Chapter 2 – Engage the Whole of US Government, Allies, and Partners
As part of a whole-of-government approach, Arctic policy must be carried out by engaging relevant stakeholders from the myriad US agencies, departments, and armed services. The aim is to foster greater cohesion and cooperation both internally as well as externally with NATO allies and regional partners across circumpolar nations and beyond.
Whole of US government engagement in the Arctic
As the main advocate for Arctic capabilities and resource management, USNORTHCOM is also responsible for the development and integration of regional concepts of operation and their integration within the Joint Force and the Unified Command Plan. NORTHCOM will have to collaborate across the myriad parts of government in charge of Arctic security, from the USCG to the National Guard, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and indigenous communities in Alaska as part of Total Force. To achieve this purpose, increased cooperation will be streamlined through the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the National Security Council as part of the NSAR, depending on current US policy developments.
Arctic Learning Curve
There is a learning curve to bridge to achieve a genuine whole of government approach, especially since many endeavors already exist across US structures and agencies. The Army hosts a Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska
for cold-weather training61 (as part of the 11th Airborne Division) and the Air Force has an Arctic Weather Survival school.62 SOF as part of SOCNORTH partner with the USCG on information sharing and lessons learned for cold-weather operations.63 The Navy and USCG have standing personnel exchange and interoperability programs that can be replicated to other armed services. Meanwhile, Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Alaska (JPMRC–AK) conducts regular training in Arctic conditions.64
As part of a streamlined, whole-of-government approach, USNORTHCOM should take stock of all existing endeavors and find ways to integrate them under a holistic umbrella for Arctic-dedicated training, formal informationsharing endeavors, and operations. This will help enhance command and control across the armed services and relevant stakeholders as well as foster better combined-arms maneuvers.
Due to the multi-domain nature of Arctic operations, USNORTHCOM could lead an effort to streamline existing command-andcontrol structures under one umbrella in terms of information sharing. Discussions around the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) with the Air Force, the Navy, and USCG are a good example of such convergence.65 Future discussions must also include the Army, Space Force, SOF, and NORAD.66 However, sharing information and responsibilities across relevant stakeholders in the US will require patience.
Another positive step forward would be for USNORTHCOM to take a more proactive and forward-leaning leadership role in identifying
specific requirements for future Arctic-related roles and missions. In other words, it should take the lead in transcribing the 2024 Arctic Strategy into a detailed list of requirements for Arctic presence and operations within the AoR across all relevant stakeholders.
To streamline this process, the first item on the agenda should be determining what goes first between missions, capabilities, and procurement. It would be beneficial to start by honing scenario-based thinking regarding the threat environment in the Arctic, potential escalation scenarios, force demand, defense planning, etc. In this, NORTHCOM could champion the organization of scenario-based threat assessments, table-top simulations (especially peacetime competition, low intensity warfare operations, and escalation management), and wargames. Ideal venues for this are the Homeland Defense Institute (HDI) and the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.
The first item on the agenda should be determining what goes first between missions, capabilities, and procurement.
Outlining potential futures will help determine the range and scope of Arctic-related missions for the USNORTHCOM and relevant stakeholders—namely demonstrating what former USNORTHCOM and NORAD Commander Gen. Glen D. VanHerck called Arctic “campaigning.”67 A similar approach has been conveyed by the current USNORTHCOM and NORAD Commander, Gen. Gregory M. Guillot.68 In turn, mission requirements will inform the procurement of capabilities and platforms
necessary to ensure homeland defense and beyond. USNORTHCOM should lead in building and wargaming such scenarios through enhanced cooperation with the subject matter expert community and key stakeholders across the US government.
Command Structure for the Arctic
There are still several unknows that need to be resolved internally within the US to streamline Arctic-related command structures. First, there are still overlaps between combatant commands in charge of Arctic operations. Currently, under the UCP, circumpolar geography sits across three combatant commands: NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and INDOPACOM.
Three commands are therefore responsible for three AoRs across the same geographical region. NORTHCOM protects the North American Arctic and integrates NORAD, EUCOM secures the European High North, while INDOPACOM is in charge of the Pacific Arctic and Bering Strait security.69 NORTHCOM focuses on homeland defense while EUCOM and NDOPACOM ensure forward defense in the Arctic.70
Such overlaps are a strength in terms of joint and combined arms operations. But they also represent a vulnerability with the exact delineation of responsibilities and resource management. What currently works under the UCP may not work well for NATO allies in Northern Europe (see below).
Second, and linked to the combatant commands, Arctic-related capabilities are also affected by overlaps. For instance, forces in Alaska (ALCOM) sit under NORTHCOM but their assets are subordinated to INDOPACOM, while it also maintains “operational control of much of the force structure stationed in Alaska.”71 This is particularly relevant for the Eielson Air Force Base.
Military infrastructure sites in Greenland, notably the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), sit under EUCOM but are critical to NORTHCOM’s mission under NORAD.72 Finally, there are similar overlaps with the division of labor and AoR between the US 6th Fleet (EUCOM) and the 2nd Fleet (NORTHCOM and NATO’s JFC Norfolk)—a situation that also affects NATO command plans.
In many ways, USNORTHCOM can be seen as a natural entry point, considering its extensive relationship with USCG and the link with NORAD.73 Yet it does not have a full and comprehensive picture of circumpolar security—especially the European High North, under EUCOM’s command—and does not represent the primary geographic combatant commander.
There is, therefore, a clear discrepancy between USNORTHCOM’s primary mission of Arctic-related homeland defense across North America and its endeavor to be DoD’s
capability advocate and ensure circumpolar force projection.
Working out the aforementioned overlaps and discrepancy will require innovative solutions and internal “homework.” Several voices within the military and the expert community have called for USNORTHCOM to serve as the primary combatant commander for the whole of the Arctic.74 In such a case, USNORTHCOM would host a subordinate unified command dedicated entirely to Arctic operations across circumpolar geography—in other words, an “Arctic command.”75
One way to potentially approach the combatant command issue would be to divide the effort between peacetime and wartime. At peacetime, USNORTHCOM would have the leadership role for homeland defense, while at wartime (and specifically from a Russia warfighting perspective), EUCOM would ensure command. Equally at wartime, operations in the Pacific Arctic would still fall under the leadership of NORTHCOM.
