may also give a narrative implying lhat some crewmen have been "disabled," the purpose being to increase the frainees' fighting efficiency. There are also cases when, in a crilical situation, an experienced specialist is replaced by a novice. lncidenlally, during a recent field firing exercise held in the subunit the exercise director introduced a narrative according lo which a control system technician confidently replaced a guidance officer.

It should be noted lhat by setting his officers the task to master a related speciality the missile battalion commander lries to improve their factical training standard along with lheir professional qualities. In doing so he proceeds lrom modern requirements. The plans for individual training are reneWed regularly lo meet the demands connected with the study of enemy attack weapons, their capabilities and lhe methods of fighting them.

This raises the crewmen's combat readiness, makes lhem tactically competenf and enables them lo operate with iniliative and resolutely and lhus to cope with the assigned missions.

Each time an exercise or a briefing is held the crewmen have to deal with various narratives which substantially improve their lactical skill.

When working out the plan for repulsing an air attack the missile battalion commander [.irst sets lhe trainees a limiled number of fasks. The main purpose of narratives is to check the crew's readiness to fulfil their combat mission and the ability of every crew member to detect the firsi targef in good time and lo "desiroy" it.

The exbrcise director sometimes gives narralives to check lhe lrainees' vigilance: they may involve a "failure" of the equipment or "enemy" jamming or iactical manoeuvres. When preparing a narrative the commander takes into account all l'lre mistakes made by the specialists and all the inaccuracies in information processlng or in taking a decision. This helps the crewmen to eliminate their defecls and improve lheir qualification.

3.

When the lraining is more complicated (double-purpose), the narralives introduced involve both checking the missilemen's combat readiness and their ability to handle air defence weapons in a quickly changing siluation. The lrainees have to deal with different narratives combining several themes. Some of them require interception ol a great number of largets in conditions of active and passive jamming while others deal wilh targets flying at different alliludes and in differenl directions.

The unit HQ aftaches great imporlance lo improvement of CP crew's tactical lraining skill. i Every day HQ personnel develop a new train- l ing theme which is brought lo ihe subunit coffrmanders' notice. Target roufe, speed and allitude,' and manoeuvre including jamming conditions change every lime. This helps the missilemen cope with fhe iasks envisaged by their combat lraining programme and, at lhe same time, polish up their skill in handling weapons and combat equipment. Such iraining is very inslruclive since ii arouses high combat activily excluding siereoiyped acfions and simplification. lf develops in lhe trainees a broad tactical outlook and lhe ability to see whaf is essenlial in estimaling lhb situalion and taking a decision.

Mobile simulalors are widely used in the missile baftalion to train lhe specialists in faclics. Th:s makes it possible for lhe CP crew to irain with the use of various narrafives and to avoid wasting lhe combal equipment service life. ln particular, every crewman can work up his methods of independent aclions. Thanks lo the use of recording equipment critiques are more concrele and

l

r

vis.ual.

Simulators.are also of great help {or developing

a CP crew's teamwork in operation. During lhis

lraining the crewmen acquire skill in timely estimation of the situation and in understanding a great deal of informaiion which is especially im- specialists-and also portant for training budding in taking a decision when iime is short. For inslance, it may happen lhal a firing oflicer concentrates on primary largets lhus losing sight of secondary ones. To avoid ihis, lhe crewmen masfer lhe technique of informing each other about every target appearing. They also use simulators io work up reporling, target lracking, coordinale plotting and so on.

All these measures aimed at improving the CP crew's tactical training slandard will be much more effective if the collective is animated by the desire lo carry out ils missions in lhe best possible way. A decisive role in achieving this ^goal is played by socialist emulation, popularisalion of advanced experience and immediate use in combat training of all that is new and progressive.

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Modern Land Forces are fully rnechanised, armed with tanks and anlitank weapons, strategic and factical rnissiles, artillery and mor'fars, grenade launchers, machine

With the beginning of ihe summer fraining period, lhe Soviel {ighting men continue Peruistently lo im-

'On the obstacle

guns and subrnachine guns. Mounted cn lFVs and APCs, motorised infantry subunits and uniis can fight

in close cooperaticn with subunils and unils o{ o}her fighiinE arms, including tank fcrces wiihoui losing con{act with them. Motorised infantry

can act in any situetion by day or by nighi, in any weather conditions, either motrnted or on foot.

It would be wrong, however, to lhink thaf it has becorne easier ior preseni-day motorised in{anlry lo perforrn their duty. lt has not. Their service has become more cornplicaied and hence more di{{iculi. For fhe higher the rate of advance, the greater the speeds and lhe more complicated the missions, lhe more need there is for high skill, know-

'ledge, combaf training

slandard,

psychological and physical steeling.

2A

prove their combat skill. ln

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each

subunii socialist ernulaiion has developed in honour of the 60ih Ancourse

niverudry of lhe Formation ol the USSS under the molto: "Reliable De{ence o{ the Soviei PeoPle's Peacef ul Labour!'' This means tlral under lhe leadership of lheir corn"' manders ihe fighting men studY the art o[ war{are, acguire related specialities, strive to secure compleie

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interchangeabilty in seciions and crews. A Ereat role in the iield training standard of lhe motorised infantry is played by training cenfres. Here everything is subordinaied lo the main mission: lo teach ihe serviceman what baltle will demand of him. The training fie.lds, firing grounds, obsiacle courses and lraining ranges are well organised and

equipped. Subunils arriving

here

during taclical, Iire and sPecial lraining raise lheir field iraining

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standard and the men imProve their physical and psychological condilion and combal skill as a wholeThese pictures were taken af a fraining cenire where routine exercises with fhe personnel were being carried ouf.

Senior Lieutenant S. Zakharenko training soldiers irt weapott handling Such a training prottrotes psychological and physical conditioning

itlobile Lerrin Room. Photos by N. Blikov'

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fr gEfrfrT#G frTfrfrCffi THE FIGHTING grew lenser every minule. The _ _ _ t "enemy" lried lo break fhrough lo the guarded M I objective from various directions and at various altitudes using all sorls of tricks and manoeuvres. But lheir actions were neulralised everywhere. Not a single aeroplane could break through air defences. The pilols knew that the tactical air exercises were for ihem an examinalion and a kind of demonsiration of the achieved level of combat lraining.

Military pilot 2nd class A. Chernyshov was impalienlly wailing 1o take olf and go into action. He is young bul the equal of veleran airmen in handling modern equipment and weapons.

An inlerceptor gels a "iakeofi', order. ln literally a few seconds the missile-carrier plane is in

lhe air.

Course... Aliitude...

Objective in frorrt and to lhe le{t. Distance...

A hardly discernible mark appeared on the radar screen.

Obeying precise movements of the conlrol handle the aeroplane carried oul ihe necessary manoeuvre. The iarget was in lhe screen's centre. Switching over lhe sight to automaiic tracking ihe pilot conlinued the pursuit. The enemy began manoeuvring, irying lo foil the aftack. But Chernyshov was confidenlly drawing inl Now the distance was suitable for launching a rockef. Nevertheless, in order to be more sure, the pilot ,,allowed,, lhe larget lo come nearer.

Time! The trigger button was pressed and the photore_ cording equipment registered target dettruclion.

The same precision of actions and accurate conseculive_ ness of operalions reigned in aeroplane control when inlercepling anoiher farget. The ,,enemy,, had the same im_ petuosity and desire lo break ihrough to lhe objective by any possible method. One manoeuvre followed another.

8ut nothing helped neither steep diving nor wing_over.

Chernyshov overlook- the iarget and intercepted if. Thai was already a second vicfory. ln one sorlie. ln lhe critique lhe exercise direclor marked the skilful aclions of A. Chernyshov and described lhem as daring.

He lhen spoke about the importance of this quality in com_ bat condilions.

At the end of the war air fights were extremely fierce on the approaches lo the fascisi den.

On April 17, 1945 l. Kozhedub (today he is thrice Hero

of lhe Soviel Union. Colonel-General of the Air

Force)

went up four times with his wingman D. Titorenko. ln the evening another flighl to lhe Berlin area.

It so happened that during the flight, owing io bad vi_ sibility, this pair of fighters nearly collided with a large group of Focke-Wul{s-l90. Apparenlly it would have been ,nore reasonable not lo offer baftle. But lhe fascist planes were llying to bomb the Soviel forces. And so the two So_ viet pilolr decided to go againsl almost forly enemy vul_ lures.

Lieufenanl-Colonel G. BALDEXKOV Having assessed lhe situaiion, Kozhejub radioed io ihe

command post about the sudden meeting with the enerny.

The correlalion ol forces was far {rom being in their {avour. No error was permissible. A plan ol action had ma_ lured instanlly gaining altitude and using clouds as - rear cover to gain lhe of thi enemy. Losing sighl of the iwo Soviet fighter planes, the hiflerites decided that they had llown off and continued their flight as il nolhing had happened.

The Soviei piiots did a combat turn and approached the iail of the tight column of enemy planes lrom behind and above. Kozhedub caughl up wiih the unsuspecling wing_ man ol the last pair and began lo lire almost poinf_blank.

Panic ensued in the hitlerite formation. Some of lhe planes, jettisoning their bombs, began to turn back. gut most of lhe Fockes coniinued their course easfward. How lo stop

theml

The Soviet pilots decided to drive a wedge inlo their it up. The pair begai diving. The Iighters cut into the fascists,combat forrn"tion, aflacking them now frorn the left, then from the right. The.enemy got the impression that there were many Scviet aircraft.

Bul combai order and break

soon they realised that there were only fwo.

At one moment of the fight a Focke_Wulf tried lo gel at Kozhedub from behind. Tilorenko, who was carefully observing lhe situation, noliced this in lime and imme_ diately cut him ofi with a bursl of fire. The enemy machine caughl lire from lhe accurale shooting of the pilot.

At that moment a group of fighters was lraslening to help lhe

pair in their unequal fight.

Help came in time and the fascisls were put to flight.

Kozhedub's and Titorenko,s fuel was coming to an end and it was time .to relurn to iheir aerodrome. iut at that mo_ menf the leader of the pair saw down in lront a FockeWulf which, apparenlly had got separaled from lhe group iust dispersed. lt was coniinuing lo head toward our posi_ tions. Having noiiced the fighters the enemy lried lo evade

pursuit and lo sleal away. Bul, making use of his reserve o{ altitude, Kozhedub caught up with him quickly and brought his plane down. lt wa, ihe last _ sixty_second enemy plane brought down by Kozhedub during the Greal Palriotic War.

Glancing over the audience that had fallen silent and

was following aftenlively every word he said, lhe general asked: Where did ,he air fighlers get lheir slrength {rom in situalions like ,hal? And lhere and lhen he answered:

Firsl and foremort from lheir firm ideological conviclion of the righteousness of lheir cause, from the]r love for tl.reir Motherland and halred of lheir enemier. Bul you all undersland. the general said, addressing a group of young pilots, among whom was A. Chernyshov, the hero of the exercise, that maslery, high combat skill, physical fraining, Iriendship, mulual aid, initiative and inflexible will for viclory were likew,ise necessary. And, o{ course, daring!;

When you get to know about various episodes o{ lhe war, the general continued, you become convinced ihat Soviet pilots had olten to ioin baftle with superior enemy forces. That you cannol do wilhoui bravery' But {irst o[ all it was rapid and Precise calculalion thal conlributed to success. Be{ore making an attack lhe situalion and ihe enemy's strenglh were evaluated, his intentions were discovered and ihe weakest link was found And only lhen did the pilots slrike a lighining blow, daringly and suddenly. Stunning the enemy and nof giving him time io come lo his senses they repeated attack. A {ight like that' as a rule, did not take long but il was saturaled and sfrained to the extreme' The aitacker had to be able lo put all his skill into it.

A question suggests itself here: Where did lhe pilois' skill come froml You know ihat there were many youihs

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in the units at that lime.

Yes, arriving in combatant air subunils from flying schools, yesterdey's cadels thought fhey already possessed knowledge and skill in everything, lhat to make a pilot consisled in doing two or three introductory f lights and " then o{{ info aclion. The cornmander had to convince them wifhoul wounding lheir pride o{ the necessity to continue iraining.

There was a war on. The silualion, naturally, comPelled the inslructors and commanders lo cut down the period of training new arrivals lor action' The ardour and bravery o{ the pilols, impatient lo be in action, had lo be matched by iheir iraining. Their senior comrades iried io persuade them lhal flying war an art' Like every other arl it demand-

ed love for one's pro{ession, knowledge, skill and

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high

discipline. Lack of preparation could cosl them a loi in action.

Of course, training in combal condilions had ils peculiarities. There were no special preparatory training classrooms. Ollen dug-outs served lhis purpose. But the standard o{ lessons was then high. Diagrams and dr.wings showing various Iighter plane manoeuvres and liring methods were made in su{{icient quantities. The most valuable in lactics, generalised and adapted lo experience ol combat operations, {ound ref lection in lhese oullines and diagrams. Some commanders

kept sPecial albums ol

air

lactics in which they oullined taclical melhods born in air fights and polished and lesled by Iire. Laler all ihis was handed down to lhe young pilofs.

The general ended his stcry. The unit commander lhanked him warmly on behalf of all the personnel for his valuable and instruclive talk and assured him lhat the new generation o{ pilols would preserve ihe combal experiente of daring attacks as its greatest wealfh and hand it down in {ull to the young de{enders o{ the Soviel skies. Naiurally it is used wilh due allowances for the increased striking power and considerably expanded range of altitude and speed of modern combat planes. As a resull an exlremely durable blend of tried and lested old with budding new has been produced and is promoting success in the air and on lhe ground. Aflack and nol defence, a prudeni, swiff and daring atiack was and remains a [irm rule for Soviet pilols.

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Major V. POPOV

when repulsing surprise counteraitacks. Watching ihe company,s actions the exercise director appraised

the skill o{ crew commanders

in

controllinE their subordinates, check_ ed accuracy and simulteneiiy of redeployment laking into eccount the time spenl on ihe ft,llilment oi the various orders.

Linear formalion has become the

nrost wide-spread battle formaiion

I I NIT team-work is an indicator t# of ihe trocps'combai training.

Srlccess in battle depends to a great

cxtent on coordinalion o{ the per-

sonnel.when carrying oul combal missions.

The mosl e{{ective ways o{ lesfing

a subunit's team-work are tactical exercises with field Iiring. Usually fhey are preceded by taciical exercises and a iactical and marching .drili exercise. The article deals with one such exercise.

Exercises were carried out aecordlactical training. The lraining questions vuere

ing to the main topic of

worked up in complex with olher subjects

of inslruciion. Naturally, for

ihis purpose the men studied the major sections ol tactical, fire, reconnaissance and engineer training and ful{illed the necessary exercises in driving combat vehicles. After such lraining one can judEe how correcfly each serviceman carries out ihe various rnovements and {ulfils training sfandards. One can also judge

the unit's leam-work and ability

to

carry out the assigned mission.

It is recommended to carry out such exercises be{ore tactical exercises in order io determine the subunit's readiness for working up vdrious missions and in a nurnber of cases lo orEanise addiiional training

for eliminafing the

reconnaissance, deteciing tarEeis, pursuing a withdrawing enemy, driv-

ing combat vehicles under fire

and

also the commanders' ability to conirol their subordinates.

The exercise was carried out in a tactical training {ield. The iraining targets for workinE up the planned questions (over 60 various targets

were set out) were laid out in advance. The company operaied on a closed circuil roule (see Sketch).

The exercise direclor (the battalion CO) worked out a plan of the exercise graphically on the map. He enlisted two officers as his assisianis.

He held lessons wifh them during which they examined in detail how

to work up all ihe irainlng

ques-

iions and normafives.

The men prepared for lhe exercise ioo. During lheir independenl study periods fhe cornpany comman-

der organised lessons wifh fhe per-

24

lhe personnel in carrying out

coordination of aclions of crews and plaloons, registered the time, ensured eliminotion of ihe shortcomnecessory ihe

ings revealed. When

exercise was interrupted,

a partial

crilique was carried out and then ihe personnel starled again lo work rrp lraining questions. The platoons,

whose crewr executed fhe

given cornmands and orders simultaneously

and irreproachably and efficienlly orienfed themselves on lhe lerrain goi a high mark.

All-round organisalion o{ baitle

lual help in the interesls o{ fhe ge-

Exercises began in

Nizkaya

Wood. Here the exercise direclor checked lhe actions of lhe men at the fighting vehicles, lhe preparation

o[ communication

means, the ability

of the cornmanders to carry oul

a

Let us examine the organisation and melhod o{ carrying out an exercise on lhe topic: "Tk Coy on fhe move at{acks enemy in defen.ce." The following missions were

.of

his

and normatives.

Then the company began to advance to the line of launching the aftack. On commands {rom the exercise direclor lhe subunit redeployed from march formation into pre-battle, baflle formation and vice versa. Besides, when carrying out lhese nar-

battle and baftle forrnalions, skills

The exercise director and

assistanis also closely watched lhe

[orls according to missions, direc-

topographic and tectical orientatian.

assigned: to define the unil's leamwork when operating in march, pre-

such changes in battle formation.

the prescriptions of lhe manuals, trained ihem in carrying out the mosf complicated melhods sonnel on

shorlcornings

revea led.

o{ a company. At the same gime, de-

pending on the situation and lerrain conditions, the company platoons can also act in wedge, vee, echelon right or echelon le{f forma1ion. That is why the exercise direc_ tor gave Irom tirne to time narratives whose fulfilment depended on

rafives, lhe crews perf ormed turns 1o lhe righl and to ihe lefi, i.e. the

manoeuvres which ore

necessary

on the spot and coordination of ef-

iions, lines and time as v,.ell as muneral rnission considerebly influence team-work in an offensive. Therelore, great aftenlion w,as paid io worki^g up precise and continuous cooperation. At first lhe company comrnander was summoned to Hil! 65.2, where he was assigned the mission for lha offensive. Then he wps ordered to assess it, do the

liming, take a decision and plan how to organise preparation for "baftle." The actions o{ lhe corn-

pany commander were checked by lhe exercise director. Meanwhile his

assislants checked preparalion of fhe crews. Parlicular aftention was paid to the ability o[ lankmen to camouflage lheir vehicles, prepare

weapons and ammunition for firing

and lo eliminale malfunclions.

Si-

mullaneously problems o{ repulsing atlacks by "enemy" helicoplers wilh fire o{ . AA machine guns were solved.

I ,

Af lhe appointed iime lhe company passed over lo ihe offensive.

The crews deployed for baflle and attacked lhe "enemy" FEBA. During {ulfilment of the assigned mission lfrey skilfully performed a manoeuvre lo destroy the men and fire weapons in a slrong point locafed

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in the deplh of {he "enemy" de{ences. Taking inlo <onsideration lhe dynamic character of lhe siluafion.

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lhe exercise director and his assislanls look care nol lo miss lhe

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main momenfs. The exercise direc-

lor, cutting into the radio net ol lhe company .commander listened lo

all his commands and orders. lt was by thenr that he evalualed the decisions laken in each concrete case. poinled oul lhe slrong and weak poinls. One ol fhe assistanis calculated lhe time spent by the company in deplcying from pre-baftle

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to baftle lormalion, delermined lhe speed o{ lhe aftack, appraised how skilfully a manoeuvre wilh men and

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equipmenf was carried ouf. The se-

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During pursuit various narralives were given and lhe exercise direclor and his assislanls observed how lhey were fulfilled.

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as a fighting reconnaissance patrol operaled.

