Germany rejoins the Club

O BRANCH

FCO HISTORICAL OCCASIONAL

PAPERS

OL

No. 3 November

1989

Foreign & Commonwealth Office HISTORICAL

BRANCH

Occasional Papers November 1989

No. 3 CONTENTS

Papers presented at the Seminar'Germany rejoins the Club', held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 10 November 1989 Page 2-4

Introduction Postwar planning for Germany and realities assumptions Dr Lothar Kettenacker Occupation

the British

and control:

during

the war: 5-16

the administration

Germany, zone of

of

1945

August-December

Mrs Margaret Pelly and Ms Gillian Bennett

A chair in the smoking in 1950 Mrs Heather Yasamee

room:

17-25

the German

question 26-35

Britain and German security 1944-1955 Professor Donald Cameron Watt

36-56

in Germany

A diplomat's view of a posting Lord Bridges

1952-1955 57-63 64

Note on Contributors Documents on British Policy in preparation published and

Overseas:

Volumes 65

Copies of this pamphlet will be deposited with the National Libraries

FCO Historical Branch Cornwall House, Stamford Street, London SE19NS Crown Copyright ISBN

0 903359

1

41

3

INTRODUCTION

The papers in this collection were presented at a conference of Editors of diplomatic documents and British historians, which was held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 10 November 1989 to mark the publication of two volumes on Germany in fell Wall Overseas.

On day Berlin Documents British Policy the series the on after the the main issues under discussion relating to the future of Germany took on renewed failures British the of successes and occupation as speakers assessed significance, Second World War. The Editors DBPO Germany in in decade the the after of policies like to thank all those who took part. would Recurring themes of the day included the extent to which post-war planners, working from 1942 onwards, underestimated the scale of Germany's final collapse and British British it.

Dr Kettenacker's provocative remarks about naivety in resources to cope with in discussion Union, Soviet by challenged afterwards to the vigorously regard further by balanced Roberts, Sir Frank the Annan Lord evidence marshalled by are and Professor Cameron Watt of early security planning by the Chiefs of Staff on the basis disturb Europe likely the Soviet Union to peace of post-war than a was more that the truncated Germany.

The possibility of a hostile Soviet Union was one argument deployed by the Chiefs of Staff when arguing with the Foreign Office in favour of the dismemberment of Germany. The gradual abandonment of dismemberment proposals overlapped with Advisory Commission European from by formulated 1943 to the officials on plans 1945 for the zonal division of Germany. Dr Kettenacker explains how 'the policy of front deliberately door, through the out pushed and partition was consciously while the division of Germany slipped in by the back door, purely as a result of technical history' (p 7). the of cunning of arrangements: a good example Dr Kettenacker touched upon the particular difficulties for the British in the North-West had deliberately for industrial they which sought, where zone, responsibility wealth and food shortages in an over-populated area combined to make it both a political and future Rhineland The liability. the of economic and Ruhr remained a constant source of friction and difficulty between the Occupying Powers, while the responsibility of looking after millions of cold, hungry and homeless people was a burden for which the British authorities were neither prepared nor equipped. The difficult choices facing in Germany in the officials ground charge on are examined in greater detail by the first of the DBPO papers in this collection. This paper by Margaret Pelly and Gill Bennett, based on Volume V of Series I, reviews the difficulties facing quadripartite control and the day-to-day problems which confronted British officials in the first months of occupation of their zone.

2

The political and economic principles for the treatment of Germany as a whole agreed at Conference, documented in Series I, Volume I, Potsdam DBPO, the were soon shown little have As each zone was run on relevance in the early days of occupation. to increasingly separate lines, overall quadripartite control was frustrated by the blocking tactics not only of Soviet, but also of French officials. A major concern for the British decide how far Germany be her to the was should rehabilitated at expense of authorities impoverished humanitarian In feeling the equally victims. and the end genuine almost 'a in Europe' the of avoiding plague spot middle of combined to produce self-interest for Germany. treatment generous relatively

In this context there was discussion of the role of the Treasury, and particularly of Lord Keynes, whom Professor Leslie Pressnell described as incapable of dealing issue distinguished Treasury had from the the of reparations, with rationally which not Sir Cairncross Alec Sir Frank Roberts both stressed, in conclusion, that and restitution.

British policy in the early post-war era was concerned primarily with pulling the Americans into firm lasting a and reluctant commitment within a divided Europe.

By 1950 the division of Germany had been intensified by the formation in 1949 of the Federal Republic in the West and the German Democratic Republic in the East. The attempt to make quadripartite control work had been abandoned for 'the foreseeable future' and the question of German unity appeared little more than an academic one as the two halves of Germany were steadily tied into the western and eastern blocs Cameron Professor Watt explained how this period of 'block-building' respectively. and alliance construction was designed to deter 'Soviet adventurism' and to 'keep Communism beyond the Elbe'.

The German question in 1950, as identified by Heather Yasamee in a paper based on the volumes of Series II, was not one of unification but of integration. The long slow Germany in the West was dramatically quickened in 1950 by the process of anchoring launch Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community and the the surprise of outbreak of the Korean war, which brought proposals for German rearmament to the top of the agenda.

The changing mood of 1950 set the tone for the next five years of German political and economic recovery, vividly captured by Lord Bridges in his recollections and reflections on the period as a whole. In retrospect he sees British policy as lacking a blueprint for the future of Europe, and as largely reactive. The changes in British foreign policy in the 1950s were, he suggests, largely brought about by considerations international of security.

Security issues continued to dominate Allied and German thinking about the future of Germany in the 1950s. Professor Cameron Watt traces the changing nature of Western defence plans and the prospects for reunification in the period 1944-1955. Amid continuing uncertainties about the American commitment to Europe and about the

3

Britain to support overseas commitments which were ten times economic capability of greater than before the war, British policy was shaped initially by wartime concern to for later by Germany the responsibility providing security provide security against and for her. After 1950 plans were increasingly based on partnership with Germany, either Sir in the European Defence Community NATO. In discussion Frank Roberts or recalled contemporary surprise at the way France, having strained at the EDC 'camel', Germany in WEU 'elephant' to the should manage swallow of and NATO. This was States Britain NATO, United the to and and understandable since were committed Britain to WEU also, but not to the EDC. The development of NATO in a nuclear age is considered by Professor Cameron Watt to have led to its becoming, by the time of German entry in 1955, 'an issue and an instrument of politics, not of war, or its prevention or survival'. European security depended on political rather than military strength, with Germany holding the balance.

In this context, despite 'the triple lures of reunification, neutralisation and division disengagement' periodically Union, Soviet by the continued the offered of Germany remained in everybody's interest. This was acknowledged by Selwyn Lloyd, in June declared 1953: State Office, he 'Germany Minister Foreign then the at of when is the key to the peace of Europe. A divided Europe has meant a divided Germany ' ...

Similarly Anthony Eden in 1954 anticipated current Soviet concerns when he asked: 'Is Germany to be neutral and disarmed If so who will keep Germany disarmed? Or is ...

Germany to be neutral and armed? If so who will keep Germany neutral? '

Margaret Pelly Heather Yasamee

4

POSTWAR

DURING FOR GERMANY PLANNING AND REALITIES ASSUMPTIONS

THE

WAR:

The British approach to Germany both before and during the war in terms of post-war 'Machtersatzpolitik', is power politics a good example of what one might call planning intentions best ie initiatives launching the of which cannot with without real power, Britain backfire In be through came very close to some and as a ways result. then seen being seen, as Hitler suggested, to act as a 'Gouvernante', 1 in other words a nanny foreign behaviour.

Superficially, dictators for kept the their selfish reprimanding who dismantling of Czechoslovakia at Munich and the guarantee of Poland six months later deterrence.

However, they of preserving and means peace: appeasement opposite were A honest Great Power both the gestures at course would expense of others. more were have been to maintain an attitude of menacing silence, a policy of non-interference and in less This the view of unpardonable acts of aggression. was more or non-recognition States for by United it is than the which was more credible given credit approach of British policy-makers. Britain's self-respect as a Great Power required her to involve herself in the affairs of Europe as a matter of course and of principle regardless of the firm but dictators like Hitler 'Musso' and needed a available resources: unpredictable helping hand like naughty public school boys. It was this concept of Great Power foreign British the and responsibility explains remarkable continuity which of status Summing before during the and war. up British foreign policy during this period policy the American historian, Vojtech Mastny refers to 'the same unsurmounted crisis of 2 Sir Alexander Cadogan he to the eclipse of power'. adjustment right was when October in 1940: 'We lived bluff in Europe for last the minuted on years of the peace, have been living on a larger degree of bluff in other parts of the world, eg in the and we Far East for nearly half a century'. 3 However, Cadogan was wrong when he appeared to suggest that this policy of 'make-believe'4 had come to an end. It was continued during and for a short while after the war in the sense that, in spite of private doubts, British statesmen acted as though Britain was still a Great Power on a par with the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain's Great Power status implied that she had the right, as Sir Orme Sargent strongly believed, 'to be concerned with the affairs of the Europe, 5 in have interest'. those and of not merely parts whole with which we a special One is bound to ask: What were the foundations of British power if not the material States United Soviet Union? Here again, the the the of resources or manpower of Sargent gave the classic answer in the summer of 1945: 'We have many cards in our hands if we choose to use them our political maturity; our diplomatic experience; the democratic institution inspires in Western the confidence which solidarity of our Europe; and our incomparable war record'. 6 These were, of course, qualities of an immaterial nature which could only be effective if they were exercised in a friendly political environment very different from that prevailing in Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. As Peter Pulzer put it: 'British power depended on being accepted by others'.?

For Whitehall's decision-making elite, used to the club and committee approach to it ie before Cold in the to time, the was politics, not easy outbreak of war, or realise

5

War for that matter, that there were powers in the world who could not be made to join by laid down by Great Power the old members. the rules the club and play The planning for post-war Germany, for the crisis management of a bankrupt state by Super how Powers is four, later the new were the three, a perfect example of receivers, business behave to partners, meeting all the obligations as responsible supposed Britain's Germany joint from the and accepting role as an occupation of resulting honest broker. The perception of ideological implications of foreign policy, the policy least.

Victor Rothwell is it foreigners, to the say as were, was very underdeveloped, of 8 Sovietologists.

Office During Foreign the war, to the to clerks as amateur right refer for instance, there were numerous intelligence papers on the future course of Soviet Stalin Communist based but that the assumption on was after all a ruler policy, not one West be Only interests, the could never of overcome. national whose mistrust as defined by history, provided the degree of predictability without which a sensible foreign policy seemed impossible to enact. In the case of France and Russia it was only Germany imperative to that security natural assume vis-a-vis was and that all efforts had to be made to satisfy those interests in a practical manner. This is not to suggest that security was not the key issue or was less important for the Soviet than for the French Government. But the methods of achieving it were different to the extent of being negotiable and in the end acceptable or not: the policy of 'guaranties materielles 9 in other words territorial efficaces', safeguards, was a matter for discussion, ideological control of foreign governments was not. The distinction was not made, or at least not perceived, until it was too laze.

British post-war planning for Germany only started in earnest in the summer of 1942.

By that time both the United States and Soviet Russia had become involved in the war formal had Britain alliance with the latter by the end of May. 10 Now it and concluded a later be that the Reich would be worn down. However, the sooner or could anticipated been had already set. Firstly, the terms of reference provided by the most crucial points inter-war the experience of period; secondly, the decision early in the war 'to avoid any 11 precise statement of our war aims', which was adhered to throughout the war; thirdly, the realisation that, especially after the fall of France, Germany could not be defeated without the help of major allies and that any planning had to avoid the pitfalls of controversy among an unlikely alliance. The result was that it is almost misleading to talk about top-level decision-making when it comes to the future of Germany. There from hardly any guidance above and the planning staffs were to a large extent left was to their own devices. They proceeded from terms of reference which were based on unspoken assumptions, or a general consensus which could be taken for granted. The dichotomy between these underlying assumptions of post-war planning and the realities after unconditional surrender is clearly visible in three issues: the division of Germany which was never intended; the misplaced expectations in the north-western zone, which contained the industrial heartland of Germany; the concept of indirect rule via Berlin and the reality of military government after the war.

6

to during the or not the whether topics question One of the most controversial war was kept be it into ie Reich, dismember the German separate parts which should then split favour in been have Three' 'Big The by of to if seem means. repressive necessary apart 12 Whitehall but Teheran, discuss the matter at this drastic solution when they came to idea in Britain, the Department, and State rejected the press13 as as quality well and the focused has been Too the it on denounced attention much and retrograde. as repressive history limelight it 'Big Three' the and too of deliberations of the who enjoy, as were, decisions. later briefed their to them and were make sense of little on the officials who Teheran, Churchill Stalin forward by Roosevelt, ideas at Whatever the and put be the taken to the at three the steps about allies among major subsequent negotiations Germany in but did which authority one central the suggest anything not war of end German The instrument state single the a of assumption of surrender. out carry would it firstly, for important have deal Allies two was to the reasons: was would which with for the period, post-hostility any planning of sensible prerequisite necessary a Germany dangerous the sole was and potentially an undivided policing secondly, however, There for d'etre the one the after was, alliance war. maintaining raison in Staff, Chiefs did hope lobby, the co-operation with of not place much who powerful As Soviet the a consequence, when asked to state their after war. government the for Office, dismay Foreign the they the the to opted and of surprise much views, Germany boundaries, because dismemberment they preferred a the along of zonal insurance Germany 'an to the unmanageable whole, especially as manageable part of 14 final decision Soviet hostile Union'.

No the on possibility of an eventually against issue this thorny was ever taken, either within the British government or among the Allies. Towards the end of the war none of the Allies wished to compromise the idea of joint occupation or to incur the wrath of the German people by openly advocating dismemberment. The British were relieved when an inter-Allied committee to discuss this question was allowed to disband in April 1945. On 9 May, Stalin declared that the Soviet Union while celebrating victory 'does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany'. 15

While dismemberment remained on the agenda until it became an obsolete issue, the from Germany foregone for the the total occupation of conclusion right was a need beginning. Even the opponents of Vansittart saw it as the indispensible means of Germany for from be disarmed that ever good and prevented would making sure 16 The be to a matter of practical procedure rather problem seemed starting another war. than principle: mixed or occupation by zones (zonal occupation), the occupation of forces the all over the country, above all the spreading out of strategic areas, or distribution of the zones among the major allies and the incorporation of smaller allies into this system of occupation. 17 In other words, the policy of partition was front division deliberately door the the through of while consciously and pushed out Germany slipped in by the back door, purely as a result of technical arrangements: a Cold due It history. to the gust of the was, of course, good example of the cunning of War that this back door, though firmly shut and safely locked, burst open. Once the Russians had agreed to the zonal boundaries by the middle of February 1944, still one

7

Americans The before Yalta, for future developments could the points year were set.

Advisory European but British Soviet in the agree to the not and proposals Commission. Of course, certain events and developments after the war, such as the collapse of central administration in Berlin or the French veto against its re-creation, Germanies.

The outcome was inevitable once the towards the two accelerated pace Germany had been divided into separate zones of Western and Soviet influence, unless it is argued that the Cold War could easily have been avoided.

The zoning of Germany was mapped out by a British planning staff, the military subin 1943 Stalingrad filled the spring as aftermath of committee, as early which all British hearts with gratitude towards the Red Army. 18 More than ever, planning for the future lessons from from learning the the right past, the inter-war period. especially meant These lessons had consolidated into powerful cliches which eclipsed sober thinking future.

The if the this or that step, such as, for always same: reasoning was about the instance, the total occupation of Germany, was not taken, history was bound to repeat itself: Germany, unrepentant and vengeful, would rise from the ashes and start world heartA 'change Leitmotif British in the of chief time. of no efforts vis-awar three it be if Germany German against all odds, achieved argued, was only could every vis 19 be demonstrated by did 'war this to and was pay', not unconditional realised that bargaining terms no over with with any alternative total occupation, surrender and Germany in There towards the is the end of war. emerge might no government which kind behind of thinking was very sound and was to pay this doubt that the psychology be denied it implied that this But, future. time, cannot a voluntary at the same off in the in final days Third Reich. for the the It of manoeuvre political scope restriction of any Keynes Maynard John history foresight to does that realise of required the exceptional for is future.

'The the itself the guide past no chief and that an obsession with not repeat Ministers 'is he ' that should not suppose that the chief thing thing that matters, wrote, 20 Not it last is time'. only generals get wrong to avoid the mistakes made that matters basis been the has the of experiences the they on war plan next said, often when, as War World be Second Even last. during to though the end of the was the very gained different from what Europe experienced after 1918, the political potential which this British On into the contrary, planning situation created was not allowed to come play. in both the middle staffs, political and military, were obsessed with the power vacuum initiatives British Germany All for Europe Allies. by the major of and the scramble falling Germany forestall both designed inside to were and a a revolutionary situation for Allies Germany It the treatment the the out of over of was significant after the war. intellectual climate of the time, for the intake of many intellectuals into government service, that certain views and habits of thought rapidly gained ground; for instance, the idea that Britain was experiencing a kind of war socialism be the and would therefore ideal go-between between capitalist America 21 future Russia, the or that and socialist could be anticipated and to a certain extent rationally This explains the planned. penchant for procedural questions and technical arrangements which could almost eliminate politics as a controversial matter. Bureaucrats tend to go for solutions which are likely to produce consensus amongst political masters of different persuasions.

