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No. 11 1945-1995:

Fifty

Years of European

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Peace

October1995


FOREWORD

former 1994, Sir Alan Campbell, British Italy, to a ambassador lecture FCO Crowe. Sir Eyre The the the a at on career of FCO that the to contemplate success of occasion prompted organising lecture fiftieth To VEthis the another year. commemorate anniversary of Day, we invited the distinguished Sir historian, Michael Howard, to military invited May Sir Michael 4 1995. '1945-1995: address an audience on chose Fifty Years of European Peace' as the title of his lecture, and his words delivered flying to the evocative sound of wartime were aircraft over the for the VE-Day Office in preparation commemorative events. In March delivered

Sir Michael's in masterly analysis of one of the most significant our periods fitting introduction history I to a memorable was a myself am week. delighted to have an opportunity his hope lecture that of reading again and it will reach as wide an audience as possible through its publication as the latest in the FCO's series of Occasional Papers.

Sir John Coles October 1995


Foreign & Commonwealth

Office

HISTORIANS Occasional Papers

No. 11

October 1995

THE

1995 FCO

ANNUAL

LECTURE

1945-1995: FIFTY YEARS OF EUROPEAN

PEACE

by Sir Michael

Copies of this pamphlet

Howard

deposited be National the with will

FCO Historians, Library & Records Department, Clive House, Petty France, London SW 1H 9HD Crown Copyright

ISBN 0 903359 61 8

Libraries


1945-1995:

FIFTY

YEARS

OF EUROPEAN

PEACE

A Lecture delivered at the Foreign & Commonwealth

Office

4 May 1995

It seems fitting that in this building, 1 in this and especially room we should today be celebrating not the end of a war, but the beginning of a peace; the longest period of unbroken peace that Europe has ever known, and one for many years yet. It would that looks set to continue seem equally that, while we are celebrating appropriate the skill of the generals, the courage of the armies, the resolution of the peoples and the wisdom of the leadership forget that gave us the victory, political the not we should diplomats whose professional expertise ensured that that victory should foundation for like the two generations establish than, that of peace, rather 1918, laying for destructive After trail third of a powder yet a all we war. Metternich, Castlereagh Talleyrand, the venerate the of wisdom and architects of a European concert that played in harmony of a kind for forty We Bismarck the skill and restraint through years. applaud gave which Europe further German Wars the a generation of peace after of Unification. Diplomatic historians (now about the only people who it) by Congress the the the remember solidity admire of structure erected of Berlin in 1878 that kept the peace in Eastern Europe for a further thirty Versailles the the years; while architects of and associated treaties of 1919 made for are quite reasonably the mess that they reviled of the peace First World Should War. settlement after the give credit we not therefore is due the to where credit statesmen and their professional advisers who has lasted 1945, crafted the peace settlement of which until the present day? The trouble is that there was no peace settlement in 1945, or even in 1946. Arguably fortyNovember 1990, no peace settlement was made until five years later, when, during that brief window of opportunity between the Germany Soviet disintegration Union, the the the reunification of and of former in belligerent Paris to representatives of the powers again assembled in Eastern and Central Europe confirm a settlement of the frontier-disputes had been Second The World War. the immediate tidythe which cause of historian historians be minded tidy-minded are - and almost all - can in European history grateful that the turbulent chapter was thus concluded before another, far more complex, opened before him. In the perspective of that chapter the year 1945 seems only a suspension of activity, a chord I The Grand Reception Room of the Locarno Suite where the Treaties of Locarno were December 1 1925. These Treaties, initialled at Locarno in Switzerland during the signed on October, previous sought to end the strife and tension in Europe which had continued after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.


for further did bring half It a settlement; not a century. awaiting resolution bring but it did, mercifully, peace that made a settlement ultimately be The diplomats if the the therefore time should given credit, of possible. least for for building then a new peace, averting another war. at not

