Uncommon Valor: The 75th Anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima

The 75th Anniversary of the Battle of

UNCOMMON VALOR

116th Congress 2D Session

H. RES. 857 Recognizing the 75th anniversary of the amphibious landing on the Japanese island of Iwo Jima during World War II and the raisings of the flag of the United States on Mount Suribachi.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES February 13, 2020 Mr. Calvert (for himself, Mr. Visclosky, Mr. Pence, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Bergman, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Cook, and Mr. Gallego) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

RESOLUTION Recognizing the 75th anniversary of the amphibious landing on the Japanese island of Iwo Jima during World War II and the raisings of the flag of the United States on Mount Suribachi.

Whereas, following the surprise attack by Japanese forces on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the United States formally declared war on the Imperial Government of Japan on December 8, 1941; Whereas during the four years that followed the attack, the United States and allied forces fought a prolonged counterattack against Japanese advances across the Pacific region; Whereas the tactic of attacking, defeating, and controlling Japanese-held outposts through the use of amphibious assault landings against Japanese-held islands and territories (referred to in this preamble as “island hopping”) became crucial to successfully countering Japanese advances throughout the Pacific region; Whereas the goal of this island hopping was to secure airfields and supply bases – (1) in order to launch aerial bombardment attacks against the mainland of Japan using the new Boeing B–29 Superfortress; and

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(2) in preparation for, and in anticipation of, a United States invasion of Japan; Whereas, by early 1945, the United States and allied forces bravely fought and advanced to the island of Iwo Jima, an 8-square-mile volcanic island with 3 strategic airfields, located between the Mariana Islands and Japan; Whereas Iwo Jima was – (1) a strategic island with airfields to support bombers of the United States with fighter escorts; and (2) an essential base for emergency, refueling, and diversionary landings for B–29 bombers; Whereas, under the command of Japanese Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Iwo Jima was a heavily fortified island with nearly 11 miles of underground and networked tunnels, rooms, bunkers, artillery emplacements, ammunition dumps, and pillboxes supporting more than 21,000 Japanese soldiers; Whereas, on February 19, 1945, under the leadership of United States Navy 5th Fleet Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and United States Marine Corps V Amphibious Corps Major General Harry Schmidt, with 3d Division Major General Graves B. Erskine, 4th Division Major General Clifton Cates, and 5th Division Major General Keller E. Rockey, the United States launched an amphibious landing and assault on Iwo Jima that culminated with the engagement of more than 70,000 members of the United States Marine Corps, buttressed by thousands of members of the United States Navy and the United States Army serving as assault, garrison, and support forces (referred to in this preamble as the “Battle of Iwo Jima”); Whereas the Marines who fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima overcame numerous disadvantages in the 36day battle that included treacherous terrain, unfavorable weather conditions, and heavy enemy fire from an embedded, determined, and fierce Japanese fighting force in places immortalized by members of the United States Marine Corps, including the “Meat Grinder” and “Bloody Gorge”; Whereas, on February 23, 1945, only 5 days into the Battle of Iwo Jima, members of the United States Marine Corps ascended the highest point on the island, Mount Suribachi, and raised the flag of the United States two separate times, and the second flag raising resulted in the iconic, Pulitzer Prize-winning image that – (1) was captured on film by photographer Joe Rosenthal; (2) has become a recognized symbol of determination, perseverance, and struggle; and (3) has been memorialized as the United States Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, Virginia; Whereas the Battle of Iwo Jima, one of the bloodiest battles in the history of the Marine Corps, resulted in more than 26,000 American casualties, including more than 6,800 killed; Whereas most of the more than 20,000 estimated Japanese soldiers that fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima were killed, with only approximately 1,083 Japanese soldiers surviving at the conclusion of the campaign;

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Whereas the Battle of Iwo Jima led to 22 members of the United States Marine Corps and 5 members of the United States Navy receiving the Medal of Honor, representing – (1) the most Marines ever to receive the highest military decoration in the United States for a single battle; and (2) more than a quarter of all members of the United States Marine Corps to receive the decoration during World War II; Whereas the secured airfields on Iwo Jima became emergency landing locations for 2,400 B–29 Bombers, saving the lives of an estimated 24,000 flight crewmen; Whereas, 160 days after the end and victory of the pivotal Battle of Iwo Jima, the United States received the unconditional surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945; Whereas the world owes a debt of gratitude to the Marines who selflessly led the fight for the strategic island of Iwo Jima in the middle of the Pacific theater; and Whereas, on March 28, 2020, the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima will be marked by commemorative events on the island of Iwo Jima, organized by the people of the United States and Japan: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the House of Representatives – (1) recognizes the 75th anniversary of the amphibious landing on the Japanese island of Iwo Jima that began on February 19, 1945, and ended on March 26, 1945; (2) commemorates the iconic and historic raisings of the flag of the United States on Mount Suribachi that occurred on February 23, 1945; (3) honors the Marines, sailors, soldiers, army air crew, and coast guardsmen who fought bravely on Iwo Jima, including the thousands of Japanese soldiers who defended the island; (4) remembers and venerates the servicemembers who gave their last full measure of devotion on the battlefield; (5) recognizes that the Allied victory in the Battle of Iwo Jima – (A) was led by the United States Marine Corps; and (B) made possible the defeat of the Empire of Japan in World War II; (6) affirms the immortal words of Admiral Chester Nimitz, who stated that “uncommon valor was a common virtue” of those servicemembers who fought on Iwo Jima; (7) reaffirms the bonds of friendship between the United States and Japan; (8) encourages the people of the United States to honor the veterans of the Battle of Iwo Jima with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities; and (9) honors the service and sacrifice of the men and women who serve the United States today, carrying on the proud tradition of the individuals who came before them.

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CONTENTS WHY IWO JIMA?......................... 10 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLAND, THEN AND NOW

INTERVIEW: CHARLES W. LINDBERG............84

By Craig Collins

IWO JIMA FIRST FLAG-RAISER

ACROSS THE PACIFIC................ 18

Interview by Bob Yehling, with Chuck Oldham

STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF “ISLAND-HOPPING”

THE YOUNG MARINES ON IWO JIMA............................. 90

By Craig Collins

by YM/Sgt. Maj. Megan Lynch

OPERATION DETACHMENT........ 26

MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES............ 94

THE STRATEGY

By David Steele

THE LANDING............................ 36 FROM THE BEACHES TO SURIBACHI’S PEAK

By David Steele

LIFE ON THE ISLAND................48 LIFE AS A FIGHTER OR NONCOMBATANT WAS DREARY, FRIGHTENING, HEROIC – AND SOMETIMES HUMOROUS.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW

by Scott R. Gourley

U.S. MARINES.......................... 104 YESTERDAY AND TODAY

By J.R. Wilson

The 75th Anniversary of the Battle of

By David Steele

THE LONGEST MONTH.............. 52 FROM THE AIRFIELDS TO THE SEA

UNCOMMON VALOR

By David Steele

EDITORIAL

OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION

UNCOMMON VALOR WAS A COMMON VIRTUE...................... 62

Consulting Editor: Maj. Fred C. “Flash” Lash, USMC (Ret.) Editor in Chief: Chuck Oldham Managing Editor: Ana E. Lopez Senior Editor: Rhonda Carpenter

Chief Operating Officer: Lawrence Wayne Roberts VP, Business Development: Robin Jobson Business Development and Marketing: Damion Harte Manager, Sales and Marketing Systems: Art Dubuc III Accounting Manager: Joe Gonzalez Marketing Intern: Emily Falcone

SOME HEROES OF IWO JIMA

By Dwight Jon Zimmerman

INTERVIEW: HERSHEL “WOODY” WILLIAMS................. 70 BATTLE OF IWO JIMA MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENT

By Chuck Oldham

THE TWO FLAG-RAISINGS.........76 THE STORY OF THE FIRST AND SECOND FLAGRAISINGS ON MOUNT SURIBACHI

By Dwight Jon Zimmerman

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLAND, THEN AND NOW

BY CRAIG COLLINS

B

y the summer of 1944, the war in the Pacific was clearly being won by the United States and its allies, who, emboldened by the decimation of Japanese naval and air forces at the Battle of Midway two years earlier, had driven Japanese forces

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from most of their island strongholds.

Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) Adm. Chester W. Nimitz had led the Allied Pacific Ocean Areas command in wresting the island of Guadalcanal from the Japanese and driving up through the

Solomon Islands to Bougainville. Joint Army and Marine Corps amphibious assaults had routed the Japanese from the Gilbert and Marshall Islands chains. Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, was on the

U.S. NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND PHOTO

WHY IWO JIMA?

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

threshold of recapturing the Philippine Islands after leading forces along the northeast coast of New Guinea and to nearby islands, isolating and enfeebling key Japanese installations.

U.S. forces crept yet closer to the Japanese mainland from July through August of 1944, when soldiers and Marines, with support from the Navy, broke Japan’s last line of island defenses guarding the approaches to the home islands from the south: the Mariana Islands, about 1,500 miles south of Tokyo. The capture of the Marianas put the Japanese archipelago well within range of the Army Air Corps’ new heavy bomber, the massive B-29 Superfortress, a 99-footlong, four-engine aircraft capable of carrying four tons of bombs a total of 3,500 miles.

The Twentieth Army Air Force, commanded

by Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, was established in April 1944 specifically to perform the strategic bombardment of Japan.

Even as fighting continued in the Marianas, Army engineers and Navy construction battalions began carving 3-mile-long runways from the jungles of Tinian, Saipan, and Guam to accommodate the B-29. Air access to Japan from the Marianas was impeded, however, by a chain of more than

Opposite page: Gen. Douglas MacArthur, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz on board USS Baltimore (CA 68), at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, July 26, 1944. While Roosevelt was determined to achieve the unconditional surrender of the Japanese, MacArthur and Nimitz differed on how to achieve that outcome. Above: 29th Bombardment Group B-29s at North Field, Tinian, 1945. Iwo Jima constituted a danger to B-29 raids on the Home Islands, first because Japanese fighter aircraft were based there, and second, even when raids navigated courses to stay out of range of the island’s aircraft, radar on Iwo Jima could warn defenses that raids were on their way.

3,000 islands and islets, collectively known as the Nanpo Shoto, studding the ocean approach north. The largest of these were generally concentrated in the Bonin and Volcano Island groups, between 600 and 700 miles south of Tokyo – and shortly after the Allied capture of the Marianas, the XXI Bomber Command, the strategic bombing unit flying out of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, discovered that one of these islands was a serious annoyance.

Iwo Jima, a barren island of about 8 square miles almost exactly halfway between Tokyo

and the Marianas, was unusually flat for a volcanic island, mostly barren, and smelly, due to the high sulfur content of the soil. The island’s lone topographical feature, at its southern tip, was a 556-foot-high dormant volcano known as Mount Suribachi. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, writing in the Marine Corps Gazette, later described Iwo Jima as “a bad-smelling, burnt pork chop of an island.”

The island’s size and flat terrain allowed for the construction of large airfields, from which Japanese interceptors could set forth to harass or bring down enemy aircraft. This forced the XXI Bomber Command’s B-29s to make dog-leg detours on their way to and from the Japanese mainland, increasing the already considerable round-trip distance.

Even with this detour, the huge formations of giant aircraft were impossible to conceal from radar surveillance on Iwo Jima, allowing the island to give the home islands plenty of time to prepare for incoming bomb attacks. Attempts to disrupt and destroy the island’s capabilities proved futile: From August to October, the 11th and 30th Bomber Groups flew nearly 50 separate missions against Iwo Jima. Damage to Iwo’s runways was easily repaired, however, and

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WHY IWO JIMA? Captured airfields on Iwo Jima also permitted the P-51 Mustang to operate against the Japanese Home Islands escorting B-29s. These P-51s are tagging along with a B-29 Superfortress to navigate the long way back to their base at Iwo Jima in 1945.

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The manpower and logistics required to conquer Formosa – an island of 13,890 square miles, occupied by more than 6 million people – and then to invade and hold the China coast was prohibitively large, a massive mobilization that was likely to involve months of additional preparation.

Nimitz proposed an approach that he considered to involve less risk, with at least the same probability of success: The Central Pacific attack would shift northward, against Iwo Jima, in early 1945, and then against Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyu chain in the spring.

Both plans required unchallenged control of the skies over Japan and the thousands of miles of ocean approaches to the mainland.

The Joint Chiefs envisioned months of strategic air bombardment of Japanese military installations and industrial centers before any invasion was mounted.

In early October 1944, Nimitz traveled to CINCPAC headquarters in San Francisco and persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to abandon the Formosa/China plan in favor of the Iwo Jima/Okinawa plan. The resulting order outlined the course of the war’s conclusion: MacArthur would seize and occupy Luzon, the largest and most populous island in the Philippines, in December, with cover and support from Nimitz’s Pacific Area Command. After that, Nimitz would occupy one or more positions in the Bonin-Volcano Islands Group, and then continue on toward Okinawa and the Ryukyus. Once these objectives had been achieved, both commanders would coordinate resources and manpower between themselves, the Twentieth

A FORTRESS AND A SYMBOL Another Allied benefit to the capture of Iwo Jima wasn’t often discussed during strategic planning, but was nevertheless an unspoken truth that couldn’t be ignored: The invasion of this island would strike a serious blow to the Japanese enemy’s morale. Iwo Jima was Japanese soil, administered by the prefecture of Tokyo. Unlike many of the islands then under Japanese control, such as the Philippines, it had been Japanese for as long as any could remember. A little more than a thousand people lived there, farming what little would grow in the sulfurous soil (rice had to be imported from the mainland) and operating a sugar mill and sulfur refinery.

The fall of the Marianas in the summer of 1944 shocked the Japanese. The islands, home to the primary administrative headquarters of all Japanese forces in the Western Pacific, had been known as the “Pearl Harbor of Japan.” It was no longer possible to pretend Japan was playing offense in pursuit of imperial ambitions. It was fighting for survival, and Iwo Jima provided an important warning beacon for the approach of incoming bombers.

ROBERT F. DORR COLLECTION PHOTO

the commander of the Iwo Jima garrison, Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi, had built a complex of armored fortifications and tunnels that prevented heavy losses of people or equipment.

America’s strategic aims in World War II – and in particular its policy toward Japan – had been articulated unequivocally by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The president considered the World War I armistice – in which the Central Powers merely agreed to stop fighting, rather than surrender to the Allies – to have been a significant factor in Germany’s post-war military resurgence. In winning this second world war, Roosevelt insisted on the total and unconditional surrender of the Axis enemies. In his “Day of Infamy” address to Congress the day after the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt made it plain that the American people would “win through to absolute victory” and “make very certain that this form of treachery will never endanger us again.”

It was in the fall of 1944 that the balance of opinion among American military leaders began to tip in favor of one of two competing ideas for achieving this outcome. The first, favored by MacArthur and Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, was to continue the drive through the Southwest Pacific, recapture the entire Philippine archipelago (in fulfillment of MacArthur’s “I shall return” pledge), invade and capture Formosa (present-day Taiwan), and land a million-man force on the China coast, from which Allied forces could launch their final assault on the Japanese mainland.

Army Air Force, and the China-Burma-India theater for the final bombardment and invasion of Japan. The Joint Chiefs’ order didn’t specify which island Nimitz should take in the Bonin-Volcano group, merely that it be capable of supporting several airfields.

There was only one island in the group that fit the description: Iwo Jima.

Capturing Iwo would allow the XXI Bomber Command’s B-29s to fly closer to Japan without being detected, and the island was large enough to provide a base for the bombers’ long-range escorts, P-51 Mustangs, which could be stationed there to meet the bombers halfway and provide protection. The island would also provide an emergency landing haven for crippled B-29s trying to return to base after being hit by anti-aircraft artillery or interceptors over the mainland. If Iwo Jima became a regular stopover on return flights, the bombers would be able to carry less fuel and more bombs.

WHY IWO JIMA?

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Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP), and Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LVT) carry Marines to Iwo Jima on the day of the invasion. The great cost of the invasion and capture of Iwo Jima in Marine Corps casualties provoked controversy even while the war was still being waged.

manpower to around 23,000 defenders, set up artillery and machine guns all over the island, and redoubled construction of underground tunnels and strongholds, fortified caves, blockhouses, and pillboxes. There were 80 fighter aircraft stationed on the island when he arrived. Kuribayashi dismissed all but four – perhaps his clearest signal that Iwo Jima’s strategic importance to the Japanese had undergone a transformation.

