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Preparing for Helsinki: The CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks


Preparing for Helsinki: The CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks

Edited by Richard Smith Foreword by Sir Brian Fall

Documents from the British Archives: No. 2


Documents from the British Archives: a thematic series with documents drawn from, or supplementing, volumes of Documents on British Policy Overseas, produced by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Historians. Series editors: Patrick Salmon & Richard Smith

This publication is available online: www.issuu.com/fcohistorians

© 2020 Crown Copyright Second edition Cover illustration: Dipoli, the Student Union building of the Helsinki University of Technology, used for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks Credit: Halaszo from CreativeCommons (CC BY-SA 4.0) ISBN: 9798693988125


CONTENTS Foreword

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Introduction

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CSCE: Multilateral Preparatory Talks CSCE: Draft Report of the Delegation to the Multilateral Preparatory Talks 9 June 1973 CSCE: The First Two Hundred Days 13 June 1973

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FOREWORD

Sir Brian Fall, KCMG, GCVO, joined the Diplomatic Service in 1962 with early postings in Moscow and Geneva. From 1971-75 he held roles in both the Eastern European and Soviet Department and the Western Organisations Department. He later served as Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1981–84; Minister in Washington, 1988–89; High Commissioner to Canada, 1989–92; and Ambassador to the Russian Federation, and to Republics of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Turkmenistan, 1992–95, also to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 1992–93. After retiring from the Diplomatic Service he became the British Government Special Representative for the South Caucasus, 2002–12.

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was formally approved at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of the 35 participating States. It would be tempting to mark this 45th anniversary year with an examination of President Putin’s record against each of the 10 Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States which form an important part of the Final Act, and that may offer an interesting subject for a seminar in due course. Meanwhile, I am delighted that FCO Historians have used the occasion to remind us of where it all started, at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) which took place in Helsinki from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973; and that, 1


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in so doing, they have brought together in one volume Ambassador Elliott’s concluding despatch (CSCE: The First 200 Days), and the fuller record to which he refers in his paragraph 6. This fuller record, which was put together by the delegation before leaving Helsinki, but not yet in a form which could be submitted to the Ambassador for approval, retains the status of a draft report, and might have disappeared without trace without the professional concern of the Historians for the safeguarding of evidence. I much look forward to seeing it again in hard copy. On the substance, the despatch notes that the MPT ‘have in effect endorsed the essential features of the Western approach to the Conference’, and it gives examples in support. To these, as a result of the Conference proper, we can now add the statement in Principle 1 that the participating States ‘consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement’. The draft report does not add to the key points in the despatch, but does its best to explain how we got there. From the point of view of the British delegation, I would add two important bits of context. The MPT began (i) just over a year after the expulsion of the 105 Soviet officials from the UK; and (ii) only ten months into our participation in the political cooperation machinery of the European Community (EC). Point (i) led the Soviet delegation to do their best to put and keep us in the doghouse, and to do their business with the French, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the US. Point (ii), thanks to the continuing solidarity of the EC Nine over the proposals we had worked out together in preparation for Helsinki, meant that the Russians came to recognise that the British needed to be regarded and worked with as one of the key interlocutors on the western side. That is how things developed in practice, and the practice received confirmation in protocol by the invitation to a bilateral delegation-to-delegation lunch at the residence of the Soviet Ambassador. Looking back, I am still struck by how fortunate I was, still a few years short of my 40th birthday, to be able to operate as Deputy Head of the British delegation in what became an important conference in its own right, and one where much of the important work was done at that level. We went into the Conference proper as leading players in the Nine, and thereby on the western side, and the icing on my personal cake was to be in the party which accompanied the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec DouglasHome, on an official visit to Moscow in November 1973. I don’t know what the 105 thought about it, but Gromyko clearly wanted the visit to go well. Sir Brian Fall

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INTRODUCTION In November 1972 representatives from 35 nations gathered in the Student Union building of the University of Technology near Helsinki to engage in preparatory talks for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This book publishes an account of those negotiations written by Brian, now Sir Brian Fall, the deputy head of the British negotiating team.1 The history of Britain’s involvement in the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) and CSCE negotiations is covered in a volume of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO): The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75.2 However, Fall’s report was too large to include. It is published here, for the first time, in part to mark the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 but also to demonstrate the importance of preparatory talks in multilateral diplomacy. It is accompanied by a despatch from the British Ambassador to Finland, Anthony Elliott, who led the negotiations, on ‘CSCE: the first 100 days’.3 Fall’s account is a draft report that never achieved final status. As Fall states in his covering note to Crispin Tickell, head of the Western Organisations Department (WOD), the lead department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for the CSCE, it was directed ‘to a readership at working level’. As well as being a record of the MPT, it was also an aide mémoire for British diplomats continuing with the CSCE negotiations, and highlighted points likely to be of interest. The report details the discussions between East, West and neutral participants to agree 1

The UK National Archives (TNA) FCO 28/2167. Minor typing errors have been corrected in this published version. 2 Gill Bennett and Keith A. Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), Series 3, Volume 2, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75 (London: The Stationery Office, 1998). On the British approach to CSCE in general see: Martin Brown, ‘A very British vision of Détente: The United Kingdom’s foreign policy during the Helsinki process, 1969–1975’, in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Bernd Rother (eds.), Overcoming the Iron Curtain: Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990 (Oxford: Berghahn, 2012); Keith A. Hamilton, ‘Cold War by Other Means: British Diplomacy and the CSCE, 1972-1975,’ in W. Loth, G. Soutou (eds.), The Making of Détente: Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75 (London: Routledge, 2007); Keith A. Hamilton, ‘The Last Cold Warriors: Britain, Détente and the CSCE, 1972-75’ (Oxford: European Interdependence Research Unit, 1999); P. Williams, ‘Britain, Détente and the CSCE’, and M. Clarke ‘Britain and European Political Cooperation in the CSCE’ both in K. Dyson (ed.) European Détente: Case Studies in the Politics of East-West Relations (London: F. Pinter, 1986). 3 TNA FCO 160/151/15, WDW 1/2. DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 1, No. 37.

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the political, military, economic and humanitarian issues for inclusion in the Conference, along with procedural questions and financial arrangements. It discusses the tactics used by the Western allies to coordinate their efforts and achieve their objectives in the face of Soviet opposition, and assesses the performance of the individual delegations present. The CSCE had a long history. Its origins lay in the Soviet Union’s desire to settle post-war problems, particularly in relation to Germany and Berlin. At the 1954 Berlin Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Russians proposed convening an all-European conference to agree a ‘General European Treaty of Collective Security in Europe,’ which they hoped would formally recognise the political boundaries in Eastern Europe established after the Second World War.4 A pan-European conference was again proposed in the mid-1960s. In July 1966 a Warsaw Pact communiqué (the ‘Bucharest Declaration’) formally proposed a conference to discuss ‘questions of ensuring measures toward the implementation of peace and security in Europe, through peaceful cooperation among States despite their differing social systems’.5 This call was repeated at a Warsaw Pact meeting held in Budapest in March 1969. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 the idea of a conference was seen as a useful way to attempt to normalise relations. The ‘Budapest Appeal’ called for an early conference on European security and cooperation to be attended by all interested European countries, to be held at the earliest date, and be proceeded by a preliminary meeting of officials. This appeal was discussed by NATO Ministers when they met in Washington the following month to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Western allies indicated they were prepared to explore with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe ‘which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution.’ The NATO Council was instructed to conduct a detailed study of various issues for exploration and possible negotiation. The communique made clear that any discussions were conditional on the inclusion of the United States and Canada.6 In May 1969, the Government of Finland offered Helsinki as a venue for a conference. In October the Warsaw Pact, meeting in Prague, adopted 4

This early history is drawn from Cmnd 6932, Selected Documents Relating to Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1954-77 (London: HMSO, 1977). 5 Cmnd 6932, No. 2. ‘Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe’ adopted by a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee, Bucharest, July 1966. 6 Cmnd 6932, No .12. Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council meeting, Washington, 10-11 April 1969.

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another declaration again calling for an ‘All-European’ conference on security and cooperation, to meet in Helsinki in the first half of 1970, and proposing two topics for discussion—the safeguarding of security through agreements on the renunciation of force, and the expansion of trade, economic, scientific, and technical relations.7 A meeting of NATO Ministers in December issued the Brussels Declaration on East-West Relations, which added that the success of an eventual conference would require ‘careful advance preparation and prospects of concrete results would in any case be essential’.8 However, it was only after outstanding questions relating to Germany had been settled, greatly reducing tensions in Europe, that the prospect of a conference became real. The Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in 1970, between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Soviet Union and Poland respectively, renounced the use of force and recognised postwar borders. The conclusion of the Quadripartite agreement on Berlin, on 3 September 1971, guaranteed improved transit to and from West Berlin and eased travel restrictions for visitors to East Germany.9 NATO Ministers, meeting in Brussels in December 1971, reaffirmed their readiness to begin multilateral preparations for a conference and identified areas of discussion: ‘(a) Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States and certain military aspects of security; (b) Freer Movement of People, Information, and Ideas, and Cultural Relations; (c) Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Applied Science and Technology, and Pure Science; and (d) Cooperation to Improve the Human Environment’.10 This emphasis on the individual did not feature in the ‘Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe’, issued by the Warsaw Pact in Prague in January 1972, which put primary emphasis on seven ‘fundamental principles of European security’ to serve as the basis of relations among European States. These were the inviolability of borders, non-use of force, peaceful co-existence, good neighbourly relations and cooperation in the interest of peace, mutually advantageous contacts

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Cmnd 6932, No. 14. Statement issued by a conference of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting, Prague, 30-31 October 1969. 8 Cmnd 6932, No. 17. Declaration of the North Atlantic Council adopted during the Brussels Council meeting, 4-5 December 1969. 9 These treaties are documented in DBPO, Series 3, Volume 1: Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-72 (HMSO: London, 1997). 10 Cmnd 6932, No. 39. Communique of the North Atlantic Council meeting, Brussels, 910 December 1971.

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among States, disarmament, and support to the United Nations.11 As Crispin Tickell noted: ‘In a nutshell they see the Conference as an occasion for declarations, statements of principles and propaganda of all kinds designed to better establish their hold on the East and weaken the coherence of the West; while we see it as a means for lowering East/West barriers, improving confidence and adopting practical measures to improve cooperation.’12 President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union from the 22 to 30 May 1972, the first State visit of a US President to the Soviet Union, accelerated the process. During the visit, the Russians agreed to begin arms control talks (a priority for the United States) in exchange for preparatory talks on a European security conference.13 Later in the month, at a meeting in Bonn, on 30 and 31 May 1972, NATO agreed to enter into multilateral preparations for a conference and accepted the proposal of the Finnish Government that these should be held in Helsinki. ‘As it turned out’, recalled Bryan Cartledge, Minister at the British Embassy in Moscow, ‘the concession which they thought they were making in arms control, turned out to be fairly minimal, and the concession we thought, in agreeing to the conference, turned out not to be a concession, but win-win for us, so it all turned out rather differently to what one anticipated.’14 The British response to the prospect of a conference was initially unenthusiastic.15 The general view was that the Soviet Union intended to use it to reinforce its hegemony in Eastern Europe, disrupt the economic and political integration of Western Europe, weaken NATO, and secure commercial advantages and greater access to Western science and technology. Meanwhile Soviet détente initiatives rang hollow in the face of sustained and widespread intelligence activities within Britain. In September 1971, in an unprecedented move, the Government found it necessary to expel 105 Soviet officials from Britain in order to check this activity (Operation FOOT).16 However, as the realistic prospect of a conference grew officials, concerned about increasing public support for détente, determined not to 11

Cmnd 6932, No. 40. ‘Declaration on Peace, Security and Co-operation in Europe’ issued by the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee meeting in Prague, 25-26 January 1972. 12 DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 2, No. 13. Minute from Tickell to the Private Secretary, 20 September 1972. 13 The preparatory arms control discussions (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) began in Vienna in January 1973. 14 British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), Churchill Archives Centre: DOHP 115: Sir Bryan Cartledge. 15 British views on the lead-up to the conference are covered in DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 1. 16 See DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 1 for a full discussion of the expulsions.

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appear too negative about the proposal. They also decided to adopt a leadership role in order to maintain Western cohesion and ensure a unified approach. Britain’s accession to the European Communities (EC) meant that it was one of the biggest common denominators in the two main Western groupings—the EC, ‘The Nine’, and NATO, ‘The Fifteen’. The NATO steering brief, agreed by the North Atlantic Council on 16 November 1972, to serve as general guidance to the delegations at Helsinki, was based on a British draft. The brief defined three ‘positive’ Western aims: to secure genuine improvements in reducing barriers within Europe, especially by promoting freer movement of persons, information and ideas and by developing East/West cooperation; to achieve politicomilitary Confidence Building Measures (CBM); and to limit the scope for the use of the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ of limited sovereignty. British officials also had extensive discussions with EC colleagues as part of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the forum established in 1970 in which Member States discussed foreign policy matters. Crispin Tickell believed that ‘by thrashing out ideas among themselves the Nine had over the months thought of just about every idea, possibility or manoeuvre which might occur, thus giving them the edge in the Helsinki Consultations’.17 The British delegation to the MPT consisted mainly of young highflying First Secretaries who brought both energy and ability to the negotiations. Their lack of seniority annoyed the Soviets—who sent ambassadorial level officials—but this was deliberate. As one delegate, George Walden, recalled: ‘One of the reasons we sent whippersnappers like us was to show our scepticism: that was the reason to keep the level of representation low. And of course, being whippersnappers, we were quite keen to sort of bounce around in the way that inexperienced youth tends to do.’18 The ‘whippersnappers’ included Brian Fall, head of section in the East European and Soviet Department (EESD) and simultaneously assistant head of the WOD. The multiplicity of roles made for an interesting time: ‘There were four sessions of the MPT, and between sessions we would be back in capitals, with time for coordination at a more senior level in the Political Committee of the EEC and in NATO. At the end of session in Helsinki I would draft a telegram for the Ambassador, Anthony Elliott, reporting on the main points of the session and pinpointing where we would need instructions for the next one. Then I 17

Crispin Tickell, ‘Enlarged Community and the Security Conference,’ Aussen Politik (1974) Vol. 25, No. l, pp. 13-22. 18 George Walden, ‘The Helsinki Negotiations, the Accords and their Impact’, seminar held 19 February 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British History, 2006) p. 43. An EESD section head, Walden later became Principal Private Secretary to two Foreign Secretaries, David Owen and Lord Carrington, before leaving the Diplomatic Service for a career in politics.

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would be back at my desk in EESD/WOD, drafting an answer to the telegram from Helsinki. An interesting way of running a conference.’ 19 They would need all of their energy over the long months of discussions, that continued until June 1973, carried out in plenary sessions, working groups, corridor conversations, and even the Students Union bar, where some of the close diplomatic in-fighting took place. As Walden recalled: ‘we waited for spring to arrive, and it never did.’20 A natural cynicism towards Soviet rhetoric, the recent success of Operation FOOT, and a certain fearlessness all served to fire up the British negotiating team. They were determined to disrupt the Soviet intention of using the negotiations merely to consolidate the division of Europe, and to legitimise their notion of the Brezhnev Doctrine. They wanted to find ways to expand the discussion and extract a price from the Russians for their obvious desire for a conference. ‘So we went out there—yes, sceptical— and, if you like, a bit aggressive on the subject, but I have to say when I look back what I recall is really how exhilarating the whole process was, what fun it was,’ noted Andrew Burns. ‘It was the hunt; the chase. For the first time we were able to discuss issues openly with the Warsaw Pact countries, issues which they always tried to keep off the table. And, of course, in a sense, that was the ultimate triumph of the Western successes at the CSCE conference: that we were able to put on the agenda the different subjects for future discussion, issues which had been in the past kept out of inter-governmental debate.’21 Like others on the team, George Walden had lived in the Soviet Union and found it a dispiriting experience. ‘So we got stuck into this conference, saying, “Why don’t you have freedom of information?” asking these absurd questions that no-one would normally ask of the Russians. It was seen as somehow indelicate to bring these matters up. We persisted in doing that and . . . we had help from a lot of other delegations who were similarly, when roused, hostile to the Russians. We felt we had been let off the leash a bit and could try and make life difficult for the Russians whereas normally (and again it is important to remember this) we were, I think, historically in a sort of permanently defensive posture vis-à-vis Moscow.’22 The main reasons for Western success in the preparatory talks were put down to careful advance preparations carried out in NATO and the EC, 19

DOHP 157: Sir Brian Fall, p. 26. G. Walden, ‘The Helsinki Negotiations, the Accords and their Impact’, p. 36. 21 Andrew Burns, ‘The Helsinki Negotiations, the Accords and their Impact’, p. 39. Summoned to Helsinki from his post on the Balkans desk, Burns later became Ambassador to Israel, 1992-95, and High Commissioner to Canada, 2000-03. 22 G. Walden, ‘The Helsinki Negotiations, the Accords and their Impact’, p. 43. 20

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the maintenance of cohesion during the talks, and winning the sympathy and support of neutral countries. However, the key Western tactic was not to commit to a conference unless they were satisfied the results of the MPT warranted it. ‘It was very clear,’ recalled Fall, ‘that the Russians wanted the preparatory talks, if there had to be preparatory talks, to last a week and a half, to agree the agenda, date, and place for the conference proper, and then to go for it. We were arguing that we wouldn’t go to a conference unless we had reasonable expectation that there would be scope for detailed discussion of the subjects we thought important, and the prospect of worthwhile conclusions.’23 The Russians fought hard for more restrictive texts but ultimately had to give way when they realised it was the price they had to pay in order to have any conference at all. The preparatory talks produced a series of Final Recommendations, the ‘Blue Book’ which set the agenda, mandates and procedural processes for the CSCE.24 During the MPT the West managed to turn Soviet plans for a short conference, focussing on high-level political declarations, into a three-stage conference, with time for substantive discussion on new elements in the East-West dialogue; such as the freer movement of people, ideas and information. They also got included, on a list of principles governing the relations between states, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. After two subsequent years of negotiations the Helsinki Final Act was signed on 1 August 1975. It was a politically binding agreement, contained a broad range of measures designed to enhance security and co-operation in Europe, consisting of three main ‘baskets,’ adopted on the basis of consensus. Basket I contained a Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, including the all-important Principle VII on human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also included a section on confidence-building measures and other aspects of security and disarmament aimed at increasing military transparency. Basket II covered economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation, as well as migrant labour and tourism. Basket III was devoted to co-operation in humanitarian and other fields: freer movement of people; human contacts, including family reunification and visits; freedom of information, including working conditions for journalists; and cultural and educational exchanges. Principle VII and Basket III together came to be known as ‘The Human Dimension’.

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BDOHP 157: Sir Brian Fall, p. 25. Cmnd 6932, No. 52. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, agreed on 8 June 1973. 24

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Whilst the significance of the Final Act in ending communism in Eastern Europe has been debated, what is clear is that there would have been no Human Dimension in the Final Act were it not for the policies pursued, and the tactics employed, by the West at the MPT. With the agenda and procedures fixed by the MPT the Soviets never fully regained the diplomatic initiative, despite several attempts, during the Conference proper. In this sense, the pre-conference talks were key to shaping the provisions of the Final Act—the highpoint of détente in Europe. It is impossible to appreciate what was achieved at Helsinki without an understanding of the preparatory negotiations. Richard Smith

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CSCE MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS

Confidential

BRITISH EMBASSY, HELSINKI, 9 June 1973

CSCE: Draft Report of the Delegation to the Multilateral Preparatory Talks Introduction The progress throughout the four stages of the Preparatory Talks has been reported upon in detail in telegrams from Helsinki. They provide a comprehensive account of the Talks, but inevitably contain much that is relevant only to the time at which they were sent. The purpose of this report is to provide in one admittedly bulky document an overall picture of the Preparatory Talks; and to single out for particular attention points likely to be of interest to those who will provide briefing for, or serve on, the delegation to the second stage of the Conference proper. The present text had not been edited, and a number of those concerned in the Talks have not yet had the opportunity to comment. The report is arranged in the following chapters: I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII.

The Four Stages Principles Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Military Aspects of Security Economic Basket III Follow-up to the Conference Mediterranean Procedural and Organisational Questions Western Co-ordination Delegations and Delegates Press

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Chapter I The Four Stages 1st Session (2 November to 15 January) 1. The first session fell into three main stages: (a) Discussion of, and agreement on, procedural arrangements for the preparatory talks; (b) the general debate; (c) the discussion of the work programme. These are considered separately below. Procedural Arrangements 2. These were used by the Romanians as a vehicle for a number of political points to which they attached importance. Their main concern was to have it agreed that all States participated on a basis of independence and complete equality whether or not they belonged to military alliances. 3. The main reflection of these ideas in the procedural arrangement is the provision that all decisions should be taken by consensus. There was no opposition to this idea, it having previously been made clear that the Warsaw Pact countries generally would be opposed even to qualified majority voting on procedural questions. The reference to military alliances was unacceptable to the Russians as formulated and the Romanians eventually had to content themselves with the compromise: ‘These consultation will take place outside the military alliances’. Romanian thinking was also reflected in their insistence that the ‘principle of rotation’ should be applied to the Chairmanship of the consultations. They were finally prevailed upon to renounce this claim insofar as the Chairmanship itself was concerned, but the agreed procedural arrangements provided that both the Vice-Chairmanship (should the Chairman be prevented from performing his duties) and the Chairmanship of Working Groups which were subsequently established should be shared by each representative in turn. General Debate 4. The general debate proved an unexpectedly one-sided affair. The Russians, no doubt to emphasize their view that the preparatory talks should be short and avoid substance, gave no indication of what they thought the Conference should achieve and referred only in very general terms to their preferred agenda. (It consisted at that stage of three items dealing respectively with political aspects of security; economic and other forms of co-operation, including culture; and the creation of a permanent

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organ.) The other Warsaw Pact countries, with the exception of Romania, followed suit, reflecting the Soviet line with a lack of imagination which was to prove one of the major features of the preparatory talks. 5. The field was thus left clear for statements by the EEC and NATO countries which indicated the main points which the West wished to have considered by the Conference; which emphasized the need for practical results rather than vague declarations; and which set out the case for a detailed second stage of the Conference proper. Given the careful preparation which had taken place both in NATO and in the political consultations of the Nine there was a large element of common ground in the Western speeches. The general effect, however, was one of harmony rather than unison. The major differences of view to emerge concerned the security content of the Conference on which the Dutch and French represented respectively the maximalist and minimalist positions. 6. The general debate was perhaps most interesting for the opportunity it gave to the neutral and non-aligned countries to express their views on questions concerning the CSCE in general and the purpose of the preparatory talks in particular. Their approach was generally much closer to that of the West than the East. The other noteworthy feature was the Romanian speech which, although following fairly closely the framework of the agenda proposed by the Russians, took a position on the security content of the Conference and on the right of all States to participate in negotiations on force reductions which were markedly out of step with the rest of the Warsaw Pact. Work Programme 7. It emerged from the general debate that East and West had opposite views of the order in which the preparatory talks should tackle their work. The Russians and their allies, in the hope of getting an early general commitment to a CSCE, argued that the first questions to be decided should be the date and place of the Conference, the list of participants and the general organisation of the Conference. The West on the other hand argued that the agenda of the Conference (including the terms of reference for the Committees and sub-Committees to undertake the detailed work at the second stage of the Conference) should be decided first. The elaboration of terms of reference at the preparatory talks was regarded as of particular importance in order to meet the criterion agreed by both the Nine and the Fifteen that the talks should establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results. 8. The Yugoslavs produced a compromise text basically favourable to the West which suggested that the preparatory talks should deal first with

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the organisation of the Conference and then proceed to the agenda and ‘once that has been drawn up’ to the terms of reference of the Committees. The East though willing to drop their insistence on taking date and place first and fighting only half-heartedly on the question of participation were not prepared to accept the specific mention of terms of reference. The West, on the other hand were unanimous in regarding this as a sticking point, and in addition wished to make it clear that the agenda and terms of reference should be considered together and not consecutively as suggested in the Yugoslav paper. 9. These differences proved too great to bridge, and the first session of the talks adjourned on the understanding that the Yugoslav paper and the amendments proposed to it would be taken as general guidance. The French, with the agreement of the Nine, had meanwhile tabled a paper setting out their views on the organisation of the Conference which stated clearly that the second stage would be taken up with the work of specialised Committees and sub-Committees whose terms of reference would have been decided at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks. 10. Other papers tabled during the first session included Swiss and Soviet proposals for the agenda; Hungarian and Polish texts on participation in and the organisation of the Conference respectively; and Romanian proposals on the agenda, organisation and venue of the Conference. 2nd Session (15 January to 9 February) 11. In the break between the first and second sessions consultations within the Nine and the Fifteen concentrated on the problems caused by the Soviet refusal to accept a mention of terms of reference (or of a satisfactory paraphrase) in the work programme of the preparatory talks. It was decided that if the Soviet position remained the same there would be no advantage in fighting the point in the context of the Yugoslav paper. This might indeed have proved counterproductive in the light of a general desire among neutral and non-aligned delegations to get down to business. It was therefore decided that the West should table its own proposals for the agenda and the terms of reference in such a way as to make it clear that they were to be considered together. 12. On the opening day of the second session the Belgians tabled the Western agenda proposals and the terms of reference for the Committee dealing with economic and related questions. The Italians and Danes tabled the terms of reference for the Committees dealing with security questions and human contacts, culture and information respectively. This example was followed by most of the neutral and non-aligned countries who tabled proposals which were on balance helpful to the West although

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considerably less detailed than the papers tabled on behalf of the Nine and Fifteen. 13. The initial Soviet reaction was to table a revised version of their agenda which contained two concessions of importance to the West. It included a reference to confidence building measures in the first item; and provided for a new item distinct from that on economic and related forms of co-operation to deal with ‘expansion of cultural co-operation, of contacts among organisations and peoples and of dissemination of information’. These concessions were combined with a firm statement that the preparatory talks should not seek to draw up the terms of reference of the Committees which would meet at the second stage of the Conference. (Soviet suggestions in the corridors at this stage included the thought that the terms of reference could be drawn up in the course of informal discussions after the end of preparatory talks.) 14. The main tactical problem for the West at that stage was to ensure that our proposals on terms of reference would not be separated from proposals on the agenda. This would have allowed the Russians, by seeking agreement on the agenda first, to argue that the main task of the preparatory talks had been accomplished before any consideration had been given to the details which we regarded as necessary. After discussion with our partners and allies we proposed that the various proposals on the table should be grouped into subject areas (subsequently referred to as ‘baskets’) which we were able to ensure were numbered rather than named in order not to prejudge the formulation of the agenda. This proposal was generally accepted and the Swiss delegation undertook the grouping of the subjects into four baskets dealing with respectively political and security questions; economic and related questions; human contacts, culture and information; and the proposals put forward by the Soviet and some neutral delegations for the follow up—institutional or otherwise—to the Conference. 15. Delegations then proceeded to an examination of the contents of the first basket during which the Russians took a further formal step towards the West in tabling what they called a draft ‘assignment’ (zadaniye) for the first committee. The draft fell considerably short of the detail regarded as important by Western delegations, and the Russians maintained their insistence that there should be no discussion of the terms of reference of sub-Committees (which they argued should be set up by the Committees themselves at the second stage of the Conference). It became apparent also that there were major points of difference between East and West both on the principles to be discussed at the Conference and on measures for their application. Furthermore, while the Soviet text on confidence building measures was not too far apart from the Western