It is this unique situation that makes any attempt to compare the events of 1945 with those of 1918, or 1814, or indeed any previous war-termination in modern history, rather a waste of time. I can think of no previous major European conflict that was not concluded by a formal peace settlement hostilities; termination settlements regarded as of within a year or so of Certainly in in history the the continent. of convenient milestones unfolding 1945 the diplomats saw it as their job to fashion such another peace how do it. how, to to or not, settlement, and studied previous examples see 1919, of course, was seen as an example to avoid. This time an Germany be left to recover. unreconciled enemy must not with the capacity desired, be, if her then at should not split up again as many of enemies differences, debellated. Further, least thoroughly the the whatever States had United And leaders to remain united. the of the victorious allies its back on realised that their country could not afford once again to turn for but had to create a mechanism the preservation of the outside world, leading in America role. which would this time play a world order For the British at least, 1814 seemed a desirable model. The arguments of had Vienna its later detractors, the that the architects of settlement forces the to rather than repress growing of nationalism unwisely attempted had less them, once people convincing accommodate seemed rather did forces had What those the conflicts which seem experienced unleashed. its the the settlement clear-sightedness with which admirable about was dynamic danger had the the power of makers recognised which had Europe France the to the peace of and redrawn revolutionary posed happen the that this attempting again, without map to ensure should not France as a major power. If this model were impossible task of eliminating followed the United States must play the part that Britain had in 1814, of had the off -shore power whose wealth made victory possible and whose The be of the settlement. needed to ensure the stability support would Russia Russian role was unchanged: once again, was the nation principally but for defeat the one whose power of the aggressor's armies, responsible in be the creation of guarded against still needed to and possible ambitions Anthony Austria, Britain balance. the role of with would play any new defeated The only trouble Eden as her Metternich. the adversary. was Talleyrand in Germany There were no tame Bourbons to restore, and no Germany behalf. had ceased to exist, and there were to negotiate on their form in disagreements fundamental the to allies as among the victorious be recreated. which she should

In fact the conditions for a stable settlement based on a new balance of favourable in had been in in 1945 than they power were many ways more

4


1918. Then inevitable conflicts of interest had been compounded and made by the pressures of angry and irreconcilable irreconcilable public opinion. The French would be satisfied with nothing less than a Carthaginian peace, but one which they did not have the power to enforce without the support Britain States. United Congress In States, United the and of the rejected President Wilson behalf had the that all responsibilities of the assumed on American people and showed themselves concerned only to recover their debts. In Britain fickle from blind a public war opinion veered rapidly hostility desire for reconciliation, to all things German to a sentimental indifference Eastern Europe total to combined with a an where the newlyGermany Russia and created nation-states were a natural prey to a revived for Germany, from West. As the they an received explicit support unless irreconcilable section of public opinion angry and refused to accept that defeated forgave been had the messengers who told they at all, and never had. With England, the statesmen that the they them of partial exception been balance-of-power had 1814 politics without too much able to pursue of Germans for domestic the opinion; showed signs of making concern when 2 it Carlsbad is down Decrees. But Metternich them the trouble, slapped on Castlereagh have hard to know what Metternich, Talleyrand and could done in 1919, at the head of ships that would not answer the helm and whose crews were on the verge of mutiny. far biddable. in The Germans 1945 public opinion no more was were imposed Soviet to them. to any settlement on public opinion position object but it is unlikely that there was much objection is a matter of guess-work, Stalin Carthaginian himself impose to the on showed peace that anxious to The had Soviet Union. to the the people who caused so much suffering fast boys back home Americans, their to as they wanted get as although for involvement in inevitable a and responsibility possible, accepted their leaders in Britain in Europe, political were given a very settlement while domestic free hand by an electorate primarily affairs, and concerned with German foreign interest in menace should policy was that the whose main for good and all. So the difficulties be scotched the that confronted in 1945 were not, as in 1918, largely home-grown, diplomats and their They arose from the failures were not the result of their own ineptitude. intractability of the situation with which they were confronted. In

