The Borneo Response to Malaysia by James P. Ongkili

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961- 1963

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA

1961-1963

• James P. Ongkili, B.A. Hons

•

DONALD MOORE PRESS LTD

PREFACE

In the writing of this book an attempt has been made to be as disinterested as possible in the treatment of what after all amounts to the focusing of attention on a living issue such as the Borneo territories and Malaysia. This impartiality becomes all the more imperative because I happen to have grown up in Sal>ah myself.

Nevertheless, even sincerity and integrity in writing do demand conviction and conclusive judgement, and for this reason I have not hesitated to come to a clear set of conclusions in the present narrative.

A number of monographs and journalistic efforts have appeared on the subject of the formation of Malaysia. These have mostly been of a general nature, and always the emphasis has tended to be on Malaya and Singapore without presenting the Borneo side of the picture in equal focus. The present work has attempted to narrate the story from a different angle by tracing, analysing and finally presenting the Borneo response to Malaysia as a study of political emergence and progress. This narrative is thus a pioneer in its relatively unexplored field, and if it could stimulate interest in the current political, social and economic developme.n ts in Sarawak and Sabah, my labour would have been amply rewarded.

My feeling and attitude towards the European periods in both Sarawak and Sabah should be understandable even to the most conservative Western reader.

I have plenty of goodwill and respect for the measures of social and welfare developments undertaken by the colonial administrations in both territories as I have written so in my Kadazan History of Sabah,¡ but the story of political development in Borneo is quite a different thing, and should I be judged harsh on the colonial power in this respect I cannot give a better apology than that 1 have been educated in a western country. Finally, I must express my thanks to Dr. D. P . Singbal of the University of Queensland for his kindness and assistance in many ways.

J . p.

Brisbane, April 1966

v

o.

for

The Founding Fathers of

Sarawak and Sabah

Published by DONALD MOORE PRESS LTD, 1967

Copyright© James P. Ongkili, 1967 Printed by Ho Printing Co. Singapore

CONTENTS

:t:a.pter

u

Page

The Land And Its Historical Background

1

Political Development In Borneo- Untn May ],961

9

Rejection And Uncertainty-May To December 1961

22

~!alayan

43

Canvass For Support- August 1961 To August 1962

• Conditional Acceptance- September 1962 To July 1963 Reconciliation And Hesignation- July To September 1963

m

Conclusion

71

96 121

.A,;:?=>-Xbc

Jo.nt Public statement Issued by the British and Malayan Governments on 1 August, 1962

128

i\greement Relating To Malaysia

130

Proclamation Of Malaysia

134

·eOn Abbreviations

136

:>graphy

137

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Chapter I

THE LAND AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This book deals with the response of the Borneo territories of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah to the proposal to form a federation called Malaysia, between May 1961 and September 1963. Among the political leaders and the peoples of the territories, changes of opinions regarding the proposed federation occurred during this period; and it has been the purpose of this study to attempt to trace and interpret the developments and changes of opinions side by side with the progress or otherwise of the Malaysia plan itself.

However, before we can proceed with any meaningful assessment of the attitudes of the Borneo peoples to the formation of Malaysia, a background knowledge of Sarawak and Sabah at the very least must be given. This is especially pertinent not only because the old colonial notion of Borneo being little more than the home of human head-hunters has persisted, but also because outside and overseas readers have in the main heard very little of Sarawak and Sabah.

At the time of writing, the island of Borneo, which is the third largest in the world and the largest of the thousands of isles and islets in the .Malay world, 1 was divided into Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah, and Kalimantan or Indonesian Borneo .

Sarawak occupies most of the north-western coastal area. With an area of about 48.250 square miles the territory covers a little less than one sixth of the island.

The boundary between Sarawak and Indonesian Borneo follows the watershed between the mainly gorge- and rapid-ridden rivers flowing generally northwesterly into the South China Sea and those which flow into the Celebes and Java Seas. The largest river, the Rejang, has a length of 350 miles and is navigable for small coastal steamers as far as Kapit, 150 miles up-river. The country is rugged and complex and the boundary is unsurveyed. Mount Murud, at 7,950 feet, is Sarawa.k's highest mountain, dominating an area of unexplored ravines, plateaux and involved mountain ranges rising to over 5,000 feet.

1

The Malay world is taken to include the Malay, the Indonesian, and the Philippine Archipelagos

2

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

The remainder of the country comprises an alluvial coastal plain and a belt of undulating country separating the coastal plain from the sharply rising mountainous interior. The coastal plain varies in width from less than a mile at Mlrl to over a hundred miles , and contains large areas of peat swamps of various depths . The beaches are generally of mud and mangrove or nipab palm .

Shallow coastal waters and the existence of bars at river mouths limit the development of deep sea ports.

The greater part of Sarawak ls still covered by primary rain forest , and large areas are practically uninhabited. The swamp forests produce the bulk of the timber exported. Much of the remainder of the land is used for agriculture, largely shifting cultivation or bush fallow farming. There are a few areas of natural grassland near the coast on which cattle are raised, but grazing land is very limited.

Kuching, the capital, is situated on the Sarawak River, twenty-one miles from the sea. The newport, fourteen miles from the sea, can accommodate ships up to 350 feet long and with a draught of up to seventeen feet. The town is growing rapidly, the population of the municipal area being 50,600 in 1962, of whom the trading community is mainly Chinese, with large Malay and other small com-

munities occupying suburban a reas . Sibu, the second largest town, is situated about eighty miles from the sea at the bead of the Rejang delta. The inhabitants of the town are mainly Chinese, with Malay, and native settlements adjoining the business area. Sibu, with Sariket and Binatang lower down the river, handles a large proportion of the import and export trade of the country.

Other main towns are Mirl, Simanggang and Limbang. Miri owes its existence to the opening of the Sarawak oilfields in 1910. Although oil is still produced, the neighbouring oilflelds of Brunei have become of far greater importance.

All the oil won in north-western Borneo is exported through Lutong which is in Sarawak, seven miles north of Miri. The Miri river has a bar which prevents all but small coastal vessels from entering, and the shallow coastal waters force larger ships to anchor about three miles out to sea.

General cargo is handled by lighter and oil from the Lutong refinery and storage tanks is loaded through underwater pipelines. Simaoggaog and Limbang both have bazaars and wharves for coastal and river launches. Navigation on the Lupar River, on which Slmanggang lies, is hampered by a tidal bore. While riverine traffic is therefore so important inmanyparts of Sarawak, this mode of transportation is often hampered by shallow coastal waters .

The characteristic features of the climate of Sarawak are heavy rainfall, a uniform temperature and high humidity. A large area of the country receives

THE LAND AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3

between 120 and 160 inches ofrain. The highest recorded fall is at Long Akah up the Baram River, with a mean annual rainfall of 236 inches . The surface mean temperature va ries between 7t F and 88° F with the highest recorded maximum 97° F and the lowest minimum 68° F. From the beginning of October untll nearly the end of February, the northeast monsoon brings heavy rainfall, particularly in the coastal belt. The monsoon moves at a fairly uniform speed across the China Seas, but once south of latitude 5° N, its average speed decreases- resulting in rain persisting for several days.

During the mild south-east monsoon from April to July or August, rainfall l.s mainly in the afternoon or late at night.

Sarawak has a multi-racial population, and the society has therefore tended to be plural rather than homogeneous . Of the total population of 776,990 in June 1962, 51 per cent was indigenous (Oayaks , Melanaus and others) , 31•5 per cent was Chinese, and 17•5 per cent was Malay. European and other non-indigenous stocks made up 1 per cent. The population growth is slow, despite improve-· ments in education, health and maternal care. Over half of the Chinese live near the three principal towns ofKuching, Sibu and Miri, although a substantial number dwell in rural aTe as as smallholders cultivating rubber and pepper. The largest c oncentrations of the latter are around the Serian district and the lower Rejang area. Almost all the younger Chinese were born in Sarawak, their parents having immigr ated from China in the years before the war.

The indigenous Dayaks are popularly divided into Sea Dayaks or !bans and Land Daya.ks. But the division is more apparent than real, as both types as well as most of the other indigenous groups are an inland longhouse dwelling people.

The lbans like to settle in new places and are now found in most parts of the country including the delta areas of the Rejang and Batang Lupar Rivers. All longhouse people like to plant dry rice by the shifting cultivation method but they own and cultivate substantial areas of rubber also and are now planting highyielding rubber under government supervision and subsidy.

The Malays are mostly swamp land rice farmers, fishermen and sago cultivators. There are also a considerable number living in villages in and around the main township areas. The urban Malays go in for salary and wageearning rather than trade and many are employed in government service. All Malays are Muslims. All communities of the Sarawak population have at least one distinctive language; but Malay is widely understood sufficiently well for ordinary everyday purposes, and the use of English is spreading with the development of education.

In the north, Sarawa.k adjoins Sabah and in the north-west the sultanate of

4

THE BORNEO

RES~ONSE

TO MALAYSIA 1961 -1963

Brunei forms a double enclave. The boundaries between Sarawak and these two territories run through much easier country and sections have been surveyed as the need has arisen. Sabah occupies the whole of the north of Borneo. The total area of the territory is 29,388square mlles . It is thus roughly the size of Ireland.

The South China Sea washes its western coast and the Sulu and Celebes Seas its eastern coast.

The country contains central mountain ranges , and the main one, the Crocker Range, stretches parallel with the coast from the Sarawak border in the southwestern corner of the country to the Kinabalu massif. The Range culminates at its northern end in Mount Kinabalu, 13,455 feet high, the highest mountain in the Malay world and one of the finest mountains in South-east Asia. This exceptionally majestic mountain, which is still venerated by the older generation of the indigenous people as the final resting place of their dead, may be seen from many parts of the country. 2 The whole of the interior between the Crocker Range and the Indonesian Borneo border, with the exception of the scrubbyKeningau and grassy Tambunan plains , is mountainous and difficult of access. On the east coast, much of the terrain inland from Tawau and Lahad Datu is mountainous and almost entirely undeveloped. To the north of this area, however, is a heavily .forested plain interspersed with hills and crossed by numbers of rivers. There are extensive areas of fertile soil in the adjacent Labuk valley and the Semporna peninsula.

Between the Crocker Range and theseaonthe west coast is an extensive and relatively heavily populated coastal plain, in which is cultivated the major part of the rubber and rice produced in the country. Inland from the coastal plain is the Tenom valley, which contains some of the best agricultural land on the west coast.

Rivers are numerous throughout the country and are of considerable importance, constituting as they do in Sarawak the only means of communication in some districts . The longest river is the Kinabatangan which follows a course as long as that of its counterpart the Rejang in Sarawak (350 miles), and is navigable by large launches as far as Lamag, over 60 miles up- river,and well beyond that point by smaller launches and shallow-draught craft powered by outboard motor. Agricultural and forest products are carried down this river to the coastal towns. Other rivers traverse the plains of the east coast. The rivers on the west coast are shorter and swifter flowing , but, like most other z For popular legends surrounding Kinabalu and Kinabatangan, see my History of Sabah, (in Romanized Kadazan), Borneo Literature Bureau, Kuching, 1965, Ch. 2

J

.....1

THE LAND AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

5

rivers in Borneo , navigation by steamers is handicapped by bars .

Jesselton, the capital of Sabah, has a good, well-sheltered harbour for vessels of moderate size, which take away the bulk of the rubber produced on the west coast. At the most northerly point of Sabah is Marudu Bay with its harbour town of Kudat, the first Chartered Company capital from 1881 to 1884, the mainland source of food and forest produce for the dwindling East India settlement on nearby Balambangan in the 1770s, and which today serves a fertile and developing hinterland, Sandakan, which succeeded Kudat as the capital until the Japanese occupation, is built on the northern shore of a magnificent harbour and is the largest town in the territory. The town is the chief outlet of the considerable timber export of Sabah. It is most likely that east-coast towns such as Lahad Datu, Semporna and Tawau will grow rapidly once the rural development and proper land utilization schemes get under way. Unfortunately, however , such a welcome development is subject to political conditions within the bordering countries to the east and north. 1International diplomacy within the Malay world does affect the economic and agricultural development of the Borneo territories.

With a tropical climate akin to that of Sarawak, Sabah has on the coast day temperatures varying from 74° F in the early morning to 88° F at mid-day, and only on exceptionally hot days to 93° F or 946 F. Night temperatures are in the region of 72° F and in most places comparatively cool nights occur. Thus, although the Equator passes through Borneo, the temperatures and relative humidities of Sarawak and Sabah are nowhere near the extreme heat waves and hot dry days of Australian summers . Bush fires and stock-ravaging droughts are unknown phenomena in Borneo.

The annual rainfall of Sabah varies from 60 inches to 160 inches depending on the locality. The north-east monsoon begins in October or early November and lasts until March or April, and the south-west monsoon prevails from the beginning of May until August. The highest rai.nfall is in the south- west around the Tenom valley and the lowest and most evenly distributed rainfall is in the interior and at Tawau in the south-east corner of the territory. The typhoon belt passes just north of Sabah, so typhoons are unknown, although severe rainstorms accompanied by high winds are not infrequent. .

Altho,ugh the population of Sabah is small (454,421 according to the 19fi0 census), like Sarawak, it is composed of a variety of races . Of the total , 59·4 per cent was indigenous- comprising the Kadazans , the Muruts and several other inland groups. The Chinese constituted 22·2 per cent, while the Malays (mostly coastal Bajaus and other allied groups) constituted 13·4 per cent. The

6

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1963

Europeans and other non-indigenous groups numbered 5 per cent. The distribution of the Chinese in Sabah is similar to that in Sarawak. They are to be found chiefly in the towns , especially Sandakan, Tawau, Kudat and Jesselton. As in most parts: of South-east Asia, they, "!having obtained virtual control of some trades , do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their OWD! countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it." 3 The Kadazans are the largest racial group in Sabah. In earlier days , and during the colonial period, they were given free-of-charge the name Dusun.

Unfortunately for their colonial masters, these indige¡n ous Borneans repudiated that name and declared that it had become obnoxious not only because they never called themselves cheerfully as Dusuns but also because that label which had! been tagged on them bears the dirty stigma of colonialism . Thus , as much as. the Sea Dayaks of Sarawak demand to be called lbans , the lar~st racial group in Sabah wish to foster the name of their own choi¡ce, namely Kadazan. The Kadazans inhabit chiefly the west coast and the plains of Tambunan and Ranau in the interior, although in recent years many families have been encouraged to¡ move east into subsidized settlements in the vast forested plains of the east coast. The Kadazans are the chief rice growers 1n the territory. With the advance in educational opportunities they are to be found in growing numbers inside government serv1ce. The same trend applies to the Dayaks of Sarawak; and as opportunities for higher education become more readily available through such bodies of regional co-operation as the Colombo Plan and other less political associations , there is now a discernible number of indigenous graduates trickling back to Sabah and Sarawak. Buta note of caution must be sounded: this nUIIilber is only the very beginning, and a lot has yet to be done in similar ways if the indigenous peoples of the two territories are to be given the chance to play their respective roles in a democratic society.

At the time of writing, there were more Malays or Muslims in Sarawak than in Sabah. In the latter territory, the Bajaus, the Suluks and the Ubians are largely descended from the once notorious pirates who terrorized the local waters until well into the 1900s. Even today, Suluk pirates occasionally cause human and material depredation on small isolated coastal towns in the east.

But energies of the Malay coastal people of Sabah are now chiefly confined to fishing, rice planting and cattle farming. The Bajaus in particular make an important contribution to the country's economy through cattle rearing in the 3

v . Purcell, The Chinese In Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1951, p. 666

TliÂŁ LAND AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUN D

7

Kota Belud district.

Among the remaining portion of the population the most important are the Brunets and the Kedayans (no kin of the Kadazans). Both are Muslim peoples o r iginating probably from Malaya, Sumatra or Java. They are in general rice planter s , sea-farers and fis hermen and inhabit the west coas t fringe from Brunei Bay to Jesselton. Among the 5 per cent non-indigenous are natives of Indonesia, the Philippines and Cocos Islands , who have come into the territory as estate wo rkers in the main. Among the 1 per cent non- indigenous of Sarawa.k a similar grouping prevails .

Sarawak is essentially an agricultural country producing and exporting primar y products, and it is la rge ly from the export of s uch produce that her national income is derived. In excha nge she imports mos t foodstuffs and almost all other consumer and capital goods . Some process ing of local products is carried out before export, but indus trial activity is generally on a modest scale.

Rice is grown for local consumption, while rubber, timber and pepper constitute the backbone of the economy. In 1962 the last three products accounted for about 76 per cent of the total export e arnings of Sarawak. This heavy dependence on ;>rimar y exports means that the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity pr ices in world markets . This instability has not o nly aggravated the problems of economic developme nt in Sarawak but also focus ed attention on the need to diversify the economy. Encouraging industriaUzation. and exploring 1nd developing the mineral potentia lity of the country are some of the attempts that ar e only now being made with this aim in mind.

Like Sarawak, Sabah is prima rily an agricultural country. Like Sarawak, too , r ice is the staple diet and is grown extensively for home consumption.

T imber; rubber and copra comprise the principal export commodities , and in 1963 timber alone made up just unde r 55 per c ent of the total value of all commodities exported from Sabah. The Sabah Government has endeavoured over the past few year s to intensify the improvement of existing crops of proved economic nlue and to introduce new crops such as cocoa and oil palm in orde r to diversify the economy a.nd make the general pr osperity of the country less dependent upon the fluctuations of world commodity prices.

A wor d must now be s aid about the earlier history o~ Sarawak and Sabah.

Of the pr e - European centuries , a synthesis of archaeological, anthropological and linguist ic evidence has yet to be evolved and accepted. Non-Bornean sources do indicate , however, that the s pread of ChinesE> and Indian influences since the dawn of the Christian era exte nded alike to the Malay, the Indonesian, and the Philippine Archipelagos. Bor neo has been right in the ce ntre of the three areas,

8

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 -1963

and the criss-crossing currents of religious a nd cultural values from China and India have left their marks on Sarawak and Sabah.

The Sino-Dongson culture with its bronze gongs, bells and pottery, for instance, although primarily indentified with Funan in Tongking, has been pr eserved in the t r aditional arts and crafts ofthe Dayaks and Kadazans. Similar motifs are of course to be found in Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. • By 1962 archaeological and related work undertaken by the Sarawak Museum bas built up a picture of a big-scale traffic between north-western Borneo and the Asian mainland, reaching a peakofintensityduring the Sung Dynasty in China - around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries . The junk trade which followed the north-east and the south-west monsoons between the Celestial Empir e and the lands to the south has left many traces of Chinese influences, in the form of folk-lore , pottery and other earthen war es such as ven.e r ated oriental jars , throughout the old- established centres of the Malay world.

At the height of Hindu influences in South- east Asia between the seventh and the fourteenth centuries, Sri Vijaya and Majapahit extended their religious, political and cultural dominance from Kedah in north- west Malaya, through Palembang and Java of Borobodur fame, to as far as Manila Bay. Lastly, when Is lam followed in the path of the Indian and Arab traders it was in Malacca, Sumatra, Java, Brunei and Sulu that the first converts were won in the fifteenth century. Throughout the pre-European centuries, in effect, the Malay, the Indonesian, and the Philippine Archipelagos were subjected to and influenced by the same historical factors.

It was progressively from the s ixteenth to the nin·e teenth century that the Malay world was partitioned into the English, the Dutch, and the Iberian portions .

So that at the dawn of the twentieth century we had a British Malaya, a Netherlands East Indies, andaSpanishPhilippineArchipelago. Borneo, while remaining a backwater of economic imperialism, was none the less similarly divided and ruled. The four- century old sultanate of Brunei dwindled into feudal insignificance, Indonesian Borneo was a de facto entity by 1824, Sarawak was carved out by an English adventurer in 1841, and Sabab received the blessings of a Royal Charter in 1881.

•

G. Wang (ed.), Malaysia: A Suroey, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1964, pp. 101-2

Chapter II POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BORNEO- UNTIL MAY 1961

\\ben the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tengku Abdul Rahman, made a sugges tion on 27 May , 1961, that a new federation called Malaysia should be :Ormed comprising his country, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah, political de•elopment in the last three territories was an emerging factor . Sarawak and Sabah were British crown colonies since the end of the Second World War; and ;trior to this the former was under the personal rule of the Brooke family, while Sabah was the possession of a British North Borneo Chartered Company. There ...-as little political advancement in both territories before the war, despite the "..ct that the Brookes acquired Sarawak as early as 1841 and the Company owned Sabab since 1878. It was not until 1941 that the third and last Rajah of Sarawak, •;yner Brooke, decided "that the time of autocractic rule was coming to an end." 1 .-\constitution was then enacted but was not put into practice before 1946 when the :erritory came under the British Crown.

The Brooke constitution of 1941 was enacted partly in commemoration of the centenary of Brooke rule in Sarawak. It granted legislative and financial prisdiction to the Council Negri,alowerhouseof twenty-five members, fourteen o: whom were to be official members appointed from the Sarawak Civil Service 3.00 eleven of whom were to be unofficial members representative of the several ;»eoples dwelling within the country and of their various interests . The unofficial :::embers were to be appointed by the Rajah in Council and were to hold office :Or a period of three years. The Council Negri had the power to make laws for :!le peace ,' order and good government of the country; and no public money may be expended or any charge whatsoever made upon the revenue of the country .:xcept with the consent ofthat body. The constitution also provided for a Supreme Council composed of not less than five members of the Sarawak Civil Service, .J..:Xi a majority of whom shall be members of Council Negri. In 1946 , when 5arawak became a colony , the Supreme Council and Council Negri retained the guihor ity granted to them in 1941. At the same time all powers conferred upon •

R. Payne, The White Rajahs of Sarawak, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1960, p. 249

10

â&#x20AC;˘

THE 'BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961- 1963

the Rajah or the Rajah in Council by any written law enacted before the date of operation of the cession of Sarawak to the British Government were vested in the Governor in Council. 2 Under the Chartered Company Sabah was never given a written constitution in any way similar to the Br ooke document of 1941. T he Royal Charter g ranted in 1881 safeguarded British interests rather than the political rights of the peoples of the territory. For this reason, although reforms were gradually introduced in the inter- war period, Sabah eme rged not a s a constitutionallyminded entity but a politically backward, s emi- stagnant economic outpost where even in 1922 "only 1 per cent of its vast expanse has been opened up , the rest still lies within the jungle's arms." 3 Earlier in 1912 a Legis lative Council was instituted, made up of seven official and four unofficial members .

No member represented the indigenous people. The four unofficial m embers represented the Chinese community, the planters on the east coast, those on the west coast, and the business community. "T he Chinese repr esentation was later increased to two;" 4 and this set- up remained undisturbed until the advent of the Japanese.

When Sarawak became a crown colony at the end of the Second World War in 1946 and began its experience with the implementation of the Brooke constitution, the territory was divided into five administrative divisions : the First Division, with headquarters at Kuching; the Second Division, with headquarters at Simanggang; the Third Divis ion, with headquarter s at Sibu; the Fourth Division, with headquarters at Miri; and the Fifth Division, with headquarters at Lim bang. 5 Each Division was in the charge of a Resident. Every Divis ion was also subdivided into a number of districts , administered by district officers , and most of the districts into smaller areas or sub- districts, each in the charge of a membe r of the Sarawak Administrative Officers' Service.

Under the Brooke constitution of 1941 the twenty-five members of Council Negri comprised official or nominate d members ; and this set-up remained unchanged for a decade until the constitution was modified in 1956. This 2 3

Sarawak Annual Report -1955, Dept. of Information, Kuching, p . l55 0 . Rutter, British J>:orth Borneo, Constable & Company, London, 1922, p. 382

K.G. Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule : Singapore, 1958, p. 65 5

Sarawak Annual Report -1962, p. 322

J881 -1 946

University of ;).laiaya ,

POUTICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BORNEO- UNTIL MAY 1961

11

modification increased the membership of Council Negri to forty- five , with twenty-four of the members indirectly elected. To qualify for election as an unofficial member a person must be, among other things , over twenty- one years of age and a British subject or a British-protected person, and must, with certain exception, have resided for at least seven out of the last ten years in Sarawak.6 Divisional Advisory Councils representing the five administrative Divisions elected twenty-one of the twenty-four unofficial members, while the remaining three members were elected by the Kuching Municipal Council, the Sibu Urban District Council and the Miri District Council.

The Supreme Council, the executive or upper house, of five members under the 1941 constitution and ten members by virtue of the 1956 constitutional change consisted largely of nominated members. 7 Thus , constitutionally, Sarawak had neither universal suffrage nor even self- government in 1961; for the 1956 set-up was modified onlywhentheformation of Malaysia was effected in 1963.

Local government played a minor role prior to 1921 when the Brooke central offices¡ at Kuching were entirely responsible for the provision of community services. From that time on, however, a measure of municipal government was introduced in centres such as Sibu, Miri, Binatang and Sarikei; and by 1957 Kuching at least had a Municipal Council - an autonomous and fullyrepresentative body based on adult franchise. s Municipal government did not get off tl;le ground in rural areas , due mainly to the difficulty of integrating supporting villages. A Native Administrative Order, introduced in 1940, attempted to initiate the participation of local people in their. own affairs, but it was not until eight years later that the first successful local authority was established in Limbang. Nevertheless, by 1957 the whole of Sarawak, with the exception of a small portion of the rural area of Miri SubDistrict, was covered by a proliferation of local government bOdies of varying composition.

Despite substantial progress , however, the elective principle even at local government level was not widely applied by 1957. British official representation on local authorities was common, even though a sign that this set- up was changing was given by the general elections of representatives to district councils

6

Ibid., pp. 323- 24

7

Ibid., p. 323 Ibid., p. 325

8

12

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

throughout Sarawak for the first time in 1959. District councils were the former local government bodies under another name . These councils were given ultimate responsibilities in the fields of primary education, preventative medicine and other normal local government services as one may find in Britain.

A considerable amount of autonomy was given to the district councils , Central government control was basic but confined only to the field of major policy principles, and the approval of annual revenue and expenditure estimates, by-laws and senior staff appointments. By 1961 local government bodies in Sar awak were performing the dual role of providing a system of decentralized administration and constituting electoral colleges for elections to the state legislature.

The people elected district councillors by secret ballot; the district councils elected from among their own numbers the members of the five Divisional Advisory Councils which in turn elected the twenty- one out of twentyfour elected members of Council Negri in Kuching. This was the well-known three-tier system of indirect elections functi_oning in Sarawak at the time the Malaysia plan was announced.

In many ways the colonial experience in Sabah ran parallel to that of Sarawak.

While most former colonial areas in South- east Asia gained inroads towards self-government and independence, Sabah, like Sarawak, regressed from being a private concern to becoming a British colony. When the Allied forces took over from the Japanese as they did in Sarawak, and Sabah was sold to the British Government in 1946 , the territory was divided into four administrative residencies . These administrative divisions were: the West Coast Residency, with headquarters at Jesselton; the Interior Residency, with headquarters at Labuan (moved to Keningau in 1955); the Sandakan Residency, with headquarters at Sandakan; and the Tawau Residency, with headquarters at Tawau. 9 Akin to the system in Sarawak, each of the four Residencies in Sabah was under the control of a Resident. Each Residency was sub- divided into a number of districts administered by district officers. There were also a number of s ub- districts administered by assistant district officers. Village headmen, as they did in Sarawak , carried on the administration of native affairs under native chiefs ; and the native chiefs were in turn responsible to the district officers .

Sabah was given a Legislative Council in 1950, but there was not even '

Sabah Annual Report -1961, Dept. of Information, Jesselton, p. 201

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BORNEO-UNTIL MAY 1961

13

Like Sarawak, it took ten years to realize a nominated unofficial majority. such a majority; and even then there were no indirect elections of any sort before the imminent participation of the colony in the Malaysia plan left the colonial government little or no choice but to introduce instruments for such elections belatedly in 1962, ~to make possible the election of members to Local Government Bodies. " 10 Yet the granting of unofficial majority in the Legislative Council in 1960 meant little so far as the effectiveness of constitutional bargaining was concerned; for these unofflcials were appointed by the colonial Governor who made his personal selections for ten seats from a panel of names put forward by a nwnber of outside organizations . 11 In short, on the eve of her participation in discussions vis-a-vis the Malaysia plan, Sabah was constitutionally backward -even such things as indirect elections were unknown to the majority of her adult population.

The development of local government in Sabah ran parallel - if left a little behind- to the sort of experiments Sarawak had undertaken. Following the lead of Limbang, which set up the first local authority in Sarawak, Sabah established her first such authority in Kota Belud in 1952. This proved successful and the second local administrative body of this type came into being in Sipitang In 1955. There.a fter, further district councils (as they were later called) were established in the administrative districts of the four Residencies. In smaller rural areas village councils were set up which later either became fully-pledged district councils or were incorporated into adjacent areas, according as whether they thrived or proved to be unnecessary economic liabilities to the central government in Jesselton. The district councils which developed in Sabah from 1952 to 1961 did much the same functions of local government as those in Sarawak over the same period.

In the field of municipal government, Sabah set up sanitary boards as early as the 1930 s: and since 1954 town boards and township authorities have been established. Except for their chairmen, town board members were wholly unofficial by 1961, and such municipal bodies functioned In Jesselton, Sandakan, Labuan and Tawau. However, though unofficial, it must be borne in mind that members of these four boards were still appointed by the Governor - much in the same fashion as the selection of unofficial members to the Legislative Council. The only instances where the elective principle operated in Sabah 10

Sa ball Annual Report -1962, p. 130

11

Soball Annual Report -1 961, p. 200

14

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

before 1962 were in the insignificant elections of deputy chairmen of district councils and town boards by the members of the bodies themselves . Most of the township authorities in Sabah were gradually incorporated under the jurisdiction of the district councils which have tended to be the most popular local government bodies .

Although Brunei eventually opted to stay out of Malaysia, it is necessary to include her political background here as she did take part in discussions pertaining to the proposed federation even until 1963. Ever since Brunei ceded parts of Sarawak in 1841 and its portion of Sabah in 1877, little has been politically significant about its history. Together with Sarawak and SaQah it became a British protectorate in 1888 , and that has been about the most 路significant date ever since. In 1906 Brunei signed a treaty with Britain whereby sh~ gained added protection in exchange for the instaliation in Brunei of a British Resident with functions similar to those in the former Unfederated Malay states of Malaya. 12 The advice of the Resident had to be asked and acted upon in all matters other than those touching Malay customs and the Islamic religion.

The 1906 treaty was modified when the sultanate was given its first written constitution in 1959 - fifty- two years after the setting up of a Malayan- type indirect rule. Under the 1959 constitution a former State Council was replace9

by Executive and Legislative Councils. The post of Resident was abolished and in its place the office of 路 High Commissioner was created. Nearly half of the members of the Legislative Council were to be elected from district councils akin to those in Sarawak and Sabah. But although the constitution stated that the first elections would be held in September 1961, a month before that date one of the two political parties then existing in Brunei, staged a rally and handed a not e of protest to the British High Commissioner, D.C. White, because the Brunei Government had decided to postpone the elections to "no later than October 18 , 1962." 13 The constitutional arrangement of 1959 ves.t ed supreme authority in the Sultan in Council, which consisted of thirty-three members in 1962, including the High Commissioner. In point of fact, at the time Tengku Abdul Rahman announced his Malaysia plan, Brunei had the least experience in democratic processes out of the three territories. But for a small number of personal 路 12

SeeR. Winstedt, Malaya And Its History, Hutchinson University Library, 5th ed. , London, and C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, Oxford University Press, London,

1958; 1961 13

T he Sabah Times, Jesselton, Aug. 10, 1961, p. 1

路"

POLIT ICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BORNEO- UNTIL MAY 1961

IS

15

advisers appointed and not elected, the personal rule of the Sultan was no joke.

The ultimate decision on whether to join the proposed federation of Malaysia or not, barring British nominal sovereignty over external affairs , rested upon Sultan Omar Ali Satfuddin - the present ruler.

It follows from the foregoing paragraphs that the three Borneo territories had very dubious and uncorrelated political set-ups before the Second World · War. Political development has been a very recent experience in the area generally; and but for the war the pace of such development might have been considerably slower. The setting up of proper administrative machinery in the Borneo territories was very much a post- war effort on the part of the British.

The same may be said of the development of national consciousness, which, if anything, dawned on the peoples of northern Borneo •• only after years of docility under the British flag.

It was highly improbable that national consciousness could advance even for a n inch in an environment where the literacy rate was deplorably low, as was the case in the Borneo territories i n the first half of the twentieth century. In the inter-war period social reforms were introduced at a very slow rate both in Sarawak and in Sa bah . Despite such stinting attitude on the part of the Brooke and the Chartered Company masters, those local people who had the unique opportunity of attending one of the few schools set up before the Second World War grew up literate enough to learn to express themselves politically. This e merging consciousness was not, in actual fact , nipped in the bud by the arrival of the Japanese in 1942.

Apart from the Europeans , who were locked up by the Japanese in Sandakan and Kuching concentration camps , most of the Bornean members of the Brooke and Chartered Company civil services were asked, if not forced, to remain in their administrative positions to help run the Japanese Occupation Government.

In many instances this retention, coupled with the quick promotions which often attended those officials who showed themselves co-operative with the Japanese, gave the local leaders and senior servants their first real opportunity of running Sarawak and Sabah themselves. The Japanese did not, it is true, completely leave the Borneans alone in their administrative tasks; but the fact is that Borneans were given a considerable amount of freedom and confidence during the first two years of Japanese rule. For it is also true that what the 14

\\"riters often wrongly use "North Borneo" to cover the three territories, where the :erms ~northern Borneo" or "north- western Borneo• should be more accurate. Sabah -:r.-as fo rmerly ~orth Borneo.

16

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSiA 1961-1963

Japanese expatriates did was essentially to supervise their newly-acquired civil services rather than immerse themselves in administrative paper work.

The result was that the Bornean senior civil serva.n ts came to know more about the running of their territories than their pre- war Brooke and Chartered Company overlords ever gave them the chance to do so. Thus, while it was true that the Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was a lot of sound and fury signifying virtually nothing, the Japanese occupation gave the local community leaders their first taste of administrative power. This in turn was to emerge as a first sign of political consciousness , both inSarawak and in Sabah, which moved a step further when resistance movements began.

In Sabah as in Sarawak, the Japanese were benevolent in the earlier stages of their rule. It was only when the Allies started their rapid island-hopping campaigns and sent the Japanese air and ground forces reeling back from the islands of the Pacific to their home ground through 1944 and 1945 that the severity of the Japanese occupation took the toll of human lives in Sarawak and Sabah. It was during this hard period that the populations of the two territories learned to share their sorrows and triumph. Out of this common experience in adversity, Dayaks , Kaclazans, Chinese and Malays alike developed a more profound feeling of brotherhood. It was one case where, instead of breeding contempt, famili.a rity bred care and respect for each other's values.

In assessing the development of national feeling in northern Borneo, we find that the low rate of literacy and the snail-like pace of social reforms in the territories before the war accounted for the singular absence of common feeling and consciousness among the races before the Japanese occupation forces arrived.