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proposal, major differences remained between the participants on the security content to be given to the Conference. 16. The extent of the differences which emerged from the discussion of these proposals finally caused the Russians to abandon their argument that the agenda could quickly be agreed upon. They therefore accepted in the closing week of the session a rapid first reading of proposals in the remaining three baskets without insisting on agreement in Basket I. In the course of this they tabled committee ‘assignments’ corresponding in detail to that which they had proposed for Basket I. The session ended with a fairly clear signal from the Russians that they would not maintain the position (which had been monotonously echoed by their allies) that their draft ‘assignments’ represented all that was acceptable for discussion at the preparatory talks in the proposals tabled by other delegations. 3rd Session (26 February to 6 April) 17. Western consultations during the second break were influenced by the belief that if the rate of progress could not be increased the neutral and non-aligned countries would tend to become impatient with the amount of detail contained in the Western proposals. It was generally felt that the West should show its readiness to press ahead but that we should not agree to a premature drafting exercise which would lead to early agreement on the less controversial points and isolate the points of substance to which we attach importance. It was agreed on the basis of a United Kingdom proposal that we should accept the creation of a Working Group to speed up the work on the agenda and terms of reference while insisting that the Groups should move from a consideration of specific proposals in the terms of reference to agreement on the agenda and not vice versa. This approach, while never formally agreed to by the Russians, was accepted by them in practice when the Working Group began its examination of the proposals in the various baskets. 18. Discussion in the Working Group started on the question of principles and reflected all the difficulties which had emerged from the debates at the second session without bringing matters appreciably nearer to a solution. The neutral and non-aligned countries, and some members of NATO, became increasingly impatient at the slow rate of progress and there was a pressure on the Nine to make some movement. The deadlock was eventually broken (albeit at the cost of some temporary disquiet among some of our partners) by our tabling in the Working Group a framework for agreed terms of reference on this subject which, while following closely the outline of the Italian mandate, left until a later stage consideration of the wording to be included under each heading. The framework was agreed by the Working Group, as the basis for the work of

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a ‘Mini Group’ to which the question of principles was then transferred. The Working Group turned its attention to the military aspects of security. 19. The idea of agreeing an outline for the terms of reference to mark the transition from the discussion to the drafting stage was generally regarded as useful, and the same procedure was followed for military aspects of security. The Working Group then turned to economic questions, and in order to save time tried to produce an outline before adequately clearing the ground. Rival outlines tabled by the Czechs and the West Germans proved irreconcilable but the deadlock was eventually broken by the Eastern delegations tabling draft ‘assignments’ on specific questions which went far beyond the exiguous text produced by the Soviet Union at the end of the second session. Discussion then centred on the new Eastern texts and on a revised (and somewhat shorter) version of the original Belgian mandate tabled by the West in order to maintain the middle ground. The session ended with texts on the environment and on science and technology virtually agreed but with important differences remaining on the introduction to the terms of reference and in the sections on trade and industrial co-operation. 20. The discussion of Basket III followed a similar course to that of Basket II. The Danes tabled a considerably shortened version of the original Western paper which was, however, carefully drafted to preserve its substance. The East reacted by tabling individual drafts on culture, information and education which in form at least were a substantial step towards the Western position. These were subject, however, to a Soviet draft introduction for this section of the terms of reference which contained qualifications unacceptable to the West. The East did not formally present a text on human contacts and the session ended with a very hard line speech by Zorin in which he declared unacceptable the sections in the Danish paper dealing with marriage, re-unification of families and travel. 21. There was a widespread disappointment at the end of the six-week session that more had not been achieved in the way of agreed texts. There were a number of occasions during the session when the Nine were regarded by other NATO members and by some of the neutral and nonaligned as responsible for the delays and the question of momentum became a source of dispute within both the Nine and the Fifteen. It was in particular very difficult to secure general agreement to the drafting and tabling of revised versions of the Belgian and Danish papers even though a majority of those concerned were convinced of the tactical need for such a move. 4th Session (25 April to 8 June) 22. The differences which had emerged towards the end of the third

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session were both reflected in and formed the basis of discussions during the third break. A large majority of our partners and allies were prepared to agree with us that the third session had performed a useful task and gone well for the West. The Russians had now committed themselves to the discussion of terms of reference of a length and detail which corresponded broadly to the original Western proposals and it was possible in Baskets I and II to see the shape of compromises acceptable to the West. The main problem concerned Basket III where the Soviet attitude to the subject in general and to human contacts in particular remained unacceptable. We therefore proposed that we should concentrate on this aspect of the Soviet position and make it clear to the Russians that we would be prepared to move quickly towards agreement on other points provided that they were prepared to meet us on Basket III. 23. While there was general agreement in the Nine and Fifteen that further progress was urgently required on Basket III the Italians and Dutch (and to a lesser extent the Belgians) were concerned that the Nine would find themselves under pressure (partly because of the Kissinger/Brezhnev timetable providing for the CSCE to start at the end of June) to come to unsatisfactory conclusions in various sections of the terms of reference. A meeting of the Political Directors of the Nine on 25 April failed to get to grips with many of the questions of substance under discussion in Helsinki, but in retrospect performed a valuable function in reaffirming a determination not to accept the conclusion of the Preparatory Talks until an agreement satisfactory to all delegations had been reached. The date of end June was stated to be a hope but not a constraint. This agreement did much to diffuse the tensions which had built up among the Nine during the closing stages of the third session, and it proved far less difficult than anticipated to maintain the cohesion of the Nine in the final stages of the negotiations on the terms of reference. 24. The main points of the negotiations during the fourth session are described in some detail in the sections of this report dealing with individual subjects. The Preparatory Talks adapted their rhythm of work to allow a considerable degree of overlap between formal and informal discussions of the various subjects on the agenda; and the emphasis of the negotiations was placed very much on Basket III which had received comparatively little attention in the earlier stages of the Talks. The East finally accepted the necessity of conceding satisfactory terms of reference in this area in order to secure agreement to a Conference beginning at the end of June or very early July, and the issues outstanding between East and West in Basket I were dealt with relatively quickly as a result. It also proved surprisingly easy once the West had agreed to a separate agenda item to draft terms of reference on the follow-up to the Conference which

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do not prejudge the matter in favour of continuing machinery. 25. Other problems, however, gained in importance as the stage gradually became cleared. Differences between the French on the one hand and the Dutch, Yugoslavs and Romanians on the other on the security content of the Conference were settled only by a compromise between the delegations most directly involved at the very end of the Preparatory Talks. Discussions on the terms of reference for Basket II proved more difficult than expected and the chief Russian negotiator, Pozharsky, clung with a stubbornness matched on the other side by the Dutch and Belgians to points established in the theology of multilateral discussions on East/West trade. The Romanians and Yugoslavs for their part created added difficulties by presenting at the last minute proposals for a preamble to Basket I and for references to the rights of national minorities in Basket III respectively. Both these proposals took a disproportionate amount of the negotiating time available in the closing stages. 26. In addition, the fourth stage concentrated for the first time on the questions of the date and place of the Conference, the list of participants, its organisation, rules of procedure and the necessary financial arrangements. Each of these questions produced its own difficulties, the detail of which have been reported separately. From our point of view it was satisfactory that the decisions to have the second stage in Geneva went through relatively easily once it was agreed to accept Helsinki for the third stage as well as the first. Much less satisfactory was the vigorous opposition of the Romanians to proposals from the French and ourselves designed to emphasize that the Conference itself should take place under the conditions defined in the Recommendations of the Preparatory Talks. We were able to secure a statement in the first page of the document that States informing the Government of Finland of their intention to take part in the Conference thereby indicated their intention to do so ‘on the basis of the final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations’; and it is provided in the Chapter on the organisation of the Conference that Ministers will adopt the rules of procedure, the agenda and the instructions of the working bodies of the Conference ‘in accordance with the Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations’. But we would have liked something stronger and it was unfortunate that we were not more strongly supported by our partners and allies on this point. 27. Part of the reason for this is that the issue became inextricably bound up with a formal proposal tabled by Malta towards the end of May which would have provided for full participation in the Conference by the Arab States. This was opposed by all other participants although the Austrians, Italians and Yugoslavs (and perhaps some others) would have been prepared to reach a compromise on observer status which went

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further than the majority of NATO and all Warsaw Pact delegations could accept. It took some time before everyone realised that the Maltese were serious in their intentions. But the penultimate day of the Preparatory Talks was spent in approving individual sections of the final report in the belief that the Maltese would resolutely oppose a consensus on the document as a whole. Conversations in the corridors concentrated on ways of salvaging the Conference in these circumstances without appearing to violate the principle of the consensus. The Americans, French, Germans, Russians and ourselves met over dinner at the French Embassy to agree on a possible procedure and we entered the final day in the full expectation that no consensus would be possible. 28. Unexpectedly, however, the Maltese backed down and accepted as a face-saver an only very slightly modified version of an already agreed text allowing the Conference to determine in what way it would acquaint itself of the views of non-participating States. The Maltese, in an interpretative statement, made it clear that they understood this to mean that representatives of the State concerned could attend in person; and it was tacitly agreed not to query this statement in the light of an earlier intervention by the Ambassador of Poland making it clear that interpretative statements expressed the views only of the countries making them. 28. [sic] The Consultations, which had been formally based on the rule of consensus and were very nearly condemned to failure by what was clearly an abuse of them, were thus rescued at the last moment. The Romanians (whether or not at the Soviet behest) played a major part in securing the agreement of Mintoff and compensated in this way for the numerous difficulties they had raised throughout the Talks. Chapter II Principles 1. The idea that the Conference should consider the principles of relations between States had featured both in Warsaw Pact and in NATO communiques before the opening of the preparatory talks. The Warsaw Pact objective was to produce a declaration expressed, if possible, in mandatory terms which they could subsequently argue formed the basis of a ‘new system of security’ for Europe. Their original proposals had concentrated almost entirely on the non-use of force, and it was largely a concern to avoid treating this principle in isolation which led NATO to think in terms of a declaration covering a wider list of principles. 2. The major interest in such a declaration from the Western point of view was in its relationship to the Brezhnev doctrine. Western countries

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generally recognised that the Russians would reject wording designed explicitly to exclude this concept and that more general wording, however clear its meaning, would not in practice deter the Russians from intervening to protect their interests in a socialist country. Nevertheless, it was felt that a declaration which clearly proclaimed in a European context principles with which the Brezhnev doctrine was incompatible would serve an important though limited political purpose. 3. The Italians tabled in Helsinki on 15 January draft terms of reference on the question of principles which had been worked out in the Nine on the basis of a French draft and was subsequently agreed in NATO. (The Nine, for their part, had drawn on work on the text of a possible Western draft declaration which was in hand in NATO). The main points of the text were the following: (i) References to the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States which were designed to emphasize the fact that a declaration elaborated in the European context should take into account the principles already generally recognised. (ii) A list of the following principles to which special attention should be paid: Sovereign equality of States; refraining from the threat or use of force, particularly as regards the inviolability of frontiers; respect for territorial integrity; non-intervention in internal affairs; peaceful settlement of disputes; respect for human rights, for fundamental freedom and for equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. (iii) Two sentences aimed at the Brezhnev doctrine: the first provided that the Committee should ‘start from the premise that the current division of Europe and the fact that the participating States belong to different social systems as well as political and military groupings should not prevent them from benefitting fully insofar as each is concerned from the prerogatives that stem from these principles’; and the second provided that the paper to be submitted to the Committee should express the will of the participating States as to the application of these principles to their mutual relations regardless of their ideologies or political systems. 4. The initial Soviet reaction (once they had reached the stage of accepting the principle of ‘assignments’ for the Committee) was to table a brief text which provided in its relevant part that: ‘The Committee will be responsible for preparing a draft final document on the question of ensuring European security and principles governing relations among States in Europe. This draft will include: (i) Principles governing relations among States on which security in Europe should be based: inviolability of State frontiers; non-

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interference in internal affairs; renunciation of the use or threat or force; independence; sovereign equality. (ii) . . .’ The Russians argued in favour of their proposal that the five principles they had listed were those most relevant to European security. They claimed also that they were ‘internationally acknowledged’ not only in multilateral texts but also in various agreements concerning West Germany and in the communiques agreed with the French in October 1971, with the Americans in May 1972 and with the Italians in October 1972. 5. The Russians made it clear that their major objection to the list of principles in the Italian draft was the linking of inviolability of frontiers to the non-use of force. The Russians argued that inviolability was an essential principle that stood on its own, and that it should not be used to illustrate another. The Russians also opposed the reference to human rights in the Italian draft, on the grounds that the question was not relevant to relations between States; and the reference to self-determination on the grounds that it was relevant only to colonial situations and not appropriate in a European context. 6. The question of principles was the first to be considered by the Working Group established at the beginning of the third stage. The debates concentrated on two major issues: the list of principles and the sources to which the Committee at the Conference itself should refer. On the first point a number of Western and neutral delegations intervened effectively to criticise the selectivity of the Soviet proposal. The West Germans (who had been engaged in active bilateral consultations with the Russians) gave a slight hint in public that they would not necessarily make a sticking point of the link between the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers in the Italian paper. This was subsequently and prematurely taken up by the French, who made it clear that they were prepared to accept separate listing of the separate principles of non-use of force and inviolability of frontiers. 7. On the second point, the Warsaw Pact countries argued that in addition to the Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration, reference should be made to the United Nations Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and to ‘the appropriate provisions of treaties between States concluded with a view to reducing international tension and ensuring security in Europe’. We took the lead on arguing that the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security could not be placed on the same footing as the Friendly Relations Declaration; and the West Germans resolutely maintained their opposition to any language which they considered would allow their bilateral treaties to be discussed,

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interpreted or in any way ‘multilateralised’ at the Conference. 8. The only other development of note at that stage was the tabling by the Romanians of draft terms of reference which required the Committee to prepare ‘in an appropriate juridical form’ documents which should be ‘in line with the ultimate objective of building up new relations among States in Europe through a system of undertakings and concrete measures eliminating for all time the threat or use of force in relations among States’. 9. The situation towards the end of the second week of the session was that the Working Group remained stuck on the question of principles with no early prospect of being able to move on. There was considerable pressure from the East to start drafting on the basis of ‘easy points first’, and a danger that some neutral and non-aligned delegations might find this preferable to immobility. The Nine gave urgent thought to a reformulation of the Italian paper to show a readiness to take into account the views of others, but it proved extremely difficult to think of changes of sufficient significance to meet this objective which would not at the same time give unrequited concessions to the East. 10. In these circumstances we took the initiative of tabling an outline for the terms of reference on principles which provided that the text should include: (i) a brief job description (to examine the principles and submit a paper); (ii) a basic premise (the principles must apply equally to all participating States); (iii) summary references to the United Nations principles which the Committee or sub-Committee should bear in mind; (iv) an indication of the principles to which special attention should be paid; (v) a reference to the inter-relationship of principles; (vi) a formula enabling the Committee or sub-Committee to consider additions to or clarifications of the principles; (vii) a statement of objectives (unequivocal statement of principles; expression of the will of the participants to respect and apply them). In introducing this outline we made it clear that, if it were generally acceptable, we would be prepared to proceed to drafting in an appropriate sub-Group while the Working Group itself moved on to other subjects. 11. From the point of view of the Russians, who seemed anxious to make more rapid progress, the proposal had the advantage of providing a way out of the deadlock in the Working Group. At the same time it required of them a commitment to draft terms of reference in a framework which was that of the original Italian mandate. (The only major difference was the addition of the reference to the inter-relationship of principles,

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which had been agreed upon at a meeting of the Nine in Brussels as a means of minimising the problems which might be caused by dropping an explicit link between non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers.) In the event, the Russians accepted the bargain and our proposed outline was accepted without amendment as the basis for the work in the ‘Mini Group’ to which the question of principles was then transferred. 12. The Mini Group provided the opportunity for informal but intensive discussion on the main issues at stake. The East were represented actively only by the Russians (Mendelevich) and the East Germans (Bock). The major Western participants were the French, Germans, Italians and ourselves. In addition the Romanians, the Spaniards and the Yugoslavs were active in pressing ideas of their own. 13. The main areas of disagreement between the East and West were the list of principles; the inter-relationship between them; their field of application and the source documents to be mentioned in the mandate. The main features of the discussions under each of these heading are summarised below. (a) List of Principles 14. The first breakthrough occurred on 23 March when Mendelevich gave a clear indication that, subject to order and precise formulation, he would be prepared to accept a list of ten principles circulated informally by the Swiss convenors of the Mini Group on the basis of proposals made by various delegations. The list comprised: Sovereign equality of States; Non-recourse to the threat or use of force; Inviolability of frontiers; Respect for the territorial integrity of States; Peaceful settlement of disputes; Non-intervention in internal affairs; Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; Co-operation between States; Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. 15. The West Germans had made it clear to their partners that they could live with such a compromise (which in effect traded Western acceptance of separate listing of inviolability of frontiers for Soviet acceptance of human rights and self-determination) subject to satisfactory wording on the other points of issue. Other Western delegations took their lead from the West Germans, and the Ministers of the Nine meeting in Brussels on 16 March had agreed that delegations in Helsinki could when the time was ripe work on the basis of the Swiss paper in this respect. The

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situation was, however, complicated by an unexpected hardening in the Italian position. They lobbied actively in NATO in the last week in March against Western acceptance of the separate listing of inviolability of frontiers and failed to make it clear whether their objection was one of principle or merely based on the tactical consideration that the separate listing was something that the Russians badly wanted and should be made to pay for. 16. The Italian position, which was maintained during meetings of the Nine in the break between the third and fourth sessions, served to delay formal Western acceptance of the list of ten principles. This was viewed at the time with ill-concealed irritation by some members of the Nine and the Fifteen and the Italian case was in many respects badly presented. In retrospect, however, this exhibition of stubbornness can be seen to have contributed to the successful outcome of the negotiations on other questions. (b) Inter-relationship 17. The Russians made no difficulty about the reference to interrelationship in the outline but subsequently opposed it vigorously in the Mini Group. Mendelevich argued that the word ‘inter-relationship’ contained implications of ‘interdependence’ which were quite unacceptable; and said that he could not go further than a formula which would emphasize the equal importance of the application of each of the principles and state that respect for one would create good conditions for the observance of the others. It seemed clear that the Soviet position was based primarily on their wish to establish inviolability of frontiers as a separate principle, and that they would be unyielding on this point. It is probable also that the late introduction of the idea of the Western side, coupled with the tough Italian line on inviolability, reinforced Soviet suspicions of the reference to inter-relationship. (c) Application 18. The first indications of position from the East Germans and Russians on the question of application suggested that they would take a hard line on formulations relevant to the Brezhnev doctrine. They proposed a text which sought to confine the application of the principles to the relations of the participating States ‘in Europe’ and which provided that the principles should be applied irrespective of the differences in political, economic and social systems. Western representatives made it clear that neither the limitation to Europe nor the use of the word ‘differences’ would be acceptable, and countered by tabling a slightly revised version of the original Italian text which combined the two relevant

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sentences and left out the reference to ideologies. The Russians made it clear that they would not accept a reference to the ‘current division of Europe’ and asked why, if a reference were proposed to political and military groupings, there should be no mention of economic groupings. (d) Source documents 19. The Russians and East Germans stuck firmly to the position that if a reference was to be made to the Friendly Relations Declaration there should also be mention of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and some formula which though vaguely worded would clearly cover bilateral agreements. The Poles, Romanians and Yugoslavs combined to produce a draft which was acceptable to the Russians in this respect, but which was vigorously opposed by the West Germans with support from other Western delegations. The only compromise that seemed possible at the end of the third session was an agreement to refer only to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 20. In addition to these points at issue between East and West the first reading of the individual principles proposed by various delegations indicated that there would be difficulties over their precise formulation. The major difficulties from our point of view were a Spanish proposal to link ‘unity’ to territorial integrity; attempts by the Yugoslavs, Spanish and Romanians to press for ‘non-interference’ either instead of or in addition to ‘non-intervention’; and Romanian proposals for the inclusion of ‘the right of States to a free existence, to independence and to sovereignty’, and ‘equal rights of States’. 21. The most noteworthy feature of this first reading, however, was a carefully prepared statement by Mendelevich setting out Soviet views on the meaning of ‘inviolability of frontiers’. He made the following main points: (i) in presenting inviolability of frontiers as an independent principle the Soviet Union was not trying to establish a new kind of international law. (ii) they were not proposing that the CSCE should produce a new codification of the law; (iii) the principles they had in mind were those which participants of the CSCE should apply to their policies in Europe (Mendelevich quoted in this context a passage from Brezhnev’s speech at the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Union stating ‘all know the political principles on which in our view the security of the peoples of Europe should be based . . .’) (iv) there was no question of trying to limit the sovereignty of any State; the principles of sovereignty and independence had the same status as

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inviolability and one did not limit the other; (v) all States were entitled to ‘safeguarded and secure frontiers’; (vi) there could be rectification of frontiers (i.e. minor border adjustments by mutual agreement) but history showed that territorial demands inevitably lead to aggression. There was no immediate reply from Western delegations although a number had previously made it clear in the debate that ‘inviolability’ could in no circumstances mean ‘immutability’. It was generally agreed in the Nine that Mendelevich’s language on peaceful changes was highly restrictive and seemed designed by implication to exclude the abolition of frontiers by mutual agreement. 22. When the Mini Group resumed its work at the beginning of the fourth session it found itself with a much clearer understanding of delegations’ positions and of where to look for possible compromises, but still without any agreed texts. In these circumstances the Swedes circulated a paper prepared by their legal adviser (Blix) who had been intermittently involved in the discussions during the third session and was personally anxious to play the role of broker. The paper (which dealt with all aspects of this section of the terms of reference with the exception of the list of principles) was in many respects an ingenious attempt to present the issues in a way which would avoid the points of confrontation which had appeared from the earlier discussions. From the Western point of view, however, it had the major disadvantage of a very weak formulation on the application points relevant to the Brezhnev doctrine. In addition, it contained language on the declaration to be worked out by the Conference which was clearly more appropriate to a legal text than to the political document which we and a number of our partners wanted. On the other hand, it was clear from a first reading of the paper in the Mini Group that it was broadly satisfactory to the East. 23. We proposed in the Nine what we regarded as the essential amendments to the Swedish paper, and these were tabled in the Mini Group by the Italians. The Russians, who were by then clearly anxious to make progress, suggested the creation of an informal drafting group to consider the Swedish paper and the proposed amendments. This was accepted and agreement reached fairly quickly on two sentences relevant to the Brezhnev doctrine. The first provided that each participating State should respect and apply the principles in its relations with all other participating States irrespective of their political, economic or social systems; and the second provided that the document to be submitted for adoption by the Conference should ‘express the determination of the participating States to respect and apply the principles equally and unreservedly in their mutual relations in order to ensure to all participating

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States the benefits resulting from the application of these principles by all’. The Russians continued, however, to oppose specific reference to political and military groupings which the Nine were instructed to maintain for the time being by a meeting of the Political Directors on 14 May; and the Romanians insisted on a reference to size and geographical location regarded by the West as unfortunate in that it diluted the political impact of the phrase ‘irrespective of their political, economic or social systems’. The final text drops the proposed reference both to groupings and to geography. 24. The Political Directors had also concluded that it was necessary to insist on an explicit reference to the Friendly Relations Declaration in the terms of reference but that, if a satisfactory one could be obtained there would be no need to insist on specific mention of inter-relationship. The Russians had earlier indicated that such a compromise would be acceptable to them, but they subsequently took the position that the reference could not be such as to imply that the Friendly Relations Declaration was regarded as a ‘source’: to do so would re-open the debate on the Declaration on Strengthening International Security and on bilateral agreements. The agreement finally reached, which includes the reference to the Friendly Relations Declaration below the list of principles, but refers generally to the task of the sub-Committee, is regarded as satisfactory by those of our partners (especially the French, Irish and Italians) who seemed most concerned to secure such a reference. 25. The problem of wording implying a legal status for the Declaration provided a strange interlude in a debate which had previously been conducted almost entirely on East/West lines. The Russians declared themselves neutral on this issue and we found ourselves (with some support from the Germans and Americans) arguing against the Swedes and Romanians who were holding out for the strongest possible language in the English and French text respectively. The Swede (Blix) based his case on the argument that the principles being referred to were principles of international law and that to use words like ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’ implied a weakening in the commitment to apply them. The Romanians, who had consistently argued for a mandatory text which would fit into the idea of a ‘system of obligations’, maintained their position. We were eventually able to secure an acceptable if untidy compromise which excludes all reference to ‘rights’ in the texts. The lengthy controversy over ‘should’ and ‘shall’ is side-stepped by the phrase ‘each participating State is to respect and apply . . .’ and the principles are referred to as ‘guiding’ and not ‘governing’ the policies of States. We had to agree, however, in order to meet Romanian (and to some extent French) susceptibilities that the French text would draw on the verbs ‘devoir’ and ‘regir’ in these

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respects. 26. The Mini Group then turned to the outstanding question of the order of the principles and their formulation. In formally accepting that the list should include as separate principles on the one hand inviolability of frontiers and on the other respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and equal rights and self-determination of peoples the West Germans made a statement on their interpretation of the inviolability of frontiers. They made it clear that they interpreted it as meaning the renunciation of force against territorial integrity. The principle did not prevent peaceful changes of frontiers nor restrict the treaty making power of sovereign States. It did not prevent the rectification of frontiers nor their removal if States wished to merge. They referred specifically in this context to Western European unity and were supported in general terms by the Italians, the Irish and ourselves. 27. The Swiss convenor (by previous arrangement with the Russians) then asked Mendelevich how in his view the principle of inviolability would be affected if Libya and Egypt were to merge and abolish their frontiers. Mendelevich replied that this would be regarded as an exercise of sovereignty. The principle of inviolability of frontiers would not be relevant in the context. 28. The West Germans subsequently intervened again and made the following points: (i) the task of the conference was not to make new international law and they were glad that this was now clear from the terms of reference as drafted; (ii) in elaborating upon and formulating the principles listed in the mandate the Conference should take into account the relationship between certain of them; (iii) the Germans had consistently maintained that inviolability of frontiers was a form of principle of non-use of force derived from Article 2 (4) of the Charter; (iv) the principles of respect for human rights and of self-determination were of major importance and the Germans had always made it clear that references to inviolability in the treaties they had signed were not contrary to their constitution. The East Germans supported by the Russians made in reply a brief reference to Article III of their Treaty with the Federal Republic. 29. The question of order would have provoked a major confrontation had the Russians insisted that the inviolability should precede the non-use of force. The Russians argued that the inviolability of frontiers was a principle essential to statehood and that it should logically proceed principles such as refraining from the threat or use of force which