8

Therefore they opted for arrangements which would find the approval of the Foreign Office and the War Office, in other words, of civilians and soldiers, of Conservative Washington Moscow.

You Labour, and of only need to organise the means of coand it in table as were, and compromise political questions would operation, the round be guaranteed. almost inside The Kremlin.

One can only imagine how British diplomacy the was viewed impression must have prevailed that London was very reluctant to launch a second front22 and share the burden of warfare while at the same time mapping out the end of hostilities and distributing the spoils of war (or denying them to Russia as in the case of in Pressing the on with war order to occupy as much enemy territory as reparations). have been Stalin by like appreciated much more, certainly someone possible would 23 bargain he by In his knew that territory the would not over occupied soldiers. who Red had Army it Rhine the the which not reached scenario was seemed which end -a likely Stalingrad diplomats but Anglo-American British too troops after all to which Thuringia.

Now it was too late for had penetrated deeply into Mecklenburg and Churchill to revert to power politics since zonal boundaries and the control machinery in Berlin had long been settled. It turned out that British diplomacy had been too clever by half in that by trying to commit Stalin to a round table approach in the Berlin control fact in it had its hands.

The Foreign Office tied own council, came to the belated 'the that unusual alacrity with which the Russians accepted our zone conclusion in EAC 24 Militarily that the suggest than they ever expected'. we gave more proposals it was not impossible for the Western Allies to occupy the whole of Germany up to the for Oder if the zonal occupation had not been drawn up in advance and if plans river had had more latitude to stir up German fears of the Red Army. psychological warfare Not much was required to persuade German commanders that it was in their own interests to surrender in good time. In their anxiety not to offend the Russians the British did very little to jostle for good strategic positions to face the ensuing Cold War. Not only did they twice turn down American suggestions, before D-Day and before Germany, to soften the impact of the demand for unconditional surrender, but entering in July 1943 the Foreign Office had even elaborated on the Casablanca formula by insisting on a simultaneous armistice and one single instrument of surrender. 25 Not that British armistice terms were particularly harsh. On the contrary, Germany had less to fear from British occupation policies than from any other ally: no Morgenthau Plan have from Whitehall, in fact the latter was convincingly possibly could emanated Treasury by What is refuted officials. the rational, if over-cautious and stressing needs defensive decision-making process designed by a bureaucratic elite26 which was only too aware of the over-stretched resources of the British Empire and also of Britain steadily losing ground in the great alliance. Diplomatic initiatives were systematically for to compensate used material resources and an acute shortage of manpower. In other Americans the words, and the Russians had to be enlisted in the controlling and Germany.

The burden had to be shared, especially in view of the ever policing of present anxiety that American troops might withdraw after the job was done.

9

Early on, the British Chiefs of Staff claimed the North-Western zone for Britain, for all German logistics, ports, strategic sorts of reasons: communications control of and far However, by the most important consideration. significance. economic security was German economic potential concentrated in the Ruhr valley, it was agreed, was crucial for any aggressive intentions in the future. At the same time the Ruhr was seen as the imperial treasure chest which would allow Britain to preside over the distribution of 27 The in Berlin industrial heartland the administrative reparations. machinery and be key influence to the assets appeared which would provide controlling over the whole Germany The assumed value of the North-Western of with a minimum of manpower. fact Americans, increased by keen lay the that the too, to their were very zone was hands on the Ruhr and use German rather than French ports for their lines of increases Since irrespective the competition market of any value asset, communication.

Chiefs Staff British intrinsic its of were all the more convinced that they were value, of North-Western In in to the their secure efforts zone. contrast to the right to persist issue, Soviet its border Anglo-American this the the over size of and zone controversy for between future bone West the three allies, except contention of was no with the the disputed in Baltic (because Fehmarn island the which was the of of the small demarcation line drawn by British planning staffs between the British and the Soviet been had by Foreign Baltic already the and written off the coast) to zones only went up Office. Only Sir William Strang's persistence saved the island from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. dropping bombing industries.

Ruhr The value of the with every which was raid, fell dramatically at the very moment that the North-Western zone was eventually handed Morgenthau the the Plan.

British, executors of thereby made were the to who over Could it be that Churchill agreed to the Morgenthau Plan, in spite of grave doubts and have British last 28 he knew because the the would word about its reservations, The Foreign Office and the Treasury obviously had no intention implementation?

29 Germany. is It de-industrialising true that there are memoranda from whatsoever of British industrialists among the Board of Trade papers which plead for a discriminatory Germany harm But in these pleas received scant to as a competitor. policy order influenced Economic Whitehall in Industrial and the only the and recognition of work Planning Staff in as much as officials were anxious about how to defuse such thinking which was also prevalent among certain cabinet ministers. While political appeasement had been discredited and abandoned, economic appeasement, as practised before the war, was still regarded as a sensible approach to the German problem. As Churchill put it, 'impoverished nations are bound to be bad neighbours'. 30 He wished for the Germans to be 'fat but impotent', 31 a phase likely to be if not properly misunderstood explained. Back to the Ruhr: the Morgenthau Plan soon disappeared into the historical dustbin. However, French and Russian designs discarded be Ruhr the so on could not easily.

In order to distract de Gaulle from the industrial centre he Germany, rightly of which regarded as vital to French security, London had to agree to a French zone of

10

in be, At the turned to the words the the mine out gold of expected end war occupation.

32 With Sargent, 'the heap Orme Sir the the ever saw'. of rubble world greatest of influx of refugees from the Eastern territories and the increasing realisation that the West would be cut off from the agrarian food producing regions of the former Reich, liability English became North-Western tax-payer. to the a more and more of the zone As an occupying power Britain was responsible for feeding a clearly over-populated he Churchill Germany.

When defended the policy of unconditional surrender area of bound by 'if bound in Parliament, our own consciences to we are we are stated 33 The Germans bound bargain We to the as a result of a struck'. are not civilisation. for fuel British food the crisis military government and produced most acute shortage of in Germany. It was the supply of these vital commodities by which the occupying Germany.

Consequently, fought for in judged London the all a over rise powers were 34 industry in food defor imports.

Not level the to of order pay vital permitted industrialisation of Germany was the order of the day, but the exact opposite; for while demilitarisation be could not compromised, the consequent enforced shift to economic industries, fact Germany did have look its the that to as as own well consumer not after defence, was to pave the way for a period of unprecedented economic boom.

British plans for a Control Commission which are at the root of the peculiar status of Berlin today are linked with a whole set of assumptions which proved to be wrong.

Only a few of these terms of reference are explicitly mentioned, explained or discussed in official papers. Three assumptions were crucial: 1.

2.

Germany would surrender, as in 1918, with the central Government or at least its central administrative machinery intact and working efficiently. Why should this be the case with a madman like Hitler at the helm? The real power was supposed to rest with the Army which had helped Hitler into power in 1933 and would get rid of him before he became too much of a liability. Since so many peace feelers were supposed to emanate from the German General Staff it was assumed that towards the end of the war, if not before, the Wehrmacht was a factor to be reckoned with. More power of command and more sense of responsibility was attributed to the 'Generals' than they were able to muster. In a way, the British ruling elite had become the victim of the myth of Prussian militarism revived by Nazi propaganda. Hitlers would come and go, but the Prussian tradition would survive unless something drastic was done about it.

Whatever happened to Germany, the state of Prussia, the evil core of Germany, had to be dissolved. 35 In fact, the Army had long outlived its role as an independent force within the state and the Nazi state was anything but a rational unitary state built on Prussian traditions.

The second assumption concerned the time honoured principle of 'indirect rule'.

There was no doubt that it could and should be applied to Germany. The whole obsession of Whitehall with drafting 70 odd Armistice terms more than two years before actual surrender rested on the scenario that Germany would in time

11

her imposed the be terms on under to all out carry obliged surrender and What Commission.

Control the Allied was controversial was the supervision of it because would recognition of a central government or a central administration keep the old elites in power and hamper progress towards democratic its Office, Foreign 1943, First, in March the on the advice of reconstruction.

Research Department, recommended doing without a central machinery for the Cabinet However, being the time and working through regional authorities. disliked the 'heavy and insidious task involved in assuming direct responsibility 36 German They Germany'. for the administration central preferred a of law instructions Allied and order. and maintain authority which would carry out What was lurking in their minds, but never expressed, was the fear of social backed by The the shortage of manpower occupying powers. one of revolution issue in decided to the the the offset effects of and need unwelcome zoning in Germany, favour of keeping a central administrative machinery even a if it in any way acceptable. Within a year the position had government was from a reformist approach to one of administrative convenience. After changed the unsuccessful plot of 20 July the opposite development was nearer the mark: the Reich submerging in total chaos. This alarming prospect prompted planning for the resurrection of certain central departments which were to staffs provide hold to the whole crumbling body together. The term 'Military as regarded vital Government', favoured by the Americans, was found unacceptable because it suggested the employment of a host of civil affairs officers. The reality after the different. looked It very war was the Americans who set the pace for the transition to German self-government and who managed with a few thousand civil affairs officers whereas the British Control Commission employed over 30,000 officials in 1946, twenty times the number of civil servants required for the administration of India before the war. The budget of the Control Office for Germany was more than that of the Colonial Office in 1939.37 Now all sorts of Germany's for the reform of plans social, political and economic structures heavy industry, (local (Yovernment, civil service, public ownership of surfaced 'indirect be hardly rule'. to the principle of reconciled etc) which could

3.

Right from the beginning of planning for Germany Berlin was accorded a Control Commission, Allied The Headquarters the and seat of prominent status. it was to represent the unity and continuity of the Alliance and was therefore given the status of a separatecombined zone: 'It is considered that the Berlin area should be a separate Combined Zone occupied by selected troops representing, in due proportions, all forces The Allied the of occupation. principal role of this mixed force be to support the authority of any Allied Military government, the would Control Commission and other bodies, and also to ensure the in the capital. '38 maintenance of order

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Berlin intended danger These political fortifications to the of a of counteract were drifting apart of the Allies. What was to become the symbol of the Cold War was When Eden and his advisers visited designed to stave off this very development. in the spring of 1943 State Department Washington officials warned them of the inherent in the zones of occupation which might give rise to separate spheres tendency A later American influence. year officers were quoted as referring contemptuously to of Commission Control the as the 'Holy Trinity', meaning you had to believe in it for it to Strang be true. The future was foreshadowed by the 'judicious compromise', as put it, 39 concerning the exercise of supreme power in Germany; was it to be the Control Council, as claimed by the Western powers, or the Commanders-in-Chief in their The in decision the to disagree agreement was more nature of a respective zones?

'Each in his jointly, in saying so: own of zone occupation, and also, without matters 40 Germany While the war lasted the Russians gave the as a whole'. affecting appearance of co-operation and agreement with the treatment of Germany as a technical de-nazification, de-militarisation one of problem, and re-education. At the same time, German communists in Moscow were being trained for the real take-over of power in Soviet Zone the and took no notice of the British directives for joint Allied control submitted to the European Advisory Commission. 41

The options were now there for developments in both East and West Germany to lead in either direction: a united Germany, especially in economic respects, under the Control Commission, or the division of the country along ideological boundaries. The following years were characterised by the symptoms of a dissolving marriage, a rhetoric on both sides for unity alongside a process of actual separation.

Lothar

Kettenacker

NOTES

In his speech at Saarbr端cken which was his first reaction to the Munich Chamberlain, 9 October 1938, in: Max Domarns (ed. ), Hitler: agreement with Reden und Proklamationen, 1939-1945, Vol. 1 (M端nchen, 1962), p. 956.

2

Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York, 1979), p. 309.

3

Minute regarding Sir Orme Sargent's Memorandum of 28 October 1940, PRO: FO 371/252081W 11399.

13

4

This is how Strang distanced himself from the summit diplomacy of the Second World War. See Lord Strang, 'War and Foreign Policy', in David Dilks (ed. ), Retreat from Power, Vol. 2 (London, 1981), p. 99.

5

Minute by Sargent, 2 April 1945, in Graham Ross (ed. ), The Foreign British Documents Anglo-Soviet Relations, the Kremlin: on (Cambridge, 1984), p. 202.

6

Ibid.

7

London

8

Victor Rothwell, 'Grossbritannien die Anfänge des Kalten Krieges', in und Josef Foschepoth (ed. ), Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage (Göttingen, 1985), p.

95. For more evidence see Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 (London, 1982).

9

See Aide-Memoire of the French Government of 23 October 1939, in Lothar Kettenacker (ed. ), The 'Other Germany' in the Second World War (Stuttgart, 1977), p. 158.

10

Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Cf. Llewellyn Vol. II (London, 1971), pp. 244-254 (Text: pp. 663-665).

11

WM 42(39)8,9 October 1939, CAB 65/1.

12

See Keith Eubank, Summit at Teheran (New York, 1985).

13

Discussed in detail by Hermann Fromm, Deutschland in der öffentlichen Kriegszieldiskussion Grossbritanniens 1939-1945 (Frankfurt/M., 1982), pp.

180-196.

14

Military Aspects of the Proposal that Germany should be dismembered, COS(44)822,9 September 1944, FO 371/39080/ C 12806. See also Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 114-123.

15

Quoted by Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: the War they Waged and the Peace they Sought (Princeton, 1966), p. 620.

16

Cf. Edward H. Carr, Conditions of Peace (London, 1942), 226. p.

Office and 1941-45

Review of Books, vol. 7, No. 15,5 September 1985, p. 3.

14

17

der Die Deutschlandplanung Friedenssicherung.

Krieg Lothar Kettenacker, zur britischen Regierung während des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1989), pp.

270-302. See also Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford, 1975).

18

See Paul Addison, The Road to 1945. British Politics and the Second World pp.

134-141.

1975), (London, War

19

See the ch. on psychological Friedenssicherung, pp. 193-208.

20

John Maynard Keynes, Collected Writings, Vol. 26 (London, 1980), p. 334.

21

Cf. Addison, pp. 127-163. See also the War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (Eden's PPS) and Harold Nicolson.

22

This comes out very clearly in Peter Böttger, Winston Churchill und die Zweite Front (1941-1943) (Frankfurt/M., 1984).

23

In his famous conversation with Milovan Djilas, Stalin said in April 1945 that 'this war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own social system as far as his York, It be Stalin (New (Conversations cannot otherwise' army can reach. with 1962), p. 114).

24

Minute by Ward, 5 May 1945, FO 371/50762/U 3598.

25

Aide-Memoire of 1 July 1943, Appendix A to EAC(44)3, FO 371/40612/U 409, also Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Vol. I, p. 708.

26

There is evidence for this criticism in John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London, 1985).

27

Cf. Alec Cairncross, The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations 1941-1949 (Oxford, 1986).

28

See Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: (London, 1966), pp. 177-180.

29

Cf. Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung, pp. 423-434.

30

Ben Pimlott (ed. ), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton (London, 1986), p. 275.

warfare

15

in Kettenacker,

Krieg

zur

The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965

1940-45

31

Ibid.

32

Minute of 4 May 1945, FO 371/46720/C

33

House of Commons speech on 22 February 1944, Charles Eade (ed. ), The War Speeches of the Right Hon. Winston Churchill, Vol. 3 (London, 1952), p. 91.

34

Cf. Cairncross; also Friedrich Jerchow, Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaft 1944-1947 (D端sseldorf, 1978): John E. Farquharson, The Western Allies and the Politics of Food (Leamington Spa, 1985).

35

Lothar Kettenacker, 'Preussen-Deutschland als britisches Feindbild im Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Bernd J端rgen Wendt, Das britische Deutschlandbild im Wandel des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Bochum, 1984), pp. 145-168. Prussia was Control Council 25 dissolved by February 1947: 'The the order of officially on Prussian State which from early days has been a bearer of militarism and facto Germany has de in Gazette of the ceased to exist' (Official reaction Control Council, No. 14,31 March 1947, p. 262).

36

WM 135(43)3,5 October 1943, CAB 65/40.

37

Cf. Jochen Thies, 'What is going on in Germany? Britische Milit辰rverwaltung in Deutschland 1945-46', in Claus Scharf and Hans-J端rgen Schroder (eds. ), die Britische Zone: Grossbritanniens 1945-1949 Die Deutschlandpolitik und (Wiesbaden, 1979), pp. 29-50.

38

EAC(44)2,15

39

William (Lord) Strang, Home and Abroad (London, 1956).