The Japanese occupatiqn, more than anything else, gave the peopl es of Sarawak and Sabah their greatest chance in so far as steps towards national consciousness followed in its train.

The story runs along a parallel line in the case of Malaya and Singapore, or for that matter in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines . The following account could well have been made by any of these countries of the Malay world: " Despite the s everities of the occupation a spirit of resistance nevertheless gradually developed among the people. There was among all groups an awakening of political consciousness that was to bear fruit when the Japanese had left. The Japanese occupation, destructive as it was, did have the effect of stimulating a desire for national independence." 16 15

Malaysia ln Brief, Dept. of Information, Kuala Lumpur, 1963, p. 23

POUTICAL DBVELOPMENT IN BORNEO- UNTIL MAY 1961

I

17

Whatever the meaning of the slogan "divide and rule" might have been as applied to the pre-war imperial powers , it was evident by 1946 that such could no longer be the form of government in most Asian countries . The Japanese brought with them occupation and plenty of atrocities, but by the time they left the Nanyang 16 they had quite unintentionally bequeathed one thing which fellow Asians to their south should and may never forget for centuries, the flowering of nationalism.

Beyond a shadow of doubt, to the average Asian with a rudiment of schooling, the achievement of national independence, once seen in its truly emancipated perspective, is a way of life not to be missed.

Even in areas of little political sophistication such as Sarawak and Sabah, colonialism l-in toto had to be modified rapidly to accommodate the emerging political and national consciousness of the peoples . In the Hght of what the Japanese atrocities and massacres did to unify the populations of Sarawak and Sabah against a common enemy I : in the light of the patriotic fervour and nationalist pride which such a unity engendered, and taking into consideration the history of deeper inter-racial understanding and care for each other's worth in Borneo since the war, it is obvious that the voluminous works of Europecentric, often ex-civil servant, writers on Sarawak and Sabah need some pertinent revlisions. ' 1 Writers ¡ of the Europe- centric school - some are Asians - do readily glamorize the alleged fact that both the Sarawak Rajahs and the North Borneo Chartered Company guided the peoples of the two territories towards selfgovernment. A random survey of the writings of this school will, however, again and ag~in, disclose the inescapable fact that there was vi rtually nothing done by the two pre- war authorities in' the way of fostering among the Borneans the development of both political awareness in its more administrative sense and national consciousness in its psychological and ideological meanings. Both Sarawak and Sabali provided economic benefits and prestige to the Brooke family and tlie London shareholders of the Chartered Company. More than this , while the tw6 territories languished in political ignorance, adventurers such as James Broo~e, the first Rajah of Sarawak, and William Cowie, who was a gunrunner between Singapore and Sulu in the 1880's, did not forget to carve out their own niches in history. The Brooke kingdom became a romantic legend in England while men like Cowie portrayed the restless quest of the economic spirit of British imperialism at the time. In northern Borneo this quest had 16

Chinese meaning the South Seas, and which maybe taken as a counter-name for the areas covered by the western-originated term, South- east Asia

18

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSJA 1961 -1963

never been of help to the developmentofnational consciousness. Far from being conducive to political emergence as national entities , the period of Brooke rule and Chartered Company exploitation - for what else could it honestly have been -was an era of political stagnation, whatever else the Europe-centric school may have preferred to gloss it with.

It is not our intention to dispute the fact that the very minimum measure of economic and soci.al benefits were afforded the two territories during the rule of the Rajahs and the business management of the Company. But a clear distinction must be made between purely paternalistic social reforms and the gr anting of political say to the inhabitants of the territories . Such political say never existed in any meaningful way before the war; and in any event purely economic and social preoccupations where the ends of the productive labour involved were geared to the London market did not constitute an altogether honest humanitarian effort. ¡ After the war, the cohesive element among the several races in Sarawak and Sabah was merely beginning to work itself out in an environment which had for decades been dominated by the unsuspecting docility of the subject peoples . ...

As has been pointed out, although both Sarawak and Sabah were given colonial administrations, the policy- making bodies - the Supreme Council in Sarawak and the Executive Council in Sabah - were never in the hands of fully- elected representatives of the peoples before the coming of Malaysia. It bas been pointed out that the Supreme Council was composedofBritish officials from the Sarawak Civil Service and Council Negri members who were never able to represent the people of Sarawak before the district council elections in 1959. The Executive Council of Sabah, even with an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council by 1960, never had an elected member on it for the s imple reason that there was neve:r an election in Sabah before the end of 1962.

When the Executive Council was set up together with the Sabah Legislative Council in 1950, the former body comprised of five British officials and four nominated members . When the membership of both Councils was modified in 1960, the Executive Council comprised six British officials including the Governor as chairman and five nominatedmembers. Both before and after 1960, therefore, there was not even one elected member. Similarly, the Legislative Council had nine British officials and ten nominated members initially, while the set-up was modified to eight British officials and twelve nominated members after 1960.

This was the constitutional position of Sabah when the proposed federation of Malaysia was announced in 1961.

Sarawak was in a similar position, but for the fact that she at least had had

~CAL

DEVELOPMENT IN BORN EO -UNTIL MAY 1961

19

:ca election campaign in 1959. As has been described earlier , the twenty-five =ember s of Council Negri were incre as ed to forty-five by virtue of the 1956 o:IO::Stitutional change; there were fourteen officials and eleven nominated ::ember s initially. After 1956 the members hip comprised of twenty-four elected ===mber s as stated earlier, fourteen British officials, and four nominated plus ::::ree standing members. The Supreme Council, which comprised a majority =! British officials from the Sarawa.k Civil Service and Coun9U Negri before :gas, had a membership of three British officials , two nominated members • 3..IJd fi ve members who were elected, nominated or standing members of the Legislative Council (Council Negri)" 17 after the constitutional change. While ~ :\la la ysia issue brought Sabah the promise of elections in 1962, Sarawa.k :.UX:,ur ed under colonial tutelage none the less . ln s um , although bothSarawa.kandSabah hadeach a legislature in 1961, these -.ere by no means territories r eady for the handing over of independence. As may :e deduce d from the preceding pages , the political development of Sarawak and £?bah had barely r eached the s tage where each might have safely been given .;:;-ernal s elf-government such as both Singapore and Brunei had been earlier .:z 1959.

At the time the Tengku ma de known his desire to form a Malaysia !ederation, political advance ment clearly needed crash programmes with its ;:ace g reatly acc ele r ated if Sar awa.k and Sabah were to take pa rt in negotiations _zs- a- uis the propos e d federation in any meaningful way. The logical and usual ~ .following the lead given by many former colonial areas , would have been for :i-!rawa.k and Sabah to agitate for internal self-government. However, whoever ::ay be blamed for it, nationa lfeeling in northe rn Borneo was a s recent - if not o:::JOre so - as the development of po litical and administrative machinery.

The lack of national consciousness was reflected by the lack of political ~mbinat ions in the three territories in 1961.

At the time Tengku Abdul .,~oma n a nnounced the Malays ia plan in May of that year, there were two ,?Olitical parties in Sarawak, one in Brunei, and none in Sabah. The two Sa r awak ~ies we re the Sarawak Unite d Peoples' Party (SUPP) and Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS). The SUPP was the first party to be formed, in June 1959 , ·~.h predominantly Chinese leadership. •• About half of its members were also C":rinese. Its stated objectives inc luded the maintenance of racial harmony among ~

S<rrawak Annual Report -1962, p. 323 The pr esent wri ter i s indebted to the United Nations Mal aysia Mission Report, Dept. of Lumpur, 1963, fo r the sources r egarding pol! tical parties in the following

~-matlon, Kuala

!irL-a:graphs .

THE BC?RNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

20

the people of all races in Sarawak and their political advancement to selfgovernment and independence. It advocated direct elections in preference to the three-tier electoral college system, and would like to see a fully-elected legislature without officialornominatedmembers. Italso believed in government based on parliamentary democracy and inspired by socialist ideals.

PANAS was formed in April 1960 and had a large following of Malays , although it included !bans, Land Dayaks, Melanaus and other indigenous elements.19 PANAS claimed to seek unity among the peoples of Sarawak without regard to race, colour, creed or wealth, and regarded communism as a threat to the territory's peace and security. It insisted on its attachment to the principles of democracy and saw planned development as the most appropriate means of achieving rising living standards. It also included in its political platform a policy of free primary education and the preservation of the existing rights of the indigenous people.

The Brunei political party in existence in 1961 was the Party Ra'ayat, which was as much a grouping of socialist as of rightist elements in the oil-rich sultanate. The socialists agitated for a better and less autocratic government, more social service measures since the state could well afford it; the rightists were staunch, if somewhat idealistic, patriots.

The rightist elements of Party Ra'ayat have always been very conservative, even today, after their party has been banned by the Sultan's Government for organizing the Brunei revolt of 1962. Brunei once dominated almost the entire known partsofBorneo, 2o andsomeofthepatriotsof Brunei have not yet abandoned the sultanate's paramountcy over these territories some time in the future.21 These patriots pledged in 1962 to resurrect a "greater Brunei claiming all the ancient territories," 22 which essentially meant Sarawak and parts of Sabah.

It was pat'tly due to this harping back to a historic background that Party Ra'ayat advocated integration of the three Borneo territories first before entertaining political union with other neighbouring states.

Sabah had no political parties when the Malaysia plan appeared on the horizon!

19

20

See my History oj Sabah, pp. 4-45, for Brunei's dominance in Borneo until the nineteenth century,

22

I

I

J

A

!though parties have tended to be formed along communal lines, no Dayak or any exclusively indigenous party has ever thrived in Sarawak even up to the time of writing. The Sarawak National Pa.r ty (SNAP) is a possible beginning.

21

j

M. Sivaram, Glimpses of Malaysia, Victoria Press, Petaling Jaya, 1962, p. 15 S. Rose , Britain And SQUth-East Asia, Chatto &. Windus, London, 1962, p. 152

I

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BORNEO- UNTIL MAY 1961

21

apart from organizations such as the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the Angkatan Gaya Baru (AGABA), and the Kadazan Societies - all of which were commercial, cultural and social in nature and aims rather than political. It is interesting to note the communal nature ofthese three sorts of organizations. The first type is self-explanatory, the second was a Malay-run cultural body, and the third attested to the growing importance of the Kadazans who formed more than one third of the Sabah population.

There were, as was also the case in Brunei and Sarawak, very few capable and well- educated leaders in Sabah in 1961. Those who then took active part in public affairs were usually unofficial members of the legislature. They were usually chary about the problems and rough-and-tumble associated with party politics and often believed that they needed more experience . 23 The granting of unofficial majority in the Legislative Council in 1960 - less than a year before the Malaysia plan was announced - appears to have contributed as well to the temporary feeling of satisfaction with the s tatus quo in Sabah. The complete absence of the electoral machinery in Sabah prior to the first district council elections in December 1962 must also have accounted for the slow growth of political parties in this territory.

At the time Tengku Abdul Rahman announced his Malaysia plan in May 1961, political development in northern Borneo was way behind the internal s elfgovernment stage, and British vfficials ran the Sarawak and Sabah Governments according to the dictates of Whitehall. National consciousness was unknown in the days of the Brooke kingdom and the North Borneo Chartered Company. It was the Japanese occupation and its hardships which ushered in the first feeling of brotherhood among the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. This first flowering of national feeling was, however, circumscribed by the existing colonial machinery of government , and as a result it was not until after 1961 that political development assumed a rapid pace.

23

Sabalz Annual Report - 1961, p. 1. Asked during a dinner-for-two why he did not form a political party, Donald Stephens told the present writer in October 1960: "I want to learn from the mistakes of SUPP and PANAS first. â&#x20AC;˘ At that time the two Sarawak parties were cutting each other's throats.

Chapter Ill

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY- MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

The first and immediate response of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah to Tengku Abdul Rahman's proposal for a federation of Malaysia was one of outright rejection of the whole idea. From May to December 1961, this reactive feeling prevailed in northern Borneo. There were several reasons for this angry attitude on the part of the Borneans, one of them being the lack of proper

political understanding. The development of political thinking was a very recent experience as we have seen in the last chapter. As a result of inadequate insight into power politics in Southern Asia at the time , 1 as a result of the very inhibiting nature of colonial tutelage, as a result of the lack of experienced political men, and as a result of political and administrative inexperience generally, the Borneans were led to believe that any proposal by an outsider such as the Tengku to unite northern Borneo under one flag would be suspect and expansionist.

Given the colonial mentality of the peoples ofSarawak and Sabah, the limited grants of local participation in government as discussed in the previous chapter sufficed to assuage any feeling of dissatisfaction with the British rulers. There is an inherent immaturity in the political thinking of peoples under colonial rule;

and so long as the masters were clever enough to perceive the trend of events, they could always manipulate situations to suit their wishes in their own sweet time. This is no new game; but the fact is that the existence of such a relationship between the rulers and the ruled in Sarawak and Sabah, between the end of the Japanese regime and the advent of the Malaysia plan, conditioned the Borneans into thinking that they were living in the one remaining paradise of South- east Asia. The Sarawakians and the Sabahans - as they are popularly known- felt and believed tthat the British raj promised protection and future independence.

What more, they thought, could Asians such as they were For background see S. Rose (ed.), Politics In Southern Asia, Macmillan, London, 1963; see also D.P. Slngbal, 'Nationalism and Communism ln South-East Asia', The Journal of Southeast Asian History, Singapore, March 1962, pp. 56-66

REJECTION AND UNCERTA!l\TY- MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

23

hope for?

It was to .such a calm, .somewhat blissful mentality that the pronouncements of Tengku Abdul Rahman on 27 May, 1961 , attempted to deliver their goods.

Addressing a luncheon meeting of the Foreign Correspondents' Association of South-east Asia in Singapore the Tengku, after stating that Malaya could not stand alone and in isolation, then suggested that sooner or later his country "should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapor e , North Borneo (Sabah) , Brunei and Sarawak• . 2 The gesture was made in a kindly manner, and the Tengku was obviously in one of his oft- mentioned fatherly and straightforward moods . He added: "It is premature for me to say nowhow this closer understanding can be brought about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together ln political and economic co-operation." 3

It has been pointed out that such a form of association among the five territories was really nothing new, that for example the former British Commissioner-General for South- east Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, firs t proposed it many years ago. • But merely pointing out this recurrent reference to a possible federation did not offe r much help when no one actually began implementing the scheme: it was r ather like sitting on a gold mine without actually starting to dig for the prized metal.

What the Tengku did was to start the ball rolling; and he mad~ it pretty certain, as the game went on, that he and his robust team would dribble the right way and win a diplomatic game as the British had taught them how when they were in control of Malaya. In so far as the anticipation of first Bornean reactions to his proposal was concerned, the first thing the Tengku did was to familiarize the peoples of Borneo , or at any rate the politically conscious among them, with

Malaysia In B rief, pp. 108-9 3

Dato Ong Yoke Lin, Malaysia At The United Natians, Dept. of Information, Kuala Lumpur, 1963, quoted on p. 10 4

See Eastern World, July 1961: •The Tunku's Vlstt•, p. 18; cf. R. McKie. Malaysia In Focu.s, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, 1963, p.181; see also M.Batta, "One Indonesian VIew of the Malaysia Issue•, p. 140: in the Asian Survey , University of Callfornia, Berkeley , March 1965

. 24

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

Malayan leadership. Thus only two months after he announced his Malaysia proposal, Tengku Abdul Rahman himself and the Supreme Ruler of Malaya, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, were seen on a state visit to Brunei and parts of Sara.wak in July 1961. This visit, however, did not immediately bring an understanding with the Borneans in the three territories.

In point of fact the peoples of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah hardly had any significant say in external developments at this time. The rough-and-tumble of political awakening in post-war South-east Asia had barely touched the coasts of Borneo, and in many parts of this third largest island in the world the slender threads of the traditional Asian village system still knitted blissfully whatever measure of public opinion existed. It was not merely because the British owned the territories , but more so because there were hardly any political leaders of stature, that the immediate response to the Tengku's feeler towards federation was represented by the Governors of Sarawak and Sabah, Sir Alexander Waddell and Sir William Goode respectively, while Brunei was indirectly given a voice by the British High Commissioner to the sultanate, D.C. White.

While these three British leaders were hurriedly summoned to a series of talks with Britain's Commissioner- General for South- east Asia, Lord Selkirk, in Singapore in June, there was not a voice from the peoples of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah themselves. It was a matter of some consolation, however, that these British leaders were quite unlike colonial governors, say, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . The colonial Governors of Borneo in 1961 were more empirical and up-to-date men, willing, tacitly at least, to recognize the dominant theme of political nationalism in South-east Asia; and they were prepared to attempt to negotiate between Whitehall and Kuching, Brunei Town, and Jesselton, rather than merely to make a virtue of their positions as Her Majesty' s sovereign representatives.

Admittedly the British Governors and the Brunei British High Commissioner had their own interests and precedents to bear in mind, such that they would not appear to embarrass their superiors and sovereign in Whitehall and Westminister, but aside from this they attempted to make the best of two worlds.

They were not too proud to admit that the Borneo territories were politically, and to a lesser extent, economically backward compared to Malaya and Singapore.

They also recognized, however, that the Tengku' s proposal had sparked the first flints which would eventually leave them no alternative but to introduce Borneo leaders , or whosoever might have managed to self- educate themselves behind the backs of their colonial masters , into the arena of inter- territorial politics.

~CTION

AND UNCERTAINTY-MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

25

The British leaders from Borneo and Lord Selkirk met for the Singapore :alks only of course after hearing from London the view of the British Government on the proposed plan. On 20 June, the British Prime Minister, Harold MacmiDtan, in answer to a question in the House of Commons , said:

"I have observed with interest the recent constructive suggestionof the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya that sooner or later the Federation should have an understanding with us and the peoples of Singapore , North Borneo , Brunei, and Sarawak on a plan which would bring these territories into closer political and economic association." 5 Obviously the answer was given to a question with notice ; but the reference to the Tengku's proposal as a "constructive suggestion" is none the less significant.

It gave the pointer to Britain's interest in letting the Tengku have enough freedom of expression vis-a-vis the Malaysia proposal. Macmillan added: "Tunku Abdul Rahman's statement is already stimulating discussion in these countries, and the Government will wish to take their reactions into account in their consideration of the suggestion. " 6 Given this favourable, if guarded, statement by Britain's Prime Minister, the Singapore talks among British leaders on 26-27 June led to Lord Selkirk's arrival in London early in July for further consultation with the British Cabinet on the Malaysia issue.

Meanwhile the Governors of Sarawak and Sabah and the High Commissioner for Brunei did not hesitate to say what they thought. Sir William Goode gave a pertinent cue which was later to play such a significant part in the realization of Malaysia. This pertained to the question of proper timing for the plan. First he implied a quiet recognition of problems associated with implementing the p roposal: "The quicker you try to do it, the more difficult it would be for the Borneo territories because they feel they lag behind Singapore and the Federation politically." 7 5

The Times, London, June 21, 1961, p. 6 .

Ibid.

The Straits Times, Singapore & Kuala Lumpur , June 29, 1961, p. 1

26

TH.E BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

In part this was an admission of something which colonial rule had bequeathed to the Borneane:, the legacy of political backwardness. Especially was this so with respect to Sir William's Sabah, where the idea of free election was still totally strange and alien. This did not, however , prevent the British officeholder from making up for lost chances of doing a good job: "So the question of proper timing is vital. If you lose an opportunity to get down to it, that opport,.mity may be lost forever. " 8 Sir William also felt that the Borneo territories should first try to forge a federation in northern Borneo before looking askance at Malaya and Singapore.

Sir Alexander Waddell believed that Sarawakfaced identical problems with Sabah.

Malaysla was a new idea and it would take some time before the people of Sarawak got used to it. D.C. White thought that Brunei favoured the idea and that the Brunei people regarded Malayans as their brothers. The High Commissioner was proved wrong when Brunei decided to stay out of Malaysia; but the checkmating of feudal and hereditary rule with petroleum wealth has led more than one prominent leader up the garden path about the feudalistic and medieval sultanate of Brunei.

After the British officials from Borneo held their talks in Singapore and expressed their guarded optimism- compounded no doubt with concern for British strategic and commercial interests as the Malaysia plan would inevitably affect them - ¡ there was a lull of half a month. During this period, there was no significant sign of response to the proposal from the peoples of the Borneo territories themselves.

A lot of this lull can be attributed to the dawning national consciousness in northern Borneo at the time. This lack of mature political expression among the Borneo leaders did not, however, deter the expression of whatever aspirations the more knowledgeable and promising community men could muster. The gesture by Tengku Abdul Rahman on the Malaysia plan in May took these Borneo leaders by surprise, no less than it did the ioreign observers in the region at the time.' More prominent among the Borneo leaders at the announcement of Malaysia were. in Sarawak, Ong Kee Hui who was the chairman of SUPP and president of the Kuc.hing Municipal Council, Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng who was paramountandpermanent leader of the 8

Ibid.

See for Instance The Bulletin, Sydney,Nov. 4 , 1961: P. Hastings on p. 17; see also Nation, Sydney, June 3, 1961: editorial, p. 3

9

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY-MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

27

Dayaks , and Dato Bandar who was the president of PANAS. In Brunei, apart from the Sultan himself, A.M. Azahari who was the president of Party Ra'ayat appeared to be the most cosmopolitan - if at the same ti me quite leftist. In Sabah, devoid of political parties, Donald Stephens who was a veteran journalist and an unofficial member of both the Executive and Legislative Councils, partnered with Dato Mustapha bin Dato Harun who was another unofficial member of the Sabah legislature, to lead the territory in responding to Tenglru Abdul Rahman' s bid for a Malaysia federation.

One thing the Borneo leaders had in common was tutelage under the British.

Most of them had had diplomatic brushes with their European masters; all of them had been given the grace of partaking in governmental affair s ranging from clerical to legislative level; and all of them had travelled as near as Singapore and J akarta, or as far as London and New York. But, above all, every one of them had had his share of torture and suffering under the Japanese.

These few self-educated leaders of northern Borneo at the time the Tengku announced his proposed federation were the first people to foster feelings of regard and respect for fellow Borneans irrespective of race, colour or creed, at the end of the Second World War. They were the founding fathers of northern Borneo in the sense that they sought to foster a national feeling among their own peoples. These were indeed the handful of men who managed to inch up above the cloud of inherent colonial mental deficiency, to look across the South China Sea from their island isolation and realize bygradual steps that South-east Asia was in the midst of surges of nationalism and political emancipation from declining imperial powers.

These Borneo leaders had beard of the famous war of 1904- 5 when Japan defeated a western nation, namely Russia, for the first time in the long his tory of As&an civilization. They admired men such as Gandhi and Nehru; and just after the last war portraits of the former nationalist hero, Soekarno , might have been seen prominent.ly hung on the walls of their homes. They came to understand their part of the world, and saw the almost insurmountable task ahead of bringing their fellow Borneans into the fold of Asian nationalism. Their conception of nationalism was highly charged with chauvinistic tendencies , wishing for &rnean independence without compromising their determination to stand on their own feet. It was an exclusivist type of self-assertiveness which the Borneo leaders of 1961 were zealously guarding and nurturing. They wished no one outside the boundaries of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah to interfere ln what they

considered was their domestic affair, namely the right to independence.

Barring the British control over external affairs and final sovereignty over

28

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

the territories, the Borneo leaders were given the chance to express their individual feelings. As has been seen earlier, the Governors of the two colonies and the High Commissioner for Brunei had attempted to mediate between the feelings of the peoples of northern Borneo and the predilections of Whitehall, rather than choosing to wade against the wind of change sweeping along with it the development of nation states in former colonial areas . Given this chance to express themselves, and noting the tidal waves of Tengku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia plan about to lash the serene coasts of their island, the Borneo leaders asserted foremost their common interest as fellow Borneans. Believing that their overlo¡rds had now decided to transfer northern Borneo to Malaya, they formed a United Front in July 1961, a fortnight after the two Governors and the High Commissioner for Brunei held their Singapore talks with Lord Selkirk.

The United Front comprised the chairman of SUPP, Ong Kee Hui of Sarawak, A.M. Azahari, the president of the PartyRa'ayatof Brunei, and Donald Stephens, who was by then about to establish the first political party of Sabah. This party, the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO), was formed as pl anned in August, while the United Front declared on 9 July, 1961, that the "British Government should be advised that so far as the wishes of the people in the three territories are ascertainable, 'any plan in accordance with the pronouncements made by Tengku Abdul Rahman in Brunei and Sarawak would be totally unacceptable to the people of the three territories.' " 10 T he pronouncements referred to by the United Front leaders were the friendly gestures and overtures made by the Tengku when he and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaya were on their familiarization visit to Brunei and, for the Tengku, Sarawak, earlier in the same month.

Speaking in Brunei, the Tengku had then said that there was "no limit as to the number of states that can join the Federation (of Malaya) -the constitution provides for it, " 11 New states he assured the peoples of Borneo- for he had never thought of Borneo since his historic luncheon address except to mean the three territories- would enjoy the same privileges as those in Malaya already possessed. Malaya, he guaranteed, had no intention to colonize other countries because the existing Federation was already made up of "sovereign" states.

10 11

Straits Times, July 10, 1961, p. 1 Straits Times, July 5, 1961, p. 1

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY -MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

29

He added: "If the three Borneo territories are included in the Federation, it will become 14 States ." 12

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong, being constitutionally above politics, confined his statements to gestures of friendship. He thanked the Sultan for the hospitality extended to him and his party, and made the following wish which ran almost parallel to what the Tengku had expressed: "May God fulfil our prayers that both the Federation and Brunei will march forward together in peace and prosperity." 13 These pronouncements , whatever their value and however well-meant they might have been, were political dynamite - ominous words pregnant with dangers to the United Front leade:rs of Borneo. They Sll:W the visit of the two top leaders of Malaya to Brunei and Sarawak as an encroachment upon the freedom and ultimate independence already promised by Britain to the peoples of northern Borneo. Whether we say that the Borneo leaders were still clouded with colonial mentality, or that they lacked political experience which leaders like the Tengku and others in more advanced countries possessed, it remains a fact that the fears and concern of the United Front leaders were genuine and deeply meant.

This attitude of distrust of what the Malayan leaders were doing in trying to interest the Borneans into participating in the Malaysia plan was aggravated when the Tengku stated on the Sarawak leg of the July visit that he "did not think it necessary for there to be a merger of British Borneo territories and Brunei or independence for them before federation or confederation." 14 It is hard to tell rightly who insulted whom at this time. The two top leaders from Malaya probably expected a good deal more favourable response to the Malaysia proposal from Borneo; but the Borneo leaders saw nothing but damnation in the whole idea and responded with an utter rejection of the proposal.

In rejecting the Malaysia plan at the first instance, the United Front leaders were partly following the lead of their British overlords in that they wished for a closer association among the northern Borneo territories first. After the Singapore talks in June, Sir William Goode had said, among other things, that 12

Ibid. , p. 18

13

Ibid.

I<

Straits Times, July 8, 1961, p. 1

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALA YSlA 1961-1963

30

the people of Sabah had indicated that the Tengku's idea was a good one; but he added that "they would like to get closer with Sarawak and, if possible, with Brunei before doing business with Singapore and the Federation. " 16 A week later, Sir Alexander Waddell echoed the statement on behalf of Sarawak when he said that before considering Malaysia "The feeling is that we would be in a better positilon to do so if associated with our neighbo1.1rs (Brunei and S11,Qah) with whom we are endeavouring to forge closer links. " 16 Recalling that the Tengku had put forward the Malaysia plan partly l!n recognition of the fact that Malaya could not stand alone, the Sarawak Governor added that in his territory: "It is a very similar feeling ~ere that has led us to seek closer links with North Borneo and, we hope, with Brunei." 17 One reason wby the British officials decided that some form of selfgovernment needed to be attained before a broader merger with Malaya and Singapore was contemplated upon by the Borneo territories was the stand generally believed to have been taken by Britain vis-a-vis the emancipation of dependent territories in other parts of the world. By granting the Borneo territories self- government first before joining a Malaysia federation , some observers believed that the British could bow back gracefully "without endangering their stand on self- determination in Africa and elsewhere in the world. " 18 There is no need to go into the nicety of whether or not such a stand by Britain held water; it is more pertinent to note that other Bornean leaders than the United Front men shared the view that self-government, and even complete independence, should first be achieved in the territories before anything else.

The secretary-general of the newly-formed and predominantly Dayak Sarawak National Party (SNAP), Stephen Kalong Ningkan, stated that when his country attained independence the Head of State must be a Sarawakian. He made it clear t.h at his party did not want Sarawak to be one of the states of Malaya, and declared: 15

Straits Times, June 29, 1961, p. 1

16

Straits Times, July 6, 1961, p. 1

17

Ibid .â&#x20AC;˘ p. 16

18

The Bulletin, Nov. 2:5 , 1961: edltorlal, p. 3

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY-MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

31

"Any attempt to put Sarawak under the influence and subjection of any foreign power would be strongly opposed. We would remain in the British Commonwealth. " 19 The statement sounds outstanding for its Anglophile tone; but the xenophobic aura is also strong- strong in defence of Sarawak against any predatory powers which might seek to gobble her up untimely. Another Sarawak leader, Temenggong Jugah, expressed the view in favour of independence for the territory first. "Let Sarawak and North Borneo settle their closer association problem first," 20 he stated, and added that when they were united "then we can urge Brunei to join us if she wishes to. But if Brunei does not agree, let her go her own way." 2 1 In Brunei itself, rejection of Tengku Abdul Rahman's proposal was outspoken and uncompromising. Three days before.the United Front declared its rejection of the Malaysia plan, Azahari himself said it outright that "Brunei wants independence first before considering Tengku Abdul Rahman's Mighty Malaysia proposal. "22 It is significant that the United Front declaration against the Malaysia proposal was made in Jesselton and not in Brunei Town or Kuching. Sabah was the least preoccupied with political development , or put in different terms, she was the most politically unconscious territory, although her leaders were beginning to realize the fact that the environment was congenial to just such a development. The announcement of the United Front leaders in Jesselton after a weekend of discussions dramatized Sabah's participation in inter-territorial politics. Henceforth she would be on a par with Brunei and Sarawak in matters of political discussion. The establishment of the predominantly indigenous UNKO, the first Sabah political party mentioned earlier and under the leadership of Donald Stephens , was warmly welcomed by the other United Front leaders.

The signatories to the United Front declaration agreed that thenceforth their parties would not make policy decisions on matters affecting northern Borneo, without prior consultation within the Front itself. Since the Tengku's plan was totally unacceptable the leaders summed up the political feelings of northern Borneo at that time, and incidentally they then depicted the exclusivist mentality in the three territories, in these terms: 19

20 21

Straits Times, July 6, 1961, p. 16 Straits Times, July 11, 1961, p. 16 Ibid.

Straits Times, July 7, 1961., p. 1

32

THE BORNEO RESPO.!IISE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

•we believe that it is vitally important that the constitutional advance in the three territories should be speeded up and with this in view elections should be held in the territories, where an undertaking has been given by the Governments concerned so that the legitimate aspirations· of the people for political advancement can be satisfied." 2 3 The reference to elections applied clearly to Brunei where, under the 1959 constitution, elections should have been held by September 1961. But as has been pointed out in the last chapter, these elections were postponed to •no later than 18 October, 1962." Apart from this the reference was also meant for Sabah, because there too the elective principle was still unknown to the people at large.

The rapid and unprecedented formation of the United Front and its unequivocal declaration against the Malaysia plan on 9 July took the Tengku by surprise. For a few days he refused to make any comment on the unfavourable developments in Borneo. However, the Malayan Prime Minister was charismatic enough and within a matter of days he had altered his line of attack on what he might have regarded as Borneo's stubborn inexperience. The earlier idea of forming the proposed federation in order to balance off the numerical preponderance of the 1,250,000 Singapore Chinese -should the city-state merge with Malaya -by taking in the Borneo territories was now shelved in favour · of emphasizing the communist threat to the whole regio~. Instead of confronting the Borneo leaders for rejecting his offerofunity, Tengku Abdul Rahman blamed the communists (there were enough of...them around) as being the main elements opposing his projected plan. The communists, he declared, felt that once the Borneo territories joined the Federation they would have less reason to attack Britain for being imperialistic in the Malaysian region and would have "no further grounds for making insinuations against Malaya, as these territories would be members of the Federation of Malaya." 2• If there was little which could be done about the Borneo leaders while they were letting off their steam against his first overtures, the Tengku nevertheless thought that if the British knew what was good for them they would kick northern Borneo -or at least Sarawak and Sabah - into federation without too much ado about self-government and independence beforehand. "I stressed, • the Tengku said, *that it would betothemutual advantage of both the United Kingdom and Malaya and the territories concerned if these s tates could be brought into 23

Straits Times, July 10, 1961, p. 1 The Times, July 12, 1961, p. 9

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY - MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

33

the Federa.tion." 25 He admitted that

"There are, of course, those who feel that Borneo is not yet ready to join the Federation but at the same time many feel that they could with advantage, become a member state of the Federation." 26 Clearly, the Tengku at this stage and all along as a matter of fact wanted the Federation of Malaya to remain intact; and that all he wished for was thP. addition of four more new member states , Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah.

His recurrent use of "join the Federation", "If the three Borneo territories are included in the Federation, it will becorne 14 States" , and similar expressions made this explicit.

He pointed to the similarities existing among the proposed Malaysian states such as ethnic origins and characteristics , language, administration and currency.

Despite all his efforts, however, the Borneo leaders remained very unwilling to compromise, until their British masters sent them to Singapore to represept Sarawak and Sabah at the eighth regional conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) in the Malaya-Borneo group . Leaders on both sides of the South China Sea seemed to have taken Sir Alexander Waddell's words quite seriously when, after the Singapore talks with Lord Selkirk, he remarked in relation to the Malaysia plan: "My advice would be that we should continue to be willing to discuss amongst ourselves, with our neighbours and with our friends in a spirit of co-operation, for only in this way can we reach accord on what could be a tremendous influence for the future." 27 When the conference began, ostensibly to discuss the strength and weakness of the one-man-one- vote parliamentary democratic system, Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, did not lose time to get down to the subject of Malaysia. Directing his remarks to the Borneo delegates, he said with obvious presumption: "I woul d like to suggest that at the conference you speak your minds 25

Straits Times, July 12, 1961 p. 1

26

Ibid.

Straits Times, July 6 , 1961, p. 16

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

34

frankly.

Let us know what are the things that you feel have to be 28 safeguarded. Let us know how they can be done and when."

Delegates to the CPA conference did not have to wait for very long. A calculated beginning made by the Tengku's announcement of the Malaysia proposal, attendance at the conference as parliamentary representatives of their territories, and convincing words from the Prime Minister of Singapore combined to make the Borneo leaders talk; and once they began talking about Malaysia with leaders from Malaya and Singapore they never stopped until they had completely broken their island barrier behind which they had sought to shelter themselves from overseas political interference.