The main problem of course - give or take a generation of revisionism and had There Soviet Union. intractability the the of counter-revisionism was `Uncle Stalin be been illusion the that an easy partner: any never would Joe' image current in public opinion, and encouraged for wartime purposes, had not percolated into Whitehall, whose officials observed with some how Stalin Churchill Winston be as effectively concern seemed to charming been had Stalin Chamberlain. had Hitler Neville quite always charmed as 2 In October 1819 these Decrees proclaimed forming German Confederation. the countries

5

a policy of collective

repression within

the


frank

his Germans In November 1941, literally the about war aims. at with Moscow, it he had Anthony Eden that a the gates of made clear to Soviet Union be less Eastthan the content with nothing would victorious frontiers former Tsarist Three later in European Empire. the of years Churchill October 1944 he had negotiated a very specific agreement with Soviet far influence how beyond their to as should extend westward did frontiers. The Yalta Conference following little the spring more than fail Soviet forces by that the armed recognise a accompli, accomplished Germany's frontiers, by the prior agreement already stood along and Commission by European Advisory the on occupation reached zones within Germany deep Poles itself. A well-merited the to obligation made sense of Churchill fair for from do his best to elicit promises treatment them of Stalin, but they were promises that the West could do nothing to enforce. influence The British that they government could realised very clearly influence in Europe, in far Eastern them at all, only they could events so as Moscow, through and this was one reason maintaining good relations with if be had to preserved. among others why such good relations possible

If there was an illusion about Stalin in diplomatic quarters in 1945, it was that he could be dealt with on a simple basis of Realpolitik, on the interests but in his defend his he define that own and assumption would international he that those the the turn respect scene; of other actors on Lenin in Metternich than the mould of of rather was a statesman - certainly invitation British His Trotsky. Up to the to to a point this was true. not of if Europe, Western bases not seriously even establish on the mainland of British in indicated co-operation retaining meant, an awareness of the value in the containment of German power. But if his tactics and strategy were MarxistRealpolitiker, his those those of a of all ultimate objectives were destruction Leninists triumph the the the and of of capitalist world-order Soviet For him Union. leadership the the workers of the world under the of in Soviet been Union had his the a state of war with the and associates, West ever since its inception. Fascism was for him only a particularly found it form he had necessary to ally with the menacing of capitalism, and left less destruction in destroy it. Its the the none order to class enemy he believed later forces intact: body that they sooner or of enemy main Soviet Union if hostile the their only to activities against would resume Britain United inevitability the and of their own collapse. stave off the States had been temporary if necessary allies - and highly unsatisfactory With but the end of the war, they were permanent enemies. allies at that Germany, final there as no reason why they should elimination of and the be treated as such. not now in ideology It is possible that the Foreign Office which - not an environment is encouraged to flourish - did not take these long-term objectives seriously States United in the they were perhaps taken too enough whereas in Stalin it Realpolitiker did do limited But the to possible seriously. make a business him. His in 1945 with short-term objective amount of was almost

6


West certainly compatible to that the of enable with period of stability, -a Soviet Union losses. The instructions the to recover from her enormous by Communist in Western Europe, the to their received somewhat parties bourgeois the consternation, to co-operate parties and not cause were with in least Eastern Europe trouble, undue a simulacrum of a multiat while brutal the tight to camouflage party system was allowed reality of and Soviet Germany by half With troops, communist of occupied party control. States United the the rest of Western Europe economically shattered and involvement in its Europe, there to once more abandoning, all appearances, from West. Perhaps longer immediate the threat a truce might was no any have been preserved, at least for a few years longer, even if it did not lead for intractable factor; been it had detente, the second to permanent not Germany. the problem of between difference 1814 and 1945 As we have seen, the fundamental indeed, between the end of every major war in the history of Europe and There is that there was no enemy left to negotiate 1945 no with. was his former Talleyrand the rivalries of enemies that to play so skilfully upon be into Germany the could peacefully re-incorporated a chastened if had been European there system, and even such an aspiring political figure there was no Germany left for him to represent. This is not the place indeed discuss to wise to prosecute the war to the whether the allies were to those surrender, and to refuse their support point of unconditional For leaders themselves the offered as an alternative who regime. resistance find I legitimate I that only the scepticism say entirely would moment, Office Foreign in how far leaders, the the time, to at those as general however heroic, did offer a serious alternative to the Nazi regime; how far in its personnel have overwhelmingly that alternative right-wing - would have been acceptable to the Soviet Union; and what conditions they would least in Germany's frontiers. demanded Their not respect of eastern did often visualise - as many of them themselves they that supporters have concluded a peace with the western allies alone, to enable would fight Eastern Front; but them to more stubbornly the on anyone who believes in has no conception seriously such a possibility of what public in in Europe, this country, to say nothing opinion that of occupied would have been prepared Rightly in 1944-45. to tolerate or wrongly, such a des inconceivable. It was to take renversement alliances in 1945 was politically five years, and a very different Germany, before it was possible even to it. contemplate So the war ended without do German the to even a puppet government bidding job Even do had themselves. to the conquerors' and the conquerors it is if Stalin had been far more willing to co-operate he than actually was, by been have hard to see how the problem Germany any solved could of Stalin implacable first In the was place, means other than virtual partition. he in his determination that retribution to extract every scrap of economic his from his defeated own exhausted could enemy; not only to replenish