40

F. S.V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization 105.

(London, 1966), Planning p. and

41

Cf. Alexander Fischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1941-1945 (Stuttgart, 1975).

1644.

January 1944, FO 371/40612/U

16

408.

im Zweiten Weltkrieg

AND CONTROL: OCCUPATION ZONE OF GERMANY BRITISH

THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE SECOND HALF

OF THE OF 1945

When the Potsdam Conference ended on 2 August 1945, the question of policy by British least foreseeable future in Germany the the was regarded, at towards Government, as settled. The political and economic principles to govern the initial l Conference, in Protocol the the the of proceedings of embodied were period control Commandersin be Germany in to the vested was which stated that supreme authority in-Chief of the four occupying Powers, both collectively as members of the Control Council for Germany, and individually in their own zones of occupation. in Government in its first Labour The main preoccupations the office were of months domestic and economic policy. In the realm of foreign affairs the importance of the loan negotiations in the autumn of 1945 (documented in Series I, Anglo-American Volume III of DBPO) tended to be given to Anglo-American meant that priority in Germany, Western including Europe, a global context, and seldom relations Cabinet Thus Secretary, Ernest British Foreign the the agenda. although appeared on Bevin, took a close interest in German affairs, it was primarily from the viewpoint of Potsdam decisions Soviet in the that ensuring were carried out, and particular that the Union should be dealt with fairly.

The British Element of the Control Commission for Germany (CCG(BE)), under FieldMarshal Montgomery and his able Deputy, General Sir Brian Robertson, soon discovered that the application of the Potsdam principles was far from straightforward.

In quadripartite negotiations the attitudes adopted by the representatives of the other three Powers necessitated a continuous process of scrutiny and adaptation of British and in Berlin in order to enable agreement to be reached. policy both in Whitehall Within the British Zone, the harsh realities of post-war conditions in Germany soon imposed themselves upon the British administration.

In Berlin the various committees which made up the quadripartite Control Authority began work during August. By 3 October Field-Marshal Montgomery was confessing Clement Prime Minister Attlee that while he had 'once thought Four-Power to Germany he 'now doubted it be government of was possible', could made to whether 2 Unanimity impossible decision: seemed the Russians were difficult to work'. on any Americans becoming General Eisenhower the and restless with work with were considering recommending that the US occupation forces be withdrawn. By the middle October General Sokolovsky, Soviet the of member of the Coordinating Committee of the Control Authority, was complaining that on the important issue of reparations had been achieved since the Soviet delegation had put in a bid on 23 August for nothing deliveries.

Nor had much more progress been made by the end of 1945. What ad-vance had happened to the 'common policies' set out in the Potsdam Protocol?

17

issues.

Control Authority The records of the reveal a similar story on most major by least, Powers committed at Although three of the occupying were, nominally four Powers in Germany, were Potsdam to a unified practice the actions of all Germany implied blocked French The a single that was which proposal any centrifugal. for by German provided administrations, central the of setting up especially and unit, Rhineland for French interfere Protocol, Potsdam the and plans with the which would Ruhr. Their obstructionism was skilfully exploited by the Soviet negotiators to make in interfering from West Zone based line, the while on shutting off their own their own British Although the to that of close policy generally was the others, appear moderate.

Government Germany British is it States, United the clear that with respect to Americans Allied long-term this the were eager to at stage while occupation, envisaged its burdens and correspondingly quick to seize compromise solutions which might shed hasten this aim. These differences in approach to four-Power control also influenced individual the zones. the government of This was the context of the problems faced by the British Element of the Control Commission both in the quadripartite forum and in the British Zone as documented in Volume V of Series I of DBPO, which will be published in the New Year. We would like to focus here on some of the problems faced by CCG(BE) in the day to day based Zone, British in Volume V. the the on of cover age administration The Potsdam Protocol had laid down the ground rules for the treatment of occupied Germany. So far as was practicable, the population was to be accorded uniform four Zones.

The German throughout treatment all people were to be convinced that they had 'suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what For brought have themselves'. the time being, no central German upon they Government was to be established. At the same time, however 'notwithstanding' as if it, Protocol as recognising the creation of a paradox - German political life the put basis decentralisation be development the on of reconstructed, the was to and of local with self-administration of economic controls in such matters as responsibility, transport, coal production and agricultural output. The formation of political parties and be to trades unions was permitted, and there would be freedom of speech, press and religion.

These 'political principles' were quickly shown to be of little relevance to post-war life in the British Zone. As Sir William Strang, Political Adviser to F-M Montgomery, in first 11 August the pointed out on of an illuminating series of reports to London, importance 'of minor political activity was compared with the struggle for existence'. 3 The principal concerns of the German population were food, coal, displaced persons Element British The and public safety. of the Control Commission soon found that these were their principal concerns also.

18

faced found Government Military largely themselves officers, CCG(BE), composed of displaced large by and refugees of numbers swollen population, apathetic an with Office for Foreign it In London food easy was shelter. and of short and persons, folly.

In Germans their the own price of that the the paying take were to view officials by Government the Military Zone misery British unmoved remain not could staff the in Office Foreign Strang, the Sir William official working a as them. that confronted he October, in Zone Following both the Zone, could see a tour of points of view. 'appeared Government Military degree high officers, who of of commitment the praised begin degree bring desire to to by be chaos... to out of of order some a strong to moved further He lines'. decent humane life remarked, the and on the people of rebuild for battle fighting 'we the it the however, that was appreciated that of the winter are not We Europe. interest interest-in fighting it in Germans... the of the our are we of sake do not want a plague-spot in the middle of Europe. '4 Food was the most pressing problem. The heavily industrialised British Zone was not 1200 level harvest of would only support a ration self-sufficient, and even a successful in US by The day. the the authorities attitude of problem was compounded calories per Germany who suspected, wrongly, that Germans in the British Zone, on a nominal Zone, in being 1550 their those treated than more generously calories, were ration of had difficulties by bureaucratic the combined supply machinery, which as and also in down by Americans. the the war, was wound operated successfully As winter approached CCG(BE) sent a stream of requests to London to be allowed to import wheat, and on 28 October F-M Montgomery warned that food shortages in the Zone could lead to 'famine conditions to an extent which no civilised people should inflict on their beaten enemies'. 5 There were sharply differing reactions in Whitehall.

Ministers were reluctant to use scarce dollars to buy American or Canadian wheat for Germany at the expense of British stocks and supplies for the liberated countries. Sir Ben Smith, Minister for Food, expressed the view that it might be imprudent to supply for flour Germany, but Secretary brief J Lawson, State for War, Mr to a of wheat and 6 be disastrous 'It do '. not to so will commented:

By December Mr John Hynd, Minister responsible for the Control Office for Germany October, Minister in had been Prime d Austria, to the about set was writing up which an 7 Cabinet if 1 January 1946 'serious the supplies were not sent, and on calamity' a humanity Zone the that the on grounds of of and enemy countries should needs agreed 8 This decision reflected the alternatives continuing to rank equally with other countries. face the Cabinet in the allocation of scarce resources as between the UK itself, British German Germany Allies in had the the suffered and who needs of responsibilities occupation.

Though the British Zone was rich in coal there were many problems in obtaining it. If the miners had insufficient food they could not work; and it was difficult to stimulate

19

increased production if lack of transport meant that the coal would sit at the pit-head for families, but Also, for their export. distribution, and the miners of use not awaiting dilemma by to the the purge whether exacerbated were problems technical production denazification, British to to or commitment of an earnest as pro-Nazi coal syndicates impossible 'it is the to and reorganise purge completely that unfortunately admit from Ruhr if industry the to time the obtain same we are at complicated structure of the 3 is Europe for awaiting'. the large deliveries of coal which As early as 12 August F-M Montgomery sought modification of the directive ordering him to export 25m tons of coal, warning that if he fulfilled it 'grave consequences' for increased leading German the to trouble and possibility of the people would ensue, 9 latitude him Control Office in The according some reply, military commitment. interpretation of the directive, was not sent until 31 October, but Mr Bevin had already in boost look Field-Marshal to the to the after order miners secretly encouraged 10 production.

The decision had also been taken to arrest the suspect coal magnates on 5 September, a Strang, believed Sir William 'discontent by that who with the progress move supported from Nazis importance in industry has in in the the positions of coal eliminating made >I in lowering Further the the morale of mine-workers'. steps past played a part designed to increase coal output were taken at the initiative of Mr Bevin, who suggested October Mines Ruhr CCG(BE) that the the the of end ownership to at of should be Commission, both Control in 'the to the eliminate present excessive vested industry be the power of economic which of coal considered an may concentration 'might have important gesture which an a psychological effect upon example', and as the miners by showing them that some really radical change is being made in the 12 Overseas In Reconstruction Committee the the event of the present ownership'.

Cabinet approved a modified proposal that F-M Montgomery should requisition the 21 December. into at on midnight effect mines: this came for CCG(BE) both in the Zone and in quadripartite caused problems General Robertson While agreed with Mr Hynd that the purging of Nazi negotiations. 'proceeded be 13 he also appreciated that if everyone with vigorously', officials must Nazi been had dismissed the a of member party ever there would be no who was Germans left to carry on the essential administration of the Zone. There was also the fear, expressed at a Military Government Conference on 12/13 October, that if the British followed the standards of the other occupying Powers and removed up to 1.5m Germans from office, those so removed would 'become thereby unemployed and a 13 security menace'.

Denazification

In Control Authority discussions on a quadripartite denazification directive the British Delegation found themselves in a minority of one. CCG(BE) Political Division were justice directive 'bring to a standstill in the British Zone', and that the concerned could

20

'an in German interest had Russians, Americans as survival no who and the that Sir William far. decision Potsdam had too the pressed community', civilised organised is 'primary but Strang was sympathetic purpose of the occupation pointed out that the harsher the view of the destructive and preventive', an example of sometimes 14 by diplomats by the than administrators. military taken senior occupation for British inclined the Germans the to The authorities themselves were criticise lower it 'the Strang Sir W denazification that agreed was programme. slowness of the least have foremen, great as exercise at reached, who not yet etc., we whom officials, Germans It is in discouraging influence the the only workers ... as the capitalists an denazification. ' According in down level to this the process of themselves who can get Germans do Corps 'the 1 District, however, No from of majority not regard to a report it for denazifying the their own', and was clear that community as the responsibility I1 been hoped. be had as rapid as progress would not

The problems caused by Displaced Persons and public safety in the British Zone were interconnected. Despite the evacuation of over 1m DPs, including 600,000 Russians, it in be 600,000 left by 1945 likely the there the that of autumn still over would seemed Zone, mainly Poles. An additional problem was the existence of nearly 750,000 disarmed members of the Wehrmacht, of whom 225,000 were being kept to fulfil German in UK. There flow labour the of requirements was also a constant reparation from home, by liable their the to expulsion numbers swelled millions refugees returning Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary under the Potsdam agreement. The Military Government Conference on 12/13 October was warned that it was estimated that there 13 Germans living 'sixteen Germany'. borders the outside shrunken million of were All these categories of people had to be fed and cared for, and although HM Government believed that the work should be done by UNRRA, British Military Government staff were still responsible for their physical welfare. Understandably between Germans DPs bad, latter by the and and crimes committed were relations Germans 'a for the Germans among the against aroused not unnatural sympathy' forces, from Germans time the the themselves at same provoking criticism occupation 15 British keep In light fears the that the that demobilised members could not order. of law into hands Wehrmacht form Freikorps, take the the their the own of might and even German After British the the of police considered. was member of the re-arming Coordinating Committee had been alone in opposing this move, CCG(BE) decided that it was not worth holding out, although the carrying of arms by the German police in the British Zone was carefully limited.

The existence of ex-Wehrmacht units in the British Zone also caused problems for CCG(BE) both in the Zone and in the Control Authority. Sir W Strang had expressed Groups in Service (Dienstgruppen) August form from to these about proposals anxiety General Cabinet in September Robertson had for the asked men, and unsuccessfully

,

21

Their labour. for 225,000 dispose misgivings reparation the required to of permission Zhukov Marshal in November justified asserting a memorandum circulated when were Protocol.

Potsdam breach the British of that maintenance of these units was a F-M Montgomery conducted a spirited defence of the British position, but was clearly for his This defensive. rather extraordinary and apparently may possibly account on the 30 Council November, Control London meeting on on the uncharacteristic report to beginning 'I drove form off straight of an extended golfing metaphor, which took the The US down the fairway on principle that I must seize and hold the initiative'. finished ball he had hostile be in 'inclined he the to and when was said, was member, ball back friendly delegate 'definitely French but the the and put on the the rough', was fairway. Then followed some rather loose strokes', but Marshal Zhukov 'selected a ball into deepest [and] [oi to try the the put part club with great care and proceeded F-M Montgomery 'his the club and slipped shot was a poor one'. rough', although 'we in that a good position to win the match', but he also took swift are concluded (Operation disband 'Clobber') Cabinet had the to the to agree on action units and 20 December that the reparation labour requirement should be met from German 16 held elsewhere. prisoners In the harsh conditions prevailing in the British Zone the reconstruction German of inevitably The formation life slow. was political of political parties had been permitted 6 but August, poor communications since made organisation on a Zone-wide basis difficult, although the main parties were active in Berlin. The Social Democrats under Dr Kurt Schumacher were the strongest party in the Zone, their position strengthened by generally good relations with the British and American authorities: in December Sir William Strang described the Social Democrat party as representing 'the centre of Zone British in in 17 Berlin'.

Meanwhile, in Berlin the the and also probably gravity Christian Democrats were'moving towards an open breach' with the Communists, and Christian Democrats, Dr Fuchs and Dr Adenauer, from dismissal two prominent the of for 'intransigence' their civic posts and administrative inefficiency respectively, led to a Germans British, 'on orders from London', were going to that the the rumour amongst 'all Democrats important Social to In October Sir appoint posts in the Administration'.

William Strang reported 'almost embarrassingly intimate' approaches to the Social Democrats from Herr Wilhelm Pieck, Communist Leader in Berlin, with a view to forming a united front. 18 There was a danger that such a development would lead to a Social Democrat in the split party, which it was British policy to build up. 19 The Foreign Office took a close interest in German political developments. Mr Bevin, for example, had affinities with the Social Democrats, but clearly distrusted Herr Severing, a former Social Democrat leader, who was opposed to any close association Communists, but links the of possible suspected with with the Nazis. Mr Bevin's be in September: 'We careful about these old leaders, better watch for must warning Robertson.

General After Severing had taken the chair to new men'20 was passed on at

22

October had been Oberpr채sidents Provincial elected the and of end at of a conference General Division, Political Steel Mr British, dealings in on the of with spokesman Petersen, Burgermeister Herr influential informed of the Robertson's orders, from be Severing Government the HM to removed Hamburg, that wished Oberpr채sidents' Committee because 'it would be improper and open to grave criticism' for the Committee or HM Government to be associated with him. According to 17 'took Petersen Steel, Mr the point perfectly'. for life brought German Encouragement of the resurgence of new problems political CCG(BE). On the one hand, as Sir William Strang pointed out, it was important to give be Germans democratic the again with the regarded would to parties or power real German dictatorship it, 'a Colonel Noel Annan (or, would replace our put as contempt 'a be it At dictatorship'). benevolent to them the same time set unwise would own hopeless social and economic task', and the British authorities would have to 'bear the 20 it is living in is better Germany than now'. much worth ourselves until weight main Acceptance of this burden, on the other hand, exposed British policy to criticism from Oberpr채sidents' Conference from It Germans that senior the themselves. emerged the German administrators wanted more power, resented that the police were not under British it 'attempted to the that policy on ground their control, and criticised German democratic built structure, up on sound superimpose upon an existing 17 foreign based British system, on traditions, an unsuitable colonial practice'.

Outspoken criticism from Dr Schumacher of Allied policy on Germany's eastern frontier and the Rhineland and Ruhr brought a rebuke from the British authorities as being 'embarrassing', but nevertheless General Robertson instructed Military Government officers to make themselves more available to explain policy. A report by CCG(BE) Intelligence Bureau in mid-December noted German complaints about ban representative councils and a on political activity by administrative nominated but for future in Zone be deferred had the to plans elections nevertheless officials, because of German apathy. 21 On the whole, however, as the Intelligence Bureau Report noted, there was little German Occupation, despite 'the anomaly of to the opposition surprisingly imposing liberalism by authority' which 'embarrasses us rather than the Germans', in in US Zone.

People 'less 'a to the reports of resentment stupefied' and contrast were but 'not truculent', troublesome', although conflicts were expected in the shade future. 21 A German police report at the end of the year on the 'mood and morale of the German population' speculated that an increased tendency to criticise Zonal authorities from fact 'criticism longer is the that prosecuted and punished with resulted no imprisonment in concentration camps'. At the same time people were disappointed and depressed that the end of the war had not brought swift improvement in conditions.

