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Foreign Commonwealth General Services

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FCO HISTORIANS OCCASIONAL

PAPERS

"

Y

No. 13 The Growth

Multilateral of

Diplomacy


FOREWORD

On i May 1996 Sir David Hannay delivered the third of the FCO's Annual Multilateral History lectures. His choice of subject, `The Growth of fiftieth Diplomacy', this the pertinent since was particularly year marks first in General Assembly London, the the aniversary of of and meetings, Security Council of the United Nations. The new world organisation did begin its in Divisions the not most auspicious of circumstances. among work the major powers and the drift towards Cold War impeded its development instrument But it became, as an effective collective of security. and soon has since remained, a primary forum for the conduct of much of the diplomacy international multilateral of an expanding community. Few

be better Sir David.

history to the qualified of speakers could examine recent During his diplomatic he than multilateralism served on career in the early Communities the UK negotiating team with the European Cabinet Sir Chef de Christopher Soames latter to the 1970s, was was when Vice-President Commission, EC FCO's Head became the the of of and Science Energy, Space Department its and wide-ranging all with Washington, He later became British Minister at responsibilities. Communities Ambassador Representative European Permanent to the and Representative Brussels. He his British Permanent career as at concluded to the United Nations in the years 1990-1995. Soon after giving this lecture, he emerged from retirement to take up a new Cyprus, for Special Representative UK's working with as the appointment for long-standing in to the the settlement search a negotiated all concerned Cyprus. divided problem of a

We are pleased to publish Occasional Papers. series of

Sir David's

lecture

FCO's in latest the the as

Sir John Coles September 1996


Foreign

& Commonwealth

Office

HISTORIANS Occasional

Papers

September 1996

No. 13

THE

FCO 1996

THE GROWTH

ANNUAL

LECTURE

OF MULTILATERAL

DIPLOMACY

by Sir David

Copies of this pamphlet

Hannay

National deposited be the will with

FCO Historians Library & Records Department Clive House, Petty France, London SWiH Crown Copyright

ISBN 0 903359 65 0

9HD

Libraries


THE GROWTH

OF MULTILATERAL

DIPLOMACY

A Lecture delivered at the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office

May i 1996

first Lecture, History FCO my asked me to give the 1996 dash invited, being of mingled with a strong reaction was one of pleasure at former before the an audience of my prospect of standing up nervousness at Thirty-six forth history. holding as portentous as on something peers and day is day dealing diplomacy to one thing, ephemera of with the years of And I fragile bark history launching the river of a on to quite another. I bruising moment of my undergraduate career when recalled a somewhat had been unwise enough to refer to myself as a historian and was told very I firmly by the distinguished to professor whom was reading my essay that, is It I historian, history. he as was merely a student of was certainly a while intervening left having I the today, that not me the period address you such to progress across that great divide. time or the opportunity

When

the PUS

Howard's I read Sir Michael to this magisterial 1995 contribution Years European Peace', I `Fifty his lecture of was even more series with in Moliere I But the the then play who recalled character awe-struck. discovered that all those years he had actually been speaking and writing in lives Diplomats the midst spend their which was called prose. something better had is history, try to they that so called subsequently of something be, is daily it. Moreover they their part of may work, wherever understand historical of the previous phases of which some understanding continuum, a let here interpret is really essential if they are properly the to and now, been My having spent on the whither own career and why. alone blot diplomacy the to on a as stand an extent can only which multilateral I have chosen to speak about the exponential of my managers, escutcheon in it form World War Second a of that of our trade, to set growth since the historical and some of the and to analyse the phenomenon perspective broad-brush it do in I and creates. so a rather and opportunities problems in difficulty betrays the way which perhaps non-quantitative non-technical, from to scholar. the transition practitioner making

When

began his recent study of diplomacy with Richelieu. I will in This the that, was a period when a and start 19th century. spare you find hard be diplomacy to pressed would modern practitioner of multilateral fields in his the of trace at all of craft, whether any recognisable international peace and security, of arms control, of trade policy and Henry