Pituffik Space Base (Thule Air Base), Greenland December 10, 2017. (US Air Force/Senior Airman Dennis Hoffman)
While these ideas are interesting, potential command unification will require internal discussions between relevant stakeholders. Unifying command, capabilities, and force projection in the Arctic under one combatant arm merits attention—provided it is carried out in full coordination with EUCOM, INDOPACOM, and other key actors. Having one entry point would indeed help streamline concepts of operation, capabilities requirements, procurement, training, and deployments under one “polar warfare” umbrella.76
Making the wider Arctic AoR fall into one command might also not be an ideal solution, especially considering internal lack of inertia and institutional resistance to change across the US government. Unless USNORTHCOM is given a clear mandate to become the sole responsible party for Arctic security, a good place to start would be to synchronize efforts across all combatant commands.
USNORTHCOM could lead the way in this endeavor by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Cooperation with allies and partners
USNORTHCOM and the North American Arctic cannot be secure without the help of allies within the “Arctic/NATO 7” and regional partners. External engagement must be a priority to ensure homeland security. Cooperation with foreign partners appears in all of the recent armed services Arctic strategies and all insist on allies as key to ensure domain awareness, improve deterrence, increase presence, and streamline operations. This, in turn, responds to the concept of integrated deterrence and burden sharing between NATO allies.
The US also signed Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCA) with Nordic partners, and more recently with new NATO members Finland and Sweden. At the multilateral level, several interconnection unknowns remain in terms of the division of labor and burden sharing in Arctic security affairs between the US (and particularly USNORTHCOM) and its regional partners.
Relations with NATO
Across NATO, there is a variety of views about regional threat perceptions and the future of Arctic security.77 Even within the confines of the Arctic 7, priorities differ in defense and security matters (readiness, situational awareness, deployments, etc.). Diverging views are not necessarily a negative thing but they do matter when it comes to fundamental security implications such as the nature of the Russian threat to regional stability or China’s involvement in circumpolar governance. Nordic nations generally have different priorities than the US.
In this, USNORTHCOM should increase its involvement with the Arctic 7 to understand their priorities for future Arctic security. Being in “listening mode” with regional allies would be a good way to identify priorities and bridge potential divergences that could affect transAtlantic unity in an Arctic context.
NATO’s natural role and place in the Arctic remains undetermined.78 Much will depend on the implementation and evolution of the Regional Plan Northwest as well as the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA).79 Implementing NATO’s new strategic concept in a Nordic/ Arctic context will require internal adaptations and discussions related to the force structure. It is yet to be fully determined whether the Arctic AoR should sit with JFC Norfolk or Brunssum. Norway currently sits under the former while Sweden and Finland are placed under the latter.
Resolving this issue is particularly vital for the two new Nordic allies, as well as for overall regional security in a Nordic-Baltic context. Continued divisions between commands would likely disrupt existing Nordic defense cooperation and military agreements.80
Implementing NATO’s new strategic concept in a Nordic/ Arctic context will require internal adaptations and discussions related to the force structure.
For the US, this will also influence how USNORTHCOM or EUCOM will interact and collaborate with regional allies in the Arctic. Interaction between USNORTHCOM and JFC Norfolk will also require more streamlining across all domains to avoid overlaps. Although another solution could be the creation of an Arctic-dedicated Joint Force Command entirely devoted to circumpolar defense and security or the establishment of an ad hoc NATO Response Force in the Arctic in case of regional crisis.
Interaction must also consider building increased linkages with existing NATO Centers of Excellence (CoE) in charge of Arctic- and cold weather-related issues—and especially with the Cold Weather Operations CoE, the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea (CJOS) CoE, and the Climate Change and Security CoE. Systematic information sharing and cross-training between the CoEs will help increase domain awareness and readiness.
Allies will require reassurance that there is strategic and operational unity for the Arctic
as a “new” frontier for NATO. In any case, USNORTHCOM should take the lead in communicating with Allies and partners about the future of US-NATO command structures in an Arctic context.
Interaction with NORAD
North American security depends on the US-Canada binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the North Warning System (network of ground-based radars) as part of the Homeland Defense Design.81 Under USNORTHCOM, the Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) is in charge of aerospace warning and the security of the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), while the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) ensures aerospace surveillance and control.82
Overlapping responsibilities within NORAD’s AoR remain between the US and Canada, which creates bifurcations. Another issue is that NORAD does not include the breadth of operational domains necessary for integrated deterrence and missile defeat,83 notably the cyber, space, and electronic domains.
More worryingly, NORAD has holes and coverage gaps in threat identification, tracking, and monitoring. The 2023 Chinese spy balloon incidents84 were a wake-up call in this regard and showed the existence of blind spots with slow-moving targets such as drones or weather probes as well as for fastmoving ones like hypersonic missiles.85
The continued modernization of NORAD is paramount to homeland security. The new polar over-the-horizon radars and various upgrades to the North Warning System are welcome additions but are only a first step. Recent announcements from Canada about developing over-the-horizon radar technology with Australia are welcomed endeavors in that direction.86
Much remains to be done, however, to upgrade NORAD with multi-layered and multidomain threat detection, tracking, and remote sensing capabilities.87 This must also go hand in hand with identifying future transmitter sites (especially in the context of climate change) and upgrading NORAD’s support infrastructure.88
Unknowns also remain in the relationship between NORAD and NATO. A further step must be discussions around the potential integration of NORAD within NATO structures. USNORTHCOM has a major role to play in this regard and should ideally pave the way to such integration, together with Canada. A first step would be to increase the depth of training and exercises between NORAD and NATO, such as opening NORAD’s Global Information Dominance Exercises (GIDE) to NATO for increased information sharing.89
Although a distant prospect, a second step could be the extension of NORAD’s AoR within NATO’s AoR to achieve integrated air defense, particularly within the GIUK-GIN gaps. This would also allow USNORTHCOM to field infrastructure requirements in Greenland, Iceland, and potentially Norway.90 Of particular relevance is the infrastructure at the Pituffik Space Base with its missile early-warning
radar system and threat tracking capabilities.91 It must be understood, however, that expanding NORAD’s AoR would go beyond the primary mission of homeland defense.