The change in Borneo's attitude to the Malaysia proposal from that of blatant rejection¡ to a more compromising position did not happen overnight, it is true, and as will .be shown in the course of this narrative; but the fact that both the Malayan-Singapore and the Borneo sides of the South China Sea kept discussing Malaysia, as Governor Waddell had thought should be the case,was a sign of things to come. Just after the declaration of the United Front on 9 July, Donald Stephens expressed his fear that should the leaders in Borneo entertain Malaysia at all, one of the consequences would be the swamping of the Borneo public services by job-seekers from Malaya. "If we join Malaya," he warned, "the people who will come and take most of the top jobs will be from Malaya. " 29 This allegation has not yet come to pass as a mere figment of the imagination; indeed, by 1966, there has appeared a possibility, if not a likelihood, that such a statement will in the future prove prophetic.

Donald Stephens, who is outwardly and by birth a Eurasian but at heart a Kadazan partly because his mother is a Kadazan, was to keep riding on the crest of popularity as a political figure in northern Borneo from the day of the United Front declaration until the formation of Malaysia in September 1963. He was the key personality of Sabah during this period. In the case of Sarawak, effective leadership changed hands a number of times among men such as Ong Kee Hui and Yeo Cheng Hoe who are both Chinese and represented by and large the Chinese community; and Temenggong Jugah and Stephen Kalong Ningkan who are both Dayaks although they had a substantial Malay following apart from their own indigenous supporters. Itcanbeseen that Sarawak was more communal in political alignment (by no means fully established in all the three territories

29

Straits Times, July 22, 1961, p. 16 Straits Times, July 19, 1961, p. 4

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY-MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

35

before June 1963) than was Sabah and Brunei. While Brunei continued to take part in Malaysia discussions, the sultanate was represented either by the Sultan himself or his substitute, or by A.M. Azahari. Azahari had a soft spot for the sort of chauvinistic nationalism obtaining in Indonesia. He was there in the later part of the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, knew the nationalist Soekarno well; and during the formation of Malaysia led the rightist as well as the socialist - but especially the rightist- elements of the only political party of note in Brunei in 1961, namely Party Ra' ay.11t. Azahari fell into disfavour with all pro¡- Malaysia leaders of northern Borneo after he unsuccessfully engineered the Brunei revolt of 8 December 1 1962.

Utter rejection of the Malaysia plan toned down to mer e uncertainty 1 once the Borneo leaders had begun to entertain discussions on the proposal. At the CPA conference Donald Stephens thought that the people of Sabahdid not reject the proposal once and for all. There was room for further development, he thought, if discussions at the conference could be made to act as a pointer to the steps which should be taken if they were to tread the road to a Malaysia federation. Though willing to entertain the proposal in principle, he added: "But we also feel that before we take the plunge, we want to make sure that the plunge will take us forward and not backward. We do believe that the leap can be a great leap forward for our country, but to ensure this there are many questions which must first be settled. " 3 0 This expression of uncertainty summed up the feelings of the Borneo delegates to the July CPA conference in Singapore. Equally significant, however, was the formation of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC) at this same conference. The primary object of the MSCC was to continue discussions on the Malaysia proposal. The Borneo delegates to the conference themselves took the initiative in forming the MSCC. Out of th~ work of this committee the leaders of Borneo and their peoples eventually took the plunge, in Donald Stephens' words, and joined Malaysia in 1963. In a joint statement after they formed the MSCC the Borneo delegates stated: "If the concept of Malaysia is not to become another forgotten dream,

then the territories concerned should get down to disc~ssing details." 31 30 81

Straits Times, July 22, 1961, p. 16 Straits Times, July 28, 1961 , p. 1

36

THE B9RNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

These delegates returned to their island homes and true to their words the first of four meetings of the MSCC was held in Sabah's capital, Jess elton, on 24 August, less than two months after the formation and the declaration of the United Front. Delegations to this first MSCC meeting came from the hosting territory itself, Sarawak, Singapore and Malaya. Brunei apologized for not being able to send a delegation on the ground of shortness of notice received.

The Jesselton meeting of the MSCC did not quite get 011 the ground. An obvious reason for this was the disheartening yet conspicuous absence of a Brunei delegation which had all along counted most in the eyes of the Malayan leaders who knew that the sultanate was the most Malayan of the three Borneo territories, and should therefore never be ignored in any vital discussion pertaining to the Malaysia plan. Another reason for the relatively slender achievement of the first MSCC meeting, however, can be attributed to the still strong _opposition to the proposed federation among certain quarters, notably among the indigenous population, and to the deeply-rooted uncertainty of the Borneo leaders themselves. Of all these leaders , Donald Stephens was most often criticized for oscillating from being anti-Malaysia to becoming proMalaysia in the second half of 1961. The criticisms showed how deeply more uncertain the critics themselves were about the proposed federation for, in the first place, Donald Stephens himself never fully embraced the Malaysia concept throughout the second half of 1961.

A fortnight before the Jesselton meeting of the MSCC , Donald stephens addressed the Foreign Correspondents' Association of South-east Asia in Singapore - the same Association to whose similar luncheon meeting Tenglru Abdul Rahman announced the Malaysia plan- and the Sabah leader said, among other things: "My people feel that if North Borneo joins Malaya now as a state , it would in fact mean that North Borneo would become not a state but a colony of the Federation of Malaya. As I have said before, these fears are genuine. Not actually fear or suspicion of the sincerity of Malaya to take us on as an equal partner but more the fear that by virtue of our status as a British colony we would automatically become a second-class state or a colony of Malaya." :12 This was the attitude of the Bornean whom other leaders in the three territories 32

R. McKie, Malaysia In Focus, quoted on p. 199

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY-l\1AY TO DECEMBER 1961

37

often criticized because their impression of him was that he had come to favour the Malaysia idea too soon. At the first meeting of the MSCC in Jesselton, the same Bornean was unanimously e lected chairma n and Donald Stephens remained

so in all four meetings of the committee.

The communique issued after the Jesselton meeting said that a number of delegates expressed fear that Malaysia would mean the domination of weaker and smaller territories by the stronger, •u was pointed out that Malaysia would not come about by a process of large units like the Federation of Malaya taking in smaller units. • 33 But such assurances as this one from the Malayan delegation were checkmated with such strong words as "I have fought against Sabah being bulldozed into Malaysia, and that standremains .• 34 It was obvious that there was still a broad gap between those who were confident and those who were uncertain about the Malaysia pr oposal at the time of the first MSCC meeting. The meeting decided to hold the next one in the capital of Sarawak, namely Kuching. .

When the second MSCC meeting was held in Kuching on 18- 20 December, with all five territories represented - the Brunei delegations to the three r ema1ning meetings of the MSCC attended as observers- and encouraged to speak their minds, expressions of uncertainty were still in plenty among the Borneo leaders , The leader of the hosting Sarawak delegation, Yeo Cheng Hoe, declared that the people in his territory were full of "doubts and questionings about this often talked-about merger. u ; He referred to recent discussions and debates in Malaya and Singapore about Malaysia and about the future of the British bases in those two countries, "Far from being reassuring, what transpired in those debates seems to have causedgreater confusion in the m inds of our people here," 36 he said.

Tengku Abdul Rahman had carried through a motion in the Malayan Parliament on 16 October, 1961, approving the Malaysia plan in principle. After talks with the British Government in November 1961, the Malayan Government concluded an extension of the defence agreement earlier agreed upon when Malaya became independent in 1957. One of the articles of the new agreement stated that: "The Government of the Federation of Malaysia will continue to afford

»

Straits Times, Aug. 26 , 1961, p. 1 Straits Times, Aug. 25, 1961, p. 9 Straits Times, Dec. 20, 1961 , p. 13

3e

lbtd,

33

34

THE "BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1963

38

to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence, and for the prese rvation of peace in South-East Asia. " 37 These were the debates and discussions which the Sarawak leader was referring to. He went on to say that Sarawakians could understand the concern of the Tengku about the Chinese population of Singapore, they could even see what Lee Kuan Yew meant by communist invasion ofthat island state, visible or otherwise: "But my people can be excused for their wanting to know what concerns them most - the advantage or even sacrifice for our Sarawak to join in this Malaysia set- up, and what kind of a set-up that best suits our needs ." 38 After expressing his doubts and uncertainty, after he had spoken his mind, however, Yeo Cheng Hoe was quite willing to listen to well-meant suggestions.

Mindful of a recent visit (the November 1961 one) to Britain by Tengku Abdul Rahman, when the decision was made to setup a commission of enquiry to assess the opinions of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah on the Malaysia proposal, he added: "It is to be hoped that out of our deliberations in this conference we may be able to recommend some concrete view on Malaysia for the information of our people so that when the Commiss ion comes , our people will be in a position to make their decision sensibly." 39 Apart from Donald Stephens , who took basically the same stand as he did when he stated in August that he had fought against Sabah being bulldozed into Malaysia, another member of the Sabah delegation to the Kuching MSCC meeting, Pang Tet Tshung, summed up adequately Sabah's attitude to the Malaysia proposal at this time: "The people will have to make up their minds about joining Malaysia.

37 38

Singapore Annual Report-1961 , Government Prlntlf\g Office, Singapore, pp. 10- 11 Straits Times, Dec. 20, 1961, p. 13 Ibid.

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY-MAY TO DECEMBER 1961

39

It is our business to pr epar e them and provide them with all the necessary information.-"•0

Brunei had not much to say - four months after the state vis it of the Yang

di-Pertuan Agong and the Tengku to the sultanate- beyond the fact that, like the position in Sarawak and Sabah, the Malaysia proposal had still to be made known to the people of Brunei. From the beginning of talks on tlhe proposed federation Brunei had tended to show disinclinations ·towards joining it. In Kuching, the leader of the Brunei delegation, Dato Setia Pengiran Ali , said at the opening session of this second meeting of the MSCC: "With well intended efforts and words from our kind-hearted neighbours, we hope the people of Brunei will be enlightened in the same way as the people of the other territories concerned. " ~ 1 It will be noticed that he emphasized the link with Borneo neighbours first

rather than any relationship with the Federation or Singapore. When the Kuching meeting was over , Dato Setia ha d not shown any encouraging s ign towards co-operation with Malaya in r espect of the Malaysia scheme: "As for the problems put forward by the North Borneo and Sarawak delegations , we feel no concrete answers have been given." 4 2

Other forms of uncertainty about the Malaysia plan were expressed in Kuching at the time of the second MSCC meeting in the writings of anti-Malaysia posters. These were posted on the walls of the Sarawak Information Service building and at another part of the town. One poster read: "Tengku, mind your own business. We can manage better without Malaya.• Another said: "Tengku leave us alone. We don' t need you." 43 These were the first anti Malaysia posters put up in Sarawak, and were attributed to the underground activities of the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) whose members were known to be opposed to the idea of Malaysia.

Opposition from a more rightist stand than the ceo was also manifested 40

41 42

43

Straits Straits Straits Straits

Times, Times, Times, Times,

Dec. 21, 1961, p. 24 Dec. 20, 1961, p. 13 Dec. 21 , 1961, p. 24 Dec. 19, 1961, p. 13

40

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961- .i.963

at this time in Sarawak. The secretary-general of the SNAP, the leading Dayal< party, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, who had declared earller in July that his party would have Sarawak remain in the British Commonwealth (presumably meaning Britain) and would have nothing to do with Malaya which appeared to posture foreign domination, this time came out openly against Malaysia. Ningkan lashed out agalnst Borneo leaders who backed the plan at the time of the Kuching MSCC meeting, Rejection of the plan was for the time being a virtue to Ningkan; and those leaders lacked loyalty who preferred to be depending upon other people for the advancement of their territories. He concluded: "It is a great pity that they have no faith in themselves and would not dare to take the opportunity of standing on their feet." 44 This hitting out against the Borneo leaders who first manifested their complete rejection of theMalaysiaplanbyformingtheUnited Front and so soon after began to go wayward along the shifting sand of political gamble was conservative in nature. In fact, while Ningkan was then crying in the wilderness and fighting a losing battle because most of the progressive leaders of Borneo bad begun to modify their stand on the Malaysia proposal, the conservative attitude had about it a touch of the prowess of the headhunters in days gone by when one warrior would often dare another to attempt extravagantly unnecessary risks.

The conservative feeling, the wish to see the Borneo territories work out their own problems themselves , this exclusivist and xenophobic tendency earlier pursued by the United Front leaders and now doggedly fought for by Ningkan was one of the inherent and inbred characteristics of the Borneo peoples. The Japanese in their old game of expansion had in the past gained control of Korea,

Mongolia and parts of China; and in their eras of decline or strong domestic policy, such as during the Tokugawa period, 45 or earlier during the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, the Japanese people had rallied together to protect the shores of their islands from domination by foreign powers. Again, although the British Isles have for centuries been able to s tay aloof from continental European affairs, it is nevertheless true that even so late as in "the middle of the Nineteenth Century popular patriotic songs still celebrated 'the ~~

Ibid.

~s

For background see E. 0. Rei.schauerandJ. K. Fairbank, East Asia: Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1960

The Great Tradition,

REJECTION AND UNCERTAINTY-MAY TO DECEM BER 1961

41

46

tight ' little, tight little island.' " In both the history of Japan and the British Isles, the insularity of the people was manifested.

Although not developed to the extent that the Japanese and the English experiences did, the Borneo peoples had the same inborn characteristics of an inward-looking personality. It was at least in part due to this insularity that when Tengku Abdul Rahman proposed the Malaysia plan in 1961 the peoples of the three territories, or those among them who were conscious of what went on around, reacted and rejected the proposal to unite with another country across the South China Sea. The peoples of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah as a whole were, and still are , a group of suspicious races ; and like their counterparts in other areas of the world they have been most self- assertive and zealous when common sense dictated to them that their serene and peaceful island was being threatened by external domination of yet another brand apart from the one which they had so recently experienced under the British.

Thus, in so far as the Borneo response to the Malaysia proposal from the a nnouncement made by Tengku Abdul Rahman on 27 May, 1961, until the end of that year was concerned, the dominant note was the rejection and the uncertainty of Borneo leaders about it. Several factors accounted for this vehement attitude, one of which was the lack of proper political understanding of the prevailing situation in South-east Asia. The surges of nationalism in the area had for years by-passed the Borneo territories; and fifteen years of benevolent British colonial rule had provided little more than the thinnest gloss of national consciousness . This feeling tended to bind the peoples of Borneo together towards some blurred goal which they found hard to define and shape independently.

This blurred goal could not be any clearer because of the colonial machinery which bound the livelihood of the Borneans from the end of the Second World War

until the advent of the Malaysia proposal. Under colonial governments, and under a sultanate which in many ways was still encrusted in the feudal era, the peoples of northern Borneo developed little more than a retarded political mentality not unlike the experiences of other colonial peoples. Moreover, it was not Britain's intention to liquidate her territories tn Borneo so soon as she did and for this reason political development suffered, A more direct consequence was the lack of poHtical sophistication among the Borneo leaders when the Malaysia plan was announced.

The handful of self-taught leaders such as Donald Stephens and Dato Mustapha of Sabah, Temenggong Jugah and Ong Kee Hui of Sarawak, A.M. 46

G.M. Trevelyan , English Social History, Longmans, 3rd ed., London, 1946, p . 583

42

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

Azahari of Brunei, and a number of equally energetic persons , these first leaders of northern Borneo , had inched up the polltical ladder only to discover how formidable the task was which lay before them if they were to help their fellow countrymen rid themselves of the shrouded colonial mentality under which they were tutored. At a time when the Borneo leaders were preoccupied with this task of up-lifting their fellow- countrymen, Tengku Abdul Rahman popped the question of a Malaysia federation.

The leaders of northern Borneo were quite unprepared for any out side interference in thei r sluggish move towards a blurred goal of self- government.

Man is never more irritable than when he is pulled back with a jerk just when he is making an irresistible step. Politically speaking, this was what happened to the Borneo leaders between May and December 1961. Just when Sar awak was given her first ever elections in 1959, and just when Sabah was granted an unofficial majority ln 1960, in fact just when the Borneo leaders believed that 1t.heir British colonial m asters were preparing them for self-government and independence, the Tengku appeared as an intruder on the scene. The Bo:rneo leaders responded first by rejecting the Malaysia proposal outright without pondering on its long- term implications .

..

â&#x20AC;˘ Chapter IV

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

In one of his writings, the British historian, Sir Lewis Namier, propounded that national feeling was hailed in 1848 as a great and noble force which was to have regenerated Europe from the stereotyped Concert of the Metternich system, and that today it is denounced as an obsession which has brought ruin upon that same continent. But, he added, "from the outset it was the expression of social and political maladjustment, and bas since been at least as much the vehicle as the source of destructive passions." 1 In the case of northern Borneo, national feeling was indeed the expression of social and political maladjustment, the maladjustment of a backward region groping for political independence. Under this prevailing mood the Borneo leaders , despite their lack of practical experien<?e, were xenophobic enough to have at first glance rejected outright the idea of Tengku Abdul Rahman to create a Malaysia federation.

This blatant rejection, however, did not stand the test of time and events; and as we have seen in the last chapter, by the end of 1961 the zealousness of the Borneo leaders to preserve their emerging national identities had toned down considerably to mere uncertainty about getting on the band-wagon and playing the same tune as Malaya and Singapore towards a new nation of Malaysia. The question to ask at this st age is why the Borneo leaders mo~ified their original stand against the proposal, a modification which was eventually to see them make a complete about-face from their first-uncompromising ground as exemplified by the United Front declaration of 9 July, 1961. There were several reasons for this change in mood, and one of them may be attributed to the manner in which the Malayan side played the game. The ice began t.) break as soon as the Borneo leaders were sent by their British masters to Singapore to represent their two territories (excepting Brunei) at the CPA conference just eighteen days after they made their declaration opposing the Malaysia plan. There and then the Borneo leaders began to talk with Malayan and Singapore politicians about Sir Lewis Namier. Vanished Supremacies, p. 47. (&Hamish Hamilton)

Penguin Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1962,

44

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

Malaysia. Once the thaw began, the process was non-stop until the formation of the new nation, including the two territories represented by their leaders at the CPA conference.

The formation of the MSCC at the July 1961 conference is very significant.

It saw the willingness of Borneo leaders to ponder and see things from a slightly different angle to that taken on 9 July, It saw the Borneo leaders taking the initiative to continue whatever talks had already taken place on Malaysia at the conference table. Of course the Sarawak and Sabah representatives need not have taken the lead; but this was part of the game. not so much to give men such as Donald Stephens and Yeo Cheng Hoe a taste of leadership-for they had already experienced chairmanship of committees many times in their lifetime in Borneo - but to make it apparent at least that participation was not lacking on the Borneo side right from the beginnirng they began to entertain discussions on Malaysia with their counterparts across the South China Sea.

Lee Kuan Yew, always the bouncing persuader in judo-type politics, suggested that the suspicious Sarawak and Sabah representatives should speak their minds frankly because he declare¡d: "Let no plan for Greater Malaysia be sired by the colonial rulers.

They have done immense damage in the past by unnecessarily splitting and splintering their colonial territories and their peoples." 2 This was the sort of talk which the Borneo leaders would appreciate, and Lee Kuan Yew, "who is nothing if not anti- Imperialtsts ,â&#x20AC;˘ 3 knew it. The Borneo leaders had heard of the Singapore Prime Minister before , and some of them , like Donald Stephens , had met him on several occasions . At this time when they were preoccupied with wriggling eut of their colonial yoke he seemed to speak their language. Lee Kuan Yew said: "The difficulty, it would appear, is that in each one of the territories there are reservations and fears as to what would happen to certain important local interests if we were all to merge into one political unit before all partners are equally strong and mature, so as not to be overborne by their more sophisticated and advanced partners. " 4 2

Straits Times, July 22, 1961, p. 1 3 The Bulletin, Nov. 4, 1961, p . 17 â&#x20AC;˘ Straits Times, July 22, 1961 , p. 1

J

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 T O AUGUST 1962

45

Understanding and sympathy with the political situation in Borneo was, however, only one side of the coin. As always with able men of affairs, persuasion was mainly a means to an end: "Today we share one currency, one telecommunication network and one defence arrangement under the British Raj. We share a common past and are inheriting a common administrative system.

It is desirable that the five territories should hold together. The only question is how and when." â&#x20AC;˘ The second portion of the above passage rings the following bell: "It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic co-operation."

What Lee Kuan Yew was driving home at the CPA conference was simply a reiteration of what Tengku Abdul Rahman had announced at a luncheon meeting on 27 May when he intimated, inter alia, the second passage above. The difference was that this time, and unlike the Tengku, the speaker was not wooing some group of community leaders across the South China Sea on a lullaby island.

Lee Kuan Yew was talking face to face with Borneo leaders in his bustling citystate.

Neither was Lee Kuan Yew recalling the Tengku' s statement without reason.

On both ends of the Johore Causeway, between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, between the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya and the Prime Minister of Singapore, talks for merging the two territories dated back to 1948 when the peninsula's acquisition of a federal status left Singapore in the lurch. In 1959, Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action Party (PAP) won power and brought Singapore to self- government. More significantly, the PAP had always advocated independence for the island through merger with the Federation, thus ending what was regarded as an untimely severance of an umbilical cord which had nourished Singapore and Malaya for ages .

The response from Kuala Lumpur had not, however, been very encouraging before May 1961. The Malayan leadership had often maintained that political 5

Ibid., p . 16

46

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

stability in the Federation depended on the maintenance of racial harmony which

had so far functioned rather well while the 1,250,000 Chinese of Singapore were kept out and south of the Causeway, north of which there were already 38 per cent of them in the Federation population of7 ,232,000.6 On ethnic ground alone, it was argued, the inclusion of Singapore in the Federation would spell disaster emanating from communal violence. The fear of communist infiltration by the leftist elements in the Singapore Chinese once they came into Malaya was another factor - reminiscent of the twelve- year Emergency (1948-60) when communism in the Federation, believed to have been of Chinese backing led by Chin Peng who is still considered at large somewhere along the Thai-Malayan border, was a cause of civil war - tending to discourage a union between Singapo:r:e and the Federation of Malaya.

It has been stated in the last chapter that foreign observers were taken by surprise when Tengku Abdul Rahman made public his wish that the five territories including Singapore, should form Malaysia. The sudden change in Federation policy towards Singapore was partly motivated by the fear of communist invasion from the north where Laos had succumbed, and South Vietnam was in the Red tiger's jaw. Related to this concern, and more disconcerting, was the growing likelihood of Singapore escalating towards the communist camp on the island.

The PAP had just lost a keenly-contested by-election where a clever colleagueturned-opponent, Ong Eng Guan, won overwhelmingly and as a result PAP was left with a tapering majority which appeared more and more precarious because "at least 8 of its members were in active disagreement with its policy and there might be other waverers ." 7 Following the western concept of security as she did, the Federation sought to ensure that Singapore would not be easily converted into a communist base by proposing Malaysia which was to include Singapore as a partner.

Thus by the time the CPA conference took place in Singapore Tengku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew were seeing each other eye to eye. By then, too , Lee Kuan Yew was playing the game, not perhaps entirely the way the Tengku would have it, but certainly by this time , more than before the Federation Prime Minister indicated his willingness to discuss the merger, Singapore was all "ready to be the active marriage broker and before long more will be heard of the proposal." 8 The next significant move was to be seen at the first MSCC 6

1

8

Malaysia In Brief, p . 8 S. Rose (ed.)., Politics In Southern Asia, p. 232 The Times, June 29 , 1961, p . 13

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

47

meeting in Jesselton on 24 August, when the leader of the Federation delegation, Ismail bin Yusoff, again appealed to common historical links between Malaya and Singapore and the Borneo territories.

Despite the fact that Brunei, it will be remembered, was not represented at this first meeting, Yusoff did his best to make up for the absence of a possibly helpful ally- Brunei being the most Malayan of the three territories and which could therefore be relied upon to co-operate more readily in any move towards a Malayan Malaysia federation - and spoke in a stylistic Malay manner. He began by plainly stating that .. . . . In Malaya today the idea of our greater association has stirred the imagination and captured the hearts of the people because it

appeals to the deepest feelings of brotherhood and unity which we feel for the people of Sa bah (North Borneo) , Brunei, Sarawak and Singapore." 9 The appeal to brotherhood as an expression of friendship is a very deeply-rooted aspect of Malayan cultural heritage. It was the basic element which ensured the cohesion of inter-sultanate relationships in the heyday of Malay rule on the ¡ peninsula both before and during the fifteenth century. Indeed, the concept of br otherhood was then the unwritten rule of law among the sultanates , as is so colourfully depicted in the Sejarah Melayu, 10 which is a compilation of the Malay Annals. This appeal to "the deepest feelings of brotherhood and unity" becomes truly significant when we remember that the cultural values of Malaya and Borneo have developed from similar historical influences .

Ismail bin Yusoff, whose name itself is of Arabic derivation, might of course have slipped naturally into his native style; but by speaking in a Malay style he let his audience, and especially his indigenous listeners when the energetic staffs of Radio Sabah and Radio Sarawak had transcribed his speech into local languages and dialects, understand what he meant very naturally. In actual fact, Tengku Abdul Rahman himself indicated, as early as the time he and the Agong visited Brunei on a familiarization effort, that Borneo had close ties with Malaya and that the Sultan "is a very enlightened ruler and one who feels that Brunei is identified with other States of the Federation." u The Agong, himself a figure9 10

Straits Times, Aug. 25, 1961, p. 9 W. G. She llabear, Sejarah Melayu, Malaya Publishing House, Si ngapore,\898, In Roman-

lzed Malay; reprinted in 1961 u

Straits Times, July 5, 1961 , p. 1

,

48

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

head of friendship, spoke eloquently on the theme of brotherhood and kinship between Malaya and Brunei on this state visit: "We came to Brunei on a mission of friendship and goodwill, and we have found them waiting for us in abundance- the same nationality, the same culture and the same customs." 12 From this the Agong went on to assure his Brunei hosts how much he cherished the friendship and historical ties between his country and the sultanate: "It is my earnest hope that the ties of friendship and goodwill in our hearts, ties which link our lands and peoples today as they have throughout recorded time, will endure as long as the sea which washes both our shores." 13 It may be that Malayan leaders believed, as most practical politicans do, that political Similarity, as against cultural link, is more often than not a matter of expediency and is seldom more lasting than political ideology itself. For this reason, it was better and wiser, in every endeavour to woo the Borneo leaders and their peoples into joining a Malaysia federation, to concentrate on the historical links and common cultural heritage between the two sides separated only 1>y the shallow waters of the South China Sea. In this light, the state visit to Brunei within a mere week after the Tengku announced his Malaysia plan was a cultural mission of note. In the first place, as has been pointed out, Brunei was the most Malayan of the three Borneo territories; any likelihood of favourable res~onse to the Malaysia proposal should be forthcoming from Brunei rather than from Sarawak or Sabah which were less Malayan.

Malayans knew more about Sarawak than Sabah; or, more Malayans knew Sarawak better than they did Sabah. For instance, the Tengku and the Agong did not touch on Sabah soil on their Borneo visit; the Tengku stopped briefly in Sarawak on his way back from Brunei, presumably because he considered the Sarawak Dayaks more Malay than the Kadazans and Muruts of Sabah, and therefore the Sarawak indigenous people should prove easier to persuade into accepting the Malaysia plan. As a matter of fact, speaking in Kuala Lumpur soon after the Borneo visit the Tengku stated: 12

Ibid. , p. 18

13

Ibid.

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

49

"In my recent visit to Brunei and Sarawak, I saw that the British Government has set up a language barrier between the Malays and Dyaks ." 14 Before continuing to say that there were no newspapers or reading material in Dayak, and that if Sarawak joined the Federation the Malayans would do their best so that the indigenous races of Sarawak would not remain in darkness forever , the Tengku added: "From the text- books at the schools and by meeting the Dyaks, I found out that the only difference between the so-cal1led Dyak language and Malay is in the dialect just as there is a difference in the dialects of Selangor Malays and Kedah or Kelantan Malays ." 16 It is to be noted also , however, that the "mission of friendship and goodwill" to Brunei did not appear to have come off as well as it was expected. Despite all the splendid exposition on brotherhood and common links in cultural heritage, there was one bone of contention between Malaya and Brunei which disappointingly marred the otherwise friendly response ofthe Brunei people. Tlhis was the issue concerning Malayan government officers seconded to Brunei after most had received their training overseas on Brunei government expenses. A number of allegations had been made that these officers had indulged in professional snobbery, regarding local Brunei civil servants less capable than they were and all the rest of it. Although there were only a handful of these Malayan expatriates (including forty Malayan teachers), the Tengku, as soon as the state visit began on his and the Agong's arrival in Brunei on 1 July, was fully occupied with the "officers affair" as it came to be known, including an almost all- night talk

with the officers themselves and a broadcast on the matter over Radio Brunei.

The Tengku appealed to the people of Brunei to change their sulky attitude towards the Malayan officers (ten of whom had by then requested their Prime Minister that they be allowed to return to the Federation because no senior Brunei officer could guarantee their safety from alleged threats by members of the Pa.r ty Ra'ayat). A.M. Azahar i claimed that "the people are angry with Malayan seconded officers who do not want to fit themselves into their 14

Straits Times, July 24, 1961 , p. 1 Ibid.

50

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963 16

environment." The whole fiasco delayed the Tengku's departure for the Sarawak leg of his visit, for he was determined to solve the crisis. The general feeling in the sultanate at the time was that "Should the Brunei visit result in any statement concerning a political link with Malaya, public reaction here would depend much on a satis.factory conclusion to the crisis over the seconded officers. " 17 The crisis died down after the Brunei Government assured the safety of the Malayan officers, but the damage was done. The projected attempt to begin canvassing for Borneo support for the Malaysia plan by first interesting, culturally and religiously, the closest of the Borneo territories, had ended in failure all because of a comparatively trivial affair.

This was not a case, however, of being once beaten twice shy; for the failure of the state visit to Brunei only served to facilitate the adoption of other modes of persuasion. Yusoff and his talk of brotherhood at the Jesselton MSCC meeting in August was only a part of a ready-made black book of answers to Borneo's doubts and fears about joining Malaysia. Yusoff, who was Assistant Minister for Interior in Malaya, did not forget what Donald Stephens had said to South- east Asian correspondents in Singapore only a fortnight before, and stated with all the diplomatic frankness he could muster: "We in the Federation have found it difficult to comprehend the charges of imperialistic intentions on our part, for we do not intend to demand or to dominate but to ask of you in the intimacy of our relations that we should all co-operate in the vision of Malaysia." 18 Again the historical sentimental touch comes out in "the intimacy of our relations"; and Yusoff sought to reinforce his persuasive plea and expression of surprise as to the Borneo charge of domination by again appealing to common ties and the possibility of co-operationamongtheproposed partners to Malaysia: "The facts of geography and of economics further reinforce our growing intimacy in our joint effort in many practical fields such as 16 17 18

Straits Times, July 7, 1961, p. 1 Straits Times, July 3, 1961, p. 16 Straits Times, Aug. 25, 1961, p. 9

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

51

administration, education, technical assistance , finance, the law and 19 exchange of experts and training programmes in various fields ," This emphasis on common ground among the proposed component parts of Malaysia would have become boring after a while; but the Malayan leaders never thought of it in such terms. One of the favourites of the Malay mind is to indulge in repetition. This is well illustrated in their lyrics , especially in the quatrains called pantun, 2~ where the repetition of lines and rhymes are deliberately employed to emphasize meaning.

When the MSCC held its second meeting in Kuchiog In December 1961, two top leaders , Dato Ong Yoke Lln and Lee Kuan Yew, crossed the South China Sea to ensure that the new bed-fellows, Malaya and Singapore, would be able to improve on what had already persuaded the Borneo leaders to come to the conference table and talk about Malaysia. Dato Ong, the then Minister for Health and Social Welfare in the Federation and leader of the Malayan delegation to the meeting, had been one of the very few top Malayan Chinese with immense capacity for commonsense and tolerant approach to politics in a complex plural society that was Malaya. "We hope ," he said, "to establish solidarity, understanding and goodwill with the Borneo people. The more we meet, the better for us all." 21 Again, following on the theme of the Brunei state visit and the stylistic exposition of Yusoff, Dato Ong told the Kuching MSCC meeting that the five territories to comprise Malaysia enjoyed common factors .

Dato Ong believed that an association which could claim for its members a. common cultural heritage , links forged in history , common economic factors , common threats to their security and consequently the need for similar defence ~ing, administrative and judicial servicesproducedoutofthe same mould arid !or decades a common currency - such an association could hardly fail. 22 In effect, the belief expressed was virtually parallel to what Lee Kuan Yew had said 1: the CPA conference five months previously. Dato Ong concluded: "Let us therefore forge a united, independent and sovereign Malaysia and open a new and glorious chapter in the history of our peoples and Ibid.

• The te rm means song; the pa.ntun, usually included In good Malay anthologies, is also • .::Caracterlstic item of Malay books tores in the main towns of Malays ia (and Indonesia). ,. S:utday Time s, Singapore & Kuala Lumpul', Dec. 17,1961, p. 1

•

Straits Times, Dec. 19, 1961, p. 13

52

THE BORJ:IEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

our lands so that our children and their children after them may say of us 'They have done wisely and well.' " 23 This commonsensical approach was given added weight when Lee Kuan Yew reiterated what he had been saying for the past five months: "Malaysia is our own creation. It is our own nationalist answer to our problems of viability and survival in one of the most contested for regions of the world." 24 Out of the sustained persuasion employed by the Federation and Singapore leaders at the meetings in the second half of 1961 came the fltcker of favourable response from the Borneo leaders . At the second MSCC meeting Donald Stephens could say: "Fears and misgivings should not, I feel , be allowed to crystallise into distrust and suspicion - distrust of a friend who, I am convinced, is trying to bring about a partnership beneficial to all the partners." 25 The partnership did begin at this December meeting. No longer could the MSCC remain purely consultative, no longer could it be solely a body through whose forum opinions and feelings about Malaysia could be aired. The committee was intended to be consultative, a body set up merely for discussions; but even discussions must come to some form of conclusion. And in any event it was naive to imagine that proven leaders such as Dato Ong Yoke Lin and Lee Kuan Yew would have wasted their efforts preaching the virtue of a Malaysia federation without getting down to concrete decisions, especially when one remembers that both the Federation and Singapore had come to the one conclusion that Malaysia was in their best interest.

Thus by the time the December MSCC meeting in Kuching concluded its sessions, the final communique stated that subjects pertinent to the realization of Malaysia such as parliamentary representation in the future federal legislature, migration to the Borneo territories , the public service, religious freedom , national language and economic development had been partly dealt with. So far 23

Ibid.

2s

Straits Times, Dec. 20, 1961, p. 13 Straits Times, Dec. 21, 1961, p. 24

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

53

had the Malayan canvass for Borneo support for the formation of Malaysia gone, that the Borneo leaders had agreed to discuss constitutional issues such as those just mentioned. Suspicion had disappeared considerably , even though 1t was by no means fully dispelled, and frank talk had taken place.