Kissinger

3


investment or of any other of the many forms it now takes. But while most diplomacy was bilateral, there were brief manifestations of multilateralism. The great alliance formed to resist the Napoleonic bid for hegemony met in his downfall; Vienna to shape the peace following the Great Powers from to tendencies time to time resist revolutionary concerted together thereafter; the Congress of Berlin in 1878 struck a series of multilateral deals over the Balkans and the fate of the Ottoman Empire; the European increasingly despairing Africa; carved up a series of powers collectively First World in leading to the the up years collective attempts were made War to handle the tensions caused largely by the erratic nature of the But none of these occasions created any standing Kaiser's diplomacy. Concert dealing for People the of spoke much about machinery with crises. Europe but it tended to be a singularly concept, not unsubstantial Gladstone for instance it when necessarily available when was needed, War. Franco-Prussian it liked head have the to make use of to off would And its useability was gradually undermined by a growing series of bilateral, sometimes secret, alliances which proliferated as the century ended and the international community drifted towards the abyss of 1914. Over the same period technological advances and long bursts of sustained increased both in the greatly economic growth most of the main states destructive capacity of armed forces and the resources available to support them. By the end of the century a full-blown arms race was under way involving not only land armies on the European continent but a highly destabilising naval arms race between Britain and Germany. Some lipjust futility the the allowing the arms race risks of and service was paid to to run on, with continual leapfrogging both quantitatively and qualitatively between the main players but no serious progress was made in limiting the framework finding in less within which some multilateral competition, still for higher be lowered tensions could armaments resisted. and the pressures Court of Justice in The What subsequently has become the International Hague, established just at the turn of the century, stands as a lonely law disciplines international to the against the multilateral of monument forces of Realpolitik and balance of power manoeuvring but that remained for long a forlorn and largely unfulfilled aspiration. In the economic field too there was as yet no sign of effective multilateral diplomacy, although here the consequences of this lack were more positive. The fact that Britain, the world's leading industrial and trading power, for free by the trade and was prepared to put the middle of century opted its muscle behind such an approach, had a powerful influence world-wide. The gold standard stood as the nearest thing the world has yet seen to a by But beginning the the to century clouds were end of single currency.

4


gather over the world economy too. Protectionist forces in some of the main industrialised countries, like the United States, Germany and France were beginning to build up and, as Britain's predominance ebbed, so too did its free trade, with the plan for imperial preference making advocacy of progress. Did the absence of any multilateral in international disciplines rules and in hundred War leading First World the to the relations year period up deal? Were follow to matter a great a any serious opportunities missed different course in which multilateral diplomacy could have begun to play an important moderating and regulating role well before it in fact did so? It is not easy to answer either question affirmatively with any sense of realism. The supremacy and sovereignty of the nation state in international affairs its its in Governments triumphalist apogee and most was at phase. were freedom did Nor to trammel their they see a of action. simply not prepared do The to compelling need so. wars of the 19th century were of relatively duration limited and of short geographical scope, the most qualitatively destructive amongst them ironically being the American Civil War which, in have been for the loth even century would not considered a suitable case internationalisation. The forces of nationalism which had brought about the Germany Italy to power the and and which continued of unification imperial drive of Britain and France had in many respects proved a influence. fundamental liberating The and constructive contradictions between the crumbling multi-national Habsburg and Ottoman empires and While bay. held the the rising tide of nationalism temporarily at were brought business bankruptcy the and recession, cycle periods of working of these were followed by up-turns which tended to carry the world economy it So, lights had hitherto higher level the to a than reached. went out when in August it Europe believed Europe 1914, was not over a which all over fundamentally international the there was something conduct of wrong with be blissfully but to remedied rather one which was relations which needed be that nothing would ever quite the same again. unaware four A little later, lights they the over years when came on again, Ottoman, different desolate illuminated The Habsburg, a very and world. Tsarist and Hohenzollern Rightly had been empires or wrongly swept away. tended the survivors to regard the absence of excessive armaments, balance diplomacy fundamental causes of of power as collective security and A just had through the appalling new and experiences passed. which they States, had United in form the player come on to the scene powerful of the different in from the old players, an agenda which agenda with a quite factors than Realpolitik were given more weight moral and under which institution be to security through collective was a multilateral achieved