Kuribayashi’s aim wasn’t to hold the island, which he understood to be impossible. After the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in June 1944 – probably the largest naval battle in the history of the world – Japan had virtually no navy left to prevent the Allies from landing as many invaders as they chose on Iwo Jima’s beaches. Kuribayashi’s

battle plan, a departure from the usual Japanese methods for meeting an invasion from the sea, reflected the importance of Iwo Jima as a Japanese island, emblematic of Japanese pride: knowing he and his men would not survive the battle, Kuribayashi devised a plan to transform Iwo Jima from a radar and air station into an impregnable fortress, anchored by the seven-story labyrinth of Mt. Suribachi. His aim was to make the capture of Iwo Jima a grueling battle of attrition that would weaken the enemy and delay its advance toward the Japanese Home Islands.

IWO JIMA RECONSIDERED Behind all the superlatives used to describe the Battle of Iwo Jima is a peculiarity that is rare, if not unique, in military history: It could be argued that in its bloody outcome, both adversaries achieved their objectives.

The Marines took the island. While the fighting was still raging, Dinah Might – a B-29 crippled on a bombing raid against

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

After losing the Marianas, Japan’s Emperor Hirohito finally decided he was through taking advice from his premier, Hideki Tojo.

Tojo believed the Americans were soft and would not be able to stomach a long and costly war, but would rather sue for peace and allow Japan to keep most of its Pacific empire. This was in fact the strategic aim of the attack on Pearl Harbor, an idea vigorously pushed by Tojo: to preemptively start a war the Americans wouldn’t want to finish.

This Japanese strategy – despite Roosevelt’s vociferous demand of unconditional surrender – had not wavered since Pearl Harbor. But in the summer of 1944 the emperor finally blinked. The Americans and their allies certainly seemed determined to finish off the empire, and they were now a mere 1,500 miles away. Before Tojo fell from power, however, he sent Kuribayashi, one of his best generals, to defend Iwo Jima, which he knew would be key to facilitating Allied air raids against the Japanese archipelago.

Kuribayashi evacuated Iwo Jima’s civilian population, quadrupled the island’s

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

the Japanese mainland – made an emergency landing on Iwo Jima’s Motoyama Airfield No. 1. It was the first of about 2,200 landings to come, that would save an estimated 24,000 airmen’s lives. The capture of Iwo Jima cleared the aerial approach to the Home Islands and paved the way to Okinawa, where soldiers and Marines would invade on April 1, 1945.

But Kuribayashi and his garrison made it as difficult and costly as possible for the Marines to rout the island’s last defenders from fortifications deep within the island’s volcanic rocks. The battle required what was then the largest force of Marines ever assembled.

American military leaders estimated that the island could be taken in about a week; the battle lasted 36 days. Japanese resistance was expected to be tenacious; it was ferocious, and mostly subterranean. Within more than 15 miles of tunnels and caves, Japanese soldiers were blown up, suffocated, and burned by flamethrowers. More than a third of the 80,000 Marines who landed on Iwo Jima were killed or wounded. Only about 200 of the island’s Japanese defenders surrendered or were taken prisoner.

The shocking costs of Iwo Jima led some to second-guess whether the invasion was justified. The book The Ghosts of Iwo Jima,

Dinah Might, the first B-29 bomber to make an emergency landing at Motoyama Airfield No. 1 on Iwo Jima is surrounded by Marines and Seabees, March 4, 1945. Having Iwo Jima’s airfields to divert to in case of damage or emergencies is said to have saved the lives of up to 24,000 flight crew.

by Marine Lt. Col. Robert Burrell, a military historian, is a careful reevaluation of the stated reasons for the battle: to enable a strategic bombing campaign of the Home Islands, followed by an invasion that would result in Japan’s unconditional surrender.

For a number of reasons, this purpose was never fulfilled. Interservice rivalries, Burrell argues, were as influential as strategic concerns in shaping the plan to invade Iwo Jima – and the Marines, whose commandant wouldn’t become a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1978, paid the heaviest price for the invasion.

With the benefit of hindsight, American strategists would have been aware of the two factors that scrambled their plan to invade mainland Japan: first, that the Japanese enemy, nearly to a man, would fight to the death rather than surrender. This happened on Iwo Jima and on Okinawa, where more than 100,000 Japanese soldiers with

no hope of victory either died fighting or by suicide, and only 7,000 surrendered. Taking the Home Islands, then, might have meant having to kill more than 90 percent of Japanese combatants, with countless civilians as collateral damage.

Second, the United States successfully detonated its first atomic bomb at Alamogordo in July 1945.

Wars are planned by people without the gift of foresight, and the resulting strategies are shaded by unconscious inclinations and wishful thinking. To those who aren’t military leaders, charged with avoiding past mistakes, what matters today is this: In early 1945, both the Japanese and the Americans, for important reasons, considered Iwo Jima a crucial battleground, and they fought savagely for it, until there were no defenders left. To remember the battle is to acknowledge the courage and resolve of the men who fought there.

THE REUNION OF HONOR In 1968 – 16 years after it had ended its occupation of the Home Islands – the United States returned the island of Iwo Jima and the other Volcano Islands to Japan. At the time, many of the American Marines

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY LANCE CPL. JAMIN M. POWELL

WHY IWO JIMA?

who’d fought so fiercely for it were upset at the prospect of the Stars and Stripes, so famously raised over Mt. Suribachi in February 1945, being hauled down and replaced by the Japanese flag. For some who fought there, that resentment never faded.

It faded quickly for Lawrence Snowden, a Marine Corps company commander who was wounded on Iwo Jima and continued to serve through the Korean War, during which he spent a week in Kyoto working directly with his counterparts in Japan. He came to admire and respect their service, and his ideas about his World War II enemies began to change. “Those men didn’t want to be there any more than we did,” he said in a 2013 interview. “They were doing their duty.

You don’t hate anybody for that.” As U.S.-Japan relations evolved into a key Asia-Pacific alliance, Iwo Jima’s significance began to evolve as well: It became a symbol of peace and reconciliation.

On Feb. 19, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the day U.S. forces began their assault on Iwo Jima, American and Japanese veterans gathered for a solemn memorial service near the spot where U.S. Marines landed.

During the service, a granite plaque was unveiled. It stands today, its words engraved in English on the beach side; in Japanese on the landward side: On the 40th anniversary of the battle of Iwo Jima, American and Japanese veterans met again on these same sands, this time in peace and friendship. We commemorate our comrades, living and dead, who fought here with bravery and honor, and we pray together that our sacrifices on Iwo Jima will always be remembered and never be repeated.

Ten years later, Lt. Gen. Lawrence Snowden was instrumental in making the

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY SGT. OLIVIA G. ORTIZ

Right: “The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built upon the ultimate sacrifice of brave soldiers who loved their respective countries,” said Mr. Tetsuro Teramoto, president of the Japanese Iwo To Association, during the 73rd Reunion of Honor March 24, 2018, on Iwo Jima, Japan.

The Reunion of Honor is an annual event held to commemorate the sacrifices made by those who served during the Battle of Iwo Jima. Below right: Then-Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert B. Neller, second from left, and Japanese Chief of the Ground Staff Gen. Koji Yamazaki, second from right, pose for a photo with veterans before a ceremony on the island, March 23, 2019.

Neller and other distinguished U.S. and Japanese leaders were there to commemorate the Reunion of Honor during the 74th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Reunion of Honor an annual event, and in encouraging veterans and their families to make the pilgrimage to the island to honor the service and sacrifice of the men who fought on both sides. Every year, Snowden organized the joint ceremony on the island, which is open to the public only once a year, on this day. The 2015 PBS documentary From Combat to Comrades chronicled the return of the only Japanese survivor ever to return to Iwo Jima for the Reunion of Honor, Tsuruji Akikusa. The former radio operator was greeted warmly by his former enemies, including Snowden. It would be Snowden’s last trip to the island; he died at the age of 95 on Feb. 18, 2017 – the day before the 73rd anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Jerry Yellin, an Army Air Forces pilot who flew P-51 escorts from Iwo Jima and returned home suffering from post-traumatic stress and depression, attended his first Reunion of Honor in 2010. As a best-selling author, Yellin had chronicled his own improbable evolution, from a suicidal veteran with a mortal hatred of his Japanese enemy to a

loving grandfather of three Japanese-American children. Yellin, who died several months after Snowden, was among the most emotional proponents of reconciliation. “We human beings, we must join together and love one another,” he said in From Combat to Comrades. “There’s just no other way for us to survive.”

The words of Reunion of Honor attendees make clear that Iwo Jima means something different today – something bigger and more important than the scrubby rock over which two nations fought to the death 75 years ago. It may be in part because of the island’s size, remoteness, and austerity that the enemies in the War in the Pacific, fighting viciously for control of those 8 square miles, could not help but acknowledge the courage and dedication of their adversaries. In a way that wouldn’t be possible in a place such as Pearl Harbor or Hiroshima, Iwo Jima – the only place in the world where former adversaries officially meet to honor each other’s dead – has become an improbable symbol of peace.

ACROSS THE PACIFIC STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF “ISLAND-HOPPING”

U.S. NAVY PHOTO

BY CRAIG COLLINS

Opposite page: “Flat-nose Flossie,” a Landing Ship, Tank (LST), unloads a Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) on the beach at Iwo Jima, Feb. 19, 1945. Specialized ships and vehicles like the LST and LVT were a vital part of United States tactics in the Pacific war. Right: The Pacific Fleet’s battle line burns at Pearl Harbor. War Plan Orange’s original incarnation, where the fleet would sail for a decisive battle with the Japanese after which the Philippines would be relieved, was rendered moot by the attack. It was replaced by War Plan Rainbow 5, based in large part on a pre-war strategy developed by Marine Corps visionaries.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

A

merican planning for a war against Japan began as early as 1897, amid rising tensions over the state of the Hawaiian islands, where thousands of Japanese worked in the sugar industry. In 1898, stirred by a wave of nationalism arising from the Spanish-American War, the United States annexed Hawaii over vigorous Japanese protests, and its victory over Spain gave it possession of new territories: the Philippine islands and Guam, one of the Mariana Islands, about 1,600 miles south of Tokyo. From the start, American leaders understood and were troubled by the vulnerability of these new possessions, which were separated from the continental United States by more than 8,000 miles of ocean. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt called the Philippines “our heel of Achilles.”

As an Entente Power of World War I, Japan was crucial in securing Pacific and Indian Ocean sea lanes against the Imperial German Navy, and during the war seized Germany’s island colonies in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands. Japan emerged from the war a modern industrial state and a great geopolitical power, and its occupation of the Northern Marianas established a ring of Imperial outposts around Guam.

American war plans of that period adopted the code name of the probable enemy, and the early plan for a hypothetical war with Japan, designated the Orange plan, called for the Army to defend the Philippines until the Navy could send reinforcements across the Pacific, where a decisive naval battle, reminiscent of World War I’s Battle of Jutland, would determine the outcome of the war.

The role of the Marine Corps, which had landed at Guantanamo Bay to establish a coaling station for U.S. Navy ships during the Spanish-American War, was not well defined in the early Orange plan; traditionally, Marine units had been deployed to occupy and defend forward naval bases. Two

Marine intelligence officers, Maj. Dion Williams and Capt. Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis, began to study the plan and envision a role for Marines in a Pacific conflict.

Ellis was among the first to recognize that Japan’s new outposts made it likely, if war broke out in the Pacific, that both the Philippines and Guam would fall almost immediately, before reinforcements could arrive.

Marine Corps units and Army troops would face the task of attacking and seizing Japanese bases in the Pacific – in the Marshalls, Carolines, Marianas, and Philippines.

Ellis wrote a plan to systematically reduce Japan’s presence in the Marshall Islands, titled “Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia.” His theories, which were limited by the equipment and ordnance then available to the U.S. military, called for the amphibious assault of these islands, with fire support from naval warships. His plan constituted the first attempt at an amphibious assault doctrine and strategy. While the amphibious Allied campaigns of the Pacific would look much different from those he envisioned, Ellis’ plan revolutionized the role of fleet Marines: Instead of defending advance bases, they would attack and seize them from the enemy, with the support of military technology including submarines and aircraft – both of which were relatively new to the world. By the mid-1930s, the Marine Corps had developed an amphibious operations doctrine and had established the Fleet Marine Force, designed explicitly for amphibious assault.

The U.S. war plan that emerged in 1941, after Pearl Harbor, was the Rainbow 5 plan,

which called for the United States to defeat Germany before focusing its attention on Japan. The strategy for Japan’s defeat was a two-pronged offensive that integrated some elements of Ellis’s plan. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Southwest Pacific Area, would isolate the Japanese stronghold on Rabaul Island, in what is now Papua New Guinea, by advancing along the northern coast of New Guinea, while Adm. William “Bull” Halsey would seize the island of Guadalcanal and drive along the Solomon chain toward New Guinea. Meanwhile Adm. Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, would lead the Central Pacific Campaign, beginning at the equator and routing Japanese troops from the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana islands, gradually advancing toward the Japanese mainland.

LOGISTICS: BUILDING THE FLEET TRAIN Projecting and sustaining American military might across the vast distances of the Pacific presented a significant challenge.

American naval planners estimated, after World War I, that a fleet of warships lost about 10 percent of its combat power for every 1,000 miles it operated away from its base. Driving Japanese defenders from island strongholds and advancing toward mainland Japan would require U.S. forces to travel 5,000 to 7,000 miles from the closest naval station at Pearl Harbor; engage and defeat the Japanese naval defenders at sea; overwhelm land-based defenders

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U.S. NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND PHOTO

with amphibious assault forces; design and build bases, airstrips, and seaports on captured islands; and defend these bases from enemy recapture.

While force projection doctrine and the American war machine ramped up to produce the ideas and hardware the military would need to pull this off, it quickly became clear that the challenge the U.S. military confronted in the Pacific was largely one of logistics – the science of moving, supplying and maintaining military forces. Just days after Pearl Harbor, American forces on Wake Island surrendered to Japanese invaders after an American relief expedition, hindered by refueling problems and a lack of modern oilers, was called off. Operation Bobcat, the first deployment of U.S. forces to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor, was a joint Army-Navy task force sent from the East Coast, through the Panama Canal, to construct a naval fueling base on Bora Bora, in the South Pacific territory of French Polynesia. The up-front challenges of this operation – securing shipping assets and converting them to military use; assembling men and materiel; identifying cargo; finding adequate loading facilities – were prelude to the troubles and delays the task force encountered after arriving in mid-February 1942. The most infamous of these became evident when personnel discovered that the heavy tractors and trucks needed to unload the five transport ships had been the first items loaded stateside – meaning they were stowed deep in the ships’ holds beneath the 20,000 tons of supplies they were meant to unload. For the 52 days

Vought Kingfisher floatplanes of Detachment 14, Scouting Squadron Two (VS-2) dispersed in the trees on Bora Bora during July-August 1942.

While the concept of seizing advance island bases and using them as airfields and logistics bases was sound, Operation Bobcat, in accomplishing this on Bora Bora, proved there were many kinks to work out in turning theory into practice.

it took to correct this and other mistakes, the transports and their escorts were sitting ducks, idling off the coast of Bora Bora – which, fortunately, was never attacked by the Japanese and served as a vital fuel facility for Allied ships crossing the Pacific.

The comically bad logistics of Operation Bobcat provided the wake-up call the military needed to develop and refine the Allies’ devastating amphibious campaigns.

The scope and timing of many Allied operations in the Pacific were influenced by the availability of supplies and equipment, particularly of shipping and landing craft, but despite these setbacks, the Allied victory is today largely attributed to the superior logistics of American planners.

One of the grand logistic achievements of World War II was the establishment of the fleet train, the lifeline of the Pacific Fleet, which at its peak consisted of 358 ships: freighters, oilers, escort carriers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and tugs. This was accelerated by the creation of an At Sea Logistics Service Group (ASLSG), a floating supply base complete with tenders, repair ships, and concrete barges. The ASLSG

provided a nerve center for Navy logistics and underway replenishment (UNREP). The capacity ultimately achieved by the Fleet Train is staggering: The invasion of Okinawa, for example, was aided by the underway delivery of more than 10 million barrels of fuel oil; more than 320,000 barrels of diesel; more than 25 million gallons of aviation fuel; nearly a thousand replacement aircraft, and more than 15,000 bags of mail.

Nimitz established a basic charter for joint logistics in the Pacific, outlining a supply policy for advance bases. Operationally, this policy reached a pinnacle of complexity and efficiency under the Tenth Army’s Island Command, led by Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace. The command, which consisted of more than 150,000 personnel at its peak, was a huge multi-service organization including combat, engineer, anti-aircraft, military government, communications, and supply units. By the end of the Okinawa invasion, Island Command had built 18 airstrips, 164 miles of road, supplied 183,000 troops from all services, and administered military government to nearly 200,000 people on the island.