While waverers were still not wanting among the Borneo delegates, as pointed out in the last chapter, in varying degrees they all had ~gun to take the plunge. At the same time Dato Ong could sigh, "I think I can really say that we have made great strides towards the realisation of Malaysia" ;26 and Lee Kuan Yew, who at the CPA conference five months earlier implied that Malaya and Singapore were "more sophisticated and advanced partnersâ&#x20AC;˘, now came out with a flattery for the Borneo leaders when he opined that the proceedings had made the Singapore and Federation delegates wonder who originated the myth that the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak were "less sophisticated" than those in Singapore and Mallaya. 27 It was quite obvious that S.Rajaratnam, then energetic Minister for Culture of Singapore, could have ably headed the Singapore delegation to the Kuching MSCC meeting without Lee Kuan Yew's diploma.c y. But it is precisely here that Lee Kuan Yew's presence becomes all the more significant. Both the Federation and Singapore wanted to keep the ball rolling the direction they favoured. Two months previous to the MSCC meeting in Kuching, Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Agong, and Lee Kuan Yew had met in Penang in October ostensibly to "keep a date with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for golf" . 28 Both Prime Ministers had said they would most likely discuss merger over that weekend. But what was not noticed is the fact that the two leaders possibly then struck on the idea of Lee Kuan Yew journeying to Sarawak to ensure that the second MSCC meeting would be more successful than the first. Indeed Lee Kuan Yew was so successful that S.T. Bani , a Singapore Barisan Socialis leader, accused him of "deliberately misrepresenting" the proceeding at the meeting. 29 After the second MSCC meeting, the Sarawak Government published a White Paper titled "Malaysia And Sarawak" . This publication was meant for home c onsumption, and it carried at least three interrelated points. One point stated that the British and the Malayan Governments had agreed that Malaysia was a desirable aim. This referred to the joint statement in London and Kuala Lumpur H

Straits Times, Dec. 21 , 1961, p. 24

11

Ibid,

11

Straits Times, Oct. 14, 1961, p. 1

u

Straits Times, Dec. 28, 1961, p. 16

â&#x20AC;˘

54

TRE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1963

on 23 November, 1961, which said that the two governments had decided to set up a commission of enquiry to ascertain the views of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. 30 The White Paper announced that the commission would be visiting the territories in the near future. "It will be for the Commission, in the light of the evidence they receive, to work out a plan which they believe will be acceptable to the peoples of both territories. " 3 1 Then it dealt with the second point: "Now an opportunity is provided for independence as a part of a larger Malaysian unit. There are obvious advantages in this. In area Sar awak is not much smaller than the Federation of Malaya but its population is under three quarters of a million compared with seven million in the Federation. It would find it very difficult and very expensive to stand alone as an Independent territory. " 32 Among the advantages it listed were the constitutional concessions already partly dealt with by the recent MSCC meeting in Kuching. The White Paper took up the historical and immensely persuasive approach of the Malayan leaders over the previous half-year when it stated: "The peoples of Malaya and Borneo have cultural, economic and historical ties which make them fit naturally together as a group. This is universally recognised and at the recent Solidarity Consultative Committee meeting in Kuching all the delegates supported the concept of Malaysia." 33 It 'had become clear that the Government of Sarawak had begun to take steps to

implement the decisions taken by its delegates to the talks on Malaysia. These delegates had argued strongly that final decision as to whether Sarawak should join the proposed federation must lie with the people themselves; and the White Paper "was given wide publicity to enable the population to assess what Malaysia would in fact mean to them. Publicity included translations tn many local languages and an intensive and sustained programme of explanations over Radio Sarawak." 34 Sabah did not la~behind in this regard. On 31 January, 1962, it Sunday Mail, Singapore, Nov. 26 , 1961, p. 1 31 32

33

34

Malaysia And Sarawak, Dept., of Information, Kuchlng, 1962, p. 1 fbid.

Ibid.

Sarawak Annttal Report -1962,

p. 1

liALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

55

;JUI>lished a White Paper entitled "North Borneo And Malaysia". The content was identical with that of Sarawak, in so far as the Malaysia issue pertained to Sabah, In the final paragraph the White Paper stated that the main issue before the :;Je<>ple of Sabah was simply this: "They must assess the future advantages of Malaysia; they must weigh up the prospects Malaysia offers of security from external aggression and internal Communist subversion, of stability and prosperity, and they must consider how far they are prepared to give powers to the central Government of Malaysia to achieve these ends. ,The central Government must be strong and provide security; it must have powers sufficient for its purpose. But local aspirations and needs must also be recognised and safeguarded. The State Government must be able to protect vital local interests." 35 ike Sarawak, the Sabah Government embarked on a publicity campaign thereby ;::assing on the decisions of its delegates to the recent Malaysia talks to the people :::the territory: y

"Wide publicity had been given throughout the territory amongst all peoples concerning the purpose of the Commission and the places it would visit. An open invitation to appear before it had been extended to everyone who wished to give oral evidence; in addition the public were invited to submit letters and memoranda either as individuals or as representative groups or associations." 36 Between the publication of the Sarawak White Paper on 4 January and that of the MSCC held its third meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 8 January, 1962. :: the second meeting in Kuching was noted for the spearheading of discussions ~ Dato Ong Yoke Lin and Lee Kuan Yew, this third meeting was notable for the ~ that the prime mover of Malaysia, Tengku Abdul Rahman himself, opened -..,discussions. He didnotwasteanytime: "We are linked by a common cultural .!e:ita.ge and historical background and financial and economic interests," 37 the 7~'"U reaffirmed.

On that basis the discussions centred mainly on the S!hah ,

:. ..

Sabah Annual ReP<>Yt - 1962, p. 2 :bid.

,..

S;mday Times, Jan. 7, 1962, p. 2

56

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

constitutional and political issues already partly dealt with in Kuching. At the end of the third and final session of the meeting the joint communique issued stated that the MSCC had decided to prepare a booklet containing the record of proceedings of the meeting in Malay, English, Iban, and Kadazan, 38 for distribution to the various peoples of the Borneoterritories, Singapore and Malaya.

This was obviously p!'.rt of the publicity campaign on Malaysia which had already been taken up by the Sarawak Government and which was to be followed up by the Sabah Government three weeks later. The MSCC delegates decided to hold a final meeting in Singapore in February, in order to "tie up affairs." 39 When the final meeting of the MSCC took place in Singapore on 1 February, the Yang di-Pertuan Negara 40 of that island state, Yusof bin Ishak, said in his opening address that the delegates from the five territories to comprise the proposed federation had "reached common ground on the broad constitutional and political issues , like a strong effective Central Government in charge of defence, external affairs and internal security, and on details such as control of migration, religion, education, national language, and other safeguards for local interests ." 41 Donald Stephens stated that the Malaysia issue had tended to divide people in Sabah along racial lines; Yeo Cheng Hoe confessed that there had grown more suspicion about Malaysia in Sarawak since the publicity campaign brought the idea across to the rural people. But Mohamed Khir bin Johari, who headed the Federation delegation to this final meeting, had the ready answers to the apparently renewed doubts expressed by the Borneo leaders.

Not for one moment was Malaya going to let the game get out of hand, especially so when everything appeared to have reached a crescendo. Laying his emphasis on the opposition to Malaysia already manifestly being put up by the socialists and the communist-inspired unions of Singapore, Malaya , Brunei and Sarawak, (Sabah had been conspicuous for the weakness or even absence of leftist elements), Johari declared:

"Now we find another myth, perpetrated by confused, hysterical people, who are frightened at the prospect of our unity, about neo311

The Iban Section of Radio Sarawak and the Kadazan Section of Radio Sabah have been the educational media for the Illiterate.

39 Straits Times, Jan. 9, 1962, p. 8 40 The Head of (a constituent) State, in this case Singapore.

41 Straits Times, Feb. 2, 1962, p . 11

llALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

57

colonialism and all the other things that the 'Big Book' has told them."~2 He was, in part, reiterating what had motivated Tengku Abdul Rahman to change hls mind about Singapore which used to be an ugly duckling in the eyes of the Federation. The fear of communist interference was now being concentrated !:pOD more vigorously than ever before.

Johari' s argument gained added :::nomentum when it is remembered that barely five weeks previously the Partal Kommunist Indonesia (PKI) - the communist party of Indonesia and the largest of its kind outside the Sino-Russian bloc - "in line with the international oommunist view that Malaysia was a British neo-colonialist plot, stated its opposition clearly at a conference on 30-1 December 1961." 43 With the ever-ready moral if not actual support of Lee Kuan Yew, the 3orneo leaders were persuaded to go along with the catchy idea that come what :nay "Unity Is Strength" ! 4 Lee Kuan Yew, who had lately been cryptic enough 3.bout the communists when he warned that "we either get together and survive ox we will hang separately" ,•s now added: "We must do everything to dispel the em s lurs and aspersions on the concept of Malaysia." 4 6 In any event, by the C:me of the fourth and final MSCC meeting in Singapore, the Borneo leaders ~re obviously not willing to abandon all the fruits of the sweated labour for ~t they had been given central responsibility to push through. Agreement was ::me: lacking, and a memorandum was unanimously s igned by the leaders of the S.e delegations . Th'is memorandum s et out all the proposals and recommenCUions arising from the committee meetings in Jesselton, Kuching, Kuala Lompur and Singapore. It was published simultaneously in the five territories , 3Dd was submitted to the commission of enquiry on Sarawak and Sabah on 3February.

Through the work of the MSCC, through the friendly and no less persuasive bugalning by the Federation and Singapore delegations, through the willingness :J! the Borneo leade·r s to continue to discuss the proposal, the Malaysia plan ;nssed from being a mere idea to partial realization. The leaders on both sides -:! the South China Sea had come to more than mere speak'ing terms , they had

...

Ibid. , p . 1 2

B. Grant, Indonesia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1964, p. 141 • This was the motto of the former Federation of Malaya, and it subsequently became that =f llalaysla.

• Straits T imes, Oct. 2·6 , 1961 , p . 11 • S:mday Times, Feb. 4 , 1962, p. 22

THE BORNEO RESP ONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

58

begun to negotiate, and through negotiation they had arrived at the promising

stage of nation-building. It was not without import therefore that the Yang diPertuan Negara of Singapore summed up the conclusions reached by the pathfinding MSCC at its final meeting in these terms: "The committee has not only given impetus to the Malaysia movement, but it has also given the concept of Malaysia sufficient definition and content to make its realization in only a matter of time." 47 Though much more had to be tackled in the way of realizing Malaysia, it was clear that the Borneo leaders had begun to look favourably to the plan by February 1962. One of the points in the joint communique issued by the third MSCC meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 8 January was to "arrange an intensive programme of exchange of visits of people at all levels between Malaya and the Borneo territories and carry it out as soon as possible." 48 This was a very generous decision, but it was in fact merely the official confirmation of what had gone on before.

Ever since the time of the CPA conference in Singapore in July 1961, a number of study delegations had left northern Borneo for a series of fortnight visits to Malaya to see for themselves the rural and social- welfare developments in the Federation. First to undertake such a see-for-yourself tour were Borneo leaders such as Donald Stephens and Dato Mustapha, and Dato Bandar , the president of PANAS, in August 1961. They were taken to such places of interest as the Military College at Sungei Best, the Police Depot at the capital, and they were shown recruits , including some from Brunei; they had discussions with the secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; they had talks with the secretary to the Ministry of Rural Development; and they visited the Agricultural College at Serdang. Duringtheirstaythe Sabah and Sarawak leaders were entertained at lunch; they were dinner guests of the Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Dato Ong Yoke Lin, who was a man of persuasive genius; and above all the delegation had an informal discussion with the Tengku who said later: "I enlightened them about various aspects of the situation in Malaya today ... . I also asked the touring delegates from Sarawak and North 47

48

Straits Times, Feb. 2, 1962, p . 11 Straits Times, Jan. 9, 1962, p. 1

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

59

Borneo to take a good look round the country for themselves and to make up their own minds. " 49 It was a diplomatic way of asking people "to make up their own minds", to say

the least.

Before leaving Malaya the Borneo leaders had seen many good encouraging things which made them feel appreciative of Malaya.

On 9 July, 1961, Donald Stephens was one of the Borneo leaders who had blatantly rejected the Malaysia plan in the United Front declaration. In less than two months, on 14 August , he could say after friendly meetings with the Tengku and other Federation ¡leaders , "I am glad to say that all the misunderstandings have been cleared now, and the target for Malaysia is in sight. â&#x20AC;˘ 50 The next day, Dato Mustapha, who previously entertained doubts about Malaysia as much as all other Borneo leaders initially did, said in Singapore after touring a part of the Federation and meeting its leaders : "Yesterday' s informal talk with the Tengku has , however, completely allayed our fear and suspicions . I am confident that confederation is ver~ near.,. 51 There was something magnetic about Kuala Lumpur in those days, which made practically every recalcitrant Borneo leader a good dynamo after a visit or two to the Federation.

One of the reasons for this attractiveness of Malaya can be attributed to the success of independence since 1957. The prediction of racial turbulence after the British had departed had been belied by racial harmony. Even if communal feelings had been simmering just below the surface of everyday life, the fact that they never erupted into a national disaster since 1957 was in itself admirable to the Federation's neighbours, Including the territorie.s of northern Borneo. As one observer of the Malaysian scene said at the time when Borneo leaders were paying more and more study visits to the federation: "Malaya is faced withoneofthemostexplosive multi-racial situations in the world, yet there are few countries where the record of race relations has been so good, or where the prospects of continued harmony seem so promising." 52

., $1

Straits Times, Aug. 15, 1961, p. 1 Straits Times, Aug. 15, 1961, p. 16 Straits Times, Aug. 16, 1961, p. 7 J.A.C. Mackie, "The Tengl<u As Unifier" Nation, July 15, 1961, p. 6

60

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALA YSlA 1961- 1963

The racial harmony and the fostering of a common Malayan consciousness as reflected in the willingness among the several races to adopt Malay as a national language and the eagerness of the Chinese for instance to wear Malay dress like the sarong kebaya 53 had done much to create Borneo's liktng for Malaya. On the more cultur al side, next to the English and Chinese pictures, the favourite pastime of the man-in- the- street in Borneo has always been Malay films with its actors and actresses such as P.Ramlee, Ahmad Mahmud, Kasma Booty, Maria Menado and others . Everyone who speaks Malay in Borneo knows something of Malaya (and parts of Indonesia) and the habits of its peoples .

Since the country gained its independence, Malaya had maintained an efficient administration compared to most countries in South-east Asia. But perhaps the more interesting factor was the boomingstateofthe economy in early 1961 . just at the time Borneo heard of MalayaaJild its Malaysia plan. Malaya was economiically very sensitive to the world rubber and tin markets; but although the prices of these commodities were static in 1961, the stability of the Malayan dollar more than offset any cause of discouragement to the Borneans who were so dependent on Singapore and Malaya for their own export prices . It was also a matter of note that Malaya launched her second Five-Year Plan in 1961. This provided for the expenditure of funds about twice as much as the first Plan.

About M$70 million offoreign loans were readily available in the form of undrawn balances of loans previously agreed to by the World Bank, the American Loan Fund, the Colonial Development Corporation and, ironically , the Brunei Government. Grants were expected from Britain and a number of Commonwealth countries.$4 Such a healthy and favourable economic condition did not fail to attract the Borneans and their relatively less developed economies.

The progress in rural development was doubtless the most attractive aspect of the Federation economy in 1961. Opening the third session of the Malayan Parliament on 18 April, the Agong revealed that the Federal Land Development Authority had established twenty- three land development schemes throughout the country, allowing to settle some 8 ,000 families . 5~ In the field of agriculture generally, new methods were being introduced through farmers' associations .

The use of new technique produced a record rice crop of an estimated 560,000 tons 53

This Is the female dress of a tight long skirt and a blouse worn tight round the waist: It has often been regarded the national dress, as the sari and kimono have been of India and Japan.

54

Eastern World, London, March 1961 , p. 21

55

Eastern World, June 1961: "Second Five-Year Plan" , p. 21

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT- AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

61

in 1960- an increase of 32 per cent over the previous year. Extensive rubber replanting was being carried out and a joint working party had been set up to consider the future of these government schemes. These were the sorts of improvements the rice and rubber growing peoples of Sarawak and Sabah would always look forward to, while they were discovering and attempting to develop their potentially rich forested hinterlands. Some headway had been made, it was true, but the progress had been even if not slow, to the annoyance of the economic- minded local leaders.

Only Brunei was basking in oil-money and so had no financial and economic worry. Furthermore, Sarawak's export earning dropped sharply for the first three months of 1961, 56 while that of Sabah for the whole year "was $2 .3 million less than the 1960 total." 67 In contrast, the values of both exports and imports in Malaya were higher in 1960 than in 1959, and the country's favourable trade balance showed a further improvement in early 1961. 58 Diplomacy apart, the favourable economic position of the Federation in 1961, relative to the conditions in Sarawak and Sabah, accounted for part of the reason why the Borneo leaders who made the study tours in Malaya were so readily captivated. The Malayan leaders had the record of political, social and economic success since independence and this record was no less a source of attraction and admiration to the visiting Sarawak and Sabah leaders.

Early in January 1962, a delegation of twenty-eight Sarawak community leaders made such a Malayan visit. Several other teams including members of PANAS, which advocated the formation of Malaysia even before the President, Dato Bandar, himself made the August tour with Donald stephens and Dato Mustapha, had visited the Federation the previous six months. This January delegation followed the now familiar pattern - visiting places of interest, especially projects in the rural development programme. They paid a courtesy call on Tun Abdul Razak, who was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Rural Development in Malaya- another routine but very significant aspect of every visit .

They were then taken to and shown the Federation's famous military- like Oper ations Room .

This nerve-centre of .Malaya's Rural Development projects , where decisions to open new land, settle the landless, introduce new crops , build roads , bridges and water supplies , improve hygiene and health services , crash through mass 56 $l

$8

Straits Times, July 18, 1961, p. 4 Sabah Annual Repart -1 961, p . 40 Eastern World, June 1961, p. 21

62

THE BOHNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

illiteracy are made, 59 must have been an eye-opener to the Borneo community leaders. At the beginning of February, another group of twenty-two community leaders and native chiefs from Sabah arrived in Kuala Lumpur for a fortnight's visit. When they steppedoutoftheirtrain it was said that some of them excitedly exclaimed, "Such a big station!" 60 Thereafter they were taken for visits to rural development projects and meetings with community leaders in Selangor, Pahang, Perak, Penang, Province Wellesley and Kedah. 61 By this time theStraitsTimes, reported: "Several groups of visitors from the Borneo (sic), Sarawak and Brunei have toured Malaya since last August. Tomorrow, a group of 12 people from Sarawak, comprising Dayaks, chiefs and a priest, will arrive for a similar two-week visit." 6 2 These strenuous and costly visits were undertaken not without some special reasons. The streams of see-for-yourselves visitors from Sabah and Sarawak were meant and proved to be an important part of the game of persuading the Borneo rural peoples to accept Malaysia. The community leaders who continually visited the Federation, and whose frequency of arrival in Kuala Lumpur was greatest in 1962, were given the insight into rural development planning in Malaya in the hope that when they had returned to Borneo they would not only help in the betterment of their own economic conditions but also assist in the dissemination of ideas favourable to the formation of Malaysia. Donald Stephens and Dato Bandar were not the only people who found the Malayan atmosphere congenial after a few visits and meetings with its leaders. Many of the recalcitrant Borneans who undertook a visit also underwent a conversion. They left Borneo mostly as doubting Thomases; they returned home often as standardbearers of the Malaysia plan.

Had the Federation been politically, administratively and, above all, economically unsound, it is doubtful if the Borneo visitors would have l:)een impressed at all; indeed it is highly improbable that the Malayan Government would have even dreamed of implementing such a scheme of attraction had the economy of the Federation been in chaotic conditions such as those of some 59 60 31 62

R. McKie, Malaysia In Focus, p. 156 Straits Times, Feb. 9, 1962, p. 9 Ibid.

Ibid.

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

63

adjacent countries -not including those of northern Borneo by the by- were then. But the Federation had the blessings and advantages of progress since independence, and these in turnprovidedherwithglittering showcases with which she could capture the imagination and gain the support of the Borneo leaders towards the formation of Malaysia.

The work of the MSCC and the publicity campaigns in January 1962 combined with the efforts of the returned community leaders not only to stimulate discussions on Malaysia among the Borneo peoples but more so to persuade them that their political and economic survival after the paternalistic British had left lay solely with the success of the proposed federation. This was the type of environment created by the time the Cobbold Commission conducted its i!J.quiries in Borneo.

As has been stated earlier, this Commission was set up as a result of the joint statement by the British and Malayan Governments on 23 November, 1961, that Malaysia was a desirable aim to be decided upon only after the ascertainment of the views of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. 63 The Cobbold Commission's terms of reference were set out as follows : "Having regard to the expressed agreement of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya that the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak (together with other territories) in the proposed Federation of Malaysia is a desirable aim in the interests of the peoples of the territories concerned(a) (b)

to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on this question; and in the light of their assessment of these views, to make recommendations. " 64

The Commission when finally appointed, after an initial difference of opinion regarding its chairman, comprised the following: Lord Cobbold, chairman; Sir Anthony Abell and Sir David Watherston, who were nominated by the British Government; and Dato Wong Pow Nee and Muhammed Ghazali bin Shafie, who were nominated by the Malayan Government. The members of the Commission 63

See Appendix l

64

Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962, (hereinafter Cobbold Commission Report), Dept. of Information, Kuching, p. vi

referred to as

64

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

arrived in Kuching to begin hearings on 19 February, 1962, and left Jesselton on the completion of their task on 17 April or just under two months since their first arrival in Borneo.

Prior to the Commission's arrival, the Governments of Sarawak and Sabah had made preparatory arrangements for their travel and accommodation in the two territories. Their secretary had also visited Kuching and Jesselton during the preceding week. Their itinerary had been so planned that representatives from every district in each territory had an opportunity to meet the Commission at selected district centres. They thus held fifty hearings at thirtyfive different centres in Sarawak and fifteen centres in Sabah.

All persons who wished to submit written memoranda to the Commission were invited to do so. In response to this invitation the Commission received some 2,200 letters and memoranda- nearly 600 in Sabah and over 1,600 in Sarawakfrom town boards, district councils, associations of many kinds, political parties, chambers of commerce, trade unions, religious leaders, members of executive and legislative councils, native chiefs and community leaders, and large numbers of individual members of the public. "From these memoranda," the Commission concluded, "we obtained much valuable material and assistance." 65 An open invitation to appear before the Commission was extended to all persons who wished to give oral evidence. The Commission considered that full advantage was taken of this invitation and that as a result they were able to meet and talk with large numbers of representative individuals and bodies, many of whom had submitted written memoranda which the Commission were able to discuss with them. "The willingness of the public to come forward and state their views quietly and responsibly," the Commission added, "was almost everywhere impressive and gratifying." 66 Over 4,000 persons appeared before the Commission in some 690 groups which varied in size from one to fifty. Most groups appointed one or more of their number to act as spokesman, and the Commission were agreed that they took pains to ensure as far as possible that anyone else who wished to state a different view, or to contribute additional points, was given full opportunity to do so. All the hearings of the Commission were conducted in private, and assurances were given that evidence and memoranda submitted to them would be treated as confidential. 67 65 66 67

Ibid., p. 2 Ibid.

Ibid.

MALAYAN C,ANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

65

It would appear from the foregoing paragraphs that the Commission was sufficiently well organized and carried out its task adequately. In its assessment of evidence, the Commission paid tribute to the success of the publicity campaigns on the Malaysia proposal undertaken earlier by the Sarawak and Sabah Governmentsowhen it stated: "The case for and against participation has been widely debated in the respective territories at meetings, in newspapers and in such forums as the Conference of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee.

Indeed on a less formal level, Malaysia has been a major topic of conversation in the bazaars, clubs and coffee houses, homes and longhouses throughout the two territories. All this has contributed in no small measure towards an understanding of the Malaysia proposals." 6 8 The publicity campaigns as embodied in the Sarawak White Paper of 4 January and that of Sabah __on 31 January were intended to be a double-edged weapon. It was meant to be a source of knowledge to the largely illiterate adult populations of the rural areas of Sarawak and Sabah. There was less need for such publicity in so far as the urban dwellers were concerned; for it is often not realized that the clubs and coffee houses of the township areas of Borneo have always been counterparts of Parisian drinking cellars inasmuch as they disseminate fresh information so rapidly. But more importantly, albeit subconsciously done perhaps, the publicity campaigns were a source of persuasion to join Malaysia.

A perusal of the two White Papers cannot fail to indicate that this was so; and this second purpose of the campaigns in effect compares admirably with the Singapore "referandum" later on 1 September, 1962, in which voters were asked to pick one out of three alternative ways of merging with Malaya rather than merely to say Yes or No in the conventional style of a referandum. 6 9 The Commission's endorsement of the publicity campaigns was, however, a matter of necessity; for without it the possibility of charges of misjudgement, that the enquiry was based on the mere sound and fury of untutored and uninformed Borneans, might have arisen. In its assessment the Commission stated that: "About one-third of the population in each territory strongly favours 68

Ibid â&#x20AC;˘â&#x20AC;˘ p. 31

69

See Malaysia In Brief, pp. 114-5

THE BORN.EO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

66

early realisation of Malaysia without too much concernabout terms and conditions. Another third, many of them favourable to the Malaysia project, ask, with varying degrees of emphasis, for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent: the warmth of support among this category would be markedly influenced by a firm expression of opinion by Governments that the detailed arrangements eventually agreed upon are in the best interests of the territories. The remaining third is divided brtween those who insist on independence before Malaysia is considered and those who would strongly prefer to see British rule continue for some years to come." 70 Apart from the arbitrary division of opinions into tight compartments of thirds, the Commission was voicing nothing which was unexpected. In point of fact, its findings merely gave a formal recognition of what the Borneo leaders had previously been repeating so many times during meetings of the MSCC. Even the division into thirds was not being used for the first time . Dato Mustapha, speaking at the last MSCC meeting in Singapore, said that his party (the Malayoriented United Sabah National Organization- USNO) combined with Donald Stephens' UNKO then "represented at least two-thirds of the people of North Borneo and it therefore ¡ followed that these two-thirds supported Malaysia and wanted it to come about as soon as possible." 71 In its recommendations the Commission dealt with political and constitutional issues such as representation in the federal parliament, special position of the indigenous races, development, the judiciary, the head of state, public services, federal constitution, finance, education, and regionalization. The details of these is sues, the Commission recommended, should be settled by a future joint Working Party. A more detailed study of these constitutional issues will be the subject of the following chapter. So suffice it to say here that these issues were paraphernalia already partly dealt with by the Kuching, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore meetings of the path-finding MSCC. Again, the Commission was merely giving a more formal expression of what had been considered before; in this respect, the Commission was largely a rubber stamp of the earlier and more significant MSCC. There was one recommendation, however, which gives the Commission meaning and significance, not, again, so much because it turned out to be the 70

Cobbold Commission Repor t, p. 31

71

Straits Times, Feb. 2, 1962, p. 11

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

67

final authority on what it recommended but because it was supposed to have r:eQresented the general will of the Borneans vis-a-vis Malaysia. Summing up the various recommendations, Lord Cobbold warned: "It is a necessary condition that, from the outset, Malaysia should be regarded by all concerned as an association of partners, combining in the common interest to create a new nation but retaining their own individualities. If any idea were to take root that Malaysia would involve a 'take-over' of the Borneo territories by the Federation of Malaya and and the submersion of the individualities of North Borneo and Sarawak, Malaysia would not, in my judgement, be generally acceptable or successful. I recommend that, in forthcoming negotiations, Governments should pay close attention to this point, both in its psychological and its practical aspects." 72

This was quite a classic appeal to those responsible for the steering of the ship of Malaysia, as the nation-building venture came to be descriJted, to a successful haven of rest and stability. There was a series of moments of discord in London in November 1961 when Prime Minister Macmillan and Tengku Abdul Rahman could not agree on the choice of chairman for the Commission because, the Tengku confessed: "To me, to be quite honest, I consider that the appointment of the right commission is very important because on that rests the whole question of merger." 7 3 The wish to ensure that the Commission would recommend the right things had been fulfilled when Lord Cobbold and his team took up and confirmed what previous consultations and unofficial negotiations on the Malaysia plan had partly decided upon. Again Malaya had the dice in her hand and she continued to play the game; and being more seasoned than the Borneo counterpart, she had led all the way towards the goal she cherished.

Leading all the way was to be the continued fortune of the Malayan leaders after the Commiss ion submitted its report to the British and the Federation Governments in July 1962. For while Tengku Abdul Rahman, undoubtedly in 72 73

Cobbold Commission Report, p. 59 Straits Times, Dec. 6, 1961, p. 20'

68

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

one of his moments of foresight, insisted two months before the Commission began its work: "If you appoint the wrong type of commission and get certain recom-

mendations which you find it is not possible to accept, then the whole question of Malaysia will collapse. " 74 the chairman of his and his cabinet colleagues' choice announced after ascertaining the views of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak: "I strongly endorse the recommendations that consultative machinery, including joint working parties, should be set up as soon as possible after a decision is taken to proceed with the Malaysia project, in order to work out the details of integration of the Borneo territories into a new Federation." 75 Consequent upon th~ir acceptance of the Commission Report, the British and the Federation Governments announced on 1 August, after talks in London, the decision in principle, subject to necessary legislation, to bring Malaysia in~o being by 31 August, 1963. By August 1962, therefore, the proposed federation had appeared within sight, even if still somewhat beyond grasp.

Due largely to thelackofpolitical tradition and to the newness of nationalism in northern Borneo, the leaders of Sarawak and Sabah ventured in a trial-anderror manner. This was especially so in 1961 and 1962 when their xenophobic feelings appeared to demonstrate the sort of political maladjustment Sir Lewis Namier propounded. Before this national feeling could develop further, however, the toning down of Bornean opposition to the Malaysia proposal led to conversation between the leaders of Sarawak and Sabah on the one hand and those of Malaya and Singapore on the other. The recurrent appeal to common historical experience and cultural heritage, the persuasive diplomacy of men such as Lee Kuan Yew and Dato Ong Yoke Lin, and the entrusting of the MSCC chairmanship to the leading Bornean politician in Donald Stephens, these facilitated understanding on both sides. The better the understanding developed among the leaders of the five component areas attending the MSCC meetings the more appreciative the Borneo leaders became of the Malaysia plan.

74

Ibid., p. 1

75

Cobbold Commission Report, p . 60

MALAYAN CANVASS FOR SUPPORT-AUGUST 1961 TO AUGUST 1962

69

The main complaints and protestations of the Borneo leaders during the period from August 1961 to August 1962 were directed against the lack of knowledge about the Malaysia proposal among the rural peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. By embarking on publicity campaigns the Governments of these two territories sanctioned the Malaysia plan, brought it to the limelight, and made it an administrative as well as an official matter. Henceforward, the proposed federation would be a matter for governments to settle and not merely the topic of conversation among leaders in their more or less unofficial capacities.

While the publicity campaigns were going on, the Federation Government intensified its efforts in organizing study tours for many doubting and recalcitrant community l~aders from Borneo. Largely due to its rural "experiment in partnership - a partnership tn administration, a partnership in planning, and a partnership in racial harmony" 76 - among its mutually respectful races, largely due to its political and economic successes since independence, Malaya soon became a symbol of freedom and progress to the visiting community leaders of less developed Borneo. Impressed and won over, they returned home to tell their peoples of the untold benefits in teaming up with Malaya to form the Malaysia federation which they had begun to hear about. These community leaders thus helped in the publicity campaigns which facilitated the task of the commission of enquiry that soon visited their main towns .

The Cobbold Commission did its best to be sane and understanding. It attempted to be frank and impartial, but it failed miserably in respect of the last category. For this was a Commission of Tengku Abdul Rahman's choice; and being so it was a foregone conclusion that its recommendations would be in favour ofproceedingwiththeformationofMalaysia . The Cobbold Commission, although it gallantly cautioned the leaders of the proposed federation and Britain to approach the formation of Malaysia through the ideal of partnership which had proved to be immensely successful in Malaya, was nonetheless essentially a rubber stamp of the earlier MSCC which truly began the plunge, to use Donald Stephens ' express ion, taken by the leaders of Sarawak and ~abah in their decision to favour joining Malays ia.

With the acceptance of the Commission Report by the British and the Federation Governments , the Malayan canvass for Borneo support had ended in success.

For with this acceptance , and the 1 August announcement that ~alaysia would come into being by 31 August, 1963, not only had Malaya won the support of many Borneo leaders towards the formation of Malaysia but it -,

Far East~m Economic Review,Hongkong, June 28, 1962, p. 703

70

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

had also received the sanction of the ultimate power over the territories, namely Britain.

Chapter V

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE - SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

The Cobbold Commission Report was considered in detail in a series of meetings in London in July 1962 by British and Malayan Ministers . At the conclusion of these meetings a joint public s tatement was issued simultaneously in London and Kuala Lumpur by the British and Malayan Governments on 1 August, stating, among other things , that: "The two Governments have noted in par ticul ar that the commission were unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia Is in the best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, and that an early decision in principle should be reached. " 1 It was beginning to emerge gradually that the work of the former MSCC had been

decisive towards the realization of the Malaysia plan. Through its four meetings as discussed earlier in this narrative, the atmosphere of willingness and understanding led to the discussion in part of political and constitutional issues pertaining to the proposed federation . The MSCC meetings we re convened by leaders from the five territories at a rather unofficial level. The appointment of the Cobbold Commission - primarily the work of the British and the Malayan Governments without the Borneo territories having any say as to whether they in the first place wanted such a commission- took up the Malaysia proposal at a more official lervel than did the MSCC. At the same time, the colonial administrations of Sarawak and Sabah, noting and following the agreeable attitude of the home Government towards the proposed federation, launched publicity campaigns , thereby familiarizing the peoples of the two territories with the Malaysia plaa. By undertaking the publicity campaigns, the peoples of the two territories were also given to understand that their Governments had favoured the proposal and that implicitly they, the peoples , should begin to entertain the Malaysia idea too.

1¡ Straits Times, Aug. 2, 1962, p. 22; see Appendix I

72

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 -1963

The bringing of the Malaysia proposal into official circles by the Sa.r awak and Sabah colonial Governments , and the official sanctioning of it by the Cobbold Commission were two very significant steps in the right direction of bringing Malaysia into being. From this point, it was just another step to the stage where the British and Malayan Governments could say without fear of contradiction from opponents of the Malaysia plan that they, being the chief architects, should begin the actual work of construction. Thus in the joint statement of 1 August, they made it known publicly that: ". .. the British and Malayan Governments have now decided in principle that, subject to the necessary legislation, the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963 ... 2 Taking up the recommendation of the Cobbold Commission that a joint Working Party should be set up to settle the constitutional issues concerning the two Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah In their entry into Malaysia, the joint statement announced: "An Inter-Governmental Committee will be established as soon as possible, on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments will be represented. Its task will be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the neces sary safeguards. â&#x20AC;˘ ' There was involved, right up to the 1 August announcement, a skilful game of diplomacy played by Malaya. On the one hand the Federation Government canvassed for the support of the Borneo leaders and their peoples as discussed in the last chapter. Quite apart from this , Malaya independently negotiated with the British Government in respect of the proposal to set up Malaysia with the latter's Borneo colonies and protectorate as member states. Thus was the 1 August announcement the result of nearly year (since the 23 November 1961 public statement that Malaysia was a desirable aim and that Britain and Malaya had decided to set up a commission of enquiry, plus the extension of the 1957 Anglo-Malayan defence treaty to cover the future Malaysia) of diplomatic

a

2

Report oj the Inter-Governmental Committee (hereinafter referred to asiGC Report),

Dept. of Information, Jesselton, 1963, Annex C, p . 50 3

Ibid; see Appendix I

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE- SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

73

manoeuvring leading Britain to acquiesce to the setting up of Malaysia by 31 August, 1963.