There were not many signs that people were convinced, as the Potsdam Protocol had decreed, that they bore any sense of responsibility for their predicament. 22

23

Despite the problems faced by both the German population and CCG(BE), the process General Government Conference At Military the of civilianization progressed.

Robertson pointed out that in the British view 'there would be no permanent peace until 13 Military Only held be Germans this to the possible'. were re-educated. we Government officials took this re-education seriously. Sir William Strang noted their for from German handling increased the problems arising political anxiety advice on he high Although their the activity. standard of also pointed out the praising work, dangers of what he called 'zonal particularism', 4 regarding the Germans of the British Zone as their own special charge and looking with disfavour on any proposal for German both This and central administration, quadripartite. rather colonial attitude, 'apparently did Strang to peculiar ourselves', noted, was not conform to the which, but in Potsdam, light inevitable laid down the at was probably of the difficulty at policy Germany levels in as a viable whole. all regarding Protocol, Potsdam based the on and therefore on policy was Germany level CCG(BE) found at as a a whole, zonal of administration quadripartite German life had to they an extent not envisaged. themselves controlling all aspects of The nature of British administration in the Zone may have been based on enlightened humanitarian but and concerned with the fate was nonetheless genuinely self-interest, Government found Military lives Germans themselves in officers over whose of those decisions inconsistent lead This to to tended unilateral naturally control. with the 1945 by Nevertheless Germany Germany the of end a concept of united unity. was still CCG(BE) Government British by the and as the eventual outcome of accepted quadripartite occupation.

Although

British

Margaret Pelly Gillian Bennett

NOTES

The Potsdam Protocol is printed in Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I, Volume I (HMSO, 1984), No. 603.

2

DBPO, Series I, Volume V (HMSO, 1990), No. 40, note 1.

3

Ibid., No. 1.

4

Ibid., No. 60.

24

5

Ibid., No. 52, note 7.

6

Ibid., No. 52. iii.

7

Ibid., No. 90. ii.

8

Ibid., No. 90. iv.

9

Ibid., No. 2.

10

Ibid., No. 65.

11

Ibid., No. 49.

12

Ibid., No. 62, note 11.

13

Ibid., No. 48.

14

Ibid., No. 49. ii.

15

V. ibid., Nos. 1 and 9.

16

Ibid., No. 89.

17

Ibid., No. 75.

18

Ibid., No. 54.

19

Ibid., No. 102.

20

Ibid., No. 27.

21

Ibid., No. 95.

22

Ibid., No. 109.

25

A CHAIR

In November his colleagues:

IN THE

SMOKING

ROOM: IN 1950

1950 an Assistant Under-Secretary

THE

GERMAN

QUESTION

Office Foreign State in the warned of

but Germany be 'It will not we as a partner and equal, pleasing or easy to treat Germany Germany's help If it both to have and want need we ways. cannot form part of our Western bloc, we must make her a full member of the club and large in big in front her a cigar chair of smoking a reconcile ourselves to seeing Germany Otherwise, in fire will not pay the subscription the smoking room. the be better join club she another where will we are asking; she may even l ' treated.

Powers Occupying Britain, Western France for the This sums up the main problem halfway German between the handling in mark the at question their of and America Republic Federal by Germany the of the end of the war and the recovery of sovereignty in 1955.

Western Occupying 1950 in German the the Series II takes up the of when spring story Germany for The how Powers were wondering work. to make their new plans attempt in first frustrated function, the even months of to make quadripartite control Occupation, had been abandoned in 1948, when the three Western Allies took decisions leading to the transfer of the Western Occupation from a military to a civilian basis and September 1949. in Germany Republic Federal of to the establishment of the The long term objective remained unification with the Soviet zone of Germany. In 1950 future. for foreseeable The be Western declared the to unattainable this objective was Allies were therefore concentrating on the shorter-term plan of bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western club. The overall aim was to build a Western European bloc capable of restraining the Soviet Union within the confines of the solid bloc she had formed in the east.

It was acknowledged that the pursuit of short-term objectives with the FRG was if long-term difficult, impossible. the the making not objective of unification all more However, as long as the Soviet government refused to cooperate in genuine quadripartite control, the Western Powers felt there was no alternative but to work with had hope FRG that the they what and would ultimately emerge with a force of attraction strong enough in time to draw the eastern zone of Germany westwards.

It was intended that the long process of letting Germany into the Western club should unfold stage by stage at a pace controlled by the Occupying Powers according to how Germans behaving.

In the well the spring of 1950 the programme was barely were

26

Secretary Allies American but the the of as why, were wondering already way, under for between Powers it, 'the Acheson, Dean the three State, principles agreed was to put dealing with Germany often seemed to break down when it came to their concrete 2 application'.

There were a number of reasons why this was so: some relating to the actual theory of Allied plans and some relating to the way it was put into practice. At the risk of putting few begin by I like horse, before to the making a general points about should the cart Occupying before by Western difficulties turning to a the powers, the encountered May December 1950. between and narrative of events

One obvious difficulty in the way of giving the Federal Republic a comfortable chair in be built. itself had Germany In to the trying to tie that room yet the smoking room was in Powers As Occupying something of a vacuum. were still working to the west, the British officials pointed out to their French and American colleagues in April: 'All were Germany into integrate Western To the to system. assure this agreed that the policy was definite Western into first be system there must of all some which to integrate Germany. '3 And of course the difficulty here, which became increasingly apparent fundamental differences between Occupying 1950, that there the through existed was build.

Was it, kind Ernest Bevin, to they to the of system wanted as as what powers British Foreign Secretary asked in November, 'to be Europe or the Atlantic. On which basis were we going to build? '4 An underlying weakness of Allied plans was that the Occupying Powers had not yet Federal Republic treat the to they going were as an ally or as a resolved whether idea Germany bringing The back into free the enemy. of comity of nations potential it doubtful based have it both ways. German that the to on premise was possible was prosperity and ultimately military strength were necessary to assure the consolidation of Europe.

The aim was to secure this while at the same time making sure that western German contributions were harnessed to the support of the west and not, when free of the yoke, turned to its destruction. Therefore in 1950 although the Western Allies were full full they to cooperation expecting offer were not ready partnership.

At the beginning of the year the Allies were divided as to how far they should trust the Federal Republic to run its own affairs. Under the constitutional arrangements of 1949, the Federal Government had been given a fairly free hand in internal affairs and yet was interference from to the Allied High Commission in whom Allied subject unwelcome supreme authority remained vested by virtue of the German unconditional surrender in 1945.

Mr Bevin regretted the tendency to over-interfere in German internal affairs and told Mr Acheson and M Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in May that he felt matters, which did not affect the security of the

27

Occupying Powers, should be left to the Germans entirely. This ran contrary to the it influence, American thesis that it was vital not to miss the opportunity of using while Bevin Mr life.

German into instil countered political western values was still there, to Having learn be by left Germans trial given them the power to and error. that the should did he In just do Allies that. particular should allow them to to govern themselves, the for Germany decisions Powers Allied business it feel on to take that was the of the not 5 Council.

Town by be in Britain issues which taken a would Powers were also divided on the question of how far, in what order FRG into for integrating the the and at what rate should the stages of their programme in Here to the economic and relation particularly at play, can see one west unfold.

Power Occupying for forces of reconciling each military aspects, the conflicting British French Neither international interests the the nor relished the ones. with national but in Germany for it having markets equally to western make way was prospect of if be had to to swing west rather than that she was paid this that a price was recognised 6 east.

The Occupying

The French were usually to be found holding back from any step which would give the Germans real power, while British hopes of forcing the pace were often frustrated by An from American to eve of conference another. tendency to swing one extreme the for German London Americans by heart the the the agenda conference over change of Commissioner, UK High from in April General an exasperated evoked the comment Sir Brian Robertson :'Not long ago they [the Americans] wanted to make every Germans keep hot to the the to and generally pace concession as conceivable as Commissioner] is [US High McCloy Today saying that we shall never get a possible.

Council Europe] German long [for Adenauer to the is of entry so as answer proper Chancellor, no amendment to the Occupation Statute can be considered for the present, 7 Germans is it the they that time where get off. we showed and began be lifted, it in lid 1949, it to the of controls as was once was not so it back for Americans, Nor it insist to the to put on again. always was even easy easy, be that each stage of relinquishing controls should accompanied by proofs of good German behaviour. Such a crude approach was not unnaturally both resented and by Dr for Adenauer's resisted government - as example in the case, mentioned by General Robertson, of German reluctance to fall in with Allied plans for associate German membership of the Council of Europe.

However,

Allied relations with the Federal government were usually conducted by the Allied High Commissioners in regular meetings with the Chancellor, Dr Adenauer. 8 It was not an easy relationship. However mutual suspicions, impatience and perhaps even dislike were tempered by a mutual, if grudging, respect and more importantly by an acknowledgement on both sides that there was no viable alternative.

28

the Adenauer than Dr against to In the main therefore work with rather sought his by him imposed the party, own Occupation authorities, within the constraints on by Schumacher Dr led by and also of course CDU, the strong SPD opposition party in For find its beginning itself, to example, German public opinion voice. which was German Powers Occupying 1950 were parties political and the when the autumn of defence, German to contribution the military of a question themselves over exercising Germany, in body large 'a Office of opinion and active was warned of the Foreign is on engaged not the which generation, among younger probably most widespread her Germany how make should conditions and what and when under considering '9 does but all. to at any contribution make simply not want which contribution German be Powers Occupying Western The reluctance to surprised at always seemed to fall in with Allied plans. Whenever they discussed plans for Germany, they always said into Federal bargain the the get to nor government with that they were not prepared favours. hardly Germans for This having tenable position the to a was ask of position help German for Germany Allied that was programme was when the whole point of the it Adenauer Dr the to to exploit see slow an advantage and would never was needed. full. For instance, his delaying tactics in April over the Council of Europe were not, I Schuman for Plan knowledge the a coal and steel of think, unconnected with a prior formally brought him had before Allies And themselves to approach the months pool. discuss he his defence, German to them that to readiness warned contribution about a Occupation depend to their on readiness make concessions. the matter would Another card which Dr Adenauer was to play more than once was the 'One Germany' Occupying Powers but Western declared The the aim of remained unification, card.

Soviet just Union for the terms, their as was working unification on unification on Soviet terms. In 1950 both sides were said to be looking at Germany as a pawn which Queenlo into German interests hoped turn to a making some wonder each whether kind better in be preserved some of neutral, no man's land after all. might not Neutrality was never considered a serious option by British officials, who were much Germany deadlock the the about scope over more worried gave to Dr Adenauer to play Soviet be Union time the to the at a off against when other, especially appeared one side for German for hearts battle Allied the propaganda and minds, making plans winning the west seem all the more precarious.

Contrary to expectations, the Pieck administration, formed in the Soviet zone of Germany in October 1949 as a hasty answer to the FRG, had proved surprisingly from Soviet Union, bolstered by imports The the substantial stable. economic situation, had noticeably improved and the East German authorities were running an effective better here; 'things things theme: the propaganda campaign with recurrent are getting 11 Soviet in in West'.

Although the the are getting worse general conditions zone still lagged far behind the West, it was acknowledged that 'there are two things which the Soviet Zone can supply which at present the Federal Republic cannot tolerable -

29

11 in By contrast for unemployment'. against housing conditions everyone and security February, in still was had mark two the million FRG, passed the unemployment, which 12 'as be as ever'. to remote said was rising while the prospect of economic viability East fears the to turn that she might The economic weakness of the FRG revived old keen Union Soviet Naturally lay. the was turn this her a was traditional markets where 'clearly being McCloy Mr about 1950 worried March in as reported was to promote and Russians The last the Germany offering in are the months six over the trend of affairs ... believed have Germans Many Pacific.

Poland from always Germans a market to the have Russians The South East.

East lay this Germany all and that the natural market of in is feels McCloy the it. situation there therefore urgency to offer and they are offering imaginative for here, Americans policy creative like and is looking, some many so and Germans West firmly into the Germany Western the link make and more which will 13 ' lies destiny believe their that way.

Schuman French British, the to rabbit pull In May 1950 the who were about unlike the for finding 'imaginative ideas barren hat, economic the creative' and of the were out of The by Americans. for looked Germany they for the supply could answer only policy NATO development for the process of as part the of an economic arm of was to press FRG be framework into Atlantic building the could which a political and economic of integrated and to accelerate the existing programme of removing controls. In particular Mr Bevin hoped to settle at the London Conference a host of administrative problems between AHC Dr Adenauer. friction the and which were causing At this point we come to the the first of two shocks in 1950 which so upset relations between the Occupying Powers and Germany as to tilt the balance for the first time in Germany. direction the of When Mr Bevin was informed by the French Ambassador at ten to four on 9 May of Steel Coal Germany, include European Pool, for Plan Schuman and a which would the he is supposed to have said of Anglo-French relations that 'Something has just changed between our two countries. '14 He might also have added that nothing was ever likely to be the same in regard to Germany either.

Schuman Plan initially the the Franco-German reconciliation, which was thought to represent, soon proved more apparent than real, it did provide Dr Adenauer both hands, begin find into Western to to the with grasped a way an opportunity, with Club on German terms. Some French proponents of the plan hoped that it would form Germany for one control of on another, whereas provide a means of substituting in German eyes for the first time they were being invited to form an organisation in British inherent the officials about equal. wondered which all were nominally fundamental idea' 'the French in 1951 they of which, policy, said of contradictions 1seems to be to treat Germany as an equal within a supranational organisation, while

Although

30

denying her equality 15 one'.

as a national

unit and even trying

becoming from her to prevent

May In did Schuman Plan not of course emerge at once.

The full implications of the its for Germany, be even though 1950 it was generally regarded to good news For Occupation. from down the process of release immediate consequence was to slow insistence in French Americans that few no their the the supported months the next Plan Schuman Occupation be the safely the was until made on should concession major be Occupying Power began Britain's And bag. to in the undermined own position as an be began industrial Occupation to decisions such as controls affecting the as discussed in the Schuman plan forum in which Britain took no part.

No decisions of significance on Germany were therefore taken at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, which concluded proceedings on 13 May. Rather September, in in New York when more was achieved at the next ministerial meeting Federal Republic to the the entitled things state as only was recognised among other British foreign However, her Germany for the policy. and given control of speak delegation was disappointed that the proposed review of the Occupation statute had yet been postponed. again Occupation issues were in fact the least of concerns at the September New York Ministers, Foreign which took place after the second and perhaps greatest conference of 25 Korean June. in 1950: the the outbreak of namely war on shock Just as German questions at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers were Schuman Germany by discussions York New the plan, so on at were overshadowed dominated by the equally surprising American plan for a unified Atlantic force which Germany include German Events in Korea Soviet the military units. and zone of would had brought about the need to get Germany into the western club much sooner than Allied defence plans had been drawn up on the assumption that Western expected.

Europe would be safe from a Soviet attack until at least the mid 'SOs. Suddenly they found themselves preparing for war as early as 1951. Some of the main issues here are being covered this afternoon by Professor Donald Watt. Rather than tread too much on his toes now, I will try to confine myself to the effect that American insistence on Germany Occupation. had the on rearming The immediate effect was to bring everything to a stand-still. Even the Schuman Plan ground to a temporary halt in October when German enthusiasm for it started to began to wonder whether a military road might be a quicker route to as some evaporate As than the argument between the Western powers equality an economic one. political German defence Federal to military contribution through the the over a raged autumn, government was quick to make difficulties over Occupation issues. The implementation New York decisions on Germany had been made dependent on some the main of

31

debts behaviour: German and raw this time assurances on further proof of good for Allies Adenauer Dr forthcoming the to No waited as assurances were materials. hand better him to defence, play. differences a give might which their on resolve strengthened at the The Federal government's bargaining hand was immeasurably its broke Union Soviet November, silence on year-long beginning of when the Germany. On 3 November proposed the resumption of the Soviet government Potsdam decisions Germany discussion the to enforcing with a view on quadripartite All-German formation by followed demilitarization the government and a of an on for Western have initiative This time the at come a worse could not peace treaty. by had been defence differences the sharpened unwelcome over open powers, whose launch of the Pleven Plan for a European Army - the forerunner of EDC - only a week for Soviet The quadripartite talks also coincided with the news proposal previously. fears increasing into North Korea, Chinese that a third that volunteers were pouring imminent. world war was At a time of such acute international tension, the British and the Americans were at one in agreeing that they did not want to meet the Russians until agreement had been defence German for for defence Western to the contribution a and plans of reached Europe were more secure. The French, who saw the Soviet proposal as a way to defer German defence, Soviet decision to that the contribution on a argued move might a be a genuine olive branch which ought perhaps to be explored at once. As the for formula for Soviet Powers Occupying Union, to the searched a three a reply Schuman, M. between in the of words was somewhere yes and no, which Dr Adenauer pushed up the price of a limited German military contribution to defence to Statute Occupation by the the replacement of a series of contractual arrangements, to be Occupying Powers Government Federal between three the the and negotiated on the basis of equality-16 This was a price which senior officials in the Foreign Office were beginning to think The internal debate have to accept. they might about whether 'we may be forced to in the political of equality maximum order to bring about even the minimum of concede 17 in Office: Foreign trenchant produced some minuting the military equality' none more Under-Secretary Assistant from No Mallet than so whose remarks about the need to in Germany the smoking room gave me my opening today. a chair give In this memorandum Mallet went on to say: 'We have not only to give the [Federal] Republic the social prestige of being an equal member of the Western confederation, but we have also to see to it that it is in her economic interest to belong to that have We her to not only treating cease confederation. as though we distrusted her or her but frightened her of must also give political equality. This means that we were have that the to come to an end much sooner occupation regime will must recognise Germany that than we anticipated and will recover complete sovereignty subject only to

32

Allied for Pact Atlantic be the stationing as may made within arrangements such military Adenauer We the German to at sitting see shortly must expect soil. troops on 1 ' French Americans, the the and ourselves. table with conference full and the and equal partnership goal was Mr Bevin agreed that eventual be Occupying Powers Western the to point the soon getting that would acknowledged Federal be Germany the those on only which remained would as controls such where Government was prepared to accept. However, he wished to work towards this point at in by initiative American the middle and alarmed a new pace was measured and a steady defence, far-reaching Occupation for to tied December concessions a package of of Ministers launch Brussels Foreign Acheson Mr to the at conference of proposed which Americans were trying to move far too Bevin Mr December. thought the 18 that on French, deadlock feared the they who start another period of with would and quickly had only just been brought to agree to pursue American plans for German rearmament in return for simultaneous American support for the Schuman and Pleven plans.