On islands where there was a large joint base – such as Guam, which provided an Army air base as well as the western Pacific’s principal naval base – Army engineer troops were largely responsible for building Army facilities, and Navy construction battalions – Seabees – for Navy facilities, but the unified construction command was so large, and shared so many personnel and resources, that the two branches often built installations together.

By contrast, the appallingly bad logistics of the Japanese military – constrained by the empire’s unswerving vision of a short war that would be concluded with a “decisive battle” and subsequent treaty negotiations – proved the fatal weakness in its strategy to defend the homeland from an extended perimeter of island bases. Sixty percent or more of the 1.74 million Japanese troops who died in the war succumbed to starvation, rather than battle wounds.

The United States and its allies exploited this weakness, and turned the vast distances of the Pacific into an advantage through operations that came to be framed strategically as “island-hopping” or “leap-frogging”: bypassing strongly fortified Japanese garrisons and taking weakly defended islands – by surprise, when possible – and quickly establishing airfields. With Allies dug in

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around them, these strongholds would be cut off and left to “wither on the vine.”

Allied amphibious assaults often followed this strategy: In the North Pacific, after Japan had seized the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu, U.S. and Canadian forces avoided the Kiska garrison and took nearby Attu, cutting Kiska off from the west and forcing the Japanese to evacuate. In the Solomons, the assault on Vella Lavella bypassed the Japanese garrison at Kolombangara; this was followed by landings on Cape Torokina, avoiding the Japanese garrison on Bougainville. Nimitz, overriding the preference of his entire staff, ordered that Kwajalein, in the center of the Marshall Islands group, be seized before attempting assaults on any of the group’s strongly defended atolls. Allied troops under MacArthur, too, adapted this strategy in their overland campaigns through the jungles of New Guinea, bypassing Japanese garrisons on their way toward the Philippines.

The choice to bypass Japanese strongholds often seemed dictated by circumstances,

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rather than grand strategy, and there were notable exceptions: The capture of Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, for example, cost the lives of more than 1,000 Marines, with an additional 2,100 wounded, for an airstrip that proved too short to accommodate U.S. bombers. At the time, Marine forces had captured several nearby islands with minimal casualties, and Seabee battalions had built airfields on them. One hundred miles to the north, for example, a company of 78 Marine reconnaissance scouts, with fire support from the submarine USS Nautilus, seized the island of Abemama, where Seabees built an airfield that B-24 bomber squadrons used to attack Japanese targets in the Marshall Islands. Tarawa was abandoned within months, as operations pushed northward into the Marshalls, where the Allies established a fleet base at Eniwetok. Unfortunately, Tarawa would neither be the bloodiest battle of the Pacific nor the last time the Marines were thrown straight into the teeth of the enemy’s defenses.

The island-hopping strategy required air supremacy, to keep newly established Allied garrisons from becoming isolated themselves. At the outset of the war, American strategists – many of them World War I veterans – envisioned the aircraft carrier as an important supporting element for the battleships that would fight, in the style of Jutland, the war’s decisive naval battles. But carriers quickly superseded the battleship as the Navy’s capital ships. Fleet formations were built around them in units such as the carrier task group, in which battleships were relegated to supporting roles.

In August 1942, the Allies began their Pacific counteroffensive with an amphibious landing at Guadalcanal Island, in the southern Solomons, where a Japanese airfield threatened mainland Australia. In this first combined-arms assault on an island base, the U.S. military demonstrated the basics of how it would win the Pacific. Elite Marine troops landed ashore and drove inland while carrier-based ground-attack aircraft and naval gunfire pounded the enemy. The airfield – named Henderson Field in honor of a Marine bombing squadron commander who died at Midway – was captured quickly, renovated by Seabees, and quickly put into American service, but the battle to hold onto it was a grinding six-month campaign that involved several major land, sea, and aerial battles, ultimately killing or driving out tens of thousands of overextended and undersupplied Japanese troops.

Maintaining air supremacy required the Allies to work fast in rebuilding or constructing airfields, and Seabees were aided by innovations such as Marston matting: lightweight, perforated, interlocking steel planks that provided good traction

NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND PHOTO

NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON AIR, SEA, AND LAND

NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND PHOTO

Left: Seabees use Marston matting to make repairs and complete construction of the airstrip at Henderson Field in Guadalcanal in 1942. The Seabees and Army engineer battalions, and technologies like Marston matting, were key to constructing U.S. bases, supporting the advance across the Pacific. Below left: A Marine Corps F4F Wildcat returns to Henderson Field after a sortie. Once seized, islands became unsinkable aircraft carriers from which Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Forces squadrons carried the fight to the enemy.

NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND PHOTO U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

Right: Despite enemy fire, Marines wade toward shore at Tarawa Island. Landing boats and barges brought them to within 500 yards of the beach, but the coral bottom prevented the boats coming any closer to the shore. LVTs were able to cross the reef and deliver Marines and supplies to the shore, but there were too few and most were knocked out. Casualties were heavy. Below: Much preferred, if possible, over fighting bloody battles for fortified Japanese islands was to bypass them entirely, isolate them by air and sea blockade, and let them “wither on the vine” as in the case of the Japanese bastions on Rabaul and Truk. Here a torpedo hits a Japanese cargo ship during the first day of U.S. Navy carrier air raids on Truk, Feb. 17, 1944.

and drainage and were used to pave airstrips and roads. At Guadalcanal, Seabees built additional airstrips at Koli Point, 6 miles from Henderson Field. The matting enabled U.S. forces to build airfields with astonishing speed, allowing land-based bombers and fighters to isolate bypassed Japanese garrisons by air. After the fleet formations advanced to established new Allied bases, these air forces were supplemented by light naval forces in the often poorly charted waters around these islands, including small motor torpedo boats – which had already proven their value by driving off a Japanese resupply convoy to Guadalcanal in December 1942.

It was the urgent need to protect Australia that had spurred the Guadalcanal invasion; the Allies weren’t really ready for such an undertaking. The Japanese array of naval warfare technology, including its worldclass torpedoes and the Zero fighter aircraft, outclassed its American counterparts.

It wasn’t until 1943 that the Navy introduced the F6F Hellcat, which significantly outmatched the Zero.

Once in control of the Solomons, Allied forces demonstrated the devastating effect of land- and carrier-based aircraft. In the fall of 1943, American, Australian, and New Zealand aviators flew sustained bombing raids from Solomons airfields against the heavily fortified Japanese airfields and port of Rabaul. Their work was soon supplemented by bombers and fighters dispatched from the carrier air groups of the USS Saratoga, Princeton, Bunker Hill, Essex, and Independence. The attacks, which lasted through February 1944, destroyed two of Rabaul’s four airstrips, destroyed dozens of Japanese planes, and left Rabaul an isolated

outpost that posed little danger to Allied operations in the area. In mid-February, Adm. Marc Mitscher’s Task Force 58, comprising four carrier task groups carrying more than 500 planes, launched a massive air and surface attack on Truk Lagoon in the Caroline Islands. With the support of seven battleships and numerous cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, TF58 destroyed 16 Japanese vessels, more than 250 planes, and nearly 200,000 tons of shipping. With Truk’s air defenses decimated, it became, like Rabaul, a toothless outpost, without hope of resupply or reinforcement.

From the earliest days of the Orange plan, the Navy and Marine Corps had been exploring better ways of getting men and

equipment across beaches in amphibious landings. The Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) – the shallow-draft “Higgins boat” that had brought waves of allied troops to the beaches of Normandy – proved crucial to the Guadalcanal landings but nearly useless at Tarawa Atoll, where shallow reefs brought them to a halt and troops were forced to wade ashore under withering fire.

The experimental Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT), the amphibious “Alligator” tractors originally designed for rescues in the Florida swamps and tested as cargo carriers at Guadalcanal, proved capable of traversing the Tarawa reefs, but there weren’t nearly enough. After Tarawa, the Marine Corps reconfigured its assault forces to include

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

Left: Ships of the fighting fleet in December 1944 at Ulithi Atoll, a major staging and logistics base for the U.S. Navy during World War II. At middle, foreground to background, are the aircraft carriers USS Wasp, USS Yorktown, USS Hornet, USS Hancock, USS Ticonderoga, and USS Lexington, with more aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and other warships surrounding them. Bottom: A small part of the U.S. Navy fleet steams along the coast of Leyte island during the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944. While not as warlike and impressive as the “murderers’ row” of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and other warships in the top photo, the ships shown here – transports and cargo ships, oilers, and support vessels – were what kept the fleet moving and fighting.

battalions of armored and cargo LVTs, along with companies of the wheeled amphibious craft, the DUKW (“the Duck”) that had also been used at Normandy. A full range of LVT variants were used in the campaign for the Marshall Islands, and DUKWs were used to cross the coral reefs in amphibious landings at islands such as Saipan and Guam.

A larger variation on the theme of the flat-bottomed Higgins boat, the Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM), was used to bring light tanks ashore during amphibious landings. Since the LVT was a vehicle itself, it was later modified to become an “amtank.”

Troop mobility remained a significant challenge throughout the Pacific campaign, and a number of solutions were created.

The Navy developed a specialized LST, or Landing Ship, Tank, a flat-keeled craft that could be beached to offload tanks, vehicles, cargo, and troops through a bow equiped with huge front doors. Other multipurpose

amphibious craft included the Dock Landing Ship, or LSD, fitted with a well dock to transport and launch landing craft; and two types of attack transports: the APA (troop) and AKA (cargo) transports that carried their own fleet of landing craft aboard.

Marine landing forces often faced fierce resistance from Japanese defenders who were dug into fortified positions. Reducing these defenses without unacceptable losses was a significant challenge. Kinetic weaponry – high-angle artillery, mortars, and pack howitzers – along with light armored vehicles helped to provide fire support from the beaches. But expeditionary forces found guns and rockets to be cumbersome and not as effective as needed for digging Japanese forces out of concrete bunkers, machine gun nests, and pillboxes. A suite of incendiary weapons – napalm bombs and portable or tank-mounted flamethrowers – proved dreadfully effective at dislodging or

dispatching dug-in enemies. Mechanized flamethrowers, mounted aboard both Sherman tanks and LVTs, were used in amphibious operations from Saipan to Okinawa.

The U.S. military’s island-hopping campaigns gave the joint forces an unprecedented opportunity to project power across the globe by land, sea, and air.

The terms “jointness” and “multi-domain operations” are rooted in the strategy and operations that unfolded in the Pacific war against Japan, and despite all that has changed in the 75 years since, the overwhelming successes of the island-hopping campaign offer several lessons that still apply: the importance of balancing offensive power with operational reach (unlike the overextended Japanese); of joint doctrine, training, and operations in multi-domain operations; and of staying on the technological cutting edge with investments in modernization.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy integrates these lessons in anticipating a different kind of multi-domain theater in the Pacific, a region that has reemerged as a 21st-century priority. It may still be true, as MacArthur once told Congress, that the Pacific Ocean and its island chains offer “a protective shield for all the Americas” – but not in the way he originally meant. Today, with Japan as a key regional ally, MacArthur’s statement takes on a significantly different meaning. Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaffirmed this in his visit to Tokyo in November 2019, when he met with Japanese leaders and reaffirmed that a free and fair Indo-Pacific region was “the No.1 regional priority for the United States military.”

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OPERATION DETACHMENT

OPERATION DETACHMENT THE STRATEGY

CREDIT

BY DAVID STEELE

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO

A group of Marines on an Iwo beachhead are organized as preparations are made for movement inland.

The United States followed its successful plan for amphibious assaults on enemy-held islands, while the Japanese countered with a defense entirely different than any they’d attempted before.

T

ake a world map, find the Mariana Islands in the Western Pacific, and draw a line roughly north by northwest from Saipan to Tokyo. If your map is detailed enough, about midway along the line and just to the west, you’ll discover a tiny spit of an island called Iwo Jima.

Like several other small Pacific islands, Iwo Jima would never have attracted the smallest footnote in even the most thorough history books if it weren’t for World War II. Yet Iwo, by virtue of its location, became a critical strategic objective to both the Allies and Japan. Furthermore, its capture exacted one of the bloodiest casualty tolls in Marine Corps history.

That’s a startling fact when you consider how small Iwo Jima really is. It has less than 8 square miles of land; by comparison, Guadalcanal has 2,180, Okinawa 454, Guam 209, and Saipan 45. But for nearly a month in early 1945, every square mile of Iwo Jima was a battleground, every square yard a killing field. To understand why, and how, it’s essential to appreciate what the island meant to both sides.

Despite being just 4 2/3 miles long and 2 1/2 miles wide, Iwo Jima is the largest and most important island in the Volcano Islands chain.

Its shape is most often described as a pork chop, tilting slightly to one side, with the thick end pointing to the northeast, then tapering southwest to a narrow tip.

The highest spot on Iwo Jima is Mount Suribachi, which dominates the southern point. By geographical standards, it is little more than a hill, rising to an elevation of just 554 feet. However, to defending forces, it offered a tremendous open view to the southeastern beaches, which lie immediately below. There’s more high ground to the north, along with rugged terrain pockmarked with fissures, crevices, and ravines. In between the two extremes, the landscape is relatively flat; with a little work, it’s suitable for one or more airfields. Along both sides, black volcanic sand beaches rise sharply into a series of terraces before leveling off; one of those terraces, Chidori Haga, was the final resting place for dozens of Marines in the first hour of the assault.

In Japanese, iwo means sulfur (jima means island), and sulfur vents give the island the unmistakable smell of rotten eggs. The sulfur was one reason the Japanese settled Iwo; the volcanic soil is suitable for growing sugar cane, making a small sugar refining industry possible.

Japan annexed the Volcano Islands in 1887. On Iwo, a village called Motoyama took root. Even though it’s about 660 miles from the island to Tokyo, Iwo Jima is a prefect of Tokyo; technically, it’s a suburb of Japan’s capital.

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That’s more than an incidental point.

As Allied forces recovered from their early losses in World War II, they first had to retake land captured by the Japanese in their brutal war of aggression. The Japanese never ceded it easily at places such as Kwajalein, Tarawa, Bougainville, Peleliu, and Tinian.

With Iwo, they had even more for which to fight. This was their land, the first of the Japanese Home Islands to be assaulted. They also recognized that the fall of Iwo Jima would unlock a critical gateway to subsequent attacks on mainland Japan. “This island is the front line that defends our mainland, and I am going to die here,” Japanese commander Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi told Radio Tokyo prior to the American invasion.

For the Japanese, Iwo Jima had to be defended at any cost. Kuribayashi determined to make Iwo Jima the most formidable fortress and bloodiest defense in his nation’s history.

In his view, it was a matter of national honor – and national survival.

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Pictured from left to right, Capt. William H.P. Blandy, USN; Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill, USN; Lt. Gen. Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, commander of U.S. Marines on the island; and Vice Adm. Richmond K. Turner, commander in chief of U.S. operations on Iwo Jima, examine a scale model of Iwo Jima as they discuss plans for attacking the heavily defended island fortress.

THE AMERICAN PURPOSE For the Allies, there was a more immediate and practical reason to take Iwo Jima away from the Japanese and begin using it themselves. The Mariana Islands had finally been recaptured in the summer of 1944. Almost immediately, squadrons of B-29 Superfortress bombers, an awesome new addition to the U.S. arsenal, began launching from Saipan, Tinian, and Guam to make runs on Tokyo, Yokohama, and other sites in Japan.

The objective was to cripple Japan’s war-making industry and infrastructure,

and the missions were working. But it was a 3,000-mile round-trip flight, which Japanese fighters didn’t make pleasant. From newly built bases at Iwo and elsewhere, they were waiting to ambush the B-29s, sometimes on the inbound trip but more often on the return leg. Any bomber crippled by enemy fire, or plagued by fuel or mechanical problems, had no friendly alternatives. The losses in crews and machines were devastating and couldn’t be sustained indefinitely.

Both the Army Air Corps and Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, decided it was essential to take Iwo. Still, that decision didn’t make an attack a certainty. Gen. George Marshall, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favored an Iwo invasion and had ordered it for early 1945 under the code name Operation Detachment.

However, Gen. Douglas MacArthur opposed the plan, as did Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Ernest J. King, who strongly believed Formosa should be the next stepping-stone to Japan. King planned to change Marshall’s

U.S. NAVY PHOTO

THE LONGEST MONTH

U.S. NAVY IMAGE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO

Right: Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi determined to make Iwo Jima the most formidably defended island America would invade during the Pacific war, and the bloodiest. Below right: One of several sketches prepared by the 31st U.S. Naval Construction Battalion of Japanese tunnel systems and fortifications. The sketch shows the north face and top of Hill 362A on Iwo Jima. Dotted lines indicate the underground Japanese tunnel system. This paled by comparison with the 7 stories of tunnels just within Mount Suribachi. More than 15 miles of tunnels were dug into an 8-square-mile island.

mind, but he didn’t get the support of the on-site commanders, including Army Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner and Millard F. Harmon.