7


for but to weaken an adversary whose capacity rapid permanently economy, however The West economic recovery was a matter of very recent record. different lesson from British learned had the a rather or at any rate the Western Europe 1920s, that the of was prosperity of the experience if flourish indivisible, their neighbour their own economy could not was and If the shattered West-European bankrupt. economies were ever to recover, lost lesson Germany had to recover with them -a on the economy not of devastated in General he Marshall the travelled through continent when for his 1947 the spring of a massive and saw with own eyes the need in Western Europe if American transfusion was to avoid society of resources Germany keeping Between total collapse. the objective permanently of is it desire build her to partner, weak and the up as a necessary economic hard to see how any compromise have been possible. would Germany's

Beyond

this, there was a geo-political central zero-sum game. her in her Europe huge to say nothing of position and economic potential her an asset that neither side all-too-well proven military capacity - made WesternStalin lose. For the restoration of a capitalist, could afford to After 1930s. Germany all, oriented would simply recreate the threat of the fascism had it was out of the bowels of just such a society that militaristic Germany He do it could trust only a might well so again. emerged, and Europe, Eastern in he power that controlled, and that meant one where, as for But in hands the western the party. of the communist was effectively Europe Western in frighteningly already. strong powers, communism was Stalin Soviet control Germany that would mean over effectively would forces having Soviet dominate to the entire continent the armed without `neutral' independent, for As an move a single man or a single tank. for hankered Germany German kind a social-democrats of the after which in Europe' full decade for `disengagement so over which that aspiration for be ink in 1950s either recipe that a the would much was spilled lead intervention by both to a recontinuing covert sides which might well Civil War; Spanish dangerous far larger or scale of the run, on a and more by herself for Germany to re-establish as a great power an opportunity dilemma It the other. of which was a playing off each side against how idea had but in European 1945 to they no statesmen were well aware, it. solve far simpler to leave matters as they were, and I suspect It was ultimately did if it, Office knew in Foreign they not say so the even that most people Eastern Western in it down. There or either or write was no enthusiasm it Germany, United for the recreation Europe to put very mildly of a for indeed. There was certainly an armed confrontation no will whatever Stalin both For Soviet Union in and the order to create one. with the best Germany division West, the continued the of was so obviously to the problem, that subsequent generations may well practicable solution fuss, less been let have it much could not agreed with very wonder why been had Indeed have it it agreed, might well alone armed confrontation.