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At lhe Gnd of lhe exercises ihe

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company formed inlo march column

Ior a lest of lank commanders' skill as reserve driver-mechanics.

At ihaf slage lhe check on lhe company's ieam-work ended. On arrival al lhe unit lines the exercise director heard the reporls of his

as-

sisfants, lhoroughly studied the marks received by lhe personnel and delermined lhe preparedness of

each platoon and o{ lhe company as a whole. On lhe basis of lhese data he conducfed a crilique of lhe exercise. The tactical lraining slandard was assessed on lhe results 4 SAiR No.

6

of aciions of lhe commanders and lhe personnel when Performing various redeploymenis, during the aftack and the "fighting" in the dePth o( the "enemy" de{ences. ln aPPraising lhe reconnaissance lraining standard the main aftention was paid to lhe aclions o{ lhe platoon detail-

ed as a fighfing pairol.

reconnaissahce

The melhod of checking i contpany's leam-work shown above is not lhe only one. Other melhods

are possible, However, in all cases lhe main requiremenf is persislenl improvemenl ol the quality of training, and raising of ihe field iraining standard ai lhe cor6 o{ high combat readiness.

25

lilnoloUictl [asfrm mt filnral anf, [om[au ffiwm[itEffi$ c..ne Tr HE DEVEIOft*eNf of high moral and combal qualilies in servicemen is a major aspect of sirengihening the cornbat readiness and effi-

ciency of a socialist army. This is because in spite of the rapidity with which modern armies are supplied with qualilatively new weapons, lhe man expertly handling the equipmeni was, is and will be the decisive element of an army's fighting sirength.

Soviet servicemen's combat and moral qualities are developed by the entire tenor ol life in the army and society and by purposeful work carr:ied out by commanders, polilical bodies and. Party and Komsomol organisations in the army and navy. Marxism-Leninism is the ideological basis of these qualilies.

AAarxism-Leninism is simullaneously the basis of ihe scientific world outlook and the universal methodology of thinking, cognition, actions and behaviour. As a world outlook, Marxism-Leninism is a streamlined sysiem of knowledge of man and ihe world surrounding hirn, based on unity of the componenl parts: philosophy, political economy and scientific communism. As a mefhodology, Marxism-l-eninism is an instrument of cognilion, providing the possibility to oblain true knowledge of the most essential laws of nature and sociely, an instrument of thinking by the rnethod of lransforming reality in conformity with communist ideals, an ideological guide in everyday life. That is why Marxisnr-Leninism is the ideological basis for forming the moral and, ultimately, combat qualities of the personality.

Proficiency in Marxism-Leninism contributes lo develop communist convictions, in which knowledge of the communist ideals becomes the individual's own posilion. Though these convictions are also acquired by experience, Marxist-Leninisl education completes and consolidates them.

Thus, the conviction that communism, which the Soviet people are building, is the most perfect and just social syslem inspires lhem wilh lofty patriotic feeling and becomes a powerful moral faclor. At lhe lronts of the Greal Palriolic War (1941-

G KARNE'E'

45) it found ils expression in mass heroism and unprecedenled courage displayed by the fighting men, sons of the multinational Soviet people.

Communist convictions formed by studying ;\Aarxism-Leninism are a mosl e{fective siimulus for human conduci and actions, io be precise, an ideological slimulus. Once ideas have taken hold of a man's mind and feelings, they compel him to act purposefully in a certain manner, i. e. according to Marx, they become a malerial force. From thought to aciion, from assimilating Marxist-Leninist propositions lo forming solid moral and combai qualities such is lhe sequence ln which acts on the personalily of a Marxism-Leninism serviceman in a socialisl army.

A serviceman's rnoral and combat qualiiies are a dialectical unity in which both components are interdependeni, at the same lime retaining their relaiive independence.

A serviceman cannot act success{ully in conditions often involving risk to his li{e unless he possesres such moral qualities as fortitude (the abiliiy to bear staunchly hardships and privotions for a long time), courage (the ability io risk life in a dangerous situation) and a special spirit of discipline.

Experience shows thai a man with firm ideological convictions quickly develops "immunity" against fear, i. e. the ability fo overcome it. A serukernan convinced of the righteousness of his cause will not flinch in {ace of mortal danger.

The Great Patriolic War provided numerous examples confirrning lhis. Here is bul one o{ them. ln February 1943, a counteroffensive was being prepared by the Soviet forces. ln order lo ensure accurate firing at vital targets, Sergeant L. Filippovich, a fire adiuster, was sent to the enemy lines.

During the artillery bombardmenl he supplied the necesiaty signals enabling the Soviet forces to fire mosi e{fectively at the enemy largets' When lhe nazis detected and surrounded him, Sergeanl Filippovich gave our ariillery his position and called for fire on himself.

On the olher hand, high combat qualities give servicemen confidence in iheir abilities, boosi lheir morale and enable them lo display loyalty io the Motherland with maximum effect and io praclise acts of heroism' Socialist sociely holds in

high esleem people who are ready to sacrifice their lives for lhe sake of life on earlh, for the sake of their near and dear ones. However, it has nevqr approved of gambling wilh life, courage for ihe sake of courage, achieving victory al any cost, irrespective of ihe sacrifices, _To a certain degree high moral qualilies can o{fset a lack of high combat qualities. V. l. Lenin stressed more lhan once that during ihe Civil War ihe Red Army defeated lhe armies of Kolchak and Denikin owing to Red Army men's self-sacrifices and heroism, though the combat training standard in the Red Army was somewhat inferior-to that of ihe enemy armies. However, it would be a criminal attilude lowards strengihening combat efficiency of a modern army lo pay less attention to servicemen's combat training, hoping that high moral qualities alone are sufficient for victory in war. All aspecls of servicemen's lraining and education presuppose maximum effort to improve iheir moral and combat qualiiies in all fheir inseparable aspects.

Servicemen's high moral ahd combal qualities are developed in combal lraining and political educafion, and in the everyday discharge of their service duties. lt is noteworthy that political knowledge, the Marxist-Leninist iheoretical legacy and the decisions of lhe Communist Party are of' great importance Ior deepening servicemen's scientific outlook, lheir understanding of iheir place in sociely and of their role in defence of socialism and for slrengthening their will. This is nafural, for lhe army is a part of the political supersiructure and fulfils poliiical functions. ll is useless io {alk about strengthening the Armed Forces' combat readiness and combat efficiency unless the servicemen understand perfectly the policy pursued by the Communist Parly and the Soviet Government, unless lhey are convinced that ihis policy is lhe only correct one and unless they iake a class approach to social phenomena.

Servicemen's moral and combat qualities are slable only on condition that the entire wealth of Marxism-Leninism becomes their own spiritual wealth. The Soviet Armed Forces have developed a tried and tesied slreamlined system o{ political educalion, laking inio accouni the degree of preparation of each caiegory of servicemen for studying Marxism-Leninism, its component parls and lheir individual problems. This syslem includes Marxist-Leninist sludies, Party education and political classes. Certain links in this chain make a lhorough study of Marxism-Leninism's constiiuents (e. g. universities of Marxism-Leninism), olhers study individual aspects and problems (e. g. groups of Marxist-Leninist studies for officers and political classes). This system is supplemented by active propaganda work in unili and 4N

subunits. Al presenl servicemen,s ideological edu_

calion is concentrated on the theoretic-al problems.adv.anced by the 26th CpSU Congreii.

Self-educalion and the need for const-anlly con_ sulling the works of the founders of scientifii com_ munism play an exceptional role in sludying Mar_ xism-Leninism. lndependent study of Marxiim_Le_ ninism enables students lo undersland lhe methodology of scienti{ic approach lo the most complicated aspects of social life and scienlific crileria in. evaluating .lhe various phenomena (e, g. ihe criterium o{ class approach to social probl-ems).

Firm communist conviclions and high moral and combat qualilies cannot be developed wilhoul independent sludy o[ Marxism-Leninism.

Nalurally, servicemen's high moral and combal qualities are formed not only in lhe process of poliiicaI studies and self-educafion, but also in everyday life, in contact with other people, which adds io ihe men's experience and enabies them lo generalise it.

High moral and combat qualilies are formed under the in{luence of ihe entire tenor of military service. _Unquestioning execulion of lhe require-

ments of commanders, orders and instruciions, fhe spirit of mililary subordination, strict discipline and efficiency are an imporlant factor in developing and strengthening servicemen,s ideological conviclions.

Combat training conducled in conditions closely approximating real baftle, a high level of all tactical, special and other traininE, absence of indulgence and simplificalion, constant raising of servicemen's field, naval and air training level contribute to develop the necessary combaf and moral qualities, Proceeding from ihe experience acquired during lheir military service, servicemen become convinced of the correctness of the theoretical proposilions and fhe requirements of the

regulations.

To provide conditions contribuling to the men's deep understanding of the lofty meaninE of ser-

vice of the Motherland and developing their willpower and couraEe is a major aspect in instilling in servicemen high combat and moral qualities.

Exercises, fliEhts, cruises and special classes not only provide servicemen with knowledge and skills for waging armed slruggle, but also help in improving iheir moral qualities, primarily courage, colleclivism and discipline. Aclive participaiion of Soviet servicemen in socialist emulalion also helps them to develop and improve the qualilies essenlial in modern batile.

Purposeful and persistent mastering of the wealth of Marxism-Leninism and development of high moral and combat qualities on this basis serve the noble purpose of defending lhe Socialist Motherland.

27

tlrllnll[]l: Princiules

ol 0ruanlsalioll

Socialisl emulation is a powerlul means ol educating Soviet people and achieving high labour indicators.

Correct 6rginisaiion of emulation is possible when account is taken of the so' cio-psychological laws governing the aPPearance in people of a conscientious strivini lo c6mpete in solving everyday tasks, a desire to help one another achievL betler resuits and readiness to share iheir erperience with cottl' rades.

The rules of emulation in conditions of socialism were worked out by V. l. Le' nin and outlined in ihe lornn of the lollowing principles: publicify, cornparabi' lity of results and possibility ol repetition ol advanced erperience.

PUBLICITY

Be{ore leaving for lhe field the missilemen underlook concrele commitments for the period of lhe exercises. And now the subunif is on the march. At exaclly the {ixed time the missilemen arrived in the area indicated by the superior commander.

The first successes in socialist emulation became known to the entire personnel immediately. Commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol

activisls took care of that. Even during short halts they had time lo iell the men about the drivers who had performed their duties welI and called on lhem to follow suit.

The example of lhe foremosf missilemen inspired lhe rest and gave them a new impetus. The the norm in depnext task in the field exercises - carried out suclikewise loying a subunit cessfully. The actions of Sergeant A. Borodnin's leam, which exceeded the norm by 30 per cent, were especially precise and skilful' It has become a rule with this subunit, as wilh olhers, lo make public ihe results of emulation after every lesson and day of training. The missilemen always know who won in the emulation and who must catch up with the rest in order lo fulfil lheir commitments in time.

Thus, publicity has the {unction of informinE on lhe course and results of emulation' Due to publicily men assess lheir achievemenls and shortcomings and have the possibility to adlust their activitGs in the necessary direction. Publicity can lake any form. lf can be verbal announcement of results, broadcasts through local radio f aciliiies, publication of combat leaflets, wall newspaPers,

meeiings and get-togethers, slands

and

of honour, visual demonstration of real etc.

boards aclions,

Units and subunits slrive to make ihe information themalic, that is, not expressed in general lerms but objectively measured indicators. Commanders prefer to speak o{ the men's concrele actions rather than of their marks. lt is belter {or ihe competitors to orient lhemselves on actions rather than on marks. Take {or example training in firing. lf the results of firing were made public by jusl allotting marks according to a five-point system then a man would know only that he got, say, "4" for carrying out an exercise but not that this "4" was dangerously near to "3" or, vice versa, on the verge of "5." ln the tank battalion commanded by Caplain A. Voronenko, during firing exercises a special stand is put up on which mock-up largets are hung, showing visually the number of holes. Gun layers and tank commanders can at once see how closely grouped the hits were or how great the scatiering was. ln other words it is clear how a man slands in comparison with others who received the same or betler marks.

Great significance is attached to crilicism of shorlcomings and bringing io light slackers parallel with more advanced soldiers. General Secrelary of the CPSU Ceniral Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L' l.

Brezhnev said that socialist emulation, being creative work of the masses, requires not only aclive supporl and encouragement of advanced workers but also exposure of slackers or lhose who are not sufficiently conscientious. This, he said, must be done publicly and oPenlY.

COMPARABILITY OF RESULTS

The principle of cbnnparabilily of results is closely linked with publicify. Experience shows that lhe more oflen the emu!ating sides' (men's cri milifary coliectives') achievehErrls are C6m6rtred, lhe more actively they strive.*o achieve beller resu

lts.

ln order to carry out this principle indicalors for comparing the results of men's activiti6i have been worked out. ln one case these inqiicbtors characterise lhe results from the viewpoint of quality-(precision of fulfilment, compleleness of operation, correcf order, confidence and exactilude of actions, etc.) and in another case from the - in unit tiviewpoint of quantity (volume of work rne, rapidily of fulfilmeni, elc.).

Comparison is more often conducled not by means of marks but by the quantitative and qualilative showings of fhe activity itself. ...At an exercise in fulfilling fhe norm for putting on a gas mask lhe commander gave excellent marks (this mark.is awarded for carrying out lhe exercise in 8 seconds) to four soldiers. But one of lhem spent 5, the second 6, the third and l-

.I te )r )s

n tY

5Y,

is

a.

in al rg

tn

w re a

of rleof t.

a-

,e rrs

ot )e

{ourth on a gas mask. seconds each in putting -.7 the results Summing up of the competition the commander held up the soldier, who had achieved the highest result, as an example and called on

the others to catch up with him.

Often organisers of emulation have to solve a rather difficult task: how lo compare, for instance, a gun layer with a driver-mechanic, a radio operator' with a topographer-geodesist or a driver wilh a cook, if they are occupied in absolufely different lypes of activities whose showings cannot be compared? in points for - ln many unils a system of marks 'For insiance, 100 every type of activity is used. poinls may be given for excellent {ulfilment ol 80 and combat norms, for good performance for satisfacfory 50.

Commanders -take inlo account also moral faclors: whether lhe warrior exerts.all his energy in his service, whether he observes fhe principle of communist moralily, what motives guide him when rendering help 1o his comrades, etc. ...1n a cross-counfry race, emulators A. Sharov and Sh. Mansuradze, finished first chalking at the same fime. But the platoon commander, comparing their results, noted the achievement of only one of fhem, namely Private A. Sharov.

"As you know," he said to the men drawn up in formation, "Comrade Sharov showed poor resulls in cross-country training. But he irained a lof and displayed persistence. Lasf month he received "good" in ihe lhree-kilomefre race and tod"y "excellenf." His emulator Comrade Mansu- having achieved a certain success, slopped radze,

in his progress and today only repeated his previous result. lf Mansuradze works with the persislence of Private Sharov he will, I am sure, achieve higher results."

REPETITION

OF

EXPERIENCE

ln socialisl emuliiion it is important to nole advanced experience and place it al the disposal of all the personnel.

What is advanced experience of combat and political training? lt consists of ways and means of maslering weapons and combat equipment, fraining and educalion and everylhing else thai ensures high resulls. lntroduction of progressive experience gives the opportunity lo advance wiih greafer confidence and to achieve belter results in a shorler period of time. In ihe army and navy great attention is paid lo using progressive experience and spreading it in every possible way.

Commanders, political workers and Party and Komsomol organisations thoroughly siudy anything new fhat appears in the praclice of training and education and do all lhey can io spread and consolidale it.

Discussion of advance experience born in emuIafion is conducted at official, Party and Komsomol meetings, conferences, polilical classes, political instructions, etc. Of course it is not always possible to show fully all sources of experience, very often ailention is drawn only lo lhe positive and from whom it comes.

Technical conferences on firing and evenings dedicated to exchange of experience contribule to introducing new elemenls into practice. Foremosl soldiers in emulation accurate shots, best drivers of combat vehicles-and experls in equipment and weapons speak at these conferences.

Councils on generalising progressive experience funclion in unils and on ships. Staff officers, engineers, technicians and others are drawn into their work.

Platoon agitalors dedicate their lalks lo foremost soldiers and lheir experience. Wall newspapers and combat leaflets are used exlensively.

Meelings of experienced and young servicemen directly at the place where combaf equipment is kept is the order of the day. This form is effeclive because ii gives an opporlunily to back (on the spot) lheoretical calculations with practical demonsiration.

Of great benefit are mufual visits of soldiers lo units and subunits. This helps them to see with lheir own eyes ways and meihods of work of their emulators and compare achievements.

Thus, publicity, comparability of results and repetition of advance experience conlribute to raising effectiveness of socialist emulation and lhe men's activily !n studies and service.

Colonel Sh. NURUILIX 29

fhis arficle is devoled to the l00th birlh anniversary ol Mitrofan Borisovich Grekov

a distinguished Soviet painter and

lieal-iCil

rounders ol baftle-paillting in Soviel arl. "i"--"f'-fii

Epelrovites !. KUZNETSOVA K. Voroshilov ar:d Members of

tar5r Council in the Grekov studio

the

Drawing

Grekoviles is ihe name given lo [:affle-painters working in the S*udio of A4iliiary Artists named after M. B. Grekov which is wtdely knor.rn in the Soviel Union and abroad.

M. B. Grekov was born into a working Cossack family in the large Cossack village of Shaprayevka on lhe Don River. The fulure painter's childhood passed in laborious peasent work. The boy's inclinalions for arl cannof be said

to have mani{ested themselves very early: pre-revolutionary condilions of life of peasanls ciid not contribute to this. Up lo lhe age of 17 he did not see a sinEle painting and had no idea of drawing lrom nalure. But even then a big ialent could be discerned in ihe boy's original drawings and palntinEs. Grekov enlered the Odessa Art School ancj in 1903 he rvas accepted inlo the pefersburg Academy o{ Arts. Fle dedicaled himself wholeheartedly io sfudying the arl of painting. Hig teachers were the greal Russian masiers Repin and 5urik6v. But afler some tirne he began to aflend Franz Roubeau's baftle-sfudio.

Affer graduating from the Academy Grekov had

to

serve his lime as a soldier in a Cossack detachmeni and a year laier he was sent lo fhe front of the first imperialisi war. Having resolutely refused of{icer,s rank in the lsarist army Grekov spent years in ihe frenches as a private,

The Civil War (,l91 8-20), which began a{ter ihe victory of the October i(evolution (191 7), found him in ihe city of Novocherkassk. Soon lhe south

of lhe country became

ihe

arena of grim events. Kornilov's White Guerd Army came oul againsl Soviel power. The young artist painted ihe pictures "Making Their Way,, and,,Kornilovifes,, (19.19)

Revolutionary fUili-

by G.

Frokopinsky

in which he depicted the collapse of the Whiie Guard Army. Estranged {rom the people and going ageinst its interesfs, it was doomed to perish.

During the Civil War period Grekov created a series canvases under the single fille "Revolutionary Struggle in the Soufh." These first works of ihe painfer received the Soviet authority'i suppori and were exhibited in the workers' club ol ihe city.

of

During lhe following fourteen .years Grekov worked of his painiings wes lhe Civii War: "Captured Denikin Tank," "Night Reconnaissance,,, "The Slorming of Perekop," "Defence of Tsaritsin,,, ,,Monument to ihe lsi Cavalry Army," "Tachanka', (,,Machine Gun much. The principal theme

Cart") and many others.