They agreed with Nimitz that an invasion of Iwo followed by a landing on Okinawa were the most logical next steps in the long Central Pacific campaign to bring the war to Japan’s doorstep. It took a candid meeting in October 1944 to decide the issue.

King was convinced. He returned to Washington, consulted with the other Joint Chiefs, and Operation Detachment was on.

JAPANESE PLAN CHANGES The Japanese were unaware of these behind-the-scenes machinations. It was already clear to their strategists that Iwo would one day be an asset and a target. In early 1943, they began improving its offensive and defensive capabilities by building an airstrip, tunnels, gun emplacements, and pillboxes into Iwo’s soft volcanic soil.

These preparations continued into 1944 and included a second airstrip and the start of construction on a third. However, the decision with the most far-reaching consequences came in May 1944. That’s when Japan’s supreme military commander, Gen. Hideki Tojo, named Kuribayashi to take command of Iwo Jima. Tojo told the descendent of the samurai warriors and 30-year army veteran: “Only you among all the generals are qualified and capable of holding this post ... The entire army and the nation will depend upon you for the defense of that key island.”

Like Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, who planned the attack on Pearl Harbor, Kuribayashi had spent a good deal of time in the United States. He had even engaged in some cavalry training at Fort Bliss, Texas, in the 1920s. Like Yamamoto, he clearly understood what a formidable, determined foe the United States would be. Kuribayashi had once written to his wife: “The U.S. is the last country in the world Japan should fight. Its industrial potential is huge and fabulous, and the people are energetic and versatile. One must never underestimate the American fighting ability.”

In June 1944, the 54-year-old Kuribayashi, a former commander of the elite Imperial Guard, arrived on Iwo and almost immediately made a fateful decision. Iwo’s artillery, in accordance with Japanese doctrine, was positioned by Kuribayashi’s predecessors to attack the beaches. A then-classified American military intelligence brief, “Japanese Defense Against Amphibious Operations,” stated the philosophy of this plan, explaining that the Japanese “have a strong aversion to [being on] the defensive,” and that they try to terminate defensive operations by “whittling down the superiority of the enemy until they can revert to the offensive and force a decision by assault.” The document further stated, “Their mission is to annihilate the enemy forces before a landing can be effected, or as soon after the initial landings as possible.”

Kuribayashi countermanded the plan. He did so against the opposition of the more traditional navy and army officers on Iwo. He

ordered the artillery pulled back and hidden at the foot of Mt. Suribachi and elsewhere. He used every ridge, cave, hill, and crevice Iwo gave him. He had learned the lessons taught at Normandy and in the Marianas: You could not stop an invasion on the beaches indefinitely, no matter how strong the defense. Therefore, the Japanese would conserve resources and inflict as much pain on the enemy as possible for as long as possible. “Above all, we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defense of the islands,” he added.

It was a brilliant decision.

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AMERICANS ASSEMBLE INVASION FORCE

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

As Kuribayashi built his defenses, American planners were putting together a massive, seasoned invasion force. There would be 485 ships involved in the invasion, including 12 aircraft carriers, and another 300 offensive and support ships within 100 miles of the Iwo Jima shoreline. This task force, under the overall command of Rear Adm. Raymond A. Spruance and the tactical command of Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, wasn’t just targeting Iwo Jima:

This shelter was captured without damage.

Though sparse in amenities, structures like this offered their Japanese inhabitants one comfort that was not enjoyed by any Marines on Iwo Jima: the protection of thick concrete walls.

It would also launch air attacks on Japan’s major cities.

The Marine assault force on Iwo would have 70,647 men. The senior Marine in the Pacific was Lt. Gen. Holland “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, considered by most to be the foremost military expert anywhere on amphibious landings. A fierce Marine partisan, Smith

Early on, a decision was made to land on Iwo’s eastern beaches, although the water was actually more shallow on the west and the ground slope more gradual.

had not endeared himself to either the Navy or the Army in previous campaigns. Consequently, while Smith had overall command, the Iwo Marines would actually be led by Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, who now headed the V Amphibious Corps (VAC) and had previously commanded the 4th Marine Division.

There would be three Marine divisions – the 3rd, 4th, and 5th – in the landing force.

The 3rd Division was commanded by Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, one of the youngest and among the toughest generals in the Marines. He would be leading forces who had already proven themselves at Bougainville, Guam, and other islands.

Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates was now in charge of the 4th Marine Division. He was a fitting commander for a division that had been in four campaigns in less than a year.

During World War I, Cates had sent a classic message from the front that said simply, “I have no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold.”

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OPERATION DETACHMENT U.S. Army Air Forces B-24 Liberators bomb Iwo Jima, Dec. 15, 1944. This raid of December 15 was one of a series of bombings of the vital Japanese airfields on the island. Mt. Suribachi is the volcano at the lower tip of the island. Allied air attacks hammered the island for 74 days before the actual invasion.

dom. In November, B-24s and B-29s from the Marianas had begun hammering the island, and had been later joined by carrier planes. The attacks had continued for a record 74 days and dropped nearly 6,000 tons of high explosives.

It’s difficult to conceive that any large force – squeezed into 8 square miles – could survive such a sustained pounding and remain battle-ready.

On Iwo Jima, one did.

Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey headed the 5th Marine Division, which had been formed in early 1944 and had yet to see combat. But some 40 percent of its Marines were battle-hardened veterans, and Rockey had also distinguished himself on the battlefields of France in World War I. Early on, a decision was made to land on Iwo’s eastern beaches, although the water was actually more shallow on the west and the ground slope more gradual. However, the east offered better surf conditions, and the Navy preferred the water conditions there for bringing in ships for landing and fire support.

The 3,500 yards of beach were divided into segments: from the south (or left) there was Green, Red 1 and 2, Yellow 1 and 2, and Blue 1 and 2. The 5th Division would come in on the left and the 4th on the right, while the

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3rd Division was held in seagoing reserve.

With an entire ocean of bloody amphibious landings to use as hindsight, the Marines wanted as much bombardment as possible just before the invasion. More than two months before the invasion, intense bombing began. Schmidt then asked for 10 days of withering pre-invasion bombardment from battleships and cruisers.

In one of the most bitterly controversial decisions of the campaign, the request was denied. Turner said that such a bombardment would jeopardize the Navy’s larger mission against Japan. As a result, there would be just three days of pre-landing bombardment.

There’s little question that the decision cost lives. Yet that didn’t mean the Japanese on Iwo would have the luxury of building their defenses in complete free-

Under Kuribayashi’s command, fortification engineers and cave specialists came from Japan and drew up specifications for construction of a cave system that would be the backbone of the Japanese defense. Caves varied in capacity from three men to 300400 men, and were meticulously planned so that frontal shells could not hit their entrances directly. Furthermore, the caves were carved out or reshaped with multiple entrances to permit escape; all were stocked with food and water. Huge amounts of concrete and reinforcing iron were shipped in from Chichi-Jima, the island commanded

by Maj. Yoshitaka Horie that was 150 miles from Iwo Jima. All available scrub oak trees were cut down; additional wood was procured from buildings throughout the island.

The man-made caves were 30-40 feet deep and had stairways, interlaced corridors, and passageways.

Japanese soldier interviews and diaries reveal the bombing and shelling did take a toll. But the work of turning Iwo into an almost impregnable fortress would simply pause and then start anew.

The Japanese and 1,000 Korean laborers dug more than 15 miles of tunnels into the earth. In many places, it was so hot underground that a man could dig for only 5 minutes or so. The tunnels interconnected, providing a latticework of channels that could be used for communications, supplies, and the rapid movement of troops to new fighting positions.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

THE JAPANESE UNDERGROUND SYSTEM

Due to Kuribayashi’s network strategy, which emphasized maximum coverage and crosscoverage of terrain with maximum force, the defenders could fire artillery from any place on the island to any other; the only thing to block it was terrain.

On the surface, more and more pillboxes were added until there were some 800 entrenched around the island. Along with them were 730 major defense installations, 120 guns larger than 75 mm, 130 howitzers, 90 large mortars and rocket launchers, 16 anti-tank guns, 200 20 mm machine guns, and 24 tanks. All installations and weapons armories were connected by tunnels.

The American military intelligence brief “Japanese Defense Against Amphibious Operations,” was very clear as to the difficulty this strategy entailed in prior engagements: “Bombardment was not very effective against these cave positions [on Guam], and it usually was necessary to dislodge the Japanese with demolition procedures, smoke, flame throwers, and grenades.”

Kuribayashi was laying down the gauntlet for a bloody, potentially demoralizing battle. He sensed that his force of 21,000 men had no chance to win the Battle of Iwo Jima, but he would not perish without the ultimate of fights: He ordered each of his men to take 10 American lives in exchange for his own.

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

NEW JAPANESE BEACH STRATEGY The Japanese did not attempt to organize a beach defense. A large number of weapons, sighted to rake the shore line, were emplaced inland. When the Americans landed, they encountered no resistance until precisely 3 minutes later – the time when Kuribayashi predicted that enough Marines would be on the beaches to sufficiently overpopulate them and create confusion in the event of intense gunfire. He also had studied the thick

An infantry battalion from the 3rd Marine Division moving up to the relief of another battalion during the fierce struggle for Iwo Jima.

volcanic sands of the invasion beach, and concluded that mechanized vehicles would bog down – slowing the Americans’ initial movement from the beachhead. Finally, he waited until the lead battalions tried to cross the eastern terrace just beyond the landing lines.

He was right on all counts.

The Japanese opened fire with artillery pieces, rocket launchers, anti-tank guns, and machine guns from Mt. Suribachi.

From the right flank of the plateau-like tableland on eastern beaches came automatic weapons that swept back and forth across undefended beaches. There were also the pillbox installations, made of steel and reinforced concrete – most of which were invisible from the sea. They were situated to flood the beaches with heavy fire.

Due to Kuribayashi’s network strategy, which emphasized maximum coverage and cross-coverage of terrain with maximum force, the defenders could fire artillery from any place on the island to any other; the only thing to block it was terrain.

Every method of classic tactical defense was employed, along with some novelties. For example, aircraft bombs were carefully laid as tank mines. Arrays of mortars were buried up to their tubes, so that one man might reload them all in rapid succession.

“Spider moles” and caves linked to the tunneling system were everywhere, giving the defenders countless places from which snipers could appear, attack, disappear, and attack again from an entirely different location. With months to plan and prepare, overlapping lines of fire could be carefully coordinated, sights set, ranges measured, and troops trained.

The Japanese organized the entire island for defense with available forces, which included 21,000 men representing

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the 109th Infantry Division, Kuribayashi’s outfit; the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, which had five separate battalions; the 145th Infantry; a battalion from the 17th Regiment; the 26th Tank Regiment; and 7,000 navy troops.

U.S. Marines gain a few minutes’ respite from enemy fire by taking shelter in the entrance to a burned and captured Japanese pillbox. Note the effects of hits in the oil drums and the concrete pillbox.

A SAD REALIZATION

COURAGEOUS BATTLE VOW

The landing was set for Monday, Feb. 19. As the task force formed, Howlin’ Mad Smith spent sleepless nights thinking about his Marines who would be lost on Iwo Jima.

He’d looked at the aerial photos. The intelligence was good. He knew how well the Japanese were fortified, and he’d seen what they’d done at Tarawa, where 1,027 Marines had died in four days and only 17 of 4,700 defenders had surrendered.

It would be much worse this time, thought the world’s foremost expert on amphibious landings. He expected 15,000 casualties, an estimate that went far beyond what the theater’s other senior commanders were forecasting.

Sadly, even Smith was too optimistic.

Kuribayashi continued to exhort his forces and prepare them for the coming battle. He had asked for enough men, planes, and ships to hold Iwo indefinitely. He didn’t get them. The inexorable advance of American forces in the Pacific had severely damaged the once-mighty Japanese navy and forced the Japanese high command to leave self-sustaining divisions on each remaining island. Noted an American military intelligence report, “Their localized defense of a particular island is conceived of as an integral part of the strategic perimeter defense of the vast Japanese Empire as a whole. The island divisions are expected to prevent hostile landings, counterattack and destroy such

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hostile beachheads as may be established despite their defenses, and conduct counterlanding operations.”

Also, they were to fight to the death.

Kuribayashi hoped to make the capture of Iwo so costly that the Allies would decline to ever invade Japan. In the pillboxes could be found the “Courageous Battle Vow,” with these closing lines: “Each man will make it his duty to kill 10 of the enemy before dying. Until we are destroyed to the last man, we shall harass the enemy by guerrilla tactics.”

A few Japanese soldiers may have hoped for a reprieve, or at least reinforcements. Kuribayashi’s wife thought her husband might be transferred, considering his status in the army. But the general had no illusions. He spent the few months before the invasion instructing his wife on handling their family affairs, and admonishing his children to get the best possible education. In January he wrote to his wife, “No one here expects to return alive, but we are determined to do our best. Do not plan for my return. Do not be surprised when you hear that I have died.”

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

THE LONGEST MONTH

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

A COMPLETE PREPARATION In size and scope, the assault on Iwo Jima would not compare to the invasion of Europe – Operation Overlord – conducted the previous June.

While both the heroism and losses at Normandy were on a huge scale, the Allied landing force there did have one advantage: The German defenders didn’t know when or where they were landing. There were literally hundreds of miles of beach to fortify and watch. In addition, the Allies went to great lengths to mislead the German high command. Moreover, the senior German commander, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, was absent from Normandy when he was needed most.

In contrast, the soldiers on Iwo Jima were alerted as soon as the amphibious

Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith, commander of the expeditionary troops in the Iwo Jima operation, and his chief of staff, Col. Dudley S. Brown, survey the bogged-down, surf-battered wreckage that marked the landing of the Marines on Iwo Jima. While Navy Adm. Chester W. Nimitz thought Iwo Jima would be taken without a fight, Smith feared the Marines would take up to 15,000 casualties. The reality was far worse.

forces left their ports. They’d recognized the continuous air and naval bombardment as a pre-invasion warning. They could see all their beaches in a single sweep from high ground. Most of all, their determined leader was in place.

As an American report noted after the battle, the preparedness of the Japanese and Kuribayashi’s strategic brilliance set the tone for

Iwo Jima: “The enemy, by continuing to follow his basic defensive tactic of occupying a position and refusing to yield until dug out and killed without counterattacking and without withdrawing, was able to maintain organized resistance for over 20 days ... it is now known that this defense of holding to the end without counterattack or withdrawal was the express plan conceived by Kuribayashi despite the contrary advice of his Chief of Staff, Maj. Horie. It was this simple tactic, coupled with the incredible rocky terrain and the maximum use the enemy had made of this terrain in constructing fortified positions, which made the capture of Iwo Jima so difficult.”

So there could be no offensive surprise nor deception on Iwo. The Japanese knew where the Americans were landing, when they were coming, and how they would wage battle.

Bob Yehling also contributed to this story.

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THE LAN FROM THE BEACHES TO SURIBACHI’S PEAK

CREDIT

BY DAVID STEELE

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DING ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER

The objective was to capture Mount Suribachi and Motoyama Airfield No. 1 on D-day. As the invading Marines quickly learned, the Battle of Iwo Jima was to be an exercise of the most bloody and grueling nature.

A wave of Marines begins its drive inland toward Japanese positions at the base of Mt. Suribachi on D-day.

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S

uribachi. It has become such a legendary landmark that it rises, in the mind’s eye, majestically into the sky.

In reality, Iwo Jima’s Mt. Suribachi is only 554 feet tall, roughly the same height as the Washington Monument. There’s nothing beautiful about this dormant volcano as it squats, in one writer’s words, “toad-like” at the southern tip of the pear-shaped island.

To the Marines charged with taking Iwo Jima, Mt. Suribachi was a fearsome, loathsome fortress. It dominated the Iwo skyline, overlooking the landing beaches and the southern ground leading to the airfields, which were the Marines’ primary objectives. Unlike many of the South Pacific islands that offered a tropical climate and foliage, Iwo Jima was a cold, craggy, barren volcanic island. One of the few Japanese survivors of the battle, Maj. Yoshitaka Horie of the Imperial Army, later said, “It had been written on the geographical book as only an island of sulphur; no water, no sparrow, no swallow.”

Mt. Suribachi bristled with heavily fortified defenses of more than 1,000 installations of some sort, including 642 block houses, pillboxes, and other gun positions that had been

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An armada of invading Marines is seen heading for the shores of Iwo Jima on D-day as Mt. Suribachi looms in the background. This aerial photo, taken by a U.S. Navy photographer, was immediately flown to Guam, where news of it was transmitted by radio to San Francisco.

located by aerial and submarine surveillance over the previous nine months.