The agreement of Britain to the realization of Malaysia by 1963 was no less singularly important for the fact that because of this concurrence with the wishes of the Federation Government, the colonial adminlstrations of Sarawak and Sabah followed suit. At theendoftheLondon talks which announced the date of bringing Malaysia into being, Tengku Abdul Rahman extended a special message to the peoples of the Borneo territories . It was part of the Malayan tactic of keeping the less able partners to the proposed federation happy and appreciative.

"I would like to tell the people of the Borneo territories ," the Tengku assured the Borneans from London , "that the Federation welcomes them into the new Federation of Malaysia and they can rest assured what is enjoyed by the people of the Federation will be enjoyed by them . " 4 The theme was an old one, having perhaps been gone over and over by the Prime Minister of Malaya himself a hundred and one times since May 1961, namely assuring the Borneans of equality.

But the reiteration was tlmelyandopportune, sincethe announcement of Malaysia Day was a crucial development both for those who favoured it and those who opposed it.

It is often against one's interests to express biographical opinions about living personalities , including prime ministers and statesmen. When this is done so in the course of this narrative, however, it is always in relation to a particular time in the life of that personality. What happened before and after that are entirely different s tories . \Vhatever writers and observers might have created in often comparing Tengku Abdul Rahman with Lee Kuan Yew, the former had been an immensely practical politician in so far as he steered the Malaysia federation to success. "They should have no fear ," he went on to assure the Borneans just as Britain flashed the green light for him to go ahead with the Malaysia plan, "that they would be treated as strangers or as unwelcome guests .

We will treat them as members of our family in the truest sense ." $ The dual diplomacy oi getting the British Gove rnment to let the Borneo territories come into the Malaysia federation on the one hand and keeping the Borneo leaders in touch and appreciative of wha!; the Malayan leaders progressively undertook towards the realization of Malaysia on the other hand will probably go down into history as themostsuccessful thing Tengku Abdul Rahman did in his political life. Because he had received the sanction of the British â&#x20AC;˘ Straits Times, Aug. 2, s

Ibid.

1962, p. 1

74

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1968

Government that the colonies of Sarawak and Sabah should join his proposed federation, because the British were in full agreement with the Malayans that Malaysia should be brought into being by August 1963, the colonial administrations of Sarawak and Sabah acted accordingly. Through negotiations between the Borneo leaders and their Malayan counterparts , through the constitutional discussions which had appeared to go in the interest of the Borneans , the leaders of Sabah and Sarawak conditionally accepted the Malaysia proposal.

It was uncertain whether the Borneo leaders would have simply wavered along with the Malayans, however, had not Britain concurred with the establishment of Malaysia. The success of Malayan canvass for Borneo support and the acquiescence of London to the formation of Malaysia led the Legislative Couneil of Sabah to pass the following motion on 12 September, 1962: "Be it resolved that this Council do welcome the decision in principle of the British and Malayan Governments to establish Malaysia by the 31st August, 1963 provided that the terms of participation and the constitutional arrangements will safeguard the special interests of North Borneo , and do accordingly authorise the following Members of this Council to represent North Borneo on the proposed Inter-Governmental Committee to prepare detailed constitutional arrangements which will be laid before this Council:The Honourable the Chief Secretary The Honourable the Attorney- General The Honourable the Financial Secretary The Honourable 0. K. K. Dato Mustapha bin Dato Harun, O.B.E. 6 The Honourable D.A. Stephens ."

In making the decision to set up the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) , the British and Malayan Governments agreed that representatives from Sabah and Sarawak to sit on the IGC would have to be selected by the respective colonial legislative councils. 7 The above motion by the Sa bah Legislative Council was passed unanimously. It ls significant, too , that apart from the British officials the two unofficial members to sit on the IGC for Sabah were Dato Mustapha and Donald Stephens , both of whom were by now men of adequate experience as far as being on the negotiation table was concerned.

6 IGC Report, p. 1 7

Straits Times, Aug. 31, 1962, p. 11

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

75

It was to be expected that Sarawak would select her similar representatives

to the IGC. This indeed she did much in the same manner as Sabah. On 26 September, 1962, the following motion was adopted without dissent by the Council Negri: "That this Council (a) welcomes the decision in principle of the British and Malayan Governments to establish Malaysia by the 31st August, 1963, on the understanding that the special interests of Sarawak will be saf,eguarded; (b) notes that an Inter-Governmental Committee has been established to work out the detailed constitutional arrangements and the form of these safeguards, which will be laid before this Council; (c) authorises the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General , the Financial Secretary, the Dato Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha, Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng, Pengarah Montegrai anak Tugang, Mr Ling Beng Siew and Mr Chia Chin Shin to represent Sarawak on this Committee; and (d) authorises the Governor in Council to nominate as additional members of the Committee or as members of Sub-Committees thereof such unofficial members of this Council and such public officers as may be desirable. ots Thus both Sarawak and Sabah took part in the formal settlement of the constitutional arrangements necessary before both merged into the coming federation of Malaysia. Both territories had by this time gone past half-way towards joining up with Malaya to form a new and bigger nation than any of the individual territories remaining separate. Given the condition that their special interests would be safeguarded , given the fact that their own representatives would take important parts in the IGC discussions , the Borneo leaders came more than ever to accept the Mal aysia proposal.

The British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, was appointed chairman of the lGC, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation, Tun Abdul Razak, the deputy chairman of the Committee. In preparation for the task ahead, the deputy chairman visited Sarawak and Sabah for a fortnight in August. rt was generally true that the peoples of both Sarawak and Sabah, 5

ICC Report, p. 2

76

l'HE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961- 1963

before committing themselves to joining Malaysia, wanted religious freedom, mediums of instruction other than Malay, and immigration to be fully safeguarded apart from the special interests of the indigenous peoples. It is a matter of note that when Tun Razak visited Borneo in August in preparation for the plenary meetings of the IGC , he spoke over the radio and said to the Borneans: •In a multi-racial society such as ours there must be tolerance,

religious tolerance, so that every religious group will have right to propagate their religion in peace and harmony. " 9 The Borneans were expected to be §!USpicious , as indeed many of them have always been to this day, of the Islamic dominance in the then Federation of Malaya whos e constitution provided for a state religion - none other than Is lam .

Yet here, in August 1962, was the Deputy Prime Minister of that Federation himself counselling religious tolerance . It was another mode of persuasion continually employed by the Malayan leaders throughout the nationbuilding venture ; and again it was driven home at the epilogue of a persuasive exposition: "If some of you are happy now you will be happier with Malaysia. Let us therefore work together as brothers and fellow citizens to build a strong and happy country - Malaysia.• 10

The IGC held its · preparatory meeting in Jesselton on 30 August, 1962.

It decided to establish its headquarters there; and at this first meeting, too, five specific sub-committees were set up to deal with the issues under their titles - the constitutional sub- committee, the fiscal sub-committee, the legal and judicial sub-committee, the public service sub- committee, and the departmental organization sub- committee. Initially it was hoped that the IGC would complete its business v-:ithin six months , At the end of the preparatory meeting Tun Razak indicated how far the Malaysia plan had· gone towards its realization and, noting that, he again gave the reminder that the IGC was earmarked for the settlement of problems the Borneo partners thought confronted them: Straits Times, Aug. 31, 1962, p . 11 10

Ibid.

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO .TULY 1963

77

"We have heard views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak and we will now work out safeguards to bring about Malaysia." 11

â&#x20AC;˘

Altogether the sub- committees of the IGC held twelve meetings; the parent IGC itself had a total of twelve plenary meetings, the concluding one being held in the Federation capital , Kuala Lumpur, on 20 December, 1962. Between the preparatory meeting on 30 August and the final plenary meeting in Kuala Lumpur, therefore, the IGC and its several sub-committees met for twenty-four times to discuss and settle Borneo' s safeguards an.d special interests. The IGC also held three of its sub-committee meetings in Kuching.

Although the constitutional issues of necessity being designated to the IGC to settle had been partly considered by the earlier MSCC, due to lack of political activities in both Sarawak (except for the leftist elements of SUPP) and Sabah there was never a broad-based and concerted effort to present a common stand on the constitutional aspects of Malaysia. By gradual steps, however, Sa bah formed three more political parties in 1962: the indigenous-oriented United National Pasok Momogun Organization (Pasok Momogun), the United Party and the Democratic Party (later merged as the Sabah United Party)- both of predominantly Chinese following . These parties and the older UNKO and USNO, instead of taking democratically opposing stands, chose to link up; and in August 1962- about the time the IGC began its work - the five parties also began to negotiate for the formation of the Sabah Alliance which came to being in September, three months before the first district council elections in December, in which the Sabah Alliance won 131 out of the total number of 137 seats.

Alliance leaders presented a joint declaration called the "Twenty Points" to Tun Razak and Lord Lansdowne during the two IGC men' s visit to Sabah just prior to the preparatory meeting of 30 August. The "Twenty Points" was a manifesto embodying most of the necessary conditions and safeguards demanded

by Sabah' s political parties before joining Malaysia.n Unlike Sabah, however, Sarawak didnotmanagetopresent a joint declaration such as Sabah and its "Twenty Points" at thet time of the IGC meetings. Deeprooted communalism existed among the main political parties in Sarawak. The SUPP andPANASwereoftenacoupleofquarrelling factions giving fine spectacles of Chinese versus Malayan mud-slinging. The more recent parties- the SNAP and the Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (both wilth predominant Dayak supporters) , 11 12

Straits Times, Aug. 31, 1962, p. 11 For tbe"Twenty Points"seeSaball Annual Report -1962, pp. 24-26

78

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

the Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak (largely Malay), and the Sarawak Chinese Association (which so far has unsuccessfully managed to foster a counterpart of the Malayan Chinese Association) - all had been heading towards the dryness of the political wilderness, with the possible exception of Ningkan's SNAP. Unlike Sabah, there was no linking up before January 1963, after the IGC had completed its task, when the relatively weak Sarawak Alliance was formed without SUPP, the oldest Sarawak political party. Hence while Sabah had presented some concrete demands (or safeguards as embodied in the "Twenty Points", Sarawak relied solely upon '_~the capability of her eight plenary ~epre­ sentatives on the IGC to bargain for the conditions and safeguards required by her leaders before entering Malaysia. It was believed that "North Borneo and Sarawak were fully represented on this committee which immediately set about the task of working out practical solutions for the various problems involved 13 in the establishment of Malaysia."

On the completion of its work the IGC submitted its Report to the Governments of the four parties concerned- Britain, Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah.

The Report was published on 27 February, 1963, the main recommendations of which were the following: 14 Religion The religion of Malaysia should be Islam but there should be no state religion in Sarawak or Sabah. There should be constitutional guarantees for religious freedom.

Where federal law provided for the granting of financial aid to Muslim institutions or Muslim religious education, proportionate amounts should in the Borneo states be made available for purposes of social welfare.

Immigration Immigration into Malaysia should remain in the federal list but legislation should be enacted by the Federal Parliament to ensure that, with certain exceptions, entry into the Borneo states would require the approval of the state concerned. This legislation should not be amended or repealed in its application to a Borneo state without the agreement of the state concerned.

Education Education should be a federal subject, but the present policy and system 13 14

Sarawak Annual Report -1962,p. 2 See Malaysia In Brief, pp. 118-123

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

79

of education administration in Sabah and Sarawak should remain undisturbed and under the control of the state government until that government otherwise agreed.

Citizenship Any citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies who was born, naturalized or registered in Sabah and Sarawak and ordinarily resident there when Malaysia comes ¡into existence, should become a citizen by operation of the law. Any other person over the age of 17 and ordinarily resident in the Borneo tfirritories should be entitled to apply for Malaysian citizenship by registration, within eight years of Malaysia Day, subject to certain qualifications including residence for seven out of the previous ten years.

Federal Legislature Two members of the Senate should be elected by each Borneo legislature.

In addition the number of appointed members of the Senate should be increased by six in respect of the accession of Sarawak and Sabah. The existing Malayan House of Representatives should be increased in numbers from 104 to 159.

Sixteen of the new members should be elected from Sabah and twenty-four from Sarawak. A merger agreement between Malaya and Singapore had already provided for Singapore returning fifteen members.

State Constitutions The first Head of each of the Borneo states should be nominated before Malaysia Day by Her Majesty the Queen and His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and should be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for a period of two years. In Sarawak the Head of State should be known as the Governor and in Sabah as Yang di-Pertua Negara. The question whether a state constitution contained provisions inconsistent with "the essential provisions" 15 of a state constitution as set forth in the Federation of Malaya constitution should be one ultimately determinable by the courts and not dependent solely on the opinion of the Federal Parliament. Certain other modifications should be permitted in respect of the state constitutions in the two territories, including one allowing the Sarawak executive council to be styled the Supreme Council and the legislative council, the Council Negri. â&#x20AC;˘

15

ICC Report, p. 6

~~

80

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1963

Legislative Powers The legislative powers which should be attributed to the federal and the state legislatures are set forth in an appendix to the report. These lists were, with some modifications, based on the distribution of legislative powers under the Federation of Malaya constitution. Certain legislative powers should be concurrent. 16 In the early years after the establishment of Malaysia as few changes as possible should be made in the administrative arrangements in the Borneo territories affecting the day- to- day lives of the people, and during the early years certain federal powers should be delegated to the state governments.

Subject to this reservation the prinqipal items in the federal legislative list should be external affairs, defence, internal security, civil and criminal law and procedure and administration of justice (except Muslim and native law), federal citizenship and naturalization, machinery of government, finance (except state sales tax), trade, commerce and industry, shipping and navigation, communication and transport (excluding the Sabah Railway), federal works and power, survey, education (subject to the reservation recorded above), medicine (except that in Sabah this subject should be concurrent until 1970), labour and social security, welfare of aborigines (though federal this should not apply in Sarawak and Sabah), professional occupations , holidays (other than state holidays), unincorporated societies, control of pests, newspapers and publishing, censorship, places of amusement, federal housing and improvement trusts, co-operative societies.

The principal items in the state legislative lists should be: Muslim law and native law and custom (including personal law relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, succession and the like), land, agriculture and forestry, local government, other services of a local character (such as fire brigades, hotels, burial grounds, markets, licensing of theatres and so on), state works and water machinery of the state government subject to the federal lists, state holidays, creation of ¡offences in respect of matters included in the state list, inquiries for state purposes, indemnity in respect of matters in the state list, turtles and riverine fishing.

Financial Provisions Subject to certain exceptions, taxation should be a federal subject. After consultation with senior officials in Sarawak and Sabah taxes in the two states 16

Ibid., Annex A, pp. 19-28

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

81

should, by graduated stages, be raised to federal levels·. In order that the cost of state services should be met and provision for expansion made, it would be necessary to provide adequate revenues for the state governments. It would therefore be necessary to assign to the Borneo states certain revenues additional to those assigned to the states in the existing Federation of Malaya, such, for example, as certain duties on petroleum products , timber and minerals, revenue from state sales taxes and port dues . In Sabah, for as long as the state retained responsibility for medicine and health, 30 per cent of all other customs revenue should be assigned to it. Among several other grants including an annual balancing grant for each stat~. to be made from federal sources to the Borneo states , is a special grant to Sarawak to provide for eontinued expansion of state services , and another to Sabah equal to 40 per cent of any increase of federal revenues derived from the state and not already assigned.

The Malayan Government would use its best endeavours to enable Sarawak to spend M$300 million during the·first five years after Malaysia Day on capital expenditure on development.

Malaya also noted an estimate of desirable development expenditure in Sabah of M$200 million for the: same period, and recognized that funds from outside the territory would be required. Britain promised a grant of £1.5 million per year for five years fo·r the development of the Borneo states .

Elections Members of the federal legislature from Sarawak and Sabah should initially be elected by the state legislative assemblies. Direct elections to the Federal Parliament (and to the state legislatures) should be held for the first general election after the fifth anniversary of Malaysia Day or earlier if the s tate government agreed.

Election should be the responsibility of the Federal Election Commission which should be increased by one additional member from the Borneo states.

The Judiciary In addition to the Supreme Court of Malaysia, there should be three High Courts , for the states of the existing Federation, for Singapore, and for the Borneo states.

The Supreme Court should have jurisdiction to determine appeals from the various High Courts , as well as disputes between the states or a state and the federation, and certain constitutional. questions . Subject to this , the High Courts sohould have unlimited original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction to determine appeals from inferior courts within t he states. Native

82

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

law and custom and native courts should remain a state ·subje?t. The Supreme Court will be known as the Federal Court.

Public Services Separate Public Services Commissions should be established in each state.

The :Federal Public Services Commission should establish, for at least five years , branches in Sarawak and Sabah, and members of the State Public Services Commiss ions should serve on the Federal Public Services Commission•s state branches . Existing officers, including expatriate officers should be eligible for promotion, secondment or transfer in the federal service but such officers should not be required to serve outside Borneo unless they agreed to do so. In recruitment in the Borneo states preference will be given to Borneans .

National Language Malay should be the national language, but for a period of ten years after Malaysia Day, and thereafter until the state legislatures otherwise provide, English s hould remain an official language. Members of the Federal Parliament representing the Borneo states should likewise be able to use English in the Federal Parliament for ten years and thereafter until Parliament otherwise decides.

Indigenous Races The federal constltution•s existing provisions relating to Malays should be applied to natives of·the Borneo states as 1f they were Malays.

Existing Laws Laws on federal matters in force in a Borneo state immediately before Malaysia Day should remain in force , notwithstanding inconsistency with any provisions of the constitution, until repealed, amended or modified by the competent authority.

Transitional Arrangements Certain constitutional powers should be delegated to state governments during the transitional period.

,I

International Agreements for Financial and Technical Aid The federal government should ensure that existing International agreements providing for financial and technical assistance to the Borneo states should

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

83

continue but should give an assurance that, as regards matt.e rs administered by the Borneo states, the benefits of such agreements should be enjoyed and administered by the states concerned.

The completion and publication of the IGC Report marked a very significant milestone in the formation of Malaysia. It will be recalled that ever since they were made to believe that rejection was not the right attitude to adopt towards Malaysia, the Borneo leaders had all along wanted one thing and only one thing - adequate conditions and safeguards for the special interests of their territories . Among these special interests were those associated with religious freedom, language, and immigration in Sarawak and Sabah. Throughout the meetings of the path-finding MSCC in 1961 and early 1962, men like Donald Stephens, Dato Mustapha, Yeo Cheng Hoe, and Temenggong Jugah had fought verbally against their territories being bulldozed into Malaysia. These were men with their own shortcomings and they were mortal as any other; but they also possessed the robust common sense to realize that the Borneo peoples had a common good which must be safeguarded for the sake of their future. Thus these founding fathers of Sabah and Sarawak argued for political and explicit constitutional guarantees before Sarawak and Sabah entered the proposed federation of Malaysia.

The consti tutional demands doggedly pursued by the Borneo leaders met the ready understanding of the Malayan leaders, who had their own preoccupation and longing to bring the Borneo territories into the ken of their existing Federation. The Borneo leaders were adolescents in the field of practical politics, and the Malayan leadership knew this well. Adolescents would have their pet toys or else they would bolt. In such a case it was wiser not to rob them but ~

to assuR.ge their feelings of dissatisfaction as their British masters had so often done in the past. It was eminently more sensible and opportune to meet the

Borneo leaders on th'eir own terms as much as possible. This would involve a politics of persuasion, and to this end the Malayan leaders made the most of their canvass for Borneo support.

Because the IGC Report favoured the Borneo territories very generously, there was little else for the leaders on the island to do but to look at each other and say: "Well, what are we waiting for? Let us take the plunge." This must have been the case in Sabah; for their demand in respect of religious freedom was fully met, they were given the liberty to use English as well as Malay as mediums of instruction, and their wish to control unwanted immigration (not like the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901, of Australia in its economic and social

84

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

import) into the territory was likewise fully met. Many other demands were fulfilled - demands regarding fe deral representation, the indigenous races , and finances. With regard to the last category, it was true that in relation to the stipulation that Sabah would need a M$200 million development grant for the first five year s "the Malayan delegation noted this estimate and recognised that state resources would be inadequate to reach this level of investment." 17 â&#x20AC;˘ But then the IGC Report added pr omisingly: "Subject to the amount of financial aid which might be forthcoming , additional funds from outside North Borneo would be required." 11 All in all, it was hard for the Sabah leaders to deny that most of their demands for safeguar ds as embodied in their "Twenty Points" wer e gener ous ly met by the IGC Report. In the context of outside financial assistance and loans , this was forthcoming, as the Report itself had already stated that Britain would grant M$12,750 ,000 (ÂŁ1.5 million) per annum for the first five years of Malaysia' s existence towards development in Sarawak and Sabah. Quite independently of this, the Commonwealth Development Corporation also announced in October 1962 that it envisaged an expansion of its activities in the Malaysian territories in the near futureY Sarawak , always the more doubting of the two territories, held her comment on the IGC for a few days. This was no doubt due in part to the lack of workable cohesion among the parties in this territory. When opinions were eventually expressed regarding the IGC Repor t , however , they were largely appreciative ones.

Stephen Kalong Ni.ngkan, who had forsaken his former opposition to Malaysia and said, "We feel that Sarawak should join the Federation of Malaysia to protect itself from being dominated by the Communists," 20 on April Fools ' Day 1962, now came out among the first to comment favourably on the IGC Report. Now fast becoming the most listened-to leader in Sarawak, Ningkan, as secretary-general of the Sarawak Alliance, said that his pro- Malaysia grouping 11

Straits Times, Feb. 28, 1963, p . 1

11

Ibid.

19

Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct. 11 , 1962, p. 52 Straits Times, April 2, 1962, p. 11

20

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85

of parties "fully endorsed the Report." 21 TheSarawak Government itself without ado considered that the Report contained "generous terms of safeguards for Sarawak. " 22 Agreeing to this statement, Dato Bandar who, it will be remembered, was a member of the IGC from Sarawak, ¡added: "I cannot say anything better than that, as far as safeguards are concerned." 23 Thus Sarawak seemed fairly satisfied with the recommendations of the IGC. One of the newer parties in the territories, the Malay-supported Barisan Ra' ayat Jati Sarawak, considered that there "should be plenty for rural projects and we want more help to be given to the rural people. " 24 If communalism then divided the opinions of Sarawak, and the preceding ones were non- Chinese, the following was the feeling of Leong Ho Yuen, who was the vice-chairman of SUPP: "All in all, the Report is quite satisfactory. Though we cannot get all we asked for, at least we have been given a high percentage. " 25 This was the opinion of the spokesman of SUPP which was anti-Malaysia in principle if not in fact. Leong echoed the feelings of bOth sides when he added that: "The $300 million for development is very fascinating. We can do a lot with it, but it is most important to develop the rural areas. A lot of the rural people cannot make a decent living at present, and with this money -.ye can help,26 It was indeed true that the grants of $300 million to Sarawak and $200

million to Sabah were "very fascinating" . That was how the Borneans viewed the promised assistance by the Federation Government towards rural development, that was how the touring visitors to Malaya felt the Federation rural development projects were to their eyes and imagination; for imagine what they could render to their fellow Borneans in the hills and villages , "the rural people who cannot make a decent living" as the SUPP vice-chairman had said, if Malaya could give them grants when they joined Malaysia. Now that the IGC Report had provided for a hundred million dollars towards the realization of the Borneo dream of opening up the great Labuk, Kinabatangan and Segama hinterland in Sabah, and 21 2

~

23

24

25 26

Straits Times, March 1, 1963, p. 18 Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, Ibid.

86

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

the Betong, Kanowit, and Bintulu undulating country of Sarawak, of dotting them with rural development projects; now that Malaya seemed to have kept her promise to help develop Borneo, honey, as it were , had been poured onto sugar and Sabah and Sarawak were ready to give their consent to join Malaysia.

After an aU-day debate, Council Negri, the lower house of the legislature in Sarawak, voted unanimously to adopt the recommendations contained in the IGC Report on 8 March , 1963. Still under the care of British officials , the resolution was introduced by the Attorney- General who said he believed that Malaysia, based on the foundations contained in the IGC Report, was a venture on which Sarawak coul d embark with confidence. The Attorney-General thought that: " ... so long as there exists in this world a struggle between rival ideologies , those matters will be troubled. Better that we sail in' convoy with the good ship Malaysia than alone in the small ship Sarawak." ~

7

Those matters the mover was referring to were the power politics of South- east Asia. Council Negri further authorized the Government to select certain members of the IGC representation from Sarawak to initial on behalf of the territory the draft Malaysia Agreement to be entered into with the British, Malayan, Sabah and, possibly, Brunei Governments . ThisproposedAgreementwas outlined in the 1 August, 1962 joint statement discussed earlier. It was¡ provided that the Malaysia Agreement, to be initialled after the Governments of Sarawak and Sabah had reached a decision on the IGC Report, among other things , would transfer the sovereignty over Sarawak and Sabah to the new federation of Malaysia."

As indicated earlier, Sabah had little to complain about the IGC Report because it met most of the issues the leaders of the territory wanted conditions and safeguar ds on, as embodied in their joint document, the "Twenty Points". On 13 March, 1963, the Legislative Council, like Sarawak in its resolution on the issue, unanimously adopted the IGC Report and welcomed the creation of Malaysia by 31 August.

Speaker s were unanimous in their praise of the Report. Two unofficial members of the Council proposed and seconded the motion. They were none other than Donald Stephens and Dato Mustapha. Donald Stephens , who was chairman of the executive committee of the Sabah Alliance which earlier drafted the "Twenty Points" , said ontheadoptionofthe Report: "The whole of Sabah will 27

21

Straits Times, March 9 , 1963, p. 18 Straits Times, Aug. 2, 1962, p. 1. See also Appendix I

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

87

now welcome with joy the creation of Malaysia." 29 With both Sarawak and Sabah having adopted unanimously the IGC Report and the decision to establish Malaysia by 31 August, 1963, the decision of the two territories to join Malaysia received a blue print. It was a decision which took a considerably long time to make. It began with the willingness to talk at the July 1961 CPA conference; it took root through the four meetings of the MSCC from August 1961 to January 1962; it was highlighted by the publicity campaigns of Sarawak and Sabah in January and its rubber stamping by the Cobbold Commission from February to April 1962; and now the blue print was given by the IGC Report and its adoption. Throughout this long period of twenty-one months, the overriding concern of the Borneo leaders was to get clear and unequivocal conditions and safeguards for the special interests of their territories, were they to join Malaysia. When the twenty-one months had brought to them much of the s tipulations they demanded as the aggregate price of joining Malaysia, when their own terms were in effect fully met, the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah gave their conditional acceptance of the bringing into being of Malaysia by 31 August, 1963.

While the Borneo leaders and their Malayan counterparts wrote the terms of their political marriage more definitely as time went on, external factors came into play and influenced some of their more important decisions. First in the field was the Philippines which sought to make a case out of a claim laid by the Sultan of Sulu who maintained that a part of Sabah belonged to him.

The claim to a part of Sabah - principally the modern Sandakan and Tawau Residencies - centres around a treaty signed in 1878 between Baron de Overbeck, an Austrian adventurer, on the one hand, and the Sultan of Sulu on the other,3 o According to the Sulu viewpoint, the 1878 agreement was a mere lease for which the North Borneo Chartered Company (which later acquired the right to occupy the part of Sabah concerned from Overbeck) was given permission to use the Sultan's land in Borneo in return for an annual rental payment of 5,000 Malayan It will be remembered that Britain took over from the Chartered dollars.

Company and made Sabah a crown colony in 1946; since then, more firmly th.a n ever before , the British argument was that the Sultan of Sulu ceded his land in Borneo in perpetuity, such that any talk of handing back that part of Sabah in question to the Philippines was meaningless.

The heirs to the Sultan of Sulu began the claim as early as 1936 when Âť

Straits Times, March 14, 1963, p. 9 See my History oj Sabah, pp. ?7-31, for a more detailed treatment

(

88

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

they requested the Chartered Company Government to resume the annual rental which had lapsed after the death of the Sultan. The payment was resumed, and for the heirs who progressively modified their claim from that of resumption of yearly payments to return of the land to the sovereignty of the sultanate, this "was the first and only success." 31 After the Second World War, the claim was resumed unsuccessfully and in 1950 Congressman Macapagal and two others sponsored a resolution urging the Philippine Government to institute the claim.

It was not until 1962, however, that the Government became directly involved in the affair. On 29 April, 1962 , a new Sultan "ceded sovereignty over the territory of North Borneo to the Philippines without prejudice to its own proprietary holdings." 32 As may be inferred from above, President Macapagal had been an ardent supporter of the Filipino viewpoint that a part of Sabah rightly belonged to the Sultan of Sulu up until he ceded it to the Government of the Republic in 1962, and since then that the Government of the Philippines has a case to pursue about Sabah. On 24 April, 1962, a rare occasion happened when the Philippine House of Representatives unanimously passed a Resolution No. 7 which, among other things, urged thePresidentoftheRepublic "to take the necessary steps consistent with international law and procedure for the recovery of a certain portion of the Island of Borneo and adjacent islands which appertain to the Philippines. " 31 Between December 1961 and April 1962, the Philippines Free Press launched a series of probing a rticles on the claim, and under this and the parliamentary pressure mentioned above "the Philippines Government on 22nd June , 1962, presented a Note to the British Government claiming that a dispute existed about sovereignty over North Borneo and requesting talks on the subject. " 34 This Note was also presented in answer to a British memorandum handed to the Philippine Ambassador in London on 24 May, 1962, which inter alia stated: "Her Majesty' s Government are convinc ed that the British Crown is entitled to and enjoys sovereignty over North Borneo and that nova.lid 31

L. Garner, "Heirs, Press and Polic.v: The Philippine Claim to North Borneo,â&#x20AC;˘ Silliman Journal, Dumaguete City, PhUipplnes, July-September, 1964, p. 174 32 Asian Survey, Nov. 1964, p. 1146 83 P.A. Ortiz,LegalAspects of theNorth BorneoQuestion, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1964, pp. 3-4 34 Current Notes on International Ajjairs,Dept.ofExternalAffairs, Canberra, October 1963,

p. 19

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO J ULY 1963

ll

claim to such sovereignty could lie from any quarter, whether by inheritance of the rights of the Sultan of SUlu (the only rights of his heirs being to continue to receive their shares of cession money) or by virtue of former Spanish and American sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippine Islands ." 35

I.

11

s s

s

l.

d

e

89

This has been the stand taken by Britain over the claim ever since, even though she no longer had any sovereignty over Sabah herself since the formation of Malaysia in September 1963. The memorandum added:

D

"In the interest of the people of British North Borneo, no less than because of their undoubted legal rights, Her Majesty's Government would be bound to resist any claim to part of North Borneo, whether _ advanced by the Philippine Government or by private persons in the Philippines ." 36

ll

e

d

t e

r

I

e

â&#x20AC;˘ â&#x20AC;˘

i

In September 1962 the Philippine Vice- President, Emmanuel Pelaez , delivered an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations claiming that the Philippines stood on what she considered to be "valid legal and historical grounds." 31 A month earlier the Philippines had also sent a Note to the Malayan Government stating that she would pursue her claim to Sabah "notwithstanding any agreement on Malaysia reached between the Malayan and British Governments " 36 At the end of the year the British Government agreed to hold consultations with the Philippine Government on problems of mutual interest, including the Sabah claim, These consultations took place at a week-long series of talks held in London from 28 January to 1 February, 1963, between the Vice-President of the Phi; llppines, Emmanuel Pelaez , and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home.

In his opening address Pelaez put forward a detailed case in support of his country's claim to Sabah. Referring to Sabah and the Malaysia plan he said: "We believe that there is a better chance of keeping North Borneo out of Communist control by restoring it to the P.hilippines. Instead of 35

p .A. Ortiz, op. cit., p. 1

36

Ibid., pp. 1-2

37 36

P.A. Ortiz, op. cit., p. 4

CurrentNotes on International Affairs, Oct. 1963, p. 19

90

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

depending for its security on Malaya and Singapore, which are a thousand miles away on the imperilled mainland, North Borneo would then form part of a compact, well- defended archipelago whose nearest island is only 18 miles away."~ 9

At the end of the series of talks , however, the British had refused to budge even an inch away from their declared position in the memorandum of 24 May, 1962.

The final communique on the talks stated that Lord Home again pledged support for the Malaysia federation , and added: "The Philippine delegation made a detailed statement of their government's claim to parts of North Borneo and the British delegation explained why this claim could not be accepted by Her Majesty' s Government." 40 Thus the London consultations ended in failure to settle the Anglo-Philippine dispute over Sabah. An important factor which correlated with this failure was a statement by President Macapagal in Manila precisely on the same day ( 28 January, 1963) when Pelaez delivered his opening statement to the London talks . In his State- of-the-Nation address to a joint session of the Philippine Congress , President Macapagal declared: "The proposed Federation of Malaysia is not in accordance with the principle of self-determination which is the accepted way out of colonialism, with Malaya as the new colonial power without historical or other rational bas~s and based on an expedient of false security." 41 This was the first time the Philippine President came out ln official condemnation of the Malaysia proposal. The strong criticism clearly upset any possibl e concess ion which the British might have contemplated giving the Philippine delegation currently attending the London talks.

President Macapagal, after thirteen years of personal involvement in the claim beginning with the sponsorship he gave to the House resolution in 1950, could find it in vain to refrain from taking a firm stand on the issue. The 39

Philippine Claim to North Borneo, Vol. I, Bureau of Printing, Manna, 1964, p. 18.

40

Sunday Times, Feb. 3, 1963, p. 2 Straits Times, Jan, 29, 1963, p . 1

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

91

Malaysia proposal , if implemented as it then appeared would be in the forseeable future , would mean the sudden loss of a long and protracted legal battle in which he himself had the misfortune to be deeply involved . .Thus in the address before the joint session of Congress he took up the claim and presented before the nation what he believed with bell, book and candle to be the true situation: " It is vital to the security of the PhiUppines that North Borneo be not

placed under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of another state, particularly a state on the Asian mainland like Malaya. In the event, God forbid, that Malaya succumbs to the potent communist threat on the Asian mainland, with North Borneo under Malaya, there would be created a situation in which a communist territory would be immediately at the southern frontier of the Philippines, which would pose a grave and intolerable threat to our country. Against such a threat, we know that our people will fight to the death, for they will rather die fighting for freedom than live in slavery." 42 Thus the President considered the threat facing the Philippines. There followed several eloquent exchanges and speeches on the merits and demerits of the claim on the floor of the Philippine House of Representatives between January and July 1963, but the official stand taken by Diosdado Macapagal remained unaltered. Incidentally, the President's contention that Malaysia was "based on an expedient of false security" was no more true and no more nonsensical than his assertion that Sabah was "vital to the security of the Philippines ."