In the event Mr Acheson, undermined by personal political difficulties in the US, Brussels, day his the three the the tone and order as at rare unanimity of was moderated Western Occupying Powers agreed not only to pursue a German contribution to defence but also talks on Germany with the Soviet Union: thereby getting themselves into the position of being committed to 'hoeing two rows at once - negotiating with the Federal Republic about rearming the Germans and with Moscow about disarming 18 ' them.

As for the Occupation, no major decisions were taken at Brussels but some major Ministers in took time to consider where they now stood statements were made as Potsdam for Germany.

While to the agreements quadripartite control of relation further for FRG Schuman M. be to that the taken, some steps equality could conceding 'we Germany in that at could not one stroke place our whole presence on a warned in fact, basis.

We fundamental the must, preserve principle of the contractual This be quadripartite rested on agreements, and we should not wise to seek occupation.

19 four-Power it in ' to suppress without agreement and advance of a peace treaty.

Mr Acheson flatly repudiated the quadripartite line when he replied. 'If we allowed bound by Russians to the that attitude adopt the we were our agreements with ourselves Russian fact lost-The them change without consent, we were and could not was that Germany had been broken by the Russians to agreements relating quadripartite all themselves at one time or another. If we chose not to take some action which might did because a reaction violent we so not provoke we were bound to respect these broken agreements but purely because our own self-interest demanded caution. ' 19 Mr Bevin hastened to pour oil on troubled waters by giving both sides their due. He Schuman M. it be that with agreed would wise to proceed step by step but warned that

33

Germans it For the to have promise possible not was to while change. attitudes would full equality all at once, 'we must recognise', he said, 'that the process of continual instance, Potsdam For in the our attitude. evolution made necessary adjustments Schuman Germany.

The idea based had been Agreement of the repression of on the Plan was based on that of equality. If the Schuman Plan succeeded it would mean that had been German basis changed and that a problems the of our approach to many further step had been taken away from the original Potsdam conception. ' 19 Well the Schuman Plan did of course succeed and what that meant for the future of Germany will be examined in Volume V of Series II, which will resume the German for first invited Adenauer join Dr 1951 in the time to the was the autumn of when story Conference formal Ministers Foreign table the the at onset of negotiations at three finding Smoking for Occupation Room. the the and one more chair towards ending

Heather

Yasamee

NOTES

British Policy Overseas, Documents Series II, Volume III, German on Rearmament 1950 (HMSO, 1989), No. 105: Mallet memo., 16 Nov. 1950.

The other volumes in Series II cited in this paper are Volume I: The Schuman Plan 1950-1952 (HMSO, 1986); Volume II: The London Conferences 1950 (HMSO, 1987).

2

Volume 11,No. 96: 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, London, 12 May 1950.

3

Ibid., No. 40: 3rd Tripartite

4

Volume

5

Volume II, No. 95 and Volume I, No. 4: 3rd Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, London, 12 May 1950, and 3rd Bipartite Ministerial Meeting, London, 10 May 1950.

6

Cf. FO 371/85667: CE 2121/45/181 for a Report on Economic Association of Western Germany with Western Europe and the Sterling Area, Apr. 1950, cited Volume II, No. 12, note 5.

7

Volume

Official

Meeting, London, 27 Apr. 1950.

III, No. 114: Bevin to Stikker, 23 Nov. 1950.

II, No. 45, note 1: Robertson to Kirkpatrick,

34

29 Apr. 1950.

8

The records of these meetings between 1949 and 1951 are published in Akten I (Munich Deutschland, Volume der Bundesrepublik Politik Ausw채rtigen zur 1989).

9

Volume

10

Under II, No. 64. i for this analogy drawn by the Permanent Volume Secretary's Committee in 'The Future of Germany: the Problem of Unity or Final Revise), 19 Apr. 1950. Ibid., No. Division of Germany' (PUSC(49)62: 64 for the main points of this paper which assesses Allied and Soviet terms for German unity and discusses the dangers of neutrality.

11

Ibid., No. 31: Brief for U. K. Delegation, 24 Apr. 1950.

12

FO 371/85313:

13

Volume

14

According to Massigli this story is apocryphal: D'apres Jean Monnet (Memoires, p. 361), Bevin m'aurait dit: "Je crois bien qu'entre nos deux pays, " Ce ete de jamais tenu, mais propos changer. ne m'a quelque chose vient Bevin ferait etait desormais, a change en effet: ne plus confiance quelque chose Robert Schuman' (R Massigli, Une comedie des erreurs 1943-1956 - Paris, 1978), p 188, note 1.

15

Volume I, No. 222: Harvey to Bevin, 1 Mar. 1951.

16

Volume

17

Ibid., No. 103. ii: Gainer minute, 20 Nov. 1950.

18

Ibid., No. 146, note 5: Gilchrist minute, 21 Dec. 1950.

19

Ibid., No. 147. i.: Tripartite Meeting on Germany, Brussels, 19 Dec. 1950.

III, No. 103: Kirkpatrick

to Bevin,

11 Nov. 1950.

by Robertson C 2765/2514/18: memo.

German Allies' Western programme. prospects of the

on the progress

and

II, No. 5: Franks to Bevin, 8 Mar. 1950.

III, No. 120. i: A. H. C. meeting with Adenauer;

35

1 Dec. 1950.

BRITAIN

AND

GERMAN

SECURITY,

1944-1955

have be Germany to passed through seven British security anxieties over said can first is between 1944-1955, of in the articulation possible serious that the years stages Second World War, last during and Britain's the the year of threats to security, made in 1955 Summit Geneva the the failure confirmation and of the conference the of in German the the groupings, military opposed the two states of military membership North Atlantic Treaty Alliance Organisation and the Warsaw Pact. But to express these developments briefly, British anxieties began with the question of security against Germany, developed into anxieties about security for Germany and found their final form in 1954, with the Federal Republic of Germany's accession both to NATO and to Germany.

Union, in European Western security with a resurrected

Stage I. Post-war

threat

assessment

The first assessments of the threats to her security which Britain would face in the Germany Nazi defeat by Post Hostilities the the surrender of and were made world after Planning Committee of the Cabinet's defence structure, an official committee under a Foreign Office Chairman, Gladwyn Jebb, but speaking with the voice of the Chiefs of Staff structure. Its role was purely advisory, and its recommendations could only take if Cabinet. by The they the and when the adopted were status of policy on crucial focused on two possible threats to document PHP (44) 17(a) of July 20,19441 Britain's security once victory had come, 'a resurgent Germany and Russia'. 'If Russia does become hostile', it stated, 'Germany is the only country whose geographic be could the reserves and other provide aid which might position, manpower essential Soviet Union ' The to our preservation. was undefeatable by virtue of its geographical If Russia in and resources. population succeeded winning Germany extent, enormous be in Britain her the gravest of danger. then to would side, The document led to a major row between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Secretary, who chose both to regard the document as incorporating a political hostility Soviet he Union, believed to be an invasion of his prerogative as the the towards which in field the arbiter of policy-making of external affairs and to damn its views as dangerously likely, should they become publicly known, to be self-fulfilling.

The Chiefs of Staff bitterly contested the Foreign Secretary's right to dictate the tone of their Britain's This in threats to on security. their view, their unique views was 1923 Cabinet the terms the of responsibility under warrant establishing their collective Their distrust Soviet Union, fed by the period of Nazi-Soviet the of existence. own by the treatment of the British military mission in Russia in cooperation and nourished the years 1941-45, was no secret. But formally they were acting within their own sphere of reference and the criteria which they applied were not so much ideological as

Soviet in the they the saw geopolitical position of concerned with the potentialities Union and the techniques of estimating a state's industrial war potential developed by Centre fears in Secretary's The Foreign Intelligence 1930s. the that industrial the the Soviets, Chiefs Staff by if became known the to the they of might, views expressed led document being the treated to the self-fulfilling a prophecy, with the of role assume Eden's least however, before is It that that, at probable, of outcome secrecy. utmost Staff in its Chiefs document's the of various was reached, contents conflict with the 2 become have known Soviets Maclean.

Donald drafts to the via would earlier The military-strategic implications of the PHP report were strengthened in the minds of began lessons 1939-45 defence they to the the as war and evaluate of establishment the its outcome. The German surrender and the Allied agreement on the scope of the Four Power occupation of Germany advanced British forces further into central Europe than history Marlborough's in British became Danubian Britain time since campaign. at any been had briefly during her Napoleonic Baltic the though she reach wars, power, as a far Stalin's in land 1918-19.

But by that as as attained any means on was not for Soviet defensive far Union Elbe the the glacis and stretching as as acquisition of a by British The 1944-45 Danube a similar matched advance. was of experience the by flying in bombarded bombs ballistic from bases Britain was and missiles when Europe Britain's the to possession made of such a glacis a valuable addition western British long Germany The the occupation as of north-western continued. security, so Tizard committee set up to advise the defence authorities on the impact of new British this sure made on war new vulnerability became a central part of technology defence planning. 3 Britain did not expect the occupation of Germany to last, however.

Substantial British efforts were put into rebuilding the armed forces of the states on Europe's Atlantic coasts. Even France, though her armies were largely supplied with American weapons, rebuilt its air force initially with British jet fighters and RollsRoyce jet engines built under licence.

Stage II.

Labour's

security

policy,

1945-47

The major input into British post-war security planning came with the election of the Labour Government in July 1945. Mr Attlee, the new premier, followed Churchill in Minister Defence.

He title the of of was to chair a ministerial enquiry into assuming defence organisations with AV Alexander, who became First Lord of the Admiralty, Liberal former Secretary State for Commonwealth Affairs, Lord the peer, now of and Addison. The enquiry arrived at the decision to set up a small coordinating Ministry of Defence, whose head would act as deputy chairman of the new Cabinet Defence Committee with which the pre-war advisory Committee of Imperial Defence was The Chiefs Staff committee from the structure replaced. of transferred of the was Cabinet Office to the new ministry, together with the manpower, administration and AV Alexander became the new Minister of Defence. He staff organisations. supply

37

Staff Chiefs The their Shinwell. right retained by 'Manny' of of later succeeded was hoc Attlee through In ad Minister. meetings as much Prime acted practice, the to access Committee.

Defence And in himself the Staff through Chiefs the chair as the with of of hands, in in his least defence British direction so own at he retained the major policy of far as high strategy was concerned.

Germany issue began very The new government of security against a revived with the disarmament dismantlement to The in supposed were and twin policies of mind. much Cabinet's War himself had Attlee committee on post-war chaired the take care of this. influence That the of the committee, under terms the armistice. of and on reconstruction 1919 Keynes' on the reparations attack of the Treasury and mindful of the young Versailles, Treaty the too, appalling of costs of mindful, and the of clauses of fuel from its Italy and normal sources of severed administering an occupied southern industrial supplies in the years 1943-45, had begun by arguing in favour of Germany's dismemberment and had ended it by insisting that the occupying powers should treat food Germany as an economic whole; else the foreign exchange costs of importing Rhineland British industrial feed Atlantic the the to zone, population of and across the Ruhr, would fall entirely on the British Treasury. The Soviet insistence on taking from French kind in their the own zone, refusal to allow a single economic reparations General Clay's back Britain, Germany, to and urging that refusal of administration for German be fixed figure German at a which allowed coal and steel production west in Germany imports food bill British led the materials to the and raw of zone exports, becoming a major charge on the British balance of payments as the Treasury had feared. From the beginning of 1946, Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Cabinet, began Germanophobe drain the the to member of the of warn most normally dollar hard-won Canadian American dollar Britain's the reserves as and and gold on loans melted away. The recovery of German heavy industry, the recovery of the German economy and its administration by Germans became major priorities in British policy.

The Labour party leadership, and much of its rank and file, had always held to views of the kind Lenin denounced as 'social patriotism'. Their belief that in 1945 they had begun a 'social democratic' revolution made external threats and disorders a threat to 4 British interests Military the the threats were to be met by a suitably class. of working The democratised Attlee citizen army. government made no bones about the in The introduction of conscription peacetime. actual size of the armed forces was Manpower another matter. was needed as much in Britain's export industries as in the Cabinet forces.

A looked 'manpower budget'. separate committee armed at a Alexander's first job as Minister of Defence was to chair endless committees on the future size of the armed forces.

Intelligence sufficiently

Cabinet Soviet Attlee Union the the that advised estimates would not be from be 1941-45 the to tempted into 'Napoleonic' experience of recovered

38

5 before the mid-1950s. This did not rule out attempts on their part to behaviour much They locally from disorder their recruited minions might reap advantage. which create Such involved. be however, an risks of escalation where major were cautious would, both leadership's British Labour fitted the the too closely with view of only analysis Communist record, and with their perceptions of Hitler's patterns of behaviour in the Chancellor, been had believe had he to they made patterns which come early years after British have to the signals pre-war government of whither provided warning should Hitler was heading, towards war and world empire.

Soviet behaviour in northern Iran, Soviet demands for a base in Libya, the British panic in France January 1946, links between the the the at end of over a possible coup Soviets and the Zionist leadership in Palestine of which the Colonial Office made so fit Hitlerian did Soviet behaviour the to the model, as pattern of much, already seemed in eastern Europe, and in eastern Germany. British Labour party doctrine was that in And conditions economic thrived of only weakness and adversity. as communism Germany began Europe to suffer through the and of western the economies of western Soviets force 1946-47, to the the separate parties of their acted as and terrible winter of Socialist Unity Party, into began Germany hold in the the to take conviction of the zone Labour leadership that Soviet policy aimed at keeping Europe economically weak, beat beginning Molotov Germany drum. to the was nationalist while within In Germany, the Chiefs of Staff had already sounded the warning note in April 1946; 6 'our position would be greatly strengthened by the creation of a western democratic Germany. Failing this, it is essential that that authority in control of Germany should long hostile Germany be full term to our to policy us... with regard take must not fact Russia is dangerous that the a much more potential enemy than account of Germany. ' The merger of the Socialist party in the Soviet zone with the Communists forced Bevin along the same lines. Britain could wave 'goodbye to democracy on the is half for Germany...

German practically of what post-war pattern a western puppet Soviet be for the to seem zone would an accomplished fact', a Foreign Office regime February 1946 had From his Commander of already noted.? position as memorandum in Chief in Germany and Military Governor, Montgomery warned Attlee on May 1 that if Germany's economic problems were not solved 'we shall drift towards possible failure. That drift will take the form of an increasingly hostile population which will begin look Such Germany East. be to a eventually would a menace to the security of Europe'.

Bevin summed up the misgivings of the Foreign Office in a Cabinet paper two days later. 9 The Soviet action faced Britain with the prospect of abandoning the attempt to keep Germany united. To break with Potsdam for a western policy would mean that the 'whole of eastern Germany and indeed of eastern Europe would be irretrievably lost to Russia. West Germany would have to be defended from the infection of political and .. influences from the east, which would mean creating a western bloc... [it] economic

39

Germans..

The forgive-and-forget involve the towards western policy a would .

Americans are not ready for this. Certainly their leading representatives in Germany American In it tooth and nail. any case we could not count on continued would oppose be ' full American it.