There was no question Mt. Suribachi would have to be conquered early in the battle to capture Iwo Jima. The assignment went to the 5th Marine Division’s 28th Regiment, led by Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rocher. The plan called for the regiment to land at the southernmost beach, send elements racing across the island to cut off Mt. Suribachi from supporting forces, then encircle the mountain and fight to the top. At the same time, the Division’s 27th Regiment, landing just to the right (north) of the 28th, would help cut off Mt. Suribachi, secure the southern half of Motoyama Airfield No. 1, and then wheel north up the island’s western half.

Meanwhile, the 4th Marine Division’s 23rd and 24th Regiments, led by Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates (a future commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps), landing abreast and to

the north of the 27th, would help take the airfield, secure the fortified Quarry Ridge defending the beaches, then continue north along Iwo’s eastern half (See article “The Longest Month” in this publication).

The 3rd Marine Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Graves Erskine, would be held in floating reserve about 50 miles southeast of Iwo Jima. It would be used only if needed; planners hoped the division could be spared for future operations.

That wouldn’t be the case.

T

he Marines in the assault force had been trained extensively in Hawaii and other locations for taking island “X.” Exercises using flamethrowers, demolitions, and coordinated fire support teams against a dug-in enemy were emphasized.

As the task force left its various ports, scuttlebutt was predictably rampant about the destination. Some were betting on Formosa; for many, the first they’d ever heard of an island called Iwo Jima came when the target was revealed during pre-landing briefings. Yet Iwo Jima had been a primary U.S. objective for nearly a year, since B-29 bombers heading toward Japan first encountered

intense anti-aircraft fire from Japanese positions on the island.

“Nobody expected it to be easy. It’s a tough proposition,” Lt. Gen. Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith told his officers. “That’s the reason we are here.”

Based on previous experience, Smith and Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, who was commanding the V Amphibious Corps, fully expected to meet the strongest resistance at the beach. “Every man, every cook, baker, and candlestick maker, will be down on that beach somewhere with some kind of weapon,” said Smith.

Japanese military strategy, acquired by Military Intelligence Division agents, underscored the expected intensity of the defense.

The War Department intelligence pamphlet “Japanese Defense Against Amphibious Operations” stated: “Positions should be constructed on high ground immediately behind the shoreline to dominate the beaches by firepower and interdict them to hostile landing forces.”

Then there would be the infamous banzai attacks – frenzied fighters making blood-curdling charges at the cost of their lives – that had become a predictable Japanese strategy.

While no Marine could look forward to them, the banzais had cost the Japanese dearly time and again. “That is generally when we break their backs,” said Smith.

T

he Marines expected to have 8,000 men ashore in the first hour and a total of 30,000 by nightfall. The operation would be the most publicized Marine battle yet. In a relaxation of previous policy, the Marines were allowing scores of civilian reporters and photographers to be involved, along with dozens of Marine photographers and writers.

Even Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was on hand to observe. His pre-landing words were among the most moving – and prescient – of all. “In the last and final analysis, it is the guy with the rifle and the machine gun who wins the wars and pays the penalty to preserve our liberty,” said Forrestal. “My hat is off to the Marines. I think my feeling about them is best expressed by Maj. Gen. Julian Smith. In a letter to his wife after Tarawa, he said: ‘I can never again see a United States Marine without experiencing a feeling of reverence.’”

Though much more concise, Lt. Col. Ralph Haas was equally eloquent. He reminded his 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment of this maxim:

“Duty is ours, consequences are God’s.” Just four days later, Haas, and so many of those who heard his words, had already died doing his duty on Iwo Jima.

F

or three days preceding the Monday, Feb. 19 invasion, virtually every square foot of Iwo was pummeled by ship and air bombardment. Reconnaissance photos revealed, however, that the island was bruised rather than broken. Consequently, the final preinvasion artillery missions concentrated on the beach areas.

At 0645 on D-day, the battleships and cruisers on station began saturating every foot from Mt. Suribachi to Airfield No. 2. Just

Kuribayashi had purposely waited to unleash his forces until the landing zones were filled and the Marines were completely exposed in order to inflict maximum confusion and casualties. after 0800, the naval guns stopped and 120 carrier planes came in, dropping napalm first then returning with rockets and strafing. One squadron was commanded by Marine Lt. Col. William A. Millington, who told his pilots, “Go in and scrape your bellies on the beach.”

The naval guns resumed at 0825, launching the most awesome preinvasion firepower the Marines had ever seen – more than 8,000 shells in less than 30 minutes. Five minutes after the final preinvasion bombing began, the first assault wave started in from a departure line 2 miles from the beach. It was the first of 10 waves – 850 landing craft – that would head for Iwo in 5-minute increments.

Cpl. Charles Lindberg recalled his observations of the bombing, and what was to

come later, as he and fellow Marines were transported toward the Iwo Jima shoreline.

“I didn’t expect any resistance,” he said.

“When they tell you they bombed it for 74 days around the clock, and that was steady, continuous, and they bombed it before that too ... and then the shelling they gave it the [first] day I saw it, planes were coming in from all directions, battle wagons were pounding the mountain ... I thought, ‘What could live through that?’

“But we got a helluva surprise when we got on that beach. They knew what they were doing. To fight us like that took a brain, and that Japanese general [Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi] had it.”

At 0859, the first Marines hit the shore. At 0902, the Japanese defense began.

Two days previously, Navy divers had checked the shoreline for hidden obstructions and demolitions. Thinking the invasion had begun, the island’s savvy commander, Kuribayashi, had ordered an attack. All the craft bringing in the divers were hit, and casualties were heavy.

On D-day, however, Kuribayashi held his fire and ordered his men into their elaborate underground garrisons; some of them were 30 feet below the surface. As a result, the first waves of Marines met little Japanese resistance. But they and their amtracs – the amphibious vehicles carrying them in – were quickly mired in volcanic sand as they tried to scale the 8- to 15foot terraces rising from the beach. It was like wading through a dark, shifting sea of quicksand; the beach was quickly clogged with men and machines. Still, the second, third, and fourth waves landed without organized opposition.

The thought flashed in some minds that maybe – just maybe – the defenses had been obliterated. Perhaps the island had even been abandoned.

That’s when all the hell that was Iwo Jima broke loose.

Kuribayashi had purposely waited to unleash his forces until the landing zones were filled and the Marines were completely exposed in order to inflict maximum confusion and casualties. He also waited until the first Marines to hit the beach began to climb up the lowland terraces that separated them from the beach – and their fellow invaders.

Now artillery, rocket, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fusillades all rained down on

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THE LANDING

men who couldn’t find any protection from guns spewing fire that was well-directed from the heights to the south and north. It was a most prodigious crossfire, a Japanese defense strategy on small islands. One firing zone was completely accessible to another; the layers of fire were withering. Many Marines died in explosive fireballs that could bring down an entire squad. Many were hit by a single bullet fired by an unseen sniper with an unobstructed view of everything below. Many survivors later said sheer luck was the only difference between living and dying because you were a target if you moved, and a target if you stayed in place.

Perhaps most exasperating of all, though the enemy could be anywhere, everywhere, there were few Japanese to be seen. Initially, the assault force couldn’t do much fighting. “Colonel Rip Collins reported being annoyed by pillboxes on D-day,” wrote Maj. John L. Frothingham in the April 1945 issue of Leatherneck. “He had shot at, but not destroyed, them on the first try. When they shot at his tank from the rear as he was leaving, he was forced to return and demolish them, as later reconnaissance on foot showed.”

They just had to keep pushing forward.

Aboard a troop transport ship off Iwo Jima, Lt. Col. William R. Wendt, division air officer, was carrying on a two-way conversation with an air observer while inside the 4th Marine Division air office.

Capt. Lyford Hutchins was receiving and passing on messages from Operations, spotting every position and movement of troops on a large map of Iwo. Over the speaker, the 4th’s air observer reported the inexorable progress of the assault: Air Office – “First wave 300 yards from Red One ... landing on Red One at 0859 ... First wave landing on Green One, time 0900.”

A naval gunfire control officer interrupted with an order – “Move fire back 400 yards.”

Air Office – “Landings on Yellow Two at 0902 ... Lead waves, Blue One at 0906.”

An officer with the 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines, which hit the beaches at the Yellow One zone, one of the northernmost landing areas, said, “Enemy fire from terraces above beaches heavy, send strafing mission at once.”

At 0910, the radio crackled. “Mission completed.”

At 0915, Hutchins read a message to all troops on the transport ship: “Our troops are moving inland. At Yellow One they are in 125 yards; 200 yards at Yellow Two and Blue One. They have not negotiated the terraces.”

This brought a look of alarm from the soldiers.

At 0930, the first ambulance boat was dispatched.

At 0947, the radio crackled again: “Advance has stopped.”

Troops on the transport ships began to realize what their fellow troops, friends, and even relatives were enduring on the black sands of Iwo Jima.

Platoon Sgt. John Basilone was among the early Iwo Jima heroes and casualties. On Guadalcanal, he had been the first enlisted Marine to win a World War II Medal of Honor. It earned him a ticket home to become a featured star at bond drives, plus the offer of a commission, which he turned down.

Now “Manila John” was back in combat with the 27th Regiment, leading a machine gun platoon and taking out pillboxes. This time he would earn the Marines’ second highest decoration, the Navy Cross.

But like so many medals on Iwo, it would be awarded posthumously. A

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Marines under fire on Red Beach No. 1. Some inch up the steep incline of volcanic sand while others huddle in shell holes beneath them. One Marine remembers digging in the volcanic sand was like digging in corn kernels or BBs.

“But we got a helluva surprise when we got on that beach. They knew what they were doing. To fight us like that took a brain, and that Japanese general [Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi] had it.�

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THE LANDING

mortar shell killed Basilone and four others as Basilone led a platoon over the first rise of ground. His final words were, “Come on, you guys, we gotta get these guns off the beach.”

Not all the heroes were on the ground.

Some were over it, working as naval gunfire spotters and, in the process, attracting hostile fire from numerous anti-aircraft positions. To do their jobs, the spotters had to get in close. The challenge was not to get too close.

At one point, Marine Maj. Ray Dollins was actually heard warbling a familiar tune with new lyrics over the 5th Marine Division radio network: “Oh what a beautiful morning, Oh what a beautiful day, I’ve got a terrible feeling, everything’s coming my way.” Moments later the plane spiraled into the water, killing Dollins and the pilot.

Not all of the heroes were Marines. Navy corpsmen and Seabees were essential to the mission, and they suffered huge numbers of casualties. Many were from the 133rd Seabees, who put 1,000 men ashore by late afternoon. Despite their heavy losses, they continued to work desperately to clear the littered beaches and open the roadways into Iwo’s interior.

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A Marine machine gunner targets Japanese positions with his water-cooled M1917 Browning machine gun on D-day.

How brutal was the battle? As he returned to his ship, Keith Wheeler of the Chicago Times told another correspondent, “I wouldn’t go in there if I were you. There’s more hell in there than I’ve seen the rest of the war put together.” Time correspondent Robert Sherrod noted, “On Iwo Jima, whether the dead were Japanese or American, they had one thing in common; they died with the greatest of possible violence.”

It was still only D-day.

If D-Day at Normandy was the longest day, then surely D-day on Iwo Jima was the longest night. Some 30,000 men had come ashore, forging a beachhead 4,000 yards wide from south to north, 1,000 yards deep on the left, and 400 yards on the right. The American plans had called for the capture of Mt. Suribachi by one regiment of the 5th Marine Division and capture of Motoyama Airfield No. 1 by the 4th Division by now; instead, the 28th Marines had isolated Mt.

Suribachi from the rest of the island, but it was not until D+3 that the mountain would be surrounded.

The cost was already appalling. The Marines had taken some 2,300 casualties, including an estimated 558 dead.

Even more telling were losses within the lead units.

Before the landing, 4th Division Commander Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates had told a reporter, “You know, if I knew the name of the man on the extreme right of the righthand squad of the right-hand company of the right-hand battalion, I’d recommend him for a medal before we go in.”

Odds are that unknown man earned a medal anyway, for he was part of Lt. Col. Justice “Jumpin’ Joe” Chambers’ battalion that had been decimated by the time it was relieved the first night.

Moreover, not a single man among the thousands left on Iwo could lay claim to a truly safe, secure spot as exhausted men began digging in for the night. Artillery and mortar fire continued, working first one sector then another in orchestrated rhythm.

Japanese soldiers rolled live grenades down the slopes of Mt. Suribachi. Worst of all, the

dreaded banzai attacks were expected at any moment, making every watch stressful, any snatches of sleep fitful.

“I know I didn’t sleep at all that night,” Lindberg recalled. “Thank God for whoever it was that kept lighting flares so that we could see.”

The Marines couldn’t know that, in yet another departure from doctrine, Kuribayashi had ordered no banzais. In fact, the only one that did occur came late in the battle, still weeks away.

Japanese soldiers did, however, begin a pattern that would continue every night: Infiltrators would stealthily try to slip between U.S. lines and positions, looking for vulnerable spots that could be exploited during the night or next day. Compounding that for the 5th Marine Division was the ever-present threat of Mt. Suribachi. It loomed over them like a hideous shadow, giving some 1,600 hidden defenders a bird’s-eye view and making the Marines feel totally exposed with every move they made.

D

+1 (Feb. 20) opened with another heavy bombardment of Mt. Suribachi as the

That set the stage for a D+3 (Feb. 22) assault that was unprecedented in tenacity and ferocity on both sides.

28th Marines, under Col. Harry “The Horse” Liversedge, began creating a noose to choke off the mountain. Elements had made it completely across the island’s narrowest point the previous day, isolating Mt. Suribachi from direct support. Now the lines had to be solidified, which included finding and eradicating fortified positions that were bypassed initially.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions began pushing forward toward Mt. Suribachi’s base, using flamethrowers, satchel charges, grenades, and nerve gas to take out pillbox after pillbox, cave after cave – one by one. It was incredibly intense, gruesome work made even worse by a gray, desolate landscape that, subjected to weeks of high explosives, helped provide perfect camouflage for the defenders. Furthermore, the Japanese refused to become moving targets. Most stayed entrenched,

trying to make good on their vow to kill 10 Marines for each Japanese. When they did appear, it was usually sudden and from ambush.

By nightfall on D+1, the Marines had advanced some 200 yards, an almost miraculous achievement given the scope of defenses remaining. By noon on D+2 (Feb. 21), they had reached the base of Mt. Suribachi; by evening, they had formed a semicircle around the front and sides.

That set the stage for a D+3 (Feb. 22) assault that was unprecedented in tenacity and ferocity on both sides. Time and again Marines threw themselves against the mountain’s lower defense, clawing for every inch of ground. Then, the first stroke of luck came upon an attacking patrol: While diving for cover in a shell hole, they found a wounded, half-buried Japanese soldier. After carefully pulling him

Just in from Blue Beach 1, 4th Division Marines watch their tanks (just below horizon) heading north toward Blue 2.

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Jubilant Marines pose for pictures with the American flag following its planting atop Mt. Suribachi on Feb. 23.

Iwo Jima: A Brief Chronology February 19 – D-day • 0640-0800: Ships off Iwo; for 85 minutes, vessels bombard island from end to end.

• 0805: Naval gunfire ceases. 72 fighter planes and bombers spray rockets, bombs, and machine gun bullets on flanks of landing beaches and adjacent area. 48 additional fighter craft hit landing areas with napalm bombs, rockets, and machine gun bullets.

• 0825: Planes depart. Vessels resume bombardment, concentrating on landing beaches and vicinity.

• 0845: Vessels begin ro!ling barrage, going 200 yards inland.

When Marines land, naval gunfire moves ahead in 200-yard steps.

• 0859: The first Marine forces reach shore. 0902: Marines begin to move toward inland terraces as other troops pour ashore.

• 0930: First call for an ambulance boat is made.

February 20 – D+1 • Col. Harry Liversedge leads 11-hour charge of 28th Marines but only gains 200 yards.

• During fight for Mt. Suribachi, battalions from 23rd, 24th, and 25th Marines of 4th Division and 26th and 27th Marines of 5th

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Division secure airfield and push northward into heart of enemy defenses. 5th Division zone makes first gains; stiffest resistance from Japanese troops in zone of 25th Marines along east coast.

Still, deepest penetration of 25th Marines is 200 yards.

February 21 – D+2 • 40-plane air strike precedes attack – all battalions employed.

Good support by tanks, 37 mm guns, and half-tracks mounting 75 mm cannon. Regiment gets to foot of mountain after smothering a counterattack. That night, Japanese suicide planes strike at vessels gathered off island.