5


known as the League of Nations. Attempts were made to lower the level of Germany, disarmament forcible both the the through of most armaments, limit Europe, in through to negotiations and continental powerful state between the the three naval powers-Britain, principal armaments naval US and Japan. Only in the economic field was little real effort made to being the the activity multilateral main approach, multilateral a construct Germany various attempts to squeeze war reparations out of a prostrate destabilising that the to effects of misguided mitigate and subsequently policy. The new multilateralism got off to the shakiest of starts when the only true believer, President Wilson's United States, failed to ratify the League's Charter and withdrew into a long period of isolationism. Left to their own devices Britain and France proved unable and sometimes unwilling to back The League their other power. with the muscle of up the machinery of the Japan, Italy Germany, Soviet Union, provided a and principal powers, the it it in joining League, the suited when and supporting moving cast of actors limiting like looked flouncing if it their seriously their purposes and ever out freedom of action. The League was as much damaged by its failure to do it in in Manchuria Japan's the early 193os as was aggression anything about by its failed attempt to do something about Italy's aggression in Abyssinia later in the decade; and by the time of the Munich crisis of 1938 it had fluctuated it for Public disappeared from wildly, with support view. simply in Ballot Peace for the example at the time of great surges of enthusiasm, Britain and the imposition of economic sanctions against Italy, evaporating have League to no was seen as rapidly when the going got rough and the magic wand. The economic scene was, if anything, even worse than the political. The boom of the ig2os, already disfigured by the collapse of the German Thereafter in in the protectionism and crash of 1929. 1923, ended currency Act in Smoot/Hawley infamous The devaluations the tit-for-tat ran riot. US, which led to massive tariff increases, was matched elsewhere. impoverishment Production was soared; rural shrank; unemployment consequences of the slump reinforced and the political widespread; democracies. the totalitarianism and weakened It was perhaps not surprising that this first serious attempt at multilateral diplomacy fared so poorly. No-one had any operating experience in the field. Too often it looked like an uneven contest between the hopelessly backed idealists multilateralism and the seasoned professionals who amateur doses Moreover Realpolitik the of scepticism. who purveyed strong of launched could circumstances under which such an ambitious project was

6


hardly have been less propitious. had fallen The great motor of nationalism into the hands of evil, populist dictators who were able to harness it to their designs. The failure own megalomaniac remedies utter of classical economic left many people ready to try almost any quack prescription which promised Honourable but to at work and prosperity. attempts a return unavailing did little but delay for few inevitable the any months; appeasement a by level been had long to the control replaced attempt of armaments since for What gearing up a war economy. competitive was perhaps surprising was that so many of the leaders of the Anglo-American alliance, which was to from Second drew from World War, the the experience of emerge victorious the 192os and 1930s the conclusion, not that multilateralism was no good it did but be that to rather strengthened and given not work, needed and States, foremost United the teeth and above all that the world's power, fully in it in firm It leadership be this to engaged a role. was only needed in determination the the to strengthen multilateralism after war, enshrined Charter Atlantic of the third great of 1943, which overcame the reluctance Soviet for Union, the the applying the rule of whose appetite war, victor of disciplines was distinctly limited. law and for accepting international So, when institutions

began

to settlement post-war it heart of and multilateral were at the to hold it together. that was intended the