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described what States once established should or should not do. But Mendelevich was careful not to make a formal proposal on this order, and finally accepted the list with inviolability of frontiers immediately below refraining from the threat or use of force. He did so on the basis that each of the principles was equally important and that the order in the list did not represent any hierarchy. He added that the document to be produced by the Conference need not copy the list: the principles would have to be elaborated and there might be other changes too. 30. This left the question of formulation of the principles, which for the most part proved relatively easy. The Russians and their allies agreed with the Holy See to add a reference to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief to the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as part of a package in which the Holy See undertook not to press amendments to the terms of reference of basket III to make special mention of religion in connection with travel and information. The Spaniards, for their part, agreed not to press their ideas on ‘unity’ in the light of explicit mention to the Friendly Relations Declaration in the terms of reference. 31. This left only the Romanian amendments which caused difficulty not only because of Romanian stubbornness but because the Russians supported the unqualified references to independence and to sovereignty proposed by the Romanians while categorically rejecting the Romanian suggestion of ‘the right of States to a free existence’, whereas our position was the reverse. We were eventually able to reach agreement with the Romanians and Russians on the basis of a first principle to read: ‘Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty’. This goes very little further than the reference to the rights inherent in full sovereignty (the Russians objected to the use of the word ‘full’) in the section of the Friendly Relations Declaration dealing with sovereign equality, but it is already clear from reactions in the Romanian press that the Romanians will use the phrase to argue at the Conference itself for the inclusion in the Declaration of their original ideas. Chapter III Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 1. In the course of extensive bilateral consultations before the opening of the preparatory talks, the Swiss made clear their intention to present at the CSCE a proposal for new machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Their proposal contained two elements: a permanent arbitral tribunal for the settlement of juridical disputes and a permanent commission of enquiry, mediation and conciliation for non-juridical

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disputes. The tribunal and the commission were to be similar in many respects: both would meet only when there was a particular case to be heard. They would deal with each case in a chamber selected for the purpose from the full body. The procedure envisaged for convening the tribunal and the commission was also the same. Any member State could bring a complaint before either body and the other State or States involved would be bound to attend. However, whilst the decision of the tribunal would be final that of the commission would not. The commission would not be limited by existing law but would base itself on considerations of fact and justice. If conciliation failed the commission would make a final proposal which would not be binding on the parties unless they had already undertaken to accept it in advance. 2. In the course of their bilateral soundings the Swiss received a negative reaction from the East and particularly from the Russians. A number of neutral and Western countries on the other hand showed interest in the Swiss proposal, though most of them made it clear that they would not be able to accept it without amendment. We made it clear that we would have amendments to propose to some of the points in the Swiss proposal, but we encouraged them to pursue their ideas at the preparatory talks and at the Conference itself. There was a strong tactical element in our position, in that the Swiss proposal seemed likely to point up the contrast between Soviet lip-service to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and their dislike of specific arrangements. 3. Against this background the Swiss made it clear in their statement in the general debate at the opening session of the preparatory talks that they would want an explicit reference to machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes to be included under the security items on the agenda. They received support at that stage from Austria, Liechtenstein and Sweden. 4. Shortly after the tabling of the Western proposals on the agenda and terms of reference at the opening of the second session the Swiss tabled their own proposals on the security items on the agenda which both in form and in detail corresponded very closely to the Western proposals. In addition the Swiss proposed the establishment of a sub-Committee distinct from those dealing with the principles and military aspects to formulate a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We subsequently expressed our welcome for the emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes in the Swiss proposals. 5. The first public indication of the Soviet position was given when the Russians tabled their draft ‘assignment’ for the Committee dealing with security questions. It provided for a draft final document which should include, in addition to principles: ‘Measures designed to promote implementation of the aforementioned

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principles in the interest of strengthening European and international security including settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means chosen and agreed upon by the parties and development of multilateral and bilateral political consultations’. In explaining these proposals the Russians emphasized the importance of political consultations and argued that the CSCE should encourage their development. The Russians described their proposal as covering the subject of peaceful settlement in as realistic a way as was possible at the present stage of the development of relations between participating States. The East Germans spoke on similar lines and argued that the Conference should consider only those steps which it was possible to put into practice in the present or in the foreseeable future. They claimed that recent decisions of the International Court of Justice showed that proposals for the creation of legal and political machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes should not be pursued where the conditions were not yet appropriate. 6. A further contribution to the Eastern side of the argument was made by the Romanians early in the third session. They introduced in the Working Group (which was then discussing the question of principle) draft ‘Instructions for the Committee responsible for questions of security’ which covered not only principles but ‘the adoption of concrete measures’ to ensure their strict observance. The following were listed as examples of such measures: (a) the promotion of mutual undertakings both bilaterally and multilaterally concerning the elimination of the threat or use of force in relations among the participating States and the promotion of international détente and understanding; (b) the development of political consultations among States both bilaterally and multilaterally; (c) the adoption by the participating States of domestic measures of a legislative nature aimed at encouraging the attainment of the objectives of security and co-operation in Europe. This list was followed by a proposal that the Committee should study and propose ‘appropriate ways and means of ensuring the settlement of existing or possible future international disputes by exclusively peaceful means as a logical consequence of and necessary complement to nonrecourse to the threat or use of force’. 7. The Swiss seemed to have concluded at the end of the discussion on principles in the Working Group that their interests would not be best served by lengthy discussion of peaceful settlement. Their diplomatic efforts were concentrated on bilateral discussions with the East, and they were clearly concerned to do nothing in public which by exposing the full

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extent of the proposals they wished to present at the Conference, would make it more difficult to secure the appropriate reference in the agenda and terms of reference. They did not press for the Mini Group set up to draft terms of reference on principles and military aspects on the basis of outlines agreed by the Working Group to take the question of peaceful settlement as a matter of priority. Instead, they kept their idea alive by a speech in Plenary in which they said that they would press for an ad hoc Committee of the Security Committee to be set up at the second stage of the Conference, and that they would explain their ideas in detail there. This proposal prompted from the East Germans the suggestion that the Conference should avoid exploring the question in excessive detail, but that it might start work which could be carried on in the Consultative Committee which the Russians had proposed should be established to continue the work of the Conference. 8. The Swiss proposal received detailed attention in the Mini Group at the beginning of the fourth session. The Swiss proposed a short paragraph in the terms of reference for the First Committee which would charge it with the task of ‘undertaking as a specific item of its agenda the elaboration of a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes among participating States’. We, the French and the Italians expressed support for the Swiss draft. The West Germans and Americans, while generally sympathetic, suggested a softening of the phrase ‘undertaking the elaboration of a system’ and the Norwegians proposed a compromise formula to meet their point which was satisfactory to the Swiss. 9. The Russians, however, opposed the Swiss draft as too precise and emphasized that the Swiss proposal should be seen in the context of ‘a Conference which was not going to work on concrete systems but merely to speak out in favour of certain actions’. They then sought to dilute the Swiss proposal further by linking it with the ideas in the Romanian proposals (paragraph 6 above) and in particular with the development of bilateral and multilateral consultations. 10. The Swiss, whose main concern at this stage was to preserve a satisfactory reference to their proposal, worked out in informal tripartite talks with the Russians and Romanians, and subsequently introduced in their capacity as convenors of the Mini Group dealing with the question, a composite text. It included a somewhat watered down version of the Swiss proposal, and also required the Conference to take action to further bilateral and multilateral political consultations amongst States and to promote undertakings on a bilateral and multilateral basis concerning the elimination of the threat or use of force. 11. These Soviet and Romanian admixtures to the Swiss proposal were regarded as unacceptable by most Western delegations and we, the French

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and the Italians worked closely together in opposing them. The Soviet proposal on consultations was regarded as objectionable both in that it prejudged the Western position on follow-up machinery and because we did not want to give the impression (which would have followed from the context in which the proposals were placed) that the application of principles was dependent on new developments in bilateral and multilateral consultations. The reference, of Romanian origin, to undertakings concerning the non-use of force involved a commitment which we argued was both undesirable and unnecessary. 12. The Russians and Romanians stuck firmly to their positions and Western delegations were thus placed in a position where they might have to choose between the acceptance of unsatisfactory Soviet and Romanian proposals and the further dilution, if not exclusion of the Swiss proposal. The question was considered by the Political Directors of the Nine at their meeting on 14 May where it was decided that the Soviet proposal on consultations should in particular be strongly opposed. 13. Agreement was finally reached on the basis of a new text worked out in the sub-Committee of the Nine in Helsinki and introduced by the French. The final text shows little trace of the original Soviet proposal on the development of consultations, and makes it clear that it is respect for the principles which will encourage the development of political contacts rather than vice versa. There is rather more trace of the Romanian ideas on non-use of force. The Committee is charged with considering proposals designed to give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force, and the Romanians will no doubt exploit these possibilities at the Conference. The final sentence makes satisfactory provision for the Swiss ideas, and by introducing them with the phrase ‘In this context’ allows us to argue that it is primarily to the Swiss that one should look for ‘proposals designed to give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force’. 14. The final problem was how to deal with the original Swiss insistence that their proposal be considered at the Conference in a separate sub-Committee. We had originally seen no objection to this idea on the understanding that the sub-Committee would form the embryo of continuing machinery. With the admixture of Soviet and Romanian ideas the proposal for a separate sub-Committee became still less attractive and the Nine were instructed to oppose it. The Swiss finally agreed not to press their point on the basis of a gentlemen’s agreement that they retained the right to press for appropriate organisational arrangements for the consideration of their proposal at the Conference itself. We and a number of other Western delegations indicated that we would have no objection to the creation of some form of Working Group to deal with peaceful settlement.

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Chapter IV Military aspects of Security Introduction 1. It was apparent before the Preparatory Talks began that a major Soviet objective would be to involve the Conference in the production of a declaration of principles which would have particular reference to the non-use of force. NATO countries therefore decided to table proposals for confidence building measures of a political-military kind, which would both demonstrate that there were military aspects to security in Europe and contrast the Soviet desire for declarations with the Western desire for practical measures. 2. NATO countries were also aware that efforts to draw attention to the military aspects of security in Europe ran the risk of encouraging at the CSCE discussion of the MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions] negotiations. There was a general desire, amongst the Western countries who were likely to participate directly in the MBFR negotiations, that progress in MBFR should in no way be made dependent upon or guided by decisions in the larger forum. The French who were consistently opposed to the holding of MBFR negotiations were particularly adamant and argued that it would be wrong in principle and in tactics to admit any inter-relationship between the two sets of negotiations. The Dutch persisted against strong opposition, however, in arguing that the Conference should consider the indivisibility of political and military aspects of security and that the CSCE should produce a declaration on force levels in Europe, which would in their view enable those not directly involved in MBFR to express their views and thus ensure that the MBFR negotiations did not adversely affect the interests of other States in Europe. 3. There was thus full agreement in NATO on the tabling of two confidence building measures: the prior notification of major military movements and exercises and the invitation of observers to military manoeuvres. It proved impossible, however, to develop any consistent Western position on what became the vexed question of the link between the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations. For our part we were prepared to make some gesture towards the interests of non-participants in MBFR, but were opposed to any commitments which would complicate an already complicated subject. And we did not wish to embarrass the French or the Americans by trying to reconcile irreconcilable positions. First Session 4. At the first session of talks, no great distinction was made between the political and military aspects of security. The Russians in particular

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gave little indication of how far they were prepared to go. Warsaw Pact proposals for the first time at that stage mentioned ‘ensuring European security’ as well as the principles of relations between States, but this seemed designed to ensure that they achieved their prime objective in obtaining a commitment to a declaration before they committed themselves to discuss any other subject under this agenda item. 5. The Romanians took up a position which remained very much at odds with that of the rest of their Warsaw Pact partners. They wanted effective participation in MBFR negotiations (which at that point seemed likely to be denied them) and they saw in the Conference a means to this end. At this stage Romanian ideas of what might be negotiated in the MBFR talks was sufficiently inflated for them not to put forward any detailed proposals for confidence building measures at the CSCE. 6. Western ideas about confidence building measures were set out in broad terms during the general debate. Together with the West Germans and Belgians we drew attention to the general inter-relationship between the political and military aspects of security, but deprecated any attempt to forge any formal link between the CSCE and MBFR negotiations. The Dutch and the Italians were less cautious and both suggested that the CSCE should draw up a declaration on force levels. The Italians even suggested that the CSCE should produce the criteria for the MBFR negotiations but their attitude changed rapidly once the MBFR preparations began. The Norwegians proposed general discussion of MBFR to allow the neutral and non-aligned to express their views, whereas the French confined themselves to a mention of the declaration of principles only. NATO interventions thus reflected the differences of emphasis which had persisted in the Alliance. The highest common factor of agreement was that: (a) MBFRs were to be negotiated separately, (b) the military aspects of security should not be ignored by the Conference, and, (c) that confidence building measures could usefully be discussed. 7. Predictably all the neutral and non-aligned delegations expressed their own interest in the military aspects of security in Europe. The Yugoslavs made it clear in private that they regarded the Romanians as going too far in their ideas, but expressed a desire to see the Conference examine the political aspects of force reductions and define the principles for the parallel MBFR negotiations. They thought that the Conference should also agree on certain collateral measures and establish a body which could be kept informed of progress on MBFR. The Swedes repeated, though in a lower key, the need to keep the Conference informed of MBFR progress, and they also recorded their inevitable desire to see

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disarmament as a whole figure on the agenda. Second Session 8. The second session of the talks saw a wider welcome for our ideas on confidence building measures which were tabled in detail by the Italians on 15 January when they presented the mandate for the first committee on behalf of the Nine and the Fifteen. The fact that the Warsaw Pact countries responded on 18 January to the MBFR invitation, with proposals of their own for widening the scope of participation in the Talks, confused discussion on the CSCE/MBFR link. (i) Confidence Building Measures 9. As early as 20 January the Russians were indicating a readiness to consider confidence building measures of the kind that the West had in mind. On 22 January they put forward amendments to their original agenda proposals which included a reference to ‘including certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence’, making it clear that the problem of the reduction of armed forces and armaments should not be included. By 24 January the East Germans had expressed support for such confidence building measures as ‘advanced notifications of military manoeuvres for certain areas and exchange of observers at them’. This East German suggestion still found no place in the new Soviet paper tabled on 29 January by which time they had accepted the inevitability of fairly detailed assignments for each Committee of the Conference. 10. It seems probable that at this stage the Russians were reacting against the strong line being taken by most neutral and non-aligned delegations in favour of discussion of MBFR at the CSCE. They were lobbying among Western delegations to try to obtain support for their position. At this stage there was among Western delegations some concern that the Russians were trying to shift any discussion of military aspects of security to Vienna where confidence building measures at least would take on less significance than they would have at the CSCE. By the end of the session the Russians had still not given formal support to an East German text which appeared on 5 February and referred to ‘certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence having in mind mutual notifications about large military manoeuvres in stipulated areas and the possibility of the exchange of observers according to an invitation at such manoeuvres’. 11. The Yugoslavs on the other had suggested on 1 February a number of additional confidence building measures: (a) limits to the size and frequency of manoeuvres, especially of a multilateral kind; (b) bans on demonstrations of force;

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(c) bans on any increase in the size of troops on foreign soil. They told us privately that their intention was to discourage the West from insisting upon defining the measures to be discussed because in their view they did not go far enough. They claimed to have further ideas to propose later and clearly saw in these measures more than the West intended or the East could accept. (ii) Disarmament 12. At the beginning of the second session the Swedes tabled a proposal that the Conference should examine questions relating to the limitation of armaments and produce a declaration on the principles which might form the basis of future regional negotiations in Europe. Although this proposal remained on the table throughout the talks, it was in the end subsumed in the discussion on the link with the MBFR. Final reference to disarmament at the end of the fourth session were exceedingly brief and the prime Swedish purpose seems to have been to ensure that their own keen interest in disarmament could be aired at the Conference. But in face of widespread reluctance to introduce the technicalities of disarmament into the Conference they apparently decided that a passing reference was a sufficient peg for an expression of their concerns. (iii) CSCE/MBFR 13. As the elaborate nature of the Western draft mandates became evident, opinion amongst most of the neutrals and non-aligned delegations hardened in favour of some explicit commitments for discussion of military aspects of security and in particular of guide-lines for the MBFR. The Dutch added on their own account an addition to the Western proposals for the first Committee which reflected their own ideas on a declaration on problems relating to the levels and activities of armed forces in Europe. This would highlight the indivisibility of political and military aspects of security and refer to the opening of MBFR. 14. On the day the Dutch made this proposal (18 January) the Russians replied to the Western invitation to attend MBFR discussions, suggesting that all interested European States should be entitled to attend. The NATO countries could not accept this Soviet proposal and the question of participation was referred for fuller debate when the MBFR preparatory discussions opened in Vienna 31 January. There was some doubt in Helsinki about how the neutral and non-aligned delegations would react, but most seem to have appreciated Western resistance to any widening of the scope of MBFR participation. They appear to have considered moreover that their own relatively uninformed participation at highly technical MBFR negotiations would not be a substitute for a formal

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commitment by the CSCE to take into account their own suggestions for strengthening security and their desire for undiminished security. What is certain is that they thought that their restraint in a MBFR context deserved warmer Western support for their positions at the CSCE. 15. As a result this apparent Soviet attempt to moderate demands for discussions of MBFR at the CSCE met with little success. By the end of the session proposals designed to increase the content at the Conference differed in detail, but reflected the same widespread wish that the Conference would emphasize the indivisibility of the political and military aspects of security and produce a declaration which would lay down the general principles upon which negotiations for force reductions should take place. Third Session 16. Discussion at the third session of talks began slowly due to the procedural difficulties involved in establishing the right Working Group to discuss military aspects and security. At the first meeting devoted to these problems, on 14 March, the Russians explained that after their earlier doubts they had accepted the case for confidence building measures and believed that agreement could easily be reached. On detailed drafting they preferred their own reference to manoeuvres ‘in specified areas’ to the Italian reference to ‘Europe’. They also objected to any reference to ‘movements’ and stressed that observers should be exchanged ‘by invitation’. 17. On the following day the Swedes by previous agreement produced a draft framework document designed for transmission to a Mini Group which would enable discussion of the military aspects of security to proceed in parallel to that of principles. The paper proposed four subjects for inclusion in the final mandate: (i) a general premise (interdependence of the political and military aspects of security in Europe); (ii) objective (contributing to a lessening of the danger of military confrontation in Europe); (iii) confidence building measures, and; (iv) other relevant military aspects of security. The paper was accepted, although the Dutch, Yugoslavs and Swedes regretted that it was so imprecise. The French expressed strong reservations on point (iv) and only slightly less strong ones on the use of the word ‘interdependence’ in point (i). The Russians associated themselves with the French, though they indicated that they might have some wording on disarmament to propose under point (iv). 18. The Americans were particularly unenthusiastic both about other

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military aspects and about the possibility (mentioned by the Yugoslavs) of ‘further confidence building measures’. (i) Confidence Building Measures 19. As far as confidence building measures were concerned, the Russians continued to resist any reference to the prior notification of movements upon which the West continued to attach great importance. The Americans and the French (and to a lesser extent the Russians) were resisting the Romanian suggestion that two confidence building measures were of a preliminary nature and could thus be followed by more farreaching measures. There was also no clear attitude towards the Yugoslav proposal for restraints on movements and manoeuvres, although we ourselves had been able to indicate that we could accept a reference to ‘self-restraint’. 20. We were instrumental in producing a consolidated text, which by the end of the session read as follows: ‘In order to strengthen confidence, to increase stability and security and to reduce the dangers of military confrontation in Europe appropriate proposals [on measures of a preliminary nature] shall be submitted to the Conference including measures such as the prior notification of major military [movements and] manoeuvres on the basis to be specified by the Conference [restraints on such movements and manoeuvres] and the exchange of observers at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions’. (ii) CSCE/MBFR 21. Discussion of other military aspects only pointed out the wide differences of opinion that persisted. The Swedes (who had parliamentary problems about MBFR) tabled a text that referred to proposals to be submitted ‘such as a declaration on certain principles pertaining to the limitation and/or reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe and procedures to inform CSCE participants on the progress and results of relevant negotiations’. The Romanians underlined their own preoccupations by suggesting that the Conference should also consider ‘show-downs of strength and concentration of troops at the frontiers of other States; the reduction and finally the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States to within their national frontiers; the dismantling of military bases on the territories of other States; the cutting down of military budgets, and gradual steps towards the reduction of troops and armaments belonging to national armies; the creation of denuclearised zones in various regions of Europe; the abolition of military blocs’. These thoughts were received with incredulity, but underlay all

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subsequent Romanian attitudes and will no doubt surface again at the Conference. 22. By the end of the session it was clear that it would not be possible to reach agreement unless the Americans and the French were prepared to show greater flexibility in dealing with requests from many neutral and non-aligned delegations, as well as from the Dutch, for more detailed consideration of other military aspects of security. The Russians shared the American and French positions and did not scruple to set out in detail their own views. But they behaved with a greater flexibility which gave them considerable influence over the drafting of compromise texts and enabled them to ensure that it was towards the West that neutral and nonaligned fire was directed. 23. We were concerned throughout to encourage the minimalist delegations to take as forthcoming an attitude as possible without precisely defining where we stood. We had early on decided that we should not unnecessarily antagonise either the French or the Americans and we felt that, while it would probably be necessary to allow some discussion on MBFR, we should seek to prevent any wording which would run the risk that the Conference would produce declarations or political instructions which would complicate further the already complicated MBFR negotiations. 24. At the end of the third session it seemed probable that some form of words could be found which would enable the Committee to consider proposals for a declaration but would not commit delegations to producing one. It was, however, clear that there was no room for manoeuvre on the question of a declaration itself. The main problem in dealing with the desire of the non-participants in MBFR to be informed of progress in Vienna lay in the fact that however carefully the mandate was drafted there would be a danger that the CSCE as such or any continuing machinery to become involved in the information procedures. We believed that bilateral contacts were quite sufficient to meet the wishes of non-participants and our view was shared by most of our NATO allies. Fourth Session 25. Discussion of military aspects of security began slowly. For tactical reasons the Western countries were determined to ensure adequate progress on Basket III before picking up the momentum of work on the other subjects of the agenda. (i) Confidence Building Measures 26. By 12 May, discussion amongst the Dutch, Romanians and Yugoslavs and subsequent debate in the Mini Group had produced a text

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on confidence building measures, integrated into a draft sub-Committee mandate, which omitted ‘on measures of a preliminary nature’ (paragraph 20 above). The Yugoslavs, however, proved uninterested in the suggestion that the sub-Committee might consider ‘self-restraint’ on movements and manoeuvres, and the French, Russians and Americans expressed opposition to such a compromise. The Russians, who had indicated to us before the session began that they were having difficulties, maintained their position over a reference to the prior notification of movements, in the face of an adamant Western position. 27. The remaining square brackets were not broached again until the end of the session, by which time there was some hope that the Russians might be prepared to consider a formulation which allowed the question of movements to be discussed at the Conference but which did not so commit them as to the outcome of that discussion. In the second half of May, however, Mendelevich went back to Moscow and said on his return to Helsinki that, while he had persuaded his political authorities, he had been unable to convince the military authorities that he should accept any of the bracketed proposals. Indeed he insisted on re-inserting a reference to the exchange of observers at manoeuvres ‘by invitation’—an omission he had agreed with us at the end of the third session. 28. On 30 May the Swedish convenor in an effort to force final agreement proposed a reference to the submission of proposals on ‘other mutually acceptable confidence building measures’ and a sentence stating that ‘The Committee/sub-Committee may in this connection study the possibility of including prior notification also of major military movements’. The first proposal was designed to deal with the Yugoslav proposal for ‘restraints’ and the second the Western insistence on a reference to ‘movements’. In face of the new strong Russian attitude the NATO countries agreed to accept a compromise text as long as it contained a stronger commitment to study the question of movements than was envisaged in the Swedish text. In view of a hostile French and American attitude NATO was however unable to adopt a common position on to ‘other confidence building measures’. The Americans have told us that their instructions were adamant on this point. 29. On 1 June the Russians accepted a commitment to ‘study the question of movements and submit conclusions’. This was a considerable Western achievement in view of the earlier Russian attitude and their normal policy on such sensitive subjects. The text enforces both a study of the problem and the submission of conclusions. Western delegations accepted a reference to ‘by invitation’ on the grounds that an invitation was a sine qua non of an exchange of observers. The Yugoslavs refused, however, to give up the reference to other mutually agreed confidence

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building measures despite strong opposition from the Russians, Americans and French (we could have accepted the reference). Accordingly a reference to other confidence building measures was carried through in square brackets to the final plenary meeting when the Yugoslavs reluctantly agreed to drop the reference as part of the bargain over the CSCE/MBFR paragraph. The subject is, however, of fundamental concern to them and they gave notice in their interpretative statement at the final plenary that they would put forward their proposals again at the Conference. (ii) CSCE/MBFR 30. Most of the fourth session discussion was spent, however, in an effort to reconcile almost totally irreconcilable views. The Russians on 26 April indicated that they preferred the idea that the political and military aspects of security supplemented each other rather than that they were indivisible or had an inter-relationship. A compromise preambular text produced on 2 May by the Spanish, Yugoslavs, Romanians, Dutch and Norwegians prompted from the Russians and Americans hints of readiness to accept reference to disarmament, MBFR and, in the case of the Americans, to the need to keep non-participants informed of MBFR developments. 31. Encouraged by the 2 May discussion, we made an effort within the Nine and NATO to find a compromise formula but although we were able to secure a text which was broadly acceptable to those who held maximalist and middle positions it proved unacceptable to the French and Italians, both of whom then indicated that they could not accept any reference to MBFR. 32. By 12 May the Mini Group had produced a text whose first and third paragraphs constituted the first real step towards finding a compromise between the maximalist and the minimalist positions. ‘(i) The Committee/sub-Committee shall start from the premise that in the process of strengthening peace and security in Europe the political and military aspects of security are essential elements which complement each other [without progress in one being a condition for progress in the other] [progress in one will serve to reinforce progress in the other]. In connection with the military aspects of European security, in which all participating States have a vital interest the Committee/sub-Committee shall: (ii) Submit to the Conference appropriate proposals on confidence building measures . . . (iii) Give expression to the interest of the participating States in other relevant aspects such as co-operation in the field of arms limitation and