• 21st Marines of 3rd Marine Division ordered ashore to reinforce 4th Marine Division.

• 5th Division makes more gains along northern front, but are battered. Maj. Gen. Cates’ tactical plans hampered by impossible terrain.

February 22 – D+3 • Marines surround Mt. Suribachi despite heavy opposition in center of regimental zone.

Wary of Japanese soldiers playing dead or concealing boobytraps, a battlewise Marine uses a sling made from enemy leggings to remove enemy bodies from the entrance to an Iwo Jima dugout on D+3 (Feb. 22, 1945).

out of the crater with a rope (in the event he was boobytrapped), the Marines began to interrogate him. The captured soldier was an Iwo Jima resident who had been inducted into the Japanese military against his will; he proceeded to give the Marines explicit details about Japanese defenses on Mt. Suribachi.

Finally, by day’s end, the lower pockets of resistance had been overcome: Mt. Suribachi was surrounded.

“At dawn we start climbing,” said Liversedge.

That night, the second stroke of luck graced the Marine fighters. It was an act so unlike anything the Japanese had ever done – or would ever do again on Iwo Jima – that to this day, it seems incongruent with the fighting spirit cast into them by Kuribayashi.

After being mortally wounded in the day’s fighting, the commander of Mt. Suribachi’s defenses, Col. Kanehiko Atuschi, ordered half of the 300 remaining defenders to withdraw and move north. All but about 25 of the withdrawing soldiers were killed when they reached the solid American front. When the survivors arrived at the headquarters of Capt. Samaji Inouye, commander of Iwo’s naval guard

forces, the lieutenant in their charge was accused of being a traitor. Inouye pulled out his sword to behead the lieutenant on the spot, but a junior officer stopped him.

Inouye wept uncontrollably at the reality: The fall of Mt. Suribachi was imminent.

Considering what had come before, the actual scaling of Mt. Suribachi was almost anticlimactic. Sgt. Sherman Watson and Pfcs. Ted White, George Mercer, and Louis Charlo were the first patrol to go up. Amazingly, they reached the rim of the crater without seeing a single live Japanese soldier.

When they reported in to their 2nd Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Chandler Johnson quickly organized a 40-man patrol from Easy Company under Lt. Harold Schrier.

Johnson told Schrier to take and hold the top, and gave him an American flag, measuring 54 inches by 28 inches, to plant there.

It was large enough to be seen from the base and from ships near the shoreline.

At 1020, the patrol had reached the peak without opposition – but the tranquil moment was to end. They found a 20foot length of hollow Japanese iron pipe, which had probably been used for a water system before it was bombed. Schrier, Sgts. Ernest “Boot” Thomas and Henry

• Two front-line units relieved, but operation hampered by rain, enemy fire, and broken terrain. Relief is accomplished.

• Japanese pin down 23rd Marines, who were scheduled to be relieved by 21st Marines.

February 23 – D+4 • Small patrol from Company F, 2nd Battalion, reconnoiters suitable routes to scale slopes of Mt. Suribachi. Patrol leader Sgt. Sherman Watson radios as he moves along that Japanese are holed up. Lt. Col. Chandler Johnson decides to send a 40-man combat patrol, survivors of 3rd platoon of Company E, under Lt. Harold Schrier’s command, to seize and occupy crest. Photographer Sgt. Lou Lowery of Leatherneck accompanies the patrol to record the attempt on Mt. Suribachi.

• At 1030, the Stars and Stripes are raised by Schrier, Platoon Sgt. Ernest T. Thomas, Sgt. Henry O. Hansen, Cpl. Charles W. Lindberg, Pfc. James Robinson, and Pfc. James Michels. Four hours later, the second and more famous flag-raising is made.

• Schmidt decides to attack Motoyama Airfield No. 2 with 21st Marines and use tank assault.

February 24 – D+5 • 3rd Marine Division enters the battle. They are to drive along rugged tableland of Iwo’s northern plateau; once controlled, they can attack from the many ridge lines leading from plateau to sea.

• 76-minute naval bombardment, pounding from Marine artillery, and carrier air strike precede 0915 crossing of divisional boundary line by tanks from 5th Marine Division to western portion of airfield.

Simultaneously, 4th Division armor push toward eastern edge of field. Vehicles withdraw from western assault because of mines and anti-tank gunfire. 12 tanks reach eastern edge of blasted enemy holed up in hills to north. Along axis of Marine attack, 5th Division advances 500 yards. 4th Division is stalled by dug-in Japanese.

February 25 • 3rd Division 9th Marines pass through lines of 21st Marines. Losses heavy as main Japanese defense lines hold.

February 27 • In evening, 9th Marines seize control of twin hills north of Airfield No. 2.

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THE LANDING

The wreckage of American landing craft clutters the Iwo Jima shoreline on D+2.

Hansen, and Lindberg attached the flag to the pipe and planted it as Pfcs.

James Michaels and Jim “Chick” Robeson stood guard. Their watchfulness wasn’t an idle precaution. “As Marines scrambled over the lip [of the crater], a small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men ... secured the small American flag, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 1030,” Bernard C. Nalty later wrote in the Marine Corps Headquarters pamphlet, “The United States Marines on Iwo Jima: The Battle and the Flag Raising.”

The skirmish began when an enraged Japanese soldier jumped from a cave to heave a grenade. Robeson downed him with a Browning automatic rifle. A second defender charged, brandishing a broken sword. He, too, was shot. The Marine patrol then threw demolition charges into nearby caves.

Mt. Suribachi was still a deadly dangerous place. There were many soldiers in the mountain and its estimated 1,000 installations who would have to be dealt with in the days ahead. Leatherneck magazine photographer Staff Sgt. Lou Lowery recorded this flag-raising; during the ensuing firefight, he slid 50 feet down the crater to avoid being hit by a Japanese grenade that had been thrown at him.

“We spent the next three hours securing that mountain,” Lindberg said.

“We used the flamethrowers for caves we couldn’t walk into, demolition charges, and we walked into whatever caves we could. We burned out pillboxes, caves ... we didn’t know what side the Japanese would be coming from. We had to work fast; we had to work hard.”

“We used the flamethrowers for caves we couldn’t walk into, demolition charges, and we walked into whatever caves we could. We burned out pillboxes, caves ... we didn’t know what side the Japanese would be coming from. We had to work fast; we had to work hard.”

February 28 • 21st Marines overrun ruins of Motoyama Village and seize hills that dominate Airfield 3, still under construction.

• 4th Marine Division struggles to take Hill 382 on right of Airfield 2.

• 5th Marine Division stalled by defenders on Hill 362A.

March 2 • Hill 362A is overrun and neighboring Nishi Ridge, just to north, is captured.

March 1 • Assignment to capture Hill 362A given to 28th Marines, who had taken Mt. Suribachi. Few Marines briefly got to summit on February 27, but had to pull back to maintain contact with rest of regiment. 224 Marines killed and wounded, but Hill 362A is taken.

• 4th day of relentless attack into Meat Grinder. Effort directed at Hill 382 – naval gunfire, artillery, and air strikes used. Japanese have to be blasted or burned out of positions by bazookas, grenades, or flame throwers. Attempt to envelop Turkey Knob thwarted; Marines pull back under cover of a smoke screen and an artillery barrage.

March 7 • 3rd Division poised to hurl itself against Japanese troops, who have been lulled into sense of security at night. They begin assault before dawn on Iwo’s darkened terrain. At day break, one company is out of position and other is engaged in intense firefight; when they reunite, they take Hill 362C.

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March 3 • Hill 362B falls to 26th Marines.

March 8 • Desperate Japanese who are battling 4th Marine Division gamble on a counterattack. Intensity of mortar and artillery fire increases.

Japanese try to crawl through lines of 23rd and 24th Marines.

Four hours later, once the mountain was secure, there would be another flag-raising that would become much more famous.

For the moment, pictures weren’t nearly as important as two facts: Mt. Suribachi had finally been taken, and it wouldn’t be surrendered. At 1038, the public-address system on an American ship near the northeast coast of Iwo Jima blared, “Now all hands hear this. The American flag is now flying atop Mt. Suribachi. The American flag is now flying atop Mt. Suribachi.”

F

rom the ships and beaches below, observers had watched the patrol move

Marine halftracks score a direct hit on a Japanese pillbox as they advance on D-day. The Japanese artillery being targeted here (note the gun at the extreme left) had been zeroed on the Marines’ landing beach and took a heavy toll on the invading Americans before being disabled.

up the mountainside. When the flag appeared, horns and cheers rang out. “I’ll tell you,” Lindberg said, “I’ve never had a feeling like the one that went through me when I heard those cheers from up there.

Not before; not since.”

Their attack is directed at point where 23rd and 24th regimental zones join; by noon, 650 Japanese have been killed.

March 9 • Loss of Hill 362C breaks down coordination of Lt. Gen. Kuribayashi’s defenses. Patrols from three Marine divisions reach the northern and western seacoast.

March 10 • 4th Division finishes off Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater, and pushes Japanese patrols to the coast.

March 13 • 5th Division compresses Japanese troops into the area around Kitano Point. The 3rd Division joins them and grinds out a 400-yard gain. In the path of 25th Marines is a gorge honeycombed with caves. 500 Japanese defenders in caves refuse to surrender, and are killed by 25th Marines.

Navy Secretary Forrestal, who had followed the battle aboard ship, was headed into Iwo when he saw the flag raised.

Turning to Lt. Gen. Smith, he said, “Holland, the raising of that flag on Mt. Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years.”

It was a fitting, stirring tribute. But for the Marines on Iwo, years had no meaning then or in the weeks to come. Staying alive today was all that really mattered.

As one Marine later said, “There probably wasn’t a man among us who didn’t wish to God he was moving in the opposite direction.”

Bob Yehling also contributed to this story.

March 16 • 3rd Division focuses on heavily fortified resistance near Hill 362C. Last Japanese resistance crushed.

March 25 • Senior officer among surviving Japanese troops contacts remaining soldiers. They assemble in vicinity of Airfield No. 2.

March 26 • Japanese launch final attack, catching Americans sleeping.

5th Pioneer Battalion, the Army’s fighter command units, and Marines 8th Field Depot hold off attackers until dawn; manhunt ensues for retreating Japanese. 223 Japanese killed, possibly including Kuribayashi.

April 4 • U.S. Marines leave Iwo Jima and are relieved by an Army infantry regiment.

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LIFE ON THE ISLAND

LIFE ON THE ISLAND

THE SITE FOR THE MOST LEGENDARY BATTLE IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY WAS A DAMP, DESOLATE, VOLCANIC ISLAND THAT REEKED OF SULFUR. LIFE AS A FIGHTER OR NONCOMBATANT WAS DREARY, FRIGHTENING, HEROIC – AND SOMETIMES HUMOROUS.

C

old. Damp. Desolate. Wretched.

Smelly. Godforsaken. An entire Roget’s Thesaurus of unpleasant adjectives has been used to describe Iwo Jima. They’re appropriate depictions, even without the horrors of war. Add the fury of unrelenting attacks by a fanatical enemy, and it’s not surprising that those who were on Iwo in February 1945 vividly recall it as 8 square miles of living hell.

From landing to departure, Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions were on Iwo for slightly more than a month. Relatively few individuals, however, actually spent the entire 36 days on the island, because few of the initial landing troops survived unscathed. Whether they remained for hours or weeks, however, the experiences left indelible impressions on every man who set foot on Iwo Jima.

What was it really like to be there? Here are glimpses into a life that no one likes to remember, but no one can forget.

It was always too cold on Iwo, except when it was too hot. The temperature might drop into the 40s with rain during the day, and Marines would shiver in a foxhole or bomb crater night after night. Sometimes, though, the foxholes could be uncomfortably warm, with the Earth temperature hitting 100 degrees.

This heat could be useful. Some foxholes hit sulfur steam vents and Marines discovered they could warm their C-rations in

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them. But it took the care of a gourmet chef to get the cooking time just right – even a few extra seconds of heat could turn a hot meal into an exploding mess.

During the early days of the invasion, Marines were warned to preserve their water since there were no natural supplies on Iwo. The only wells were cisterns built by the Japanese to collect rainwater. Eventually desalination units were erected, but with thousands of men to serve, water was always in short supply. Shaving and bathing, even with cold helmet water, was a luxury.

It was even worse for the Japanese, particularly after Marines captured the cisterns located about halfway up the island. The defenders had stored about a month’s worth of supplies in caves and pillboxes, and the few captured Japanese invariably talked of troops who were continually thirsty and malnourished. In desperation, they’d venture out of their caves at night to sneak through Marine lines and forage for essential supplies.

From many accounts, it appears that the most-often used word on Iwo Jima was “Corpsman!” Certainly among the most courageous men on this, or any other battleground, were those who gave fallen Marines their first vital medical aid, often in the midst of hostile fire.

In fact, medical personnel often earned the most decorations in their units. They also took the most casualties, because

Father Joseph Hammond gives Holy Communion to a 4th Division Marine on Iwo Jima, Feb. 27. 1945, even as the battle rages on.

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO

BY DAVID STEELE

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO

corpsmen were among the favored targets of Japanese gunners, as were the litter bearers who carried the injured back to aid stations and the beach. That’s why the term “noncombatants” typically appears in quotation marks in various Iwo histories.

Quite simply, no one on Iwo escaped combat, even if they never used a weapon.

Yet countless lives were saved because these men did their job so well under such adverse conditions.

For example, one of the first makeshift surgical amphitheaters on Iwo was located in a 15-foot crater created by a 16-inch naval shell during the preinvasion bombardment.

Niches were carved from walls to accommodate the wounded, and two larger platforms were sculpted as operating tables. This temporary operating area accommodated 16 wounded below ground level.

Unlike several other locations, this site didn’t take a direct hit. One time, though, a Marine was blown into the crater, landing on a patient being sutured.

Many bodies were mangled so badly by explosives that the only way to distinguish them as Marines was by the leggings they wore.

Other injuries were simply, painfully bizarre.

One Marine shattered all the bones in his feet, without the skin being broken, when a satchel charge blew up under his tank. Another awoke to discover he couldn’t pry his feet apart. The surgeon, seeing an entry wound in one foot but no exit wound, finally determined that the crossed feet had been “nailed” together by a spent .30-caliber bullet.

Above left: Marines had no shortage of derogatory words to describe the day-to-day life on Iwo Jima. With most of their time spent dislodging a tenacious and fanatical enemy, mundane moments like making a cup of coffee (seen here) were a welcome thing. Here, two Marines use a hot sulfur spring as a heating device. Above right: Grim as this supply container might seem, its contents undoubtedly saved some lives.

Among the most terrifying of all the weapons used against the Americans was the “spigot” mortar. It was a 5-foot-long, 13-inch-wide projectile whose flight could be followed like some gigantic ash can, speeding through the air. It was notably inaccurate for hitting a specified target. But it was terribly lethal as well, sending out pieces of shrapnel that could be several feet long.

Another deadly part of the Japanese arsenal was the knee mortar. A soldier could fire it once or twice, then quickly shift to a new position before being located.

Perhaps, though, as many Marine casualties were caused by the weapons of close-in combat – grenades, small arms, and swords – as any other. The Japanese had vowed to conduct a guerrilla war, and they did it well. Attackers would suddenly emerge from caves as human bombs, blowing up themselves and those around them with satchel charges. Infiltrators would silently creep up to Marine foxholes, then roll grenades down the sides.

And, using captured U.S. uniforms, sabo-

teurs might lie in wait for hours to cause maximum devastation.

Surgeon James Vedder recalls accompanying a line officer as he did a reconnaissance on a supposedly just-secured plot of land. The two men walked past a body covered by a Marine poncho, then the officer wheeled around and fired into the poncho.

Underneath was a Japanese soldier, a bag of grenades clutched to his chest.

“All of the Marines in this sector were accounted for,” explained the officer to a quizzical Vedder. Therefore, the hidden body had to be an unfriendly ambusher just waiting to strike.

Sentries and patrols, including some with canine support, were used to counter the nightly infiltrators. So, like a mantra, Marines chanted the day’s passwords to avoid friendly fire as they returned to their own lines or simply made a midnight nature call.

Today’s passwords might include the names of U.S. cities; tomorrow’s might be U.S. cars; the following day’s, U.S. presidents.

Naturally, the tension could lead to mistakes and occasionally a lighter moment.

“Password?” challenged one sentry. “Wallace, Wallace, Wallace,” responded a startled Marine.

“Not vice presidents … presidents!” hissed the sentry.