Hlowever well-meant and legalistically defended the Philippine viewpoint might have been, the Sabah attitude to the claim had been equally outspoken and uncompromising.

Partly due to lack of cultural, social and political intercourse between Borneo and the Philippine Archipelago in recent time principally during the British and the Spanish periods in the two areas Sabahans had found their northerly neighbours remoter to them than the Malayans and the Indonesians . The indigenous Kadazans of Sabah, who comprise over a third of the total population of the territory, and the Tagalogs of Luzon in the Philippines are ethnically closer together than any other kindred races in Indonesia or Malaya; but the periods of the western powers had separated the two races so much for generations that by the middle of the twentieth century they found the mselves emerging through different hazes of cultural , social and u

Phi.l ippine Claim to North Borneo, Vol. I, pp. 6- 7

92

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

political heritage largely imposed by their former colonial masters. Thus in 1962, when the Philippine Government began to adopt an official stand on the claim to Sabah, the latter found the mere suggestion of an alignment with her northerly neighbours quite unnatural and in effect amounting to a walk-over.

Britain as the suzerain over Sabah before the latter was finally persuaded to join Malaysia, said little about the Sulu heirs' clamour for requisition of their land on the island of Borneo. Likewise, Malaya stayed off the field of dispute until as late. as March 1963 when the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation , Tun Abdul Razak, maintained that the issue was one between the Philippines and Britain, and that Malaya was not involved. "At the moment, we don't come into the picture," he said, and added: "We only come in after Malaysia is formed. " ., The British decided there was no case; Malaya thought it none of her business until Sabah took the plunge by joining Malaysia.

While Britain played a sneaky diplomacy and Malaya kept her paws off the hot chestnuts of the Sulu claim, however , the leaders of Sabah were in no mood to be subjected to what to them amounted to an act of territorial aggrandizement on the part of the Philippine Government. The main political parties in the territory reacted immediately when the Philippine Government presented the Note mentioned earlier to the British Government on 22 June, 1962. Donald Stephens , who was president of UNKO, the first political party of ~abah, declared that if the Philippines had hopes of taking any part of Sabah, it could only be done "over our dead bodies" ! 4 Being the most upcoming Sabah leader of the time, his words of course influenced those of his associates. He added: "Any claim made without reference to the wishes of the people is irresponsible and could only create hatred among the people of North Borneo for the Philippines with whom the people of North Borneo have had friendly relations for so long.'' ' 5 Other leaders did not hesitate to express their feelings . Dato Mustapha, the president of the USNO which then claimed the largest party membership in the territory, and himself partly of Filipino origin, said that the claim was "false and without foundationâ&#x20AC;˘ .â&#x20AC;˘~ Apparently not conversant with the fact that the heirs to the Sultan of Sulu had been endeavouring to i.n terest the Philippine 43 44

45

u

Straits Times, March 6 , 1963, p. 1 Sunday Times, June 24, 1962, p . 1 Ibid.

Ibid.

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE-SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

93

Government into making the claim a national issue ever since February 1962,47 Dato Mustapha said that the people who were making the claim were not even the heirs. Khoo Siak Chiew, President of the United Party, stated that his party rejected the claim "totally and unconditionally." 48 In an editorial on 25 June, 1962, the oldest English daily in the territory, the Sabah Times, stated that the British Government should reject the Philippine claim unconditionally. The claim had no substance at all. Sabah wa·s then a British colony, therefore it belonged to the British. In accordance with the British policy of helping colonial territories to gain independence, however, Sabah, like dependent arep.s elsewhere, was working towards self-government and independence. The newspaper editorial added: "There can ·be no discussion and there must be no conve rsations started either in Manila or in London between representatives of the Governments of the Philippines and the British. " 49 In fairness to those who did not subscribe to it (though there were very few who

did not, for the simple reason that there was no other decent English newspaper in the territory) however, it should be pointed out that Sabah Time s was owned by Donald Stephens; and although his political career was getting the better of his journalist life, he s till often commandeered the editor's column.

Yet it should also be recalled that Donald Stephens was riding along the tide of political popularity and success until the realization of Malaysia in 1963.

While the Philippines Free Press earlier campaigned ·for the Sulu claim to be made a national issue in the period December 1961 to April 1962,50 the Sabah Times put up a rejoinder by expressing opinions against the claim in Sabah from September until the endof1962. In another editorial on 27 September, the daily urged: "It is time that the political leaders in Sabah s hould produce a joint statement categorically s aying that they condemn the Philippines Government's claim to Sabah and that the people of Sabah do not want to have anything to do with the Philippines. The world must be told P .A. Ortiz, op. cit., p . 2 .

4-S -6

Straits Times, June 26 , 1962, p. 1 Straits Times, June 26 , 1962, p. 1 L. Garner, op. cit., p. 184

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

that the Philippines claim is completely repugnant and unacceptable by the people of Sabah. • 51 The Sabah dailydidnothavetowaitfor very long. The Sabah Alliance comprising the five political parties in the territory had begun to emerge in August; and two months later, on 16 October, 1962, the Alliance leaders sent a joint letter to President Macapagal. In it the Sabah political leaders declared: "We do not believe and our people do not believe that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines has any claim over any land whatsoever in North Borneo whether because of the former Sultan of Sulu or in any other manner. • 52 Not forgetting the recurrent attacks made on farmers and coastal dwellers on the east coast of Sabah by Sulu pirates , the Alliance leaders added, almost with a touch of vengeance: "Extravagant claims against North Borneo, false accusations against us and the killing and plundering of our people are creating suspicion and hatred between our peoples which we deplore. • n Sir William Goode, the Governor of Sabah, who could hardly be expected to do better or act otherwise than the taciturn and unco-operative attitude of the British Government vis-a-vis the Philippine claim, stated at a stop-over in Singapore on his way to London for talks with the British Cabinet: " North Borneo political leaders do not think the Philippines has any right to North Borneo They are hostile and angry." 114 Indeed, it was not only in 1962 that the leaders of Sa bah were hostile to any suggestion that they be taken over by the Philippines; for even after the formation of Malaysia they became more than ever certain that they could manage without the intercession of Macapagal and the Philippine Government. The Philippine claim has remained an open question. and up to the time of. writing it has done little more than being a red herring drawn across the track of good relations between the Philippines and Malaysia.

Ol 52 53

Sabah Times, Sept. 27, 1962: editorial, p. 2 Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec. 13, 1962, p . 559 Ibid.

Straits Times, June 28, 1962, p. 1

•

CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE -SEPTEMBER 1962 TO JULY 1963

â&#x20AC;˘

95

In the beginning, in May 1961, both Malaya and the three Borneo territories

had their axes to grind.

The Federation wanted at l east two things out of

Malaysia - the preservation of racial harmony and the territories of northern Borneo. The two were related and Malaysia could not function without one or the other. As for Singapore, the Federation had never any liking for that ugly duckling anyway; and that was why the Malayan leadership spent virtually all their robust nerves and energies on the Borneo territories instead. Singapore was i.ncidental and largely taken for granted; and in any event Lee Kuan Yew had ridden the tiger from whose back he was not likely to dismount "until the Malaysia Federation rendered it obsolete." 55 The Borneo territories did not favour Malaya for a start; nor for that matter did they prefer any other country across the seas su.rrounding the serene, if unmodernized, island of Borneo. However, Malaya played a dual diplomacy, with Britain on the one hand s.o that she would graciously give her consent to the Borneo territories' being included in the projected Malaysia federation and with Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah on the other such that through the use of a politics of persuasion and relentless canvass for Borneo support the Malayan leadership could arid did captivate them with ihe unlimited possibilities of a future Malaysia.

For twenty- one months , from July 1961 to March 1963, the Borneo leaders pressed for conditions and safeguards for what they beUeved to be the special interests of northern Borneo. After the months of consultations, talks, and discussions, the IGC Report met most of the demands of the leaders of Sarawak and Sabah. This being so, the Borneo leaders had little else to be fussy about.

Moreover, at any rate in the case of Sabah, the Philippine claim was seen as a very unpleasant alternative to joining Malaysia. The Malayan leadership and the British Government having consented to most of the safeguards they insisted upon, Sarawak and Sabah decided to give their conditional acceptance of Malaysia. Thus , while Brunei wavered anddoubted,SarawakandSabahsent their delegations along with those of Malaya and Singapore to London; and there, on 9 July, 1963, their leaders all signed the historic Malaysia Agreement which was to bring the new federation into being on 31 August, 1963.

s.

Rose (ed.), Politics

In Southern Asia, p. 234

Chapter VI

RECONCrLIATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

Once the Council Negri of Sarawak had unanimously adopted the IGC Report on 8 March, 1963, and the Legislative Council of Sabah did likewise a few days later on 13 March, it remained for the draft of the Malaysia Agreement to formalize in black and white all the necessary headings to bring Malaysia into existence.

All five territories - Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah - sent delegations to London to initial the Agreement, although Brunei decided to stay out of the new federation at the last minute. The Malaysia Agreement, when finally initialled in London on the auspicious 9 July , 1963, was a very short document consisting of eleven Articles; but none the less it met all the requirements of Item 4 of the Joint Public Statement between the Malayan and the British Governments on 1 August, 1962. 1 In view of the importance of the Malaysia Agreement , and bearing in mind its impact on the formation of the new federation in particular, it is hard to deny that the document constituted the manifesto of the contracting parties in their realization of a new nation. The Agreement provided for the name and the geographic extent of Malaysia, the necessary amendments to the Malayan constitution in order to make it fully applicable to Malaysia, constitutions for Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, transfer of sovereignty over those same three territories , immigration stipulation for the states of Sarawak and Sabah, an extension to Malaysia of the Anglo-Malayan defence agreement of 1957, compensation for overseas officers , power to implement the conditions and safeguards contained in the IGC Repo:rt, a common market between Malaya and Singapore, broadcasting and television arrangement in Singapore and proper interpretation of the Agreement. 2 ICC Report, Annex C, p. 50. See Appendix I Maklysia-Agreement Concluded Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Fedel'ation of Malaya, North Borneo,Sarawak and Singapore (herein rclerred to as Malaysia Agreement),Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London,l963, pp.l-3.

2

See Appendix D

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION-JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

97

To the Sarawak and the Sabah delegations at the initialling of the Malaysia Agreement in London, nothing must have been more rejoicing than the provisions contained in Article VIII which reads: "The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak will take such legislative. executive or other action as may b" required to implement the assurances, undertakings and recommendations contained in Chapter 3 of, and Annexes A and B to, the Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee signed on 27th February, 1963, in so far as they are not implemented by express provision of the Constitution of Ma1aysia." 3 The Article may need to be read -t.wice before its contents become clear, but it basically meant that the conditions and safeguards for over a year demanded by the Borneo leaders were now themselves written and safeguarded in the Agreement. Chapter three of the IGC Report contained the political and constitutional issues first mooted by the early MSCC , r ecommended for further study by the Cobbold Commission, and settled by the IGC. A summary of these issues has been deemed so important in the story of the Borneo response to Malaysia that it has thus been given in the last chapter. Annex A of the Report contained the same constitutional issues, divided into their respective Federal, State and Concurrent Lists .• Annex B provided for the proper functioning of the public services in Sarawak and Sabah, including Borneanization.5 The Agreement provided for the British Government to giv'e "the force of law to the Constitutions of Sabah, SarawakandSingapore as States of Malaysia" 6 before 31 August , 1963. These constitutions were drafted in such a manner as to be almost identical in form and content, especially so In the case of Sarawak and Sabah. lnboththeSarawakandSabahconstitutions , express provisions were made for safeguarding the special interests of the indigenous Bornean communities . 7 The Public Services Commissions in tbe Borneo states were charged with treating all persons of whatever race in the same grade of the services strictly 3

Malaysia Agreement, Article Vlii, p. 2. See Appendix D

4

ICC Repo1·~. pp. 19-28

s 1

Ibid., pp. 29-33 Malaysia Ag·r eemenl, Article Ill, p. 1

Ibid. Consltutton of Sabah , Article 41, pp. 97-99; Constitution of Sabah, Article 39, pp. 123-24

98

TH E BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

impartially; and in each state "it shall be the duty of the Commission to appoint, confirm, emplace on the permanent or pensionable establishment, promote, transfer and exercise disciplinary control over members of the public service."

The definition stood virtually verbatim for both Sarawak and Sabah.8 One other important provision i n the Malaysia Agreement, in so far as the demands of the Borneo leaders were concerned, must be mentioned. Apart from religion and language (which were adequately covered by the IGC Report and written into Article VIII ofthe Agreement) , the Malaysia Agreement provided that: "The Government of the Federation of Malaya will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment before Malaysia Day by the Parliament of the Federation of Malaya of an Act in the form set out in Annex E to this Agreement for the purpose of extending and adapting the Immigration Ordinance, 1959, ofthe Federation of Malaya to Malaysia and of making additional provision with respect to entry into the States of Sabah and Sarawak; and the other provisions of this Agreement shall be conditional upon the enactment of the said Act. " 9 It will be remembered that immigration in Malaysia was to be a federal subject, but with the proviso that, with certain exceptions, entry into the Borneo states would require the approval of the state concerned. Thus Annex E referred to in the above Article of the Malaysia Agreement stated:

HAn order under section 55 (exemption) of the Immigration Ordinance, 1959 shall not have effect for the purpose of the Ordinance as a special law for a Borneo State, except in so far as its provisions are by the same or a subsequent order applied tq those purposes with the concurrence of the State authority. " 10 In more usual terminology, the demand of the Borneo leaders that they be given control over immigration into Sarawak and Sabah was acceded to; and it was further agreed upon that the special provisions for the two territories should not 8

Ibid. Constitution of Sarawak , Article 37 ,p. 96; Constitution of Sarawak Article 75, p.158 Ibid., Article V, p. 1. See Appendix II 10 Ibid., Annex E: Immigration Bill prepared by the Malayan Parliament as required by Article V of the Malaysia Agreement 9

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

99

be amended or repealed Without their concurrence."

It can be fairly said,

therefore, that the three major fears of the Borneo leaders - religious domination in an Islamic state, imposition of Malay as a national language to the exclusion of any other medium of speech and instruction, and the swamping of the lal:our market and public services of northern Borneo with job- seekers from Malaya and Singapore - had been greatly allayed by the three Articles of the Malaysia Agreement discussed above. Again, as time went on, the Borneo leaders found that the British and the Malayan Goverrunents were being overly generous to them. Again, at the historic (for so it must have been to all believers and converts of the Malaysia ideal) signing of the Malaysia Agreement in far- away London, leading men such as Temenggong Jugah, Dato Bandar and Abang Haji Openg of Sarawak, and Donald Stephens , Dato Mustapha, Khoo Siak Chiew and G.S. SUndang of Sabah, all of them found that the British and Malayan leaders were meeting them on Borneo's own terms. Had their demands for conditions and safeguards even been begrudged, things might have taken a different course.

The Borneo leaders had indeed gone very far themselves ; they bad gone so far from their original stand as envisaged by their early unqualified declaration against the Malaysia plan that they had given their conditional acceptance - and not merely willingness to discuss the proposed federation.

Exactly two years since they declared their utter rejection of the Malaysia proposal through their United Front on 9 July, 1961, the Borneo leaders made a complete about- face by joining with their colonial masters , Malaya and Singapore to sign the Malaysia Agreement on 9 July, 1963. It was a rare irony of history that the declaration and the Agreement should have fallen on the same date of the calender.

If the earlier date was a matter of regret in the final scheme of things , the later one was an occasion for joy. At the signing of the Malaysia Agreement in London, Dato Mustapha, Donald Stephens , Kboo Siak Chiew, G.S. Sundang, w.s. Holley and W.K.H. Jones initialled the document for Sabah; and Temenggong Jugah, Dato Bandar, Abang Haji Openg, Ling Beng Siew and P.E.H. Pike signed for Sarawak. Harold Macmillan , either through lack of knowledge or due to preoccupation with matters more important than the Borneo colonies soon to be no longer Her Majesty's concern, had no word for the leaders from Sabah

and Sarawak. Tengku Abdul Rahman, however, gave a pointer to the type of fo r eign policy Malaysia would pursue: II

IGC Repor t, Chapter 3, p. 4

I

;~

I

100

T,HE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

"It is my hope and prayer that this new nation - Malaysia - with Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Malaya will be the same staunch 12 friends of our old masters and will become very, very close friends."

It was not the sort of foreign policy which would please the Indonesian leaders of

the time. But, his English training and background apart, 13 Tengku Abdul Rahman was under no illusion about the future in store for Malaysia. His Borneo colleagues must have been in complete agreement with him when he added: "We need all the help possible not only from Britain but also from all other members of the Commonwealth and from all the friendly nations to make a go of this new nation. I am confident that we shall make a go of it." 14 In his usual terseness, if sometimes with a touch of rudeness and haughti-

ness, Lee Kuan Yew insisted that he signed and settled for an agreement for the sake of the Tengku, and not for Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, and who was unkind enough to have taken over from Lee Kuan Yew as the active marriage broker by slithering in and out of the. rooms where the several delegations were busily trying to reach agreement. Lee Kuan Yew added to¡ newsmen, after asking them to quote him on his statement about having settled for the sake of the Tengku (who probably hardly rejoiced at taking in Singapore): "If it had not been for the Tengku we would have had Duncan Sandys on his bended knees. I want you to quote me on that, too." 15 It was a personal attack;

I

'

I

I

and admitting that Lee Kuan Yew was not the first Asian political leader to have passed slurring remarks on British politicians and senior officers, the Singapore Prime Minister's words were in some ways crude and naive, unbecoming of a former scholar.

The initialling of the Malaysia Agreement was in fact the climax of all the 12

Straits Times, July 10, 1963, p. 18

13

Tengku Abdul Rahman studied and obtained his B.A. and barristership in London; Lee Kuan Yew left Cambridge with a brilliant law degree .

14

Straits Times, July 10, 1963, p. 18

15

Ibid,

6ECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

101

consultations, talks and discussions on the Malaysia plan. For the Borneo leaders, who had by now gained an insight into the meaning of international politics by having taken part in talks with Malayans as well as the British, the burden of responsibilities had also begun to be a part of their public life. Having accepted Malaysia with adequate safeguards for the interests of the Borneans whom they themselves had only recently truly understood, having been given an added encouragement by their British masters who, as part of the Malayan brand of political canvass for support, had given to Sabah and Sarawak the rudiments of ministerial systems in 1963, the Borneo leaders could sigh with the feeling of reconciliation and spirit of resignation that they were after all on the road to self-government. At the signing of the Malaysia Agreement, Donal d Stepehns could end a short speech with the exclamation "Hidup Malaysia!", while Dato Bandar of Sarawak made an equally reconciled expression with the familiar "Merdeka Malaysf!a!"

From the signing oftheMalaysiaAgreementinJuly to the actual launching of Malaysia in September 1963, things moved rapidly in Borneo. In the first place the British Gove:rnment - the House of Commons - passed its Malaysia Bill on 19 July, paving the wayforbothSabah and Sarawak to be transfered to the new federation of Malaysia. Twenty days later, on 8 August, the Sabah Legislative Council unanimously passed a resolution reaffirming its earlier decision, when it adopted the IGC Report, that Sabah should attain independence by joining Malay0ia, and approved the Malaysia Agreement. By this time Donald Stephens was the Chief Minister-designate of Sabah; and ln moving the resolution he stated, partly referring to his state's representation in the Federal Parliament in Kuala Lumpur: "We have gone through the democratic process of electing representatives to the Federal Parliament and to the Senate . We have elected our Head of State, formed the State Cabinet. In fact, we are prepared and ready for independence." 16 The Head of State of Sabah, or the Yang di-Pertua Negara, was none other than Dato Mustapha, the older leader who teamed up with Donald Stephens since as early as the August 1961 tour to the Federation of Malaya to bring Sabah into Malaysia. By having adopted the Malaysia Agreement as it did, the Legislative Council of Sabah brought the territory constitutionally into Malaysia. It remained Straits Times, Aug. 9, 1963, p. 16

102

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

for the state leaders and their flabbergasted people to wait for Malaysia Day. ln Sarawak, too , events had begun to move fast since the signing of the Malaysia Agreement. A classic example of how Borneo leaders first rejected, then protested about, and finally accepted the Malaysia plan, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, now the Chief Minister des ignate of Sarawak made the following motion in Council Negri on 4 September, 1963: "Be it resolved that this Council reaffirms its support for Malaysia, endorses the formal agreement which was signed Ln London on the 9th July and, while regretting that the Federation of Malaysia could not be brought into being on the 31st August, welcomes the decision to establish it on the 16th September, 1963." 17 The motion contains other references than mere acceptance of the Malaysia Agreement, and these other references will be dealt with in the remaining pages of this narrative.

In the meantime, winding up the debate Stephen Kalong Nlngkan concluded and hoped with a touch of resignation: "Joining the Federation of Malaysia does not mean that we are degrading the country to Malaya, in fact we are elevating it to a position where we should be proud of ourselves to be recognised as one of the member s tates of the Federation of Malaysia. We are not optimistic about Malaysia but we are confident that we can achieve progress and prosperity for the country." 18 Such were the reconciled words of a Sarawakian who, in December 1961, could lash out against those Borneo leaders who were then beginning to favour the proposed federation. Ningkan still of course ended with the British Commonwealth as he wished Sarawak to remain in it; but he had had to resign himself to the fact that Sarawak had totally been allured by the wooing of Malaya to join Malaysia and only then achieved a status of self-government at the very best, Unlike in Sabah, the motion to accept the Malaysia Agreement was carried with s ome opposition in the Council Negri. The motioi:l was passed 38 to 5, with five opposition members and independents c rossing the floor to vote for the motion 17

Council Negri Debates, Offic ial Report, Kuching, 1s t Meeting of the 6th Session, Sept. 4, 1963, p . 20 18

Ib id ., p . 60

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION-JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

103

with the Sarawak Alliance 19 Thus, likeSabah,Sarawak gave constitutional effect to her decision to join Malaysia. It remained for the leaders to wait and observe what would happen on 16 September, the new date for the bringing of Malaysia into being.

External factors influencing developments towards the formation of Malaysia did not limit themselves to the communist threat and the Philippine claim to a part of Sabah. A verysignificantdevelopmentwas the staging of an armed revolt in Brunei on 8 December, 1962. This disturbance was primarily and openly the work of A.M. Azahari and the more extreme elements (presumably both socialist and rightist) of his Party Ra'ayat in Brunei. As has been stated earlier in this narrative, 20 the Party Ra'ayat had long been dissatisfied with the slow growth of constitutional government in the sultanate. When finally the party opposed the Sultan's apparent decision to join Malaysia because this would once and for all shatter the dream of the rightist elements to recover the old historic position of Brunei - encompassing Sarawak and the West Coast and Interior Residencies of Sabah - Azahari himself, who seldom felt modest about his association with the nationalist hero Soekarno during the days of struggle against the Dutch in Indonesia, announced and engineered the Brunei revolt from Manila. ¡ The armed revolt was actually, in the physical absence of Azahari, undertaken by an underground irregular army organization which trained its recruits in the dense jungle area between Brunei Town and Lawas in Sarawak, as well as Sipitang on the south-western tip of Sabah. Writing in his personal "The News As I See It" column, Donald Stephens stated three days before the revolt: "Kalimantan Utara National Army? That's what the news said, For sometime now I have heard from friends in Sipitang and Lawas of strange happenings in the jungles there. The story was that an illegal society (which tried to get itself registered in North Borneo but failed because the police were suspicious about them) was drilling young men in cleared areas in the jungle. That 'wooden guns' had been used and that the object of the jungle exercises was to 'liberate' Sabah. The illegal society has been very active in Sipitang and recent police activities in the area show that they are fully aware of the trouble which members of the illegal society are trying to cook up there. " 21 19

The Borneo Bulletin, Kuala Belait, Sept. 7, 1963, p. 1

2o

See Chapter Two

21

Sabah Times, Dec. 5, 1962, p. 2

104

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

The Tentara Nasional Kalimant_a n Utara, as the underground organization was called (TNKU), held parts of Brunei Town for a few hours; Seria and Kuala Belait, where the oil-fields are, fell into rebels' hands; and the Limbang and Lawas areas in Sarawak territory were also over-run. While his TNKU men were doing the hazardous job, from the peace and calm of Manila Azahari declared: "We want history to say it was our sweat and struggle and not Malaysia which gave Brunei independence." 22 But the whole amiir was over in less than a week. At the request of the Sultan and his Chief Minister, the British sent 5000 troops into Brun~i from Singapore, and with that the TNKU recruits who trained with 'wooden guns' sculled and scuttled. Some were killed, and a few hundred were captured, many of whom were later pardoned by the Sultan. The Borneo Times of Sabah summed up the episode: "Provided the Philippines stay out of the pi cture (and the latest press reports indicated they will) and- possibly even more important provided Indonesia does not indicate any intention to assist the revolutionary forces, then the rebellion must inevitably collapse, and collapse quickly." 23 The Phllippiries did stay ottt; but as for Indonesia, she did more than give moral support in the long run as will be discussed in a moment.

It will be remembered that A.M. Azahari was one of the signatories to the United Front declaration by Borneo leaders against Malaysia in July 1961. While other leaders - Donald Stephens and Ong Kee Hui - soon modified their stand (Ong Kee Hui argued for self-government for Sarawak first before joining Malaysia and especially Donald Stephens, as we have seen, made a complete about-face) Azahari doggedly pursued his ideal that Brunei should keep politically out of Malaysia. It was generally believed that Azahari had a soft spot for the sentimental background of the rightists in his party. The Sultan of Brunei had already appointed a commission following the pattern of the Cobbold Commission, although its findings were never published, and announced in ames-

sage to his Legislative Council in July 1962, five months before the revolt, that he was accepting the Malaysia plan in principle, and would initiate negotiations with the Governments of Britain and Malaya.

22

23

"The Sunday Mail, Brisbane, Dec. 9, 1962, p. 1 The Borneo Times, Sandakan, Dec. 10, 1962, editorial, p. 1

,

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

105

The message to the Brunei legislature was hardly good news to Azahari.

"After I have had discussions with my senior advisers , I announce that, with the Grace of Allah, the Federation of Malaysia plan will give large benefits and an abundance that will be profitable to our country , " 14 the Sultan had then declared.

Five months later, while the revolt was in progress, Azahari declared in Manila on 9 December: "The Revolutionary Government is formed by and for the people of Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah (North Borneo) and is neither fo r eign inspir ed nor influenced.'' 2 & He added that: "The Revolutionary Government agrees to accept the Sultan of Brunei as the Constitutional and Parliamentary Head of State." 26 It is true enough to say that "The Sultan of Brunei wished to negottate suitable terms for the entry of his state into the Federation of Malaysia; Azahari would have none of this and saw himself as Prime Minister and the Sultan as constitutional ruler of a smaller unit made up of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo." 27 The impact of the Brunei revolt upon the Malaysia proposal was significant.

Far from dismaying them, Azahari's rebellion only served to drive the proMalaysia leaders of northern Borneo closer to the already successful political canvassing leaders of Malaya. If an alternatilve to joining Malaysia was going to be so dras tic, revolting and unconstitutional as Azahari's "Revolutionary State of Kalimantan Utara", the pro-Malaysia leaders were induced to think twice about Tengku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia plan. When it was reported that Azahari was supposed to have said he was the Prime Minister of Sabah, the Legislative Council in Jesselton unanimously passed a motion condemning Azahari as a criminal. Moving the motion, Dato Mustapha declared: â&#x20AC;˘we cannot but condemn in the str ongest terms possible the dirty handiwork of Azahari and his gang. The lies which Azahari has spoken while in Manila are notl}ing but barefaced and shameless lies . His claim to be the leader of this country and of Brunei and Sarawak has no basis of truth and his proclamation of himself as the Prime Minister of 'Kalimantan Utara' would be laughable had it not been a part of the 24

M. Sivaram,Climpses of Malaysia, p. 15

The Borneo Times, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 4 26

Ibid.

27

T .E. Smith, The Backgrmmd to Malaysia, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 22

106

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

horrible tragedy enacted in Brunei, the author of which is no other than this enemy of the people - Azahari.â&#x20AC;˘ te It is interesting to note the non-communal stand of Dato Mustapha. Before

Azahari engineered the revolt, the t wo men admired each other a lot, partly because both were Moslem, but especially because both men had behind them sterling reoords of guerrilla fighting against the Japanese during the period of the resistance movements on the island of Borneo as well as in the Indonesian Archipelago where Azahari fought side by side with the Indonesian nationalists from 1942 to 1952. Data Mustapha did so well against the Japanese, that just after the war he built for himself a legend of prowess in Sabah.29 But such is politics that even deep cutual admiration could turn overnight into scathing condemnation. Donald Stephens , who incidentally had had his share of torture by the Japanese, whose father was among a group summarily executed by them, and who spent days (including his 1944 New Year's Day) in lavatory-like filthy Japanese jails , seconded the motion condemning Azahari. Donald Stephens stated: "From reliable sources of information I have also learned that many of the men who led the rebellion in Brunei were either members of the PKI (Parti Komunis Indonesia) or PKI-trained men. â&#x20AC;˘ 30 The reference to the PKI was significant, for it indicated to the Borneo leaders another unwhol esome alternative to joining Malaysia. This was especially so with regard to Sabah, where theamountofleftist, let alone flagrantly communist, influence was surprisi.ngly insignificant compared to the situation in Sarawak.

To most Sabah people in December 1962, communism was largely the sort of alien and totally evil destructive phenomenon their British masters had taught them about.

Soon after the outbreak of the rebellion, the Sarawak Government issued a statement saying that as a precautionary measure, the' emergency powers provided by the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance had been brought into 28

Sabah Times, Dec.

12, 1962, p. 1

29

When home !rom Australia In 1963 I was amused to hear my old man sometimes still boasting of how he and Oato Mustapha used to track down Japanese around Kudat during the war .

30

Sabah Times,Dec. 12, 1962,p. 1

RECONCILlATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

107

effect. The Ordinance was originally enacted as a weapon against the substantial amount of subversion going on in Sarawak since the inception of the Malaysia proposal. The statement appealed to the people to remain calm . The next day Sir Alexander Waddell, the colonial Governor, declared: "Should there be elements disloyal to Sarawak who seek to fish in troubled waters they will be 31 dealt with with rigour."

Unlike Sabah, Sarawak had for long been pestered, or at any rate the colonial Government was , by the communist and subversive activities of the underground CCO. The Chinese in Sabah enjoyed living in harmony with a lot of mutual respect and an a lmost absent feeling of suspicion from the local and indigenous communities. In Sarawak, however, the Chinese community had often been identified with the activities of the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO).

A well- known writer about the Chinese in South-east Asia noted recently: "The criticisms made against the Sarawak Chinese were similar to those made against their fellows in other countries of Southeast Asia, namely that they looked to China rather than their country of a doption as the object of their loyalties ; that they were 'capitalistic' and had accumulated for themselves an unfair s hareofthe wealth of the country; that they remitted money to China for the support of their relatives , at the expense of Sarawak; that they were able to educate their children better than could the indigenous peoples; andothers of the same sort." 32 The Chinese in Sabah had direct and customary contacts with Hongkong. Those of Sarawak, however , had been closer to their counterparts in Singapore. It had often been thought therefore that the Sarawak Chinese had not only good contacts with the Singapore Chinese, but also good lines of communications with the secret societies and communists on that island state.

In any event, it is true to say that there are far more people with communist sympathy in Sarawak than there have ever been in Sabah. In 1955, for instance, it was r eported that in Sarawak: "There was less overt evidence of undesirable political activity during 1955 than during the two previous years ; there were no major crises " 32

Sabah Times, Dec. 11, 1962, p . 6 V. Purcell, Malay sia, Thames and Hudson, London , 1965, pp. 161-62

108

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

in the Chinese schools and the flow of young people to China diminis hed to A total of 230 as compared with 500 in 1954." 33 The s tatement was clearly a recognition of the presence of undesirable ele ments in Sarawak as early as a decade ago- and it went much earlier than 1955 in fact. Many of the Chinese middle schools of Sarawak had long been the breeding ground of young communists who later joined the ranks of the ceo in its effort to subve rt the territory. By 1962 the Government, not being a communis t one , made no bones about disclos ing that: "The problem of purely Chinese communist subversion became more and more serious during the year and firm action had to be taken against a number of leaders of the Clandes tine Communist Organis ation.

Several undesirables born in China were deported during the year and several persons who had been born in Sarawak and on whom restriction orders had been served confining them to small country towns in Sarawak elected to return to China of their own free wilL Energeti c police action was maintained and resulted in the capture of a very large volume of communist documents . A great deal more was learned about the nature and workings of the movement." 3~ The Government of Sabab since 1945 or even earlier have never yet ha d the unenviable opportunity of including such an exhaustive length of information in an annual report. The communist movement in Sarawak has taken such deep roots that by 1962 it had incurred more time, energy and cost on the Government.

Some writers have seen possibilities in the communist cadres in Sarawak.

They attempt to link the CCO with the PKI of Indonesia, and having done s o, realize the connection possible between the two and revolutionary Peking. The latest proponent of this view puts forward the rather idealistic view that " ... if the Chines e had the running of an independent Sarawak, they would become in effect the firs t overseas colony, or protectorate, of the new Chinese Communist Empire. It is very difficult to believe that

there would be any other solution, and It is one which the Western powers would at present most s trongly oppose.'" 35 33

Sarawak Annual Report -1 955, p. 3

~

Sarawak A nnual Report -1 962, p, 3

ss

C.P. FitzGerald, The Third China, F. W. Ches hire, Melbourne, 1965, p. 97

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION- JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

109

This is of course a lot of speculative thinking, although it could amount to something when it is related to the feelings of the pro- Malaysia leaders in Sarawak at the time of the Brunei revolt. That revolt brought home to both British-oriented Sarawak and Sabah the unpleasant alternative of having a man of adventurous leanings like Azahari lord over them. A Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara, to the English- educated leaders of northern Borneo, was a poor substitute for the persuasive and almost politically seductive promises of the Malayans. Related to the December revolt were two other reinforcing factors . Just as Sabah held apprehension apout the Philippines and her claim to a part of the territory, so Sarawak was on the horns of the dilemma regarding the subversive communist elements within her borders. In this manner, three external factors - the Brunei revolt, the Philippine claim to Sabah , and the

communist subversive elements in Sarawak - significantly influenced the decision of Sarawak and Sabah to join Malaysia.

It may then be asked! why in that context Brunei stayed out of the new federation . The pertinent point to bear in mind seems to be not so much the demoralization caused by the TNKU sporadic and hit-and-run attacks as the feeling of security assured by the quick response of the British paratroopers and marine commandos in the hour of dire need. The guardianship of Britain was a very protective umbrella after all; and more than that, was it not true that the oil-wells were a considerable source of income to the British economy?

Could it not be that so !long as the oil derricks kept pumping up the crude mineral and the product flowed towards the London stock exchange, Britain would only be too willing to guarantee the survival of the s.emi-feudal sultanate?