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disarmament, negotiations continued in appropriate fora on measures designed to bring about a reduction on military confrontation in Europe, [on political guide-lines aimed at ensuring the security interests of all participating States in as far as they might be affected by such negotiations, appropriate information of the participating States on the progress of such negotiations] [political considerations which States not present at such negotiations would like to raise and which they believe should be taken into account to protect their own interests, and appropriate and timely information to these States on progress and results of such negotiations].’ In the first (preambular) paragraph of the above text the first square brackets enclose a Russian proposal and the second an American counter proposal, both of which were in our view unnecessary. In the third paragraph of the above text the second phrase in square brackets ‘political considerations’ was a Swiss/Spanish proposal designed to overcome widespread Eastern and Western objections to ‘political guide-lines’. The proposal was generally well received particularly by the Russians, Americans, Italians and ourselves. The French, however, took no part in that meeting. 33. This text marked the start of serious drafting but concealed the real differences of opinion that persisted. The Dutch, Romanians and Yugoslavs were unable to accept the reference to ‘political considerations’ since this did not for them give them a strong enough commitment to the CSCE to produce principles on which to base the conduct of the MBFR negotiations. While it then seemed likely that the gap between the Americans and the Russians on the one hand and the Dutch, Yugoslavs and Romanians on the other was sufficiently narrow for a compromise to be found, French intransigence seemed likely to cause serious problems and was discussed on a number of occasions at meetings of the Nine in Brussels. 34. The French had, in fact so dissociated themselves from the texts under discussion that there was a real risk that delegations would believe that if only a text could be found acceptable to everybody else the French would come round at the end of the day. To counter this, the French on 21 May made a long statement on instructions confirming and seeking to justify their opposition to any form of CSCE/MBFR link. After questioning whether the ambiguous text under discussion was the right way to promote the interests of those who wished to have their views heard by MBFR participants, the French representative argued that while he could accept that Ministers would have the right to raise whatever subject they wished at the first stage of the Conference any reference to MBFR in the terms of reference would create the need to reach an agreed position at

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the end of the Conference. In the French view it was most unlikely that such a consensus could be achieved, and it would in any case, promote a link between the two negotiations which the French found unacceptable. They were not prepared to give approval to negotiations in Vienna upon which they had no influence and in which they were not represented. They were also unable to accept any institutional arrangements for keeping nonparticipants informed of progress in Vienna. The Italians strongly supported the French line. The Russians and Americans both said that a link between the two negotiations was unacceptable but were prepared to accept the phrase in the second square brackets in the third paragraph of 12 May compromise text (paragraph 32 above). 35. We kept to a low profile throughout these exchanges. It was apparent that any compromise that was reached would be acceptable to us. In subsequent discussion (in which the sensible Norwegians played a particularly prominent part) efforts were made to draft ever more exiguous texts which might prove satisfactory to the French and the Dutch. The French were prepared to accept a reference to disarmament in the preamble of the first Committee mandate as a whole but were resolutely against any substance to the sub-Committee on military aspects beyond confidence building measures. Their proposal for a preamble, when amended, resulted in a text which was acceptable, to us and most other delegations as long as it figured in a military sub-Committee context, but which in our view would have grossly upset the compromise already reached over the preamble to the first Committee mandate as a whole if it had been given greater prominence. The Russians contributed to the process of trying to find a compromise text for the third paragraph. There was, however, a real danger that the general willingness to search for a compromise text acceptable to the French would not last and that there would be a move back to formulations that might involve the French blocking a consensus, and could certainly have proved more embarrassing in the end to all MBFR participants. The French were pressed by many delegations to seek changes in their instructions. 36. The process of trying to find a text acceptable to the French and the Dutch (as the main protagonists on each side) was carried on until the eve of the final Plenary when the final formula was agreed on the basis of a French draft. For the French the text must be considered something of a defeat for it provides, albeit in very general and vague terms for the kind of potentially far-reaching discussions they were at such pains to avoid. But the formula does not commit participants to producing an agreed conclusion, let alone the principles upon which the maximalists had originally set their heart. In essence, as the Yugoslavs made clear in their final interpretative statement, the argument has been carried forward into

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the Conference itself. The text provides three avenues for discussion and the maximalist delegations will exploit every bend in the way to achieve the kind of results they wish. Chapter V Economic Co-operation 1. During the first session of the MPT, the Russians proposed that economic questions be dealt with in the same agenda item as cultural cooperation. During the second session they limited themselves to the simple ‘expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technological ties on a basis of equality, including co-operation in the protection of the environment’ 2. The Belgian draft agenda item and mandate for economic cooperation, tabled on 15 January proposed the study ‘under conditions of reciprocity and mutual benefit, ways and means of developing commercial exchange as well as co-operation in the various economic fields’ and referred to the possibility of ‘the newer forms of co-operation’ especially in the fields of industry, raw materials and energy resources. The Committee would be assisted by four sub-Committees: (i) on the development of commercial exchanges, which would aim in particular at the improvement of administrative procedures, of business contacts and facilities, of arbitration, as well as in available information; (ii) on industrial co-operation and co-operation in the development of raw materials and energy resources, in particular the development of administrative and managerial conditions as well as protection of investments and transfer of funds. (iii) on co-operation in other areas of economic, notably transportation, communications and tourism. (iv) on co-operation in the field of the environment. The Belgian draft was subsequently complemented by a draft mandate on science and technology tabled by the West Germans with agreement of the Nine. 3. The Russians criticised the Belgian proposal for its failure to take into account differences between economic and social systems, for its excess of complication and detail. As in the other baskets, the East Europeans resisted the idea of preparatory talks agreeing on the number and detailed mandates for sub-Committees. But they did start to indicate the areas which they wished the CSCE to cover. They predictably took the line that the Conference should consider general principles including MFN [Most Favoured Nation] treatment and non-discrimination. 4. Western countries pressed for greater precision than in the previous Soviet proposal, and were rewarded on 5 February by the tabling of an

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expanded Soviet draft calling for the Committee to prepare a draft final document containing a European programme for the development of economic co-operation, including: (i) the principle of MFN treatment and non-discrimination; (ii) all-European projects in the fields of industry, power, mineral resources and transport; (iii) co-operation in the field of science and technology; (iv) protection and improvement of the environment. The Poles on 19 March expanded the Soviet draft to include the development of industrial co-operation. 5. When discussion moved into the Working Group in the third session, however, it became bogged down in an attempt to agree on a skeleton for the mandate in Basket II similar to that adopted successfully for ‘Principles’ in Basket I, which would aid the drafting work. This attempt was not successful since the Russians resisted the inductive approach favoured by the Western delegations and pressed for drafting to begin from the top. They accordingly on 21 March tabled a draft introduction to the terms of reference for the Committee on economic co-operation, which was little more than a call for the drafting of an all-European programme. This was quickly followed by a Bulgarian draft mandate on trade which proposed terms of reference in some detail including much of the wording from the Belgian draft. It did however call for consideration of MFN treatment and non-discrimination. Further Eastern draft mandates were tabled in the next few days on science and technology (by the Czechs), on the environment (by the GDR), and all-European projects (by the Hungarians). 6. These moves, clearly giving the East the initiative, forced the West to consider the reformulating of the Belgium draft mandate to take account of the East European proposals. The ad hoc group in Helsinki accordingly produced, and in a remarkably short space of time cleared in the nine capitals, a new document which was produced on 28 March which showed the following moves towards the Soviet position: (a) a reference to ‘a draft final document’; (b) the inclusion in the trade mandate of ‘general provisions’ to take account of the East European interest in ‘principles’ governing trade; (c) the shortening of the trade mandate; (d) the insertion of a reference to ‘proposals’; (e) the inclusion of a reference to ‘projects of common interest’ to meet the Hungarian point, in the mandate on industrial co-operation. 7. The initial Soviet reaction was disappointing, but since the positions of East and West on the environment and science and technology were very close, the Russians reluctantly gave in to a Western suggestion that

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drafting should begin on those two mandates, which were fairly quickly agreed. The problem areas thereafter narrowed down to: (a) Eastern insistence on a long term programme and on references to MFN treatment and non-discrimination, together with their insistence on projects of common interest; (b) Eastern dislike of the Western reference to reciprocity and to improved administrative procedures in trade. During this period, the ad hoc group, meeting almost daily, had its first differences with the Commission representatives. The latter, who never really understood the scope and purpose of the MPT, wished the Nine to offer to discuss MFN treatment in the tariff field with the CMEA [Council of Mutual Economic Assistance] countries at the Conference, for the sake of the counter-parties they hoped to secure. This was strongly resisted for tactical reasons by the Nine. Fourth Session 8. When the final session of the preparatory talks resumed, Zorin (who had been in the Soviet chair for the economic as well as the cultural discussions) was replaced by Pozharski, the Deputy Head of the International Economic Department in the Soviet MFA. He immediately showed his interest in getting a move on, and on 7 May tabled a new draft introduction to the economic mandate, which went a long way towards the Western position, and at the same time indicated Soviet readiness to negotiate on references to ‘principles’ governing trade, as well as their proposed European programme. They remained however firmly opposed to mention of reciprocity. The Nine responded shortly thereafter with a reformulation of the introduction and the Working Group completed drafting the introduction (subject to certain Spanish and Romanian reservations) within the week. Reciprocity 9. The question of reciprocity however was left over for discussion at the same time as the trade mandate. The Community delegations, at the insistence of France, Belgium, the FRG and the Netherlands, made a mention of this and in substantial form a sticking point. They agreed that ‘reciprocity’ could be excluded from the section on commercial exchanges provided that there was a mention in the chapeau and most of them, including UK, made clear this preoccupation in the Working Group. The rest of the trade section was quickly agreed on the basis of a neutral paper produced after informal negotiations with the Russians and the Nine. The Russians accepted in discussion that ‘business contacts and facilities,’ had a wide meaning that would not preclude discussion on administrative

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procedures, though this expression itself was unacceptable to them. It apparently has disagreeable legalistic overtones in Russian. 10. Pressure for reciprocity was resisted by the East and the ad hoc group, mistakenly, waited on the Political Directors’ meeting of 25 May for an indication as to whether, in the light of the agreement that the principles of Basket I should also cover Basket II, unqualified mention of reciprocity should remain a sticking point. The guidance was not, however, forthcoming and discussion had to be resumed on the old basis. 11. The Swiss agreed to produce a compromise formula ‘reciprocity of advantages and obligations’ which had appeared in the Franco/Soviet agreement of 1971. Told that the Nine insisted on the use of substantive reciprocity he suggested that this be modified by adding ‘and taking into account different economic and social systems’. After a quick consultation the Nine agreed that they would study this formula with good will in the hope that there would be no need to return to discussion of it. 12. The formula gave rise to lively discussion with the ad hoc group. The Commission and the Germans thought that the Pozharski qualification could be taken to mean that even where there were different economic and social systems reciprocity applied. We and others were inclined to think that it would be interpreted by the East as providing a loophole which, like an albatross, would forever hang round the neck of the word reciprocity in future negotiations. 13. Eventually the reverse formula ‘taking into account the diversity of economic and social systems and under conditions of reciprocity of advantages and obligations’ [sic]. It appeared that the East had been alarmed by the possibility of our using our interpretation of the Pozharski formula as we had been at theirs. Our fears had been compounded by the possibility that a Romanian amendment providing for clear exception in the case of developing countries (and thus weight to the ‘exceptional’ character of the Pozharski formula) might be accepted. But in the event it was not. Commercial Exchanges 14. Some bitterness was caused among Canadians and Americans by acceptance of the Nine of the formula on obstacles to trade in the same sentence as the reference to MFN treatment. They claimed that whereas the reference to MFN treatment was acceptable and that to obstacles was also acceptable, if couched in excessively Eastern language the conjunction of the two made it easier to argue that QR [Quantitative Restrictions] should be discussed in a MFN context. We argued that on the contrary the clear provision of an alternative justification for bringing up the QRs would make it easier to argue that these should not be discussed

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under MFN treatment. In the event the Americans succeeded, under the guise of a stylistic amendment, in having a full stop placed between the two parts of the sentence. So everybody was happy. 15. The Commission argued strongly that ‘in the tariff field’ should follow the reference to MFN treatment in the mandate. Members of the ad hoc group were all agreed this would (a) prove unacceptable to the Poles and other East European countries and (b) mean that if we had to climb down, as we would, their point would thus have been explicitly conceded. The Commission eventually accepted the Belgian suggestion of an interpretative statement to be made when this section of the mandate was agreed ad referendum. The statement was eventually made and the Russians (whom we forewarned) did not react. Industrial Co-operation 16. The first two paragraphs were agreed fairly rapidly in the Working Group after a qualification had been agreed to the Polish proposed formula that the precise forms of co-operation should be agreed bilaterally. The proposal in the reformulated Belgian mandate of 28 March relating to establishment, administration, management and financial provisions for projects aroused bitter and continued hostility from the East. Wording covering the ‘conditions for setting up projects’ was finally agreed. Projects of Common Interest 17. The East argued forcefully and persuasively that the Western case for dividing these projects between two different headings (on the grounds that some were for public, some for private enterprises) was unrealistic. The ad hoc group was divided about whether it was more important to secure satisfactory arrangement on this point or on the above point in the industrial co-operation section and was hampered in negotiation by the inflexibility of the contradictory instructions of the Dutch and Belgians on the one side and of the Italians on the other. At the last minute the Nine regained the initiative by tabling a draft covering industrial co-operation, projects of common interest, and other areas simultaneously. This formed the basis of the ultimate agreement reached, not without last-minute acrimony (an unusual feature of Basket II in the fourth session) [in] the final working group meeting. We managed to secure some linguistic satisfaction, but there is no doubt that the disagreements in the Nine led to a less satisfactory result than unity would have achieved. The ‘other areas’ mandate was quickly mopped up, with a nod to Spanish and other countries’ preoccupations with tourism and migrant labour.

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Science and Technology 18. Discussion was resumed at the end of the fourth session on the— already agreed—mandate. The Nine played no great part in discussion and left it to the Swedes to press for mention of contacts and information which, during discussion, became, unobtrusively, the cardinal point of the first paragraph. Environment 19. Discussion on the basis of the—also agreed—draft was resumed at the end of the fourth session, and resulted in the removal of the limitation on relevant international organisations to members of the UN family. 20. When the Basket II mandate was adopted in plenary on 8 June, the Belgian Ambassador accepted it on behalf of the Community and made a declaration on Community competence in the trade field. Co-ordination 21. Co-ordination in the ad hoc group was close, continuous and above all time-consuming, covering tactics day by day as well as matters of substance. The Nine acted and were seen by all to act (since they caucused frequently outside the conference room when difficult moments arose during discussion) as a homogenous group. While the British and French played leading roles in discussion and negotiation with the East, there was no acknowledged chef de file on any point. The East could be confident in discussing a subject with any member of the Nine willing to do so, that he spoke with all. The neutrals, while occasionally irritated at the ponderousness with which the Nine had to react to new situations, were undoubtedly impressed. So must the East have been. 22. The conduct of meetings, however, left much to be desired. It was not certain whether de Selys (amiable but unsure of himself) or Herpin (at the other extreme) were the less successful chairmen. An effective secretariat would have speeded discussion. But the greatest single contribution to greater effectiveness would have been more flexible instructions for the Dutch and Belgians, who appeared to need permission from Davignon personally (apparently hard to obtain outside normal working hours) before they could change a word in an agreed text. In negotiating, we were thus never able to accept on the spot a compromise formulation. This, however, improved towards the very end of the talks, and, in view of the general tendency of the Nine to fall back on a fallback position with the least possible delay, may have been a positively useful brake. 23. The Commission understandably found it very difficult to keep closely in touch with proceedings at Dipoli, since the Presidency were too

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preoccupied with other things to help. As a result their interventions were often malapropos, and they lost the sympathy of the ad hoc group in consequence. If they are to be brought to understand the negotiating process of the CSCE, more care must be taken to keep them advised and informed. NATO 24. NATO co-ordination was much less satisfactory than between the Nine. Kovner (US) had instructions to go along loyally with the decisions of the Nine but clearly found it not much to his taste. The Canadians also occasionally showed their impatience with the Nine’s slowness. The Greeks, Turks, and Norwegians, on the other hand, seldom attended NATO meetings and their interventions were in consequence occasionally positively unhelpful. Their absence was at least sometimes due to inadequate administrative arrangements. This should be cured if possible before the Conference proper. Eastern Co-ordination 25. The Romanian, who produced a great series of amendments and showed little skill in negotiating them, was clearly regarded by East Europeans as a maverick. But the Russians were all too often able to throw the onus on to us to deal with them. They appeared always able to get the others into line when they really needed to. Pozharski (USSR) also liked to give the impression that the Bulgarian was forever looking over his shoulder and keeping him in line. The Pole and the Hungarian led on industrial co-operation and projects of common interest respectively and were occasionally able to command Russian support for their particular preoccupations. But when it came to the point it was with the Russians that compromises were always struck. Pozharski for his part clearly preferred dealing along with one or two of the Nine. The Neutrals 26. The Neutrals (particularly the Austrians and the Swiss) were generally willing to play a helpful and constructive role. The Swedes argued pertinaciously in defense of their own theses, which were generally better for our not adopting them as our own. The Yugoslavs played less of a role than one might have expected. The Spaniard and Finn seemed to have little understanding of what was going on. Despite our instructions to cultivate the Neutrals pressures were such that they tended to feel neglected in the press of events. The Nine will have to do much better at the Conference proper.

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Chapter VI Basket III 1. Soviet defensiveness on Basket III was apparent from the beginning of the MPT. In the general debate at the opening stage, the West emphasised the need to lower barriers to human contacts and the free flow of information, and were staunchly supported by neutrals, particularly the Swiss. The Russians on the other hand stressed the importance of the status quo in these fields, the need to respect other peoples’ laws and customs and to refrain from any form of interference. The Czechs reminded everyone that they must be ‘realistic’, and the Romanians told us privately that ‘any mention of freedom will cause difficulty’. 2. The East’s initial aim was therefore to obstruct detailed discussion of human contacts or information. Their first move in this direction was to combine these items with the economic section of the agenda under a single, loaded heading: ‘Co-operation’. They also strongly resisted in the initial phase the suggestion that the MPT should draw up detailed terms of reference for Commissions and sub-Commissions at the main Conference. 3. At the beginning of the second stage in January the West tabled three separate agenda items, the last of which, a Danish paper, was entitled: ‘The development of human contacts, broadening of cultural and educational exchanges and wider flow of information’. The Russians themselves tabled a very much shorter and general paper emphasising ‘co-operation’ in all these fields. They did, however, eventually agree to a separate item on ‘cultural co-operation’. In presenting the agenda item to the MPT, the Soviet Ambassador quoted from Brezhnev’s speech of 19 December of the previous year on the subject of human contacts and information, adding that there was no room under the Soviet agenda item for the ‘dissemination of anti-culture, i.e. pornography, racism, fascism, the cult of violence, hostility among peoples and false, slanderous propaganda’. 4. The Swiss suggestion that different proposals in various field should be put into ‘baskets’ resulted in those in the cultural field (Danish, Soviet, Romanian, Austrian and Yugoslavian) being lumped together for discussion. But at the end of the second session the Russians were still refusing to discuss terms of reference, and the contrasting length of the Soviet and Danish proposals emphasised the gap between East and West. [E]ventually the Russians did finally agree to the discussion of ‘tasks’ to be entrusted to Commissions at the second stage of the Conference. They then tabled a draft mandate for what was now item 3 of the agenda entitled ‘Expansion of cultural co-operation, of contacts among organisations and peoples and of dissemination of information’. The mandate was extremely brief and replete with restrictive qualifications.

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5. The first sample of what was later to become a standard Soviet practice of using East European countries (often with more liberal attitudes) to defend untenable Soviet positions came on 7 February when the Polish representative made a remarkably crude attack on the West for allegedly aiming at subverting the social systems of Eastern Europe by pornography, etc. Zorin’s own speech on this occasion was noticeably more flexible in tone, and included the Danish paper amongst those which could be examined in working out the mandate for Basket III. 6. Following the precedent set by the Working Group on Basket I, where an inductive (‘bottoms up’) approach had been successfully promoted by the West in order to ensure full discussion of the mandates, the same method of work was agreed in [the] Working Group on Basket III when this was established on 29 March. In a step to meet Soviet and neutral criticism of the length of the Danish draft mandate, the paper was abbreviated, though without any loss of substance. (It is worth noting however that the reference to ‘ideas’ in the information sub-section of the mandate which had not figured in the earlier paper was introduced in the shorter version.) 7. There was some discussion in the Nine and NATO about the tactics of tabling the revised Danish paper. These discussions brought out the latent differences of approach amongst various countries. The Dutch, Belgians and Italians quickly emerged as the anchor men of the West, and in the initial stages seemed reluctant to enter into negotiations at all with the East if this involved moving away from the Danish paper. Others, including ourselves at that stage, pressed for a more tactical approach, and emphasised the importance of ensuring continued support from the neutrals in the Basket III context. Agreement was finally reached to table the revised Danish paper quickly. It received the almost unqualified support of the neutrals. In response the Russians tabled a draft chapeau for the agenda item, composed almost entirely of high restrictive language aimed at diminishing the impact of whatever appeared beneath it. 8. The first discussion of the Working Group was marked by an opening statement by the Finnish delegate emphasizing the need to avoid controversy and indifference in other countries’ affairs, and generally taking undue account of Soviet susceptibilities. We and other delegates expressed strong disappointment to the Finns in private. The Finns hardly ever raised their head again in the Basket III context, although they must have been subjected to considerable Soviet pressure to maintain their opening line in order to balance the other neutrals who were very firmly aligned with the West. 9. Initial discussions in the Group also revealed a disappointing eagerness amongst some NATO countries (particularly the Canadians,

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Danes and Norwegians) to move more than half-way to meet the Russians. Throughout the discussion on Basket III the UK delegation occupied the middle ground in NATO and the Nine, leaning if anything slightly to the right of centre. The Americans maintained a consistently low posture, though their interventions were useful and clearly effective, e.g. the emphasis they gave to the importance of producing new proposals in the human contacts field and their strong resistance to over-emphasizing the legal aspect dear to the Russians. 10. On 2 April the East tabled counter drafts to cover all the sections of the Danish paper except human contacts (the Poles tabled on culture, the GDR on information and the Czech on education). The Russians however hinted privately that, as a concession, they might at some stage be ready to discuss human contacts. The West reversed its position against discussing the chapeau before the substance of the mandate following the tabling of an attractive Austrian alternative draft chapeau. The end of the third session found the Working Group moving towards the drafting stage on the chapeau, though the West displayed no hurry to do so. In his last two speeches at the Working Group, Zorin took a very negative position, refusing categorically to discuss e.g. re-unification of facilities, and insisting that such matters could only be solved on a bilateral basis. It seemed clear that the Russians were trying to disguise a weak hand by adopting a rigid position. Zorin’s abrasive presentation, however, helped to stiffen Western attitudes. 11. As expected, Zorin took a more flexible line after the Easter break. Though the Russians were clearly not yet prepared to make concessions of substance, Zorin’s more conciliatory tone nevertheless induced illfounded euphoria amongst the weaker brethren of NATO. This produced some strains in the Alliance, accentuated by the reluctance of the hardliners to make a tactical move away from the Danish chapeau on the Austrian paper, in order to avoid drafting on a basis of only the Russian and Danish versions and to ensure neutral support. We ourselves pressed hard for tactical acceptance of the Austrian draft in toto. The eventual Western readiness to do this can be seen in retrospect as a major tactical victory, following which the original Soviet chapeau was no longer under serious discussion. The Russians now produced a redraft of their own paper which, though it included some elements of the Austrian paper, remained much closer to their own earlier chapeau. The reference to ‘customs’ had gone, it was replaced by an odd phrase about the need to respect the ‘specifics of social systems’, and by a direct reference to the principles of ‘non-interference’ which was later to become the main plank of the Soviet position on Basket III. It was noteworthy however that the Soviet redraft included a mention of ‘new possibilities’, a point which they

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had no doubt conceded as a result of American interventions. 12. Meanwhile, the West had prevailed on the Austrians (who were willing accomplices throughout) to produce a revised version of their own chapeau, including a series of significant translation changes making the paper even more attractive from a Western viewpoint. The Russians now abandoned their attempts to keep their own papers in play, and concentrated on introducing amendments into the new Austrian text. Via the Bulgarians, they proposed the addition of: (a) a reference to sovereignty, non-interference and respect for laws; (b) a reversal of the order in which the sub-sections of the preamble were listed to bring culture to the fore rather than human contacts; (c) a mention of the UNESCO Conference in Helsinki in June 1972. It became more and more clear that the Russians attached prime importance to securing a specific reference to the principle of ‘noninterference’ in the chapeau. There were hints from the East that, provided this were guaranteed, the Russians would be flexible about the detailed sections of the mandates. Their aim was no doubt to poison the body of the mandate by introducing this omnibus negative qualification into the introduction. 13. So single minded did the Russians become about ‘non-interference’ that they seemed ready to make other significant concessions in the preamble itself in order to secure the point. Although the Austrians had originally inserted a reference to ‘differences in political, social and economic systems’ into their chapeau as a sop to the Russians, they had unwittingly made a Western point rather than an Eastern one by prefacing the phrase by the word ‘irrespective’ rather than ‘with due regard for’, which the Russians initially demanded and clearly wanted. It was therefore surprising to find Zorin actually agreeing to accept ‘irrespective’, given the strict Soviet attitude on co-operation with the West in areas bordering on the ideological field, such as information and human contacts. Zorin also indicated readiness to leave the order in which the sub-sections were listed in the Austrian preamble as it stood (though he entered a reservation) providing he got ‘non-interference’. 14. Although the Danes and the Norwegians wobbled from time to time, both the Nine and the Fifteen took a determined stand against noninterference, and the issue became a major test of will between the East and West. The West argued that it could not accept the selective insertion of principles in the chapeau, particularly those of a negative nature. We ourselves pointed out that there was no such principle as ‘noninterference’ in our political vocabulary (we were currently arguing for ‘non-intervention’ in Basket I). Yet, despite firm Western indications to the Russians in private that the issue was not negotiable, the Russians

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persisted to the point where it became clear even to them that they would have to climb down if further progress on Basket III were to be made. A number of ways out of the impasse were suggested privately or formally in the Working Group by the West or the neutrals: (a) a general reference to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (which includes the concept of non-intervention as well as more attractive principles from the West’s point of view); (b) a general reference to the principles in Basket I (which, when negotiated, would include not only non-intervention but respect for human rights); (c) the specification of two balanced principles of a positive nature, e.g. sovereignty and human rights. The Russians showed no interest in (a). The conservatives in NATO argued strongly against (b) and (c), and at one point the Americans, French and Norwegians broke ranks with the rest of NATO by openly supporting (c) in the Working Group, when the idea first surfaced as a Vatican proposal. (It should, however, be noted that the French, who adopted a remarkably firm position on Basket III throughout, deliberately refrained from supporting a reference to ‘non-interference’ though their instructions were flexible on this point.) 15. It was not clear at this stage whether Zorin still hoped that the West would climb down on ‘non-interference’; or whether he was awaiting new instructions from Moscow. The Russians were told by the Belgians that a meeting of the Political Directors on 14 May had unanimously agreed to continue to resist ‘non-interference’. The West simultaneously agreed to the establishment of an informal drafting group to deal with the preamble, in the hope that this would facilitate a Russian retreat. It was agreed that the Working Group would go on to draft the body of the mandate in parallel. 16. When, several days later, the Russians were still fighting for ‘noninterference’ in the drafting group, while showing considerable flexibility in the Working Group by agreeing to discuss human contacts rather than culture first and by accepting almost in toto a compromise Spanish text on human contacts which did not stray far from the Danish version, it seemed for a moment that the West may have made a major tactical error by agreeing to transfer discussion of the preamble to the drafting group, thus enabling quick progress to be made on the body of the mandate, while the Russians isolated the question of ‘non-interference’. However, the turning point in the negotiations on Basket III came on 17 May when the Russians finally offered to abandon ‘non-interference’ in return for a package including: (a) insertion into the preamble of a phrase emphasizing that the