Grekov's heroes in his baftle pictures were laken from life. They were workers and peasants who had temporarily abandoned lheir peaceful labour for military life. The pain-

ler knew how to discern and transfer to canvas the characils popular characfer.

leristic feaiure of the Red Army

-

Periodical exhibiis o{ pictures dedicated to ihe Red Army have shown lhat the baitle-studio aliached io the Academy cl Arts, where Grekov worked, was too limited. He dreamed

of uniling young battle-painters. Soon his dream came true. The first group comprised fourieen pupils. Their tesk consisted in not only mastering fhe skill of painting but, in the first place, in studying military hislory, the hislory of the army end navy. M. B. Grekov nurlured 6 ;ilan to create monumental panoramic and dioramic works about the army on which a group oI ariisls would work. ll was in collec-

tive labour that he saw the manifeslalion of an arlisf's individualiiy and ialent.

M. B. Grekov's sudden deaih on November 27, 1934 cul short his work of collecting rnaterial for ihe firsl Soviei panorama "The Storming o[ Perekop."

Two days laler, by Order of the USSR People's Commissar

{or Defence K. Voroshilov, the crganisaiion was of ihe arrraieur fine arts studio named aftor

announced

M. B. Grekov in a special independeni cavalry

brigade.

Four years later by Order of the Commander of the Moscow Miliiary District S. Eudyonny it was reorganised into ihe Siudio of Military Artists. The closest tutors and ieachers of the studio were already ai that time well-known rnasters of

Soviei art who formed the {irst Arlistic Council of the StuA. Gerasirnov, G. Sovitsky, N. Kotov, D. Toporkov

dio

-

and others.

The Great Patriotic War - lefl a speciei imprint on lhe

it became a combat subunit of the Scviet Army in ihe Iull sense of the Siudio's aciivities. During ihe war years

Buglers of the

lst Cavalry Army. Drawirrg by

word, fighting with a special weapon called ert. The iask of becoming the annalists of fhe national s{ruggle arose before the studioites.

1941. Most of these went fo the front. Their first "volley" fired at the enemy consisted of leaflets, posters and

other agifationel artislic publicolions. By ihe second day o{ the war they put ouf a collective les{let "Victory Wiil Be Ours!" which rrras quickly reprr:cluced and seni {o mililary units.5ovief people remei'nber especially the posiers "We Wili Defend Moscorv!" by N. Zhukov and V. Klimashin, "Strike io t'.illl" by N. Zhukov and "We Will Reach Berlin" by L. Golovanov. Pos*ers become an original and effective kind of arf and weapon.

Durinrg the entire war ihe Studio ortists paintecl and fought where the bloodiest baftles were roging.

ln the Far Norih painfers R. Gorelov, V. Pobedin and 5. Khinsky lramped snow-covered paths to the remofest vredpon emplacemenfs io make skefches of soldiers who had ciislinguished themselves in baftle. A. Gorpenko and l-. Golovanov took part in ihe Batlle ol Kiev. Together with

Marines. A fragnrent. Drawing by N. But

To Stalingrad. Drawing by L. Chernyshov

the arrny ihey forced the Dnieper River. P. Kirpichyov and G. Prokopinsky worked on fhe legendary Small Land in

lhe Novorcssiisk area. ...The niEht of April 16, 1945 on fhe Oder River. The Command of the lst Eyelorussian Front applied a method unknown iill ihen which stunned a,rd paralysed the enerny for a tirne after a power{ul arlillery bombardmeni hundreds o[ searchliglrts literally blinded the hiileriies. At that momenf infaniry and tanks with submachine gunners mounled on the armour rushed inio the aftack. Arlist P. Korelsky was an eye-lvitness of lhis event. He managed lo make a few sketches on the spol but fhe main impressions were imprinted in his memory and formed lhe basis lor a dior:ma "The Baftle on the Oder Bridgehead" creaied jointly 'rith N. YevsliEneyev. Bolh arlists wers aw.rded a Siaie Prize.

:i;?:,)!4;":;i,,, a,i,:,)!.r1r1;.ii!1,,

41. Grekov

l,ink up of two lronts in the Kalach area. Drawing by G. Marchenko

Grekovites look part with the Scviel forces in liberating Europe, in lhe baftles of Budapest, Warsaw, Berlin and Prague.

During the war ihe ranks of .lhe Grekoviles were all ihe lime being reinforced: 42 painters, drawers and sculplors joined the sludio. Exhibiticns af the front and in the Ceniral House ol the Soviei Army were accounls of their work. their paintings. breathed the truth aboul lhe war, their aesthetics were severe and militani and their realism siraighfforward and laconic.

-

The war ended. A new lask arose be{ore ihe Grekovites: fo perpefuafe in lhe memory of the people ihe heroic deeds of the Soviet soldier who defended lhe freedom of his Motherland and liberated the nations of Europe from fascism. The man who bore all the hardships o[ war on his shoulders and emerged victorious despite everything this is the main iheme of the arlisfs'posl-war work.

It was- embodied in monumenial works of painting and scu

Ipture.

Today the Grekovite5 are also closely connecled with lhe life of the Soviet Arnry and Navy. They sfrive to reflecl in lheir works ihe image and spiritual world of the Soviet warrior of today, heir of ihe glorrous lraditions o[ ihe

Underground missile range. Drawing by S. Antonov

{

Iront-line heroes. They are_ oflen preseni oi lactical exercises, ocean cruises, al aerodromes and in the field' Army li{e has its peculiarities, leaving an imprint on the mindof military persons. The most imporlant peculiarity is constanl combat readiness. This is reflected successfully, for inslance, by N. Ovechkin in his canvases. His pictures "Knights of the Skies," "lnlerceplor Pilots" and others convey concrete and convincing idea of ihe front-line people of lhe Soviel Armed Forces.

The painlings ol lhe Grekoviles are exhibited in the cilies of the Soviel Union and many counlries of lhe worid.

For example, lhe exhibilion of Honoured Artist of the RSFSR N. But "Friendship Born in Baftle" was a greal success in Czechoslovakia; the graphic works o[ the People's Artist o{ the USSR N. Zhukov were exhibiled in Angola.

For great achievemenls in developing Soviet fine arts lhe Grekov Sludio of Military Artisls has been awarded lhe Order of lhe Red

Star.

The Cruiser "Minsk" N. Denisov

Attention! Start! DrawinS by A. Yevstigneyev

I

in

the e;rercise

area. Drawing by

,

OFFICERS' I{OUSE EXt{tBlT!ON Amaleur sculplor Major Fyodorov showed his works at an exhibilion organised in the Frunze Garrison. Officers' House (Central Asia

UNFORGETTABTE

.

MEETII{GS

One unil of lhe Order o{ the Red Banner Byelorussian Military Dislricl

showed high lraining slandard al facfical exercises in an area which was

fhe 3cene of {ierce fighting

against the nazi invaders forly years

ago. During a lu!l in lhe "flghting" a meetinE was held al the monument

lo the Byelorussian partisans. The men lis?ened 1o war veteran Golik,

a ormer mernber of lhe underground Party regional commiftee.

The audience was captivated by his f

Military Districl).

Major Fyodorov is a prize winner

o{ All-Arrny Amateur Art Comoetitions and has been awarded a diploma of the ,All-Union People's Arl Exhibition. Most of his works are devoled io life and training in the services and to ihe Soviet people's ieal of arms during the Great Patriotic War. This army sculptor is very popu-

lar with the

servicemen.

WEI.!.

DESERVED

POPULARITY

The Of{icers' House headed by Captain Kuznelsov is located in

colleclives are highly act;ve.

lls

"Folon" vocal and instrumental ensemble, lor ins{ance, is popular dmong servicemen and inhabifants

of neighbouring villages. During the eight years of its exisfenrce !l has given hundreds of concerts including Soviet and foreign classical music, modern and folk songs.

story oi the slubborn fighiing waged

by lhe people's avengers in

Eyelo-

russia.

Amcng the visitors to unils of this miliiary districl were veterans o{ lhe Great Patriotic War Hero o{ lhe Soviet Union Malor (Ret.) Zhukov and former comrnander of a pariisan deiachrnenf M. Chefu erin.

A'RMAN's EOOK

oF

6"00Nor.!R

ln one aviation unif an "Airman's Eook of Honour" was inlroduced in rnemory of Hero o{ fhe Soviet Union A. Rogov, who served in this unil during the Great Petriolic War

(1941-451. This courageous piloi performed a heroic feaf {ollowing in ihe foolsfeps of Nikolai Geslello.* The names of airmen showing lhe

best resulls and lheir accornplishmenrs are enlered in this book. For instance, lhe air crew comprising Maior Trokhin (commander) and Caplain Vylegzhanin (navigator) had the honour lo be menlioned in ihis

The "Foton" Ensernble.

Strenuous work goes on in the Iaboratories and 5ludy rooms, classrooms and training ranges of the

piano.

Serpukhov Higher Miliiary Cornmand School named efter the Lenin Komsomol. lis cadefs work hard to obtain lhe sound knowledge and firm skiils which an officer of today musl posse5s,

lndividual study in a physics classroom. Left to right: Sergeant S. Fedolov and Junior Sergeants G. Veretin and V. Dundukov. Photo by V. Yudin 7:

book for lheir high flying skill and

excellenl performance of

Art director Private O. Polyakov at the

Photo by A.'Yefinrov SERPUKB.IOY CoAAA{AND SC$.tOOr-

?TM

?::;&

#;lt{,ii

combat

@t::li;irtr,.a

missions.

At an exercise held recently this air crew again dislinguished themselves by lheir mastery and deserv-

ed lo be commended by the

com-

$ri.j.i{:**

mander.

N. Gastcllo accofnplished a - ' Captain feat of arms on ttre fifth day'after th.

Great Patriotic Wor broke oui: he dived column of

his burning plane into a

ercml tanks and fuel.tankers.

34

a

far-away garrison of lhe Order of the Red Banner Siberian Military Districf. The gerriscn's ama{eur arl

0+,

*&

a,nd.Tecrrnologsr TAMING THE STORM Many seclors of the railway system in the Sovief Union lie along ihe shores of seas and large lakes, and this necessitaies additional wave profection inslallations. For in-

rian harbour lo the Dnies{er

la-

Sovief specielisls from ihe All-

goon) on the edge of lhe tslack Sea coast. The earih removed wou ld ihen be used io prolect Jhe canal againsi sea waves. Moreover, piercing ihe canal lhrough the seashore would make il possible lo.preserve ferfile soil.

Union Scieniific Research and De3ign lnslitute "Transportprogress'' work-

during lhe-season of winter storms on ihe Black Sea in lhe Sostance,

chi-Gagra area the hydraulic impacf reaches 20 tons per square metre o{ the coast. This is naturally bound

lo allecf the railway line

Scientisls Irom the Black Sea Branch of lhe All-Union Scieniilic

of Transport Construclion working io solve the prob-

Research Institute

lem of prolecting fhe banks o[ water reservoirs by developing new protection installations have given quite

a few useful

recommendalions.

TRANSPORT OF T!-iE FN"'TURE

ln large ciiies the bulk of

psssen-

gers are carried by an underground railway. lts construction, however, calls f or greal capital investmenls. lf pays ofl only in ciiies wilh a populaiion of over a million" But in cities wifh 600,000-800,000 inhabitants and in new neighbotrrhopds o{ cities wilh a population

succeeded in reproducing a storm

of over a million, where no underground railway has yei been built,

on Lake Baikal and were thus able

surf ace

Several years ago, {or example, they

lo draw diagrams of proteciing inslailations Ior secfors parficularly exposed lo danger from waves o,r the Baikal-Arnur Railway. For this purpose, ihe various manilestafions of ihe shore processes occurring on this gigantic lake were modelled in basins and channels.

have estimated the researchers' e{{orf at ils true worthThey appreciate lhe economy lo be obtained by implementing lheir reBuilders

commendations. Scienfists have suggesied th6l instead of cutling recesses for lhe railway bed in rocky

ground on sectors with difliculf lerrain, the bed should be made on the boftoin ol the lake near fhe water-fronf. This would allow the utilisation of the rock, frorn which breakwalers would be made.

Greai interest was also aroused by research connecled wiih lhe construclion of lhe Danube-Dniesler Canal. Scientisls have come lo the con-

clusion thaf if would be most advanlageous 1o dig the 80-km long rlrelch of the canal (from the Zheb-

iic f ield and driven by a linear elecfric motcr.

The f irsf trials have con{irmed the correctness of the designers' idea o{

running

by fhe water's edge.

rng lo d--velop lrains running on electromaqneiic suspension have advanced ihe idea ol a lrain held over the rails by an electromsgne-

transpori-bus, trolleybus and ]v66 666nef cope with the {low of passengers.

Soviet scientists and designers believe fhet this problem can be solveo' by providing a highspeed, ecologically clean, noiseless and relafively cheap means of trans-

port wifh a considerable carrying capacity, which would cost 4 io 6 iimes less than an underground

an articulaied joini by means of which fhe five bogies meking up ihe running gear of the future vehi-

cle should be inlerconnecled lo

al-

low curvatures of ihe roule io be easily negotiated. The irains, capable of developing a speed of up- lo 500 km/h, will run on special 5-7: m high overpasses laid over the central dividing lines o{ major avenues and highways.

Electromagneiic suspension trans-

pori is nalurally nof a matter of the near fuiure. SIecialists believe, how-

ever, that by the beginning o[ the

2lst ceniury it will be as cornmon on urban and suburban lines as ihe tram or the trolleybus in the streets today. The 26th CPSU Congress set the task of extendinE ihe sphere of

application of nevr transportaiion {acilities lor urban and suburban iraf{ic. To develop and put into ser-

railway. This is a vehicle on eleciro-

vice eleciromagnelic suspension transport would be a feasible way

magnetic susPension.

o{ fullilling this fask.

ffiu*r ffie$endmr

IXtrIWED ilTTEN EREAT

frIILTWI,EMENS

(40th Anniversary of the Institution of the Orders

of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Alexander

Nevsky)

Lieufenant-Colonel Y. MIKHAIIOY

I N THE summer ol 1942 fierce fighting deveI- loped on ihe Soviel-German front. The Battle of Stalingrad, one of the greatest bat-

lles of the Second World War, which went on for six and a half months, began in the Don and Volgja steppes. At thai menacing iime for the Soviet country, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of fhe USSR by a Decree of july 29, 1942 instituted the Order of Suvorov, three classes, the Order of Kutuzov l st and 2nd Class (the Order of Kutuzov 3rd Class was instituted by a Decree of February 8, 19431 and the Order of Alexander Nevsky, having only one class.

These Orders were awarded lo command personnel for skilful leadership of the forces in battles and'operalions and to military units and formations whlch distinguished themselves in battle.

Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov (1 730-1800), a greaf Russian military leader, look part in over 50 battles and never knew a defeat. With lightning speed he estimated lhe situation, quickly look decisions and acted daringly. This military leader had a deep faith in {he patriotism and courage of lhe Russian soldier. Frequently Suvorov rouled an enemy many times superior lo his own forces.

During the Greal Patriotic War .Soviet lhe Order o( Suvorov was awarded to mahy military leaders and commanders who succeeded in organising the defeat of superior enemy forces during lhe offensive. ...December 1942. The Sovief forces at Slalingrad were successfully pressing home the attack begun on November 19, The 24th Tank Corps under General V. Badanov was rapidly penetrating deeper into the enemy rear. Two hundred and forty kilometres had already been covered, bul ihe general urged his rnen onr "Fo!",nard! To Talsinskaya!" ln fhe early foggy morning of December 24, lhe fanks approached Tatsinskaya railway slation and fhe nearby airfield. The appearance of the

Soviet troops was a complete surprise lor the enemy. The nazis were still asleep and a salvo of a Guards Rocket Moriar Battalion the signal for the assaull woke them. The-attack was so swift that the enemy airmen had no iime lo lake off. The tankmen seized the stalion and the aerodrome with 350 combat planes. Large ammunition depots and food stores and great quantilies of weapons and equipment were captured.

Having come lo iheir senses after the surprise blow, lhe enemy launched fierce counieraftacks wilh superior .forces against Badanov's corps, But the fighting men, led by the courageous and resolule general, did not refreal a single step. For several days lhey held the caplured station and completely fulfilled the assigned mission.

For lhis daring raid, ihe capture of an imporlant stralegic railway junction Tatsinskaya stafion, and for valour and staunchness displayed in the fighting the 24th Tank Corps was renamed the 2nd Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Corps. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarded its commander, Lieutenant-General V. Badanov the Order of Suvorov 2nd Class. He became the first bearer of this Order.

Over seven thousand servicemen were awarded the Order of Suvorov. Many Soviet military leaders were decorated with lhe Order of Suvorov 1st Class. Among them were Marshals of lhe Soviei Union A. M. Vasilevsky, R. Ya. Malinovsky, K. 5. Moskalenko, V. l. Chuikov and others. Order of Suvorov I st Class No. 1 was conferred on Marshal of lhe Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov for his parf in planning operations and exercising conlrol over lhe combat aclions of fhe Soviet forces in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Field Marshal M. l. Kutuzov (1745-1813) was a worthy pupil of Suvorov. Under his leadership during ihe Patriotic War of 1812 ihe Russian Army utlerly defeated Napoleon's imperial army which had invaded Russia.