Malaya was more an intruder to Brunei than anything els.e in 1961, and by July 1963 when the London Agreement to set up Malaysia was initialled it had appeared to the Sultan that Malaya was simply all out for a catch. The only quarter which could have persuaded Brunei to join Malaysia was the British Government itself which ensured the political and strategic survival ¡of the sultanate. But no pressure came from the British; and Tengku Abdul Rahman had pushed his luck far enough. by getting Sarawak and Sabah, to be able to insist that prefidious Albion flung the oily Brunei baby on to his lap as well.

Indeed, one factor which played into the Tengku's nand while he was preoccupied with his Malaysia nation-building was the hostile and untoward attitudes of the neighbouring countries to the south and east of Malaya. Instead of rivalling Malaya in wooing and coaxing the Borneo territories into joining up with them as Malaya was evidently doing, both the Philippines and Indonesia began by picking up quarrels with Malaya which in turn persuaded the Borneans that

I I

110

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

to their east and south were corrupted and expansionist nations.

Malayan relations with Indonesia had always been spasmodic and were never sustained ever since the end of the Second World War. The first real difference between the two countries arose in 1957 when Indonesia bitterly criticized the Federation for allegedly harbouring political undesirables and rebels from the turmoils in central Sumatra and Celebes. T his cooled down, and in 1959 a significant thing happened when in April a Treaty of Friendship was signed between t~e two countries , providing, among other things , for closer cooperation in many sectors of public life, including immigration between the two countries, uniformity in the use and development of the Indonesian and Malay languages , and the cultural, Intellectual, scientific and educatlonal fields . One part of the Treaty stands out. This was Article 4, which in fact covered the tone and general intention behind the signing of the Treaty. It stated that: "The two High Contracting Parties agree that in case any dispute on matters directly and exclusively affecting them should arise they shall endeavour to settle such dispute through usual diplomatic channels in a true spirit of friendship and goodwill. If a settlement cannot be found through such channels within a reasonable time, they shall endeavour to settle them by other ways and means in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles emmciated at the AsiaAfrican Conference in Bandung in 1955." 36 The next attempt at co-operation occured when Tengku Abdul Rahman attempted to mediate in the dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch over West New Guinea.

For his effort, the Tengku was criticized and ridiculed. From that time on, relations steadily deteriorated. When Tengku Abdul Rahman announced his Malaysia plan in May 1961, Indonesia at first picked no quarrel.

She insisfed that she was not expansionist, and that she was merely fighting for the self-determination for subject peoples everywhere. In a letter to the New York Times regarding West New Guinea on 13 November, 1961 , the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio said, inter alia: "As an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent, one fourth of the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) consisting of three Crown Colonies of Great Britain, is now becoming the target of the Malayan 36

Malaya-lndonesia Relations, Dept. of Info rmation, Kuala Lumpur, 1 96 3, p. 29

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

111

Government for a merger, Of course , the people there are ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. Still, we do not show any objection toward this Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with this plan." 37 What Dr Subandrio stated was generally the official policy that was followed by Indonesia, which was then more preoccupied with the West New Guinea issue than anything else. A week after he wrote that letter to the influential newspaper, Dr Subandrio made another statement on the West New Guinea issue, this time more significantly in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In the course of his speech he again referred to the Federation's intention to form the proposed federation of Malaysia with the northern Borneo territories as component parts.

The reference has become somewhat of a classic for those who do not share the subsequent Indonesian attitude of hostility and so-called confrontation against Malaya. Dr Subandrio reiterated: "We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island, but more than that- when Malaya told us of her intention to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei (sic) and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we have no objections and that we wish them success with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and freedom ." 38 Thus the Indonesian Foreign Minister affirmed in the General Assembly on 20 November, 1961. It had, however, generally been believed that Indonesia was a country where the locus of real policy-direction was difficult to trace. As recent as at the formation of Malaysia, it was the opinion of Professor Justus M. Vander Kroef that: "Malaysia is anathema to the PKI which will never be reconciled to its existence under its present anti-Communist leadership. Government in Indonesia involves, as is bynowgenerallyknown, a delicate balancing of the three principal power centres , viz., Sukarno , the PKI, and the army, and an assent to Malaysia or an acceptance of its unmolested Ibid., p. 11

B. Grant, Indonesia, quoted on p. 141

112

THE BOftNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961- 1963

continuing existence would, under the circumstances, involve a major disturbance with unforeseen consequences in Indonesia's political power structure. " 39 Thus it came to be that only five weeks after Dr Subandrio had reaffirmed that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions in northern Borneo, the PKI began its denunciation of the Malaysia proposal (30-31 December, 1961). The Indonesian Government itself, however, did its utmost to live up to its Foreign Minister's avowed words to the General Assembly that she was not expansionist, for the whole of 1962. It was after the Brunei revolt that the official Indonesian policy began to show signs of more concerted efforts towards opposing Malaya and preventing the formation of Malayisa. On 11 February, 1963, Dr Subandrio, at a press conference held at his home, officially declared Indonesia's opposition to Malaysia; and two days later President Soekarno declared that Indonesia's opposition to the proposed Malaysia federation was not because of communist influence but because Malaysia represented forces ofneo-colonialism.40 In April 1963 Indonesian irregulars and "volunteers" began their armed infiltration into Sarawak territory; and after holding talks in Tokyo on 31 May, President Soekarno and Tengku Abdul Rahman shook hands, cracked many jokes , and to all intent and purposes it seemed that confrontation was over. Having gone to meet the Indonesian President in the Japanese capital in the hope of easing tensions within the South-east Asian region, the Tengku confidently told newsmen after the talks: "Tell the people at home that their prayers and mine have been answered. This is what we have all wanted. My mission to Tokyo has been worth-while." 41 Things, however, did not eventuate as the Tengku had hoped them to do.

Because of the signing of the Malaysia Agreement, both Indonesia and the Philippines, with their respective axes to grind, mounted more pressure against the formation of Malaysia. The big and apparently decisive moment came when the President of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of Malaya, and the President of Indonesia held a Summit Meeting in Manila from 30 July to 5 August and formally launched a new confederation of their three countries 39 40 41

Fa.r Ea.stern Economic Review, Sept. 5, 1963, p. 643 Malaya-Indonesia Relations, pp, 13-14 Swulay Times, June 2, 1963, p. 1

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

113

under the name Maphilindo (Ma-Malaysia, Phil-Philippines , andindo-Indonesia).

This was embodied in one of three documents written and agreed upon by the three top leaders , and was known as the Manila Declaration. The other two papers were the Manila Accord, which embodied agreements made to co-operate in political, economic, social and cultural endeavours; and the Manila Joint Statement issued after the conclusion of the week-long series of discussions. 42 Once again everything appeared to have been settled in so far as Filipino and Indonesian demands before Malaysia was formed were concerned. Both the Manila Accord and the Joint Statement made explicit reference to the condition that Malaya should request the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations to undertake a mission to Sarawak and Sabah, either himself or through his representative, to assess opinions and to check election results before both the Philippines and Indonesia could welcome the formationof Malaysia.43 Meanwhile the Malayan House of Representatives, after Queen Elizabeth had given the British Royal Assent to the Malaysia Act on 31 July, thus providing for the transfer of sovereignty over Sarawak and Sabah to the new Malaysia federation, approved the establishment of Malaysia by accepting and endorsing the Malaysia Agreement on 15 August. Eleven days later, on 26 August, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong of Malaya gave the Malayan Royal Assent to a Malaysia Bill which provided for the special act creating the new federation.

I~ northern Borneo, too, as has been seen earlier, events moved equally rapidly. Sabah and Sarawak respectively reaffirmed their resigned decision to join Malaysia by passing resolutions in their legislatures as well as endorsing the Malaysia Agreement on 8 and 21 August (Sarawak of course doubled her affirmation by having another debate on 4 September 44 ). Earlier in July Donald Stephens , already Chief Minister-designate of Sabah, invited Dr Subandrio to visit Sabah and see for himself if it was true that the people in that territory supported Malaysia. According to the Chief Minister-designate, the people of Sabah were 100 per cent for Malaysia .45 In Sarawak, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, also by then the Chief Minister-designate of Sarawak, commenting on the 42

Straits Times, Aug. 6, 1963, passim; for full texts of the three documents, see MalayaIndonesia Relations,. pp. 45-52 43

This condition is provided for in paragraphs 4-7 of the Manila Joint Statement .. See text in Malaya-Indonesia Relations, pp. 50-51 44 This second debate pointed to the relatively stronger Opposition in the Sarawak legislature; Sabah had virtually none.

45 Straits Times, July 20, 1963, p . 20

114

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

proposed United Nations Malaysia Mission (UNMM) to Borneo as provided for by the Manila Accord and Joint Statement, declared that there was no point ln holding a plebiscite in his territory because the June 1963 three-tier elections in Sarawak had proved that peoplevotedforthe pro-Malaysia Sarawak Alliance.â&#x20AC;˘e (In those elections 47 the Alliance won 138 out of 429 available seats at the district council level, 45 out of 108 at the Divisional Advisory Council level , and 19 out of 36 in the Council Negri.48 ) stephen Kalong Ningkan also said that so far as he and his people were concerned: "We welcome the Manilaagreementabouttheassessmentof the wishes of the people on Malaysia by a United Nations team , " 49 and added, although he was to be proved wrong as regards the original date for the establishment of Malaysia: "We shall assist the U.N. team in its work and we are confident that Malaysia will be established as declared on the 31,s t of this month." &o Two days later, on 8 August, Donald Stephens , in part moving for the reaffirmation of Sabah's decision to join Malaysia, stated in the Legislative Council in Jesselton: "We are willing to see a United Nations official or officials here , but I cannot honestly say that Sabah would welcome their visit."$1 The Chief Minister-designate was untoward partly because , like his counterpart in Sarawak, he felt that the people of Sabah had clearly expressed their decision to join Malaysia by overwhelmingly voting for the Sabab Alliance in the December 1962 district council elections, the fir st ever in the territory, it will be 46

Straits Times, Aug. 7, 1963, p. 1

47

As Indicated earlier in this narrative, Sabab and Sarawak respectively held Indirect elections in December 1962 and fune 1963, United Nations Malaysia Mission Report, (hereinafter referred to as UNMM Report.), p. 24 49 Straits Times, Aug. 7 , 1963, p. 1 so lbid.

Straits Times, Aug. 9, 1963, p. 16

RECONCIUATION AND RESIGNATION -JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

115

remembered, wllen the Alliance won 131 out of 137 seats, the remaining slx being won by independent candidates , most of whom later decided to favour the Alliance' s stand welcoming Malaysia. With a touch of lhe Lee Kuan Yew brand of diplomacy, Donald Stephens added of tbe UNMM: "They would be intrudingan uncalled-for Intrusion which we are willing to tolerate only out of respect for.

Tengku Abdul Rahman. " $ 2 But the UNMM did arrive in Sarawak and Sabah, and did the task allocated to them between 16 August and 5 September, a period of twenty days. It was stipulated that Philippine and Indonesian observers should be included with the teams , one team to Sarawak and the other to Sabah , to expedite their job.

Britain, which was still the sovereign power over the two territories , could not reach agreement on the number of personnel comprising the Philippine and Indonesian observers. By the time these representatives arrived, the UNMM had done almost half their task. Another friction arose when, before the UNMM could report on its findings, the Malayan Government decided to set a new date for the formation of Malaysia. On 29 August the Yang di-Pertuan Agong signed the proclamation fixing 16 September as the new Malaysia Day. To both the Phlllppines and Indonesia this was an unholy departure from the spirit of the Manila Accord and Joint Statement, which, they argued, stipulated that nothing should be done about bringing Malaysia into being before the UNMM had reported on Its findings.

When the UNMM dld report its findings on 13 September (true enough It was given to the three Maphilindo Governments before Malaysia came into being), It was an endorsement that a sizeable majority in both Sarawak and Sabah favoured teaming up to form Malaysia: "The Miss ion is satisfied that through its hearings it was able to reach a cross -section of the population In all walks of life and that the express ions of opinion that it beard represent the views of a s izeable majority of the population. The Mission is convinced that the time devoted to hearings and the number of localities visited were adequate and enabled it fully to carry out its terms of reference." u Thus the UNMM Report stated in the summaryof its findings. With reference to the validity of the December 1962 and the June 1963 elections in Sabah and Sarawak respectively, the UNMM Report concluded: Ibid UNMM Report p. 124

116

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

"The Mlssion is further of the opinion that the participation of the two territories in the proposed Federation, having been approved by their legislative bodies, as well as by a large majority of the people through free and impartially conducted elections In which the question of Malaysia was a major issue, the significance of which was appreciated by the electorate, may be regarded as the 'result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change In their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage.' , &.~ Where Malaya was concerned, the object of the Manila Accord and Joint Statement, in so far as they pertainedtctheformation of Malaysia, had been amply fulfilled.

The Mission authorized by the Secretary- General had done its job; 1t had reported; it had endorsed the fact that both Sarawak and Sabah wanted to join Malaysia.

With every thorny problem associated with the proposed federation apparently out of the way, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah jubilantly proclaimed their new homeland, Malaysia. The Proclamation of Malaysia declared that the new federation shall ''forever be an independent and sovereign democratic State founded upon liberty and justice, ever seeking to defend and uphold peace and harmony among its peoples and to perpetuate peace among nations.â&#x20AC;˘ Âť Tengku Abdul Rahman, as the Prime Minister of the new federation, in his Malaysia Day message sighed and said: "The great dny we have long awaited has come at last- the birth

of Malaysia. In a warm spirit of joy and hope ten million people of many races in all the States of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah row join hands in freedom and joy ... $6 Having gone through a similar joyous day, the Tengku, recalling the Merdeka Day of 1957, looked ahead of Malaysia and was under no illusion as to what was in store for the new citizens of the new nation: Ibid. ~~ w

Malaysia In Brief, p. lv.

See Appendix Ill Straits Times, Sept. 16, 1963, p. 10

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION-JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

117

"Now finally the peoples of Malaysia are celebrating the establishment of Malaysia. This is the time to think earnestly and hopefully on the future of Malaysia as the whole country resounds with joy." 57 Across the South China Sea in Borneo, Donald Stephens declared from the state capital Jesselton: "Today Sabah as a national entity emerges from its colonial cocoon to full nationhood as an independent State within the great new nation of Malaysia." M Despite the expressions of joy and the jubilant mood of the peoples in the various states , however, the signs of the future did not escape the notice of the leaders . In his Malaysia Day message, Donald Stephens , recognizing future menace, dec lar ed: "Let no man tell us Malaysia is not what we the people want , that Malays ia is no good for us ." 59 On the eve of Malaysia Day a grenade exploded in a KuOhing open- air ma rket, and as a result the Government cancelled its Malaysia Day lantern and float procession in order to safeguard the public and facilitate stringent security measures . Commenting on the grenade incident a Government spokesman stated: "The wanton act of terrorism undoubtedly was carried out by the Clandestine Communist Organisation. The grenade used was a similar type (to that) captured from Indonesian terrorists.• 60 To all intents and purposes it seemed that as Sar awak and Sabah were on the one hand receiving their self- governme nt within Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah, as states within Malaysia, cannot in reality and constitutionally be called nationally independent) , the promise of stability which was one of the main pillars of support for the formation of the new federation was already being bulldozed by the declared opposition of Indonesia and the Philippines.

In its editorial for Malaysia Day the Straits Times commented on the regrettable fact that neighbours of the new federation should choose not to recognize her existence. It referred to Indonesia and the Philippines and stated: &7

Ibid.

&8

Straits Times, Sept. 17 , 1963, p. 7 Straits Times, Sept. 16, 1963, p. 1

59

•

60

Ibid •

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

118

"It ls distressing that there is still confrontation, that not even the impartial and painstaking investigation carried out by U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations , has convinced them of Malaysia's impeccable credentials. For a time we must do without their friendship , hoping that something of the spirit of Maphilindo remains while bracing ourselves , as we must, to opposition which is without reasonable cause." 61

Not unnaturally, there was the will to make something out of Malaysia, for , now that she had become a creation, it would be poor politics to let those who In the first place had no hand ln the difficult stages of bringing Malaysia into being determine her future. And yet it was willy- nilly true as a less- involved editorial observed that: "Malaysia has come into existence and it is to be welcomed for the same reasons that prompted us to welcome its first intimation three years ago. It enables the former colonial power to withdraw from political sovereignty in the small and unenviable states of Sabah and Sarawak without abandoning them to confusion. But it can only be an effective grouping if its large neighbours are reconciled to the new arrangement." 62 That statement in the last sentence has remained substantially true since the formation of Malaysia, although of course the Philippines has shown tendencies towards returning to normal relations with Malaysia. However, this is beyond the scope of the present narrative.

With the signing of the Malaysia Agreement in London on 9 July, 1963, the manifesto and the blue print of the new South-east Asian federation were written and initialled. Borneo' s participation in the initialling ceremony (with the exception of Brunei of course) signified the moment of true reconciliation between Malaya and the Borneo territories . It took a full two years for Sarawak and Sabah to effect a oomplete about- turn from blatant rejection to reconciled acceptance of the overtures of Malaya and the Malaysia proposal.

The British had dominated, at one time or another, all the four territories whose representatives initialled the Malaysia Agreement. The British had given Gl

Ibid, p. 10

62

Far EastemEconomic Review, Sept. 26, 1963, editorial, p. 771

RECONCILIATION AND RESIGNATION- JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1963

119

them administrative, social, and even cultural catalysts which in the final analysis - despite unqualified rejection of Malaysia by the Borneo members at the outset - reconciled the needs and common interests of the four participating territories. In so far as the Borneo partners were concerned again, it was like having honey poured on to sugar when the Malaysia Agreement penned down virtually all the conditions and safeguards Sarawak and Sabah had earlier dogged:y pursued and demanded of the IGC . When most, if not all, the demands the Borneo leaders asked for were met, they had little else to be fussy about.

Th~s they felt resigned to the dictates of their clear conscience that in the interest of their peoples they should join Malaysia.

Such a feeling of resignation was reinforced by the sheer force of circumstances surrouncling the Borneo leaders. Out of the lack of recent political, social and cultural intercourse between the Philippines and Sabah (because their former western masters, the Spaniards and the British, revelled in the id.e a of divide-and-rule), the Manila claim was regarded by the Sabah leaders as primarily an act of political and territorial aggrandizement on the part of the Philippine Government. Far from forestalling their entry into Malaysia, the insistence of the Macapagal administration in 1962 and the first half of the following year that its claim to Sabah be resolved speedily with the British suzerain only served to push the Sabah leaders closer towards Malaya and her Malaysia scheme.

No one ¡ benefited from the December 1962 revolt in Brunei - not even Azahari and his men; Brunei lost considerably, both humanly and materially speaking. One possibly good consequence, from the long-term point of view, however, was tlie fact that the rebellion forced upon Brunei the reality of the situation - to join ,or not to join Malaysia. Should she decide not to join, then she had to face the realistic approach of whether to continue with the semifeudal condition of public life in the sultanate and thereby expect another disturbance, or accelerate political advancement among the people and modernize the state generally, even with the aid of the ever-ready, ever- willing British protectors who had their own baskets to care for in the oil-rich sultanate, Brunei remained the Kuwait of the Malay world; the Azahari revolt of December 1962 pushedmanyfence-sitters inSarawakandSabahover to the side of Malaysia.

For the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah, the Brunei revolt brought home to them the brutal fact that such an alternative to Malaysia a.s the Revolutionary State of Kalimantan Utara of Azahari was not very encouraging to say the least.

The majority of the common people and the rural dwellers found this out sooner than those few on the middle rung of society who did not so much bear the brunt of

120

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961- 1963

the jungle- trained recruits of the TNKU and their supporters. Thus the Brunei revolt, if anything, decided the politically unsophisticated peoples of Sabah and Sarawak to vote for pro- Malaysia Alliance candidates in the elections which followed the rebellion.

The CCO of Sarawak by appearing, if not meaning, to aim for the eventual communist Chinese control of the territory, drove the many capitalist-minded and wealthy conservative Chinese into supporting Malaysia. The Dayaks and kindred indigenous communities, like their counterparts in Sabah, in the face of strange, peculiar missionary indoctrinators stealthily visiting their villages and longhouses and saying bad and cruel things about the good old days of the White Rajahs and the sapping economic greed of the British capitalists - things which they thought were sacrilegious and unkind- readily c lung tight to the British system which they knew and were all too familiar with. So that in the case of the communities in Sarawak that did not know anything about communism, and whose leaders had been converted to the belief that there was immense goodness in Malaysia after having been captivated bywhattheysawduringtheir study tours of Malaya, it was better the British devil which they knew than the Red devil which they did not.

Lastly, }.)ut by no means the least, the manifestation of Indonesian i.ntransigence towards the country whom the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah had come to know most about through sheer force of circumstances, namely Malaya, d.isturbed rather than calmed the nerves of the introspective and sensitive Borneans .

Through no fault of their own, under the rule and umbrella of the British, the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah had been administratively, politically, economically, socially and culturally drawn towards Malaya and Singapore ever since the adventurer James Brooke came to Sarawak and the British intervention in Malaya got under way well over a century before anyone thought of anything like Malaysia.

By appearing arrogant and spiteful instead of persuasive to the Borneans like the leaders of Malaya did, the leaders of Indonesia only drove the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah all the more readily into the waiting arms of Tengku Abdul Rahman and his robust colleagues.

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

When Tengku Abdul Rahman announced his intention to form a Malaysia federation comprising his independent country, the internally self-governing state of Singapore, the semi-feudal sultanate of Brunei, and th.e British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah in May 1961, political development in northern Borneo was not only very recent In time but was also well before the self-governing stage.

The century of Brooke rule in Sarawak and the sixty year s of Chartered Company

business management in Sabah were together a blissful period of tutelage and political ignorance for the peoples of the two territories.

The Japanese occupation and its atrocities instilled! for the first time a feeling of common destiny in adversity and in prosperity among the several races in Sarawak and Sabah. Through the ordeal of war they learned to care for each other' s values and worth, irrespective of race, colour or creed. When the British masters returned to "liberate" them from the Japanese, a handful of local leaders bad begun to speak the language of self-government and independence But for sixteen years they were voices crying in the political wilderness, because the British who were adroit in the game of divide-and-rule kn.ew only too well how anO. when to act to suit their own sweet time, For sixteen years Sarawak never bad a fully-elected government. let alone a ministerial system. Likewise , and even more deplorable, for sixteen years, all the years before the coming of the Malaysia plan, the idea of free eleotions was allen to the people of Sabah.

The immediate response of the Borneo leaders to the Tengku' s Malaysia proposal was one of utter rejection. Being politically backward In comparison to most other South - ¡east Asian countries at the time, and bei ng largely under the influence of the British, who had for years ostensibly promised them independence, the Borneo territoi1es refused to entertain any outside suggestion that they should form a larger federation such as Malaysia. All along, after sixteen years of waiting and hoping in their cocoons , the colonial peoples of Sabah and Sarawak relied on the paternalism of their British masters. They were never given the experience of standing on their own feet , so much so that when they were told that the Prime Minister of Malaya planned to ask them about coming together to

122

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1963

form one national entity they thought he must be out of his mind. The more articulate among the leaders of the three Borneo territories formed a United Front and through it on 9 July ,1961, they declared their uncomprising opposition to the proposal of Tengku Abdul Rahman about Malaysia.

The protests of the Borneo leaders were the reflections of the immature political thinking in northern Borneo at the time. Lack of experience in practical

politics combined with an inherer.t insular mentality to resist any outside interference in the affairs of peoples and governments on the peaceful island of Borneo. But then the British, in one of their rare fits of mind, suggested that the Tengku's plan was a constructive one , thereby implying that their colonial possessions in Borneo should entertain the proposal. To do so the British officials in Sarawak and Sabah urged local leaders to go to Singapore and represent their territories at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference being held there only eighteen days after the United Front declaration.

In that bustling island- state its energetic Prime Minister lost no time in convincing the suspicious Borneo leaders that there was little point and there was little to be gained from keeping their jaws stiff and locked; instead they should speak their minds so that people would know what they wanted. The Borneo representatives began talking, and there and then the ice was rapidly broken.

What emerged from the conference was the path- finding Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee with a Bornean as its chairman. Through the four meetings of this Committee in Jesselton, Kuching, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore -while the Borneo leaders became more at home in the last two places - the Borneo leaders were not only enabled to impress upon the Malayans and the Singaporeans the fears, uncertainties , and genuine feelings of the peoples of northern Borneo , but were also given every opportunity to state and ask for conditions and safeguards for the special interests of their peoples were they to join Malaysia.

The MSCC, despite its almost routine formation out of the British-oriented and often drab CPA conference, must be regarded as the unofficial constituent assembly which, through the success of its four meetings, drafted and formulated the broad outline of the body politic Malaysia was going to be. Through its forum, too, the Malayan leaders were able to deliver fine expositions on the magnetic, if no less romantic, question of a common cultural heritage between the peoples of Malaya and Singapore on the one hand and the peoples of northern Borneo on the other. These expositions were persuasive and attractive to the Borneans, who made a virtue of the notion of brotherhood and kinship as deeply as did their Malayan counterpart. Throughout the discussions on Malaysia, in fact, the appeal to a common cultural heritage ran like

CONCLUSION

123

an underground stream into whose course poured the several strands of thought and which in its sum total became the fountain of hope in racial tolerance and harmony.

The appeal to a common past was only one important part of a political canvass for Borneo support in the formation of Malaysia. From August 1961 until the end of 1962, streams of community leaders from Sarawak and Sabah were invited by the Federation Government to see for themselves the economic and development successes which had been achieved since Malaya gained her independence ln 1957. Malaya had one very important showcase which captured the imagination of the visiting Borneo leaders - the Operations Room in Kua.la Lumpur and its successful rural development projects all over the peninsula.

Rural development such as the Borneo leaders saw in Malaya was the crying need of the ru.r al dwellers in the forest-covered but river-traversed hinterlands of Sarawak and Sabah. The persuasive diplomacy of the Malayan leaders combined with the economic success of the Federation to convert many recalcitrant Borneo leaders into staunch supporters of Malaysia. More than this, the converted leaders did not only return home to tell their fellow Borneans about the untold successes of Malaya, but they also took up the Malayan canvass and persuaded their countrymen that Malaysia was a good, rewarding thing.

It is doubtful if Malaysia could have come into being so soon as it did, had it not been the case that the British were readily agreeable to the request of Malaya thattheirpossessions inBorneobemadeparts of the projected federation.

It has not been the purpose of this narrative to discuss why the British decided to relinquish their sovereignty over Sarawak and Sabah in favour of handing these two territories over to Malaya to become parts of Malaysia. But it is a fact that by having encouraged Tengku Abdul Rahman to proceed with his plan for a new federation, the British gave the Malayan Prime Minister all that he ne_eded. In line with the British policy, the Governments of Sarawak and Sabah launched publicity campaigns on the Malaysia proposal in January 1962, just after the MSCC had completed the most si.gnificant phase of its work on constitutional issues and just beforâ&#x20AC;˘e the Cobbold Commission began its task of ascertaining the view of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah on the Malaysia plan. By taking up the publicity campaigns the Sarawak a.n d Sabah Governments brought the Malaysia issue into the limelight of discussion tn northern Borneo. More than this, however, the two Governments also rendered the issue an official status. Henceforth the proposed federation would be a matter for governments from the proposed component parts to settle rather than being merely an interesting and engrossing topic of conversation among leaders in their more or less unofficial capacities.

124

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

Although the Cobbold Commission spent eight weeks in Borneo receiving information and assessing the opinions of peoples in Sarawak and Sabah, its task was less important in effect than the earlier MSCC. The MSCC formulated all the conditions and safeguards demanded by the Borneo leaders were their territories to join Malaysia. What the later Cobbold Commission did was to repeat what the Borneans had alreadydivulgedtothe meetings of the MSCC. The Commission was little more, in fact, than a rubber stamp of the MSCC. Moreover its very appointment was subject to the wish of Tengku Abdui Rahman who openly stated both in London and in Kuala Lumpur that if the wrong commission was appointed and it recommended certain matters which the Malayan leaders found it impossible to accept then ,the whole question of Malaysia would fall to pieces.

This wish clearly made the outcome of the Cobbold Commission's findings a foregone conclusion. All the Commission did was to add more to the already successful Malayan can:vass for Borneo support in Sarawak and Sabah. Thus far the Malayans had played a good successful game.

Purely as a matter of formality (although some would prefer to add a gloss over this), the British and the Malayan Governments had only to wait for the Report of the Cobbold Commission before they jointly announced on 1 August, 1962, inter alia, that they hoped to bring Malaysia into being by 31 August, 1963; and that an Inter-Governmental Committee would settle in detail the legislation and constitutional arrangements (including conditions and safeguards demanded

by Sabah and Sarawak) necessary before the realization of Malaysia. The work of the IGC was essentially a blue printing of the constitutional issues already having been given a draft by theearlyMSCC . Top Borneo leaders headed representations to the IGC, andas a result virtually all the Sarawak and Sabah demands for conditions and safeguards for what they considered to be their special interests were fully met by the Malayan and the British Governmental representatives.

This being so, the Borneo leaders had little else to be fussy about. After twentyone months of demands for safeguards , and after most of these ~.ad been so generously met, the leaders of Sarawak and Sabah joined the British, Malayan and Singapore delegates in initialling the Malaysia Agreement in London on 9 July, 1963, exactly two years since the Borneo leaders de~lared their unconditional rejection ofthe Malaysia proposal through their United Front. Thus the leaders of Sabah and Sarawak made a complete about-face and decided to join Malaysia.

From the beginnings of discussions on the proposal, Brunei had shown disinclinations to join Malaysia. An obvious reason for this was that, from the economic point of view, she stood to gain nothing from such a proposed federation.

Secondly, the Sultan of Brunei, who held the government machinery more with

CONCLUSION

r

125

the dictates of his personally- appointed advisers than with the advice and consent of the state legislature, never had any special liking for Malaya - unless the prospect of becoming a Yang di- Pertuan Agong of Malaysia was in sight. Brunei did not have to worry so much about political survival; for so long as the oilwells kept spurting their crude product,.,the British were ever ready to protect the Sultan and his subjects as well as they did their economic interests in the sultanate.

Neither Malaya or Singapore nor Sarawak or Sabah could have persuaded Brunei to join Malaysia. The revolt in December 1962 forced her to renew negotiations about the possibility of after all becoming a partner of Malaysia, but even this predicament failed to overrule the wish of the Sultan for royal precedence among the other state rulers in the future Malaysia. Only one nation or quarter could have possibly induced Brunei into joining Malaysia, and that was Britain. But Britain had her interests and petroleum securities to think of before she could gracefully hand Brunei over to Malaya as she was readily prepared to do in the case of Sarawak and Sabah. She decided to do nothing, happy to retain another Kuwait in South-east Asia, while Brunei remained assured of royalty dues and security under the protective umbrella of the British. ¡ From rejection to reconciliation and resignation - this was the story of the Borneo response to Malaysia in the period undertaken by this narrative, When the Malaysia Agreement was signed in July 1963, the manifesto of the formation of Malaysia was written and initialled. This signing was a moment of reconciliation - it marked the end of the temporary parting of the way between the British- tutored Malayan leaders and the British-directed leaders of Sarawak and Sabah. The uncompromising United Front declaration against Malaysia was watered down completely, and reconciliation and agreement were effected through conversations, talks and discussions ending in the fulfilment of Bornean demands, Malayan diplomacy and British co-operation apart, the influence of external forces also operated to accelerate the formation of Malaysia. The Philippine claim to a part of Sabah which Manila mounted more outspokenly from June 1962 right to the formation of Malaysia was seen by the political men of Sabah as an act of territorialaggrandizementonthepartoftheir neighbours to the north-east.

The lack of political, economic, social and cultural intercourse between Sabah and the Philippines during the periods of the western powers in the two areas led to alienation and much estrangement. Whatever affinities and close ties existed in the pre-European eras had been corrupted and erased by the centuries of foreign domination . When the Philippines ¡pressed for the speedy return of a

126

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961-1963

portion of Sabah to her ken, the Borneo territory felt she knew that country less than she did Malaya who happened to have been continuously associated Wiith her for almost a century under the British. Moreover, and unlike Malaya, the Philippines pressed on with her claim without paying the slightest attention to or attempting to befriend the people of Sabah who after all mattered most if she really wanted the territory for keeps. Far from dissuading and preventing her

from joining Malaysia, the unfriendliness and insistence of the Philippine Government on the disputed claim only served to push Sabah closer still towards Malaya and her Malaysia proposal.

The Brunei revolt did not only fail as a concerted effort to take over northern Borneo from the British, but it also failed to impress the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah and weakened the earlier attempt to achieve a Borneo federation of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah first before entertaining any other form of union with an overseas country such as Malaya. The notion of a Revolutionary State of Kalimantan Utara with a man of adventurous spirit such as Azahari at the head of it was, to the English-oriented, pro-Malaysia leaders in the territories, a very poor substitute for the elegant promises and seemingly bright prospects offered by the friendly Malayans and their Malaysia plan. So that far from disrupting pro-Malaysia sentiment in northern Borneo , the Brunei rebellion had the paradoxical effect of pushing many fence-sitters in Sabah and Sarawak over to the side of Malaysia.

The communist influence in Sarawak had been unable to prevent the territory from joining Malaysia largely because the environment in which it operated was not congenial to the development of an insurgent underground movement. The body politic of Sarawak was so much entrenched in the benevolent and paternalistic British system that it was quite impossible to foster any other ideological alternative without super-human efforts. Moreover, the authorities were so well aware of the activities of the Clandestine Communist Organization that the latter stood little chance of successfully indoctrinating the rural _dwellers who by the way had retained their confidence in the one and only British system they had known for generations . When the friendly and wooing Malayan leaders came bearing showcases and promises of economic and political stability, it was only a matter of time before the majority of Sarawakians came to believe that Malaysia was in their best interests . It is a fact, furthermore, that Sarawak for the previous hundred years had been adrninistrati vely, economically, and socially closer to Malaya than had Sabah which nevertheless had decided to join Malaysia.

When the final decision had to be made, the greater number of Sarawakians believed that it was better the Malayan devil whom they knew than

CONCLUSION

127

the communist devil whom they did not.

Indonesia's hostile and intransigent attitude did much to damage her opportunity of gaining the confidence of the peoples of northern Borneo. By confronting the country most familiar to the Borneans , namely Malaya, the leaders of Indonesia embarassed and disappointed the peoples of the Borneo territories - peoples who had until recenUy in fact truly admired Indonesian nationalism. By appearing arrogant and spiteful to the Borneans, instead of being friendly and persuasive like the leaders of Malaya, the Indonesian leaders lost the trust and admiration of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. In the end, Indonesia, more than any other neighbouring country, helped the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah to make up their minds about joining Malaysia.

Any of the three neighbouring countries of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines could have taken the initiative to incorporate the British Borneo territories in a larger unit. The Malay world had been subjected to so many similar historical influences during the long pre-European centuries , that, despite substantial alienation in more recent times, it would have been presumptuous for any sane observer of the region to have believed in 1961 that none but Malaya could have coaxed the Borneo territories into forming a federation.