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Committee’s proposals should be based on full respect for the principles in Basket I; (b) the introduction into the human contacts mandate of a sentence stating that relevant matters should be examined and settled by ‘States concerned’ (a presumably deliberately ambiguous formulation lending itself both to bilateral and multilateral interpretation); (c) the exclusion of the reference to ‘travel within’ (as opposed to ‘between’) participating States in the human contacts mandate. 17. Western reactions to the Soviet offer followed the usual pattern, with the Dutch, Italians and Belgians displaying the greatest reluctance to compromise on this basis. We argued in favour of qualified acceptance of the Soviet package, emphasizing that the abandonment of ‘noninterference’ represented a major psychological victory for the West. The Alliance eventually agreed to accept the package, but encountered unexpected obduracy from the Swiss, who were piqued at what was obviously an East/West deal. For several days they held up work in both the drafting and Working Groups, first by taking an intransigent stand on the relatively minor issue of the re-unification of families; and later by insisting that ‘States concerned’ was unacceptable since (as Zorin obligingly confirmed in response to a question) it was designed to exclude multilateral agreements. The French were also unhappy about ‘States concerned’ though they did not openly support the Swiss. The Swiss and the Italians (who had also reverted to a hard line position on the issue) eventually agreed to allow ‘States concerned’ to remain, following a threat from Zorin to withdraw his package if it were removed, and an interpretive statement by the Danes in the Working Group intended to emphasize the multilateral aspects of the phrase. 18. With the preamble now largely agreed ad referendum and an acceptable solution to the remaining problems in the human contacts mandate (involving the substitution of ‘shall prepare proposals to facilitate’ instead of ‘work out new ways and means’; and the deliberately vague formula on travel), the Working Group moved on to discussion of other sub-sections of the mandate. It was agreed in NATO that work on culture, education and information should initially be pursued informally with the East in order to produce compromise texts which could be surfaced as a basis for negotiation in the Working Group. We elected to discuss information with the East Germans, which promised to be the most difficult outstanding issue; while the Danes and the Canadians took on culture and education respectively. 19. A compromise on culture was quickly agreed between the Poles and the Danes. When this was discussed in the Working Group it gave rise to only three substantial amendments:

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(a) in a long duel with the Swedes and the Poles, the French insisted on maintaining a reference to ‘a long term cultural programme’, under which they planned to submit papers at the second stage. A compromise formula dropping the word ‘programme’ was eventually agreed; (b) the Danes had rather laxly dropped ‘dissemination and access to books and periodicals’ from their original draft. We, the Italians and the French moved for its reintroduction and a compromise was eventually worked out with the Russians, though the Italians held out for more; (c) the Yugoslavs proposed an amendment stressing the rights and interests of national minorities shortly before the paper was finalised. 20. The education mandate gave less difficulty, and contained two positive points of interest to us: the expansion of links between nongovernmental organisations; and a phrase about improving access to cultural, educational and scientific institutions. The only significant amendment proposed to the compromise worked out between the Canadians and the Czechs was the Yugoslav amendment on national minorities, which they insisted on introducing into the educational as well as the cultural mandate. 21. Meanwhile, we had begun a long series of informal meetings with the East Germans on information, taking care to include the Swiss in the talks. The East Germans and the Russians themselves made it clear that they were anxious to avoid ideological debate in the Working Group which was bound to arise if a compromise paper was not agreed before the subject was due to be discussed. We made full use of their nervousness, by emphasizing our need for a good presentational text and our determination to fight hard to get it, whether informally or in the Working Group. Although the original GDR counter draft on information had been absurdly restrictive, the East Germans gradually indicated readiness to make concessions to secure quick agreement. They began by conceding point (c) of the original Danish mandate (which dealt with the improvement of working conditions for journalists) in full. They then offered to drop restrictive language about ‘peace, intellectual values and good neighbourly relations’ if we would drop the references to the ‘flow’ of information and, more importantly, of ‘ideas’. We indicated flexibility on ‘flow’, and suggested that we could substitute ‘dissemination’ provided a satisfactory formula were agreed to include ‘ideas’. The East Germans maintained their insistence that ‘ideas’ must be either heavily qualified by specific references to ‘peace and good neighbourliness’, or dropped altogether. At the same time they moved a further step towards us on (a) of the mandate by agreeing to reference to ‘improved circulation of information’ providing this were balanced by a mention of the more official sounding ‘exchange of information’ in the same sentence.

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22. It gradually became clear to us that, despite the time pressure on the East, it would be impossible to secure from them a formula on ‘ideas’ which would imply clearly that it was the dissemination of ideas rather than their ‘peace loving’ nature which promoted security. We nevertheless decided to insist on the point in order to extract further improvements to the text on information. The East German finally made an unsolicited offer to include the word ‘freer’ if we would drop ‘ideas’. At this point we persuaded most of our allies (with the perennial exception of the Italians) that the moment had come to accept a package in return for dropping ‘ideas’. After tightening up the text still further (e.g. by including the phrase ‘of all kinds’ after ‘information’ in the first sentence), we told the East Germans that we could recommend to our government and allies that ‘ideas’ should be dropped only in return for a fully satisfactory text on confrontation. Minutes before the subject was due to be discussed in the Working Group, the East indicated that they could accept our draft, including ‘of all kinds’, in return for dropping ‘ideas’. The final text on information was in some respects an improvement on the original Danish proposal. 23. In introducing the paper into the Working Group, we recorded our disappointment on its failure to include ‘ideas’, but warned that it would be preferable to avoid trying to amend such a delicate compromise. The text was quickly adopted without amendment ad referendum, though the Swiss, Italians (and, in response, Zorin) made tactical reservations. 24. The last major issue to arise in Basket III concerned the order in which human contacts, information, culture and education would be mentioned: (a) in the agenda item (b) in the preamble (c) in the body of the mandate. The Russians argued that we should accept their preferred order since they made so many concessions on substance. The West, however, and particularly the West Germans were keen to see ‘human contacts’ in first place, and were supported by the neutrals. The question was dealt with in a series of informal contact groups. Zorin, with occasional support from the East Germans and Poles, conducted the negotiations on the Eastern side in the presence of representatives of all Warsaw Pact countries, except Romania. For the West the Danes took the lead under the watchful eye of the Americans, Germans and ourselves. The Swiss and Austrians participated throughout and sat firmly on the Western side of the table. 25. Zorin moved fairly quickly from his opening position and offered us our choice of the order for the preamble and in the body of the mandate provided that he was given his own choice in the agenda. The most

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attractive formulation he produced for the latter was ‘cultural cooperation, contacts, information’ with a fairly clear indication that he would accept the insertion of ‘human’ before ‘contacts’. He firmly rejected a number of Western formulae which reversed the order in the preamble even when we offered the introduction ‘Co-operation and facilitate . . .’ which placed the individual subjects in a context more attractive to the Russians. Our own fear during these negotiations was that the Russians would finally offer a ‘Co-operation’ formula which left out the crucial word ‘facilitate’ and which would prove in many respects less good than the short and clear title offered by the Russians. The Germans, however, were adamant in their insistence on having human contacts first and a number of our allies shared their view. It was generally agreed by NATO countries that we should seek to avoid a formula which would lead to the Committee being referred to as the ‘Cultural Committee’. 26. After a series of meetings which made no progress Zorin proposed the ‘neutral’ formula ‘Co-operation in humanitarian fields’. This, taken from the Brandt/Brezhnev communique, was clearly designed to appeal to the West Germans while leaving uncovered a number of important aspects of the terms of reference and, in particular, the question of information. We, with support from the Americans and the French (who joined the Group for the final round), argued first for the word ‘human’ and then for some formula to expand upon ‘humanitarian’ to which the German allies were clearly attached. Compromise was finally reached on the title: ‘Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields’ which, while in many ways a nonsense, at least avoids the risk that the work of the Committee will be overlaid by the adjective ‘cultural’. As part of the compromise we were given our choice of order in the sub-sections of the terms of reference (human contacts, information, and longer titles on culture and information) while conceding to the Russians the relatively unimportant order in the corresponding sentence in the preamble. 27. The only other issue outstanding was the Yugoslav proposal on the rights of national minorities which provoked strong opposition from the Italians and the Spaniards and was viewed with considerable disfavour by the French. We did not like the proposal but were content to accept it; and we fully supported a revised version produced by the West Germans in consultation with the Yugoslavs. We were drawn into the discussion, however, when the Romanians produced an amendment which not only limited discussion of the contribution of national minorities to cooperation between States but typically went further and sought by implication to limit the whole of the cultural and educational mandates in this way. We took part in the informal drafting meetings in order to block this Romanian initiative and were instrumental in finding a compromise

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acceptable to the delegations principally involved. The agreed text refers to ‘national minorities or regional cultures’, thus providing some escape route for the Italians and Spaniards who were particularly opposed to the reference to national minorities; and the reference to the role of States is clearly placed in a text limited to this particular question. Chapter VII Follow Up to the Conference 1. Soviet ideas for the creation of permanent machinery to follow the CSCE had been present in Warsaw Pact thinking for as long as the Conference itself. Prior to the Conference the Russians had tended to speak in terms of a permanent political body whose task would be to carry on the work of the Conference and in particular oversee the implementation of the conclusions. The idea of such a permanent body of political or general nature had been rejected as unacceptable by the Nine and NATO. They had determined before the Conference began to argue that questions of follow-up to the Conference could only be decided in the light of the results of the Conference and that therefore discussion of any new machinery of an ad hoc kind could not begin until the results of the work of the Committees and sub-Committees of the second stage were known. In arguing that the Committees and sub-Committees should themselves be on each subject the initial forum for discussion of followup, the Western countries envisaged making use of existing international institutions and resisting the establishment of any new machinery which might give the Russians droit de regard over Western Europe. 2. Soviet ideas on permanent machinery had been sufficiently discussed before the Conference for a number of countries to make a reference to the idea in the general debate in the first session. The Yugoslavs were particularly enthusiastic and argued from the start that CSCE should decide to meet again for a second Conference at a given date and that machinery should be created to continue the work of the Conference and prepare for the next. They saw in such machinery and the continuing nature of the Conference the possibility of a new safeguard against super-power pressure; but the fact that the Head of the Economic Commission for Europe, Stanovnik, is a Yugoslav has meant that they have looked with understanding upon the Western concern to use existing organisation to the full. 3. The Romanians too were enthusiastic from the start, but displayed less understanding for Western objections and were forward at an early stage of the Conference in suggesting in private that a bargain might be struck, in which the East would accept an agenda item that included human

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relations, and the West a separate agenda item on institutional follow-up. Other neutral and non-aligned countries differed in the importance which they attached to the question but it was clear from the first session that the West would not be able to rally much support from them if we sought to exclude discussion of continuing machinery altogether. 4. Western speakers generally refrained from any comment on ideas on follow-up to the Conference. The one discordant voice was from Norway who regularly throughout the Conference expressed the view that some form of continuity would be helpful to détente. 5. At the end of the first session of talks the Russians for the first time indicated some watering down of their original proposal when they said that the permanent machinery should be consultative in nature, work on a consensus approach, and be seen as a bridge between the first and subsequent Conferences. It seems likely that at that stage they realised they would have a better chance of getting their ideas accepted if they tried to play down the significance of what they were proposing. 6. Western proposals put forward at the beginning of the second session made no reference to continuing machinery and the ideas put forward by the Swiss, Austrians, and Swedes two days later were also commendably cautious. The Yugoslav proposals however clearly reflected their earlier ideas. When the Russians put forward their proposals on 22 January they put forward a four-item agenda of which the third item was an expansion on cultural co-operations, contacts between organisations and people and the dissemination of information, and of which the fourth was the establishment of a consultative committee, whose tasks they defined in greater detail three weeks later as being ‘to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe, open for participation to all European States, the USA and Canada. This committee will have a consultative status. Its functions may include such tasks as matters relating to European security and co-operation; preparation of further all-European conferences; and any other questions which might be entrusted to it by the Conference. The committee will work on the basis of consensus’. The Soviet proposal was surprising in two respects. In the first place they conceded the Western idea of a separate committee for cultural and human contacts, without attempting to bargain it off, either against the dropping of sub-Committees or the acceptance of a separate agenda item on followup. Secondly, the wording of their text on follow-up machinery was a good deal looser than had been previously expected. 7. On the whole it was recognised that discussion of institutional follow-up was premature, but predictably the Romanians went a great deal further than everyone else in saying that not only would a continuing

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institution ensure continuity of talks among European states but that it should ‘examine, at the request of a State and on the basis of consensus, problems which might arise, and present the results of such discussions to the next conference for decision’; they went on to say that it should ‘prepare for future meetings of the conference; its institutions should have a rotating presidency who would host the secretariat.’ At the end of the session the Russians felt obliged to defend their proposal against Western attack. The main interest in their speech lay in the indications of apparent flexibility. 8. During the second session discussions in the Nine and NATO turned to a French proposal which took up an earlier German idea of a steering/co-ordinating Committee. They proposed that, parallel to the other Committees of the second stage, there should be a Committee whose task it would be to co-ordinate the work of the other Committees and provide a forum in which, at the end of the second stage of the Conference, there could be a discussion of what follow-up if any was required. At this stage we were concerned that such a co-ordinating Committee would not downgrade the work of the commissions and sub-commissions whose role was crucial to the Western concept of the Conference, but which had not been properly accepted by the Russians. Once the French had taken up this idea, however, they were keen to get the idea of a co-ordinating Committee clearly established insofar as its procedural functions were concerned before the Talks entered into serious arguments about the fourth basket. 9. The procedural arguments were quite strong since it was clear that there would be a role for some form of steering Committee on which deputy heads of delegation could sit and ensure a certain consistency of work at the second stage. The idea of giving the Committee the task of considering follow-up (which at this stage was considered an alternative to a fourth agenda item), was, however, thought by some to carry with it the danger of becoming an embryo for a consultative Committee of heads of mission after the Conference. 10. By the end of the second session our arguments that it would not be possible to decide what, if any, new machinery would be required, until we had a clearer idea of the result of the Conference, remained valid. There were good technical reasons for sticking to this line of argument, but it was becoming apparent that it would probably be impractical for the West to try to exclude a separate agenda item altogether in view of the attitude of the neutral and non-aligned delegations. The Nine and NATO therefore gave particular attention during the recess to the kind of proposals that the West might make for follow-up to the Conference, on the basis of the French idea of a consultative Committee. 11. In view of the slow progress at the third session the fourth basket

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was not discussed again until late in the session. At a plenary meeting on 13 March the French tabled the proposed terms of reference for the coordinating Committee insofar as they concerned procedural matters, and they set out its functions in greater detail at the end of March. It was, however, in the Western interest to delay discussion on follow-up machinery for as long as possible and the Russians proved content with only a cursory discussion of the fourth basket before the end of the third session. At the plenary on 3 April the Swiss and Austrians both argued that the follow-up would have to wait until preliminary results emerged from the second stage of the Conference, though the Romanians expatiated at length upon the subject. They suggested in particular that the consultative Committee should move from country to country at six-monthly intervals. In a rather heavy-handed intervention the Russians made the point that the United States and Canada could participate in the consultative Committee. 12. At the beginning of the fourth session of talks the French and Canadians reported indications from the Russians that they would be prepared to accept the co-ordinating Committee as the forum for consideration of questions of follow-up, but the fourth basket was not tackled until nearly the end of May. By that time the Irish and to a lesser extent the French had begun to feel that the text agreed by the Nine and in NATO was inadequate for that stage in the negotiations. It was agreed, however, that the Belgians would table the text agreed by the NATO Council without the inclusion of the reference, originally inserted by the French, to a second Conference. 13. One cause of difficulty was that the West Germans had begun to promote a rival text which, in the light of the discussions between Brezhnev and Brandt in Bonn, would have been more forthcoming about the idea of a political consultative Committee and more specific in its suggestions for its organisation. Fortunately their views received little support but it was generally accepted that, having started off with the NATO text, we might if necessary agree to add references to a consultative Committee or a second Conference provided that we retained the essential considerations upon which discussion of follow-up machinery should be based. 14. The Belgians accordingly tabled the following text: ‘The Committee shall, before submitting to the Conference the recommendations of the other Committees, study such measures as might appear necessary to give effect to these recommendations. Insofar as these measures appear to require an appropriate framework, the Committee shall seek to make maximum use of existing international institutions and to avoid duplication of work. If a specific requirement is identified in an appropriate field where no suitable institutions exist, the Committee may

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at its discretion recommend to the Conference proposals likely to meet this specified requirement for as long as this may be necessary.’ 15. This served as the basis for a compromise reached at an informal lunch which we attended with representatives of Belgium, Italy, Romania, Soviet Union, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. The compromise text was remarkably similar to the one originally proposed by the NATO countries and caused difficulty only to the French for reasons connected with their position on the aspects of security for Europe. They insisted that the coordinating Committee should consider ‘procedures’ rather than ‘measures’ to ‘improve’ rather than ‘strengthen’ security. We accepted the reference to ‘improving’ security and co-operation in Europe, but expressed a preference for ‘measures’ rather than ‘procedures’ in the English text. The Russian text will also speak of ‘measures’ and no-one objected to the Russian’s acceptance of ‘improving’ on the basis that the Russian word would mean ‘consolidating’. 16. Despite a half-hearted attempt by the Belgians it was agreed that the mandate for the co-ordinating Committee to consider follow-up of the Conference should figure as a fourth agenda item provided that it had an uncontroversial title and was clearly assigned to the co-ordinating Committee for consideration. It is by no means clear why the Russians did not fight harder for a punchier text on this subject. One explanation may be that in view of the strong Western attitude they reckoned that it would be better to allay neutral and non-aligned suspicions by going for the least controversial text. It may also be that their enthusiasm for the subject has been somewhat dented by the nature of the mandates agreed for the second stage of the conference and that they wish to keep open their options. Whatever the Russian motives, it is interesting that neither the Romanians nor the Yugoslavs made any serious effort to get included references to a second Conference, for there seems little doubt that they will revert to this idea during the second stage. Chapter VIII The Mediterranean 1. During the early stages of the preparatory talks Algeria and Tunisia expressed a desire to be associated with the Conference on the grounds that their interests were closely bound up with European security. When the talks began there were references in the opening speeches of several countries to the need to take into account the problems of the Mediterranean and the effect that a Conference on security and cooperation in Europe would have upon security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. All the European Mediterranean states stressed this

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problem, but although one or two, Austrian and Yugoslavian most notably, referred to the problems of the Middle East it became clear fairly quickly that no-one really wanted the CSCE to be confused and side-tracked by debate on the problems of the Middle East. The Austrians (and to a lesser extent the Yugoslavs) were alone in pressing, long after others had dropped the idea, for some explicit reference to the Middle East in the agenda of the conference. In fact most countries realised that even giving observer status to the non-European Mediterranean states was likely to upset the balance of the Conference. 2. In the first session the Yugoslavs said that the North African states should be allowed to ‘contribute to examining our common problems’ and the Spanish thought that the Conference should ‘provide appropriate means for the voices of the Southern Mediterranean countries to be heard’. Although the Maltese emphasised their particular interest in the Mediterranean, they did not call for a separate agenda item nor for the participation of the North African countries. They did however make a specific reference to the concentration of naval forces in the Mediterranean. 3. Throughout the early stages of the talks the Algerians and Tunisians made a particular point of cultivating participants. They called on HM Ambassador on 23 March to canvass a proposal that they, with the support of two or three countries participating in the talks, should make a declaration in closed session pointing to the concern and interest of Mediterranean countries in the CSCE. The Algerians however ma[d]e it clear that they no longer sought observer status at the CSCE or the inscription of the Mediterranean on the agenda. Later in the first session they sent formal notes to a number of participants and to the Finnish chairman with the request that they should be circulated to delegates and treated as ‘conference documents’. Totterman announced in plenary that he had received the documents and would make them available to any representative who so desired, but he did not offer to circulate them more generally and the notes did not subsequently become formal documents of the Consultations. Both communication[s] argued on predictable lines that North Africa’s close economic and security ties with Europe made it necessary for European participants in the CSCE to bear their interests in mind. 4. At the second session of talks at the end of January, the Turks proposed that, in order to emphasise the link, between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean, the text for the first commission should include an obligation to bear in mind when drafting a declaration of principles that these principles should apply to the Mediterranean as well. They won little support except from the Yugoslavs since it was clear that any such attempt

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would only result in a markedly inferior set of principles. Moreover they then had to argue against any similar reference in that part of the first Committee mandate which concerned confidence building measures. Although they stuck to their ideas until the end of the fourth session, in the end they reluctantly accepted the more general reference in the preamble to the first Committee as a whole. 5. At about the same time the Maltese representative argued in plenary that while he was not asking for a special item on the Mediterranean he wished simply to ensure that when participants talked about the Mediterranean aspects of certain problems, for example the prior notification of exercises, they would not be ruled out of order. By the end of the second session there was considerable consultation between the Mediterranean countries including the Italians and French. The fact that there was a strong Mediterranean lobby did not however prevent the Russians and their allies from maintaining a steadily hostile attitude to the subject. 6. The Political Directors however at their meeting on 16-17 January, had become seized of the interest expressed by the certain non-European Mediterranean countries and had asked the sub-Committee in Helsinki to consider the problem. As a result of this mandate, the French produced a paper which formed the basis of all subsequent discussion on the problem. This paper (which became in due course CSCE (73) 22F revised) drew particular attention to the interest of the Algerians and Tunisians and the need for the Nine not to take a negative attitude to their requests for some form of association. The French argued that not only were there genuine arguments in favour of taking Mediterranean considerations into account, but that it would be better to leave it to some of the other participants at the talks to take a negative attitude. It was agreed however that it would not be possible to give these countries full participation nor observer status since this would only lead to further demands for full participation. They suggested that the final text on the question of participation should include a passage which drew attention to the close ties between the problems of security and co-operation in Europe and similar problems in the Mediterranean and suggested that under conditions to be determined by the Conference, the Conference should acquaint itself with the points of Mediterranean non participants. They rather cleverly also proposed that the final text on participation should draw particular attention in this context to those who had already taken the initiative in expressing interest in the CSCE. 7. Although we were concerned to meet legitimate Mediterranean concerns without widening the scope of the Conference or giving rise to the demands for participation by countries not represented in Helsinki

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other members of the Nine were less careful. We took the line that while we had no objection to a general formula requesting the Conference to bear in mind Mediterranean aspects of European problems, we would rather not have specific references to specific aspects of the agenda mandates. This line proved acceptable though when the paper was later discussed with other NATO allies the Norwegians were particularly cool to the whole idea. 8. During the third session a number of informal meetings were held on the Mediterranean, convened by the Yugoslavs and the Spanish with participation by invitation. We attended almost all meetings together with the French, Italians and Dutch. East European interest in the group did not last long. 9. This informal group was totally unofficial (clandestine to the French) and was under no instructions to report back to the Working Group or to Plenary. Its ostensible aim was to exchange views on the various formulations put forward in the plenary and to reach agreement on the most suitable draft. Discussion in the group was lively and frank if often muddled. Predictably certain Mediterranean countries wanted more than the West was willing to concede. The main points of issue were: (i) Mention of the Mediterranean in the terms of reference of the commissions and sub-commissions and sub-commission. It was eventually agreed that the most sensible solution would be to have the following phrase in the introductory paragraph of the final report: ‘En traitant de las securité (et de la co-operation) on ne doit pass perdre de vue les rapports qui existe entre la securité (et co-operation) entre le Continent European et le région Mediterranée’. This was very much on the lines of that proposed by the French in the Nine (page 3 of CSCE (73) 22F revised), although at the time the latest revise agreed in the SubCommittee was the slightly more restrictive alternative ‘la Commission ne doit pas perdre de vue les rapports existant entre certains problèmes touchant las Mediterranée’. It was agreed that the above formula should be retained and that the Group should decide later, in the light of the discussions in the Working Group, how and where it should be inserted. The Maltese argued against seeking to include a reference to the Mediterranean in the draft terms of reference for the sub-commissions. A mention in one sub-commission but not in another would prove restrictive. Their view was that a general mention either in the final report or in the terms of reference for each commission would allow anyone to raise the Mediterranean where they considered it appropriate. Any attempt to include a reference to the Mediterranean in the terms of reference of each sub-commission would only lead to excessive argument at the consultations.

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(ii) Extension of various proposals to the Mediterranean: (a) Principles The Turks and others wanted the principles applied to non-participating countries of the Mediterranean and suggested that there should be some means whereby such countries should themselves subscribe to the principles. The French pointed out that it was invidious to extend the principles to certain areas and not to others. The Maltese made the refreshingly frank comment that non-participants would anyway not be particularly excited about this suggestion given that the Conference would only be reaffirming principles contained in the UN charter; (b) Confidence building measures The Maltese and to a certain extent the Cypriots were very keen that CBM’s should be extended to the Mediterranean and they found considerable support amongst the other neutrals. (c) Exploitation of raw materials and energy The discussion was very vague but there was no doubt that the Mediterranean countries would want to raise the Mediterranean aspects of this and other economic questions at the Conference. (d) Environment There was a strong feeling that the Mediterranean should be included in the discussion of this issue at the CSCE. (iii) Participation. Nobody advocated full participation at the CSCE for non-Mediterranean countries but the Swiss and Yugoslavs pressed strongly for their being granted observer status. 10. The group provided a useful forum in which to moderate some of the more extravagant ideas of the Mediterranean states; in particular the idea that confidence building measures could easily be extended to the Mediterranean. It was apparent however that no firm decision about the way in which the Mediterranean should be considered could be made until the form of the agenda and mandates was clearer. The group met from time to time throughout the fourth session without any great result. A full Working Group discussion on 27 April reached tentative agreement that (a) the Middle East should not figure on the agenda, (b) that there was no need for specific reference to the expansion of principles to the Mediterranean (Turkey dissenting); (c) that confidence building measures should not be extended to the Mediterranean (Yugoslavia and Malta dissenting); (d) that the best way of covering the Mediterranean might be the inclusion of a phrase in the preamble to the effect that the relationship between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean should not be overlooked. 11. The question of the Mediterranean was not again formally tackled until discussion turned to the question of participation at the Conference.