take shape, multilateral disciplines were the glue

in San Francisco in June whose charter was signed General Security Council institutions, the the and 1945 and whose main Assembly, began to meet regularly soon afterwards and have continued to do so ever since, was a very different animal from the League of Nations. For one thing it was universal and has remained so. Every independent belong it; belongs to to to statehood strives every government aspiring state South Serbia it, Africa left has it; to were and although willingly no state General international for Assembly from the gross violations of suspended law. The Security Council, a body restricted to a small proportion of the fifteen, has first then wideeleven soon perhaps rather more, membership, it by by the veto of tempered exercises majority voting ranging powers which Members. It impose Permanent five the can mandatory economic sanctions, it can authorise the use of force to back them up and it can authorise the international to to threats reverse aggressions and other waging of war Over it developed has time a complex array of also peace and security. in functions it has every which applied with varying success peacekeeping Of the course the system of collective security reflected world. continent of in the United Nations has not worked perfectly or achieved a coo per cent for Cold War it by hobbled the and tit-for45 years was record of success; be by had the to regarded as tat vetoes super powers; many conflicts simply

The United

Nations

7


few; its Iran-Iraq, Biafra, limits-Vietnam, to sometimes mention only a off Churchill in described be had have terms the to used about merits democracy, not brilliant but better than the alternatives. But aggressions Kuwait Korea South and were reversed; successful peacekeeping against Congo, Suez in in Sinai in the the 1956, after operations were mounted Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique; cease-fires have been in Sahara Western in Cyprus, the monitored and sustained over many years if look These Golan Heights. you are no mean achievements and on the back at the events of the half century that preceded them. In parallel with the establishment of the UN, but separate from it, there Woods Bretton known institutions the as was set up a group of multilateral Fund, Monetary International Financial Institutions, International the or General family, for long Bank World the the neglected child of the the and, into World Tariffs Trade, Agreement the recently transformed and on Trade Organisation it was always intended to be. As with the work of the UN, the record of these multilateral financial and trade organisations has been have There been periods of considerable successful. uniformly not dollar in the 1970s when the crisis and the explosion turbulence, particularly destroy if looked Yom Kippur they much might as war of oil prices after the had fabric of stability and multilateral support which of the carefully woven been so painstakingly built up. But the structure held, the will of the main did it financial to not weaken and the sustain powers and trading in hard inevitably times were resisted. that surface pressures protectionist Interestingly enough the orphan of the family, GATT, which in 1948 had backbone it needed to deal with trade failed to receive the institutional disputes and which was left for 45 years as a purely inter-governmental body relying on consensus, achieved quite remarkable results in rolling back in havoc had caused such gradually the great tide of protectionism which Kennedy, Tokyo Dillon, liberalisation A rounds the 1930s. series of trade (again but Uruguay trade again world successfully opened up painfully and because we are now not much further advanced than we were at the end of has As consistently a result, world trade growth the 19th century). And the new now growth. sustained economic and world outperformed WTO has at last been given the teeth to deal with trade disputes which in face far it better to the to than recidivist past up should enable tendencies in its member states. financial international trade organisations were these and years many being developing by as countries as rich mens' clubs, suspected regarded being Communist by irrelevant the world as to their problems and regarded The the transformation of or collapse conspiracy. part of a capitalist The has these that. of membership all changed economies command For


And become is is, their activities are universal. set to organisations or either fields little into hitherto touched such as stabilising the effects of expanding barriers industries in flows, liberalising the service trade and reducing capital financial, in diplomacy Multilateral investment. international the to from fields, has the total neglect of the 1930S to moved and trade economic highly the working of the world network which underpins sophisticated a economy. It did not take long however after the end of the Second World War for it that the burgeoning to become apparent cold war was going to ensure that had in been hope, these universal institutions, which set up such were not be free As to to sustain the collective sufficient going the security of world. Communist increased Western threat the the and ruined countries of Europe struggled to cope, the response, US leadership, under was again a NATO for the defence of its multilateral one. to provide was established deterrent members, with an integrated military the command and effect of The Marshall the US nuclear capability. Plan, which put Europe back on its feet, was implemented OEEC. through the multilateral the machinery of The contrast with the confused and largely bilateral fumbling of the 1920S External for example, and 1930S was stark. crises, over Berlin were Europe from basket being surmounted; and economically went a case to becoming one of the chief motors of the world economy, providing trade and developing far larger scale than its erstwhile to aid countries on a patron, States. When in the Soviet Union the United i gg i and the collapsed Central Eastern liberty, bloodless Europe their a of and countries regained huge had been significance won. victory of