The fact of the matter of course was that out of the three nations, two did nothing a:nd Malaya took the initiative. Through diplomacy and a friendly persuasive approach Malaya won the confidence and admiration of the majority of the peoples in Sabah and Sarawak. Thus, the Borneo response to Malaysia was essentially a response to Malayan friendliness and persuasion.

Appendix A

JOINT PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE BRITISH AND MALAY AN GOVERNMENTS ON 1 AUGUST, 1962

The British and Malayan Governments have received and studied the Report of the Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Cobbold which visited North Borneo and Sarawak earlier this year to ascertain the views of the inhabitants on the proposal to create a Federation of Malaysia embracing Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. The Report is being published today.

2. The two Governments are most grateful to the Commission for their valuable Report and have accepted almost all the recommendations on which the Commission were unanimous. The two Governments have noted in particu~ar that the Commission were unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia is in the best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak and that an early decision in principle should be reached.

3. In the light of this Report and of the agreement reached between the Government of Malaya and the Government of Singapore, the British and Malayan Governments have now decided in principle that, subject to the necessary legislation, the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963.

4. To give effect to this decision, the two Governments intend to conclude, within the next six months, a formal agreement which, among other things, will provide for: (a) the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by 31st August, 1963; (b) provisions governing the relationship between Singapore and the new Federation, as agreed between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore; (c) defence arrangements as set out in the Joint Statement by the British and Malayan Governments dated 22nd November, 1961; and (d) detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo a:nd Sarawak, to be drawn up after consultation with the Legislatures of the two territories.

1.

~INT

PUBLIC STATEMENT

129

5. These safeguards will cover such matters as religious freedom, education, representation in the Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous races, control of i.mmigration, citizenship and the state constitutions.

6. In order that the introduction of the new Federal system may be effected as smoothly as possible and wi.th the least disturbance to existing administrative arrangements, there wi.ll be, after the transfer of sovereignty, a transition period, during which a number of the Federal constitutional powers wi.ll be delegated temporarily to the State Governments~ 7. An Inter-Governmental Committee will be established as soon as possible, on which the British, Malayan, NorthBorneoand Sarawak Governments will be represented.

Its task will be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards.

8. The Minister of state for the Colonies , Lord Lansdowne, who will be the Chairman of this Committee, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tun Abdul Razak, will proceed shortly to Sarawak and North Borneo to conduct discussions.

9. In order to maintain the efficiency of the administration, the British and Malayan Governments are agreed on the importance of retaining the services of as many of the expatriate officials as possible. The Minister of state wi.ll discuss wi.th the Governments of the territories and wi.th the Staff Associations how best this can be done.

10. The British and Malayan Governments have informed the Sultan of Brunei of the agreement they had reached and have made it clear that they would welcome the inclusion of the State of Brunei in the new Federation.

Appendix B

AGREEMENT RELATING TO MALAYSIA

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore; Desiring to conclude an agreement relati.ng to Malaysia; Agree as follows:-

ArticLe I The Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak and the State of Singapore shall be federated with the existing States of the Federation of Malaya as the States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore in accordance with the constitutional instruments annexed to this Agreement and the Federation shall thereafter be called "Malaysiaâ&#x20AC;˘ .

Article II

The Government of the Federation of Malaya will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment by the Parliament of the Federation of Malaya of an Act in the form set out in Annex A to this Agreement and that it is brought into operation on 31st Au.g ust, 1963 (and the date on which the said Act is brought into operation is hereinafter referred to as "'Malaysia Dayâ&#x20AC;˘).

Article Ill

The Government of the United Kingdom will submit to Her Britannic Majesty before Malaysia Day Orders in Council for the purpose of giving the force of law to the Constitutions of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore as States of Malaysia which are set out in Annexes B, C and D to this Agreement.

Article IV The Government of the United Kingdom will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of an Act providing for the relinquishment , as from Malaysia

131

AGREEMENT RELATING TO MALAYSIA

Day, of Her Britannic Majesty' s sovereignty and jurisdiction in respect of North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore so that the said sovereignty and jurisdiction shall on such relinquishment vest in accordance with this Agreement and the constitutional ill$truments annexed to this Agreement.

Article V Th~ Government of the Federation of Malaya will take such steps as may be appropriate and available to them to secure the enactment before Malaysia Day by the Parliament of the Fede_ration of Malaya of an Act in the form set out in Annex E to this Agreement for the purpose of extending and adapting the Immigration Ordinance, 1959, of the Federation of Malaya to Malaysia and of making additional provision with respect to entry into the States of Sabah and Sarawak; and the other provisions of this Agreement shall be conditional upon the enactment of the said Act.

Article VI

The Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Malaya of 12th October, 1957, and its annexes shall apply to all territories of Malaysia, and any reference in that Agreement to the Federation of Malaya shall be deemed to apply to Malaysia, subject to the proviso that the Government of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the Government of the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as that Government may consider necessary for .the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia. The application of the said Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of Annex F to this Agreement (relating primarily to Service lands in Singapore).

Article VII

(1) The Federation of Malaya agrees that Her Britannic Majesty may make befor e Malaysia Day Orders in Council in the form set out in Annex G to this Agreement for the purpose of making provision for the payment of compensation and retirement benefits to certain overseas officers serving, immediately

132

THE BORNEO RESPONSE TO MALAYSIA 1961 - 1963

before Malaysia Day, in the public service of the Colony of North Borneo or the Colony of Sarawak.

(2) On or as soon as practicable after Malaysia. Day; Public Officers' Agreements in the forms set out in Annexes H and I of this Agreement shall be signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaysia; and the Government of Malaysia shall obtain the concurrence of the Government of the State of Sabah, Sarawakor Singapore, as the case require, to the signature of the Agreement by the Government of Malaysia so far as its terms may-affect the responsibilities or interests ofthe Government of the State.

Article VIII

The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak will take such legislative, executive or other action as may be required to implement the assurances , undertakings and recommendations contained in Chapter 3 of, and Annexes A and B to, the Report of the Inter- Governmental Committee signed on 27th February, 1963, in so far as they are not implemented by express provision of the Constitution of Malaysia.

Article I X

The provisions of Annex J to this Agreement relating to Common Market and financial arrangements shall constitute an Agreement between the Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of Singapore.

Article X

The Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of Singapore will take such legislative, executive or other action as may be required to implement the arrangements with respect to broadcasting and television set out in Annex K to this Agreement in so far as they are not implemented by express provision of the Constitution of Malaysia.

Article XI

This Agreement shall be signed in the English and Malay languages except that the Annexes shall be in the English language only. In case of doubt the English text of the Agreement shall prevail.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto , have signed this Agreement.

133

,\QREEMENT RELATING TO MALAYSIA

Done at London this Ninth day of July, 1963, in five copies of which one s hall be deposited with each of the Parties.

For the United Kingdom: Harold Macmillan Duncan Sandys Lansdowne

For the Federation of Malaya: T.A. Rahman Abdul Razak Tan Siew Sin V.T. Sambanthan Ong Yoke Lin S.A. Lim

For North Borneo: Dato Mustapha bin Dato .Harun D.A. Stephens W.K.H. Jones Khoo Siak Chiew w.s. Holley G.S. Sundang

For Sarawak; P.E .H. Pike T . Jugah Abang Haji Mustapha Ling Beng Siew Abang Haji Openg

For Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew Goh Keng Swee

Appendix C

PROCLAMATION OF MALAYSIA

In the name of God, the Compassionate , the Merciful. Praise be to God , the Lord of the Universe , and may the benediction and peace of God be upon Our Leader Muhammad and upon all His Relations and Friends.

WHEREAS by an Agreement made on the Ninth day of July in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three between the Federation of Malaya, the United Kingdom, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore it was agreed that there shall be federated the States of Sa bah , Sarawak and Singapor e with the Federation of Malaya comprising the States of Pahang, Trengganu, Kedah, Johore, Negri Sembilan, Kelantan, Selangor, Perak, Perlis, Penang and Malacca, and that the Federation s hall thereafter be called "Malaysia": AND WHEREAS It has been agreed by the parties to the said Agreement that as from the 'establishment of Malaysia the states of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore shall cease to be colonies of Her Majesty the Queen and Her Majesty the Queen shall relinquish Her sovereignty and jurisdiction in respect of the three States: AND WHEREAS there has been promulgated a Constitution for Malaysia which shall be the supreme law therein: AND \.1/HERAS by the Constitution aforesaid provision has been made for the safeguarding of the rights and prerogatives of Their Highnesses the Rulers and the fundamental rights a nd liberties of subjects and for the promotion of peace and harmony in Malaysia as a constitutional monarchy based upon parliamentu¡y democracy: AND WHEREAS the Constitution aforesaid having been approved by a law passed by the Parliaments of the Federation of Malaya and the United Kingdom has come into force on the Sixteenth Day of September in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three: NOW in the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Hajl lbni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah, Prime Minister of Malaysia, with the concurrence and approval of His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of the Federation of Malaya , His Excellency the Yang diPertuan Negara of Singapor e , His Excellency the Yang di-Pertua Negara of Sabah and His Excellency the Governor of Sarawak DO HEREBY DEC LARE AND PROCLAIM on behalf of the peoples of Malaysia that as from the Sixteenth

PROCLA!IIATION OF

135

~IALAYSIA

day of September in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. c orresponding to the Twenty-eighth day of Rabi'ulAkhirin the year of the Hijrah

one thousand three hundred and eighty-three, that ~MALAYSIA comprising the States of Pahang, T rengganu, Kedah, Johore, Negri Sembilan, Kelantan, Selangor, Perak, Perlis , Penang, 1\'lalacca, Singapore , Sabah and Sarawak shall by the Grace of God, the Lord of the L'niverse, forever be an independent and sovereign democratic State founded upon liberty and justice, ever seeking to defend and uphold peace and harmony among its peoples and to perpetuate peace among nations.

Sgd:

Kuala Lumpur, Sixteenth day of September, 1963 ,

Tengku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister .

l3G

A NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

CCO: CPA:

Clandestine Communist Organization, Sarawak Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (Singapore , July 19(5.1)

Inter-Governmental Committee Report (February 1963) Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (comprised Malaya Singapore , Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah, August 1961 to February 1962; met four times, and drafted and formulated Borneo demands for conditions and safeguards before entering Malaysia) PANAS: Party Negara Sarawak PAP: People' s Action Party, Singapore Parti Komrnunist Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PKI: SNAP : Sarawak National Party SUPP: Sarawak United People's Party TNKU: Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (the underground rebel army which mounted the Brunei revolt of December 1962) UNMM Report: United Nations Malaysia Mission Report (August to September

IGC Report: MSCC :

1963)

UNKO : USNO:

United National Kadazan Organization, Sabah United Sabah National Organization

137 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. OFFICIAL SOURCES

(i) The United Kingdom: Her Majesty' s Stationery Office

Cmnd. 2094: Agreement concluded between the Unitf!d Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore.

This indispensable volume contains the Malaysia Agreement (see Appendix II) and inter alia the following four Annex es: A. Malaysia Blll, later the Malaysia Act which formed the basis of the Constitution of Malaysia and which was essentially the former Federation of Malaya Constitution in slightly modified form; B. The Constitution of the State of Sabah; C. The Constitution of the State of Sarawak; and D. The Constitution of the State of Singapore.

The volume contains other Annexes oÂŁ lesser importance, referred to in the Articles of the Malaysia Agreement proper. (il) The Federation of Malaya (and later Malaysia): Department of Information,

Kuala Lumpur Indonesian Involvement In Eastern Malaysia , 1965 Malaya- Indonesia Relations . 1963 Malaysia At The United Nations., 1963 Malaysia In Brief , 1963 Malaysia, No. 3, October 1962 , aquarterlypublication intended as a forum for

the synthesis of current thought on Malaysia Questions And Answers On Malaysia, 1964 United Nations Malaysia Mission Report , 1963 This is the Report of the United Nations mission which visited Sarawak and Sabah from August to early September, 1963, as required under the provisions and paragraphs of the Manila Accord and Joint Statement agr eed upon by Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines in early August the same year.

(NOTE Undoubtedly, much of the material under this and the following two headings (Official Sources for .Sarawak and Sabah) reflects the pro-Malaysia viewpoint. Not only for the sake of being conversant with the subject of this

138

BIBLIOGRAPHY

narrative but also in an endeavour to present both sides of the case , the reader is encouraged to pay equal attention to the opposite views of the public, opponents and observers of the .Malaysia proposal in sections 2 and 3 of this bibliography.) li.ii) Sarawak:' Department of Information, Kuching Counci l. Neg 7' i Debates: Official Reports for 26th, 27th a nd 28th September 1962; 4th, 5th and 6th September 1963 Information On Sanwak . 1960 \Ialaysia And Sarawak, 1962 · R <>IJOl' t of the Commission of Enquiry, N orth Bo·rneo and Sarawak, 1962

This is the Report of the Cobbold Commission which undertook the task of ascerbl.i:ling the view of th e peoples of Sarawak and Sabah on the Malaysia issue from February to April 1962. An important Appendix is the Memorandum On Alalaysia submt..ed to the Commission by the MSCC and contains the draft and bas•c: ht>u.diugs of the conditions and safeguards demand\')d by the Borneo leaders; ~~.;se '1e!ldlngs were later taken up in further discussion3 -recommended by the •:':o:::nmission, endorsed by the IGC , and embodied i.n the Malaysia Agreement.

Su)'awak Annual Reports - 1955, 1957, 1962 :Sarawak By The Wee.~?. , a weekly release oflocal events a nd general information JC" · ng the Malaysian area (iVi :3r~b!! IJ.:

Department of lnformation, Jesselton L eg·isfnttve Cotr~cilDebates : O[ficial Reports for 25th and 2Gth September and 6th '.c•·r-11. ~ 963; 28th April, 30th June, 13th and 14th July, 21st September, ,'1 • " mDer and 18th, 21st and 22nd December 1964.

B )J neo ond Malaysia, 1962 \•; ". ul)l"'leo Today, 19fi2 )J the /rJter-Govemrnental Committee, 1962 This ia the Report of the '<icl1 was recommended to be set up by the Cobbold Commission and !n ~he Joint Public Statement of 1 August, 1962 (see Appendix I, '· 7 J. Chapter 3 of this Report sets out in detail the political and mal issues demanded by the Borneo leade~·s as adequate safeguards l- co :al intere&ts oi their territories and p~oples .

• ,.' /•AnnunlReports- 1957,1961, 19n2 , 1963 .,, ::7-,!:l Akhbar, the daily English press release

· • ": ~:gli1 JOl'(;. Department of Information S11 gr:.p••te r~n• ual Reports - 1954 to 1961:

useful for background to Malaya-

139

BIBLIOGRAPifY

Singapore relations, particularly on the pros and cons of merger between the two areas.

2. PUBLISHED SOURCES

Newspapers

The Bo'Y'IIeo Bulletin (Kuala Belait, Brunei) The Bo'Y'IIeo Times (Sandakan) The Manchester Guardian (United Kingdom) Pelita Brunei (in Romanized Malay) The Sabah T'mes (Jesselton) The Sarawak Tribune (Kuching) The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore) The Sunday Mail (Singapore) The Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore)

Books And Journal Articles Allen, R . , "Britain's Colonial Aftermath in South-East Asia", Asian Survey, University of California, Berkeley , September 1963 Bell, C., "South-East Asia and the Powers• , The World Today, London, April 19.65 Bloodworth , D., "Indonesia and Neo- Colonialism•, The Bulletin, Sydney, April 6, 1963 • Bottomley, A., "Malaysian Common Market• , Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, February 21, 1963 The Bulletin, Editorial, November 25, 1961 Editorial, June 22, 1963 Editorial, September 7, 1963 Buss , C.A. , Asia in the Modern World, Macmillan, 2nd ed. , New York, 1964 Butwell, R., "Malaysia and its Impact on the International Relations of Southeast Asia", Asian Survey, July 1964 Crane, D. , " Neglected Riches", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 29 , 1963

140

BffiUOGRAPHY

Dale, M. , "The CDC to Expand Activities" , Far Eastern Economic Review, October 11 , 1962 Dartford, G.P ., "Plan for Malaysian Federation" ,Current History, November 1962 Ebon, M., "Indonesian Communis m", Review of Politics, January 1963 The Far Eastern Economic Review,Editorial, October 4 , 1962 "Malaysia" - a 24-page survey, including a message from Tengku Abdul Rahman, November 8, 1962 Editorial, December 20 , 1962 Editorial, January 10, 1963 Editorial , February 21, 1963 Editorial, March 28, 1963 Editorial, September 26, 1963 FitzGerald, C . P., The Third China, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965

Garner , L., "Heirs , Press and Policy: The Philippine Claim to North Borneo" , Silliman Journal, Dumaguete City, the Philippines , July-September 1964 Hastings , P., "Malaysia -The Proposed Merger of Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo Territories has run into many Problems•, The Bulletin, November 4, 1961 Hatta, M. , "One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue", Asian Survey, March 1965 Horne, D., "In Times Ll.ke These - A Kaleidoscope of 1961", The Bulletin, December 30, 1961 "Strong For Malaysia", The Spectator, London, March 8 , 1963 "Malaysia From Manila" , The Bulletin, April13, 1963 Hose, C.andMcDougall , W. ,The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, Vols . I & ll, Macmillan, London, 1912 Irwin, G. Nineteenth-Century Borneo, ' S-Gravenhage-Martinus Nijhoff, 1955 Jacobini, H.B., " Fundamental Philippine Policy Toward Malaysia", Asian Survey, November 1964 Karim, A.R., •Northern Borneo Nationalism•, The Eastern World, London, June 1963 Leifer, M., "Indonesia and Malaysia: the Diplomacy of Confrontation", The World Today, June 1965.

Leigh, M.B., "Sarawak - Focus on Federation", The Australian Quarterly, June 1963 Mackie, J.A.C., "The Tengku As Unifier" , Nation, Sydney, July 15, 1961 "Azahari's Young Men", Nation, January 12, 1963 McKie R.,Malaysia In Focus, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1963

BIBLIOGRAPHY

141

The Emergence of Malaysia, Harcourt Brace & World, New York, 1963. This is Malaysia In Focus, under another title, the only difference being in their Postscripts: the Australian version has confrontation, the U.S. one has Brunei.

Milne, R.S., "Malaysia: A New Federation in the Making" , Asian Survey, February 1963 Mookherji, S.B., "Cold WarinSouth-EastAsia", United Asia, Bombay, June 1963.

Nation, Editorial, June 3, 1961 Editorial, August 10, 1963 Ness, G.O. , "Modernization and Indigenous Control of the Bureaucracy in Malaysia" , Asian Survey, .September 1965.

Ongk111, J.P. , Susuzan Totopot Do Sabah (History of Sabah), Borneo Literature Bureau, Kuching, 1965 Ortiz, P.A., Legal Aspects of the North Borneo Question, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1964 Payne, R., The White Rajahs of Sarawak, Funk & Wagnalls , New York, 1960 Philippine Claim to North Borneo, Vol. I, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1964 Purcell, V., Malaysia, Thames & Hudson, London, 1965.

Ramos , G.P., A. Reply to Senator Sumulong on the Philippine Claim to North Borneo, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1963.

Robequain, C. ,Malaya,Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines, Longmans , 2nd ed. , London, 1958 Ronquillo, B., "Talks Over Borneo" , Far Eastern Economic R eview, October 18, 1962 "Manila On Malaysia", Far Eastern Economic R eview, February 28, 1963.

Rose , S. , Britain and South-East Asia, Chatto & Windus , London, 1962 Roth, H.L., The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo, Vols. I & II, Truslove & Hanson, London, 1896 Runciman, S. , The White Rajahs, Cambridge University Press, London, 1960 Rutter, 0. , British North Bo¡r neo, Constable & Company, London, 1922 Salleh, M., "Shock for PAP"', The Eastern World, September 1961 Salonga, J.R., A Point-by-Point Reply to the Sumulong Report on the Philippine Claim to North Borneo, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1963 Singhal, D.P. , "Nationalism and Communism in South- East Asia", The Journal of Southeast Asian History, Singapore, March 1962 "The Writing of Asian History" , ln Maguire, R.J. (ed.). , Hemisphere, F.W. Cheshire , Melbourne, 1964

142

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sison, J .M., "The Philippines and Malaysia", The Eastern World, June 1963 Smith, T ,E, , The Background to Malaysia, Oxford Univefsity PTess, London, 1963 Starner , F .L., "Malaysia and the Borneo Territories" , Asian Survey, November 1963 "Malaysia's First Year", Asian Survey, February 1965 Tar ling, N., Piracy And Politics in the Malay World, F. W. Cheshire. Melbourne 1963 Tregonnlng, K.G. , Malaysia, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1964 Under Chartered Company Rule, University of Malaya, Singapore,1958 Vander Kroef, J .M. , •Maphilindo: Illusion or Reality?• , Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1963 Wang, G. (ed.), Ma laysia- A Survey, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1964

3. SECONDARY PUBLISHED MATERIAL

Brecher, M., The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis, Oxford University Press , London, 1963.

The Bulletin, "Industry's Role In Malaysia", July 20, 1963 The Eastern World, "Boom In Malaya", January 1961 "PTogress in Sarawak and Brunei", March 1961 "No Merger With Singapore" , March 1961 "Second Five- Year Plan", June 1961 "The Tunku's Visit" , July 1961 "The Tunku Triumphant• , August 1961 "Confrontation Over Malaya" , May 1963 Far Eastern Economic Review, Malaysia's Tariff Problems", January 25, 1962 "Malaya's Progr ess Seen From Bangkok" , June 28 , 1962 "From Manila to Djakarta", December 13, 1962 "Import Boom" , July 4, 1963 "Wise Victors 1n Sarawak", July 18, 1963 "The London Pact•, July 25 , 1963 "Sabah's Stephens", September 19, 1963 Grant, B. , Indonesia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1964 Hall,D.G. E. ,Historians of South-East Asia,Oxford University Press, U>ndon,1961 Harrison, B. , South-East Asia, Maomlllan, 2nd ed., London, 1963

BIBUOORAPHY

143

Kamenka, E., "More Upheavals in Singapore", Tile Bulletin, August 12, 1961. :\lacDonald, M., Borneo People, Jonathan Cape, London, 1956 Mackie, J.A.C., "Scallywag's Win", Nation, May 20, 1961 Nation, "The Lesser Evil", March 9, 1963 "SUPP With A Short Spoon", April 20 , 1963 Panikkar, K.M., Asia aud Western Dominance, Allen & Unwin, London, 1959 Purcell, V. , The Revolution In South-East Asia, Thames & Hudson, London, 1962 Romein, J ., The Asian Cenltaâ&#x20AC;˘y, Allen & Unwin, London , 1962 Rose, S. (ed.), Politics In Southern 4sia, Macmillan, London , 1963 Singhal, D.P., "Western Element in South-East Asian History" , Joumal of Southeast Asian Histor), September 1960 Sivaram, M. , Glimpses of Malaysia,.Petaling Jaya, 1962 Time & Tide, "Birthpangs In Malaysia ", London, May 1963 United Asia, "Malaysia - An Economic Challenge", March 1962

INDEX

Abdul Rahman, Tengku, 9, 14, 19, 21- 23, 25, 28-30 , 32- 33, 37 . 41- 42, 45- 49, 53, 55, 58 , 67- 69 , 73, 99100, 109-110 , 112 , 116- 117. 121122 Abell, Sir Anthony, 63 Administrative division: Sabah 12; Sarawak 10 Africa, 30 Agong, Yang di- Pertuan, 24, 28-29, 39 , 47-49. 53, 60 , 79, 113, 115 Albion, perfidious , 109 Alliance: Sabah, 77, 86 , 94, 114, 120; Sarawak, 78, 84 1 103, 114, 120 American Loan Fund, 60 Arab, 8, 47 Azahari, A.M., 27, 28 , 31, 39, 41 , 48, 103-106, 109, 119, 126

British bases , 37- 38, 96 British Commonwealth, 31, 38, 40, 60, 100 , 102 British Government, 22, 25, 27 , 28 , 32, 37 . 41 , 53, 63, 67- 75, 78-79, 81 , 87-89, 92 , 97, 99, 101 , 104, 115, 118-120 , 121- 122 British interests, 26 , 109, 119 , 125 Brooke (Rajah and rule), 9-11, 17-18, 21-22 , 120- 121 Brotherhood, 47-51, 68 , 76, 122-123 Brunei, 4 , 8 , 9, 14-15, 20, 22- 33, 35- 37 ' 39 , 41-42, 47-50, 58 , 60-61, 86, 95, 103-106 , 109, 111 , 118- 119, 124 Brunei revolt, 20, 35, 103- 106, 109 , 112, 119-120, 126 Brunei, Sultan of, 15, 29, 35, 104- 105, 109, 124- 125

Balambangan, 5 Bandar, Dato , 26 , 58 , 61-62 , 75, 85 , 99 Bandung Conference, 110 Bani, S.T., 53 Bank, World, 60 Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak, 78, 85 Biographical opinion, 73 Booty, Kasma, 60 Borneanization, 34, 97

ceo, 39 , 107- 108 , 120, 126 Clhia, Chin Shin, 75 Clhin, Peng 46 Clhina, 8 , 40, 57, 107 Clhlnese, 3, 6, 16 , 19, 32, 34 Cobbold CommiSsion, 38 , 54-55, 57 , 63- 69, 71-72, 87 , 97, 123- 124 Cobbold, Lord, 63, 67 Coffee houses, 65 Colombo Plan, 6 Colonialism, 6 , 17, 22, 28 , 36-37,

145

INDEX

41-42, 90, 93, 112, 118, 121, 125 Colonial (Commonwealth) Development Corporation, 60, 84 Communism, 32, 38, 46, 55-57, 84, 90-91, 106, 112, 120, 126 Company, North Borneo Chartered, 9, 10, 15, 18, 21, 87-88, 121 Confrontation, 111-118, 127 Constitution: Federation of Malaysia, 80, 82, 96-97; Brooke, 9, 15 Council, Executive, 18 Council, Legislative, 10,12-13,17, 21, 74, 84, 96, 101, 105-106 Council, Negri, 9, 10, 18-19, 79, 86, 96, 102 Council, Supreme, 9, 11, 18-19, 79 Court: Federal, 81-82; High, 81 Cowie, William, 17 CPA, 33, 35, 43-45, 53, 58, 87, 122 Cultural heritage, 45-51, 54-55,60, 68, 91-92, 111, 120-123, 126-127

Dayak (lban), 3, 8, 16, 20, 34, 40, 48-49, 56, 77. 120 Democracy, 6, 19-21, 32, 33, 91, 101, 116 Democratic Party, 77 Dual diplomacy, 72-73, 95, 123 Early history, 7-8 Education, 6, 12, 20, 51, 56, 66, 78-79, Elections, 12, 13, 18, 21, 26, 32, 42, 113-114, 121 Elizabeth II, Her Majesty Queen, 79, 113 Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA), 60

Feudalism, 24, 26, 41, 109, 119 Five-Year Plan, 60 Founding Fathers, 26-32, 83, 95, 99, 121-122 Gandhi, 27 Ghazali bin Safie, 63 Goode, Sir William, 24-26, 29, 94 Hindu, 8 Holley, w.s., 99 Home, Lord, 89-90 Hongkong, 107 IGC, 66, 68, 72, 74-87, 95-98, 119, 124 Immigration Restriction Act, 1901, (Australia), 83 Immigration, 34, 56, 78, 98-99 Imperialism, 8, 27, 30, 32, 50, 109, 118-120 India, 8 Indonesia, 57, 91, 104, 108-113, n5-117, 120,127 Islam, 8, 76, 78, 80, 99 Ismail bin Yusoff, 47, 50-51 Jakarta, 27 Japan, 27, 41 Japanese occupation, 12, 15, 16, 21, 27, 35, 106, 121 Jesselton, 5, 31, 36-37, 50, 57, 76, 105, 117 Johore Causeway, 45-46 Jones, W.K.H., 99 Jugah, Temenggong, 26, 31, 34, 41, 75, 83, 99 Junk trade, 8

146

Kadazan, 5-6 , 8, 16 , 21 , 28, 31, 34, 48 , 56 , 91

Kallmantan, 1 , 103-105, 109, 110 Khir bin Jobari , 56-57 Khoo Siak Chiew, 93, 99 Kinabalu, 4 Korea, 40 Kroef, Professor J .V. de, 111 Kuala Belatt, 104 Kuala Lumpur , 45, 48, 53, 55, 57, 59, 71 , 77 Kuwait, 119 , 125

Language, 3, 49, 56 , 60 , 82-83, 98-99 Lansdowne, Lord, 75, 77 Lawas, 103 Laos, 46 , Lee Kuan Yew, 33 , 38 , 44-46 , 51-53, 55, 57. 68 , 73 , 100, 115 Leong Ho Yuen, 85 Llmbang, 104 Ling Beng Siew, 75, 99 Local Government, 11 , 13, 51 London, 18, 27, 53, 67- 68, 71 , 73-74, 88- 99, 95-97. 118

Macapagal, Diosdado, 88 , 90 - 9~ , 94 MacDonald, Malcolm, 23 Macmillan, Harold, 25, 67 , 99 Mahmud, Ahmad, 60 Majapahit, 8 Malay, 3, 6, 16 , 20 , 47-49, 56, 77 , 82 Malayan Emergency , 46 Malaya.n Government, 37 , 53, 60 , 62-63, 67-69, 71- 76, 78, 81 , 92 , 99, 109 , 121- 127 Malaysia Agreement , 86 , 95-103, 109, 112-113 , 118-119 , 124-125

INDEX

Manila , 8 , 93, 103-105 , 112, 119, 125 Manila Accord, 113-116 Manila Declaration, 113 Manila Joint Statement, 11 3- 116 Menado, Maria, 60 Mongolia, 40 Montegrai, Pengarah, 75 Multiracialism, 3, 5, 46, 48 , 51 , 56 , 59- 60, 69, 76 , 85, 95, 97. 107 .

119, 121 Murut, 5, 48 Mustapha, Dato , 27 , 41, 58-59, 66, 74, 83, 86, 92- 93, 99, Yang diPertua Negara 79, 101 MSCC , 35-40 , 44- 58 , 63, 66 , 68-69 , 71, 83, 87. 97 . 122

Namier, Sir Lewis , 43, 68 Nanyang, 17 Nationalism, 15- 17 , 22, 24, 27, 35 , 41 , 43, 68 , 115- 116 Nehru, 27 Neo-coloniallsm, 57, 112, 125 New York, 27 Ningkan, Stephen Kalong, 30, 34, 40, 78, 84-85 Chief Minister- designate, 102, 113- 114

Observers , 115 Oil, 2, 26 , 61, 104, 109, 119, 125

Ong Eng Guan, 46 Ong Kee Hui, 26 , 28, 34, 41 , 104 Ong Yoke Lin, 51- 53, 55, 58 , 68 Openg, Haji, 99 Operat ions Room 61- 62, 123 Overbeck, Baron de, 87

147

INDEX

Pelaez, Emmanuel, 89-90 PANAS, 19-21 , 27, 58, 61 , 77 Pang Tet Tshung, 38 PAP, 45-46, 51 Pasok Momogun, 77 Peking, 108 Pepper, 7 Pesaka, Party, 77 Phutppines Free Press, 88, 93 Philippines , The, 87- 95, 104, 109 , 112, 115, 117-119, 125-127 Pike, P .E .H., 99 PKI, 57 , 106 , 108, 111-112 Public Services Commission, 82 , 97 Ra'ayat, Party, 20, 28 , 35, 49, 103 Radio Sabah, 47, 76 Radio Sarawak, 47, 54, 76 Rajaratnam, 8 , 53 Ramlee, P ., 60 Razak,Tun, 61, 75,77,92 Referendum, Singapore 65 Revolutionary State of Kalimantan

SNAP, 20 , 30 , 40 , 77-78 Soekarno, President, 27, 35 , 103, 111-112 South China Sea, 1, 4, 27 , 33-34,41, 44-45,48 , 57 , 117 South-east Asia, 4, 24, 27, 38, 41, 60, 86 , 107 , 112,118 , 121 , 125 South-east Asia, CommissionerGeneral for , 23-25, 28 South- east Asia, Foreign Correspondents' Association for , 23, 36 South Vietnam , 46 Sri Vijaya, 8 Stephens , Donald, 21, 27- 28 , 31, 34-38, 41 , 44, 50, 52 , 55-59, 62, 68, 74, 83, 86 , 92- 94, 99, Chief Minister- designate , 101, 103, 106, 113-115, 116 Subandrio , Dr. , 110-113 Suffrage, 11, 116 Sulu, 87- 89, 92, 94 Sundang, G .s., 99 SUPP, 19-20, 21, 26, 28, 77-78 , 85

Utara, 105, 109, 119, 126 Rice, 4, 6, 7, 60 Rubber, 3- 4, 7, 60-61 Rubber stamp, 66 , 69, 87 , 124 Russia, 27 , 57 Sabah United Party, 77 Sandys , Duncan, 100 Sarawak Chinese Association, 78 Second World War, 27, 41 , 88, 110 Sejarah Melayu, 47 Selkirk, Lord, 24-25, 28 Seria, 104 Setia Pe.n giran Ali, Dato, 39 Sipitang, 103

Tagalog, 91 Timber, 2, 3, 7 Tin, 60 T~u . 103-104, 109, 119 Tokyo, 112 Treaties: of Brunei, 14; of Friendship, 110; AngloMalayan, 72, 96 Twenty Points , 77-78, 84, 86 United Front, 28-32, 36 , 40, 59, 99, 104, 122 United Nations: General Assembly of, 89, 111-112 ; Charter of, 110;

I t

I~ iI

II , II

148

Secretary- General of (U Thant), 113, 116 , 118; Malaysia Mission, 113-116 United Party , 77, 93 UNKO, 28, 31, 66, 77, 92 t.:sr-:o, 66, 77 , 92 Waddell, Sir Alexander, 24-26, 30 33, 107-109

,,

...

INDEX

Watherston, Sir David, 63 Westmtnister, 24 West New Guinea, 110- 111 \Vhite , D.C., 24- 26 Wong Pow Nee, Dato, 63 Yeo Cheng Hoe, 34, 37-38, 44, 56 , 83 Yusof bin Ishak, 56, 58

•

•

..... .-·f •

This is the first book to focus attention on Borneo • in relation to Malaysia. As an impartial study of reactions and feelings in the territories of northern Borneo to the idea of federation with Malaya and Singapore, it provides the background to and serves to stimulate interest in current soci al,economic and political developments in Sabah and Sarawak.

The story of Borneo's response to the Malaysia proposal ran from blatant and outright rejection to reconciliation, resignation and agreement. What does this about- face in Borneo's response signify?

What were the factors influencing it?

The narrative begins by placing Borneo in proper per spective with a study of her geographical setting, historical background and political development to date of the Malaysia proposal. It then traces the stages of Borneo's response to the proposal c~early and objectively; analyses the factors, internal and external, which influenced each stage; and conclusively presents the whole as a study of pol.itical emergence a nd progress. Throughout, the author draws largely on official publications and the daily Press for evidence and support. The treatment , therefor e , remains disinterested and conclusions where drawn are always rational and unbiased~ Written in a qlear, readable style, this book is of interest to every general reader • •

Donald Moore

Pres~ Ltd