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This is discussed more fully under the chapter entitled ‘Procedures and Organisation of the Conference’. Although the Yugoslavs in particular still hankered after some form of observer status for the Mediterranean countries the informal group was able to agree that the French text, as it had been agreed by the Nine, constituted the best guarantee that the interest of the Mediterranean would not be overlooked. The Russians however took a very hostile attitude towards any attempt to single out any particular set of countries for special treatment. They had reconciled themselves to some general reference to the Mediterranean but insisted that any reference to oral or written contribution from non-participant states should be phrased in as general and discretionary manner as possible. Despite some grumbling (among others from the Italians who had decided in Rome that it might be worth their making a political gesture towards the Arabs) agreement was reached on a text which enabled the Conference to acquaint itself with the points of view of non-participant states, drew attention obliquely to the non-participating Mediterranean countries but did not give any special priority to the Algerians and Tunisians. This restrictive text was also welcome to the Scandinavian countries who had not from an early stage looked with much favour on the Mediterranean aspects of the Conference. 12. The question of the Mediterranean however was overshadowed in the final stages of the talks by the Maltese amendment, proposing that the Arab states bordering the Mediterranean should be entitled to attend the Conference as full participants. The effect of this amendment was to strengthen the fears of most delegations that any move to give the Arabs or North Africans any special treatment would run a very real risk of introducing Middle East problems into the Conference. These fears were encouraged by the fact that the Tunisians had become more active and had started to argue that the Middle East should have a place at the Conference. 13. The Maltese amendment was tabled on 23 March and on 23 March the Maltese Ambassador made a long statement explaining why the Maltese Government had felt it necessary to put forward this disruptive proposal at such a late stage. In view of Malta’s line in earlier discussions it was clear that Mintoff had decided to use the talks as an opportunity to draw attention to Malta and pose as a Champion of the Arabs. The Ambassador’s main argument was that the security of Malta should not be made subordinate to any considerations of the convenience of the CSCE. He also included some remarks about the threatening activities of states represented at the talks. 14. The Maltese amendment was unanimously opposed by all the other participants at the talks. The Yugoslavs, Italians and Austrians in turn came perilously close to offering unacceptable compromises but the

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Cypriots, Spanish and French were particularly forthright. The West refuted the logic of the Maltese arguments and left the East to make the impassioned appeals. The Russians were particularly upset at the prospect of having their Conference wrecked by a Maltese attempt to up stage them in support of the Arabs. In the end the Maltese backed down and accepted a Romania compromise which constituted re-inserting into the chapter on ‘Contributions from non-participants’ the old French phrase (end of para 6 above) about giving particular attention to those states who had already expressed their views. Chapter IX (a) Financial Arrangements 1. A Working Group was set up to meet in the last session of the MPT to examine ‘the principles of distribution among the participating states of the expenditure required for the holding of the Conference, and of the system of financing the set expenditure’. When decisions concerning the date, place, procedure and structure of the CSCE had been taken by the Plenary Session, the Group was also to consider the scope and volume of expenditure required for the holding of the Conference, the basic requirements as regards technical facilities, as well as other technical and financial problems of the Conference. Since however the decisions concerned were taken only at the last two plenary meetings, the Working Group was only able to have an informal discussion of the costs of Stage 1, which were estimated by the Finnish Government to total about $1 million. It was left that the Executive Secretary would submit a draft budget to the participating states for Stage 1 before the start of that stage. It would be for the Conference itself to consider similar budgets for Stages 2 and 3. 2. The Working Group held a disproportionate number of meetings to discuss the basis on which the costs of the Conference would be shared. Discussions among the Nine and in NATO failed to produce any united point of view, and consequently the financial group was the only working group at the MPT where the delegations either of the Nine or of the Fifteen did not have a common line. The Americans, for understandable reasons, were opposed to the application of the UN system of cost sharing, and proposed originally that all participant states should pay the same proportion of costs. They quickly amended this to an equally unacceptable proposal that the seven smallest nations should pay a smaller proportion, and for several meetings stubbornly defended their position. Once the Group moved, at British initiative, into informal sessions however the Americans showed themselves more flexible, particularly as it began to

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appear that their proportion of the expenditure (which on a UN scale would have been over thirty per cent) would in practice be brought below ten per cent. 3. The majority of delegations had a clear preference for the implementation of an adapted version of the UN cost sharing system. In the knowledge that this was unacceptable to the United States, Ambassador Mendelevich suggested informally to HM Ambassador on the eve of Dipoli IV that cost sharing should be based on a division of contributors into a number of groups. Once initial positions had been stated in the Working Group, our Delegation proposed dividing the contributors into six groups, each paying an equal share, grouped according to their proportion of the UN budget. We were able to secure the agreement of all delegations, even the Romanians (who were the most insistent on sticking to the UN formula), that such a system should be taken as the basis of consideration. 4. From this point, mostly in informal sessions, agreement emerged on the division of participants into six groups; we indicated that we were prepared to join the same group as the United States and the Soviet Union as long as our percentage contribution was kept below nine per cent. We originally tried to obtain agreement that all states would pay a minimum contribution of one per cent; this quickly proved unacceptable to the mini states, who succeeded in negotiating their contribution down to 0.2 per cent. 5. With few exceptions, the grouping of states was a relatively easy, if time consuming, affair. The principal difficulties were Italy and Canada, which had a similar GNP or UN share, between the five largest countries and the next group (including Belgium, the GDR, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden). For reasons no doubt of ‘bella figura’ the Italians were anxious to join the top group of contributors; the Canadians were anxious not to join the second group. A compromise was reached to put Canada in a category of her own. 6. The British Delegation played the major part in achieving the final result. What finally swung the decision in favour of the scheme which was eventually agreed was the knowledge on the part of all delegations that any alternative would be even more difficult to negotiate. This was the only Working Group in which the Romanians were actively helpful, although they insisted that the cost sharing scheme adopted should not create a precedent. The Russians were throughout helpful to our efforts to achieve a sensible grouping, and the general readiness to keep the mini states’ contributions below one-quarter per cent helped to ensure their good will.

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Chapter IX (b) Procedures and Organisation 1. The procedures which were agreed at the first session for the preparatory talks as a whole provided the basis for the rules of procedure subsequently drawn up for the Conference proper. The framework of the recommendations and their division into seven different chapters dealing with the organisation of the conference, the agenda and the related instructions, participation, date, place, rules of procedure, and financial arrangements were a French idea, the details of which they set out at the end of the third session on 6 April. It was a fundamental part of Western tactics however to resist European pressure to agree on the procedural and organisational aspects of the Conference before agreement had been achieved on the agenda and the instructions for the Committees and subCommittees. I. Procedures for the Preparatory talks 2. The question of the procedure to be used for the preparatory talks was the first topic of negotiation when the talks opened in November. It saw a major Romanian diplomatic offensive. They pressed (in ascending order of ideological importance) for an open attitude toward publicity for meetings; for the main offices to be held by rotation by participating delegations; and for an introductory paragraph to the procedural arrangements providing that the states participating did so ‘as independent and sovereign states, in conditions of full equality whatever their social system, size, level of development and whether or not they belong to military alliances’. 3. The other East Europeans ignored the Romanian suggestions in their various interventions, but took full advantage of the opportunity provided by a French draft on the procedural arrangement to make it clear that they favoured closed sessions and Finnish chairmanship and vice chairmanship. On the question of military alliances the Russians were forced out into the open. They argued that the concepts of independence and sovereignty were perfectly clear and did not require any explanation on the lines proposed by the Romanians. 4. The compromise formula was worked out largely outside the plenary sessions. The French played an important role in their efforts, having circulated their views in a letter to the Finnish Chairman, Totterman. The considerations set out in the French paper were broadly acceptable to all NATO countries. Their ideas of a decision making procedure based on consensus, but leaving open the possibility for noting if there was a consensus that this was preferable, was close to the fall-back position

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originally envisaged by NATO countries. It had become apparent that the more elaborate procedures favoured by the Americans were unacceptable to many delegations and inappropriate to their concept of the preparatory talks. The Nine were agreed that, whatever decision was reached on the rules of procedure, they would have to be set out in writing; that the main Western interest was in ensuring that Totterman himself presided over the talks to the maximum extent possible; and that there was no need at that early stage to specify what would happen if Totterman were absent. 5. A number of informal discussions on the question of the introductory paragraph to the rules of procedure ended in a Polish proposal in plenary that consultations ‘should take place outside of all the categories of blocs’. This ran into predictable opposition from the Nine. The Romanians and the Russians then agreed to substitute ‘outside military alliances’ with an alacrity that surprised the West. The agreed text thus read ‘all states taking part in the consultations shall participate on the basis of sovereign equality, as independent states and in complete equality. These consultations will take place outside the military alliances’. The Romanians were able to claim to have saved their face and were regarded by many of the smaller delegations as having fought effectively for the principle of equality. 6. The Romanians also made great efforts to establish the principle of rotation for the holding of office. They originally wanted this proposal applied to the chairmanship but fell back on its application to the chairman’s deputy (in the event that the chairman was unable to fulfil his functions) and the chairmanship of any working groups which might be set up. It became apparent that they attached more importance to this principle for reasons that were beyond the preparatory talks. Romanian ideas were given some support because a number of countries (notably Italy, the FRG and Switzerland [who] had suspicions about the intentions of Totterman) elected to switch the effective conduct of the talks to Iloniemi whom they thought to be less neutral than some of his colleagues. The Nine decided to give discreet support to the Romanians and probably tipped the balance in favour of a rotation. As a result it was agreed that if the chairman was prevented from performing his duties, heads of missions would take it in turn to exercise the chairmanship. If the chairman became permanently unable to exercise his functions a successor would be chosen by consensus. Rotation was also agreed for the chairmanship of any working groups which might be set up subject to agreement on ‘practical rules’ which had not then been discussed (and were never subsequently drawn up) and which were intended to make it possible to ensure a certain continuity in the chairmanship of the working groups. 7. For the rest of the rules of procedure broad agreement was reached on the basis of a Finnish ‘non-paper’; all decisions were to be taken by

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consensus (according to the NATO definition of the term under which an objection only blocks a consensus if it is formally defined as so being); any working groups [which] might be necessary should be open ended and bound by consensus; decisions on draft amendments and interpretative statements were to be circulated in writing, but there were to be no written records of the proceedings; meetings were to be closed to the public unless otherwise decided. 8. The most noteworthy aspect of this initial procedural discussion was the vigour with which the smaller countries and the neutrals and nonaligned took part. It was also worth adding that their arrangements stood up well to the test, even though the talks lasted much longer than originally envisaged. II. The Three Stage Conference 9. Although the West was determined not to agree to the organisation of the conference until the agenda and mandates had been settled, references were made during the general debate to the idea of a three stage Conference always on the condition that the results of the MPT were satisfactory. In view of pressure from the Russians and the neutrals to start reaching decisions on some of the subjects under discussion, there was a general agreement within the Western camp that it would be useful to obtain general agreement at the first session to the idea of a three stage conference. The Americans were the most difficult to convince, but it had become obvious that it would be much easier to argue in favour of subCommittees for the second stage if the West had given a clear indication that it was prepared to accept the idea of a Conference in three stages (foreign ministers; committee experts; a further ministerial meeting) as long as progress in each stage warranted holding the next. The Poles tabled a paper on the three stage Conference on 11 December. This contained no surprises. It [reiterated] that participation at a third stage should be at the highest level. On 1[?] December the French circulated on behalf of the Nine a document containing Western views on the three stage hypothesis and by the end of the session there was general acceptance of the theory though not the modalities of such an agreement. 10. The next formal proposal was contained in a Yugoslav text tabled on 23 March, which dealt with all the procedural arrangements for the CSCE. This useful document was subsequently followed by the rather more closely argued French paper. This letter had been tabled at the end of the third session but the Dutch in particular had been much irritated by the way the French had cleared their paper among the Nine. The French were therefore obliged to submit their idea to detailed considerations by their partners and Allies during the recess in order to table the paper in

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stages during the fourth stage. 11. The most contentious part of the paper concerned the level of the third stage. The French had always been more forthcoming about this than their community partners and in negotiating their text with the Russians and the neutrals they went on several occasions rather further than the Nine or the West as a whole could accept. The Russians made a great effort to achieve a reference to a summit meeting at the third stage of the Conference and were able to use this desire as a lever with which to obtain more satisfactory wording in the other parts of the paper. In particular we ensured that the idea of sub-Committee figured in a satisfactory form, and that it was clearly established that the Conference would take place in accordance with the recommendations of the Helsinki consultations. In the event the West was able to achieve all that it wanted on the other parts of the draft without giving way on the question of the level of the third stage. Since it was such a major element in the thinking of a number of countries (including our own) not to decide the level of the third stage before we had seen the results of the second, we were able to force the Russians to agree to the present surprisingly satisfactory wording. 12. The final formulation was in fact less than by the end the Nine had been prepared to consider; the fact that the Russians did not press for a reference to the possibility of a summit level third stage is not easy to explain. It may have reflected some concern at the commitments they had entered into in the mandates for the second stage. The present text however allows the Russians to raise the question of the third stage as early as the first stage of the Conference and they may see attraction in this, although the West has made it clear that it is not prepared to take a decision by then. They may also see advantage in the fact that the job of decision is not expressly given to the coordinating Committee, although we shall be able to argue from the context that this remains the appropriate body to do the job. III. Site 13. The Eastern countries tried to get the first stage of the talks to agree to Helsinki as the site for all three stages of the Conference and there were early indications of strong Nordic unity on this point. This attempt fell foul however of Romanian theories of rotation. In the early stages of the talks the Romanians peddled the idea that not only should all three stages rotate but all the Committees of the second stage should take place in different towns. This Romanian desire for physical rotation proved to be central to their thinking and indeed there was some risk that the efficient running of the Conference would be subordinated to this wish. 14. The question of site was considered from time to time on an

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informal basis throughout the talks but participants were equally divided upon the wisdom of moving the second stage of the Conference elsewhere. The French and Americans had early committed themselves publicly to the Conference being held in all its stages in Helsinki. But other members of the Nine and NATO had reservations. Some, like ourselves, the Germans and Italians, thought that if Helsinki were the site for all three stages there would be much greater risk that Helsinki would become the site for any institutional follow-up to the Conference. Other countries and particularly the small, the neutral and the non-aligned tended to want the second stage to move to Geneva for the purely practical reason that they had no facilities in Helsinki but a reservoir of experienced people at their missions to the UN in Geneva. Similar practical arguments also had considerable force for the larger countries, including our own. 15. At the fourth session the Portuguese joined the Romanians in lobbying actively against Helsinki and the Swiss played a clever hand, indicating a desire to see the second stage in Geneva, but refusing to the last formally to invite the Conference there. There was a widespread belief among Western delegations that if a break was to be made from Helsinki it would have to be after the first stage, but the subject was contentious and embarrassing to all in view of the manifest Finnish desire to keep the Conference in its entirety in Helsinki. Most resident Ambassadors were naturally reluctant to argue in public against Helsinki, and there was a general preference to wait until the Geneva bandwagon was well under way before joining it. 16. In the end it became clear, as a result of two meetings in which everyone had expressed his view in cautious or not so cautious terms, that the participants were almost exactly divided in their views. The Irish delegation was given the task of conducting informal consultations designed to achieve a consensus. By that stage the practical arguments advanced by a number of delegations had become a respectable enough reason to support Geneva for the second stage and the Irish were able to come up with a compromise which made a bow to the idea of rotation and established that the second stage should go to Geneva provided that the first and third stages stayed in Helsinki. This was in our view the most satisfactory result. The Russians and the East Europeans who had previously supported Helsinki acquiesced and though the Finns were disappointed the result was finally achieved with a reasonable amount of tact and the minimum of ill feeling. V. [sic] Date 17. The Eastern countries had in the first session pressed for the holding of the first stage at the end of June, but the Western countries refused to

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commit themselves to the date until right at the end of the preparatory talks when it was clear that satisfactory agreement had been reached. The question was something of a cliffhanger since the timescales originally envisaged were considerably compressed by the time that the much extended [?] came to the end. The East Europeans made an effort to promote a date at the end of June but quickly agreed to the early July date proposed by the French who wished on principle to move the date out of June and thus demonstrate that the super-powers could not prearrange such matters. 18. One other concern to the West was the difficulty in obtaining from the Russians a date for the opening of the MBFR talks. The Americans had been consistently determined that the CSCE should start on the date originally agreed in the Brezhnev-Kissinger timetable in view of their overriding need to get the MBFR negotiations started on time. Towards the end of the fourth session however it became apparent that the Russians were trying to get all three stages of the CSCE concluded before the start of MBFR. While most NATO countries felt that this problem was better handled outside the context of the Helsinki talks, the Canadians and Dutch felt it necessary at the final plenary to make oblique references to the fact that although they had agreed the date for the first stage of the Conference their decision to attend would be influenced by progress in the other negotiations. VI. Procedures 19. The procedural arrangements agreed for the preparatory talks provided the basis for the procedure drawn up for the Conference itself. A comprehensive and well drafted French paper was used as the basis for discussion although the Yugoslav paper tabled in March reflected divergent views on a number of issues. 20. The final document was agreed without too much difficulty with the exception of the arrangements for the executive secretary. Agreement was delayed on this point by the prolonged uncertainty about whether the second stage of the Conference would take place in Helsinki or in Geneva. We were successfully able to resist the idea that there should be one executive secretary for the whole Conference regardless of site since this would have run the risk of creating the embryo of an all European political secretariat. But it was agreed that the two local executive secretaries should bear in mind the need to ensure some continuity between the three stages. Points to note in the rules of procedure are as follows: (a) paragraph 1 is a revised formula, at Romanian request, of the text drawn up for the MPT rules of procedure. Although the earlier text had been designed to meet West German susceptibilities, the later text causes

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us no difficulty in view of subsequent German developments; (b) the role of the Committee and sub-Committee is formally established. The Romanians created difficulty with the text for the coordinating Committee, because they adamantly refused to allow the possibility that the co-ordinating Committee might have any meetings in Helsinki at the end of the first stage of talks since this went contrary to their ideas of rotation. The Spanish were particularly incensed at this Romanian attitude, partly because they believe in a unitary Conference and partly for financial reasons connected with the cost of holding isolated meetings in Geneva; (c) the idea of further working bodies to be set up by the Conference may be useful in order to meet that part of the first Committee mandate which deals with the Swiss proposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes; (d) consensus worked remarkably well during the MPT and it proved possible to achieve a final text clean of all square brackets. The pressures against standing out against a consensus become increasingly difficult to resist as discussions neared their conclusion; (e) chairmanship. The order in which the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will take turns in chairing the working sessions of the first stage was decided by lot at the final plenary session. The UK was picked low enough down on the list for it to be most unlikely that we shall be involved. (f) the fact that the executive secretary is expressly designated sharing responsibility for technical matters is an important one and should be used to resist any effort by the executive secretary particularly in Geneva to adopt a more political role. We successfully argued down the idea that there should be an international staff, as the Yugoslavs had wished, but the executive secretary for the second stage has agreed to bear in mind the need to give as international a flavour to his staff as is consistent with efficiency and economy; (g) the arrangements for interpretative statements worked well at the MPT, but it is important that they should only be made when a formal decision is actually taken by a working body and not made ad hoc when a particular point is under discussion. VII. Participation 21. At the first session of talks it was generally accepted that all those who took part should be entitled to attend the Conference proper. Arguments adduced by some delegations in favour of observer status for non-European states had little success, through the fear of most delegations that to do so would import extraneous issues into the Conference. The French raised the question of the attendance of Monaco

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at the end of the fourth session and after some close questioning by the Russians it was agreed that Monaco should attend. It was also accepted that the Albanians should attend, if they wish, but there is a general determination that they should abide by the recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations if they do. 22. In order to meet the desire of some delegations that international organisations should be represented and that arrangements should be made for the non-participating states to have their views heard, there is a section on contributions which leaves it to the Conference itself to decide the manner in which the views of these countries and organisations should be taken into account. The text does not explicitly rule out a de facto observer status for such non-participants, but the intention is that communications should be usually given in writing. The wording also makes it possible for the European Commission to make its views known as long as the Eastern countries do not block a consensus. There was strong opposition from many countries of the West to the idea that the UN Secretary General should be present throughout the Conference on the grounds that he could hardly avoid making a speech that would liken the CSCE to the UN’s idea of regional security organisations and on the grounds also that his presence would inhibit the free flow of discussion between the states of Europe. The neutral and non-aligned countries were however keen that the Secretary General should be present at some point and the final agreement that he should attend the inaugural session is a compromise. The question of whether he should be entitled to speak at the first session was left open. 23. At the end of the fourth session the Maltese raised the question of the participation of the Arab states. This proposal is discussed elsewhere in this report but was unanimously rejected. One irritating side effect of this amendment however was that it proved difficult to achieve really satisfactory wording to ensure that those who took part in the Conference proper would do so in accordance with the recommendations for the Helsinki Consultations. There is a reference in the chapter on organisation of the Conference to the fact that the Conference will take place on this basis, and the first page of the recommendations themselves indicates that the reply to the Finnish government indicating a desire to attend the first stage of the Conference will be considered as indicating a preparedness to accept the Helsinki recommendations as a basis for the Conference. We were however totally unsupported by our partners and allies in our effort to make acceptance of the Helsinki recommendations a sine qua non constitution of entitlement to participate. The main obstacle was the Romanian delegation whose views were expressed at immense length but (to our ears alone) unconvincingly. There is a clear danger that they will seek at the first stage of the Conference to reopen some of the issues settled

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at the MPT. Fortunately most delegations will be most reluctant to allow them to do so. Chapter X Western Co-Ordination 1. Good Western co-ordination and an effective performance by the Nine have been one of the main features of the preparatory talks. The importance of this, both for the Conference itself and for the development of a common foreign policy of the Nine is considered in the Ambassador’s final despatch. It may, however, be useful to describe in greater detail how this co-ordination was maintained as the talks proceeded. The paragraphs which follow concentrate on co-ordination in Helsinki, and do not cover the meetings of the Nine and NATO during the breaks between sessions nor the regular meeting of the Political Directors and the NATO permanent machinery which discussed CSCE questions during the preparatory talks. It must be emphasized, however, that the ‘discipline’ provided by such meetings away from the site of the talks made an extremely important contribution to the cohesion of the Nine and of the Alliance. 2. One of our major objectives during the preparatory talks was to maintain the close co-ordination with our partners and allies which had marked the detailed work done in the political consultations of the Nine and in NATO to prepare for their opening. This work was made more complicated by the fact that from February 1972 we found ourselves discussing the same or similar issues in two fora. As the work of the Nine gathered momentum the difficulties of avoiding duplication with NATO and, more importantly, of avoiding presenting our allies with decisions of the Nine presented as a fait accompli became greater. On the whole they were successfully overcome and the West arrived at the preparatory talks with a well thought out common position on most of the major issues. It was clear, however, that the French regarded the terms of reference agreed among the Nine and NATO on the three substantive agenda items of the Conference as papers of the Nine rather than of the Fifteen; and they were determined to avoid the impression of treating the preparatory talks and the Conference itself as a bloc to bloc affair. 3. It was agreed before the beginning of the preparatory talks that the established sub-Committee on CSCE questions would be the vehicle for this co-operation. On the NATO side, it was agreed only that ‘practical and discreet ad hoc arrangements’ for the consultations among NATO countries should be worked out on the spot in Helsinki. Co-ordination of Alliance positions on important policy questions would continue to take place in the permanent machinery in Brussels. Finally, we were instructed

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to keep in close touch with the neutrals and to seek to discourage them from setting up a ‘neutral bloc’ which might tend to make a virtue of adopting positions distinct from those of the West. 4. The paragraphs which follow deal separately with co-ordination in the Nine and among NATO countries, and with consultations with the neutrals. The Nine (a) Sub-Committee 5. The first and second sessions of the preparatory talks were gentlemanly in pace. Formal meetings took place only in the mornings and there was little if any time pressure on delegations. There was as a result ample opportunity for consultation among the Nine, and the subCommittees met regularly. The general debate confirmed their common approach on all questions except that of security content, and tactics were well co-ordinated. The only major test of loyalty to common positions occurred at the end of the session when the Russians made clear their opposition to a mention of terms of reference in the proposed work programme of the second session, and the search for acceptable paraphrases became a major source of activity. The French were clearly in the key position, and there is no doubt that had they had accepted a weak formula a number of our partners would have rallied to them. In the event they received instructions confirming their original position and the session ended well for the Nine. 6. The second session proved equally successful in this respect. The Western terms of reference were tabled by the Italians, Belgians and Danes and were widely (and at times embarrassingly) regarded as positions of the Nine rather than of NATO. Given the very low posture of the American delegation it was, in fact, the Nine who played the major part in defending their proposals in the subsequent debates, from which emerged the first signs of flexibility in the Soviet position. The main features of note were the vigorous Danish performance in defence of their proposals on Basket III; and the fact that the French stuck firmly to the logic of their position on the need for the preparatory talks to agree to terms of reference for both the Committees and sub-Committees which would undertake the detailed work of the second stage of the Conference. Apart from the question of military aspects of security, on which the Dutch tabled a separate proposal with some support from their Benelux colleagues, the Nine maintained a cohesive approach to the consultations. 7. The lengthy third session of the talks produced more serious problems. The agreement to set up a Mini Group, which dealt with the question of Basket I in the afternoon while the Working Group continued

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in the morning its examination of other subjects on the agenda, severely reduced the amount of time available for meetings of the sub-Committee of the Nine. At the same time, as discussions neared the stage where detailed drafting could be done, the difficulties of negotiating on the basis of carefully drawn up common papers became apparent. It was generally accepted that changes of substance in the position of the Nine had to be decided upon in the sub-Committee and that changes of importance would have to be submitted to capitals. But there was inevitably disagreement as to what constituted changes of substance and importance. These difficulties were compounded by the fact that the Danes, under the influence of their Nordic colleagues and of the Americans and Canadians, began to show increasing signs of impatience at the slow rate of progress; while the Belgians, Dutch and Italians grew increasingly concerned at what they regarded as a too rapid progress towards unsatisfactory compromises. 8. A number of difficulties, which became known in the jargon as ‘accidents de parcour’ arose during the session. We were criticised by some of our partners for tabling an outline for the terms of reference on principles; the French for jumping ahead of the Germans and of their partners on the question of inviolability of frontiers; and the Dutch for negotiating with neutral and non-aligned delegations on military aspects of security without keeping their partners fully in the picture. These questions were discussed by the Political Directors of the Nine at a meeting in Brussels in the course of the third session, and they provided what would ordinarily have been useful emphasis on the need for close consultation among the Nine. In the particular circumstances, however, the main result was to confirm the Belgian Chairman (Herpin) in his rigid insistence on adherence to the letter of decisions which were widely regarded as having been overtaken by events. It proved quite unnecessarily difficult towards the end of the third session to reach agreement on the tabling of a revised version of the Belgian paper proposing terms of reference for Basket II; and the Political Directors had to be called upon to give their approval to a revised version of the Danish paper on Basket III, the changes in which were quite clearly presentational rather than substantial. The Danes in particular reacted badly to the situation, and the leader of their delegation (Mellbin) made no secret of the fact that he regarded the NATO meetings as a more satisfactory way of doing business than the meetings of the Nine. 9. In retrospect, these difficulties did no serious harm either to the Western position at the preparatory talks or to the cohesion of the Nine. At the time, however, they had a divisive effect among the Nine and seemed likely to provoke major difficulties with the Americans, Canadians and

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Norwegians who become increasingly impatient at the inability of the Nine to respond to the exigencies of negotiation. It is probable that these difficulties would have been much less had the Belgian Presidency been more conscious of them, and more ready to work for a solution. They did not do so partly because of the personalities of those concerned; partly because the Belgian delegation was given virtually no discretion by Davignon; and most importantly because they failed to dissociate their position from that of the Dutch in order to establish the Presidency in a neutral position between the faster and slower moving elements of the Group. 10. The third session ended with markedly less cohesion among the Nine than had previously been the case. It proved possible, however, in the meetings of the sub-Committee and of Political Directors during the break between the third and fourth sessions to re-establish the main lines of a common approach to the fourth session. The major factor in persuading the Dutch and their sympathisers to work actively for the negotiated solutions on the lines which were emerging was the joint reaffirmation of the determination of the Nine not to accept the conclusion of the preparatory talks until an agreement satisfactory to all delegations had been reached. 11. The sub-Committee met only very rarely during the fourth session. The timetable of formal and informal meetings of the Consultations themselves became increasingly crowded, and it became necessary for the Nine to consult quickly on the spot when points of importance arose. The main burden of the negotiations on Basket I and on procedural and organisational questions was borne by a small number of delegates, who kept in close touch with each other but did not receive formal negotiating mandates from the sub-Committee as a whole. The Belgians, who seemed to have been told to take a more flexible attitude in the Presidency, seemed content with the way things were going and did not propose formal meetings of the Nine. 12. The results were fairly satisfactory both in Basket I and on the various organisational and procedural questions which took up a large part of the closing stages of the consultations, but the informal practices which became established undoubtedly weakened the involvement of all delegations in the decisions to be taken. In retrospect these relaxed procedures must be regarded as acceptable only at a late stage in a particular series of talks. 13. This much more flexible Belgian attitude to the Presidency produced results of a different kind in Basket III. The Nine did not meet regularly, but close co-ordination of Western negotiating positions was done in the NATO framework, with the active participation of the French.