The Order ol Suvorov, I st Class

The Order ol Kutuzov,

lst

Class

The Order of Alexarrder NevskY

ed and routed the German knights on lhe ice of invaders iutu Cf'tuatkoye. The inroad of {oreign beNevsky Alexander in nrttiu was arrested' To us io comes who "He words: the prophetic il' i;#;;"^a-'Jriit,e .o,p"renr conducr o{ long perish by the sword' That is will s*otd tn" *itfr ;;iii; ;nJ :l:,;;I;,;"; -.ount"r"f{ensive. n'"* tn" Russian land has stood and will always Thousands of Soviet of{icers u -stand." qualiiies' ;";-;;";t;ls displaved these high. the Order o[ lh; Motherland honoured with BatMorlar Rocket ="i^;;';;;; ;";:'i[. Guards to diviplatoon {rom lor ,qfu;und"i Nevsky officers iufl"n unJ", Maior Opuleu cleared. ihe way of ;t;;'.;;;"nder for personal valour, courage and lhe advancing forceibuiing 9.tilsl: .monthde- Lr"r"ry, competent control of combal actions rebattation ii"lti""-i" ih-e autumn ol lill hiiand on the enemy' sulting'in men and a --...iFit heary losses inflictedPrussia' officers :lY;;;; r'r"a'"al"i "n"v Four atlack Eastern in h"ppened were atoreit quantitY of materiel' Semeiko N' Capiain by the.na- uir.tuft-h.ud'ed "';'il;;;ieni or ihe {ishtins in Hunsarv wedge-{orin the Ke- i".kl"g if"'. .n.*y. They were flying When ,i, loirla nJ pains to h6td t6eir lines on soviet ."ti""" when l3 Messerschmitts appeared' comthe the gave ;;""i;; i;;i;;il, counterattackine immediately he ihem saw role was l"r.if" ;A;ume i;;..;. ln tn"tL cirJumstances a-great clos" combat {ormation!" The pi;;;Ji opalev's Maior of ,utonnui"unce attack ;i;;;; Ly the the co- i"ir'ltlrrriivJuliitr.a the command' The firsl However' [utiution.'lt detected and defined exaclly off' beaten was fighters ih. un".y fire positi*,"tir important 9n:'v salvoes ;i;;;; "J and deplovgi.f"t.a new aftack' of ii.;';";;; "r by Jlstroyed were "'h"ui to meet ons. Laler these being prov.id- Semeiko courageously steered his.aircraft pilo-t's Soviet "Katvushas." ruuourubL toniiti"ns the of result a As carried out an assa.ult crossine ih. ;;.;t lLad-er. nazi fighter went.down in lla"d:it;";;;l.i{.;;;' on ihe enemy' *.f f-"i..i fire ihe IIi'i"rir"ted a crushing defeat deprived ot.thetr 99Tthe battalion and mes. Finding themselves ;;;;;;p;tlnt leadlship ofopule' their heads.' Their ballost airmen tnina.r, the-nazi ;il".h;;;t in battL* MaiorClass' was awarded ii. but they undertook still broken was i"ir"iiln Ora., of Kutuzov 3rd ifru afiack. And again the Soviet attack air"';ll'il-'ufl' nearly-seven thousand mililary 1ea- ;;";;;; still various .ruit ..t them with heJvy fire' After losing ders and commanders were awarded tail' turned hitleriies the plane diviRegimenis' -inotfl"t uiui tf'. finale of one of Captain N' Semei1""*"t'"f tf,. Ota.iJ Kuluzov' i;.h decorated ui-to wt'" ;"dt;it; military sions and sorties. For high flying skill and compeIJ)ZO this Order' with *'rvi""v in air com-bat he was awarded ihe se."nrtol Gi s-""Li miliiary leaders were honoured NevskY' and Kutu- Order - Overof42Alexander iir* wiih the o'de's of Suvorov men were Soviet fighting-. thousand soD' v' -The Union ";i soviei the order of ;;;.'ih;;'Maishal-ot suc.h orders' aiJinouirli.d with'i[lt-nigf"t aw-ard' colours [;i;";kt '*as six times awarded combat th" decorJttd ,u"iGf'A' A' Grechko, five times and M' V' Za- Ab;il;;Gvskv formations' and units of hundreds of kharov, '-"inl four times. inslituted in July 1942 was nam- -'il; o;J;rs of the celebratLd Russian miliiarv inita Order iy.U"ft of military valour' combat Alexander Nevsky, under whose com- t.uaJrr-ui" tlrrr l^a fidelitv to the Motherland "a'uit"t mand 740 y"uru ugo Russiin regiments surround-

{o military The Order of Kutuzov was awarded a successorganising {or IeuJers and commanders exhausting fotces' enemy superior of i;i;;";lt. heavv losses on them; for .

?1

ilrt l!$$r ffiwil ttffiLY-rmH $0ililm!fi$ Colonel Ye. DOLGOPOLOV

HE IMPERIALIST countries headed by the United States recently launched a wide-sca_ le offensive against lhe national-liberation movement, lndepeqdence of new states does not suit the imperialisfs. They go out of fheir way to bind these counlries to the imperialist chariot st as 1o exploit without hindrance their natural riches and to use their ierritory for imperialist strafegic schemes. The 26th Congress of iire CpSU poinied out that the aggressive circles of imperialism ,,in_ deed have set out to achieve lhe unathievable _ io set up a barrier to progressive changes in the world, and to become again the rulers olihe peo_ ples' destiny."

treaties of friendship and cooperation signed with India,. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Syria, Con_ go. They have consolidated fhe ioundaiions of lhe inlerslate relationships and facilitated further development of comprehensive cooperation bel_ ween lhe USSR and lhese countries.

The Soviei Union supporls the legitimate aspi_ rations of the young slates and their Jelerminalion to fo away for ever with imperialist exploitaiion and io do whal lhey wish with their nalional riches. The USSR believes in parlicular as historical_ ly justified the demand of the former colonies that .ihe inter,naf ional economic relationship should be changed and remodelled on a democExpansion and consolidafion of cooperation ralic.and equal basis. Unlike the imperialist sfates, .beiween the newly-free countries and the USSR which have been and still are exploiting the coun: and other socialist states is of parlicular signifi_ lries of Asia, Africa and Latin America] the USSR cance in these circumstances, This .oope.ution is taling practical sleps lo help establisi\ new and conslilutes an important faclor of the new states, jusi internatiorial economic relations. a.dvance The positions of the Soviet Union coincides with .on the path of strengthening lheir na_ tional independence and social progre-ss, and ser_ ihat ol lhe newly free countries on a number of ves as a guarantee against imperialist_exported key inlernational issues such as curbing fhe arrns counler-revolution. race, promoting social and economic develop_ ln contrast lo the imperialist attempts fo keep ment, and peaceful cooperation between counlfhe developing countries in neo-coionialist de_ ries. The Soviet Union supporfs the non-aligned pendence, fhe socialist countries are helping thlm movement, stressing ils anti-imperialist and anti_ to rid lhemselves of the remnants of naiiorial op_ colonialist nature and encouraging its struggle pression and exploitation. ln developing the lies againsi war and aggression. li reiolutely ,p[Jta wilh. newly-free countries fhe USSR seeki ;" p.;_ the proposals advanced by many countries to fits lor itself, is not out for concessions, wants declare Latin America, Afiica and the Middle East nuclear-free zones, to establish zones of neither war bases nor political dominaiion. peace in Southeast Asia, the lndian Ocean and lhe True to the principles of proletarian internatioMediferranean. Whereas the US imperialist circles nalism, lhe Soviet Union renders the friendly de_ declare differeni regions of the globe where lhe ve.loping countries whatever aid and ,rppo.i thuy US war machine is f-rying lo giin a foolhold as.k for in all possible fields political,' ..ono'_ "spheres of the US vital interests,,, the peaceful mic or military. and internationalisf stand of the USSR helps the developing cooperalion of lhe USSR with newly-free counlries lo avoid involvement .in - The the lhe newly-free countries manifests ilself in the world arms drive. .

38

The Soviet Union sides with the newly-free countries on many regional issues bearing on their deepest national interesls. The Soviet posture in the Middle East problem, for instance, is well known. ln contrast lo the imperialist-sponsored separate deals which betray vital national interesis, the Soviet Union insisls on a comprehensive political Middle East setilement that could bring peace to that troubled region without harming ihe legitimate rights of all the inlerested nations' Such a- settlement must provide for wilhdrawal o[ lsraeli lroops from all Arab lerritories o:cupied in 1967 and guaranlee the national rights of the people of Palesline, including the right fo state sovereignty. The Soviet Union maintains a similar principled' stand towards other newly-free countries in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, in South and Central Africa and other parts of the world'

A characterislic {eafure of the Soviet approach io the development of political relationships with ihe newly-free nalions is expansion of inierparty

ties between the CPSU and the national-democraiic parties to intensify interstale cooperation' This is vividly illustrated by ihe fact that while ihg 25th CPSU Congress was attended by 19 such parties the 26th Congress welcomed representaiires from 36 parties of developing states' There is obviously increasing altraction among. the revolutionary' democratii movement towards scientific sociallsm, a tendency to adopt Marxism-Leninirrn and the basic political and organisational orinciples of building a working people's party' an additional dimension to the relationThis gives -of the USSR with the young d.eveloping slaship tes, especially those which have declared Marxii.-i.ninitrn lhe fundamental scientific basis for ihe activities o{ the ruling parties' The USSR promotes wide-scale mutually bene.ficial economic and technical cooperaiion with the developing counlries. While the imperialisi countries ,".k- to relain the young countries in il',e ,ph"ru of their domination and control, lhe Soviet Union regards these countries as equal partners and carefully considers their inleresls and requirements. The scope o{ c-ooperation conlinuously grows: whereas in 1960 only 14 coqntries receiv-ed Soviet economic and technical assislance, this number rose to 40 in'l 970 and to 64

in

1981

ln line with the requirements of the newly-free slales the Soviet Union focusses its assistance on building the key branches of the national economy: ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, machinebuilding, chemistry, oil, light and food industries' There are maior if nol lhe key induslrial projecls among those built during recent years {or

lhe national economies with Soviet

assistance,

such as As-Saura which produces 70 per cent of Syria's electric power, lhe second slage of the metallurgical plant in Algeria, which has increased steel oulput by 2 million lons, and the bauxite works in Guinea wiih an output of 2.5 million f

ons.

Many of the enlerprises under conslruction now

in a number of newly-free countries will serve as the basis {or the creation of entirely new indusiries. For insfance, such a basic branch as ihe ferrous melal industry ha.s been clreated in most Asian and African corhtties with predominanl Soviet assislance. lncidentally, 84 per ceni of the increase in the output of steel in those countries in 1960-1980 was attained owing to the Sovietbuilt plants while lhe projecls nearing compleiion will double the present output. The power plants already built or under construction wilh the assistance of the USSR will almost double the oulput of electric energy as compared with 1960 in ihe developing countries of Asia and Africa' The USSR makes a subslantial conlribution to developing agricullure and food producing industries in ihe newly-free counlries.

Enormous work is done to trairi nalional specialists: engineers, lechniciarts, qualified workers, medical lersonnel, schoolieachers, etc' Over 850 thousand specialists o{ different pro{essions have already been trained. The Soviel instilutei, universities and technical colleges have issued diplomas to more than 40 thousand and are now training nearly 39 thousand .y.oung ciiizens of the develJping countries. ln addition lo that, nearly 18 thousaid workers, technicians and engineers practical training at Soviet have gone through -and project institutions and re{actoriis, design search centres.

The growing economic ties of the USSR with the

develoiing cJuntries are vividly demonstraled by the 1 5-iolJ increase in the volume of trade during 1960-1980. Soviet exports include predominantly machinery and industrial equipmenl, half of it complele sets for the industrial proiecis built with the assistance of the USSR. The growth of exporls .r"ui"t a material prerequisile for an increase of Soviet imports from lhe developing countries' Unlike ihe imperialist staies, who maintain and pre-

sently even sliffen customs barriers against imports irom'ihe developing countries, especially finished p-Jr.t, the UiSn-has abolished customs'duiies Ln su.h goods. All this helps the development o{ ttr" n.*tiJree states' economies and gives addiiional momenlum to lheir efforts lowards economic independence. ln the military lield the Soviet Union and other

39

socialist states help lhe newly-free states, af their request, lo slrengthen their defence capacity. This increases the capability of the young s{ates lo re-

buff foreign and inlernal counfer-revolutionary encroachmenls and fo protect the progressive socio-polilical development they have chosen. l

i I

Sovief military assistance co.ntributed to winning independence for Algeria, and to enhancing lhe defence potential of many Arab counlries. Soviet and Cuban mililary assistance enabled Angola and Ethiopia to uphold their national sor!reignly, integrity and revolutionary gains.

loviet military assisfance acquires growing significance and scope in organising young nationil armies. lt includes education and training of mililar:y specialists, exchange of experience i-n educalion, training and political orientalion of military personnel. Many newly-free states gladly make use of Soviet experience in military construction,

above.all in promoting fhe leading role of the nalional democratic parties in fhe army as well as in furning out of{icers and men devoled to the ideals of the revoluiion, and in expanding the ties be{ween the army and fhe people.

l

I

While imperialist mililary "aid" is generally intended lo turn the young armies into regional gendarmes in lhe service of the monopolies, which o{ten resulls in loss of their national identity, Soviet assisfance pursues directly opposile goals. lt permits early democralisation and transformation of the armies along anlicolonialisl lines into reliable means of defending the national gai ns.

Nowadays progressive and free development of the newly-free countries can hardly be imagined without conslanf support and assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, Many of them would find it almost impossible to retain and consolidate their independence in the face of lhe continuous attacks of the imperialists and infernal counter-revolulionaries.

The developing coun{ries, especially ihose which have chosen the path of socialism, highly appreciate Soviet help, which facilitates their progress lowards safer economic and political independence, towards deep socio-economic changes {or lhe benefit of the popular masses.

The Soviet Union for its part declares that it is determined 1o conlinue along the path of cooperalion wilh the developing countries,. lowards slronger unily of the socialist countries with lhe national-liberation movemenf. This is a guarantee of final victory for the cause of national and social liberalion of ihe peoples.

40

The article fells aboul the activify ol lsraet,s spe. cial services and Zionist cenfres, and their coilaboration wilh special services in the USA and olher capilalist slales in fighting lhe national-li-

beration movement.

Being one of the mosl reactionary offspring of imperialism, Zionism is closely tied up with-the latter in ihe economical, political and miliiary spheres, including secret service work. Joinily with intelligence agencies of imperialist countries Zionist subversive cenlres are waging a fierce struggle against socialism and the revolulionary, working class and national-liberation movements.

For many years lsraeli special services have mainlained particularly close relations wilh the inlelligence agencies of the United Stafes. Here are a few examples of the history of their cooperation. ln 1956 the USA virtually became an accomplice in the aggression of Greal Britain, France and lsrael againsl Egypt. M. Copeland, a former highranking CIA official, reported in .1957 that on the eve of the "triple aggression" lhe American infelligence service supplied the US governmeni with ample information or Egypt and olher Arab countries. Assessing this information, he slressed meaningfully that the data of the lsraeli intelligence service was much the same as lhe American,

ln May 1967 the Egyptian security service recorded talks in the U5 embassy in Cairo between the CIA resident and his local agents, during which the former demanded the physicai elimina-tion of Egypt's leaders, including president Nasser. lt would be most appropriate to mention here that these talks took place on lhe eve of ihe lsraeli .1957 aggression againsi the Arab countries, of which the USA had detailed informalion. ln that "six days war" the lsraeli aggressors made wide use o{ lhe assistance provideT by the American special services the CIA and the intelligence agency of the -US Defence Deparlmenl in the spheres hilherio hardly accessible to the-lsraeli intelligence service, i. e. in air, outer space "and electronic espionage. Facts tesiify that lsraeli pilots whose planes were shol down over Arab lerrilory in 1967 carried maps drawn on lhe basis of aerial photography carried out at dilferenl limes from American aircraft and spy satelliles. According to the lsraeli press, such malerials were also used in preparing and carrying out Tel Aviv aviation's pirale raid on the lraqi nuclear research centre near Baghdad in June 1981. lt

INSTRU'VIENT

OF TERROR AND SABOTAGE L. KORNEYEV, Cand. Sc. (History) should also be emphasised that the AWACS reconnaissance planes manned by American crews

"did not detect" lhe lsraeli military aircraft flying

over Saudi Arabia either then or later.

The help given by the US intelligence service to lsrael was no less extensive during the war of Oclober 'f 973. As early as Seplember 24, 1973, the CIA aided by the electronic espionage centre of lhe US National Secr.rrity Agency in lran had detected concentrations of Egyptian . [orces on the 5uez Canal and relayed this inforrnation to lsrael.

To reveal the positions o{ the Syrian and Egyptian lroops, U5 intelligence agencies pul a Samos spy saiellite into orbit passing over Syria and Egypt.

During the October baftles NATO's radio stalions in Cyprus gave the lsraeli GHO extensive information on the posiiion of the Aiab ermies. The data obtained by American spy satellites end reconnaissance planes helped fhe lsraeli forces to carry out a dangerous breakthrough to the western bank o{ fhe Suez Canal.

The Arab press reports that today American spy sateliites photograph the territories o{ Arab countrieE 3 to 4 times a day.

An important feature of the espionage and subversive activilies carried out by lsraeli special services is their striving 'to rely on Zionist "fi{th columns" in meny counlries. The USA alone numbers more than 300 Zionist organisations, which are in a posi{ion to put pressure on the While House, the Pentagon and the CIA through fheir agents' The close cooperation befween lhe secret services of lsrael, the United Slafes and other imperialisi countries can be explained nof only by the cornmon class interests of world imperialist reaclionaries, neo-colonialisls, Zionisfs and lsrael's ruling circles, bul also by the in{luence lsrael i.s trying to exert on the secret services in a number of states, primarily the USA and Great Britain. For ihis purpose various methods are used, including infiltration of Zionist agents into foreign secrei services. ln his book "ln the Service of Peace" Swedish Generel Horn wrote that lsrael abiiity to penelrate into secret services of all the world's major states is an additional faclor facilitating lhe w'ork of lsraeli inlelligence.

The numerous Zionist establishments, e. g. branches of the World Zionist Organisation, whose

headquarters are in New York and which has its own intelligence department, are packed with lsraeli intelligence agenls.

The tactics and methods of subversive activities practised by the Zionisl special services are most diversified.

With the help of NATO's special services in the field of ihe most costly and complicated reconnaissance facilities, i. e. air, outer space and elecfronic reconnaissance, lsrael's secret services, in the first place army intelligence, lay emphasis on organising terrorist acls and provocations in order to aggravate international tensions and undermine the unity of the national-liberalion forces. ln 1972lhe lsraeli leadership decided to slep up the lerrorist activity of lsrael's secret services.

For this purpose an inlernational terrorist organisation was set up within the lsraeli army.

The terrorist activity of the lsraeli special services has gone beyond the bound of the Middle East fo embrace practically all confinents. Relying on neo-fascist gangs of the Jewish Prolection League type, lsraeli agents orEanise attacks on proEressive Arab and Jewish public figures in the USA, Great Britain, France, Australia and many other countries. Zionists' bullets and explosives have killed a number of official represenlalives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which is recognised by more than one hundred states.

Since 1975 lsrael's special services have been fakinE an active part in inciting the Iratricidal conflict in Lebanon. As revealed by foreign press reports, lhe lsraeli army intelligence service dropped into Lebanon arms, sabotage and sniper groups; and helped blockade the counlry's sea coast. The intelligence department of the rightChrislian Party of Lebanese Phalanxes has been conslantly coordinating its work with the lsraeli intelligence service. The influential Kuwaiti Arab Times newspaper wrole that Israeli intelligence officers attend lhe phalangites' military councils.

The Histadruth sindicalist organisation has become a refuge for lsraeli intelligence agents. More than half the Histadruth's "councillors" who arrived iri Uganda from Israel not long ago furned out to be professional intelligence agents. The mask of "frade-union aclivists" was also torn off ihe inveterate lsraeli spies in Chad, the Congo, Niger

4t

and Mali. Besides, lsrael's special services, jointly wilh the ClA, took a direci part in subversive activities in Uganda, Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia and olher African countries in order to torpedo lhe anti-imperialist policy pursued by these slates and get them lo support Zionism. The Palestine, a PLO magazine, wrole lhat lsrael was trying to

outflank the Arabs in Africa from the rear. Voicing lheir protest against lsrael's aggressive policy and

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Colonel N. KHMARA, D. 5c. (Philosophy)

IBoURGEOIS IHEORTES ON THE ESSENCE, ORtGrN AND ROLE OF WARS tN HISIORYI

the impudent espionage aclivily of Histadruth emissaries, the majority of African slales severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. lt is also noteworlhy that Histadruth people are smuggled in great numbers inlo many Asian and Latin American counfries.

The sinister role played by the lsraeli intelligence service and CIA in lran under the Shah is a malfer of common knowledge, at that time they helped American and lsraeli monopolies rob the lranian people and strengthen the Shah's regime, For Tel Aviv lran was a source of profit and raw materials (including oil), and a well-payinE commodity market.

The lranian press has repealedly written that today the lsraeli intelligence service and CIA conlinue to plan and carry out subversive lerrorist activities against lran's anti-imperialist regime. The lranian Azadegan newspaper wrote in September 1981 that Zionisl agents had succeeded in penetraling into lran's staie and government bodies.

Maoisl leaders too play a treacherous role in respect of developing countries by promoting collaboration belween the lsraeli and Chinesi special services. The Lebanese weekly Al Kifah al Arabi reported last year that when the lsraeli embassy in Teheran was liquidated, lranian officials came across secret documents proving that lsraeli special services had been cooperating not only with the Shah's regime but also with China.