Existing Arctic Security Forums and Endeavors
There are many, overlapping regional endeavors pertaining to Arctic security—from the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Staff (CHODS) meetings (relaunched by Canada in 2022), the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the new Arctic Security Policy Roundtable, or the proposed Canada-led Arctic Security Dialogue at the level of Foreign Ministers.92
Systematic participation of USNORTHCOM in existing cooperative forums is vital to information sharing and overall cooperation with allies and should be encouraged. USNORTHCOM should also help overcome issues linked to information sharing between allies, whether for technical or political reasons. Ultimately, discussions should lead to the creation of a dedicated military security architecture for the Arctic that the expert community has been calling for.93
US Marines prepare to move out near Alta, Norway during Exercise Nordic Response 24. (NATO)
Chapter 3 – Exercise Presence Through Deployments, Training, and Infrastructure
Power in the Arctic depends on access and sustained presence. As per the NSAR and the 2024 Arctic Strategy, the US must exercise a tailored presence across circumpolar geography. This encompasses physical deployments of troops and hardware, training and drills, as well as logistics and operational support. This, of course, must be carried out individually as part of the US force structure as well as with allies as part of deployments in and with partner nations. Successive DoD strategies identified key priorities in terms of exercise presence, such as NORAD and US ADIZ enforcement, regional multi-domain deployments across the AoR, and airborne and maritime patrols.94
Overall, US presence is akin to what VanHerck called “campaigning” in the Arctic to “test and demonstrate capability, readiness, and our will to operate.”95 US deployments in the Arctic seek to create a quick reaction force as part of the UCP. The reactivation of the US 2nd Fleet in 2018 as part of NATO’s JFC Norfolk was a positive step in this direction.96
Another landmark was the redesignation of US Army Alaska as the 11th Airborne Division in 2022 within the ALCOM Joint Operations Area as part of the US Army’s 2021 Regaining Arctic Dominance strategy.97 The 11th Airborne Division operates from Fort Wainwright in Alaska within its Arctic Aviation Command. The intention was to turn the division into an Arctic-capable force able to project and sustain presence equally across circumpolar geography and towards the Asia-Pacific theater if required.98 The division continues to expand, for instance in August 2024 when two helicopter battalions were moved under
its command.99
SOF have also stepped up their presence in the Arctic in recent years. In this, Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) is Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) supporting USNORTHCOM in the AoR to ensure its primary mission of homeland defense.100 The range of missions to protect the homeland is an interesting anomaly compared to usual SOF operations.101
SOCNORTH recently created a Northern Approach operational-level framework to increase readiness and deploy capabilities.
US bases and infrastructure
US sustained presence in the Arctic relies on a well-established network of bases at home in Alaska and abroad. Alaska, through ALCOM/NORTHCOM, hosts several bases such as Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson (operated by USAF), Eielson Air Force Base (mostly in support of INDOPACOM), Fort Wainwright, Fort Greely (ground-based missile defense as part of NORAD), and the Clear Space Force Station. Meanwhile, the Navy and USCG are lagging in terms of assailable basing and infrastructure to support operations in the Arctic.102
Through Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCA) with regional allies, US presence is centered around the concept of “calibrated presence”103 through permanent and rotational deployments. This is akin to the Canadian concept of “agile basing” through modular forward operating presence.104 Of note is the Pituffik Space Base in Greenland for missile early-warning detection and
space domain awareness—which also serves as the only deep seaport for US regional operations.105
Another critical piece of the US basing network is the Keflavik Naval Air Station in Iceland, which plays a key role in monitoring and deterring Russia’s regional presence, notably with P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. Upgrades in the airfield infrastructure and expanding airlift and refueling capabilities at Keflavik are positive steps.106
US sustained presence in the Arctic is complicated by the impact of climate change in the region, and notably on infrastructure.
A recent RAND report called for the US to consider the construction of extra airfields in Norway as well as the construction of a facility at Ramsund Naval Base in Norway to improve US regional infrastructure and basing.107
US sustained presence in the Arctic, however, is complicated by the impact of climate change in the region, and notably on infrastructure. Permafrost thaw and receding sea ice are some of the many threats compounding US presence.108 A 2023 Report to Congress identified that permafrost thaw represents “moderate to considerable risk” for military infrastructure at the Pituffik Space Base, Eielson Air Force Base, Fort Wainwright, and the majority of the North Warning System installations in Alaska (with 57 sites built on permafrost out of 61).109
USNORTHCOM should conduct a thorough and comprehensive audit of infrastructure
at risk in the AoR to identify solutions before climate impact disrupts military operations.
Exercising presence through Arctic logistics, drills, and training
As part of the NSAR and the 2024 Arctic Strategy, exercising US presence further depends on training the Joint Force to Arctic and cold weather conditions through cycles of drills and exercises, including with allies and partners. Exercises also emphasize equipment testing, interoperability, operational coordination with allies, and upholding US navigational rights across the AoR.
Exercises and Drills
Regular drills take place on both sides of the Arctic in the Pacific Arctic (under INDOPACOM) such as Northern Edge as well as in the European High North (under EUCOM) such as Nordic Response or Arctic Challenge. Exercises allow the Joint Force to operate in cold weather conditions, practice Arctic warfighting, test equipment and capabilities, and strengthen cohesion between US branches and with allies.110
USNORTHCOM’s prime Arctic exercise is the biennial Arctic Edge drills, a combined exercise with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and NORAD. Arctic Edge focuses on homeland defense, joint force readiness, deployment, and sustainment of operations in an Arctic environment at the strategic and tactical levels.111 The drills incorporate troops across all branches as well as SOF in Alaska and the Bering Sea.