The post-war world was a lot less successful at dealing with the dangers of from the proliferation the of and emerging risks excessive armaments destruction. for Indeed many years an absolute priority weapons of mass Soviet defences threat; to the strengthening of against a massive was given full scale arms race, which spread out around the world, as the and a East joined in both West and and made the most of their proxies of leverage over their protectors, ran on unchecked. Gradually the dangers of lists became the this approach of potential nuclear weapons apparent, from damage longer to the global environment nuclear and the states grew So disarmament less became testing negotiations multilateral acceptable. from being moved perhaps the most sterile and artificial gradually lip-service diplomacy, to a mere paying of manifestations of multilateral forum for scoring propaganda points, to much more public pressure and a Non-Proliferation There now exists a results. practical and action-oriented indefinitely, international Treaty prohibiting conventions prolonged biological and chemical weapons and shortly, one hopes, a comprehensive

9


is ban The test treaty. nuclear not the negotiation now challenge of texts but their implementation through multilateral machinery of and verification South Africa, North Korea The Iraq, great complexity. and examples of for just Meanwhile how hard is be. the this need show a more going to effective multilateral approach to areas of high or particularly ignored. Arms races of the sort destabilising and represent a

transfers tension potential developing now to the

major

threat

of conventional weapons, is as obvious as it is largely in East Asia are inherently to international peace and

security.

if been, has anything, an growth of regional multilateral feature even more remarkable of our epoch than that of the universal institutions to which I have devoted most attention so far. Clearly the development of the European Union is the outstanding example and the But in there are this country. one which attracts most of our attention South East Asia in ASEAN others, and sub-regional organisations such as SADC in Southern down Africa be and a similar path moving may gradually for a similar mixture of political and economic reasons. The European Union has carried multilateral diplomacy on to a different plane from those The largely inter-governmental hitherto I have mentioned. organisation its spread of responsibilities, the scale of its operations and their nature, Commission, institutions, its the the the with supra-national elements of Court of Justice and the Parliament, different in it a completely put It its from been be, it has category. to continues outset, a remarkable as lengthening, for the the success story, with membership queue of applicants for it foreign develop to pressure towards a common and security policy in the the crucial role of the single market achieving strengthening, into its is it But choppy prosperity of also sailing members ever clearer. high for the the one and risk a waters, with clearly project currency a single tensions between a federal vision and one based on a union of nation states rising.

The

diplomacy

So far I have concentrated on a mainly descriptive approach to the growth And diplomacy, it has its to. even with of multilateral got origins and where this approach I have missed out almost as much as I have included, making no mention of the many UN agencies, dealing with refugees, nuclear dealt I Nor have with the many energy, agriculture and many other things. in Africa, Europe Latin America organisations, regional whose activities and have, on the whole, so far been less significant than the ones I have Overall in is huge the picture multilateral mentioned. of a expansion diplomacy over the last 50 years which has transformed the structure of the diplomatic career and shifted the balance between classical bilateral but lesser diplomatic some, activities, not all, of which are now of

10


importance,

and those related to multilateral diplomacy, some, but not all, diplomacy. The to the are crucial of which successful pursuit of any nation's two has look time now come to aspects of more qualitative at one or diplomacy. multilateral