The lsraeli Zionist special services are also very active in the ideological slruggle of world reactionaries against the USSR. Resorting to lies and provocations, lhey fan the myth of a "soviet miIitary fhreat," thus slriving to undermine the Arab nalions' confidence in lhe Soviet Union. These activilies are direcled by the agency for psycholoEical actions of the lsraeli General Staff jointly with a number of major international Zionist organisalions, Numerous facls lestify lhat at present Zionisl secret services in cooperation with ihe intelligence services of imperialist slates have intensified fheirsubversion against the nalional-liberation movement and sfepped up their struggle againsl socialism and d6lente. This makes it urgent for anfi-imperialist progressive {orces to dispTay conslanl vigilance and counteract vigorously the evil designs of imperialism and Zionism.

42

The bifter ideological struggle on ihe' key issue of war and peace in the world loday embraces such important problems as lhe origin, essence and role of wars in human history.

Marxism-Leninism defines war as a historical class phenomenon. All wars are a consequence of the profound socio-political developments of an antagonistic society. The germ of wan is present in any social order based on privaie property, exploitalion of man by man and oppression of lhe working people.* Bourgeois analysts, obedient to their masfers in lhe ruling circles of the imperialisl stafes, seek to fake a theoretical foundation for lhe imperialist aggressive policies in order to mislead the world public concerning the true origin and nature of wars.

. Numerous concepfs have been developed for lhis purpose. Socio-political theories on war oc-

cupy a prominent place among them. They affirm thai the causes of wars should be sought among the social and political features of public life. Many Western theories insist that wars are caused by "communisf policy," by "the policy of lhe Kremlin,l' efc. Especially eager pedlars of such ficlions are the leaders o{ NATO and the US Administration.

Of course, lhese and similar slanderous lheories have no malerial foundation whatever. Speaking to lhe 26th CPSU Congress L, l. Brezhnev said: "A war danger does exisl for the United States, as il does for all the other countries of the world.

But fhe source of the danger is not the Soviet Union, nor any mythical Soviet superiorify, bul is the arms race and the tension thai still prevails in the world."

This is confirmed in particular by recenl events.

The US Administration arroganlly uses the neutron bomb to blackmail the world, escalales pre-

+ por more detailed inlormation see "Causes altd Sonrcr';", Q[ Wars," Soyict Military Revicrv, n-o. 10, 1951.

uAR Uoffi parations for deploying medium-range missiles fhe USA slates in his book "That Dif{icult World" in Western Europe and adverlises so-called limit- fhat there is a deeply rooied instinct of aggressied nuclear war. veness in every rnan which pushes him lowards lmperialist ideologisls, in an e{fort to whitewash rvar. Another psychological school insists that imperialism, misinterpret and misrepresent the wars are caused by the human reaction to danMarxist-Leninist theory of violence and lhe theory ger from oulside. o{ class struggle. They assert that according lo From ihis it would follow that the ones responMarx and Lenin the victory of socialism in the sible for wars are psychically unbalanced stale world can only be attained by war againsi capi- leaders, whereas ihe monopolists whose inieresls lalism. Bul Marxism-Leninism never said ihat the they represent have nothing to do with it. class struggle in the capitalist countries must deAmong the most reactionary theories are.neovelop inlo world war. The Programme of the Malthusian explanafions of fhe causes of war.

CPSU slates: "Socialist revolution is not necessa- They attribute wars fo overpopulalion, which emrily connecled with war... The great oblectives of bitters the struggle {or survival to the extenl of lhe working class can be realised without world war. Professor H. Bouthoul of France has even war." These ideas permeale the decisions of the advanced a theory which he called "polemology 25th and 26lh Party congresses. new science of war" (from the Greek "poAnolher group of lheories to explain the ori- -a lemos" war, and "logos" 56isn6e), The po- reduce all causes- of war io man's ingin of wars is what ihey call in lhe West "theories lemologists of inlernational anarchy." This professes that na- dividual aggressiveness allegedly due.io overpoiional sovereignty is the principle cause of all in- pulation. lernational conflicts. R. Aron, a French socioloThese misanthropic theories stubbornly overgist, stales oulright that wars are caused not by look the {act that the low living standard of peothat "all-powerful evil-doer, capilalism," as Marx- ple in differenl parts o{ the world, especially in isls 'would assert, but by the division of the world the former colonies, is caused by imperialist exinto sovereign sfates. The lheory makes particu- ploitation. Such lheories advocate neo-colonialarly bitler attacks on nations which struggle for lism and expansionist wars against the developtheir liberation, independence and sovereignty. ing counlries.

These iheories call for abandoning nalional soveAt present the imperialists are once Bgain rereignty in favour of a political union of states soriing io geopolitics to justify iheir expansionisi under lhe tutelage of the major imperialist po- policies. Especially outspoken in this respeci is wers, such as the USA, Britain, France. This is in lhe "concept of expanding frontiers." lt slates facf no more lhan a way for the big great impe- that with industrial and lechnological advance of rialist powers to swallow up the small naiions. a counlry its territory must be expanded by force.

The concept passes over in silence the fact thaf This predalory, iungle-law theory is specially inimperialism is the primary source of wars, it jus- tended to justify the expansionist policy of imlifies expansion and aggression by imperialisl po- perialism. wers against small riations, and tries to prove the Some modernistic iheories try to associate wars necessity for imperialisl miliiary blocs.

With technological progress. The book "The BreakThe sociological approach has given birth io a through to Peace" published in the USA warns number of naturalistic theories of war: psycho- that modern sophisticated weapons sysfems are biological, neo-Malthusian, geopolitical. Psycho- being gradually automated to the point where logical theory, represented mainly by the Freu- they get out of man's control and turn into a dedist school, suggests that the cause of war lies in monic force looming over the humanity. Once "a man's inherent aggressiveness." A. Meherlo of again, fhe authors overlook the essential fact that 43

militarisation of countries and the arnrs build-up do nol occur o{ fhemselves but are encouraEed by the military industrial complex rnagnates. ldolisation of technoiogy and attribution of supernatural features to it are in the final analysis intended to cover up ihose really responsible {or wars.

There are numerous other theories lo explain the car.rses of war. However, that is not a proof of the {ertility of the bourgeois military science.

The inulh aboul the origin of wars is one, but ihe

advocates seek to convince people lhel there are issues which are far more important in life than peace. Statements to {hat e{fect can often be heard frorn US political spokesmen. ln the book "War and Civilisation from Early History to Nuclear and Space Era" (1980) polemologists suggest ihat peace may be sacrificed to things of greater value, for instance, the survival of lhe state.

This subjectivist approach permils imperialism 1o justify military aggression against socialism un-

der the prelext that it cannot survive peaceful competition with ihe socialist world. lmperialism is ready to commit any crime, to sacri{ice anything for the sole purpose of survival. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assislant to the US President for Nacan be neither a firsi, nor: a last war." lf lhat is iional Securiiy Af{airs, once cynically said lhat a true, there is no prectical purpose in looking for nuclear world war was nothing lo be afraid of, for it would cost no more lhan 10 per cent of the or, exposing the culprits and fhe anti-war siruEgle is therefore useless. This is lhe final conclusion fo w,crld population. which these theories lead.

The 26th CPSU Congress brought to the atteniion of the world the fact that some Weslern spoWitrh no less zeal do the bourEeois ideologists kesmen are trying to present a limited nuclear misinterpret the essence o{ war. They look spepossible option and lo adapf the public war as a cial advantage of lhe 200th enniversary of K. von possibility. to a such Clausewitz, a prominent German military lheoreThe director of the so-called US research cenfician. Bourgeois sociology widely re{ers to Clausewitz's maxim that "war is a conlinuation of ire for the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe, iried to prove that a limited nuclear con{lict was stale policy by di{ferent means." nol bound to grow into a toial nuclear war.

V. L Lenin accepfed this formula too, ar,d he Exposing such phony tranquilising bunkum actually highly appreciaied K. von Clausewitz as L. l. Brezhnev warns that "this is sheer deceplion a rnilitary theoretician and gave him credit for his of the peopies! A limited nuclear war as conceivwar and discovery of the relationship between politics. But Clausewitz failed to see the depen- ed by the Americans in, say, Europe would {rom dencd of a state's external policy on its inter- lhe outsei mean the certain destruction of Euronal policy, he did not realise that the policy of pean civilisation. And of course the United Staies, too, would not be able to escape the flames a siate is, in V. I. Lenin's words, "a concentraled expression of the economy." Clausewitz believed of war." that the foreign po[icy pursued by a slale in war There are nirmerous other fheories o{ war circuexpressed the interests of the w'hole nation. Aclated in the West. Some of them approach wars cordinEly modern bourEeois analysls assert ihat more cautiously, while ihe pacifist concept conwers are waEed by slale leaders on behalf of the demns any and every war, including war for freewhole country. Developing the lrue, not imagi- dom against oppressors and invaders. Paci{ists nary essence of war V. l. Lenin stated ihat war is hope in vain to restrain the imperialists by desca continualion of the policy o{ the ruling ctrass by ribing fhe horrible effecls of a future nuclear war. violent means. Bourgeois lheoreficians go out of Distorting the essence, causes and roie of wars fheir way to conceal lhe cless essence of wars in in history, bourgeois ideologists comply with the order to calI any imperialisf military intervention orders of the imperialis{ reaciionaries and the an expression of the national will. But imperialism will the ruling class in an effort io mislead the of pursues only ihe interesfs o{ monopoly capital popular masses concerning the aggressive nature and iis policy runs counfer to the interests of the military policy. of imperialism's working people.

Exposure o{ the false concepls of wars is a vital Bourgeois sociologisls ettribufe differenf roles necessity for all those who cherish peace, demolo wars in history. Let us consider the mosl dan- cracy and socialism. gerous theories and concepts. Some of lhern praise wars in the hislory of mankind. These theories belong to the most rabid proponents of ihe imperialist system. They praise mililarisation of society, minimise fhe hazards of nuclear war. These war I Iies are multiple. Bourgeois analysfs carefully conceal the truth and do everything to make war look like an eternal and intrinsic feature of human society. l-'1. Berbera says: "As long as ihe basic causes and motives of wars rennain lhe sanne fhere

44

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HE AREA o{ the Medilerranean Sea, iis eastern parl above all, has become one of lhe rnost volatile "hot poinls" on the globe. Under the false pretext of a "Soviet military threat," the "straiegic center of graviiy" is being shified ihere and Js nrignt in thJtvtedilerranean, which is

expected to be beefed Yp by naval . {ormations from Britain, fhe FRG and Holland, is being bolslered. All this is being done to rein{orce a soulhern springboard {or delivering slrikes- at socialisl countriel as well as for armed interference in ihe affairs of any Medilerranean siate'

The independenf states of lhe Arab East and Northern Airica are constanfly being subjected to .poliiical pressure on the pari of ihe Uniled States, io blackmail and outright military ihreats' There are more than enough examples of this' Thus, last Augusl US warships led by the aircrait carrier Nimiti made an incursion into the Bay of Sidra' Fighter planes from lhis carrier shot down two Lybiln aircra{t which had been patrolling their own ierrilorial waters, while bombers made "training" raids on the Lybian cilies of Tripoli and Bengasi' Last November ihe Pentagon conducted in this area the mosl massive manoeuvres since 'lhe war, code-named Brighi Slar-2, during which American

troops practiseJ landings on the territory of an Arab country. Dozens of ships of the US Sixth Fleet fook part in them; 4,000 US Marines from the rapid deployment {orces disembarked on Egyptian soil, and American strategic bombers .a-rried out bombing "exercises" on the ierrilory

along the Lybian border. American AWACS airptanes were quickly dispatched to Egypt to moniior Lybian air space. Washingion simultaneously prodded the Sudan inlo a "preventive sirike" against Lybia. Sudanese Preside,ri Nimeiri declar.l hir country io be in a "staie of w'ar with Lybia," while Washington o{{icials announced that they would suppori the Sudan's aggression against Lybi

a.

One oi the principal means of suppressing nalional liberation movements in the Mediierranean area is the US Sixth Fleet, vrhich is NATO's "strike force" in ihe Souih European theatre of operations. Depending on the siiuation, il is composed of as many as 50 ihips of various designalion, including aircraft carriers and submarines, as well as so-me 200 carrier-based planes. Furthermore, in the

event of interventionist actions against states of ihe Middle and Near East, ihe 1st Amphibious Group with Marine subunits is permanently stationed in the Mediterranean.

Under fhe NATO slructure, ihe South European theatre of operations includes the territories of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea and ihe Sea of Marmora, and even the southern part of ihe Black Sea. The Apennine Peninsula, so ltaiian journalisis claim, is as full of American military inslallaiions as a watermelon is full of seeds' Some 12,000 American servicemen are slationed ihere on military bases and strongholds of various designation (naval, air, communication, supply, etc')'

The Commander-in-Chief of ihe South European

45

lheaire of operations is localed in Naples, The headquarlers o{ lhe US Sixth Fleel is also fhere, in ihe cily's port.

Washington views the territory of lfaly as a springboard for the conducl of military operations

by American armed {orces far beyond the con{ines of NATO's sphere of aclivity East, - the Middte Persian Gulf and the lndian Ocean.

There exists a plan for the creatio:r of the so-:alled "arc of defence" which is supposed to reach into Pakistan in the East and Poriugal in the West, and to include lsrael, Egypf, Turkey, Greece, ltoly and Spain. With the aid of this "arc" Washington, as people in that region see it, wanls to protect the "vulnerable underbelly" of Western Europe, ln realily, however, what is at issue is the applicaiion of NATO's zone of action to Norlhern Africa and the Near and Middle East, right up lo the Persian Gulf and the provision of "oplimal condilions" for the actions of the American rapid depioyment forces in the Mediterranean and "east of 5uez. "

ln this conneciion Washington is concentrating on restoring ils military lies wilh Turkey in full measure. Washinglon became particularly infe;ested in military bases in lhis counlry afler lran calegorically demanded that Americaq military bases be dismantled on iis territory. Here account is taken not only of Turkey's direct proximity to the USSR, which has always been a stro6rg calling card with the USA and lhe olher NATO countries, but also its role as the "norfhern guard of the Middle Easi and A{rica." The US Department of DeIence took great pains to have Congress lifi the

embargo on US weapons deliveries to Turkey, owing to which the latter closed down American military bases on its lerrilory in 1975. The Pentagon also got Congress to consent to give mililary aid to Turkey. A{ter the embargo was lifted in the summer ol 1978 the Turkish government announced fhe resumplion of the aclivity of US military bases. According to the Western press, functioning on Turkish terrilory today are some 40 American military installations, includipg 26 military bases on which as many as 5,000 US armed forces personnel are stationed. lsrael and Egypt are the United States' mosf energetic accomplices in ihe Eastern Mediterranean. Following the conclusion of the Camp David agreement lsraeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin proposed to Washinglon io set up a naval base in Haifa and an air base in Ezion. Washingion, of course, will take advantage of Tel Aviv's and Cairo's good graces. An agreemeni has been reached on the Pentagon's using two air and one naval base which lsrael handed over to Egypt, as well as on ihe setting up of two American air ba46

in lsrael's Negev Desert. The bases which the Pentagon has received or is building in these couniries will become iransfer points for lhe rapid deployment forces, which are one of the chief instruments lhrough which the course for'inlernational lerrorism proclaimed by US President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of Stale Alexander Haig is to be pursued.

Washington's Medilerranean policy ignores lhe inieresls and aspirations of lhe peoples of this region, "Today, just as many years ago, lhe warships of the US Sixih Fleet in the Mediterranean are an active means for bringing pressure to bear on the African nations," staled M. Qaddafi, leader of the Lybian revoluiion. "This fleet is a link in lhe chain of conspiracies againsi ihe Arab counfries, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia and other independenl countries, lt supports reactionary forces, including lsrael and racisi minority governments."

Washinglon ignores not only the inleresls o{ the Arab and African peoples, but also ihe national inlerests ol ihe NATO member countries. For example, in a bid to woo Greece and Turkey, Washinglon is trying lo resolve their conflicl over Cyprus within the NATO framework. This solulion is being rejected by the people of Cyprus, who want an inlernalional conference on Cyprus, as was once proposed by the Soviet Union. ses

Unlike the United States, which is localed thousands of miles away from the Medilerranean, lhe Soviet Union, while being a Black Sea power, is

aiso a Mediterranean one. lt cannot but show an inlerest in the siluation in this region, inasmuch as the USA and ihe other NATO countries have lor many years now been concentraling large forces in ihe direct proximily of Soviel borders. For this reason the Soviet Union's introduclion of a naval squadron into lhe Mediterranean was quile underslandable and justified.

The Soviet Union supporls all the initiatives o{ the Mediterranean countries aimed at demilitarising the basin. lt itself has advanced many such iniliatives. The progressive public of the region called the proposals made by Leonid Brezhnev in June 1981 at a receplion in honour of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid a programme of peace and securily for the Mediterranean peoples.

These proposals are so extensive, topical and constructive that they should be implemenled in their enlirety.

The Soviet Union believes that ihe Medilerranean should and can be transformed from a region of military and political confronlation into a zone of peace and cooperation, stated ihe head of the Soviet stale. These aims could be served by the reaching of internaiional agreemenis on the following issues:

the application to the area of the Medilermeasures in the military field, which have already proved to be ef-

- of confidence-building ranean

Talyzin last autumn the necessity was underscored

io turn the Mediterranean inlo a zone ol slable peace and fruitful and equitable cooperafion.

feciive in internaiional practice; a coordinated reduction of armed forces in - area; ihat withdrawal from ihe Mediterra:lean of ships nuclear weapons; carrying desisting from deploying nuclear weapons on- the lerritory of Mediterranea;r non-nuclear cou ntri es;

ihe adoption of a commilment by ihe nuc- powers not to use nuclear weapons against lear any Medilerranean country which does not permit ihe deployment ol such weapons on ils ierrilory.

These proposals by the USSR have been enthusiaslically endorsed and supported by the peaceloving public in the region and the world over.

Thus, during the official visit to Malla of Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Minislers N. V.

Bolh sides came out in favour of reaching inlernational agreemenls in the spiril of the aboyementioned principles.

It is telling, however, that the official press of the United Stales and several other NATO countries have tried to play down and even dislort ihe all-encompassing Soviet initialives on the Medilerranean Sea. American envoys continue to pressure the Mediterranean countries into laking part in Washinglon's military preparalions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The United States continues to beef up its military presence in these regions. Here, too, it is playing power politics, a practice which has blought it many shameful miliiary and political failures.

Washington's Mediterranean gamble will nol pay off, since it runs .ounter lo lhe vital interests of three neighbouring continents.

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MEFHffi{3ffi flBF ffi TffiEWffi Colonel Z. ZOTOV, Cand. Sc. (History) URING the Great Pairiotic War the Soviel ,A.rmy gained all kinds of experience in defending lowns. Let us exarnine the rnain questions connec'ted with this type of combat action. $rganisimg de{ences. On the approaches to tovrns defences were organised as posifional ones, while inside lowns ihey were organised on the principles o{ fortress defence. LeninEred, for exarnple, was surrouncJed by three defenrsive lines. The {orces holding the iirst line vyere in close contacf with lhe enemy. The second defensive line was organised along the railway ring. The third line followecl fhe city's oulskirts. The lines were ,connecled by switch positions. The city itself was lurned into a fortress and divided in seven defensive sectors, Defences were organised approximately in the sarne way in a number of olher cities and towns inciuding Odessa, Sevastopol, Kiev end Stalingrad. ln the defensive lines battalion defence areas and company and platoon strong points were organised. They had frenches, comrnuhication lrenches, log pillboxes, concreie bunkers and armourprotected fire emplacements. Besides, antitank ditches were dug and scarps, concrele blocks, wire entanglements and mine fields installed.