Every service in the US armed forces is training to Arctic conditions and increasing their operational knowledge for cold weather operations. The Navy trains in the Arctic region through regular naval exercises with allies (Dynamic Mongoose, Cold Response,
Ice Camp, Trident Juncture, etc.) while the Marine Corps trains with Norwegian forces112 as part of a rotational presence. The USAF emphasizes training in Alaska and Greenland and deploys assets including in the European High North.113
The Army trains for Arctic warfare, including with Norway through the Arctic Shock exercise114 and with Finland as part of Northern Forest 115 As mentioned, the Army’s Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center–Alaska (JPMRC–AK) trains Arctic conditions.116 The first JPMRC–AK drill took place in 2022 to test deployment and sustainment in extreme cold weather conditions as part of a combat training center (CTC) exercise. The 2024 iteration took place in February in Alaska.117
SOCNORTH particularly emphasizes cold and extreme weather training in the Arctic through participation in regular exercises such as Arctic Edge and Ice-X. SOCNORTH also trains with the Canadian Armed Forces (Operation Nanook Nunalivut) as well as with Nordic partners in the European High North.118 Recently, the 2024 Polar Dagger exercise included SOF and Navy SEALs in Alaska.119
From a geographical perspective, USNORTHCOMrelated military training and drills should focus more on protecting regional chokepoints and keeping them open for navigation.
As part of the DCAs with Nordic partners, joint air patrols with Norway and NATO missions with Iceland help increase regional domain
awareness around the GIUK-GIN gaps. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO stirred discussions around the establishment of a Nordic Air Operations Center to integrate Nordic air defense120 as well as the creation of a joint Nordic air force.121 Finally, the US regularly trains with Canada through Operation Nanook Nunalivut as well as though Noble Defender and Vigilant Shield (NORTHCOM/NORAD).
US-led exercises and drills with allies, however, have the tendency to focus heavily on warfighting.122 They generally lack elements of logistics, infrastructure resilience, and defense support tailored to the Arctic environment. In this regard, USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training.
From a geographical perspective, USNORTHCOM-related military training and drills should focus more on protecting regional chokepoints and keeping them open for navigation. This is particularly relevant for the Bering Strait (in collaboration with USCG and INDOPACOM) and across the GIUK-GINBear gaps (with EUCOM).
Arctic Logistics
Exercising presence in the Arctic is not simply a question of deployment and sustainment. Indeed, an essential but generally overlooked aspect of Arctic warfare pertains to cold weather-specific logistics—mainly transportation, storage, and maintenance. Without the latter, Arctic operations cannot be sustained over longer periods of time.
Logistics represents a critical gap in the ability of the US to project and deploy force in an Arctic environment. Mentions of military maintenance, transportation, and general logistics are relatively scarce in the recent Arctic-related strategic documents.123 These,
however, represent the biggest challenge to sustaining operations in the region.124 Another critical aspect of military logistics is the modernization of existing infrastructure in the Arctic, not least because of the impact of climate change (see above), as well as the creation of a new generation of scalable infrastructure to ensure a flexible response.125
More emphasis is therefore required to sustain a modular forward operating presence—close to the Canadian concept of agile basing. In this context, Canada has announced more investment in the establishment of a network of Northern Operational Support Hubs aimed at ensuring year-round presence and better support for military operations.126
NORTHCOM should explore what these concepts could look like in the US and develop streamlined solutions for dualuse infrastructure with the civilian sector,127 support infrastructure for maintenance of equipment deployed in extreme conditions, and overall better logistics to ensure increased mobility and reach across the Arctic.128
More resilient infrastructure and logistics should be prioritized over a larger physical presence. Several chokepoints in military logistics can be identified:
Cold weather gear, especially the impact of the cold and night operations on battery life and components in personal gear;129
Water storage and transportation in cold weather;
Special liquids storage and transportation in cold weather such as oils, fuels, and lubricants, considering they also freeze at cold temperatures;130
Ammunition storage and transportation;
Power generation, storage, and transportation over Arctic terrain.
The absence of a deepwater port in Nome, Alaska, is a critical infrastructure gap within NORTHCOM’s AoR. Although the project is underway, construction is now facing financing and cost overrun issues that will delay its completion into the 2030s.131 The deepwater port in Nome will be essential for regional military logistics and maintenance132 as well as for deployments into the Pacific Arctic.
Upgrading the infrastructure at Port Valdez, close to Anchorage, Alaska should also be considered to support regional operations— especially on the way to Nome, much closer to the Arctic Circle. Port Valdez equally plays a role in Bering Sea and North Pacific security. The construction of rail infrastructure at the port would also play a critical role in regional military logistics.133
Bridging the identified gaps will help USNORTHCOM strengthen its role as the capability advocate for Arctic operations. A first step could be to conduct a thorough assessment of existing gaps in logistics, maintenance, and transportation as well as adapt them to Arctic-specific requirements. Such an assessment will help identify the necessary investments required to ensure better Arctic logistics.
Conclusion and Summary of Policy Recommendations
The implementation of the NSAR and the 2024 Arctic Strategy all boils down to ensuring that the US prevails in terms of homeland security and forward defense with allies and partners in the Arctic. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM.
Forward defense will require forward-thinking, and notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence. This is part of the deterrent value of deploying the Joint Force globally as well as demonstrating combatcredible capabilities throughout circumpolar geography.134
USNORTHCOM will have to approach Arcticspecific deterrence in threat-driven terms, notably in the face of Russia’s aggressive behavior, Chinese regional inroads, risks linked to nefarious low intensity warfare operations and sub-threshold activities, and the impact of climate change. Deterrence in the Arctic will also have to avoid the risk of horizontal escalation into the Arctic per se as well as limit the potential for miscalculation, tactical errors, and military accidents—all the while keeping the Arctic open and navigable.
To pursue these priorities, USNORTHCOM must create “connective tissue”135 within US structures and with allies, as well as increase overall circumpolar domain awareness. Only then will the US be able to achieve a genuine monitor-and-respond approach and turn USNORTHCOM into the Arctic capability advocate envisaged in the UCP and the Total Force concept.
This paper has helped identify several policy pathways and action points.