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The Nine did, however, do useful work in preparing position papers for the Conference itself. (b) Ad Hoc Group 14. Economic experts from the Nine arrived in Helsinki in the latter part of the third session when the Working Group began its detailed discussion of Basket III, and continued their work for most of the fourth session. Co-ordination here was assured by regular meetings of the Ad Hoc Group at which representatives of the Commission participated. The Belgian Presidency made a major effort to ensure that the Nine kept together throughout this period, and concentrated most of their resources on the economic side during the fourth session. That close co-ordination among the Nine was required in a field where many points of Community competence were involved was generally recognised by the member countries; and the fact that the economic Working Group of the Consultations met for only one session a day ensured that there was ample time for the Ad Hoc Group to meet and decide on tactics on a session by session basis. The question is considered in more detail in Chapter V of this report. NATO 15. The ‘practical and discreet ad hoc arrangements’ envisaged before the beginning of the talks took some time to establish in Helsinki. It became the practice for occasional meetings of NATO countries to take place before the morning session in the conference room of the American delegation, whose facilities (bequeathed by the SALT delegation), were ample and conveniently placed. We, the Germans and Italians played our part in calling and chairing such meetings in order to avoid the impression that the initiative came always either from the Americans or from some other non-member of the Nine. During the first and second sessions these meetings were held sufficiently regularly to ensure that the Fifteen knew what the Nine were doing, but they did not play any very substantial role. 16. The dangers of a split between the Nine and the Fifteen became apparent during the third session. As the pressure of negotiation mounted, and the Nine found themselves in the difficulties described above, consultation with the rest of the Alliance were not always as regular as could have been wished. The problem was compounded by the fact that the Belgians and Dutch (and to some extent the Italians) regarded the Americans, Canadians and Norwegians as a pressure group for a speedy conclusion to the consultations and something of an adversary relationship grew up between the Nine and the Fifteen. We played an active part in trying to maintain harmony and agreement was reached in the Nine that

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individual delegations would make themselves responsible for ensuring that a particular member of the Alliance was kept informed of what was going on within the Nine. The fact that it finally proved possible to table revised versions of the Belgian and Danish papers on Basket II and III did much to ensure that the session ended on a reasonably satisfactory note as far as Western co-ordination was concerned. 17. The NATO meetings came into their own during the fourth session, when they became the centre of Western efforts to co-ordinate their negotiating position on Basket III. The Americans, who had taken a passive attitude to most of the questions under discussion in Basket I, played a more active part on Basket III, and this in itself intended to increase the usefulness of meetings of the Fifteen. The fact that Basket III experts of the Nine were meeting regularly to prepare positions for the Conference itself maintained the position of the Nine as such in this field; and the fact that the day-to-day co-ordination of tactics was done in NATO provided a useful boost for the Fifteen in circumstances which did nothing to diminish the cohesion of the Nine. The French, who played an active role in negotiations on Basket III, participated fully in the NATO meetings. Neutrals 18. There was no institutional basis for consultation with the neutrals, and contacts were maintained on an informal basis. The Austrians, Swedes and Swiss were generally helpful to the West, and, although they worked closely together, they at no time showed any disposition to form a larger ‘neutral bloc’ which might seek to occupy the middle ground. In these circumstances, the main question became one of keeping them sufficiently closely informed of the intentions of the Nine to maintain their confidence and their support. In this we were on the whole successful. Once again, however, it became noticeable in the closing stages of the third session and during the fourth how the pressure of official meetings could react adversely on co-ordination and consultation. Prospects for the Conference 19. It will be important that we should build on this successful history of Western co-ordination for the Conference itself. We should not be deluded into thinking that this will be easy. The preparatory work in the Nine and in NATO on which much of our solidarity depended took a considerable time to produce and we shall be pressed to prepare positions for the Conference itself in the short time between the end of the Preparatory Talks and the beginning of the first and second stages. 20. The main point shall again be the cohesion of solidarity of the Nine,

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and the extent to which the French are prepared to associate themselves with and defend common positions. We were much helped during the Preparatory Talks by the fact that the terms of reference and the papers on the organisation of the Conference tabled by the West were based on papers drafted by the French. They maintained their feeling of paternal responsibility until the end; and, on the comparatively few occasions on which they were tempted to stray they were reminded of these responsibilities by colleagues who had taken an equal share in the elaboration of the common positions before the Talks. This old guard of sub-Committee experts is now much depleted. The German delegation under Brunner consisted almost entirely of people who had not had experience of the early work in the sub-Committee; and same was true of the Danes under Mellbin; and the Dutch have now produced in Huydecoper an intelligent and active Ambassador who again has not been involved in the early work of the Nine. Our main efforts during the summer should be directed towards involving the delegations to the Conference itself in the process of political consultations and in helping the Danish Presidency to take on its responsibilities. Chapter XI Delegations and Delegates 1. Following are brief comments on the performance of individual delegations and representatives. Western delegations Belgium 2. The Belgians held the Presidency of the Nine during the three latter states of the consultations. Their performance in this respect is covered in general terms in the section on Western coordination but varied alarmingly from person to person. Herpin was King Stork; and Segesser an intelligent King Log. The Belgians did not make a major mark on the consultations in other respects, although Herpin and de Selys played their part in defending the Western proposals in Basket II (where de Selys proved a timid but on occasion stubborn Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group). The Ambassador (Eggermont) did not play a major role; and his reluctance to summon Ambassadorial meetings of the Nine effectively prevented attempts to achieve some Western coordination at that level. The Belgian delegation as a whole were given very little discretion from Brussels. Segesser was a pleasant colleague, but he was content to leave to others the deployment of the Western case on political questions. There was a general tendency in the Belgian delegation to take tough lines in Western

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coordination meetings, and leave it to others to fight the battles with the East. Canada 3. The Canadians started well and clearly appreciated the close contacts which we maintained with them. This served to a large extent to allay their early fears of being bypassed by the Nine, although Ottawa (or the Canadian delegation to NATO) remained concerned about the question. The Canadian Ambassador, Cote, though sometimes naïve, was frank, friendly and helpful. His senior adviser Shenstone was not particularly effective and played little or no role in the discussion of political and military subjects. The delegation as a whole got into deep water over Basket III where they pushed themselves forward at the beginning of the fourth session as the major point of contact with the Russians. The Russians for their part were quick to exploit a Canadian position which, while sounding tough, was alarmingly wobbly at points of detail and the danger passed only when it became clear to the Russians that the Canadians could not deliver their Western colleagues. Denmark 4. The Danes contributed little on Baskets I and II but played a leading role in Basket III. Their resident Ambassador took no part in the consultations and the delegation was led by Ambassador Mellbin. A capable operator with wide UN experience he deployed the Western case effectively during the second and third session; and his devastating criticism of the original Eastern Position on Basket III, as presented by the Poles, made a major impact. During the fourth stage however, he allowed his impatience with the slow rate of progress in general and the Belgian, Dutch and Italian delegations in particular to affect his handling of the delicate compromises required to maintain solidarity in the Nine (which he tended to ignore) and in the Fifteen; and he made a number of mistakes in his bilateral dealings with the Russians. His overall performance was clearly on the credit side and we found him ready to be persuaded on issues of importance to us. But his lack of sympathy for the often time-consuming procedures of the Nine does not augur well for the Conference itself, where he will probably be required to play a leading role as the representative of the country holding the Presidency. France 5. The French as was to be expected fielded a very competent delegation in which the major roles were played by the Resident Ambassador Andre; by Andreani and Siefer-Gaillardin from Paris; and by

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a specially appointed resident Counsellor Pierret. The French were responsible for rather more than their share of ‘accidents de parcour’ as far as Western coordination was concerned and they developed a habit of producing initiatives on organisations and procedural questions without undue concern for the susceptibilities of their partners. These were usually sensible, however. They stuck firmly to the Western line on substantive issues; and neither Andreani on Basket I nor Pierret on Basket III were afraid to press vigorously positions known to be unpopular with the Russians and the French adherence to the need for terms of reference and sub-Committees was a major factor in getting the Western concept of the Conference agreed. Our relations with the French delegation were close throughout the talks. We were greatly assisted by the fact that the two Ambassadors live next door to each other; and that our inclusion in the Helsinki diplomatic list as ‘Great Britain’ placed us next to the French in formal meetings. The extent to which we supported each other in discussions with the East must have made a considerable impression on the Russians. Andreani, Pierre[t] and Siefer-Gaillardin are likely to play a major role during the Conference itself. They, and in particular the former two will be well worth cultivating. 6. On the economic side the French fielded first Bochet then Grenier. Both played an active constructive and loyal role in the Ad Hoc Group and in the negotiations themselves. Germany 7. The German performance was rather patchy and there were periods when the delegation seemed either without a clear line or involved primarily in bilateral concerns. The delegation was led by Brunner who proved an intelligent and cooperative colleague. But he tends towards a Ministerial disregard of points of detail, and spent much of his time in Bonn. In his absence the delegation was left in the hands of von Groll whose performance was as usual erratic, or Kühn who was agreeable but carried little weight and was concerned not to expose himself. Zu Rantzau from the German delegation to NATO was helpful when present but took little part in the latter stages of the consultations. Dahlhoff who was appointed to Helsinki for the consultations and will probably take part in the Conference itself showed very little conception of what was involved in coordination among the Nine and in NATO and could be brought only with the greatest difficulty to look beyond his own rather narrow conception of immediate German interests. Henze who carried most of the burden on Basket III was happily of a very different stamp and proved a valuable colleague. He is intelligent and tough at the right time. In the absence of von Groll the negotiation of Basket II was left to Lucas who is

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knowledgeable on substance but has little conception of the tactics. The major point to note is that none of the German delegation, with the exception of Von Groll, were involved in the preparatory work of the Nine; and they do not on the whole take easily the idea of Community solidarity. Greece 8. The Greeks were regularly represented in meetings of the Fifteen and in the various Working Groups of the consultations but did not play any active part. Iceland 9. Thorsteinsson (Head of Icelandic MFA) arrived at the first NATO meeting of the first session (which was held in the British Embassy) and delivered himself of a tirade against the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Subsequently, the Icelandic seat was filled in Plenary sessions of the consultations and occasionally in Working Groups but they played no part. Ireland 10. The Irish were represented by their Ambassador in Stockholm, by their very competent Davignon correspondent, Campbell, and by a sufficient number of First Secretaries to staff all meetings. They intervened rarely but usually helpfully and effectively; and they kept in very close touch with the proceedings. Campbell did an excellent job as Chairman of the informal group which decided the tricky question of the Conference site. Our relations with the Irish delegation were very good and we kept them suitably informed of developments in the NATO meetings. Considering their lack of Embassy facilities in Helsinki and their limited resources they made a major effort at the preparatory talks and won considerable respect as a result. It will be well worth keeping in close touch with them during the Conference. Italy 11. The Italians were represented by their resident Ambassador Favale, whose performance and views can only be described as eccentric and who was constantly at odds with the delegation from Rome headed by Ferraris. Ferraris is an established figure in the sub-Committee of the Nine and he played a major and generally helpful part in the consultations. His instructions from Rome on the question of inviolability of frontiers placed him in the position of being more German than the Germans and he bore as a result more than his fair share of criticism from the Russians. In retrospect Italian stubbornness both on this issue and on aspects of Basket

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II stood the West in good stead and compensated for their too frequent failures to concentrate on the best solution possible. Rachele and Civiletti (both from Rome) were loquacious and knowledgeable, but unwilling to look beyond their immediate instructions. Their performance on economic questions was good when Ramasso and Miss Maglietta were responsible and inevitably erratic when Rizzo Venci was left in charge. Pietromarchi, their Basket III expert, arrived very much in a world of his own but became progressively more amenable to reason. If he takes part in the Conference he should be taken in charge. The Italian delegation as a whole were clearly handicapped by the unpredictable nature of their Political Director, Ducci. They became markedly hesitant whenever a meeting of Political Directors was in the offing. Luxembourg 12. Luxembourg was alternately represented by the Ambassador in Moscow, Meisch, and by Helminger from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former, though friendly, was not fully conversant with the details and tended to accept with little question the advice given him by his Belgian and Netherlands colleagues. Helminger was consistently helpful in meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen, but did not seek to play an active part in the negotiations. When he spoke, however, it was with wit and point. Netherlands 13. The Dutch resident Ambassador Lucassen played little part in the proceedings. The delegation for the first session was led by Quarles van Ufford, who subsequently disappeared to Vienna leaving van der Valk in charge. We maintained close contact with him but more often than not had to agree to disagree. His energies were divided during the second and third sessions almost equally between negotiating with neutral and non-aligned countries on the security content of the Conference, and in complaining in meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen that everything was going too quickly and that the West was being sold down the river. After a hand-over period at the beginning of the fourth session he was replaced by Huydecoper, an able professional diplomat serving as Minister in London, who has been specially appointed to take over the delegation for the Conference itself. For reasons of personal temperament or because of the change of Government in The Hague, or perhaps for both, he took a far more active part than van der Valk in the negotiations and showed himself ready to work for compromise. He is intelligent and ambitious and will certainly repay cultivating during the Conference itself. Of the junior members of the delegation, Biegman on the political side was helpful and Elzinger on

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the economic knowledgeable but negative. Norway 14. The major role in the Norwegian delegation was played by Mevik assisted by Biörn Lian. We maintained close contact with both and their position was generally helpful although at times they showed impatience at the slow rate of progress in the Nine. They played a useful role in the discussions on military aspects of security but were not otherwise very active in the negotiations. They can both be mobilised to provide effective support on particular issues once their confidence had been gained. Portugal 15. The Portuguese delegation was led by resident Ambassador Novaes Machado assisted by de Almeida from the NATO delegation. They regularly attended meetings of the Fifteen and were fully represented in the various Working Groups of the consultations themselves. They did little more, however, than maintain a watching brief for Portuguese interests. Turkey 16. The major figure on the Turkish side was the Deputy Ambassador, Hikmet Alp, who was well informed, firm and helpful, and prepared to speak up on matters of importance. Other members of the fairly large Turkish delegation made little impact. United States 17. The Americans fielded a large and remarkably silent delegation under the effective leadership of Vest. During the early stages of the consultations he saw his main task as avoiding public confrontations with the Russians on the one hand and accusations of collusion between the superpowers on the other; and he seemed to have concluded that the best way of achieving these objectives was to maintain the lowest possible posture. He was also concerned to maintain the momentum of the preparatory talks to maintain credibility in the Kissinger/Brezhnev timetable on MBFR and CSCE. But his experience in Brussels brought to bear in promoting effective consultations between the Nine and Fifteen and he made a major contribution in this respect. 18. During the third and fourth sessions, when most of the work moved from Plenary into Working Groups of increasing informality, American views became heard more often. Vest, whose instructions on most points seemed to allow him to go along with almost anything was able on a number of occasions to add support to Western positions. But he would

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wait for one or more of the Nine to make the case before indicating his agreement—usually in terms which indicated considerable flexibility. The major American effort was reserved for Basket III which Vest left largely in the hands of Floyd. He grew in authority during the fourth session and proved a most effective colleague. 19. The American delegation clearly attached considerable importance to their relations with the Russians and they had a member of their Moscow Embassy with them for most of the time. Garrison got on quietly with his job of maintaining contact with the Eastern delegations, while Kamman (who was in Helsinki for the fourth stage) saw it as his role to provide assessments of Soviet intentions for the benefit of other NATO delegations. These usually proved disastrously naïve and he clearly had little, if any, conception of the negotiating position in Helsinki. 20. The American delegation to NATO was also consistently represented either by the tactless and heavy-handed Reddy or by Niles, who was both more intelligent and more impatient. On the economic side Korner (also from the NATO delegation) took a fairly active part in the negotiations on Basket II. He knows a lot about the Soviet economy and very little about negotiation. Warsaw Pact Countries Bulgaria 21. Bulgarian interventions varied only in that they alternated between supporting the Soviet position in Russian and French. Yovkov (the resident Counsellor) deployed with some relish a line on Basket III which proved less flexible than that of the Russians; and Grachev, with equal relish, a harder line on Basket II. Otherwise, the Bulgarians were given very little work to do. Czechoslovakia 22. The Czechs played little part in the proceedings. The resident Ambassador, Pavlovsky, spoke occasionally and in bad Russian from a prepared text under the watchful eye of the visiting Number 2, Mudroch. The latter maintained an almost complete silence in public and showed no signs of flexibility in private. Vajnar and Jambor were both talkative in Working Groups, but neither made much impact on the proceedings. The latter took an exceptionally hard line on Basket III in fluent KGB English. GDR 23. The resident Ambassador, Oelzner, played little part in the proceeding and the GDR delegation was under the effective leadership of Bock. He was one of the few East European representatives to make a

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major impact on the consultations. He won considerable good will from his courteous and friendly manner, his sense of humour and his moderate presentation of his case. He participated actively in the Mini Group which dealt with Basket I throughout the third and fourth sessions and clearly enjoyed an authority not granted to his Warsaw Pact colleagues. It was apparent, however, from his negotiation on behalf of the East of the terms of reference on information that he had no real discretion. Neither was he always well informed of Soviet intentions. A number of indications of position given privately and apparently in good faith were almost immediately disproved by the performance of the Soviet delegation. In the final stages of the discussions on confidence building measures, for example Mendelevich cut the ground from under Bock’s feet by agreeing to draft a text allowing discussion of the prior notification of movements immediately after Bock had repeated the previous Soviet line that no mention of this subject should be made. The rest of the large GDR delegation did little more than provide support for the unilingual Bock. Hungary 24. The Hungarians were represented by their light-weight Ambassador, Ronai, and by Matusek from Budapest. The latter was earnest and friendly and seemingly content to do no more than the minimum required to maintain public support for the Soviet line. We maintained fairly close contact with him but failed to discover any traces of original thinking. Palotás in Basket II showed some however, and was an interlocuteur valable on the Eastern side. Poland 25. The Poles were the best equipped of the East European delegations. Their resident Ambassador, Wilmann, was a former Deputy Foreign Minister sent to Helsinki especially for the consultations. His Counsellor, Skowronski, arrived at the same time and for the same purpose. The Polish delegation at the first session also contained a very able Wiejacz, but he took no part thereafter and was replaced as Deputy Head of Delegation by Szymanovski who was agreeable in private and unyielding in public. 26. Wilmann provided more active support for the Russians than the majority of his less able colleagues but played less large a part in the consultations than had at first been expected. His extremely tough speech on Basket III during the second session was not only strongly criticised by a large number of Western and non-aligned delegations but contrasted unfavourably with a statement by Zorin on the following day which was distinctly more moderate in tone if not much different in substance. Wilmann was unhappy at being thus isolated and this incident may well

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have affected his willingness to play a major role in the talks thereafter. 27. Skowronski proved an indefatiguable exchanger of confidences and clearly saw himself in the role of ‘fixer’. He performed a useful function in the third session by starting the series of informal buffet suppers which provided us with a useful point of contact with Eastern delegations and with the Russians in particular. But as the negotiations proceeded it became clear that he was no more able than his European colleagues to predict the position of the Soviet delegation, still less to engineer a compromise on points of issue. He played virtually no part in the formal negotiations. In Basket II the Poles fielded a young whiz-kid for the fourth session, Woznowski, who must have given the Russians an anxious moment or two. Romania 28. The sorry story of the Romanian performance at the preparatory talks can be simply told. They started with considerable Western sympathy for their efforts to emphasize their independence and sovereignty and the non-bloc nature of the Conference; and they squandered it all as it became clear that their initiatives were either basically favourable to (and in the case of Basket III often harder line than) their Warsaw Pact colleagues; or equally irritating to most of the other participants in the preparatory talks. They found themselves during the second and third sessions without a constituency; and for a period, were relatively inactive. Their more grandiose ‘initiatives’ ran into the sand. Their proposals on military aspects of security were regarded with incredulity; and they pressed their invention, the ‘principle of rotation’ beyond the point of absurdity. 29. The effective leader of their delegation, Lipatti, was a former Ambassador to UNESCO (and brother of Dinu). He intervened frequently and at length in excellent French on all issues; but behind the impression of verbal finery it too often appeared that the Emperor had either no clothes or at best a few undergarments of distinctly Stalinist cut. In the final phase, however, after a series of increasingly irritating prevarications, he scored a major and heavily publicised coup by promoting a compromise with Malta on terms which had been available to the latter for the previous three weeks. The most able members of a large Romanian delegation were Neagu, Diaconu and Serbansecu from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former, though an unattractive personality, is intelligent and seems to have realised towards the end of the consultation the need to look for support from other delegations. He was (with Bock of the GDR and Wiejacz of Poland) the only Eastern representative other than Mendelevich to attend the Warsaw Pact meeting in mid-January which preceded the Soviet reply to the Western invitation on MBFR, and he seems to be a man of some

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influence. It will be worth maintaining contact with him during the Conference. Serbanescu in Basket II was the only Romanian who seemed interested in at least trying to show flexibility. 30. We were able to maintain good personal relations with Lipatti and tolerable ones with Neagu. But there was very little in the Romanian conception of the CSCE with which we can agree and we inevitably found ourselves opposed to the Romanians on a number of issues. Their part in persuading the Maltese to withdraw their opposition to the final consensus was noted with appreciation, but it will not quite have restored their credibility as a serious participant. It will be important during the first stage of the Conference to keep a careful eye on possible Romanian attempts to ignore the recommendation of the consultations. Soviet Union 31. The performance of the Soviet delegation cannot be easily separated from the development of the preparatory talks as a whole and is dealt with primarily in the substantial sections of this report and in the Ambassador’s final despatch. Following are brief personality notes on the major figures. 32. The Soviet delegation comprised three Ambassadors: Maltsev (the resident), Zorin and Mendelevich from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apart from them the major personalities were Pozharski who was responsible for the negotiation on Basket II during the fourth session and Shikalov who acted as a hard line and happily not very influential shadow to Mendelevich. 33. Maltsev is an impressive figure who remained consistently well informed of developments but did not play an active part in the negotiations. In private discussion he was prepared for detailed (though friendly) argument about the Soviet position, but he never showed any sign of independent thought or flexibility. The main work was divided between Mendelevich who was responsible for Baskets I and IV and for organisational and procedural questions; and Zorin who dealt throughout with Basket III and with Basket II until the fourth session. Mendelevich is very much a UN professional, shrewd and fairly sophisticated. He negotiated skilfully, deployed his charm to good effect, and tended to dominate the meetings in which he participated. He realised fairly quickly that the views of smaller delegations had to be taken into account and bore this cross for the most part with an appearance of good grace. Zorin clearly found it much harder to learn new tricks and his relapse into an uncompromisingly hard line were often badly timed from the Soviet point of view. Pozharsky, who has considerable experience of the United Nations in Geneva, confirmed his reputation as an effective negotiator in

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his handling of Basket II. 34. Neutral and Non-Aligned Austria The resident Austrian Ambassador, Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstain, played an active role particularly in Basket II. He did as much as he could to be helpful, though he sometimes lapsed into a fussy and timorous legalism. On the political side he left the running mainly to Liedermann from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was consistently helpful to the West, though occasionally rather muddled (and always desperately serious) in the execution of his good intentions. He, together with the Swedes and the Swiss, acted as convenor of the Mini Group which dealt with Basket I; and he produced a draft preamble on Basket III which served as a rallying point for the other neutrals and ensured that the discussions were based on a text essentially favourable to the West. He was particularly concerned to be kept informed of the thinking of the Nine; and the process of satisfying his appetite for ‘inside information’ proved at times excessively time-consuming. The game proved worth even the fairly large candle, however, and the Austrian delegation at the Conference itself should repay equally close attention. Cyprus 35. The Cyprus delegation made little impact on the proceedings until the arrival of the garrulous and legalistic Ipsarides, during the fourth session. He performed one useful service in the final phase, by making a dramatic and well-staged appeal to the Maltese not to persist in their obstinacy over Arab participation. If he attends the Conference itself he will no doubt wish to make a mark for himself. He is friendly and may be steerable. Finland 36. The Finnish delegation (as opposed to the Chair) was led by Ambassador Tuovinen. They did no more than was necessary to remind other delegations occasionally of their presence and obviously felt unable (even if willing) to take the forthright and basically pro-Western line of the Austrians and the Swedes. But neither did they do anything to help the Russians. Their performance can best be described as one of inactive neutrality. Holy See 37. The delegation of the Holy See was led by the Pronuncio Mgr Zabkar assisted by the more effective Silvestrini. Their major effort was