Towns had all-round defences. All blocks and large strong buildings were turned into strong points connecfed wilh each other by communicalion trenches. The walls of houses in which embrasures were pierced were reinforced with sandbags and additional brick-work. Sewer syslem and communicalion shafts were equipped as concealed fire ernplacemenls, underground lines as communicafion lrenches and basements as command and medical posls and depofs.

Baftle lormalions of units and large unifs. Divisions and regimenls holding defence on the line of the enemy main blow were reinforced with men and equipmenf and given narrower sectors and defence areas than on the line of a secondary attack.

The battle formalions of subunits. units and formalions depended on many factors such as com4B

position and numerical strengih

of own

and

enemy forces, the length of the front Iine, chc3racier o{ the terrain, etc. Thus, when defendinE Cdes-

sa in field conditions the defence zone of a division was 2A-25 km. lt had o!-re- or fwo-eclre!sn battle formation with all-arms (an infantry beltalion) and enfitank (an antitank batte!ion) reser\,/es and an artillery group. Defence ereas of reginrenis were 5-10 km and battalion defence sectors 22.5 km in frontaEe. ,4s a rule, regirnents assumed one-eehelon batile {or.nlation with a reserve (one infantry company). Each reEimenf was reinfoiced with an artillery battalion. lnfenlry battalions assumed one-echelon bottle {ormation. Tl-ley were reinforced with several antitank guns. [n{antry companies defended strong points.

The baiile formations of ihe forces defending Leningrad were differenf. For example, the 42nd 4try, holding delences in the 21-km zone, had four infantry divisions, two of them in the firsi echelon and lwo in ihe second. The divisions held defences in a 10-km zone and had one-echelon battle fornration, while in{antry regiments had de{enrsive areas with 3-3.5 km froniage end assumed two-echelon baftle forrnation. Quiie dif{erent was the picture in fhe 55th Arnry, which held defences in a 28-km zone and had five infantry divisions. lt had a one-echelon operational formetion which rnade it possible for divisions lo heve relatively narrow zones, on lhe average 5-6 kmThey assumed fwo-echelon battle formotion with iwo regimenis in the first echelon and one regimeni in the second echelon. Regir"nenls' defence sectors had 2.5-3 km frontage. The enemy could nol break through the deeply-echeloned, strong defences or gain a foothold in the city's outskirls-.

OrEanising a fire system. Experience shows thaf this depended on the quantity of armament, froniage of lhe defensive zone, the forces' baftle formations and ierrain conditions. The characterisiic feature of the fire system was that its basis was machine-gun and arlillery lire. This was due to the fact that the core of the infantry divisions' defences ai Kiev, Leningrad, Sevastopol and other cilies were separate machine-gun and artillery batfalions occupying solid engineer conslructions.

The second peculiarily in organising a fire system was its being prepared in advance not only before the FEBA, but also in ihe depth of the deIences along ihe mosl imporlanl lines. Fire weapons of the second echelons, reserves, artillery and tanks were used to fulfil this mission. lt should be pointed out thal the {ire sysfem, as a rule, was tied in with engineer obstacles.

The third peculiarity was a lier siiing of fire weapons. For this purpose use was made of multislorey buildings and hills, as was the case at Sevastopol. The multi-tier {ire made for increased density..

Defence inside towns required conslanl and high readiness o{ the fire system. Frequently the sides were divided by a street or a space between houses amounting to a few dozen yards.

The slightest delay in opening fire allowed the enemy to rush into a defended objeciive. The exislence o{ permanent emplacements, log pillboxes, reliable shelters, including some for guns of all calibres and ammunilion, made the de{ences and lhe fire syslem mc're stable.

All ihese made it possible lo create zones of continuous fire of high density before the FEBA a.;rd in ihe depth of the defences.

Organising anlitank delences. ,The Soviet Command always strove lo organise deep antitank defences. A characleristic fealure in organis'ing antitank defences was a complex use of all available weapons and their massing in tank-threatened directions.

Anlitank gun fire was the basis o{ the antitank ln de{ending a number of ciiies and towns antitank strong points were organised with lhe arlillery intended {or fighting tanks. They were siled within ihe battalion defence areas as a result of which they were able lo cooperate closely with the infantry, tanks and supporting artillery. ln a number of cases ihe slrong points were uniled into a lank-proof area. Experience tesliiied that if was imporlani to have antitank reserves.

They were disposed in tank-lhreatened directions and formed, as a rule, by three lines o{ deployment in the probable directions o{ a tank advance, and by strong points in the conceniration area.

A system o{ engineer obstacles including antilank mine fields, fougasses, ditches, dragon teeth, road blocks and barricedes played an important role in antiiank defence. lt was also characterised by great density and depth of engineer obstacles.

Aciivity of {orces. HiEh activity of the forces determines to a great extent the slability of de{ences. lf the batile taciics of units and formations on defensive lines oulside a lown differed only slightly from those of field defences, in the town ilself the differences were considerable. As a rule, fighting in a town was split up into clashes bel-

Stalingrad. November

1942

de{ences.

ween small subunits and separate groups of different composition. Such groups Iormed lhe basic taclical unii. The appearance o{ such groups was quite natural. By no means every organic subunil with its armament, organisation and equipmeni was suited lo defend town installations. Besides, there was no sharply marked forward edge and subunits often had to defend buildings in the enemy rear.

The tenseness of the fighting led to considerable losses in men. The command had lo unite lhe depleled subunits and somelimes even regiments and divisions inlo independent groups (detachments). Aciive de{ence demanded organisalion of {requenl counteratlacks and this led to the crealion of assault groups, which subsequently assumed defence of captured obiectives. ln Slalingrad, for example, groups . numbering {rom 5-10 lo 20-30 men armed wiih machine guns, antitank rifles, mortars and sniper rifles

were detailed to de{end buildings' Close combat was an imporlant peculiarity of the fighting laclics in a lown.

49

When fighling in a building lhe sides were {requenlly divided only by a wall, sfaircase, floor or ceiling. ln such conditions close combat was the only way to achieve success. Often it look place in ruins. Such was the case in Stalingrad, where practically all the city buildings were deslroyed.

Activity of the defence found its expression in counlerattacks, massed artillery blows, constant aimed fire of small arms, and sniper activily.

Counteratlacks were carried out not only for lhe purpose of capturing big objecfives, bul even separate buildings, floors and staircases. Operations of engineer subunits were of paromount importence {or the activity of defence. During battles fcr separate objectives combaf engineers dug saps to lhem and blew them up to clear the way {or attacking assault groups.

Wide use was made of rnanoeuvre with men and equipment. ln Stalingrad, when carrying out counferaftacks, the Soviet Command massed forg.e1 to capture a specific objective. Very oflen fighting look place at niEhf-iime when the enemy did not undertake exten!ive offensive operations and one need not fear {or weakened sectors. Undoubtedly this demanded a concealed conceniration of forces. . Experience of organising defences in a town showed that troop contro! here had certain pecu_ liarilies. lt is rather di{{iculi io exercise confrol over a greal number of separate small subunils and groups (garrisons) and also too complicated to provide communication and organise observa_ lion. ln these conditions command and observa_ tion posts of formations, units and subunits were siled nearer 1o the forces. The network of observaiion posts was considerably increased.

It should be underlined that when fighting in a town commanders and men had to display not only courage and resolve but also the ability to act independently in any situation. Of great im_ porlance here was Party-political work. Even in the most di{ficult momenfs, commanders and political workers, rank and file Communists tried to have talks with the soldiers, to give them fhe latesl news, 1o explain lo lhem lhe combat mission and to recommend how to act in particular combat conditions.

The experience o{ organising defences in a town acquired during the war is still of considerable significance today.

E

fi Eerner

of frussta Lieutenanf-Colonel of Medical Service Yu. !-ANOYENKO

HE VOLOKOLAMSK and then the llyinsk highways

lead lo one of the most beautiful places.near Moscow the "Arkhangelskoye" Museum-Eslate.

This monumenl of architecture has been famous {or 350 years. Its consiruction Iasled almost hali a century. The estale was created by serfs, artists, architects and sculptors.

Ai the beginning of the'l 9th cenlury i{ became ihe properiy of Prince N. Yusupov, one of fhe richest men in Russia. ln his iime "Arkhangelskoye" was turned into a depository o[ mosi valuable works of arl. lis picfure gallery alone conlained over five hundred canvasses. The palace was decorafed with sculptures, furniture of extraordinary

beauty, bronzes, porcelains and carpets.

After ihe victory of the Greaf October Socialis! Revolution ihe doors of all old Russia's palaces, among them "Arkhangelskoye," were opened to the public. Millions of people were able to see lhe wonder{ul monuments of Russian cullure and 1o appreciafe at their worth the labour and lalents of those who created lhis remarkable architeclural ensemble, now a state museum.

ln 'l 933 lhe Government decided to lransler ihe esfate io ihe military aulhorities and the construciion of a rest home for commanders of ihe Soviet Armed Forces began.

Thus a sanaforium, now one of lhe best health r'esorts of ihe USSR Ministry o{ Defence, was lounded in ihat piciuresque spot of the Moscow suburbs. t he popularily of "Arkhangelskoye" grew. Servicemen were not the only ones who visiled it. Revolutionaries weni there ioo. The book of guests'impressions o{ that period contains an eniry made by G. Dimiirov: "l am exlremely delighted with the museum. Everylhing is wonderfully arranged. Very instruciive, especially for our younger generalion.

medical block, a swimming pool wiih

sea wafer, a gymnasium, sports grounds, a spacious club and a large library.

From one year to the nert "Arkhangelskoye" this wonderful cor-

ner of Russia,- where lhe be.:uties of nature and lhe old palace esiate are combined well wifh the Iamous heallh resort. becomes more att-

racfive. The sanatorium's perscnnel aie a comrnunisl labour colleclive really worthy of fhat title.

The

"Arkfiangelskoye" Museurn:

Estate

One of the sanatoriuffi buildings

A living hislory of barbarous landlordship and real revolulionary political lileracy..."

During lhe Greal Patriotic War a mililary hospital, in which lhe lives of hundreds of Soviet lervicemen were saved. was sei up in the sanaforium.

ln May 1943 lhe sanalorium was named "Cenlral Clinical Sanalorium of fhe Red Army" and supplied with

modern apparafuses, equipmenl, and rnedicines.

MM

ln recenl years the sanalorium cenfre of a scientificresearch trend in the study of

became the

melhods and rneanr o[ lreafing hearf diseases. Special aftenlion is paid lo problems of climatology, mefeopalhology and climatotherapy in lhe <enfral zone of lhe European part o[

the USSR. The history o{ the "Arkhangel-

skoye" sanaiorium continues. Year

by year diagnosfic and

freatment

lacilifies are improved. The inmales have al their service a wondcrful

N

N$N

Ni.iN.n$

H$

.^.. $rt\rN

:::.!if..::,1N;:lN+

p IG TIURE ffiffi ffi& TEUTENANT Vladimir KARPOV, Hero of the Soviet Union

This is the last instalment of Vladimir Karpov's "Picture of a Lieutenant"* about the life of Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Teremov, regimental commander, and Lieutenant Alexand-er Teremov. his son. s^to1y

FTER the air raid the commandant's platoon leeder and Lieutenant Teremov l-ere picked up b-v medical orderlies of a military unit u'ho happened io be passing along ihe road and delivered the l,ounded men io hospital- The starshina died there, but Alexander u,'as evacuated to the rear lor treatment. He spent more than a month in bed. Upon dischargg lrom hospitaI Alexander asked to be sent back to his regiment. But during the heavy fighting uniis rvere being transferred practically evbry day from one sector of the front to another, from one IIank to another or rvithdrau.n to the reserve. Nobody in the rear could Iocate Teremov's regiment for sure. During the month many changes had taken place.

,*

Co.n-tinue_d. See pre.cedin-g ^ .1, 3, 4 and 5, 1982.,

-* view," Nos

52

instalments

in .,Soviet Military

Re-

Thc iact that Alexander could not rcturn to his regiment put him in a touglr spot indeed. To report to the rear authorities that he had been ordered to be shot and to ask for the execution of that order would be simply stupid. Nobody there kneu, him. Nobody knew rvhat charges had been brorrght against him. So he could not t,ery rvell ask to be shot. Alexander had no intention whatever oi hiding from his mates. His conscience u.as clear. He

decided to locate his regiment by the number of the field post office. Meanuhile he intended to iight in some other unit, to try to distinguish himself and, if evervthing went u-ell, win a decoration. Then his unit would

sflow him mercy and his father u,ould be mollified.

Firmly dctermined to earn justification in battle AIefander "looke( for trouble." He vhs soon wounded again and spent some tinte in hospital. He wrote severaI letters to his faiher giving the originat field post office numberBut he received no answer. Thc division had apparently been reformed. Sasha knew noihing about the death of his mother or the fate of his father.

He did not return to the front until the beginning oi I

943.

On the day of his dcparture hc attached io his tLrnic thc newly introdticed shoulder pieces. On his way' to the foru'ard edge he had his photo taken in Tula. LIe had not earned any Order yet. Lieutenant Teremov. gave the photograph that had been taken in Tula to a tankman asking him to iind a major with a common Russian name and to

tell him that he had died an honourable death' I(oloskov-

senioi, the tankman, could not remember the simple Russian name. Att he could remember was that the lieulenanti had asked him to look for his relatives in Vyazma, where his paternal uncle used to live.

SCORCHED BY WAR And so, trventy 1'ears later yotrng Lietrtenant Koloskov' just as 1'oLrihful, iresh and slim as Alexander Tcrctnov had once been, lold Colonel Teremot'the storl'of ihc last .battle his son had iought and died in.

They u'ere sitting in the regimental commander's strrdy at his home. The shelves were stacked rvith books. Newspapers and magazines were neatly piled on the desk' The colonel's home lr,as jrrst as neat as his office. Not only the study, but alt the rooms Koloskov happened to pass through u'ere Spick and span. Yet there was somethirrg missing, something that makes a home a home.

The two sat lor a while in silence. The colonel was engrossed in ihe past. The lieutenant was somewhat confused becaLrse he knew so little.

Teremov began to ask one question after anothcr. He vanted more details. Lieutenant Koloskov rvillingly retold thg,story, adding a few deiails he happened to knorv. The colonel askcd'him to repeat the main poinis: "Woutd yott please telt me again u'hat he actually said to your father, u.hen he gave him the photo?"

"He said: 'Give the rrajor this photograph and tell him

that I died honourably, iighting ior nr1' cotrntry,"'the

lieutenant repeated.

Plunged .in thought, ihe colonel seemcd to frown. The lieuienant ihorrglrt he u'as displeased" Of cottrse, Terernov was eager to know every detai[ about his boy's life and death. But Koloskov cotrld tell the colonel onll' l'hat he had heard from his father.

After the talk rvith Koloskov the colonel could not work for several days. He could not put his hand to anything, absent-minded, he ielt sick. Sensing ihat this would tor-

tilt he found out everything, Teremov took his annual Ieave, reqttesting Lieutenant Koloskov to accompany him to Or.vol, i.e. to see Koloskov senior' The Koloskovs rvelcotrted ihe guests 11'4rml/.

"Dad," Grigory said, "we've come to find orrt somethe major t'hose name lhing. This is Colonel Teremov

ture him

-

you could not recall."

"Why, of course, Teremov! Teremovl That's the common Russian name I tried to remember," the lather exclaimed' Dmitry Vasil)'evich Koloskov was stilI narrating the events of the remote past late that night.

At $reakfast the iollowing morning the colonel said to him: "Would you do me a favour? Could you sparc a couPle of days and take me to the place of that battle' Smolensl( is not far from here. I feel I must go there. Perhaps 9e could find his grave."

Koloskov responded enthusiastically:

"That should have occurred to me in the lirst place' We should have gone there a long time ago. Of course, we shall go, comrade colonel'" Tlre place had changed very much since the u'ar. Kolos-

kov senior could hardly recognise it. In those dals the woods u'ere badly battered with shell splinters. The boughs ol many trees had been broken. But now the trees were covered u'ith a thick foliage as if there had becn no war at all. Only the common graves of fallen soldiers on the hills and at the edges of woods reminded I'isitors of the heavy battles fought in the area.

Koloskov senior said sadll':

"We should have iollowed ihe exact route oi our regiment. I'm afraid I mighi fail to recognise the place from the road. V'e u'ere noi advancing along the road lhen' We ran inio it lrom the side and straddled it' We were coming from the north-east. On the other side of the embankment there tvas a marsh' inio l'hich we u'ithdrew Iater.

They stopped several times KoloJkov asked the local

inhabitants:

"ls

there a placc l'here a marsh goes right up to the

road?"

"We have a loi of marshes around here- Which one

do

you \\'ant?" they rePlied.

Finally, an old nran thought he knew what ihe visitors rvere looking for, He started to explain to thern saying:

"l think I

know the marsh .vou

want.

disabled lanks there."

"Do y'ou mean to say the tanks are loskov senior asked in amazement.

There are sotne

still ihere?"

Ko-

"Not alt oi them, of course," the old man replie{"They cut many of them up rvith welders and removed them."

"So ihere are none Ieit?" Koloskov enquired-' "'lhere are stili it'o or lhree left. They could not get thrn out oi ihe bog. The tanks had sunk too deep into the grorrnd."

They t'ere on the move again- -\nd indeed, as soon as ihe car had climbed a hill round a bend all three of them idenlified the place they were looking for- There was a bog to the left of the road. In the marsh, not very far from the edge, u'ere two T-34 medium tanks' "Tanks! Our tanks!" Koloskov ciied out in amazement. "That one is mine, the one on the right. You can see one iigure on it. Seven. D'you see it? It used to be three hundred and seven. I painted the figures on it myself ."

There were people on the edge of the marsh. Koloskoy drove towards them. He'stoPPed the car near two boys. He asked them: "What are you doing here?"

"We are draining the bog."

"I lought here during the war," Koloskov said pensivell'. "That \Yas my tank. Number three hundred and seven. D'you see it?"

The boys looked intere*ed-

53

(r (

r(

-?

,(

,e tl

rl

\-.

tfu,t

t,

='W,bg

-. /, t,

.tt

:G

il't:ra*.EaFl+

+._ ..\--rff--

)

,"Did

"I

1'ou really

a

iight in it?" one of them

asked.

driver-mechanic," Koloskov replied. ,,Why don't 1'ou get ihem out? In prague they tuined one ot our T-34 ianks into a memorial and placed it on a peu.as

desta 1."

"We've read aborrt that."

"Then u'hv don't you do the same thing?"

"They' onl1. shon.ed

up jast r.ear. Before lhat

you

couldn't see them above the surface of the bog. We didn't even krpw there were tanks in i,he marsh here.

When u'e started to drain the bog, the u.ater Ievel dropped and the tanks shou.ed above the surface."

The lanks were more like mounds covered by dry r,l.eeds-

Only the gun turreis shou.ed u.hat they werl.

Lieutenant Koloskov asked: "Have vou checked to see s.hether there are any bodies in them? Perhaps, ri'e should burv them?', "Yes, u'e had a look. Those that have alreadv been taken a\r'a\'\\'ere empty. There rvas only l.ater and.ilt in th"r.