1. Enhance domain awareness
USNORTHCOM should lead the effort in the domain awareness discussion by identifying what a credible US monitorand-respond approach genuinely entails as well as lead the way in fostering a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities and capacity tailored to the environment.
For this to happen, USNORTHCOM must help unify Arctic-related concepts of operation and force design across all relevant stakeholders under the UCP.
USNORTHCOM should systematically advocate for the need to increase domain awareness across all domains. Modern technology is critical in this endeavor with regards multi-domain networks of sensors, ISR, and data fusion.
USNORTHCOM should champion the organization of military exercises within the AoR that emphasize practicing domain awareness across relevant stakeholders across US services, and especially between the Navy and USCG, Air Force, Space Force, and NORAD.
2. Improve capabilities, technology, and procurement
USNORTHCOM should champion connections and discussions between relevant stakeholders in North American air defense as part of NORAD and beyond, especially between the Air Force, Space Force, and the Army. Working with Canada, but also Greenland and Denmark, will be particularly critical to address
potential security gaps.
USNORTHCOM should consider recent calls to establish a rotational UAV presence in its area of responsibility for domain awareness purposes.
USNORTHCOM should advocate for increased investment and procurement in ASW capabilities, specifically antiUUV capabilities, mine counter-measure systems, maritime patrol aviation (MPA) assets, and counter-electronic warfare capabilities for US Navy and USCG assets.
3. Ensure a whole of US government engagement
USNORTHCOM should lead the way in clarifying the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole-of-government perspective.
USNORTHCOM should take stock of all existing endeavors and find ways to integrate them under a holistic umbrella for Arctic-dedicated training, formal information-sharing endeavors, and operations and better combined arms maneuvers.
USNORTHCOM could lead an effort to streamline existing command-and-control structures under one umbrella in terms of information sharing. Discussions around the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) with the Air Force, the Navy and USCG are a good example of such convergence.
USNORTHCOM should take a more proactive and forward-leaning leadership role in identifying specific requirements
for future Arctic-related roles and missions—in other words, take the lead in transcribing existing and future strategies into a detailed list of requirements for Arctic presence and operations within the AoR across all relevant stakeholders. To streamline this process, the first item on the agenda should be determining what goes first between missions, capabilities, and procurement. It would be beneficial to start by honing scenario-based thinking regarding the threat environment in the Arctic, potential escalation scenarios, force demand, defense planning, etc. Mission requirements will inform the procurement of capabilities and platforms necessary to ensure homeland defense and beyond.
USNORTHCOM should champion the organization of scenario-based threat assessments, table-top simulations, and wargames through enhanced cooperation with the subject matter expert community and key stakeholders across the US government. Ideal venues for this are the Homeland Defense Institute (HDI) and the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.
4. Increase cooperation with allies and partners
USNORTHCOM should increase its involvement with the Arctic 7 to understand their priorities for future Arctic security. Being in listening mode with regional allies would be a good way to identify priorities and bridge potential divergences that could affect transAtlantic unity in an Arctic context.
USNORTHCOM should take the lead in communicating with allies and partners about the future of US-NATO command structures in an Arctic context.
Systematic participation of USNORTHCOM
in existing Arctic cooperative forums is vital to information sharing and overall cooperation with allies and should be encouraged.
5. Exercise greater presence through deployments and training
USNORTHCOM should conduct a thorough and comprehensive audit of infrastructure at risk in the AoR to identify solutions before climate impact disrupts military operations.
USNORTHCOM should also conduct a thorough assessment of existing gaps in logistics, maintenance, and transportation as well as adapt them to Arctic-specific requirements.
USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training.
From a geographical perspective, USNORTHCOM-related military training and drills should focus more on protecting regional chokepoints and keeping them open for navigation. This is particularly relevant for the Bering Strait (in collaboration with USCG and INDOPACOM) and across the GIUK-GINBear gaps (with EUCOM).
USNORTHCOM should develop streamlined solutions for dual-use Arctic infrastructure with the civilian sector, support infrastructure for maintenance of equipment deployed in extreme conditions, and overall better logistics to ensure increased mobility and reach across the region.
1 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border and its Arctic Approaches Through Cooperation With Allies and Partners,” German Marshall Fund, August 17, 2023, https://www.gmfus.org/news/defending-americas-northern-border-and-its-arctic-approaches-through-cooperation-allies-and
2 For an in-depth analysis, see Mathieu Boulègue, “The Impact of the War Against Ukraine on Russia’s Arctic Posture: Hard Power on Vulnerable Ice,” Polar Institute, Wilson Center, June 14, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter. org/publication/impact-war-against-ukraine-russiasarctic-posture-hard-power-vulnerable-ice; Mathieu Boulègue, “The militarization of Russian polar politics,” Chatham House, June 6, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/militarization-russian-polar-politics; Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment,” Chatham House, June 2019, https://www. chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-28-RussiaMilitary-Arctic_0.pdf.
3 Mathieu Boulègue, “Arctic Seabed Warfare Against Data Cables: Risks and impact for US critical undersea infrastructure,” Polar Institute, Wilson Center, July 30, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/arcticseabed-warfare-against-data-cables-risks-and-impact-uscritical-undersea
4 These refer to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap; the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) gap; and the Bear gap between the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), and mainland Norway.
5 Camilla T. N. Sørensen, “The Evolving Chinese Strategic Approach in the Arctic Following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” International Competition in the High North (US Army War College Press, 2022); Camilla T. N. Sørensen and Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, “The Role of Technology in China’s Arctic Engagement: A Means as Well as an End in Itself,” Arctic Yearbook, 2021, https:// arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2021/Scholarly-Papers/11_AY2021_Sorensen_Hsiung.pdf
6 Elizabeth Buchanan, “Why Russia and China Won’t Go the Distance in the High North,” Royal United Services Institute, May 8, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/ explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-russia-and-china-wont-go-distance-high-north
7 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress, 2024, https://media.defense. gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
8 Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia-China Military, Defense, and Security Relations in the Arctic and Antarctica: Polar Symbols over Substance,” Berkeley Risk and Security
Lab, UC Berkeley, forthcoming.