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to secure a reference to freedom of religion in the list of principles in Basket I and to get appropriate references to religion in the sections of the mandate dealing with travel and information. In the event they had to settle for the first and an interpretative statement. This apart, Zabkar’s performance was often uncertain. He found it difficult to remain silent for too long; did not always choose carefully the issues on which he intervened and in general failed to convey any clear indication of purpose. Liechtenstein 38. Liechtenstein fielded Prince Henri, a Count with glasses and a Count with a moustache. The latter two intervened often enough to ensure that Liechtenstein was noticed. They were admirably robust on questions of freedom; extremely pedantic on legal and financial questions; and generally incapable of suppressing the echoes of musical comedy which followed them about. Malta 39. Malta fielded a one-man delegation in the form of their Permanent Representative in Geneva, Saliba. He worked untiringly and during the first three sessions built up a reputation as a man of common sense and good will who was effectively representing his country in difficult circumstances. This reputation stood him in good stead during the fourth session when his instructions to insist on the participation in the CSCE of the Arab countries, and to block a consensus on the final document if these demands were not met left him totally isolated, and under fire from all sides of the house. He will probably attend the first stage of the Conference, but not the second. San Marino 40. San Marino was represented almost throughout by their Honorary Consul in Helsinki, Wainstain, who was religious both in his attendance and in his abstinence from intervention. Spain 41. The Spanish delegation was of a reasonable size reinforced on occasion by senior visitors from Madrid. But for most of the preparatory talks it could have consisted of only one man. The resident Ambassador Aguirre de Carcer spoke on every issue; tabled texts or amendments on most; wrote extraordinarily detailed notes on everything that was said; and produced from his brief case at unexpected moments in the least fashionable and informal drafting groups large volumes on international law and diplomatic procedure. That he did not have a nervous break-down

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is one of the major surprises of the consultations. 42. From the political point of view this intense activity started badly for the West. During the early stages of the consultations it became increasingly clear that Aguirre saw the preparatory talks not only as a way of putting Spain on the East/West map but as a short cut to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He threw himself with vigour into a process which he described as ‘throwing roses to the Russians’ and was noticeably unconcerned about whose roses he was throwing. He also caused us considerable trouble with an interpretative statement on Gibraltar which was both procedurally unacceptable and unnecessarily polemical in substance. 43. It is not clear how much of this frenetic activity came from Madrid and how much from Aguirre himself. It was noticeable however that during the occasional visits to Helsinki of Ambassador Arguelles he calmed down considerably and the more regular presence of De La Morena was also helpful. Towards the end of the third session Aguirre’s passion for drafting compromises became more helpful and this progress was maintained throughout the fourth session. A very good Spanish draft on human contacts was particularly useful and formed the basis for the final negotiations with the Russians. It was tempting to think that the Spanish delegation at the Conference itself will maintain this pro-Western orientation, and they should certainly be encouraged to do so. The friendly and intelligent first secretary in the Helsinki Embassy, Ruperez, will attend the second stage of the Conference as continuity man. He will be worth keeping in touch with. Sweden 44. The Swedish delegation kept in close contact with the Austrians and Swiss throughout the preparatory talks and in general were extremely helpful to the West. They made no secret of the fact that their position on Baskets II and III was similar to ours and not in some middle ground between the East and West. The resident Ambassador, Ryding, proved an effective and useful head of delegation and his linguistic ability earned him a portion of influence which he exploited with almost invariable good sense. He was ably supported by a series of senior visitors from Stockholm. Of these Edelstam was the most regular and he acted as convenor of the Mini Group dealing with the military aspects of Basket I. In his absence, the job was done by Berg, a first secretary from Stockholm who attended the talks throughout and will act as continuity man during the Conference itself. He is friendly, well-informed and full of common sense. 45. From our point of view the only doubtful apple in the Swedish

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basket was their legal adviser, Blix, who attended the discussions on principles in the latter half of the third session and during most of the fourth. His ‘compromise text’ which is described in Chapter II of this report was tabled sufficiently late in the day not to damage the Western case, but was clearly much less satisfactory than the terms of reference finally negotiated. Both in his production of the text and in his defence of it in the face of Western criticism Blix took an attitude clearly at variance with that of the Swedish delegation on other issues. Switzerland 46. The Swiss delegation was led by their resident Ambassador, Campiche, who although active (to a sometimes exaggerated extent) in the early stages left the detailed negotiations to Brunner his senior adviser from Berne. The Swiss position on many of the issues under discussion was comfortably right of the NATO centre and they defended it actively and often with heat, taking a particularly strong line in the early stages against Soviet attempts at bullying. The only difficulties we had with them were in connection with their proposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes for which they were clearly prepared to pay much more than we in the form of unsatisfactory Soviet and Romanian adjunctions. The problem proved fairly short-lived however and the Swiss then compensated by criticising as too soft texts on Basket III negotiated very much on a NATO/Warsaw Pact basis. This somewhat erratic aspect of the Swiss performance was reflected also in their acute suspicions of undue Soviet influence on the Chairman and Secretariat. Much of this can be ascribed to Brunner who although capable and energetic had a tendency to over-react, and often seemed out of step with his equally excitable Ambassador. Yugoslavia 47. The Yugoslav delegation was led by Madame Stanimirovic who kept in close touch throughout the proceedings. Dr Nincic was a regular visitor but he tended to exercise his influence behind the scenes. The major burden of negotiation was carried by Stojakovic with the assistance of Acimovic and (for economic questions) Markovic who was formerly Minister Commercial in London. 48. The Yugoslavs proved an effective and friendly team. After producing at the first session a paper on the future work programme of the consultations which clearly suited the West much more than the East, they left to others the role of honest broker and concentrated on arguing their case on matters of major concern to them. Their line was consistent throughout the preparatory talks and they stuck to their positions until it

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became clear that compromise was necessary. That stage having been reached they negotiated toughly without undue rigidity, although they had to move a considerable way from their opening positions on a number of issues and in particular on the security context of the Conference. Chapter XII The Press 1. A member of News Department came out for the opening of the first session of the Preparatory Talks, and left after about a week, when most of the visiting journalists from London went home. Subsequently, apart from occasional visitors for a few days, the British press was represented by Helsinki-based correspondents or stringers. The most important were: Lance Keyworth (Financial Times) who has been in Finland for twenty years, and who reported consistently accurately and in as much detail as his paper would allow. Hillar Kallas (BBC) who though wilder than Keyworth, did his best to keep informed and to get as much onto the air as possible. Colin Narborough (Reuters) who is not a professional journalist, and whose coverage of the Preparatory Talks was consistently unintelligent, ill-informed, and ill-digested. It was a major draw-back of the press coverage that Reuters was represented by far and away the worst correspondent of any of the major new agencies in Helsinki. It is to be hoped that the situation will not be repeated in Stage 2 of the Conference. Olli Kivinen (The Times) is also Foreign Editor of Helsingin Sanomat, the main Finnish paper. This meant it was never possible to brief British correspondents separately from Finnish. 2. Because of the low standard of Reuters correspondent, and the dual role of The Times stringer, the Head of Chancery of the Embassy briefed all-comers at Dipoli after each Plenary. When, after the establishment of working groups, the frequency of plenaries decreased, we remained loyal to the agreement that briefings on the activities of the working groups should not be given. This understanding was consistently broken, principally by the Swiss, West and East Germans, and in the last session by the Yugoslavs and Poles, who became increasingly liberal with the distribution of Dipoli documents as the end of the MPT drew nearer. 3. We conducted occasional special briefings, usually at the start or end of sessions, for the British press but otherwise concentrated on giving factual summary accounts each week of the main events. These briefing were regularly attended (in addition to the British stringers) by correspondents of all the major news agencies, the principal Finnish newspapers and radio/TV, as well as various strays including NCNA [New

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China News Agency]. The operation was useful if only because it established a reputation for accuracy which no other delegation claimed to emulate.

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Despatch from Mr Elliott (Helsinki) to Sir A. Douglas-Home Confidential

HELSINKI, 13 June 1973

Sir, CSCE: The First Two Hundred Days The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe began in the resounding concrete halls of the Finnish Students’ Union at Dipoli, outside Helsinki, on 22 November, 1972. My colleagues, who vary considerably in their experience of multilateral diplomacy, found themselves sitting around a large hexagon of tables with microphones in front of them, advisers behind, and very little idea of what awaited them. It was fashionable at that time to speak of informal consultations between Ambassadors accredited to the same post; and we were unanimous in saying that our intention was not to have a preConference. 2. When the preparatory talks concluded 199 days later, on 8 June, 1973, they had taken on a different pattern. The leisurely pace of the first two sessions, where the business was conducted in plenary meetings convened only once a day, gave way to a proliferation of formal and informal working groups and drafting committees; delegations were reinforced by various categories of expert advisers; and the final confusion of night sessions, compromise proposals and interpretative statements was in every way typical of a major international conference. 3. The preparatory talks can indeed be regarded as a Conference in their own right. Many issues of major importance in East-West relations received detailed consideration before agreement could be reached on the agenda of the Conference itself and on the terms of reference for the Committees and Sub-Committees which will meet during its second stage. The presence of neutral and non-aligned countries gave a particular flavour to the debates, and their special concerns complicated the task of negotiation, especially at the final stage; but the main issues were between East and West. It is, I believe, the fact that we, with our partners and allies, emerged from the process in a position of clear advantage. 4. The brief for the UK delegation at the outset of the preparatory talks restated the objectives agreed by NATO Ministers: to ensure that the proposals in which they were interested would be fully considered at the Conference, and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to justify the reasonable expectation that a Conference would produce satisfactory results. Hence, our aim was to seek agreement at the preparatory talks on: (i) an agenda which would allow Ministers to raise at the Conference

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proper the points to which they attached importance, and (ii) an organisational structure for the Conference which would ensure that the various items on the agenda received detailed examination before any decisions were taken. In my view these objectives have been met. 5. A major difficulty in the early part of the discussions lay in convincing the Russians that an agenda drawn up in general terms, even with a separate agenda item covering human contacts and information (a point in effect conceded by Brezhnev in his speech to the 50th Anniversary Congress in Moscow in December), would not be sufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Western delegations. We insisted that the preparatory talks should also specifically agree terms of reference for the Committees and Sub-Committees which would undertake the detailed work of the Conference at its second stage. The Belgians, Italians and Danes tabled on 15 January draft proposals (previously agreed among the Nine and in NATO) for the agenda and terms of reference. The recommendations that finally emerged from the talks are naturally less satisfactory to us than those original drafts. But it is remarkable how little has been given away. 6. The preparatory talks have in effect endorsed the essential features of the Western approach to the Conference. It will take place in three stages; and it will not produce results until the Committees and SubCommittees at the second stage have undertaken a thorough examination of the subjects covered in their terms of reference. I have reported on their contents in telegrams to the Department, and the delegation has produced separately a fuller record of the main points of interest. But the following points are worth noting here as successes for the West. (i) The list of ‘principles of primary significance guiding the mutual relations of the participating States’ includes: (a) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; and, (b) equal rights and self-determination of peoples. (ii) The terms of reference on principles contain two important sentences which are clearly incompatible with the Brezhnev doctrine. One refers to ‘those basic principles which each participating State is to respect and apply in its relations with all other participating States irrespective of their political, economic and social systems’; and the other provides that the document to be submitted for adoption by the Conference ‘shall express the determination of the participating States to respect and apply the principles equally and unreservedly in all aspects of their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to all participating States the benefits resulting from the application of these principles by all.’

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(iii) The terms of reference for the Committee dealing with economic and related forms of co-operation provide the basis for a business-like examination of economic questions at the second stage of the Conference, and they place useful emphasis on reciprocity, and on information and contacts. (iv) The section of the terms of reference corresponding to the original Western ideas on ‘freer movement’ contains a preamble which contradicts the traditional Communist line that progress in this field is limited by differences in political, economic and social systems; and which states that the Committee ‘shall not only draw upon existing forms of co-operation but shall also work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims’. (v) In addition, there are agreed references to facilitating freer movement and contacts between persons, as well as institutions and organisations, of the participating States; to marriages between nationals of different States and the re-unification of families; to the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, and to improving conditions for journalists working outside their own countries. 7. There can admittedly be no guarantee that the results of the Conference proper will justify the expectations raised by a reading of the terms of reference. Some of the formulae that were evolved did little more than paper over major differences of principle. Thus, the dispute between the French on one side and the Dutch and Yugoslavs on the other about the relationship between the military and political aspects of security (and so inter alia the possibility of a link between the CSCE and the MBFR) was composed by means of a neutral formula that in effect exports the dispute to a later stage of the Conference. Again, the Maltese demand that the Mediterranean Arab States should be permitted to participate in the Conference was deflected on the final day (after it had appeared likely to block a general consensus) by the adoption of wording which keeps open the possibility that these States might present their case to the Conference, and which may be so vague as to give Mr Mintoff scope for lengthy argument at the first stage. More important, there is still room for months of discussion at the second stage on the precise decisions to be taken by Governments on the issues covered by the first three major sections of the terms of reference. The Russians fought hard for more restrictive texts, and gave ground only when they realised that they must pay the price of accepting them in order to get any Conference at all. If we are to build effectively on the foundations laid by the preparatory talks we shall have to exert and maintain similar pressure on them during the first and second stages of the Conference. I think it important, therefore, to consider in some detail what have been the main reasons for the relative success of the West so far.

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8. The primary reason, I believe, was the careful advance preparation carried out in NATO and in the Political Consultations of the Nine. As a result we were able from the outset to adopt a business-like attitude to the Conference, and thus to win the sympathy of the neutrals and non-aligned. In sharp contrast the Warsaw Pact countries proved unable to produce any evidence of detailed planning for the Conference which they had so long promoted. Our advantage was confirmed when the Western proposals were tabled on 15 January. The East never explicitly accepted them as the basis for negotiation, but as the talks proceeded it proved as a matter of practice that the discussion tended to be based on them rather than on their own much more sketchy drafts. The West were thus able to maintain their ground until acceptable compromises were in sight. 9. The second reason was the success of the West in maintaining its cohesion throughout the long negotiations. Our advance preparations would hardly have been effective if our partners and allies had not been willing and able to put up a persistent defence of their joint proposals. They did so with varying degrees of commitment, and there were inevitably occasions when a delegation departed from the agreed line. But on the whole the West stuck together well, and the fact that they created an impression of harmony rather than of unison contrasted favourably with the rigid discipline of the East. Confusion could have resulted from the evident decision of the US delegation to maintain a low posture with the object of reconciling the two aims of avoiding public confrontations with the Russians and accusations of collusion between the super Powers. But that thrust the main burden of defending Western positions upon the Nine, and they passed the first real test of their ability to develop and execute a common policy with flying colours. 10. The idea that the preparatory talks should take the form of a salon des ambassadeurs soon evaporated, as far as the Nine were concerned. Even before the substitution of working groups for the plenary sessions, many of the Ambassadors had dropped out of the picture, lacking either the time or the inclination to acquire the volume of detailed knowledge needed for negotiations whose subject matter ranged from divided countries to divided families, from the social conditions of migrant workers to East/West industrial co-operation. Co-ordination between the Nine in Helsinki thus devolved on a number of deputy heads of delegation who had been involved from an early stage in working out the common positions of the Nine in the Sub-Committee and Ad Hoc Group reporting to the Political Directors. They were used to working together, and felt jointly involved in the papers they were defending. They were as a result able to form a cohesive nucleus which proved resilient to the strains of the negotiations, and to the unpredictable behaviour of the Belgian

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Presidency, which alternated in Helsinki between King Log and King Stork. Their efforts were co-ordinated by meetings of the Nine in Brussels during the break between the various stages of the preparatory talks; and by detailed discussion of CSCE questions in the regular meetings of Political Directors. The latter were occasionally tempted to think too little about strategy and too much about tactical details which could have been left to delegations on the spot; and the timing of their meetings (perhaps unavoidably) appeared eccentric to those engaged in the day-to-day struggle at Helsinki. Yet without the discipline provided by common instructions from senior officials who were free to concentrate on the broader picture the Nine would have proved far less effective. 11. Much of the credit for the achievements of the Nine must go to the French delegation. Despite occasional lapses, they remained loyal to the positions worked out with their partners and defended them actively not only in debate but in private conversations with the Russians. If they had chosen to act as mavericks they could have confronted their EEC partners with an uncomfortable choice between an appearance of solidarity around the French flag and the maintenance of agreed positions. In the event, the French were especially effective in their deployment of the Western case on principles guiding relations between States and on most of the major issues relating to freer movement. Their attitude contrasted with that of the Dutch and Belgians who, for all their tough noises in meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen, were for the most part unwilling to expose their views in discussions with the East. 12. A third reason for the favourable development of the talks was the extent to which the neutrals gave sympathy and support to Western positions. The Austrians, Swedes and Swiss worked closely together, but without trying to establish a ‘neutral bloc’ that might have made a virtue of taking decisions half-way between East and West. Instead they defended their own conception of a business-like Conference, and made it plain that on most issues, their values were those of the West. (Indeed, the Swiss, and sometimes the Austrians, found themselves often to the right of the NATO centre.) The support of these delegations was especially valuable to us in so far as it formed a focus for other neutral and nonaligned delegations; and we shall no doubt need to retain their confidence during the Conference itself. Bilateral consultations are time-consuming, but it would patently be useful to arrange an exchange of views with each of these three countries (and if possible also with the Yugoslavs) before the second stage of the Conference begins. 13. One final reason for the success of the Western tactics remains to be mentioned. The Nine refused to accept an opening date for the Conference until it was clear that the preparatory talks had produced

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satisfactory results. Before the beginning of the crucial fourth session, the Political Directors reaffirmed their determination not to accept an artificial timetable, and we were able to maintain to the end that the preparatory talks would conclude only when the results justified it. Hence, the West continued to exploit the Soviet anxiety to hold the Conference in the middle of the summer without themselves coming under time pressure on points of major importance. The implications for our strategy at the second stage of the Conference itself are obvious. 14. I turn now to the general shape of our dealings with the East during these negotiations. British relations with the Russians were still in an icy stage when the talks began, and this was reflected in our contacts with the Soviet delegation here. During the first and second stages the Russians reacted to most of our interventions as if they were deliberate attempts to obstruct progress towards a Conference, and they concentrated their bilateral attentions on the Americans, French and West Germans, trying to settle as much business as possible with them in the corridors. That they failed is due to the loyalty shown by those three delegations to their partners and allies; and also to the fact that the neutral and non-aligned countries made it crystal clear that they (like the French) would not accept solutions privately concocted by the big Powers. (There is a moral here that might well repay thought in Washington as well as Moscow.) Meanwhile, we did our best to establish in the minds of the Russians the idea that, although we would fight hard in defence of our positions, our underlying attitude to the talks was a constructive one; and that we were in as good a position to influence the opinions of the Nine and the Fifteen as any other delegation. They reacted realistically; and during the third and fourth session of the talks, we were fully accepted as a delegation with whom the Russians thought it necessary and profitable to do business. 15. The other East European countries as a whole failed to make the most of the opportunities the Conference gave them. The Russians kept their allies under strict control and allowed them small discretion on points of importance. The Bulgarians, Czechs and Hungarians neither made, nor tried to make, an individual impact; while the Poles, although better equipped in diplomatic skills, disastrously allowed themselves to be manoeuvred by the Russians into defending an absurdly illiberal (and soon discarded) thesis on human and cultural contacts, and ceased thereafter to play a prominent role. The East Germans deserve a special word. Their main representative, Dr Siegfried Bock, displayed an irrepressible intelligence and sophistication of manner which one may hope will be repeated at other conferences as the GDR gains in international experience. He was the only East European representative to take an active part in negotiations on questions of substance, and his relationship to the

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Russians was that of a member of a team rather than that of a subordinate. But often enough, when the Russians decided that the time had come to make another move towards the Western position, they left him stranded. 16. The Romanians were a case apart. They began the preparatory talks with a loud (and to the Russians no doubt embarrassing) advertisement of their independence and sovereignty. Yet as the talks proceeded it became clear that they had done no more than give premature indications of fallback positions acceptable to the other Warsaw Pact countries; and that they were among the most rigid of the East Europeans on questions of freer movement and human contacts. Their reputation became tarnished, and in the closing stages of the talks their elegant prevarications (expressed in impeccable French) produced apoplectic reactions among both Eastern and Western delegations. They finally achieved a coup of a sort by persuading Mr Mintoff, on the basis of a formula proposed by the French weeks previously, not to block a final consensus; but they had by then lost much of the general sympathy they had won at the outset of the talks. The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, by maintaining a consistent line and pursuing their major interests with a balance of firmness and flexibility, emerged from the process with a high reputation. The contrast is instructive. 17. I should say a word finally about the Finnish record at the Conference. The vigorous pro-Western performance of their fellow neutrals, the Austrians, the Swedes and the Swiss, placed them in a position of some embarrassment. Finnish neutrality, which has yet to be recognised by the Soviet Union, by definition cannot be pro-Western; and the Finns were careful not to associate themselves with these three delegations. On the other hand, they did not allow themselves to be used as ‘Eastern neutrals’ to provide a counter-weight. They may well have come under bilateral pressure to do so, as an intervention they made at the outset of the detailed discussions on human contacts and information suggested; but this was a solitary lapse and otherwise they kept resolutely silent. The Chairman of the preparatory talks, Richard Totterman (Secretary-General of the Finnish MFA), and the Executive Secretary, Ambassador Joel Pekuri, performed their difficult tasks impartially and well, and the general organisation of the long and (for the Finns immensely expensive) talks was seldom faulty. I think it a reasonable reward for these efforts that the first and third stages of the Conference should take place in Helsinki. There was a risk that the decision of many of the Nine to support Geneva as the site of the second stage would cause the Finns offence; but the negotiations that achieved this result were handled with great skill by the Irish chairman, and I was eventually assured by Mr Sorsa, the Finnish Prime Minister, that the Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki formula

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was the ‘best possible solution’ to the problem. 18. It is to the Conference itself that the West have now to turn their attention. We entered the preparatory talks believing that the Conference was inevitable; that the dangers it comprised could probably be avoided; and that it might provide us with some modest benefits. In the light of the preparatory talks I would take a more optimistic view. 19. The Russians have pressed for the Conference for their own purposes. They hoped no doubt to get its blessing for the Brezhnev doctrine; and to exploit it in other directions as a means of dividing the West. The preparatory talks suggest that they did not judge the situation very accurately. From the first they found themselves in a forum where they could expect the regular support of only six out of thirty-four delegations; and where the neutral countries, because of the consensus rule, had much more incentive to express, and persist in expressing, their individual points of view than is the case in international meetings operating under majority voting procedures. In the early days of the talks I sometimes had the impression that the Soviet spokesmen were in a state bordering on panic as they found themselves in a negotiating position rather less strong than they had enjoyed in the UN in the early 1950s. As time went by they adapted themselves to the new situation, abandoned bullying tactics (which succeeded only in alienating the Swiss, the Maltese, and many other neutrals), and began to deploy their real diplomatic skills and experience. But they still remained in a defensive position; and one where their only hope of making their point was by rational argument rather than by the exercise of pressure. It was a stimulating experience for Western delegations to find the Russians, in the hearing of representatives of all their satellites, obliged to give a detailed defence of their domestic policies on, for example, the increase of human and cultural contacts, in order to answer criticism by Liechtenstein. For the Soviet spokesmen themselves the experience cannot have been so refreshing. It is no wonder that the Soviet leadership are still pressing for an early end to the Conference. 20. It should nevertheless be possible for the West at the Conference to exploit the psychological advantage gained at the multilateral preparatory talks. I know that we have never set much store by a declaration on principles guiding relations between States; and public opinion in the UK is rightly suspicious of elevated legalistic phrases with little practical content. But the relevant section of the terms of reference provides some encouragement for the view that we should be able to produce a document of political value if we are prepared to make a major effort to elaborate the principles. Perhaps more important, we can work for some improvement in Soviet behaviour in the area covered by the terms of reference on human

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contacts and information. In this field, which they have always hitherto insisted is appropriate only to bilateral discussion, we now have a means of exerting multilateral pressure on the Russians and their satellites; and we have never had anything of the sort before. At the least, we ought now to be in the position to oblige the Russians either to make some concrete (if modest) advances in this area or to expose the hollowness in practical terms of their professed desire for détente. 21. The importance of the Conference is not limited, however, to what it achieves in the field of East/West relations. It has become, as a result of the work done both before and during the preparatory talks, something of a test case for developing the co-ordination of foreign policy among the Nine. Many of our partners have reasons for wanting to go their own way in important aspects of their relations with the East. But they have shown during the preparatory talks a willingness to work as a group and an awareness of the negotiating advantages this provides. It should surely be a major objective of our policy to ensure that this lesson is reinforced in the course of the Conference itself. We shall not get our own way during the second stage without full preparation. 22. There is one final point. As the MPT showed, the Nine cannot be led from behind. In the early days of the talks the still uncertain state of our bilateral relations with the Russians, as well as tactical considerations relating to our position as a newcomer to the EEC, led the British delegation to play a cautious role. But the detached position of the French, the special preoccupations of the Germans, the eccentricity of the Italians and the public silences of Benelux increasingly made it necessary for us to give a lead, if the Nine were to continue to follow a positive line and enjoy the initiative in the talks. I believe that we shall find ourselves in a similar position in the second stage of the Conference itself; we shall have little choice but to act as one of the leaders of the West. And it is reasonable enough that we should do so. We can, evidently, make a greater contribution to the collective self-confidence of EEC and the more effective safeguarding and prominence of the Community countries’ interests if we take a lead in urging and directing the full preparation of the position of the Nine than if we take a back seat. If Britain is not to act as a major European Power in the context of the CSCE she can hardly hope to be a Power anywhere. 23. I cannot conclude this despatch without expressing my gratitude and admiration for the work of the First Secretaries (including my own Head of Chancery, Mr Beetham) who bore the whole burden of the detailed work of negotiation on our side. They were younger than any other delegation and more lively, led by Mr Brian Fall, who played a significant role in shaping the course of the talks, they took a prominent

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part in working out the agreed terms of reference and the arrangements for the procedure and finances of the Conference. Their ingenuity, drafting ability and resilience during these protracted discussions were alike remarkable. I found it both a piece of good fortune and a pleasure to work with them. 24. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassadors in Paris, Brussels, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Moscow, Washington, Bucharest, Belgrade, East Berlin and to Her Majesty's Representatives to NATO and the European Community. I have, etc., T.A.K. ELLIOTT

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Profile for FCDO Historians

Preparing for Helsinki: the CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks  

An account of the preparatory talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, written by the British delegation, detailing t...

Preparing for Helsinki: the CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks  

An account of the preparatory talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, written by the British delegation, detailing t...

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