8


for brinkmanship in Berlin, the the anomalous situation not and Stalin in by Western to their rights compel the adopted allies to abandon That the city. event, more than any other, was responsible for transforming Soviet Union, in but from difficult West, the the eyes of the necessary a into into Germans from former a potential enemy, and the enemies partner It did and necessary allies. else to also more than anything potential States from United the transform a sympathetic and generous, though still detached, former for into confrontation ally a partner whose zeal somewhat had most an embarrassment even to those who was to prove almost it. urgently solicited been

be Soviet intransigence historians Even if, as revisionist claim, should forces invasive defensive interpreted of mechanism against the as a purely been if had West American to the and even more sympathetic capitalism, Soviet interests than they actually were - and it is hard to see, reading the documents of those sterile conferences of 1946, that we could have been any been have how it is difficult there to could now visualise more sympathetic Germany it division different the of and with outcome other than the any for basis division of Europe; or one that could have provided a more stable peace. fought had been Let us remember about - or at what the two world wars had European least, what this country gone to war and our neighbours Germany, both In to as contain the power of cases we went to war about. France. in fought had to the power of contain generations previous we in the First World War there was also much talk about defending Certainly best indeed did to establish them at our we the rights of small nations, and destruction Fascism it. In and the second we spoke about the of the end of did best democracy, our after the war to and, again, we of the restoration in both wars Britain fought, and the live up to our promises. But ultimately German British people were mobilised to fight, for the destruction power. of The rights of small nations could not have been established after the First, Second, been have democracy that the after until restored not could and in There was much concern among intellectual had been achieved. elites both wars, not least in the Foreign Office itself, about Britain's war aims, from desire it be it to enlist the that much of arose a admitted though must in States. in his But United the the country mass of people support of the both wars were fighting simply to beat the Germans, and that was war-aim informed he Churchill the the right note when struck exactly enough. Prime for first he it House of Commons, time the as addressed when Victory. had his Minister, that only one war-aim administration for German basis For the destruction any peace of power was the necessary in Europe - at least any peace that would be in the least compatible with interests. A ideals British traditions, new, sardonic sentiments, and far been historians is have to wiser that of suggesting we would generation have accepted in 1940 a Pax Germanzca that would have relinquished control

9


for Reich in being Continent Third keep to the to the allowed return of in is little It I Empire. a scenario that exploring except to see point our Continent, long, if Germany for how had controlled the we would wonder indeed have been left have been allowed to keep our Empire - or Germany had been If by to govern ourselves at all. governed a effectively bourgeois democratic regime that shared our values, such as that which it is have it indeed today, that parity, conceivable yielded rules we might States; but it did United this was not to the as equably as we primacy to in Second. First World let Even War, in the the the the case even alone First World War the dominant elements in the German government were in interested in in `peaceful not a settlement' any sense which we for in itself. it: In them many of understood war and conquest was an end Hitler this philosophy was overt, and only blind wishful thinking prevented from from Hitler beginning. And have this the seeing would not us very he he did had the that achieved not reflected a mood and a success German it has long been in that to philosophy society as a whole an extent for rather unfashionable us to admit. So one necessary element in the fifty-year peace that we have enjoyed has long been the destruction German peace that of power; much as the destruction in Napoleonic least the the of part on succeeded wars rested at French power. Those who now fear that a reunited Germany will once Europe threaten are making much the same mistake as those who more his believed that Napoleon III of France would prove a reincarnation of formidable uncle: even if he had the will to do so, French society would no longer provide the armies and the ideology to attempt a reconquest of Europe, and German society is even less likely to do so today. Secondly,

German the destruction power made possible the solution of of World had Second been immediate that the problem the occasion of the had War; that of Germany's democratic borders. if Even a regime eastern Germany been in between if had the wars, and even survived one have dilemma 1945, the effectively recreated after stubborn would how Germans to reconcile the claims of the to territories remained, which heartlands they had learned to regard as their historic with the ethnic for have distribution Poland in to those regions and the need of populations Sudetenland Germans in The the access to the sea. of the problem was These problems were settled - perhaps also one that would not go. away. finally by the application by the Soviet Union, with the tacit approval of Poles from blood iron. Western Bismarckian the and were evicted allies, of Ruthenia Belorussia had Ukraine, they that the regions and of the from Germans 1921, the not only occupied after were evicted, while Silesia Sudetenland West Prussia for the conquered and and regions of from Great but his by Frederick the purely them the and successors, German its lands of East Prussia. It was certainly at realpolilik most Soviet had Union have It the worked possessed not outrageous. would not but to to maintain the power and the will not only enforce such a solution,