The

I regard now might to use the unforgettable classification of io66 and all that, as quite simply `a good thing'. To a certain extent I do. The contrast between the first and second halves of the 2oth century remains a striking international diplomacy the and salutary one. The role of multilateral and structures and disciplines it has created and operated must receive much of the credit for it, reluctant though of some of the principal practitioners it. But be like Kissinger to power politics are admit unwise to regard would its diplomacy For multilateral structure one thing as a panacea, a cure-all. fragile disciplines and and relatively support remain weak and public Geoffrey Howe recently said, so perceptively, episodic; as not many people pro decorum `dulce to say are ready an et mori' about est patria . international it does American Moreover, The not always work. entity. in Asia build in to the 195os and 196os attempt up regional security alliances SEATO CENTO, East, Middle the and and and ended was misconceived in failure. The response to the oil crises of the 1970s of trying to smooth the failed fall to gain rise and of the price of oil and other commodities rightly flawed, by is most economists as along with the support and now seen Some OPEC producers. activities of cartels of primary and other attempted for UNIDO United Nations' the also example and probably agencies, of do UNCTAD, have never had a very clear justification not and certainly Union, have one now. In the European the Commission and the doctrine Parliament the to recognise the validity of of are reluctant for to work out multilateral solutions subsidiarity and to eschew attempts level. best handled the at national or regional problems audience up to diplomacy, multilateral

be forgiven

for

thinking

that

in Many critics of multilateralism, the and there are plenty of them around, further States in particular, United and would speak at would go much duplication length extensive proposing about and corruption, waste, last laboriously built deconstruction the the century. of network so up over is no doubt diplomacy There that at all and multilateral multilateral It is not efficient. are not cheap and nor are they particularly organisations do difficult to demonstrate that national many things more governments is international do. But than that not the real test, organisations efficiently because in the modern are simply unable on world national governments from the to their own carry out many of the classic tasks of government, defence basic, to of the realm, through of the environment most protection International functions. range of economic an extensive and trade policy


peace and security cannot be left to the world's one remaining super-power, is in which any case not prepared to carry the burden, but nor can it be left to the law of the jungle which would lead in due course to extensive depend political those and economic dislocation, affecting all on who stability and open, growing markets for their prosperity. So the solution to the inherent inefficiency of multilateral organisations has, in my view, to be found in reform and not in deconstruction. But there lies the rub; because multilateral organisations are remarkably The inertia resistant to reform, far more so than national institutions. is just in bureaucratic terms but also because resisting reform strong, not decisions most policy reached multilaterally represent a compromise between the competing priorities of the member states concerned, so any decisions adjustment of such will require new compromises and a willingness to give and take. But reform there has to be because international organisations are no more immune from the Darwinian to requirement die than the rest of us. It is easy to reach the conclusion that it is adapt or just too difficult to reform the UN, or NATO, or the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, but to do so would be immensely damaging to the future prospects of those organisations. One aspect of reform which will need a higher priority than it has hitherto for is better the to received multilateral organisations get at performing tasks they have been given, rather than, as now, putting much of their effort best into their and administrative resources acquiring new responsibilities This has become they which are sometimes not well placed to exercise. in for UN European it Union but the the particularly urgent applies also in field In disarmament. the trade and of most and of arms control and for it is framework handling basic the areas where needed multilateral it but level problems at a global or regional effective, making now exists, fleshing out the framework with day-to-day decisions, ensuring the policy international disciplines once in place are respected and that commitments honoured, that is slow, uphill work for many years which still gets too are low a priority. Of course new global challenges will arise and will require new global responses but you only have to extrapolate the growth of diplomacy on a graph to see that it is inconceivable that the multilateral trend will not bend as trends always do. The important thing is to ensure it does not break. This

rather conservative analysis is strengthened by the growing signs of stress and conflict between the proponents of the nation state as the focus of most, if not all, effort and policy-making and those who are looking to federalist solutions. The tension is most in supra-national, the evident