We inspected one of these too. Bui ri.e couldn't get into tbe one u'ilh the figure seven. It is closed from inside.

Without a word Colonel Teremov made his rvay to the tank. One of lhe boys cried out:

"Don't go there, comrade colonel,

there."

ii is siill

boggy

However, the colonel went on as if he had not heard the warning. He entered the green-black ooze sinking

practically to his knees, his boots champing in Koloskovs

-

father and son

-

iollowed him,

it.

The

"/

When they reached the tank, Teremov, derying the rnud, ulll' removed the silt and moss frorn the turret.

caref

The three of them iried to raise the hatch cover. but failed. Dmitrl, Vasili,evich returned to the bus to get hiS tools. Using a cold chisel and a tyre bar, they iried to force the hatch cover. They hope{ the locks had rusted through and would break u'hen force u.as applied: But their effort u'as vain.

Accompanied by the bol.s,

ihey u,ent to the

village,

^ found the smithy and persuaded the blacksmith to help them open rhe tank.

"We'll pay you for 1'our trouble,', Lieutenant Koloskov said, seeing that the blacksmiths were unwilling to helpA siurdy grey-haired fellow very much like a gypsy raised a thick brow and cast an angry glance at lhe y'oung officer.

"You don't take money for a job like that,', he said in a low hoarse voice. "lt yould be a sin. Well, come on,

let's go," he said io his apprentices.

The blacksmirhs took several long hours to knock the hatch cover ofi its hinges u'ith their sledge hamrners.

Cars stopped on ihe roadside to see what they u.ere doing.

When the blacksmiths finally opened the hatch, Koloskov looked inside the turret and whispered to Teremov: "Here he is. He remained at the gun.,'

After a brief pause he added: "He died a hero's death, fighting to the last round."

New Books

+ New Books + New Books +

Books a

Fo'R 1I]E SAT(E OF

New

He noted that this fraternal

en-

thusiasm developed into a mighty and majestic demonsiration against

A BRTC'{TEP.

internaiional imperialism, rvhich rvas preparing to march against

FUTURE

Soviet Russia.

The documents ciied in the book show that the fate of this great

revolutionary was closelv bouod up with the communist and working class movement.

B. SOLDATENKO

The book under revieu'gives con-

in

1921 Georgy Dimitrov took

part in the

3rd

Congress of the

Communist International, at u'hich he met V. I. Lenin. In 1933 he de-

fended the ideas oi communism and exposed fascism at a triaI Hiller's henchmen staged at Leipzig in 3n

The Political Literature Publish'ing House of the USSR and lhe

siderable space

threw him into prison, but yielding to ihe pressure of a broad international campaign in . defence of Georgy Dimitrov, they rvere forced

ber."* The collection shou's vividlland convincingly the internationa-

October Socialist Revoluiion on the development of ihe revolutionarY movement in Bulgaria, to the Bulgarian working people's actions ttnder the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Partyr in deience oi the

diplomatic and trade relations with

Communist International. During

Publishing House oI the Bulgarian Communist Partl'have iointlv out out a tu'o-r'olume collection bf docrrmcnts and materials entitled "Under the Banner of Octo-

list solidarit.v of the Soviet and Bulgarian u'orking PeoPle during the Civil \\'ar and the Period of foreign military' intervention in Russia in l9l8-20. the '*'ork of Bulgarian communist grouPS in Russia. the historical ties. friendship and cooperation betu'een the Russian C6mmunist PartY (Bolsheviks) +* and

the Bulgarian

Com-

fttrrnist Partr'.

The book points out that Bulgarian rvorking people found themsel-

in Russia for various reasons.

In the main thev were prisoners-of 'war captured during the First 1\'orld \\'ar, poliiical exiles, or farm labourers *'ho had left their own country in search for rvork. When ves

'the Great October Socialist Revolu-

lion triumphed in l9l7 the f or-

ward-thinking Bulgarian u'orking people formed communist grouPs with ihe support of the Russian

Bolshevik Partr'. These groups entered the Russian Communist Partv (Bolsheviks) and Plaved a big role in the dissemination of comrnunist ideas among the Bulgarian vorking people in Russia and in

lhe orfanisation oI

international

units for the Red .\rm1'.

* "Under the Banner of October: ColIe.ted Documents arld Materials in'l-wo Yolumes. October 25 (November 7), 1917.

November 7. 1993." Political Literature Publishing House. Moscow. Publishing

House o[ the Bulgarian Comtnutlisl Parlv. Sofia.1981. i* The name of the CPSU at thc time.

to

documentary

proof of the inlluence of the Great

Soviet Republic and the mass ri'orking people's movement in Bulgaria Ior the cstablishment of Soviet Russia.

Georgy Dimitrov (1882- 1949), faithful son of the Bulgarian People, distinguished leader of the international communist and 'fforking class movement, rvas one of the leaders

of that struggle. The

tenarv of his birth

t'ill

cen-

be marked

on Jirne 18. 1982.

The book has \\'arm tvords'lor this ardent Conimunist. Dimitrov enthusiasticall.v hailed the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. From the outset'he became one of its active Promoters and de-

He persistentlY fought against the efforts of the Bulgarian government to suPPIv the Russian White Guards t'ith t'eaPons and render them other forms of aid. At the same time he rvorked to get the Bulgarian people 1o aid the starving people in Russia. The book rePro-

fenders.

duces his article entitled "Aid of the Bulgarian People to the Starr'-

People." It reads in Part: ing ..\ccoiding to information from Bulgaria the masses of working peofle there have responded with unusual enthusiasm to the aPPeal oi the Communist International to render material aid to the siarving population of areas of Soviet Russia that have been afflicted with crop failure. The slogan: 'Bread and aid to the starving Rtrssian ]vorkers and peasanis instead of guns, cartridges and shells against Soviet Russia.' "

attempt to indict him. The

nazis

to release him.

In 1934 Georgy Dimitrov becarne a Soviet citizen. From 1935 to 1943 he u'as Secretary General of the Executive Committee ol the those years he took an aciive Part in the- public antl political life oI

the USSR. He was-elected

dePtrtY

to the Supreme Soviet of the USSRlle oerfoimed a historic service in tuniolding the antifascist struggle in Bulgalia which led to -victorl'- in

the armed uPrising on

SePtember

9, 1914. In'1945 the Presidiunr of the USSR SuPreme Soviet au'arded Georsy Dimitiov the Order oi l-enin f"or distinguished services in the iight againsl fascism.

The articles collected in the'bool< end excerpts from GeorgY Dimitrov's sDeecltes vividly testify to his devotioh to the world comr,nrrnist rnovement.

These two volumes

of

documents

and materials were collected bY scientists in the USSR and Bulgaria two fraternal socialist coun-

- They prove that the Great tries.

October Socialist Revolution not onl,v marked a turning point in lhe life of these two countries, but also

ushered in a new historical era, the era of revolutionary transfor-

rnation of the world, the era oi transition to socialism and communism.

I

TtlE Ivl0$T PIICEFIJL U],llT 0F ILL t.

-'

Commenting on the torrr of lhe

Twice Ordcr of the Red

Banner

and Order of the Red Star A. V. Alexandrov Soviet Army Song and Dance Ensemble a Japanese paper wrote:

"lf all

the armies consistcd only .of such units, the s'orld worrld havc never known the horrors oI u,ar."

These u'ords

rcflect one of

main tasks of the

the Ensemble.

lhough its members *.car rnilitary rrniform, they scrvc thc carrse of peace-

The lamorrs company has u,on lhe applausc of atrdiences in many countries on all five continents.

The Muzyka Publishing House has put orrt an illrrstrated album "Tu'ice Order of the Red Banner and Order of ihe Red Star A. V, Alexandrov Sovict .\rmy Song and Dance Ensemble"* rr'hich gives an admirablc insight into the history of this well-kno* n artistic company.

\r. Dobronravov,

composcr, and E. Mikhailov, journalist, -- aulhors

of the tcxt givc thc story oi thc first public -perfornrance of the Red

Army Song Enscmblc (as the company \r-as then officialll,called) held

\'. Frrrnz-c Central Horrsc Red .\rmi, (now the M. V. Frunze CentraI Ilorrse of thc Soviet Arm.v-) on October 12. lg28 and at lhe ,\1.

oi the

the carlv torrrs first in the Kiev area and then in thc theatre o[ war on the Chinese Eastern

Railu.'ar,'.*'t

The book contains excerpts from

{he diarv of a nrcmber of llte Ensemble rvho took part in the Far East tour:

"...October 29, 1929. Siding 86.

Today the Ensemble gave a performance for mcn stationcd on lhe very frontier..."

Alexander Vasilyevich Alexand-

rov,

Ieader

of thc

Ensemblc, said

to the men:

"We are u ith volt in days of rvill be u'ith you on ihe

peace. We ba

t t Ief ields. " The Ensemblc

lived up to this pledge during lhe Creat Patriolic War of l94l-45. As carlv as June 21. 1g4l (ie. tu'o days after nazi Germany' attackcd thc USSR) the Ensemblc sent threc grorrps to r.a rious sectors oI thc battlefront. A

fourth group cntertained troops leaving for thc front irom thc

E. Mikhailov. ..Twiee ^'.V. I)obrcnravor., Ordcr o[ lhe Red Banner and Ordei-oi

the. Red Star

A. \'.

Ale_randrov

Soviet Armv Song and Dance Ensemble...

I1^uz1ka Prrblishing Horrse. Moseorv. l9gl. l19.pages (in Rrrssian. English, Frcneh and German)*-? In summer-autumn t929 the Chinesc militarists performed a series oI p.ouo.:i-

tions_ on the C.E Railway and Soviet Far L.aslern frontier whi(h led lo a Soviet'Chinese conilict. The Soviet Armr. dealt a resolule rebrrff lo lhe nrovoca_ terrrs and forr.ed lhe Chinesc auihori_ ties lo a(cept a peaccIrrl selllemcnt and testore Ihc slallrs quo on the Chinese Easlcrn Raiiway.

56

Bvelorussian Railway Terminal in the capital on Junc 26, I941. On that day the dcparting troops heard

for the first time lhc

song

"Sacred War," a herald of

the

coming victory, u'hich inspired them to perform feats of valorrr in the name of the Mothcrland.

Many years later, on May 9, 1973 (VE-Day) 1he E,nscnrble was on lour in Prague pcrforming "sacred

\\'ar." .\fter the

VASTLYEV

performance

a

middle aged Czech approached Boris Alexandrovich Alexandrov. then leader of ihe Ensemble. and said:

"We fought arm1.

our rvay u.ith your from Buzuluk (a 1ou'n in

Orenburg Region, where the lst Czechoslovak Infantrv Battalion l'as formed out of Czech and Slovak internationaiist patriots to fight

against the nazi invaders on the Soviet-German front) to prague.

Though the Czechs and Slor.aks have manv splendid songs of their ot'n, the-v u'ould sing precisely this song together u'ith lheir Soviet bro-

thers-in-arms, at particularll. tough moments."

And he handed B. .\. Alexandrov a huge bunch of iilacs. saying: 'l knot' rhat thei. u'ill u'ither bcfore vou get home. But I knorv that u'hen vou get back home Iilacs

will be blooming in

Moscow.

\\'ould 1'ou please lay a bunch of lilacs like this on behalf of me and tho u'hole of Czechoslovakia orr tlrc grave of {hc man uho composed this wonderful music."

The author of the music u'as Ma-

jor-General .\lexander Vasilyevich AIe.randrov, distinguished Sor.iet composer and conductor, people's Artiste of the USSR, State prize l'inner, professor, founder of the Ensemble.

The s'riters of the lext of the albtrm point out that over 200 Soviet cttmposers took part in the con-

test for composing the music of

thc Soviet Union's

National

Anthem. .{fter hearing a vasl num-

:.L

Major-General B. Alexandrov, people's Artiste of the USSR, Hero of

Socialist Labour, Lenin and State Frize winner

"lnvitation to the

Dance"

Chorus of the Ensemble

.

SI.,$N\

ber

of works

submitted, the go-

vernment commission chose the music oi Alexander Ale.xandrov.

A. V. Alexandrov u'rote:

"ln

the music for the Anthcrn I was eager to combine the genres of a victorious march, folk song

and epic Russian tunes. I u'anted it to be inspiring to the citizen, io

him surmotrnt hardships and to evoke a feeling of jo1' and triumph on account oi our great help

Soviet Ilomeiand-" Thc music t'as broadcast for the firsi time as the nerr'National Anthem on Januar)' l, 1911 \\'hen.{. \'. Alexandrov died in 1946. his son Boris took over as leader oi the Ensemble.

He has not only preserved the best of s'hat his father created. he has also furthered the Lrndertaking

bv introducing

improvements.

Boris .\le-randrov, an outstanding worker in the sphere of Soviet mi-

litarl-music, a composer and

con-

ductor, a man of distinguished talent and energ)', has done much to promote the aesthetic advancement of the Ensemble, to enrich its repertorv rvith heroic-patriotic s'orks, the best songs of Soviet conrposers belonging to various generations.

The performances of the Ensemble in other countries have been crou'ned u'ith orrtstanding srrccess. \['hen the Ensemble toured Canada, the Neu's Chronicle u'rote: "Take fifty of the brightest adjectives and place them before the Soviet .{rmy Ensemble and you will get an idea of its performances."

Other papers gave equalll'favourable opinions. The Evening Argris of Britain stated: "lf the concerts of the Army Ensemble have failed to make yorr tap your ieet, click 1'our fingers

and u,armly applaud it, then, honestly speaking, you are only good

for being put into a cofiin and taken to the nearest cemetery."

The French public admired the "manifest folk character ol all the numbers shown in the programme" (France Soire), the excellent voices of the soloists and the nragnificent concertedness oi the choir (L'llumanit6 Dimanche), the "colourful cha-

58

racter and rapitl rhythm of

the

dances" (Le .\1ondc).

The Notte of Itall' cornmented:

".\lilan applauds the

excelleni pollphonic choir of the Soviet Armr.

Ehsemble. The wonderful triangle:

and dancers form a harmonl' that evokes the admiration

ffi{!rr)sl I{tlll ihfil

[tAllilllliU

choir, band

of the audience."

No u-onder manv foreign firms have put out long-plaving records with the concert programmes of the I:nsemble. Thousands upon thorr-sands oi these records have been sold all over the s'orld and have

u'on great popularit"v.

Chant du.\londe of France

NAVIOATOR FROM BUDAPEST

and

\ O.S. of

the Netherlands have awarded the Ensemble Gold Discs for record sales. In the Trophy Cabinet 1'ou u'ill see standing next to the Grand Prix of the World Exposition of Technology and Arts, held in Paris in 1937, (where the Ensemble represented Soviet son'gs) the Gold Discobolus award-

ed b1' the French Record Academy

Grammophone Ensemble

to the

in l96l for the best record of

the

year.

Wh1' does ihe Ensemble appeal so much to audiences? The authors say that the superb skill of the performers is not the only reason for

their success. The main reason is thai the art of the Ensemble conve1's to audiences the great message of truth about the USSR, the most humane and peaceful country on the planet.

One of the best songs in the repertor)' is "Do the Russians Want

War?"

It sounds

like an eloquent

and convincing ans\r'er to the myth about a "Soviet military threat." It has sounded and rvill continue to sound at the grrest performances of the Ensemble in other countries to

remind audiences that Soviet

peo-

ple can fighi, but will do their

THE LONG winter evening drags

t on. Slowly and with

soldierlY He-

restraint retired Colonel Akos

vesi is telling his story. For us ii is like turning over the Pages of a great and brighi life, lingering on ils mosl memorable Years.

His lile was bound closelY io lhe Great Oclober Socialist Revoluiion in Russia and the Hungarian Revolufion of t91 9...

Akos takes out a small Phofograph from the familY album. l{ showed a slreet in BudaPest's. lifteenth disfrict named a{ler his- {aa colonel and also Akos Hether -ln those days, when the grda' vesi. lhe Oclesl evenl of lhe <enlurY

-

lober .Revolution in Russia

shook

lhe old world io its foundations, AkLs Hevesi Sr', an agronomist bY .prof ession, became a Communisl and a professional revolulionary.

During the l919 revolution in Hungary the Party entrusled him with the high post of DePufY PeoPle's Commissar of Agriculture.

Akos Jr. was lhen a small boY, but

he remembers well BudaPest, deeP-

ly stirred by the

revolulionarY

utmost (as they have proved many times over) to prevent the horrors of u'ar being repeated over again.

They u'ant the sun to shine forever

slorm. lt was not easy to undersland the rapidly changing evenfs, bul one thing was clear: lhe work-

on a u,orld untroubled

lriumph, f eeling lheir slrength and iuslice. Falher used lo come homc

b1, u,ar. the story of

That is the keynole of the world's most peacefut military unit-

ing people were reioicing

in

lired and perturbed bul alwayt joyful. One day he did nol relurn

-

were spreading rumours ihat ihe Republic had {allen. lt was to check this that ihe pariisans sent iheir represeniaiive to ihe Madrid area.

The Command of ihe Republican lorces decided to immediaiely inIorm the detachmeni o{ ihe real siiuaiiori al ihe front. This mission was assigned lo the crew o{ a bomber in which Akos Hevesi was na' vigalor.

The bomber circled over the partisans' locaiion area. Visibiliiy was bad, obstructed bY clouds. The

plane should have been flYing lowei, bul tirat was very dangerous: with the mounlains so close this f light could have been ihe lasi.

Akos scrutinised a hardly- visible

A. A. Hevesi (right) with his combat friend Kovasi Gyula, Director of

a

Technical School named after Hevesi

clearing till his eyes began to smart and passed on lo the crew commander Viktor Kholzunov: lower, another twenty metres lower.

Through the haze he had noliced lhe parlisans' landing sign. Now

he had been arrested and thrown into jail by fhose who had suppressed lhe revolution. A long separation ensued. Only in 1922 was ihe Soviel Government able wilh the

diers and of{icers, aircraft, tanks and other modern materiel.

Twenly five fhousand international volunieers from fifty {our countries were taking part with ihe Spanish

tended spot. And on the ground,

help of an international organisation

patriots in lhe fierce siruggle against the uniled forces of inierior reaction

lheir hands, warmly welcoming

of assislance lo revolutionaries, lo oblain the release of Akos Hevesi.

He came to the Soviet Union and began to work in ihe Communisi lniernalional Execuiive Committee.

Three years passed before ihe Hungarian Communist's wife and child could join him. The Soviet Union

became their second

homeland.

Here Akos Jr. finished a secondary school, lhen a military Ilying school and became navigafor of a bomber.

...At the end of Augusf 1936 an inconspicuous lransporl ship cast off from its moorings in the Odessa porf.

A long and difficult roule lo lhe shores of slruggling Spbin lay ahead of lhe vessel. ln lhose days the mere mention of ihat. country gave rise to alarm and pain in ihe hearls of decent people in all continents.

Spain's working people rose proudly and courageously io defend lheir

freedom and valiantly barred the way lo fascism. The iascist leaders of Germany and ltaly were giving generous military assislance lo General Franco's insurgenls, sending lo Spain lens. of lhousands o{ sol-

and German-ltalian interventionists.

Many of them were forced lo change

not only lheir uni{orm but even their name and nationalily. Colonel Malino was fhe name under which fulure Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky foughi, General Lukacs was ihe name adopted by

lhe Hungarian writer and communist Male Zalka, and the Turkish Khalil Ekrem was that of the Butgarian pilot Zakhari Zakhariev, who la-

ler became a Hero of the

Soviet

Union and affer the liberation of his Motherland lrom fascism was Conrmander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Air Defence and Deputy Defence Minisler of People's Bulgaria. ln Spain Akos Hevesi, lhe faiher, was known as Majoi Pal Nibur.