But if essential. support would they came to agree to support even The danger of Russia in Europe is 'certainly as great as, and possibly even greater than, GermanRapallo, be Germany'.

But a new a new that of a revived worst of all would Soviet link-up. There was a need to 'keep Communism beyond the Elbe'.

This doctrine, spelt out in its starkest form, was more than the Cabinet found easy to Soviets Attlee to the as yet. Dalton swallow. was unwilling write off negotiating with Germany.

Chancellor be instincts But his to quit of as wished own were still antiGerman. Bevin hoped to strengthen Britain's links with western Europe. But neither Treasury nor Board of Trade would play with him. The American decision to end from Soviets Germany the to the payments reparation western zones of and Byrnes' Stuttgart speech paved the way for the establishment of the Bizone. But the strategic dilemmas remained.

They were to be made more difficult to solve by Montgomery's appointment as CIGS, in its form inter-Service the raised which appointment worst an schism of the inter-war developed its Each service own strategy, the RAF and the Royal Navy preferring years. based Mediterranean Britain's Strategic American Air strategy a with the equivalent of Command concentrating on carrying the air war onto the Soviet oil and industrial Asiatic in Russia from bases on Cyprus and the Middle East. and southern centres Montgomery argued for commitment to a continental war to meet Soviet forces and far them as east as possible. The Chiefs of Staff Committee had accepted the contain desirability of such a strategy already in April 1946. But they did not agree that Britain should make any major military contribution - not, that is, unless there was an advance American commitment of land forces on the same scale.

The absence of any immediate Soviet military threat enabled the arguments over policy and strategy to unfold at three different levels. The first was that of political and diplomatic strategy, a strategy of block-building, of constructing alliances, a policy had launched Bevin which as early as August 1945 on his return from Potsdam. The second was that of military and diplomatic strategy, the pledging of forces to alliances, designed inhibit to a policy and deter Soviet policy by creating the image of resolution.

The third was starker, the development of a military (battlefield and sectorial) strategy to avoid military defeat. The aim of all three strategies was to contain, deter and inhibit Soviet adventurism. But the needs of such a deterrence strategy had to operate at two different levels. Not only did the Soviets have to be deterred; but Britain's quite own people and the peoples of her allies had to be convinced that the Soviets were being deterred. At each level the strategy had to be convincing; and lack of plausibility at any level, especially at the purely military battlefield level, interacted and weakened the effectiveness of the strategy at the other two levels.

40

Britain's European allies needed reassurance against both German recovery and Soviet Fear Soviet Europe's German the the weaknesses. of pull on psyche exploitation of 6 February 1947 1947, into height the that terrible a memorandum as of at of continued German in Berlin fairly 'if government a reproduced the outlook of the winter, noted: be looking looking. it neither wholly eastward nor wholly westward would country, The question would then turn on whether the western democracies or the Soviet Union On be balance the the to the whole, strongest pull. of advantage seems would exercise Communism has its in Germany Russians. the addicts west and prevailing with the ... ' them excellent ground. conditions would give The events of 1947, the union of the Bizone, the announcement of the Marshall Plan, Marshall's European introduction to the reaction speech and of the the western European Recovery Programme gradually alleviated these fears; but only at the expense from diplomatic level. the to the political-diplomatic the emphasis military of moving

Stage III.

Western

Union:

1948-1949.

Security

for

Western

Europe

After the abortive Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in London in December 1947, Bevin's political strategy took a new turn with his vision of a Western Union. His initial memorandum to the Cabinet on January 4,1948 spoke of West Germany being drawn into a western democratic system'. 10 But Cabinet discussions and discussion Committee Staff Chiefs revealed continued misgivings, especially at those of within the Sea by Mr Attlee.

The First Lord did believe Germany chaired not meetings would ever be a contented nation even when she had regained her old boundaries and again rebuilt her military power. Mr Attlee said it would be dangerous to think of Russia as the only Montgomery's Germany's defence that arguments enemy. potential was an essential defence besieged the the the of perimeter of west broke in any case on French part of Germany.

It Benelux leaders in the was over the aftermath of the Prague coup anxieties for Western Union Defence Organisation firmly into the the turned negotiations a who direction of an 'instrument of deterrence against the Soviet Union'. But it was the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee (WUDO COS) chaired by Field Marshal Montgomery which had to wrestle with the military security problems. These presented heads; Western Europe three themselves under where was to be defended, who was to defend western Europe and with what was western Europe to be defended?

The first question resolved itself into a dilemma. If western Germany was important to Europe, Montgomery then, tirelessly argued, 11 western Germany would as western have to be defended. With the existing troop strengths available to Western Union, this impossible.

The was only remotely feasible defence line was that of the Rhine. This had the great disadvantage that it involved leaving the northern Netherlands undefended, and allowing the invader access to the North Sea coast from Antwerp to

41

Europe Rhine, Baltic.

Even the the of all east of abandonment the entrance to the with hundred for kilometres. division one every the available troops could only provide one The obvious military solution, as was mentioned by the French representative at the first meeting of the WUDO COS committee, was to raise German troops. Politically disappeared from immediately issue WUDO's hot the that this was such a potato German in ) (As there government or state a west existence. even not yet, was minutes.

The British military planners concluded in September 1948 that Germany would not be 'in a position to assist in any way towards checking a Russian advance westwards for feasible defence Rhine line short of the the that to offered only come' and many years 12 December, Cabinet in The Channel. that the endorsed saying that it was view decision future Allied hasty to on relationships make any premature with western Germany, especially as to her military recovery, 13 which at least one Cabinet minister 14 'the danger to world peace'. greatest still regarded as constituting There was, however, a further problem. The events of 1939-45 had virtually destroyed industry.

The Europe's WUDO, let armies armaments of alone their navies and western American forces, had lend-lease, of on a supply existed arms air ended with which and British in 1946-47 transferred to them or the to the value of arms sold surplus on years dollars. half billion To four and raise a Belgian armoured division, two hundred some Sherman tanks sold for scrap had to be recovered from their purchaser. As the British Chiefs of Staff commented early in 1949, the states of west Europe had barely do little defeat from to build up their defences. Morale, especially and could recovered in the French army, was at a very low level. 15 Germany, however, had the heavy industry and had had an advanced armaments industry. The only other source of arms German States.

A United impossible the military contribution was was politically German American the the support, revival of arms industry equally so. Even without American American troops these, and arms and money were essential. At the without Pentagon talks in March 1948 between British, American and Canadian representatives, it had been agreed that when circumstances permitted Germany or the three western invited be to adhere to the Brussels treaty (Western Union) and the zones should North Atlantic Defence Agreement.

'This objective, however, should not be proposed 16 disclosed'. publicly

Stage IV

1949-50.

Security

for

West Germany

The establishment of the Federal German Republic by the Petersberg agreements at the end of 1949 made the military dilemma even more acute. The abandonment of west Germany east of the Rhine to Soviet invasion continued to make military sense, while it impossible.

No more certain way of creating the Soviet-German politically was now link-up, which all feared, could be imagined, even without Soviet military invasion.

There was, too, an added hazard, the development by the East German authorities of a

42

in light infantry kept and artillery weapons and para-military police, equipped with been followed had by the British and French authorities in development This barracks. deserters defectors from Berlin since the winter of 1947-48. In 1949, the WUDO and COS committee agreed among themselves that any armed East German incursion into Federal German territory would have to be treated as a casus belli.

Early in 1950 the new Federal Government began to raise the issue in discussions with in Morale West Germany Commissioners. low.

There High Allied seemed to was the in Allied in increase the Federal Republic. But only the British High troops be no Commissioner was prepared to encourage the new Federal Chancellor, Dr Adenauer, to be forces (Bereitschaften) his to allowed raise armed police readiness country ask that Kasernierte frontier Polizei German to the the the police match of and to arm Democratic Republic.

The matter was made the more acute by the discovery by the European members of NATO at the first meeting of the new organisation's Military Committee in the summer Staff Chiefs for, US 1949 totally the of that were unprepared and unwilling to of in American increase Europe.

They troop to commitments any were not contemplate, for in the the three sectorial commands take to planning part military even willing had been There American for Europe. team of senior military a substantial envisaged COS WUDO There be planning to military sessions. at all were none observers present for European NATO Arms, the meetings planning command the staff sectors. at forthcoming; be legislation though only under which covered money, supplies would American Arabia Saudi and other satellite states and on terms which made all aid to between individual bilateral it Congress states and, the as seemed, of the negotiations United States. The American strategic concept, it emerged, which NATO was forced, for France bulk to to the adopt, was provide of the western ground forces willy-nilly, in Europe.

The Chiefs of Staff in Britain and the Cabinet found themselves forced to face two in It changes policy. and major was clearly impossible, as the Chiefs of Staff serious March defend Germany in 1950, West West German 17 to Unless without troops. noted West Germany became, militarily and politically, an integral part of the West, the whole become Germany integral East.

Under the might an of the circumstances, while part of it was still true that'the Middle East is crucially important to Allied strategy and must be held if humanly possible', 'to hold the enemy east of the Rhine is vital to our first defence United The Kingdom it (the Middle the the of to pillar, allocation of resources ...

East) must not be allowed fatally to compromise our ability to sustain the first pillar. ' Western Union 'from the point of view of our interests-is worth our support'; the time had come when 'we must decide what military undertaking we should give and what risks we should take to improve its morale and strengthen its defences'. 18 At that time the Allied Forces in West Germany consisted of two and a half disorganised and divisions, US two and one third British divisions and three French under-equipped

43

Germany Western defend inadequate against the to divisions. These were not only hold line They Europe. to in Eastern a were not adequate twenty-five Soviet divisions by May Cabinet had Staff Chiefs by This the already on the of pressure anywhere.

German for Cabinet some 1950 brought the to contemplate the need reluctantly from Apart Europe. the her strong that to of western and to security own contribution the the of civilian members even which to a nation rearming psychological objections Cabinet had spent most of their lives regarding as the major threat to European peace had democracy democracy, British they to to come conversion a nation whose and believe would require lengthy re-education coupled with a major social revolution, there A the actual situation. proposal to were also major contemporary anxieties arising out of invasion.

America into Soviets Germany the could a pre-emptive might provoke rearm be provided with a reason for not increasing the strengths of her own forces in Europe.

She might even see the rearmament of West Germany as grounds for withdrawing Germany.

German in The few American proposed new army those units still stationed for European NATO American members of arms and would compete with existing German West bargaining least, Allies At the the power vis-채-vis would very equipment. be undesirably increased. 19 Britain found herself confronted with three separate threats and four separate elements in her security strategy. There was the threat of an East German attack on West disorders Germany, possibly in conjunction with Communist-provoked and organised in West Germany. There was the political threat that a demoralised and divided West German government might embark on a policy of unification with East Germany that Soviet hands lead into kind Soviet in Germany to the and take-over that of might play had already been seen in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. To all of this Soviet fear the military adventure. of a was added The threat of Soviet aggression was, however, not confined to central Europe. A war be Soviet Union It China. involve The 'emergency' the global. would could with well in Malaya, which had begun in 1949, was widely seen in London as part of Soviet 'cold war' strategy. To control any American reaction to the threat of global Soviet 20 Cabinet implications Germany's West the the noted, aggression, military of recovery have be dealt to with as part of the building up of a genuine Atlantic community. would British security strategy rested on the alliance with France, the military as well as financial support of the United States, the solidarity of the Benelux countries, and the Federal Germany.

The falling away of any one of of continuing western orientation these factors, the defection of any one of these partners would destroy the basis of British policy. It is to the credit of the British system of government that all these issues had been faced and, so far as possible, resolved by the end of May 1950. It is an indication of how much Britain's role as one of the super-powers had vanished that she had no effect on the much more disparate, the much less integrated French and American systems of policy-making.

44

Stage V. Security

for Europe

with

West

Germany

by War Korean by the the the and opening of The position was changed abruptly Korean North in believed it.

If, the the attack west, as was widely American reaction to 'aggression by development Stalinist the then of proxy', a new southwards represented American for The German to there everyone see. two states were the with parallels if NATO divisions, Germany West that, to twelve and raise up should that proposal, defences be Europe's American to to should raised west contribution the agreed to this, Commander Allied Forces in Europe Supreme American should four divisions and an its American The British at the point. establishment weakest be appointed, struck hopes NATO, the as all pinned on politically of the consummation was commitment Germany West The to another matter entirely. was rearm proposal militarily. well as in Chair had Committee Attlee Defence Cabinet the accepted the with In May, the German formation be 'one Staff the of a Chiefs of ultimate aim should view that 21 Given Europe'. forces the that over a earlier, year the of western contingent within force had been initial NATO's NATO by that committee the military made estimate for force divisions 30-40 hostilities a were of with of the opening at requirements The burden 22 decision of providing and 4,200 aircraft, this was unavoidable.

German be forces level a without contribution would of a such maintaining insurmountably expensive.

German West integration been had into Europe have Cabinet that But the would view23 firstly Organisation European into 'as follow the organisation', part of a three stages, to for European Economic Cooperation, then into the Council of Europe and only 24 Staff Chiefs both The NATO. into this; of supported military and eventually it NATO that take would some time to plan and economic considerations suggested develop armed forces in Europe. The view of the CIGS, Field Marshal Slim, was that Republic Federal be from before 1954'. 'useful the could expected contribution no The American proposal was followed by the French reaction: the proposal for a European army comprised of multi-national units with no single unit larger than a battalion being of troops of a single nation. Nothing could have been more carefully Unlike British American British the the to arouse resistance. army, army's composed based.

Even territorially with conscription, British army regimental structure was draw bulk from their tended to the their the counties and recruits of regiments officers history identified.

Even divisions their titles the and which with were carried, and were proud of their territorial titles, the 44th Wessex Division, the 51st Highland Division Military and so on. morale, it was a basic tenet of British doctrine, rested on such paratribal identification. British units had fought in multi-national armies, even in the Allied 5th Army in Italy, under American generals. The Commonwealth Division, with British half its strength, was fighting in Korea. But to convince those who units making up remembered from 1940 the escape of the BEF at Dunkirk and isolation and

45

Division, Highland 51st St Valerie Germans of the of at abandonment to the encircling level, brigade down the the even to where the virtues of a multi-national command different drum, in different to tongue a march and a orders give might supporting arms French by the himself Churchill, called impossible. origin, officer cavalry a regular was ' 'sludgy amalgam. concept a in Britain's directly a global war.

Moreover the concept ran responsibilities counter to To withdraw a division or an army corps for transfer from one theatre to another was disruptive enough. The British had been through this in 1942 when the bulk of the Australia's defend Middle East in Australian to the was withdrawn contingent destroying battalions To Japan. the would mean not only withdraw approaches against divisions from which they were withdrawn but to bring together units with no previous form in fact Militarily divisional to the proposal made training new units. coordinated European Its the maintenance of parallel and adoption would mean either no sense. for by Britain the the abandonment of all responsibility overseas service armies or defence of her interests in South East Asia, the Middle East or Africa. With British forces in action in Korea, Malaysia, and under threat on the Suez Canal, the proposal is known, As bizarre.

French the now plan was produced without any seemed simply input from, let Chiefs French Staff, the along of whose reactions consultation with, British their to those of colleagues. were not unsimilar British policy towards the EDC went through three sharply distinct phases; the first involved making it clear to all that no British participation in the 'European army' was Britain be that to expected, and wanted to see NATO reformed not divided by the Defence European Ministry; involved doing the of a second establishment as much as force (as Attlee noted, in the to proposed army a make militarily possible effective August 1951, in a minute adopted by the Cabinet, 25 Britain was 'ready to look very European Army the on plan, provided it can be shown to be militarily sympathetically Britain's Germany West in a the thirdly, strengthening to and of guarantees effective'); form which did not involve a choice between a 'global' and a 'continental' strategy.

Britain's guarantee to the FRG was thus given under Article 51 of the UN Charter, not Brussels IV Article Treaty. the of under

Stage VI. 1952. The Reform

of NATO

and the signature

of EDC

The reform of NATO, agreed at the Lisbon conference in the spring of 1952, gave NATO not only the integrated military command structure with an overall American Eisenhower agreed in 1951 with the appointment supreme commander, of as SACEUR, but a political structure with a Secretary-General. Lord Ismay was the first to hold this office which he held for the first vital five years. The signature of the European Defence Treaty gave NATO German the framework of a military No-one realised that it would need two more years before a French contribution.