10


inflicted by brutal it over two generations had the this until wounds surgery The presence healed. `expellees' in these of millions of with votes a West Germany for it impossible democratic West-German made any for full this to accept settlement a generation, and the government irredentism factor in Soviet this was a very significant making existence of both Czechs. Poles It domination to more acceptable and was only twentyfive years later that a German government came to power that was able, towards to move public support, sufficient acceptance of this with the status quo. settlement and sign treaties effectively recognising German So the peace rested upon the destruction of power and the issue likely the to exercise that of about which she was most settlement in depended That its Soviet turn the on power. continuing occupation of Europe. It is unpleasant it, but that Eastern to have to recognise injustices it involved, the with all appalling occupation, and oppression was factor less in If West had the the a major preserving none post-war stability. back Soviet desirable in the power, as we considered successfully rolled so 1950s, it would only have uncovered the all these traditional problems; German power again to the Baltic, the revival of the historic extension of Poles Germans, Germans I Czechs. That, of against antagonisms against it British think, was well recognised within this building, and perhaps made in democratic the status quo than advocates policy more acquiescent of human have Chamberlain been Neville has and rights values would wished. for his criticised tactless reference, during the Munich understandably crisis, between `far away people of whom There know to quarrels nothing'. we resentment that we should have fought was, and remains, to allegedly independence Poland in Germany the preserve of to against only acquiesce by an equally evil regime. But the her subordination fact sad was that after 1945 there was no desire whatever in this country to go to war to redress injustices in Eastern Europe even if there had been the capacity; and the knew this very well. British government Can

it be said therefore Soviet power was that, in spite of appearances, factor in Europe of stability really a post-war and that we should now The is be, best, jury The this? to answer must at recognise only up a point. but be Stalin that to a good case can made still out, was quite prepared in division Europe have lived happily the of and would quite with acquiesce less from The Soviet from trouble than arose perhaps this solution. strength States Unless United be West-European the to could persuaded weakness. balance, the ugly geo-political fact of Soviet become part of the European bound to evoke constant alarm and apprehension among the power was Western Europe, have done divided and would nations of so weakened and far friendly in hands been it had if the more and co-operative of a even friendly It it As the nor neither co-operative. regime was was was, regime. in West instantly the that parties communist were the patron of powerful immensely from directions, Soviet and who profited political responsive to in their countries. and economic confusion weakness the post-war political


It was in Stalin's interests to keep Western Europe weak and divided, and he had the capacity to do so. It rapidly became clear that the nations of by interests Western Europe their only an unprecedented could protect degree of mutual co-operation, and military; and that such coeconomic, be impossible, insufficient, indeed the committed without operation would States. United With instant the their acceptance of the offer of support of into Aid, and the patient ground-work Marshall that went the creation of NATO, diplomats in keep the British their really earned statesmen and foundations for creating the a stable peace. formal had With the establishment NATO, though of even no settlement been reached, a balance of power was established that provided both sides framework for development the peaceful with a of their own societies. When the balance was threatened, it was to be in consequence not of Western but of Soviet fears. The forces Allied presence of and a for democratic in factor West Berlin destabilising regime was a constantly Soviet Germany building East it the control of until was sealed off with the led Berlin Wall in 1961. Fears for Pact Warsaw to the solidity of the of the Soviet bloody invasion Hungary in 1956, and the crushing the of of Czechoslovakia intervene. in 1968, but neither event provoked West to the With nuclear weapons now in the armouries of both sides, the stakes were In high: balance had become balance any too the of power of terror. a been destinies had former to Europe now event, the of the great powers of large a extent taken out of their own hands. They were now protectorates fate States United Soviet Union, their and of the or satellites of the The depended decisions in Washington Moscow. task of taken on and Western diplomats hostile handle and suspicious was now not so much to a Soviet Union to and themselves as to cement good relations among for whom influence the policies of their friendly Superpower Superpower -a in Europe, important, be however a considered was only one region to global confrontation. long peace was thus bought at a price, and one that some critics have lamented Some have hand the militarisation thought excessive. on the one development and above all of our societies, the of a `cold war mentality', believing in had consequence; the risk of nuclear to accept war that we Others, different at a that all this endangered rather than stabilised peace. have of our cold-blooded the complained end of political spectrum, from better little Eastern Europe that than to a regime abandonment of had But it. Both had the good cases. tried to rescue groups which we however by carried with well-intentioned, policies advocated such critics, the structure them the risk of destabilising on which the entire post-war West's by been had the capacity and weakening system erected - the one by from defend itself, a violent reaction the other provoking an will to kind of maintaining a condition was good-will any adversary whose minimal Between intercourse these unacceptable at all. alternatives of effective our leaders have had to navigate, without really having any objective other than The