9 Such documents refer to the US Coast Guard’s Arctic Strategic Outlook (April 2019), the US Air Force’s Arctic Strategy (July 2020), the Department of Homeland Security’s Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security (January 2021), the US Army’s Regaining Arctic Dominance (January 2021), and the US Navy’s A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic (January 2021).
10 White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region. pdf
11 White House, Implementation Plan of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/NSAR-Implementation-Plan.pdf
12 Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy, 2024 https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF
13 Department of Defense, “Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience,” https:// policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/ASD-for-HomelandDefense-and-Hemispheric-Affairs/Arctic-and-Global-Resilience/.
14 https://www.state.gov/biographies/michael-sfraga/
15 Abbie Tingstad, Scott Savitz, Benjamin J. Sacks, Yuliya Shokh, Irina A. Chindea, Scott R. Stephenson, Michael T. Wilson, James G. Kallimani, Kristin Van Abel, Stephanie Pezard, Isabelle Winston, Inez Khan, Dan Abel, Clay McKinney, Yvonne K. Crane, Kate Giglio, Sherrill Lingel, and Lyle J. Morris, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces,” RAND Corporation, November 1, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RRA1638-1.html
16 Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy.
17 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Lori J. Robinson, United States Air Force Commander, United States Northern Command And North American Aerospace Defense Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee,” March 21, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Robinson_03-22-18.pdf
18 House Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Glen D. Vanherck, United States Air Force Commander United States Northern Command And North American Aerospace Defense Command Before The House Armed Services Committee,” March 8, 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/08/2003174619/1/-1/1/NNC_FY23%20POSTURE%20STATEMENT%20 HASC%20FINAL.PDF
19 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command G-2, “The
Arctic Through 2035: An Overview Of The Operational Environment And Competitor Strategies For U.S. Army Training, Doctrine, And Capabilities Development,” July 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1134377.pdf
20 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
21 Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy.
22 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy,” June 2019, https:// media.defense.gov/2019/jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019dod-arctic-strategy.pdf
23 David Auerswald, “A U.S. Security Strategy For The Arctic,” War on the Rocks, May 27, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/a-u-s-security-strategy-for-thearctic/
24 Caitlin Yilek, “What we know so far about the Chinese spy balloon and the other objects the U.S. shot down,” CBS News, June 29, 2023, https://www.cbsnews. com/live-updates/chinas-spy-balloon-unidentified-objects-shot-down-what-we-know-so-far/
25 Abbie Tingstad et al, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
26 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
27 Timothy Greenhaw, Daniel L. Magruder Jr., Rodrick H. McHaty, and Michael Sinclair, “US Military Options To Enhance Arctic Defense,” Brookings Institution, May 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-military-options-to-enhance-arctic-defense/
28 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Lori J. Robinson.”
29 Department of the Navy, Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/ Jan/05/2002560338/-1/-1/0/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRINT%20 2021%20FINAL.PDF/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRINT%20 2021%20FINAL.PDF.
30 Department of the Air Force, Arctic Strategy, 2020, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2020SAF/July/ ArcticStrategy.pdf
31 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy.”
32 Caitlin Lee and Aidan Poling, “Bolstering Arctic Domain Awareness to Deter Air & Missile Threats to the Homeland,” Mitchell Institute, Policy Paper, vol. 41, June 22, 2023, https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/ bolstering-arctic-domain-awareness-to-deter-air-missilethreats-to-the-homeland/
33 Caitlin Lee and Aidan Poling, “Bolstering Arctic Domain Awareness”; Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North: Confronting Arctic Insecurity,” Center for European Policy Analysis, December 5, 2024, https://cepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Up-North-CEPA-22.11.24.pdf
34 Paolo Braca, “Multi Domain Situational Awareness: Seabed to Space Situational Awareness (S3A),” NATO Science and Technology Organization, Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation, March 2023, https:// ieee-aess.org/files/ieeeaess/slides/Braca_Multi_Domain%20SA%202023_compress.pdf
35 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
36 Abbie Tingstad et al, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
37 Kathy Murray, “Coast Guard adds first polar icebreaker to its fleet in 25 years,” MyCG, December 23, 2024, https://www.mycg.uscg.mil/News/Article/4016098/coastguard-adds-first-polar-icebreaker-to-its-fleet-in-25-years/
38 Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” July 14, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41153
39 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/joint-statement-on-ice-pact/
40 Government of Canada, “National Coordinators of the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort meet in Helsinki, Finland,” March 9, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2025/03/national-coordinators-of-the-icebreaker-collaboration-effort-meet-in-helsinki-finland.html
41 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Lori J. Robinson.”
42 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy.”
43 Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek, “Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities for growing problem sets in the Arctic region,” in Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge, eds., Defending NATO’s Northern Flank: Power Projection and Military Opera (Routledge, 2023).
44 Abbie Tingstad et al, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
45 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Lori J. Robinson.”
46 Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek, “Operationalizing joint force capabilities.”
47 US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, “The Arctic Through 2035.”
48 Davis Hovey, “Head of Alaska Aerospace sees
Kodiak Island spaceport as solution for national congestion,” KTOO, January 28, 2025, https://www.ktoo. org/2025/01/28/head-of-alaska-aerospace-sees-kodiakisland-spaceport-as-solution-for-national-congestion/
49 Space Systems Command, “International Partnership’s Arctic Satellites Arrives at Launch Site After Integration and Testing,” June 27, 2024, https://www.ssc. spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/International%20Partnership’s%20Arctic%20Satellites%20Arrives%20at%20Launch%20Site%20After%20 Integration%20and%20Testing.pdf
50 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
51 Northrop Grumman, “Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission,” https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/arctic-satellite-broadband-mission
52 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
53 Caitlin Lee and Aidan Poling, “Bolstering Arctic Domain Awareness.”
54 Sarena Padilla and Garner Fleming, “Navy, Coast Guard, NOAA Work to Improve Arctic Forecasting for U.S., Allied Forces,” Defense Opinion, February 20, 2023, https://defenseopinion.com/navy-commandworks-to-improve-arctic-forecasting-for-u-s-allied-forces/352/
55 Gary Roughead, “The Trident Returns: Reactivating the U.S. Second Fleet and Revitalizing Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Atlantic,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 26, 2018, https://www.csis.org/ analysis/trident-returns
56 Timothy Greenhaw et al, “US Military Options To Enhance Arctic Defense.”
57 Mathieu Boulègue, “Arctic Seabed Warfare Against Data Cables.”
58 https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title46-chapter532&edition=prelim
59 “NATO stands up undersea infrastructure coordination cell,” NATO, February 15, 2023, https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/news_211919.htm
60 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
61 11th Airborne Division, “Northern Warfare Training Center,” https://11thairbornedivision.army.mil/Units/Northern-Warfare-Training-Center/.