46

for Treaty National Assembly brave felt to to the the submit enough government Assembly National then to the one that return everything square would or ratification, for. had hope Militarily, the they planners now all could by refusing that ratification. by Lisbon NATO demonstrate did the to ask They much realism using meeting of not for a 52 division army. This was the first lesson the military planners of Britain and framework the Benelux, used to operating within of integrated military-political decision making, were to learn of what the lack of political realism inherent in American the the separation of of military and political sides of policya result thinking as military bring American This incipient the can about. system conflict was, making under Council NATO by largely the however, very new reformed structure of muffled whose British Secretarythe to the the model of cabinet, with was approximated closely General filling the dual role of Chief Whip and Permanent Under-Secretary to the Cabinet Office. The main issue at the level of political strategy became one of into western Europe in such a way as to integrating Federal Germany politically little former We have European to the their revival so of enemy. opinion reconcile it is impossible NATO NATO's that to military proceedings say whether access to Soviet immediate indeed how Soviet threat, threat the to or an over worry continued however, is, in diplomatic There the reflection no negotiations of any was assessed.

Soviet The German integration immediate threat. problem of was seen as sense of an NATO American British firstly, defence internal, to to relations with and secondly one Europe. relations with western joining in Britain involved the Americans in pressure on successive This willy-nilly French governments to grasp the nettle and submit EDC for ratification. It also involved Soviet Germany, in the the of various proposals any on unity of resisting as them defeating integration Germany into the too an aim of obvious of western carrying 26 This much was easy. What was more difficult to cope with was the Europe. western Foreign Secretary's hostility towards Europe as a field for activity, and the Prime Minister's drive for peace. The Chiefs of Staff were beginning to see the issues involved in NATO's role, and still more that of EDC, not of adding German strength to Germany.

Sir As but John Slessor, Chief of the Air that the of controlling that of west Staff, was to minute in October 1952: 27 'If we joined the EDC we could probably make it a reality and we could assume the leadership. If we do not, it is more than possible NATO it, if it thing that the collapse and probably carry will whole or, with either Germany before leads be it. ' it time a matter of survives, will only

Stage VII.

1953-55

Between 1953 and 1955 the shape of the problem of German security was to change drastically. The most drastic change was, at the time, that which was least realised British defence innermost the circles of planning; this was the result of the outside American hydrogen bomb tests of 1952 and the Soviet test the following year. To be

47

it the military of the the realisation of result was precise, more for the a radical review need events, when coupled with light in the the cost of rearmament. of escalation of expenditure

implications Britain's of

of these defence

These costs were essentially a result of the effects of the inflation of raw material prices But War. had Korean US they the also a stockpiling after the outbreak of congruent on German aspect in that from June 1953 the German government was no longer to be Since Germany. in forces British long-term for these the were of costs responsible largely payable in D-marks, they would now be a charge on Britain's foreign exchange had Exchequer Chancellor 1952 May In the already warned that there the of reserves.

28 British 'overseas British be economy. military a serious effect on the would before been The had the they than war'. situation commitments... were ten times greater 'could be held for the next six months. the long term outlook is very grave'. The ..

Prime Minister had warned against 'any public statement which might imply that we forces in Germany... by NATO [it] break likely to our to reducing our pledges were Western defence have the the whole structure of and gravest possible effects on would in States.

United ' the would shock public opinion The radical review of British defence expenditure of 1952-53 was to result in the it being Chiefs of Staff being finally driven to ask for a new policy directive, impossible, in their view, to carry out their existing strategic directive within the financial limits set by the Chancellor. The new directive came from a committee Supply, Minister Duncan Sandys. by Priority be the to of over was given to presided Britain first during to the the three months of military survival of contributing measures a nuclear exchange. may be said of the realities of such a view its adoption firmly transfers all discussions from any serious relevance to battlefield subsequent military-strategic into levels deterrence the political-diplomatic or political-military strategy of policy.

Out-of-area operations, such as Suez, Cyprus, against the Mau-Mau in Kenya, in Malaya, might continue to demand a degree of low-level 'flexible response' and, forces in involve fighting.

But introduction latter real the real this moreover, until of into discussions (flexible block conflict at the end response) concept of a NATO-Soviet 1950s, forces in Europe was, at best, to impress west the the of role military of European or West German opinion. It had nothing in reality to do with winning battles begun. had actually once war

Whatever

As such, NATO became an issue and an instrument of politics not of war, or its prevention or survival. NATO's security and that of Britain depended on events at the is level, that political-diplomatic on Federal Germany not being tempted by the Soviets into abandoning her integration into NATO and western Europe by the triple issues of disengagement.

Lord Strang noted in May 1953 that reunification, and neutralisation Churchill was 'earnestly concerned with the question of the possibility of a reunified

48

29 in far Germans... it'.

July In Germany, the so as really wanted and neutralised happens 'whatever Salisbury30 Lord Churchill told we shall have to face the problem of feared, he German German unity'. might come to think the Soviets could offer opinion, be fact "German 'The issue. that there a will always problem" and a them more on this kept before He did fear German-Soviet be danger" "Prussian eyes'. our not must German is irreconcilable 'the the the of people conditions of with character cooperation: Germans The have in the example of communist world. the communist serfdom in hatred The Bolshevism the that eastern their experience zone. of own tyranny and German in hearts I in the next twenty years deep is that Hitler preached still am sure ...

Germany will not ally herself with Russia against the West or loosen her internal ties America. ' Europe free and peoples of with the Churchill's in 1953-54 Stalin's death in May in that It is with this efforts after mind 'at his be bring the 1953 to summit' successors meeting with must about a seen.

Whether or not there was a period, before the East German rising of June 1953 and in Khrushchev, Molotov's temporary victory, alliance with over Beria and Malenkov, leadership Soviet to open genuinely such an approach, will remain was the when Soviet Union has in further has it the than togone much obscure until archival access day. What is clear is that Churchill's proposals irritated Eisenhower, scared the Foreign Office, frightened Dr Adenauer and broke on the injured vanity of his successor and the Most his Cabinet. his from these construed of the motives as rising only obstinacy of his to the end career ambition and as great peace-maker of a man obstinacy personal into his deep dotage, be but for believed to sunk a they man whom, electoral whom for None had impossible Churchill it them to them oppose. of grasped, as was reasons, had, the manner in which the hydrogen bomb had made war not only impossible to indeed increasingly impossible limited but to of only survive, use as a threat to win, introduce into diplomacy. There was the undoubted truth too that for much of British Labour idea including the the party, most of of a summit conference was opinion, undoubtedly a popular one.

It was also true that a divided Germany seemed in everyone's interests. As Selwyn Lloyd, Eden's chosen deputy in the Foreign Office, wrote to Churchill in June, 'Germany is the key to the peace of Europe. A divided Europe has meant a divided Germany. To unite Germany while Europe is divided even if practicable, is fraught Adenauer, for Therefore Dr danger the Russians, the Americans, all. everyone with the French and ourselves - feel in our hearts that a divided Germany is safer for the time being. '31 The integration of Federal Germany into western Europe and NATO was, however, hanging fire, EDC was still not ratified by France, and the Americans were still getting impatient.

Returning from the Bermuda conference, Churchill his fears to voiced Eden: 32

49

idea Eisenhower President EDC the 'We are all agreed to press rejects through. be delayed indefinitely be it to if can made an arrangement to that continues include a German army in NATO. It must be EDC or some solution of a States forces United This "peripheral" the would would mean that nature. from Iceland, bases East from France the of via crescent and occupy withdraw Anglia, Spain, North Africa and Turkey operating with atomic power therefrom in the case of war. The consequence would be a Russian occupation of the between Germany defenceless an arrangement and probably whole of Communist-soaked France and Soviet Russia. Benelux and Scandinavia will go down the drain... ' EDC was finally submitted for ratification to the French National Assembly and 33 horrible is 'There deadly fears Churchill's one even more and again. awoke rejected. is 'go it 'She do America ' to that alone'. quite strong enough might so. alternative...

All that would happen is that we would have no influence on her policy and no for dangerous the that and some years, years, no means of at present protection, and include Germany NATO defence to only a revised under safeguards can secure our ... freedom and the freedom of the world. ' Such safeguards were in fact built into the Paris agreements by which Germany was Brussels NATO Western 1948 Union it the treaty the to of a revival of and via admitted had created. WEU, as it was now to be known, regulated the level of forces each NATO did to that they so not exceed the agreed maxima. member country assigned NATO's SACEUR was given greater authority in the integration and deployment of forces within his command. The British committed four divisions and 2nd Tactical Air Force with 780 aircraft to SACEUR's 12 command. West Germany committed 1300 aircraft and coastal defence naval forces in the same way, while divisions, biological long-range to manufacture nuclear, or not chemical weapons, undertaking or Council Western The Union determined what overseas and internal tactical missiles. of forces each member might have which were not to be put under defence/security SACEUR. With the achievement under his belt and Churchill safely retired, his successor, Eden, Soviets for the again approached a European security agreement. His proposals demilitarisation Eastern Germany the of envisaged and possibly a small strip of western Germany, an agreed security pact on the lines of Locarno and a limitation of armaments in Europe. American and Canadian forces must remain in Europe. 34 Eden had been idea Locarno the of a new playing with style pact since the eve of the Bermuda Foreign Office the conference, when professionals had talked him out of it. 35 But the idea of abandoning the security the presence of their own troops in the DDR gave the Soviets offered Molotov no attractions. The Geneva summit broke up on the dilemma Eden had voiced in the Commons on returning from the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference in February 1954: 36

50

'Is Germany to be neutral and disarmed? disarmed? Or is Germany to be neutral Germany neutral? ' British basic policy remained The premises of Makins, British Sir Roger the to them explained

If so, who will keep Germany ... and armed? If so, who will keep

as Harrison, Ambassador

Eden's private secretary, in Washington. 37

'The present division of Germany is dangerous to the West because Europe German division be the the people remain at restive of stable whilst cannot Germany and whilst the Western Powers have given a hostage in the shape of Berlin... ' follows: be basic The stated as premises may (a)

German reunification through free elections;

(b)

'The right of a reunified Germany to choose its own associations and alliances;

(c)

Our assumption WEU.

that a reunified

Germany

would

choose

NATO

and

Today EC would be added to premise (c). In 1989, even after the Wall has come down, it would be surprising if Britain's security requirements have much changed, though in longer disguise the to past security military given can no that it is the primacy political

security which we seek.

Donald

51

Cameron

Watt

NOTES

1

CAB 79/78.

2

Changing Directions: Julian Lewis, inter For this controversy alia, see, Strategic Defence, 1942-1947 Planning for Post-War Military Britain's (London, 1988), pp. 122-42 and Appendix 3.

3

On which see Lewis, pp. 178-241.

4

See D Cameron Watt, 'Die Sowjetunion im Urteil des Foreign Office, 1948Neidhart (ed. ), Der Western und die Sowjetunion 1949' in Gottfried (Paderborn, 1983), p. 138.

5

On which see JIC(44)467(0)Final, 18. xii. 44, N 678/20/38, FO 371/47860. See Cameron 'British Watt, D Military Perceptions Soviet Union as a the also of in Becker 1945-50' J threat, strategic and Franz Knipping, Powers in Europe Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a post-war world 1945-1950 (New York, 1986).

6

COS(46)105(0), 5. iv. 46, CAB 80/101.

7

8.ii. 46, FO 371/55586.

8

Montgomery

9

CP(46)186,3. v. 46, CAB 129/9.

10

CP(48)6, CAB 129/23.

11

Cf. JP(48)63(Revised Final) of 26. vi. 48, DEFE 6/6, COS(46)105(0), 5. iv. 46, CAB 80/101, COS(48)15th, 16th, 18th, 27th mtgs, 30. i/2,4,25. ii. 48, DEFE 4/11.

12

JP(48)91 Final,

13

CM(48)82nd

14

CM(48)8lst

15

COS(49)18th,

memorandum,

PREM 8/216.

l. ix. 48, DEFE 6/6.

22. mtg., xii. 48, CAB mtg., 15. xii. 48, CAB

128/13.

128/13.

42nd mtgs., 4. ii/19. iii. 49, DEFE 4/10,11.

52

1948, III, p. 75.

16

FRUS

17

COS(50)52nd mtg., DEFE 4/30.

18

DO(50)20,20. iii. 50, CAB 131/9. DO(50)5th mtg., 23. iii. 50, CAB 131/8.

19

JP(49)156,2. xii. 49, DEFE 6/11; COS(49)409,24. xi. 49, .DEFE 5/18; COS (50)8,10. i. 50, DEFE 5/19; COS(50)52nd, 70th mtgs., 29. iii/2. v. 50, DEFE 4/30,31; Bevin Memo, CP(50)80,26. iv. 50, CAB 129/39; Attlee minute, 2. v. 50, PREM 8/1203.

20

Cf. CP(50)114,19.

128/17.

21

Elliot minute, 8/1023.

22

COS Memo, DO(49)45,17. vi. 49, CAB 131/7.

23

CM(50)29th mtg., 8. v. 50, CAB 128/17.

24

COS(50)78th mtg., 18.v. 50, DEFE 4/31.

25

CP(51)240,30. viii. 51, CAB 129/47.

26

FO Memorandum,

27

Slessor Papers, XIVD,

28

CC(52)50,7. v. 52, CAB 128/24.

29

C 1016/32, Dixon, Strang minutes, 19.v. 53, FO 371/103660.

30

PREM 11/419,6. vii. 53.

31

S Lloyd to WSC, 22. vi. 53, PREM 11/449.

32

WSC to AE, 6. xii. 53, PREM 11/618.

33

WSC Memorandum, 20. viii. 54, PREM 11/618.

34

Eden to Adenauer, 19.vi. 55, PREM 11/894.

CAB 50, v.

9. vi. 50, CAB

129/40;

21/1896;

CC(52)48,10.

CM(50)29th

Shinwell

iv. 52, CAB

Air Historical

53

mtg.,

to Attlee,

128/24.

Branch.

8. v. 50, CAB

13. vi. 50, PREM

35

Eden Memo, 20. xi. 53, PREM 11/418.

36

A Eden, Full Circle (London, 1960), p. 76.

37

Harrison

to Makins,

11/894.

28. v. 55, PREM

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Gipfeldiplomatie, die und

in

Saki Dockrill, 'The evolution of British Policy towards a European Army 1950-1959', Journal of Strategic Studies, XI111,1989.

'Britain and the Settlement of the West German Rearmament Said Dockrill, Question in 1954' in Dockrill and Young (Eds. ).

M Steven Fish, 'After Cold War', Diplomatic

Stalin's Death: the Anglo-American History.

Adenauer J Foschepoth, 'Churchill, Deutschland Archiv, 1984.

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die Neutralisierung und

Deutschland',

Martin Gilbert, Never Despair. Winston Churchill, 1945-55 (London 1988).

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Planning for Post-War

Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer. The Conservative Government 1951-55 (London 1981).

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Schweizer lecture, im britischen in Urteil des Foreign Office, 1945-1949' Sowjetunion 'Die Idem, die Sowjetunion: Der Westen (Ed. ), Einstellungen und Niedhart Gottfried und USSR Europa der in der USA in Politik gegenüber und seit 1917 (Paderborn, 1983).

Idem, 'Grossbritannien, die Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland', in Josef Steininger Rolf (Eds. ), Britische Deutschland Foschepoth and und Besatzungspolitik 1945-1949 (Paderborn, 1985).

Soviet Union 'British the Idem, perceptions of as a strategic threat, military Becker Franz Josef Knipping (Eds. ), Power in Europe: in 1945-1950', and Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Post-War World, 1945-1950 (New York, 1986).

Idem, 'Demythologising the Eisenhower Era' in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Eds. ), The 'Special Relationship'. Anglo-American relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986).

JW Young, 'Churchill, the Russians and the Western Alliance: the three power December 1953', Bermuda, English Historical Review, 1986. at conference 'No' to Europe: the rejection of European Unity by Idem, 'Churchill's Churchill's Post-War Government, 1951-1952', Historical Journal, 28/2, 1985.

And the following collective works: Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (Eds), Power in Europe: Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Post-War world (New York and Berlin, 1986).

ML Dockrill and John W Young (Eds. ), British Foreign Policy, 1945-1956 (London, 1989).

Josef Foschepoth (Ed. ), Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage. Deutschland Widerstreit der Mächte, 1945-1952 (Göttingen, 1985).

Raymond Poidevin (Ed. ), Histoire des debuts de la construction (Mars 1948-Mai 1950) (Brunds, 1986).

55

im

europeene

Olave Riste (Ed. ), Western Security: The Formative Atlantic Defence, 1945-1953 (Oslo, 1985).

Years. European

and

Bruno Thoss and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Eds. ), Zwischen Kalten Krieg und Entspannung. Sicherheits- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesregierung im M채chtesystem der Jahre, 1953-1956 (Boppard am Rhein, 1988).

Ian D Turner (Ed. ), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany. British occupation 1945-1955 (Oxford, 1989).

Western Zones, the and (Eds. ), Die Europ채ische Hans-Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler Stand und Probleme der Forschung (Boppard am Verteidigungs-gemeinschaft.

Rhein, 1986).

Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland Foerster (Eds. ), Die Westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegens채tzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gr체ndungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz (Boppard am Rhein, 1988).