Among the volunteer pilots and navigators from lhe Soviet Union was Akos Hevesi Jr. One day a messenger from a big partisan detachment surrounded by

fascists in the mountains made his w.ry with great difliculty lo lhe posi-

lions ol ihe Republican forces.

Through iheir agents ihe insurgents

ihey could act con{idently. The precious load was dropped on lhe inthe partisans came running, waving and

ihanking their {riends of lhe air. The detachment had got everYlhing it needed and could now continue the slrugg e.

I

A parting circle over lhe positions of the Republic's defenders and lhe bomber retraced its course. This was

just as dangerousl Seville was near and lhe enemy had a fighter aircraff base there. They must surely have noticed the bomber...

It had iust gained heighl when suspicious dols appeared in the dislance, approaching nearer and nearer. They were Messerschmitts. The low-speed Breguel would hardly be able lo get away from ihem. Luckily, quile close to il and a liftle higher was a solid bank of cloud. Kholzu-

nov flew straight inlo if. The

{ascisf

fighfer planes were unable io overlake it after all. ln Oclober-November the fighting

near Madrid was especially Iierce.

It went on on lhe ground and in the air. Pilots of ihe lniernaiional Squadron somelimes had lo fly three or four sorties a day. Fear and confusiorr seized the fascisls when Re-

59

publican bombers appeared over iheir positions. But {ewer and {ewer

son, but as a volunfeer also. Their ialk lasted a long iime, because each one had a lot lo tell ihe ofher- Then they had iheir photo iaken 1o com-

combat planes remained.

And suddenly gladdening news!

Transporls wilh weapons and ammu-

memorate the meeting. The pariing words were few, simple and severe and soldier-like. Neiiher father nor son knew ihat ihis meeting was tlreir lasf. Soon Lukacs-Male Za.lka, ihe commander of the Iniernaiional Division, and Akos Hevesi, the com-

'nilion began to arrive at the Spanish shores. The pilots and navigaiors not only helped unload the aircraft that arrived disassembled in big boxes, they assembled them lhemselves at the aii bases. Thirly highspeed aircraft (SB) were assembled just len days. Apip record iime

poiniment and- retraining of

mander of ihe Hungarian Battalion, died a hero's death in heavy Iighting.

crews

al once. Time was vaihe enemy \ras pushing

iook- place

luable

his way- towards Madrid.

The volunteer pilofs flew iheir

Soviet Union was Akos Hevesi. Soon he went lo lhe Kremlin io receive al once two combat awards iwo Orders of the Red Banner. -And again service in ihe Air Force, and again intensive lraining.

When nazi Germany aitacked ihe

first combat missions on 5B bombers against fascisl aerodromes in Seville, Casares, Navalmarl and Talavera. Olher power{ul blows folIowed.

"Ofien we flew wiihout any figh-

ler escori," recalls Akos Hevesi. "Ai their very first aitempt lo altack us ihe German Heinkels and the ltalian Fiats realised that fhey could not catch up wilh the Soviet planes. By lhal lime ihe velociiy of SB bombers was excellent res an hour.

This

up to 430 kilomeiwas three irmes that

of the Breguet or Polez. The

was aiso considerable

range

up io

2,300 kilometres and the -ceiling 10,000 metres. Besides, fhere were four machine-guns on each plane.

They helped to keep enemy fighters at a dislance...

About thai lime one more unforgeftobie event occurred in the life

of Akos Hevesi. One Sunday, when

fhe crew was resfing, a piiof dropped in at ihe room where the squad-

ron navigaior lived: "Akos, you're yyanted..."

He saw an elderly man surrounCed by his comrades. Could it really be his father? He pushed ihe oihers aside, rushed io him and they ieli into each other's slrong arms. His friends did not understand what fhey were talking about so quickly and with such excitement in Hungarian.

Only after a {ew minutes did Akos announced joyously: "This is my father..."

60

Soviet Union Major Hevesi was

his

an

air force navigator of one of

the armies. Bul then units and formaiions of long-range aviation began

io be formed. Hearing o{ this Akos applied 1o be senl to one of lhose unils. He was seni 1o a regimen{ cornmanded by Hero o{ the Sovief Union Vasily Tikhonov, who iook pdrf in sorties against Berlin and other cities of hitlerite Germany.

He was happy to learn that the navigafor had considerable combal experience and had flown over

a

hundred combat missions in Spain.

ln the very first sorties against ihe enemy Akos won esteem of his comrades not only as a navigator buf as a slrong-wi lled man too.

Raids in the enemy rear, especially on Berlin, took place in exceptionally difficult and complex situations.

Crews o{ Iong-range bombers covered the distance of over three lhou, sand kilomelres and were in lhe air

Ior 10 lo l2 hours. They flew thouof kilomelres by instruments,

sands

dropped iheir bomb loads dccurately. Only afler ihat did they experience a feeling of duiy fulfilled.

ln Oclober 1942 the siiuation on the territory belween ihe Don and Volga rivers was extremely serious.

Long-range bombers, having moved nearer to ihe area o{ operaiions, were dealing blows af ihe enerny concentrations on ihe approaches to Slalingrad and at railway junciions in the hitlerites' rear. The aerodromes where lheir planes were

based were subjected to air raids.

The pilois flew against those iargels day and night. lntervals between ihe repeated sorlies were measured not

by rest so needed by the crew buf by ihe lime needed lor inspecting and fuelling planes and loading ihe bombs. The men seemed to simply have iorgoften whal physical faligue

meant. Regimenlal navigator Akos Hevesi also took parl in these Ilighls.

He worked wilh inspiration and enthtrsiasm with young pilofs and navigators, was sensiiive io iheir

moods and succeeded in combining

the eagerness of youth wilh ihe ex-

perience ol age. He tried to be wilh each young crew on combal missions,

to show ihem what comp-

iex situaiions could build up in the skies of war and how to find the one correcf solution. Only aiter com-

bal misisons like that and lhorough cntique of strong and weak poinis he would report with confidence io the regimental commander thal the young pilots had grown reliable wings and now only needed to f lyihe more ihe befter.

For {eats of arms in baftles againsf fascism Akos Hevesi was awarded

ihe Order o{ Lenin, three

Orders

of the Red Banner, ihe Order of the Patrioiic War 1sf Class, iwo Orders of the Red Slar and many medals.

relying only on the navigator's calcuialions. And almosi always through

ihunderstorms and zones of dense c

louds.

When approaching Berlin in

Hevesi Sr. had travelled all lhe

way 1o Spain nof jusf lo meet

.

ln ihe sprirrg of 1937 the Soviet pilots were recalled {rom 5pain.

Among those who returned to lhe

fire at ihem. But the 5oviei pilols broke through lo lhe targels and

ihe

black-out hundreds of searchlights were directed towards the skies and hundreds of antiaircraft guns opened

Colonel l. IGOSHEV

SPORT AND

RACISTY1

ARE

We have been receiving leflers lrom sporf lans erpressing indignation about athleles who maintain contacls with lheir counferparts in fhe Repubcenfre of apartheid and ralic ol South Alrica cial disciminalion.

-

D. L Prokhorov, Cand. Sc. lPedagogyl, Head of the Departmeni lor lnfernational Sports Confacts, USSR Sports'Commiftee, kindly granted an inlerview to our correspondeni Lieuienanf-Colonel

l.

Barchukov.

ln l98l progressive athleles and sporls lans were outraged by the Soulh African rugby. feam's lour ,o Xew Zealand and lhe USA. Would you please lell our readers ebouf lhe measures applied lo those who slained lheir reputalion by conlacls wilh lhe racisfs.

The facl that Soulh African rugby players look parf in a mafch in New Zealand evoked a world-wide reaction. Mass prolest demonstrations were held in New Zealand itsel[ and olher countries loo. The same rugby team then wenf to lhe USA, where the next Olympic Games are to be held.

US sports organisations have tried lo convince world opinion lhat rugby is not included in the Olympic programme. Therefore, il has nothing lo do wilh the 1984 Olympic Games. But lhe lour of South African rugby players lo the USA was an aflempt to split the Olympic rnovemenf.

I would like to mention lhat since 1964 the teams of lhe South African National Olympic Commiftee have been barred from the Olympic Games for racial discrimination in sport. ln 1970 the South African Nalional Olympic Commitlee was expelled {rom lhe Olympic movement lor lhe same reason. Conlacts wilh Soulh African athleles are a direcf infringemenf of Rule No. 3 of fhe Olympic Charter.

Unforlunafely, a number of inlernational sports {ederalions conlinue to maintain contacls with Souih African athleles, Among ihem are rowing, modern penfathlon, equesl-

INCO,YTPATIBLE

rian sporls, fencing, hockey, shooting, sailing, archery

and

skafing federations.

This is because some of the big Weslern capilalist monopolies supporl Preforia's sporis organisalions both politically and economically. For inslance, General Molors Corp. of fhd USA provides financial backing for competilions in irack-and-field athlelics, cycling, molor cycling. horse racing and bowling. Brilish Pelroleum backs football matches and Peugeot-Citroen of France-tennis matches. ln 1952 a Non-Racial Olympic Commiftee was founded in Soulh Africa. lt has been working to achieve compleie isolation of lhe racist South African Republic in inlernalional sports. The South Africa Non-Racial Olympic Commiftee (SANROC) has spared no effort to expose lhe background of the ties belween the capitalist counlries of lhe West and lhe Republic o{ Souih Africa.

The UN has been regularly circulaling documenls drawn up by SANROC and printed with the aid o{ olher anliracist organisations. These papers have given lisls ol athleles who, in defiance of UN resolulions on ending all contacls with the South African Republic, have taken part iri various compelilions held there and have ihus aclually given supporl lo lhe inhuman aparlheid regime in power lhere.

The aihletes listed in those documents have been warned: either they abandon all further contacls with South African athleies iill lhe racial segregaiion syslem has been completely eliminated, or lhe fronliers o{ over 100 developing counlries will be closed lo them.

At a meeling of lhe Organisation of African Unity (OAU) representalives of more than 40 African member counlries passed a unanimous resoluiion urging to bar New Zealand aihletes from all international sporls compelilions. The resolulion poinled out lhal lhese sanclions were lo be applied, because New Zealand regularly violaled a decision of ihe Commonwealih counlries passed in Gleneagle, Scotland, on breaking olf all lies with the Soulh African Republic.

The African Nalional Congress, which is fighting against racial segregation in Soulh Africa, has urged lhe African countries to boycott lhe summer Olympic Games in 1984, ln 1976 a large group of African counlries (26 allogeiher) left from the Olympic Games in Montreal in prolesl againsf

6t

lhe participation of New Zealand alhlefes, because the latter had compromised themselves by contacls wiih racisl Soulh Africa. Now hislory is repeating itself. US and New Zealand siatesmen have again created an explosive silua-

lion in the Olympic movement. There can be no other appraisal of this alliance. Those who have been trampling

underfool ihe sacred ideals of ihe Olympic movement will bear responsibiliiy for the aclions of iis participants.

The South A{rican racisls have many fellow-fhinkers, but lhe {ighters againsl apartheid have many iimes more' So I undersland lhat certain quarlers maintain regular conlacls with South Alrican alhleles. What has (omPelled the USA and olher couniries lo do sol There are some sporls federations in the USA, some sporls organisaiions and individual alhletes in New Zealand, Britain, lreland, Chile and a few other couniries that maintain fies with the Republic ol South Africa' Many US athletes participaie in the Makkabin Games in lsrael, at which Zionists meet racists {rom Soulh Alrica and the USA who are close to them in spiril' South Africans {eel "al home" among the {ootball Players o{ the Cosmos Club, USA. We could quote many olher similar examples' What is the reason for this? US reality gives lhe answer io ihis question. Non-whites are constantly subiected to humiliation, harassmeni or direct violent perseculion. The outrages perpelrated by the Ku-Klux Klan, murdered and missing Negro children in Ailanta are all typical features of the "American way o[ life."

There are also oiher reasons. The Republic of South

Africa is extremely rich in mineral and other nalural resources which have attracted Western enlrepreneurs. Thus, in recent years the USA has invesled,52,000 million in the South A{rican economy. US-South African. trade is steadily expanding too.

Filteen big US corporations have made huge investments in Namibia, which the South African racist regime has unlawfully occupied. They are in control of lhe copper, lead and zinc mines, ore concenlraiion planis and metallurgical works there.

Exploilation of cheap Black South Alrican labour brings Iabulous profits lo U5 and other companies. 5o lhe tycoons are eager to retain their posilions in the South African Republic and to keep the racisf regime in power.

The South African Republic Plays an imporlant role in US slrategic plans and schemes. American warships conslanlly pul in at Durban, Simonstown, Port Elizabeth and Capelown.

This is where lhe lrail blazed by Weslern athleles leadl to. This is what is behind every visit of South A{rican alhletes.

Have Souih Alrican racisls atlemPted lo re'enler lhc inlernalional sPorB associations!

Yes, lhey have. ll is also worih noling that reactionary iircles have been admitting South African athletes lo various compelitions held in lheir countries. They have several iimes raised lhe queslion of South Africa's parlicipalion in the Olympic Games. Some Western leaders have been

inciling action.against friendship and cooperation in lhe Olympic movement and trying lo split the iniernalional

62

federations. They know lhat the leadership of lhe federations is not always homogeneous. There are racisf-minded people in some of lhese associations. The process o{ democratisation is not developing in all lhe federalions, even some lhal are recognised by lhe lnternaiional Olympic Commiftee.

At the llth Olympic Congress, which was held in Sep' tember 1981, delegales repealedly declared lheir resolve manoeuvres of Soufh African racisls, lheir allies and sponsors..Despite lhis, provocations did not cease. On the eve of the closing of lhe congress it became known lhal a racist "raid" from the South African Republic appeared near Baden-Baden, FRG. lts members intended lo develop "explanatory" propaganda c.mpaign aboul the "raids" perlormed by the South African rugby leam and other alhletic groups in certain counlries.

Referring to lhis provocaiive acf J. A. Samaranch, Presidenl of lhe lnlernational Olympic Commiftee, said that the 'Nalional Olympic Committees o[ all countries were indignant al lhe alhletic racist conlacts of couniries belonging io lhe Olympic lamily. And lhe lnternational Olympic Commiflee censured on- all those who encouraged ruch con-

lo resisl all

tacls.

However, racisls still succeed in oblaining access lo sporls compelilions. The governmenls o{ countries which send lheir athleies lo the Republic of Soulh Alrica disguised as represenlatives of nafional sport have encouraged sophislicaled forms of racial discriminalion. They have also favoured return visits in defiance of prolesls from progressives and all lhose who cherish the inleresls of sporf.

And whal ls the posilion oI ihe USSR Xalional Olympi< Commitlee on lhe mattert The Nafional Olympic Commiftee and other sports federaiions of the U55R condemn oulrighl all forms o{ racism.

Acting on behalf of all Soviet athleles and lovers of sporl ihey voice support for the people of lhe African countries and all slates on other continenls which oppose racial discrimination and apartheid, and which regard lhe visii oI South African rugby players lo New Zealand and the USA as a direct breach of the Olympic Charter.

The fight againsl racism in sports would never have succeeded, were it nol for the persislent e{forts and principled

posilion of ihe USSR and other socialist counlries in lhe lnternational Olympic Committee and international sports associalions.

Acting in defiance of the UN Charter and decisions, ignoring lhe demands of the overwhelming majorify of states, the iacisl regime in Soulh Alrica, enjoying ihe supporl of foreign reaclionaries, is continuing lo pursue a policy of apartheid and mass terror. lt is committing furlher acls of aggression againsl neighbouring countries on lhe conlinenl, lhereby creating a lhreal lo peace and ihe security of nations.

The Soviet Union consislenlly pursues lhe course of support for lhe nalional-liberalion movement and {or resoluie measures for liquidaiing aparfheid. There is no room in lhe world for racism. And sport ir also an arena of struggle against racism.

Physicol Ctrlture

ond

Sport

BOXINTG fiTATCIT The traditional l.lth official USSRUSA boxing match held in Moscow aroused keen interesi among boxing fans. The match drew a capacity

Alexander Belyayev (75 k9), Ale-

crowd to lhe Palace of Sport in Luzhniki (by the way these teams were meeting there for lhe seventh

xers were: Clifford Grey (57 kg), Vincent Webb (63.5 kg), Alfred

time).

From the first bout it was a tough fight. ln fhe under 48 kg category army man Shamil Sabirov, Olympic champion and erperienced boxer of the USSR Naiional Team beat Jose Rozario. Then the iollow-

ing

USSR

team borers

performed

wifh confidence and won: Yuri Alexandrov (51 kq), Viktor Miroshni-

chenko (5a kg), Sergei Michnik (60 k9), Serik Konakbayev (57 ks),

xander Krupin (81 k9) and Alexander Yagupkin (91 kg).

The besi among the American bo-

Mayes (71 k9) and Warren Thompson (over 9l kg).

For lhe first time the boxing Mos-

cow mafch between ihe USSR and ihe USA was carried out in 12 weight categories. The match took place in a friendly atmosphere. The

coaches

and specialists of both teams once

ww

more lested lhe readiness of both experienced boxers and novices for lhe forthcoming infernational compelif ions.

The hosts won

8:4.

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I

fle'Tlifitolltrn' Prbe

lif.l

ON AUGUST 13.17, 1982 KIEY, CAPITAL OF THE SOYIET UKRAINE, \M!LL BE THE YENUE OF THE FRIENDLY ARMIES' SPORTS COMMITTEE

lsKDAl

TRACK-AND-FtELD CHAMptONSHTp.

ATHLETES FROM SKDA MEMBER ARMIES OF

AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, BULGARIA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOYAKIA, ETHIOPIA, THE GDR, HUNGARY, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN, POLAND, ROMANIA AND THE USSR WILL COMPETE IN 2I EYENTS. SPORISMEN FROM ARMIES V/HICH ARE NOT SKDA MEM. BERS ARE ALSO INYITED TO TAKE PARI IN IHE COMPETITIONS.

THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE "SOYIET MILTTARY REVIEV/" MAGAZINE HAS INSTITUTED A ,,WILL TO WtN" PRIZE, TO BE AWARDED TO TI{E ATHLETE WHO SHOWS HIGH RESULIS AND DISPLAYS THE NOBLE FEELINGS OF FRI.

.

ENDSHIP, BROTHERHOOD AND COMRADESI{IP

TOWARDS HIS OPPONENTS.

The city of Kiev whose history dates many centuries back lis notable for its irrdividual and inimitabie beauty. By a UNESCO decision the l,500th Anniversary of Kiev was

widely and solemnly celebrated on May 29-31 this year Front cover: Senior Lieutenant V. Yakovlev assigning "The First Ashore"). Photo by P. Skuratov Back cover:

a demining mission to

In the park of the "Arkhangelskoye" sanatorium

(see article

Praporshchik G. Fomenko (sce malerial

"A Corner of Russia") Photo by A. Mironenko

Subscripfion to the magazine can be oblained in the USSR through post-offices and abroad flrrough firms dealing with lhe Sovief "Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga" organisalion. lY/O "Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga," Moscow O-200, USSR.I

5th Spartakiade ol Friendly Armies^ Track-and-lield alhieles compeling. Hun9ary, 1981 Photo by Y. Xrokhmalyuk

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