12


keep them to the ship afloat. When suddenly the mists lifted to avoid and in destination in whose very existence they had there appeared sight a and hardly dared to hope, they were as surprised as anyone else. None the less do. knew to they exactly what If there is a parallel with the events of 1814-15, it is to be sought, not in 1945-46, but in 1989-90, East West last the when statesmen of and at basis to together make a settlement came on a of genuine understanding justice: but Germany a to the community restoring united chastened and of defining frontiers Eastern Europe, the now accepted powers, of and Russia including a now co-operative as a guarantor of the new settlement. history it is hard to find so signal an In the entire annals of diplomatic disputes had that torn the of of rapid and sensible settlement example for best But just the could so rapid and part of a century. a apart continent have been if had been by the achieved not prepared so ground settlement long, and so unjust, a peace?

13


Sir Michael

Howard

Professor of War Studies at King's College, London and Chichele Professor Regius Professor History War the of and successively of Oxford. Robert Modern History Appointed A Lovett Professor at of of Naval History Yale. President Military at and co-founder of the and include: The Institute for Strategic Studies. Publications International Franco-Prussian War (1961); The Theory and Practice of War (1965); The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (1967); Studies in War and Peace (1970); Grand Strategy - vol. IV in UK History of the Second World War (1971); The Continental Commitment (1972); War in European History (1976); War and the Liberal Conscience(1978); The Causes of War (1983); ClausewitZ (1983); Strategic Deception in World War H (1990) and The Lessons of History (1991). Formerly

14


i nis

collection Commonwealth

and Majesty's

of

documents Office

Government.

is

The

freedom

customary documents.

from

in

the

published Editors

the

foreign Her of

archives of the by authorisation have

selection

been and

SERIES

1 (1945-1950)

Conference

Potsdam, at

the

accorded

arrangement

of

Published Volume

I

The

Volume

II

Conferences

July----August

Conversations

and

1945:

Washington

Moscow and America: Negotiation August-December

Volume

III

Britain States

and Loan,

Volume

IV

Britain Food,

America: Atomic Energy, and December 1945 July 1946

Volume

V

Germany December

Volume

VI

Eastern

Volume

VII

The United Organisation,

Western

and 1945 Europe,

August

Nations: January

1945

of 1945

London,

Bases

Europe,

1945-April

United

the

and

August-

1946

Iran, Cold War and 1946-January 1947

World

SERIES II (1950-1955) Published I Volume

The

Schuman

Western December

Plan,

the

European 1952

Volume

II

The London

Volume

III

German 1950

Volume

IV

Korea,

Europe of

Integration,

Conferences,

Rearmament,

June

Council

1950-April

May

January-June

and

1950-

1950

September-December

1951

In preparation

Volume

V

Germany

Volume

VI

The Middle

Free lists Titles of Majesty's Stationery London SW8 5DR.

European and

(state Office,

East,

Security,

1952--1954

1951-1953

subject/s) are HMSO Books,

available 51 Nine

from Her Elms Lane,


cNv.

Drplomaey

and

W

Diplomatists

in the 20th

Century

No. 9 DBPO:

Publishing

Policy

Practice and

No. 10 United

Kingdom,

United

Nations

divided and

Foreign and Commonwealth ISBN 0 903359 61 8

Office

world,

1946


1945-1995 – Fifty Years of European Peace