Amid all the mind-numbing horror, there were other stories destined to elicit a much-needed laugh both then and in the re-telling over the years. For example, a Marine officer awakened one morning to find

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MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

Above left: A Marine inspects a Japanese 320mm mortar shell (without warhead) still partially resting on the fallen spigot mortar’s base plate.

Other sections, bodies, and heads are in the right recess of the position. Fully assembled, the mortar shell weighed 675 pounds and was 5 feet tall. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines commander at Iwo Jima and later a Commandant of the Marine Corps, said, “You could see it coming, but you never knew where the hell it was going to come down.” Above right: Stretcher bearers bring in a wounded Marine while under sniper fire near Motoyama Airfield No. 2. Corpsmen and stretcher bearers were among the favorite targets of the Japanese. Left: A Marine tends to the grave of Gunnery Sgt. John Basilone, who received the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions at Guadacanal. He died while leading an assault at Iwo Jima.

that a Japanese soldier had shared his foxhole the entire night. They both leaped out in amazement, running in different directions. “Why didn’t you shoot him?” asked a buddy hearing the story.

“It’s not right to shoot someone you just slept with,” explained the officer.

One morning, Marines near one of the airfields noticed a bulldozer leveling the ground. As with any vehicle on Iwo, it drew a lot of unfriendly sniper fire. But two ingenious Seabees figured a way to improve their chances. As the bulldozer reached the airfield’s end, a Seabee appeared from a foxhole, jumped aboard the driverless vehicle, headed it in the opposite direction, then scampered back into hiding. At the other end of the field, a second Seabee repeated the process until the job was completed.

Mail calls became a much-appreciated morale booster for troops who hadn’t heard

from home for weeks. They, too, could provide a moment of humor. At his first mail call, Vedder got a letter from the Naval Bureau of Medicine and Surgery noting that he hadn’t completed some required correspondence courses. A stern warning followed: If these courses weren’t completed immediately, Vedder would be transferred to “more hazardous duty.”

As Vedder tried to picture more hazardous duty than Iwo Jima, the other medics chuckled and asked if they might join him.

There were also moments of normalcy conducted in surreal settings. Chaplains had crawled up Iwo’s terraces and hills along with the infantry. They conducted services when and where possible: the Protestants might meet in a spigot mortar crater; Catholics by wrecked enemy anti-aircraft guns.

Attendance was always good.

Even as the battle raged, division cemeteries were created on Iwo. Here, too, noncombatants tried to do their depressing work under the never-ending threat of enemy fire. Sometimes there were so many men to be buried at one time that long rows of graves were dug and, following brief services, covered en masse with bulldozers. Eventually, more than 5,000 American fighting men would be interred on Iwo Jima.

Years later these cemeteries would be closed and the bodies returned to the United States.

But no Marine, medic, or Seabee who walked – or was carried away – from the island in 1945 would ever forget those left behind.

Nor would they forget how razor thin the line was between surviving and perishing on Iwo Jima. In what could be a testament for all those who came home, one private said simply to a friend who asked him what it was like on the island, “I’m alive.”

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LONGEST MONTH

FROM THE AIRFIELDS TO THE SEA

BY DAVID STEELE

The 24th Marines prepare to attack Motoyama Airfield No. 1 Feb. 20, 1945, at H-hour, 0900, 500 yards inland from Yellow 2 Beach.

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ALL PHOTOS U.S. MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER CREDIT

The capture of Mount Suribachi is the ultimate symbol of triumph in military history. However, it was only the beginning of the most grueling month of battle an American fighting force would ever know.

J

oe Rosenthal’s photo of the flag-raising on Mt. Suribachi is so well known that some general references imply – or even say – the event marked the end of the battle for Iwo Jima.

If only it were so. There was certainly nothing easy about Suribachi, but the battle for the rest of the island was even more violent and considerably longer. One statistic underscores the point: A total of 27 Medals of Honor were awarded for heroism on Iwo; all but three were earned up-island, beyond Mt. Suribachi. In addition, nearly one-third of all Marines killed during World War II lost their lives either during the Battle of Iwo Jima or from injuries sustained on the tiny island of lava and sulfur.

Even hard-bitten veterans, not given to rose-colored assessments, underestimated how deeply and widely the Japanese were dug in and how cunningly they would use their advantages. After Mt. Suribachi’s fall, V Amphibious Corps (VAC) Commander Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt repeated his timing forecast for the entire campaign. “I said last week it would take 10 days, and I haven’t changed my mind,” said the general.

He wasn’t even half right.

Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi, a Japanese tactical genius with the fortitude and patience befitting his samurai ancestry, had arrayed two broad, convex zones of resistance from coast to coast with their centers jutting toward Suribachi. The first overlapped much of Airfield No. 2 and looked down on a natural east coast boat basin. The second began just behind Airfield No. 2, included the incomplete third airfield, and boasted some of the island’s most rugged terrain.

These zones would become the toughest nuts to crack. In reality, the island’s defenses were so abundant, so varied, and so insidious that it was impossible to find a weak point.

Compounding that was the philosophy of the Japanese defenders, and their formidable commanding general, who was reknowned as a one-man fighting force with boundless courage. Kuribayashi circulated what were called “The Courageous Battle Vows,” copies of which were found in pillboxes, caves, bunkers, and on the bodies of dead Japanese soldiers. They stated: “Above all, we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defense of this island.

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“We shall grasp bombs, charge enemy tanks and destroy them.

“We shall infiltrate into the midst of the enemy and annihilate them.”

Because of the Japanese convex defense and these vows of non-surrender, it was difficult, especially in the early days, to apply traditional terminology to the battlefield.

There were definable front lines that could more or less be plotted on a map. There was a rear that couldn’t be found among the mortar attacks, mines, bypassed pillboxes, spider traps, and nightly infiltrators.

It’s no wonder that many of those who were on Iwo would later say that, in essence, all of Iwo was a vicious front. You could die from any direction.

As the Marines of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions began the arduous drive to the sea on the north, it was hoped that the 3rd Division could remain in seagoing reserve.

By the end of just the second day, however,

Covered by Marine riflemen in the foreground, a Marine flamethrower clears an enemy cave on the north side of the island. Persuasion was attempted first, but as was the case with most of the Japanese soldiers, surrender was not an option.

the 5th Division had lost 1,500 men killed or wounded and the 4th lost about 2,000.

“I know that just our 40-man platoon had 36 people either killed or wounded at Iwo Jima,” Cpl. Charles Lindberg said. “And we were among the most seasoned fighters; most of us had either been to Guadalcanal, Bougainville, or both.”

Clearly the luxury of holding back the 3rd couldn’t be enjoyed. Its 21st Regiment landed and was initially attached to the 4th Division, passing through the 23rd Marines on D+3 (Feb. 22). Two days later, the division’s 9th Regimental Combat Team joined the

fray following the landing of the division HQ the previous day.

Throughout the campaign, various regiments of each division would frequently be shared or operate in coordinated commands. Basically, the 3rd Marine Division took the center of the line with the 5th Marine Division on the left flank and the 4th Marine Division on the right. Each assignment came with formidable ground to take and thousands of Japanese defenders determined not to surrender it.

“My opinion is that we were fighting the very best fighters that Japan had,” Lindberg said. “Boy, were they tough – and not afraid to die, either.”

Yet not all of the advantages went to the Japanese. The Marines had considerable fire support from the sea and air. In fact, Kuribayashi was convinced he could hold out indefinitely if there were no aerial and ship bombardment.

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“The Japanese defense on Iwo Jima was perhaps the most consistent and effective of any in the Pacific war. It was carefully planned to make the maximum use of the terrain and the plan was faithfully followed to the end,” Marine Capt. Clifford P. Morehouse, USMC Reserve, wrote in a 1946 Marine Corps paper, “The Iwo Jima Operation.”

Consequently, the Japanese high command made one concerted effort to send help in the form of kamikazes – suicide pilots who would turn their planes into dive bombs and point them at the decks of Allied ships.

The newly created tactic would later be especially effective at Okinawa. It took its toll at Iwo, too, when on Feb. 21, kamikazes sank the escort carrier Bismarck Sea and sent a major carrier, the badly damaged USS Saratoga, limping back to Pearl Harbor for repairs.

A sizable U.S. armada of nearly 800 vessels remained on station, however, and as the work of taking Iwo began, each day’s assault began with air-sea bombardments.

They were soon joined by land-based Marine

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Sheltering in the rubble of a Japanese fortification, Marine casualties are given medical attention on Feb. 26, 1945, at an aid station in the cliffs near the East Boat Basin on Iwo Jima.

artillery that came ashore in increasing numbers, as the Seabees, usually under fire, cleared and matted the beaches and carved roadways into the core of Iwo Jima.

Determined fighting had put Motoyama Airfield No. 1, a primary objective, into Marine hands by the end of D+l. Furthermore, the 4th and 5th Divisions had combined to carve a line across the island, cutting off Mt. Suribachi from the rest of Iwo Jima.

The drive to Airfield No. 2 began. The ground was particularly treacherous there, because the Japanese had sighted their guns down the runways and flat expanse, had their artillery and mortars pre-registered for the assault, and, as always, had a multitude of machine gun nests and riflemen hidden in strategic positions. What’s more, the heights

to the north made the entire sector around the airfield a “no man’s land” that was defended by elite Japanese troops.

The entire gruesome network of defense erupted as the 23rd Marines of the 4th Marine Division began its attack on D+4.

“The 23rd is being held up by minefields on both flanks. Fields are covered by heavy artillery and small arms fire,” a communications man with the 23rd Marines radioed to offshore command. “The entire regimental front is receiving mortar fire. Maximum use is being made of supporting weapons.”

All of these factors stalled the move up Iwo’s center, as each new attempt brought heavy casualties. But there was no way around, so the Marines had to go up, over, and through the terrain and its defenders.

As with most battlegrounds, a few landmarks on Iwo would soon take on descriptive names. Most of the hills, though, were known simply by numbers that denoted their height in feet. In 3rd Division history, one of the most famous is Hill 199, at the

Right: A Marine flamethrower team silences an enemy dugout on Iwo Jima. While two riflemen cover the entrance, the flamethrower showers the position with liquid flame. Below: Members of a Marine Corps war dog platoon move up to the front lines on Iwo Jima. The dogs were a great asset due to their ability to ferret out enemy snipers and to act as speedy messengers.

northern edge of Airfield No. 2. In a pattern repeated countless times, the defenders hadn’t just fortified the hill’s face: They’d entrenched pillboxes and fighting positions on the reverse slope as well, making the fighting along the top and opposite side as horrific as the ascending assault.

Led by 1st Lt. Raoul Archambault, K Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Marines finally gained a tenuous foothold on Hill 199 on its third try. The 3rd Marine Division history, written by 1st Lts. Robert A. Aurthur and Kenneth Cohlmia, describes what happened next: “... suddenly a wave of [ Japanese] infantry rose out of the gully on the reverse slope of the hill and counterattacked with bayonets.

That fight, in the ankle-deep sand which clutched at men, tripped them and clogged their weapons, will be recalled as one of the most freakish nightmares of the Iwo battles ... K Company battled with bayonets, knives, clubbed rifles and entrenching shovels in a savage, hacking, screaming melee that was over in a few minutes with nearly 50 Japanese killed in hand-to-hand combat.”

This time the bloodied, battle-weary Marines held the hill.

Less vivid, but no less intense, were the smaller fire team battles for a seemingly never-ending succession of pillboxes and caves. Each presented its own unique challenges, because they were typically interlocked and defended with mutually supporting fire.

A typical scenario called for a team to lay down a covering fire and hold the defenders’ attention while a Marine with a flamethrower or satchel charge tried to move in and around the stronghold’s flank. If that tactic was successful, a pillbox might be silenced.

However, it still posed a multitude of threats. Its occupants might be alive inside, waiting to ambush the Marines as they drew close. They might also be hiding in another area of the bunker’s labyrinth. Or they might have escaped to an entirely new position to start the process again. Also, if the Marines weren’t careful, the defenders

would abandon the position for the moment, then return later to re-man it under cover of darkness.

“When we moved into the pillboxes, we didn’t know the situation,” Lindberg said.

“I’d fire my flamethrower in the entrance, but they might come out the sides, out the back, or someone might get me from behind. You just didn’t know.”

The initial attack team did its best to close off the stronghold with the limited time and resources it had. Then it was left to the engineers to follow up, preferably sooner than later, to seal the bunker or cave with explosives and prevent further use.

The complexity of many of these underground mini-fortresses was remarkable.

They might feature six, eight, or even a dozen separate entrances, connected to just as many corridors, tunnels, and rooms surrounded by concrete up to 10 feet thick. Many pillboxes barely peeked above the ground, and unwary Marines literally didn’t know until it was too late that there was anything or anyone there. Snipers popped in and out of spider holes (holes camouflaged with flat, removable covers) just as Marines approached or went past.

If the infantry was fortunate, the terrain would allow for support by tanks, both traditionally armed Shermans and flamethrowers that were ideal for taking out pillboxes. But the tanks were also a mixed blessing for both their crews and the

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“ground-pounders,” because nothing drew the attention of defenders like a tank rolling forward into battle.

Mortars and rockets would inevitably cascade down on them, creating a ring of havoc for anyone caught nearby. Moreover, the maneuverability that tanks enjoyed on other battlefields wasn’t possible on Iwo. They often had to advance one by one or in single-file right into the jaws of strategically placed anti-tank weapons or mines.

“As the battle progressed, the enemy planted more and more mines, and the cooperation of the infantry’s attached engineers to clear routes for us was continually sought,” Maj. John Frothingham wrote in the July 1945 issue of Leatherneck. “Tank people had tried to be in the fight with the infantry, but it became increasingly annoying when our tanks were destroyed by mines behind the front lines.”

On one assault, a Sgt. McIntire of Charlie Company got his tank stuck on the rocks forward of the northern lines. Japanese soldiers immediately swarmed the tank despite protective fire from other tanks. Lt. Dusty Blake, in another tank, radioed to McIntire, “Don’t be afraid, Mac – open your hatch and drop a grenade on them!”

“But I am afraid, Mr. Blake.”

Despite the likelihood in his mind that he would be gunned down, McIntire mustered up the courage to open the hatch. He

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Marine infantry and tanks attack Japanese positions on rocky northern Iwo Jima during a direct frontal assault. The explosion seen is an enemy mortar shell. This advance gained 20 yards at a cost of 30 Marine casualties.

dropped several grenades, then radioed back to Blake, “He shouldn’t bother us now. I blew the SOB’s head off.”

All of these factors continually put the Marines behind the timetables originally set for taking Iwo. Much more importantly, the fighting took a terrible toll: After six full days of battle, 1,605 Marines were dead and 5,496 wounded. Kuribayashi still controlled twothirds of Iwo Jima.

The 4th Marine Division had already encountered and overcome such challenging obstacles as Charlie-Dog Ridge as it pushed up Iwo’s eastern coast. The toughest test was yet to come in the form of the Hill, the Amphitheater, and Turkey Knob; these points became known collectively as the Meat Grinder.

Perhaps no battlepoint has been more aptly named. The Meat Grinder contained a major communications center that the Japanese defended tenaciously with anti-aircraft guns, artillery pieces, anti-tank guns protected in caves, and the familiar strongholds with interlocking fire of all types. A new wrinkle came in the form of tanks buried to their turrets.

The three areas were mutually supported so well that it required a coordinated,

simultaneous attack on all three sites at once. Such cooperative movement is challenging in any circumstance; in the confines of Iwo Jima and its extreme conditions, it was nearly impossible.

Nevertheless, the 23rd Marines tackled the Hill, the 24th Marines took on the Amphitheater, and the 25th Marines assaulted Turkey Knob. Time after time, an immediate objective would be taken, then the assault would come under renewed fire from positions to the front, sides, and rear. Mangled companies and platoons would be forced to withdraw, and the defenders would move back in.

The reason why repeated naval gunfire and aerial bombardment were important but never decisive was now becoming apparent. The durability of many major fortifications was simply beyond belief, and another reminder of how vital Japan considered this tiny island to its survival. At one point around Turkey Knob, the Marines brought in a 75 mm howitzer and fired it again and again point-blank into an emplacement. After 85 rounds, the fortification still hadn’t succumbed.

On one day alone, Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater cost the 4th Division 792 casualties. That was even worse than the first two

In a deep ravine on the northern ridges of Iwo Jima, Marines use high explosives to destroy Japanese caves and pillboxes. The terrain at the northern end of the island was rocky, volcanic, and stank of sulfur.

days on the beaches. It took a full seven days – from Feb. 26 to March 3 – for the Marines to conquer the Meat Grinder. By that point, the division had lost 7,591 men to death or injury since landing on Iwo, and its fighting capacity was down by 30 percent.