European

Union, but it exists elsewhere, for example in the attitude of Republicans in the US towards right wing the UN, and in almost any in the world which finds itself overruled by an international country tribunal. It seems to me extremely dangerous for the future of the multilateral I have described, if it comes to be thought that we are caught up structure in a titanic between the nation struggle state and world or regional federalism. That was not what the great post-Second World War surge in diplomacy multilateral set out to achieve. The aim was not to abolish the but framework international to construct nation state a of machinery and disciplines its destructive tendencies could be contained within which more and controlled and within which collective solutions could be worked out for those problems and areas of policy where solutions at a national level were fully longer Naturally there will be a continuing no available or effective. I have tension between those who draw the various lines or boundaries described in one place and those who draw them in another; it should be if live tension to that the current tendency to go back to first possible with be principles can resisted. Where

has Britain stood in all this? What role has she played in the growth diplomacy? The of multilateral short answer is that she has stood at the heart of it, at least since the late 1950s when in a short space of time two fairly disastrous decisions were taken to engage in the Suez expedition and European Community. As a to stand aside from the foundation the of its defend further its to middle-ranking power whose capacity on own and interests international has extensive waned, we have learned to recognise that most of what we want done has to be done in concert with others and that it pays us to harness the multilateral that has been created, machinery international to that task. Middle-ranking to powers are absolutely crucial Member States Their invariably smaller organisations. are almost but bring the they to the clout and resources enthusiastic multilateralists table are modest. The large powers are at best reluctant multilateralists, in believe they times tempted to that they can crisis; are of easily except the clamour well get along perfectly without and constraints and So it is in those the middle multilateral negotiation. compromises of upon depend it is in that multilateral those the middle organisations most and have interest biggest in the their success and the greatest who vested direction. Britain, its NATO, their to opportunity shape with membership of Commonwealth, EU its Security the the the and and permanent seat on Council, is as well placed as any country in to play an effective role diplomacy it done does has It multilateral and often so. seem to me that that is the arena in which, for better or for worse, we are going to have to Since diplomatic future. I for foreseeable business the conduct much of our how never was entirely that it mattered convinced more you played the

13


if I bring lost, hope it than to the qualities of game you won or we will determination, ingenuity and perseverance which are required of those who field diplomacy I left. the remain on recently of multilateral I apologise if I have drifted away a bit from history and into policy. But I is history that understand construed as pretty well anything that nowadays happened up until the day before yesterday. History has certainly travelled It has helped diplomacy. through 36 years of multilateral with me me had I to negotiate and to cut to those greatly understand where with whom the deals were coming from, just as understanding and being able to explain is history diplomatic in tool our own a crucial persuading others of where If has the our sticking points are. loth century provided a series of object lessons in the dangers of pure bilateralism in the strength and and weaknesses of a multilateral approach, the 21st century will show whether build we can on those strengths and remedy those weaknesses or whether the will and the resources to achieve collective solutions to the main global damaging for I the problems are wanting, with consequences all of us which believe that would entail.

14


Sir David

Hannay

Tehran Office in Kabul from Foreign the and served at 1959 and Secretary UK Delegation Appointed (later to the ist) on ig6o-1963. 2nd European Communities, Brussels, 1965-1970, subsequently ist Secretary, UK Negotiating Team with European Communities, 1970-1972. Chef de Cabinet to Sir Christopher Soames, Vice-President of the EEC, 1973-1977; Head of Energy, Science and Space Dept, FCO, 1977-1979; Head of Middle East Under-Secretary State Dept, Assistant FCO, (European of 1979; Served Minister, British Community), Embassy, FCO, as 1979-1984. Washington, 1984-1985; Ambassador and UK Permanent Representative to Brussels, British Communities, European Permanent the 1985-1990; Representative to the United Nations, 1990-1994. Appointed British Special Representative for Cyprus on 23 May 1996.

Joined

15


In preparation

Titles Free lists of Stationery Majesty's London SW8 5DR.

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United

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United

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Century Foreign and Commonwealth Office ISBN o 903359 65 0

The Growth of Multilateral Diplomacy  

Sir David Hannay examines the history of multilateral diplomacy in the late twentieth century in the 1996 FCO Annual History Lecture, deliv...