John W Young (Ed. ), The Foreign Policy of the Conservative Government, 1951-1955 (Leicester, 1988).

56

A DIPLOMAT'S

VIEW

OF

A POSTING

IN

GERMANY

1952-55

invitation Conference for the to speak to you I am grateful to the organisers of this I by begin the task I that considerable undertake with explaining should today, and I for hesitant There this attitude my part. am not on hesitation. are a number of reasons I have had no active connection with Germany in recent years. I historian. a practising And I kept for Germany no the in are covering. which you of period part was only diaries.

in lane is down invitation trip self-indulgence an exercise to take a memory But the be hope I been have that the I to of marginal result only will resist. unable which for I history.

But diplomatic task, this interest to you, the editors and practitioners of if had I have increased been have and my uncertainties would myself; chosen not would I be here distinguished to today. should also mentors were known that so many of my Government British between the those of my and views that resemblance any warn you are coincidental.

Germany. involvement background and with First, an explanation of my own fought in have in November 1945 18 just the thus to too I was and young years old Second World War in Europe. I grew up during the war, school and home being within Germany The in London. thus 30-mile a constant element with was war our radius of a lives, although generally it was not the dominant or determining element.

Germany and its future were discussed a good deal among us. It was a feature of warlot follow, debate England, to talk the a about progressed, as years what should a time domestic future British life.

As the and social political aspects of to about mainly Germany, there was a surprising readiness to agree, even then, on the mistakes made at Versailles in 1919: and a debate, which I can remember as early as 1941 in preparatory kind There the this time. should of aim at peace settlement we was also, school, about Chamberlain Government's in least the the of acceptance early war years, a ready at Germans' Germans' 'bad fighting 'good the that argument and we were view of Nazism, not Germany. Total war took over as fighting proceeded, but it didn't seem Goethe's be in 1944, lyrics German the to studying of summer with a strange, Professor, in spite of explosions of V1 bombs around you at the time. And if Germans didn't know much about concentration camps, I doubt if the average Englishman destruction by bombing the the caused extent carpet of realised of cities, nor of its did I indiscriminate nature. not, and Hamburg certainly seen in 1947 was a considerable shock.

Later, as a National Serviceman, I served with the Army in Germany 1947/48.1 was in Germany at the time of currency reform and Berlin

57

in Austria and blockade and I

So it followed. in German great no was the which years student spoke reasonable Bonn in I in 1951/52, Office Foreign to in posted was the a after year surprise when September 1952.

This was a strange introduction to diplomatic life.

Our Mission in the Federal Republic was not an Embassy: formally speaking, we were Our Headquarters in Element British described the occupying power. were as the still but in French Americans its in Bonn the a and as were outlying villages or not former barracks at Wahnerheide, on the edge of what is now the Flughafen Köln/Bonn.

There was a proto-Embassy led by Foreign Service staff, but the bulk of the personnel job My Government from branches drawn service. of the other were either military or Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, High Secretary Private the to and this was as Schloss Röttgen, household.

He lived his his both at a office and meant running fame, family Kölnischwasser Castle by Mühlens 4711 built Rhenish the of modern between Wahnerheide and Köln. It would have been a source of delight to Osbert Lancaster. It was a rather stuffy, gloomy house, surrounded (as German gentlemen like it) by a thick belt of woodland and an impressive wall. The High Commissioner lived in some isolation.

And the Chancery was physically separated also, by an inconvenient distance, from the it in True, Bonn.

20 from houses Bad Ministries the only on was miles nascent Godesberg, Honnef and Koenigswinter where most of them lived. But the roads were in by horse-drawn those trucks years vehicles and slow-moving narrow, congested deal A Pope, Lance time trailers. the great of was spent on road. with one or more who Chancery for German internal in the many as years our resident expert on worked POW in Germany), ditty (after spent mostly as a a about the war composed a politics Bonn Wahn knew between Like better and which all too we another, road only well.

I known, anthem - this was sung to the tune of 0 Tannenbaum can and only line: (recalling Hangelar, '0 0 the opening a particular narrow village) remember Hangelar, wie eng sind deine Strassen... ' This was a busy period in my life and much happened to me. There was so much to learn about the work of the High Commission, Schloss the and about running of Röstgen. I made lots of mistakes. The Kirkpatricks kind to me were personally very in their close company taught me much. The concentration of brain and a year spent Chancery in the was, at times, a bit overpowering power to the young and inexperienced. This applied particularly to the Counsellor, Con O'Neill, one of the few I have intellect ever met whose men and manner were equally intimidating, at first it is (generally acquaintance not thus). He ran a tight ship, and later became an admired Jack Ward had a misleadingly and trusted friend. The Deputy High Commissioner ruminative style. I can see now that he had what we would nowadays call, in a computer, a 'random search' facility, by which I mean that he could produce from a

58

disconcerting a series of considerable experience, and memory well-stocked But he line thought. an any established of was unsettling of capable observations had foil Kirkpatrick's Kirk to team, the sharper-edged a mind. and of member excellent Germany from derived in initially his service long-formed and strongly-held opinions in the 1930s. long dwell too I on these reminiscences about people, and should give a But mustn't I in those as remember them. years few impressions about politics in Bonn Conventions Bonn that the the arrival of my moment was The phase reached at had been signed, some months previously, and that we were awaiting ratification. feeling Wahnerheide in the of satisfaction when a complex and tedious There prevailed level feeling At 'You been has this one was personal. should completed. negotiation I Few had during here those told. been the of was concerned negotiations', ever have done anything like this before, and they were understandably gratified. At a different found had that the right method, both to meet the we level there was also satisfaction Communist Federal from to the and start a the new partnership world, with threat Conventions Bonn From The the the of Republic. was crucial watershed. negotiation Conventions stemmed the end of the occupation and the active collaboration and the hallmark has been Federal Republic the of the our relationship with partnership which in these past 40 years. 'Partnerschaft' was a favourite word of Kirkpatrick's (it never deutsch but he in finding to me) echt was surely quite right seeking and a sounded German key like Hallstein Blankenhorn, officials with relationship and trusting who in important be the coming years. so were to This time also marked the beginning of the Adenauer apogee and I cannot think about Bonn in these years without Konrad Adenauer's face appearing in my memory. Much has been written about him, and I didn't know him personally at all well. But I do You he in the the clearly personal that presence of very man. sensed the recollect was fill it He his to seemed with strong and controlled personality. He had a rare room. knowing his qualities of seeing and objective, steering steadily towards combination it, and of speaking in deliberate, unemotional manner. A casual remark of his to Kirkpatrick conveys this: 'Gott hat die Klugheit aber nicht die Dummheit der Menschen begrenzt' [God has limited man's intelligence but not his stupidity]. And I like the Sir Christopher by Steel some years later: 'If anyone had been granted comment made in 1945 a vision of West Germany as she is today, he would have been incredulous.

No-one then could have hoped for the half of what has been attained... It happened Adenauer, I that, think, will always be the last word about him'. A fair and under comment,.

I should add that Kirkpatrick had good relations with Adenauer. Of the three Allied High Commissioners he was best placed, after McCloy's departure, to influence the Chancellor. Francois-Poncet had, when he chose, great charm, and brilliance, and

59

lion's ('he he tail Germany, but the twisting could not always resist much experience of for Commissioner High Conant's (US Dr Kirk would say): and was naughty', Germany) eminent intelligence took some time to get to grips with the German scene. he but for being by to took Kirkpatrick pains great aloof, some was criticised he him Adenauer, could. when and to please understand I can recall one episode involving Adenauer at this period. He had made a remark (not I heel be Achilles he believed in to the of the agriculture think public) to the effect that Soviet economy. This was taken seriously in London and efforts were made by visiting Soviet him for the that economy of the contrary: the purpose, to persuade experts, sent sector was receiving was powerful, resilient, expanding, and that the agricultural flattered Adenauer in due investments course pay off, etc. was which would massive by the attention to his opinion and intrigued by the beetles which he had conjured from he he but and surely was right. the woodwork; was unconvinced,

How do our policies look today, nearly 40 years later? It is too soon to pass judgement, interest I few hesitant is But to the this area of greatest you, and offer a even now. opinions.

I am struck by the atmosphere of military necessity which was the mainspring of our in international Living behaviour. the a world now where motives of activity political it be hard it is important different to this, to understand. recognise although may are so At that time the western world had suffered a series of brutal shocks - the Berlin blockade, the Prague coup d'etat in 1948, the arrival of Soviet nuclear weapons, and the invasion of Korea. These events announced to my generation that we faced a fresh it by decided I to contain threat, and we rearmament and collective security. can military between discussion Harwich Hook Holland in steamer the a channel on and recall a of July 1950 with two undergraduate friends: we saw Korea as our test to produce a had failed our to do over the re-occupation of predecessors collective response, which the Rhineland and the invasion of Ethiopia. Further, it looked very much like a last it however may seem now. Most of us saw it that way. chance, extraordinary So it was for security reasons that we needed German help and collaboration. For the British the impetus for greater unity in Europe came from these security necessities.

The urge for political unity in Western Europe was always present, but the failure of the EDC in the summer of 1954 meant that the road to a closer, integrated European identity in defence was blocked. It had never been the solution liked by the British, for NATO and the Brussels Treaty route was thereby confirmed; and whose preference for European unity, begun through the Schuman Plan of 1950, continental aspirations followed be to were now along a different road.

What would have happened if this security need had not weighed so heavily on us?

Were we right in judging it to be as imperative as it seemed? These are the vital

60

in have hesitation I discussing, the for seeing the and no are we years questions in Europe Western key has happened 1950-55 then. the to since as what quinquennium do I But ask I would not myself presume to answer those questions very categorically. less East had been happened if from have and the the threat explicit, might what myself homogenous for less Suppose had felt.

Russians keenly less and that the a aimed thus Eastern Europe: what would have been the effect on Western directly controlled if Note March 10,1952 And had their they which sent of what organisation? political Germany two the sooner? of a years to possibility neutralised, reunited offer seemed he Perhaps Adenauer it hand. have that then and It seems unlikely could rejected out of in have do Soviet the year or Allies to this wished point, so. motives at would not the Gromyko's in death, are unclear: and characteristically, Stalin's the before passage so his March 1952 Note him the on at most unhelpful. shows recently published memoirs At the time I felt that the Soviet Note should have been tested. Now I am inclined to a it intended different opinion: either was not seriously (in which case we reacted intended lead Germany it democratic, (like to to a unified, neutralised correctly); or was in become), Austria was to which case the move was taken too late to have effect, and divisions hesitations been in do know Kremlin have the or not yet which we there may diplomatic history, be If the this realm of a crucial point to will glasnost enters about. look into.

One conclusion about Soviet policy does seem to be fairly clear, that their actions were determination by and seriously misjudged, evoking a military response of surprising because in West.

Also, the the effectiveness the game was not worth of the candle, failure of their self-imposed mission in Eastern Europe, as this year 1989 has so conclusively demonstrated. The uncertain part of the scenery is what effect Soviet actions had on the political organisation of Western Europe. I would suggest, personally, that this did have an indirect but critical effect.

My next reflection is Germany.

It dominated by British towards the past, was policy on as our handling of the Naumann affairs illustrates: we were trying to avoid the last mistake. Our policy was also largely reactive. We had not wanted to fight Germany and declared war because there The between wobble appeasement seemed no alternative. but I would remind our critics that identified, and deterrence has been correctly parliamentary democracies require popular support: alternative, more rational policies would not have obtained it. A consequence was that there was no clearly thought through policy of war aims. There were statements of general policy such as the Atlantic Charter, but there was little or no discussion of the kind which had in gone on first the world war - the Lansdowne letter, for example. This meant that after 1945 we had no blueprint for the reconstruction Germany.

The Allies did set up certain of in their own image, which have in institutions some cases proved remarkably Bank Deutscher Laender based on the experience the Federal Reserve successful, the of being the prime example. The Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund far has outshone record its British the standing of godparent the Trade Union Congress. But in general, our

61

brilliant Europe Western Germany Britain, and future as a more was and the of view of be Nations United by held in a would which a the place past, stable edition of light in improved the League experience. of painful and enlarged purified, resurrected it future that the There was nothing particularly wrong with this vision of except was developed for the inadequate at our and resources the which circumstances wholly disposal. Thus a new chain of reactive policies was set in train.

Then there is the Britain and Europe issue, the closest to heart and perhaps the most difficult. Looking again at some of the documentation of this period, I am struck by the British Ministers by from Europe detachment and officials. so many shown attitude of This is very clear in the documents about the EDC for example. I can recall a visit paid

by Sir Cecil Weir, our representative at the ECSC in Luxembourg, to Bonn in I think 1953, in an effort to persuade Kirkpatrick to be more Eurocentric, but without success.

We must remember that the wartime experience had strongly implanted the notion of States; it for had been United the recipe victory, and the same collaboration with the Partnerschaft had given birth to the United Nations. We were not alone, perhaps, in following the principle that you should be on very good terms with the strongest man issues large Europe do Changes this to of policy so as attitude our on on your side. in habit deeply ingrained transformation this the case of of a not occur suddenly, and Suez, Eden's by Macmillan. did and replacement not occur until after mind The interesting reflection here is whether diplomats should attempt to anticipate changes in political opinion, or even to promote them, within their own political society. On the be believe I that they should willing to contemplate that, and that senior officials whole did, in for European have they than the more sowing seeds a more attempted might formed by had by But too the they the views experience of war and victory, policy.

Fourth Republic, by in the of the and record exasperating moments unimpressive Council of Europe; and as a current example reminds us, guerilla activity by officials is in Whitehall So happened is the culture. accepted not readily not all that what if I And had been made, in the confines of our that the am certain attempt surprising. been have it Diplomatic successful. not would period, revolutions are not readily made in Britain, although we have learned to accommodate ourselves to sudden changes brilliantly conceived and quickly executed by powerful minds elsewhere.

We should not conclude this meeting without raising our eyes to the level of current for has, Our been framed by a pattern formed in the years a generation, events. world 1950-55, or thereabouts. That frame, that mould, is now collapsing around us. This fresh follow dangers.

I presents new challenges, new possibilities, and with riveted attention the sequence of events in Central and Eastern Europe. In an important way, these demonstrate the justice of the policies we have been following for 40 years or so.

They certainly prove the failure of the alternative system. Our task now is to combine a fairer and more lasting and more democratic settlement in Central Europe with our own So many things we have striven for, collective mission in the European Community.

62

including a substantially lower level of armaments, may now be -within grasp. It may but future is impolite important to this to the say so audience, to me always more seem 5/7ths date After Germany has joined to all, the Club. the only of past. than

Lord

63

Bridges

ON CONTRIBUTORS

NOTE

Lord

Control Commission

Annan

Ms Gillian FCO

Control

Kettenacker

Commission

German Historical

for Germany

Institute,

Sir Frank Roberts

Overseas,

1945-6,

University

of

London

Mrs Margaret Pelly Editor of Documents on British Historical Branch, FCO Professor Leslie Pressnell

Policy

1954-6, HM Ambassador,

HM Embassy, Bonn 1952-4, Berlin

Sir Alec Cairncross Glasgow Dr Lothar

1945-6

Assistant Editor of Documents on British

Bennett

Lord Bridges Rome, 1983-7

for Germany

Policy Overseas, Head of

Cabinet Office Historian

HM Ambassador, Bonn, 1963-68

Professor Donald Cameron Watt Relations, London School of Economics

Stevenson

Professor

of

International

Mrs Heather Yasamee Editor of Documents on British Policy Overseas, FCO

64

ON

DOCUMENTS BRITISH

POLICY

OVERSEAS

Commonwealth Foreign from documents the the and archives of This collection of Her Majesty's Government. have by The Editors is Office authorisation of published freedom in documents. the selection and arrangement of been accorded the customary SERIES

1 (1945-1950)

Published Volume I

The Conference at Potsdam, July -August 1945.

Volume II

Conferences Moscow.

Volume III

Britain and America: Negotiation of the United States loan, AugustDecember 1945.

Volume IV

Britain and America: Atomic Energy, Bases and Food, December 1945-July 1946.

Volume V

Germany and Western Europe, August-December

Conversations and

1945: London,

Washington

and

1945.

In preparation Volume VI (Volumes VII-VIII 1946).

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1945-1946.

United Nations Organisation the will cover

and Peacemaking

SERIES II (1950-1955) Published Volume I

The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, 1950-1952.

Volume II

The London Conferences, 1950.

Volume III

German Rearmament, 1950.

In preparation Volume IV

The Korean War, 1950-1951.

Free lists of titles (state subject/s) are available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, HMSO Books, 51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5DR.

65

FCO HISTORICAL,

OCCASIONAL

BRANCH

PAPERS

No. 1 Papers presented at the FCO Seminar November 1987

'valid

Evidence'

No.2 Papers presented at the FCO Seminar for Editors of diplomatic documents November

1989

Foreign and Commonwealth Office