62 Spencer Hanson, “Arctic survival training course specialist helps base prepare for hazards on Last Frontier,” Torch, September 17, 2024, https://www.torch.aetc.af.mil/ News/Article-Display/Article/3909443/arctic-survival-
training-course-specialist-helps-base-prepare-for-hazards-on-la/
63 Shawn R. Satterfield and Sky B. Jensen, “Special Operations Command North: Leading Special Operations Forces Into The North American Arctic,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 3, 2022, https://www. airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3172966/special-operations-command-north-leading-special-operations-forces-into-the-nor/
64 Brian S. Eifler and Troy J. Bouffard, “Forging the Arctic Warrior: Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center–Alaska,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 3, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3173321/forging-the-arctic-warrior-joint-pacific-multinational-readiness-centeralaska/
65 Timothy Greenhaw et al, “US Military Options To Enhance Arctic Defense.”
66 Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek, “Operationalizing joint force capabilities.”
67 Glen D. VanHerck, “Campaigning at the Top of the World: Arctic Security and Homeland Defense,” Journal Of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 3, 2022, https:// www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3173407/ campaigning-at-the-top-of-the-world-arctic-security-andhomeland-defense/.
68 Ryan Dean and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Defending the North American Homeland: Reassuring Messaging from the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Perspective,” Quick Impact, March 12, 2025, https://www.naadsn. ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/25mar-Defending-the-North-American-Homeland_RD-PWL-QI.pdf
69 Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress.”
70 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
71 Joseph R. Blume, Nathan L. Golike, Geoffrey R. Latimer, and Michael Stanski, “The Key to Arctic Dominance: Establishing an Arctic-Focused Subordinate Unified Command,” Joint Forces Quarterly 115, 4th Quarter 2024, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol115/iss3/3/
72 Nicholas Glesby, “NORAD in the Arctic: Command and Control Gaps and Information Siloes,” NAADSN, August 27, 2023, https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/ uploads/2023/08/23AUGNORAD-in-the-Arctic-PolicyPrimer-Nicholas-Glesby-Final.pdf
73 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
74 Timothy Greenhaw et al, “US Military Options To Enhance Arctic Defense”; Joseph R. Blume et al, “The Key to Arctic Dominance.”
75 Joseph R. Blume et al, “The Key to Arctic Dominance.”
76 Jeremy M. McKenzie, Chad M. Pillai, Ryan R. Duffy, and Jahara Matisek, “Fighting and winning in the Arctic: improving polar warfare capabilities,” Defense & Security Analysis 40(4), October 2024, https://doi.org/10.1080/147 51798.2024.2401712
77 Gabriella Gricius, “A Transatlantic Perspective on Arctic Security,” American University, February 26, 2024, https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/transatlantic-policy/policy-briefs/20240226-a-transatlantic-perspective-on-arctic-security.cfm
78 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
79 “Deterrence and defence,” NATO, June 26, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/iw/natohq/topics_133127.htm
80 Minna Ålander, “NATO’s New Northern Flank — Don’t Ruin It,” Center for European Policy Analysis, July 20, 2023, https://cepa.org/article/natos-new-northern-flankdont-ruin-it/
81 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Lori J. Robinson.”
82 Binyam Solomon, “The Political Economy of NORAD,” Defence and Peace Economics, 35:5 (2024), https://doi. org/10.1080/10242694.2024.2349888
83 Nicholas Glesby, “NORAD in the Arctic.”
84 Caitlin Yilek, “What we know so far about the Chinese spy balloon.”
85 Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek, “Operationalizing joint force capabilities.”
86 Prime Minister of Canada, “Reinforcing Canada’s security and sovereignty in the Arctic,” March 18, 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2025/03/18/reinforcing-canadas-security-and-sovereignty-arctic
87 Thomas Hughes, James Fergusson, and Andrea Charron, “Nuanced futures: Canadian and US defence in the North American Arctic,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 30:2 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2 024.2346902
88 Government of Canada, Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, December 2024, https://www.international.gc.ca/gacamc/publications/transparency-transparence/arctic-arctique/arctic-policy-politique-arctique.aspx?lang=eng
89 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
90 Nicholas Glesby, “NORAD in the Arctic.”
91 Aidarkhan Dauylbayev, Raushan Yelmurzayeva, Takhira Kamaljanova, and Gulnara Ibragimova, “The ambivalence of the implementation of the US arctic policy: integrating and disintegration factors of the allies,” Frontiers in Political Science, 6 (2024), https://doi.org/10.3389/ fpos.2024.1341375.
92 Government of Canada, Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.
93 Duncan Depledge and Mathieu Boulègue, “It Is Time to Negotiate a New Military Security Architecture for the Arctic,” Wilson Center, April 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/no-5-it-time-negotiate-new-military-security-architecture-arctic; Mathieu Boulègue, “Exploring military security issues in the Arctic,” Chatham House, January 21, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse. org/2023/01/exploring-military-security-issues-arctic; Duncan Depledge, Mathieu Boulègue, Andrew Foxall, and Dmitriy Tulupov, “Why we need to talk about military activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct,” Arctic Yearbook, 2019, https://arcticyearbook. com/arctic-yearbook/2019/2019-briefing-notes/328-whywe-need-to-talk-about-military-activity-in-the-arctic-towards-an-arctic-military-code-of-conduct
94 Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy; and Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy.”
