29 in far Germans... it'. July In Germany, the so as really wanted and neutralised happens 'whatever Salisbury30 Lord Churchill told we shall have to face the problem of feared, he German German unity'. might come to think the Soviets could offer opinion, be fact "German 'The issue. that there a will always problem" and a them more on this kept before He did fear German-Soviet be danger" "Prussian eyes'. our not must German is irreconcilable 'the the the of people conditions of with character cooperation: Germans The have in the example of communist world. the communist serfdom in hatred The Bolshevism the that eastern their experience zone. of own tyranny and German in hearts I in the next twenty years deep is that Hitler preached still am sure ... Germany will not ally herself with Russia against the West or loosen her internal ties America. ' Europe free and peoples of with the Churchill's in 1953-54 Stalin's death in May in that It is with this efforts after mind 'at his be bring the 1953 to summit' successors meeting with must about a seen. Whether or not there was a period, before the East German rising of June 1953 and in Khrushchev, Molotov's temporary victory, alliance with over Beria and Malenkov, leadership Soviet to open genuinely such an approach, will remain was the when Soviet Union has in further has it the than togone much obscure until archival access day. What is clear is that Churchill's proposals irritated Eisenhower, scared the Foreign Office, frightened Dr Adenauer and broke on the injured vanity of his successor and the Most his Cabinet. his from these construed of the motives as rising only obstinacy of his to the end career ambition and as great peace-maker of a man obstinacy personal into his deep dotage, be but for believed to sunk a they man whom, electoral whom for None had impossible Churchill it them to them oppose. of grasped, as was reasons, had, the manner in which the hydrogen bomb had made war not only impossible to indeed increasingly impossible limited but to of only survive, use as a threat to win, introduce into diplomacy. There was the undoubted truth too that for much of British Labour idea including the the party, most of of a summit conference was opinion, undoubtedly a popular one.
It was also true that a divided Germany seemed in everyone's interests. As Selwyn Lloyd, Eden's chosen deputy in the Foreign Office, wrote to Churchill in June, 'Germany is the key to the peace of Europe. A divided Europe has meant a divided Germany. To unite Germany while Europe is divided even if practicable, is fraught Adenauer, for Therefore Dr danger the Russians, the Americans, all. everyone with the French and ourselves - feel in our hearts that a divided Germany is safer for the time being. '31 The integration of Federal Germany into western Europe and NATO was, however, hanging fire, EDC was still not ratified by France, and the Americans were still getting impatient. Returning from the Bermuda conference, Churchill his fears to voiced Eden: 32
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