95 Glen D. VanHerck, “Campaigning at the Top of the World.”
96 Alex Horton, “The Navy is resurrecting a fleet to protect the East Coast and North Atlantic from Russia,” Washington Post, May 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2018/05/05/the-navy-isresurrecting-a-fleet-to-protect-the-east-coast-and-northatlantic-from-russia/.
97 US Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance, January 19, 2021, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/15/9944046e/regaining-arctic-dominance-us-army-in-the-arctic-19-january-2021-unclassified. pdf
98 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
99 Patty Nieberg, “Army activates Arctic Aviation Command for extreme cold flying,” Task & Purpose, August 20, 2024, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-activates-alaska-aviation-command/
100 Matthew Tucker and Jason Buell, “Securing the Homefront: Special Operations Command North’s Approach to Secure the Homeland against the People’s Republic of China,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2024.
101 Shawn R. Satterfield and Sky B. Jensen, “Special
Operations Command North.”
102 Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress.”
103 “The DOD’s New Arctic Strategy: An In-Depth Discussion,” Wilson Center, July 23, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/dods-new-arctic-strategy-depth-discussion
104 Mathieu Boulègue, “Up North.”
105 Aidarkhan Dauylbayev et al, “The ambivalence of the implementation of the US arctic policy.”
106 Paul McLeary, “US Expands Icelandic Airfield For Tankers, Big Cargo Lift,” Breaking Defense, July 18, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/07/us-expands-icelandic-airfield-for-tankers-big-cargo-lift/; Mila Cisneros, “Air Force awards multiple contracts for airfield construction at NAS Keflavik,” US Air Force, September 24, 2020, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2359356/ air-force-awards-multiple-contracts-for-airfield-construction-at-nas-keflavik
107 Abbie Tingstad et al, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
108 Kelsey A. Frazier, “Arctic Insecurity: The Implications of Climate Change for US National Security,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2024.
109 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, “Report to Congress: Permafrost Thaw on Infrastructure, Facilities, and Operations of the Department of Defense,” May 2023, https://www.acq. osd.mil/eie/imr/mc/Downloads/2023%20Report%20 to%20Congress%20on%20Permafrost%20Thaw.pdf
110 Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress.”
111 Todd South, “Marines hit the high North in separate Arctic exercises,” Marine Corps Times, March 8, 2024, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marinecorps/2024/03/08/marines-hit-the-high-north-in-separate-arctic-exercises/
112 Abbie Tingstad et al, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
113 https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-strategic-bombers-deployed-northern-sweden
114 Alex Candlin, “Arctic Angels: US paras swap Alaska for Norway as they drop in for Exercise Arctic Shock,” Forces News, March 19, 2024, https://www.forcesnews. com/usa/arctic-angels-us-paras-swap-alaska-norwaythey-drop-exercise-arctic-shock; https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/regaining-arctic-expertise-us-troops-alaska-making-strides-become-armys-arctic-force
115 Thomas Nilsen, “Key allies US and Norway on move in Lapland as thousands of soldiers train rapid reinforcement,” Barents Observer, May 28, 2024, https://www. thebarentsobserver.com/security/key-allies-us-and-norway-on-move-in-lapland-as-thousands-of-soldiers-trainrapid-reinforcement/166062.
116 Brian S. Eifler and Troy J. Bouffard, “Forging the Arctic Warrior”; Jim Verchio, “March Brings Joint Pacific Multi-national Readiness Center Exercise to Fort Greely, Donnelly Training Area,” USINDOPACOM, February 18, 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2941038/march-brings-joint-pacificmulti-national-readiness-center-exercise-to-fort-gre/
117 Todd South, “8,000+ soldiers tested in largescale combat in the Arctic,” Army Times, February 26, 2024, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2024/02/26/8000-soldiers-tested-in-large-scalecombat-in-the-arctic/
118 Shawn R. Satterfield and Sky B. Jensen, “Special Operations Command North.”
119 Ellie Cook, “Navy SEALs Test Arctic Skills in Freezing ‘Operation Polar Dagger’ Drills,” Newsweek, August 15, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/us-military-navy-seals-operation-polar-dagger-arctic-special-ops-forces-russia-china-1939016; Alex Horton, “In the Arctic, American commandos game out a great-power war,” Washington Post, April 11, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/04/11/navy-seals-greenberets-arctic-russia-china/
120 Valerie Insinna, “Norwegian air chief wants ‘Nordic Air Operations Center’ if Sweden, Finland join NATO,” Breaking Defense, July 8, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/norwegian-air-chief-wants-nordicair-operations-center-if-sweden-finland-join-nato
121 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Nordic nations move to link air forces into 250-strong aircraft fleet,” Defense News, March 24, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/ europe/2023/03/24/nordic-countries-move-toward-linking-their-air-forces-250-planes/
122 Thomas Hughes, James Fergusson, and Andrea Charron, “Nuanced futures.”
123 Kristen Heiserman, “Snowblind: Investing in Logistical Infrastructure in the Arctic to Support the Indo-Pacific and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2024.
124 US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, “The Arctic Through 2035.”
125 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement Of General Lori J. Robinson.”
126 Government of Canada, “Minister Blair announces First Northern Operational Support Hub locations,”
March 6, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/03/minister-blair-announces-first-northern-operational-support-hub-locations.html
127 Kristen Heiserman, “Snowblind.”
128 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
129 Jeremy M. McKenzie, Chad M. Pillai, Ryan R. Duffy, and Jahara Matisek, “Fighting and winning in the Arctic.”
130 Kristen Heiserman, “Snowblind.”
131 Peggy McCormack and Joey Klecka, “Expansion of deepwater Nome port delayed due to costs,” Alaska’s News Source, October 31, 2024, https://www.alaskasnewssource.com/2024/10/31/expansion-deepwaternome-port-delayed-due-costs/
132 Abbie Tingstad et al, “Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
133 Kristen Heiserman, “Snowblind.”
134 Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy.
135 Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristina Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, “Defending America’s Northern Border.”
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