Diminished fighting capacity began to plague virtually every unit, although replacement troops for the casualties were moved in as quickly as possible. Certainly the fresh Marines didn’t lack stamina, spirit, or courage, but often they didn’t have the previous battle experience of the initial frontline troops.

As a result, many became casualties themselves almost as soon as they reached the battleground. Rank had few privileges on Iwo Jima. Officers and noncommissioned officers were always prime targets. When the enemy enjoyed the advantage of position as did the Japanese, the situation was made worse as gunners took their time to carefully spot command posts, communications centers, and troop leaders.

Nineteen of the 24 original battalion commanders who landed on Iwo became casualties. Among them was the leader of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, Lt. Col. Alexander A. Vandegrift Jr., son of the commandant of the Marine Corps. Although he survived a mortar hit to his command post, he was wounded in both legs.

Less fortunate was Lt. Col. Chandler Johnson, the man who led the battalion that planted the flag on Mt. Suribachi. After his 28th Regiment left the mountain to help the drive up the island’s west coast, Chandler took a direct hit from a mortar shell. The heroes of the flag-raising on Mt. Suribachi, Company E of the 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division, were reduced to a very few survivors when they came in with Johnson to help take Hill 362A. Despite the carnage, the attack pressed on.

On March 4, the Marines got a huge

reminder of exactly why Iwo Jima was strategically important as the first jumbo B-29 Superfortress made an emergency landing there. The airfield immediately came under mortar attack, so repairs were completed quickly and the bomber was sent on its way.

The event was a major morale booster for troops who were now measuring daily gains in feet rather than yards. One of the legendary obstacles was a place called Cushman’s Pocket. Named for Lt. Col. Robert E. Cushman Jr., who headed the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Marines, the pocket became the 3rd Division’s equivalent to the Meat Grinder. It was one of the most perfectly devised fortifications on the island, recalls the division’s history.

At one point around Turkey Knob, the Marines brought in a 75 mm howitzer and fired it again and again point-blank into an emplacement. After 85 rounds the fortification still hadn’t succumbed.

The Japanese even had a surprise or two left. At one point, the Marines were moving against what seemed to be huge mounds of earth. Suddenly the ground roared to life as five Japanese tanks rumbled out of covered emplacements and opened fire. Dripping rocks, shrubs, and earth, they were about to crush the 1st Battalion’s flank when Company I Commander Capt. Edward V. Stephenson rallied flamethrowers and bazooka men in a counterattack. The charge destroyed three tanks, while air support took out the other two.

The defenders held on to the pocket’s core using every resource they had, especially against Marine tanks. They’d first scatter the infantry with an air burst, then charge the tanks under cover of smoke, armed with satchel charges and Molotov cocktails.

The Japanese also counterattacked in force. In one pre-dawn raid, more than 200 Japanese soldiers tried to squeeze between the lines of two battalions. An hourlong battle ending with hand-to-hand combat ensued.

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THE LONGEST MONTH

Above: Marines manning a .30-caliber machine gun crouch amid a welter of spent shell casings and empty ammunition boxes. While a common misconception holds that the capture of Mt. Suribachi marked the end of the fighting at Iwo Jima, the truth is that the battle had just begun. The fighting during the month that followed was among the most grueling in the history of America’s armed forces. Right: The Japanese soldiers’ philosophy of non-surrender made capturing them alive something of a rarity on Iwo Jima. The “Courageous Battle Vows” of the island’s defenders read as follows: “Above all, we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defense of this island. We shall grasp bombs, charge enemy tanks and destroy them. We shall infiltrate into the midst of the enemy and annihilate them.”

The next morning the Marines found 161 dead Japanese soldiers around their lines.

As it became clear, the pocket couldn’t be taken by frontal assault, the objective became Hill 362A to its rear. The Marines launched their own surprise. Daylight assaults, preceded and supported by air-sealand bombardment, were the rule of thumb on Iwo. The one exception came on March 7.

The plan was for the 21st Marines to seize Hill 362A in a daring pre-dawn attack, while the 9th Regiment made a diversionary movement. There was no initial bombardment, and the surprise was complete. At dawn, the two regiments came under intense fire. It appeared the objective was taken, but a combination of two similar landmarks and incorrect maps put the Marines on Hill 331, not 362A.

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More determined fighting, and the essential support of tanks, eventually put the 9th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion on the right hill. Moreover, during the night, troops had covered a substantial amount of heavily fortified ground that no longer required frontal assault.

Best of all, the Marines now held the commanding terrain in the north. And the novelty of being able to look down on the enemy rather than being under his continual observation, notes the division’s historians, “was by far the greatest boost to morale the 3rd Division had experienced.”

As the Marines advanced, the Japanese became more desperate. For example, the

5th Division surrounded and took one hill relatively easily. Then, as Marines raced to the peak, the top literally blew off as the defenders destroyed their own command post, causing 43 Marine casualties.

On March 8, the Japanese conducted the banzai attack the Marines had been expecting since the first night. The date was not coincidental. Japan commemorated the eighth of every month since it marked the date (on their calendar) for their attack on Pearl Harbor.

This night, nearly 1,000 men, some armed only with bamboo spears, crept close to the 4th Division lines. A few ingenious defenders dragged stretchers behind them as

though they were transporting wounded, and yelled, “Corpsman!” in English to try to deceive American troops. The bulk of the Japanese rose up and charged, screaming “Banzai!” and directed their efforts at the point where the 23rd and 24th regimental zones joined. The Marines were ready, but still had 90 men killed and 257 wounded. It was much worse for the Japanese: 784 bodies were found.

Finally, after 18 days of the toughest fighting the Marines had ever experienced, a patrol from A Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, reached Iwo’s northern end on March 9. They relayed a canteen with saltwater back to Maj. Gen. Schmidt with the now-classic message, “For inspection, not consumption.”

On March 16, the island was officially declared secure, a term that drew derision and anger from many of those still fighting a determined enemy. By no means was the battle over, even as the Army began to garrison the island.

Kuribayashi was still defending the island from his stronghold, an impenetrable bunker 60 feet under the north end of the island. On March 21, the general signaled the nearby island of Chichi Jima: “We have not eaten or drunk for five days. But our fighting spirit is still running high. We are going to fight bravely to the last ... The enemy front line is 200 or 300 meters from us and they are attacking by tank firing.

At the March 21, 1945 dedication of the 5th Marine Division cemetery on Iwo Jima, the cemetery flag is raised. The 5th Division had lost 1,500 men killed or wounded by the end of just the second day of fighting on the island.

“They advised us to surrender by loudspeakers, but we only laughed at this childish trick and did not set ourselves against them.”

On March 24, Kuribayashi sent out his final signal: “All officers and men of Chichi Jima – good-bye.” His body was never found; some suspect that he was severely wounded in the final Japanese offensive of the battle, and committed suicide rather than surrender. No one is certain.

The mop-up operation was conducted swiftly. The 3rd Division concentrated on still heavily fortified resistance near Hill 362C. When that was completed on March 16, they joined the 5th Division to compress Japanese troops into the area around Kitano Point, at the northern tip of Iwo Jima. On March 25, the 28th Marines – including just four of the 40 men from the Company E platoon that had planted the first flag on Suribachi – walked into a gorge that was honeycombed with caves.

More than 500 Japanese were there, and they fought to the end. The location was later known as “Bloody Gorge” and “Death Valley.” The 4th Division worked on last pockets of resistance between the

East Boat Basin and Tachiiwa Point, along the central east coast immediately east of the Meat Grinder.

On March 26, hundreds of Japanese made a final major attack. They hit the Army’s 506th Anti-aircraft Battalion just above Airfield No. 2, quickly over-running positions and attacking Marines and soldiers as they slept in their tents. Only a concerted effort by infantry, pilots, truck drivers, and medics quelled an attack that claimed more than 50 American and 262 Japanese lives.

At long last, the mission was truly accomplished.

It cost 6,821 American lives (including 5,931 Marines) to conquer Iwo Jima, plus more than 2,000 others who later died of their injuries in American veterans’ hospitals. In all, there were 25,851 U.S. casualties.

Kuribayashi and his 21,000 men hadn’t killed 10 Marines for every Japanese, as they vowed. But they had died trying as they made Iwo Jima the most costly action the Marines had ever endured. Few Japanese surrendered.

Yet any mention of the valiant men lost must also acknowledge the valiant men spared. After that first B-29 landing on March 4, there were 852 similar forced landings over the next three months. The Army Air Force estimated that more than 9,000 pilots and crew members were saved because the Marines, with the support of the Navy, took Iwo Jima at all costs.

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UNCOMMON VALOR

UNCOMMON VALOR WAS A COMMON VIRTUE SOME HEROES OF IWO JIMA

BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN

“This will be the bloodiest fight in Marine Corps history. We’ll catch seven kinds of hell on the beaches, and that will be just the beginning. The fighting will be fierce, and the casualties will be awful, but my Marines will take the damned island.”

– Lt. Gen. Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, Commander, V Amphibious Corps

T

he battle was supposed to last a week. Instead, it took five. When it was over, the Japanese garrison of about 20,000 soldiers and sailors was wiped out. American casualties included 6,821 Marines and sailors killed and 19,217 wounded.

Such a total is a testament to the grueling ferocity of combat on that remote Pacific island. Marine correspondent Sgt. Gilbert Preston Bailey observed that of the men who fought on Iwo Jima, “Stories will never be written about most of them. There are too many, and what they do has come to be taken for granted.”

Yet over the years many of those stories – of heroism and sacrifice both great and small by men on the battle lines; of corpsmen and surgeons waging their own war to save the lives of those wounded; of Navy beachmasters and Construction Battalion personnel, the Seabees, imposing organization out of beachhead chaos; of cooks at their field kitchens, braving hostile fire in order to provide hot food; and so many others – have emerged, reminding each successive generation why Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) Fleet

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Headquarters Adm. Chester W. Nimitz said of those who fought on Iwo Jima, “Uncommon valor was a common virtue.”

That statement is underscored by the 27 Medals of Honor awarded to Marines and Navy servicemen who fought there, the highest number awarded in a single battle. The 22 Marine Medals of Honor represent more than 25 percent of the 83 Medals of Honor awarded to Marines in that conflict. Of the vast mountain of countless acts of heroism rendered on Iwo Jima, those who received the Medal of Honor represent the summit.

What follows are some of their stories.

The first Medal of Honor awarded in the battle was the result of action that occurred two days before Marines would set foot on Iwo Jima’s volcanic beaches. Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs – the forerunner of Navy SEALs) were conducting reconnaissance and demolitions missions to gather beach condition intelligence and destroy underwater obstacles in the days leading up to the amphibious assault.

On the morning of Feb. 17, 1945, LCI(G)-449 (Landing Craft Infantry (Gunboat)), under

the command of Lt. j.g. Rufus G. Herring, was one of a flotilla of gunboats assigned to carry UDTs and then provide close-in support as they conducted their final mission before the assault. The 449’s complement of weapons included two 40 mm cannon, four 20 mm cannon, six .50-caliber machine guns, and 10 Mk 7 rocket launchers.

After the UDTs had disembarked and proceeded to the beaches, the gunboats took up station about 250 yards offshore. The gunboats soon came under heavy and accurate artillery and machine gun fire from Mount Suribachi and elsewhere on the island. In less than two hours, all the gunboats had been hit, several severely.

The 449 was struck repeatedly. One 40 mm gun was blown into the water. Cannon fire blasted apart the conning tower, killing 12 and wounding others. One of the wounded was Herring, who was knocked out. When he came to, he saw the 449’s decks were a charnel house of dead and wounded, with the gunboat wallowing out of control, the helmsman being one of the many dead.

U.S. NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND PHOTO

The first Iwo Jima Medal of Honor was earned before any Marines landed on the island. Lt. j.g. Rufus G. Herring, commanding officer of LCI(G)-449, received the award for continuing to battle Japanese shore batteries, con his ship, and aid his wounded despite being badly wounded himself. Some of LCI(G)-449’s casualties are evident in this photograph of LCI(G)-449 alongside USS Terror, which was rendering aid to the badly damaged ship.

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

Lt. j.g. Rufus G. Herring, USNR.

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOS

Above: Col. Justice M. Chambers, USMCR. Right: Sgt. Darrell S. Cole, USMCR.

Despite his wounds, Herring clambered down to the pilot house, took the helm, regained control of the 449, rallied his men, and directed fire of the gunboat’s remaining weapons and care of the wounded.

Forced to give up the helm due to loss of blood, he continued to give orders to his men, finally ordering the 449 to retire to the minelayer USS Terror that was also serving as a casualty evacuation vessel. Despite the severity of his wounds, Herring refused to be evacuated until all the other wounded and dead had been taken aboard. Evacuated to the United States, he received his Medal of Honor on Sept. 17, 1945.

Over a period of four days from Feb. 19 to Feb. 22, 1945, as commander of the 3rd Assault Battalion Landing Team, 25th Marines, 4th Marine Division, Lt. Col. Justice M. Chambers, from the moment he landed on the beach, disregarded his own safety and inspired his men to heroic efforts by his own valor, constantly encouraging them to push forward against fierce enemy resistance. Critically wounded and evacuated under heavy Japanese fire, his Medal of Honor citation noted: “… Colonel Chambers, by forceful leadership, courage and fortitude in the face of staggering odds, was directly

instrumental in insuring the success of subsequent operations of the Fifth Amphibious Corps on Iwo Jima ...”

Sgt. Darrell S. Cole, USMCR, was the leader of a machine gun section. On Feb. 19, his team assisted in the assault of Airfield No. 1. In the push-off, he personally destroyed two enemy emplacements with hand grenades. When gunfire from three additional Japanese pillboxes halted his men’s advance, Cole devised a shrewd and daring counterattack. Armed with just a pistol and hand grenades, he neutralized in quick succession all three of the pillboxes.

After eliminating the third pillbox and while returning to his squad to rearm, his luck ran out. His citation stated, “Although instantly killed by an enemy grenade as he returned to his squad, Sergeant Cole had eliminated a formidable Japanese position, thereby enabling his company to storm the remaining fortifications, continue the advance, and seize the objective.”

On Feb. 20, 1945, Capt. Robert H. Dunlap, USMCR, was leading Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, 5th Marine Division, along the low ground on the western side of Airfield No. 1. His men encountered heavy, accurate fire from Japanese positions hidden in the steep cliffs overlooking their position. After ordering his men

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UNCOMMON VALOR

to give him covering fire, Dunlap crawled 200 yards to the base of the cliff, located a number of enemy positions in caves, and made his way back to report their positions. He then grabbed a field telephone and as his citation states, “disregarding his own personal safety, he then placed himself in an exposed vantage point to direct more accurately the supporting fire and, working without respite for two days and two nights under constant enemy fire, skillfully directed a smashing bombardment against the almost impregnable Japanese positions.”

Pfc. Jacklyn H. Lucas was one of many underage men who lied about their age to enlist. In Lucas’ case, he was really underage. He was just 14 years old when, in August 1942, he walked into a Marine recruiter’s

office in North Carolina. Standing 5 feet, 8 inches tall, and weighing 200 pounds, he easily convinced the recruiter. Lucas was the classic example of someone who is a pain in peace and a boon in battle. He was a constant headache to military policemen, running afoul of them for one infraction or another. Instead of hitting the beach on Iwo Jima as a rifleman in C Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment, 5th Marine Division, Lucas should have been in the brig. Technically, he was AWOL, having stowed away on an Iwo Jima-bound troopship just one step ahead of military policemen who were searching for him.

On Feb. 20, D-day+1, he was part of a four-man rifle team transiting a twisting ravine when they were ambushed by Japanese troops. A vicious firefight erupted. When two Japanese grenades landed in their midst, Lucas’ citation states, “Private First Class Lucas unhesitatingly hurled himself over his comrades upon one grenade and pulled the other under him, absorbing the whole blasting forces of the explo-

The surgeon on the hospital ship Samaritan who operated on him said in amazement, “Maybe he was too damned young and too damned tough to die.” Instead of the brig, Lucas received the Medal of Honor.

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOS

Above Capt. Robert H. Dunlap, USMCR. Right: Pfc. Jacklyn H. Lucas, USMCR.

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOS

sions in his own body in order to shield his companions from the concussion and murderous flying fragments.” Miraculously, the explosions didn’t kill him. The surgeon on the hospital ship Samaritan who operated on him said in amazement, “Maybe he was too damned young and too damned tough to die.” Instead of the brig, Lucas received the Medal of Honor.

On Feb. 21, 1945, Sgt. Ross F. Gray, USMCR, was an acting platoon sergeant in Company A, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 4th Marine Division. While advancing toward high ground northeast of Airfield No. 1, his men came under heavy fire from hidden Japanese positions. His citation states, in part: “Repeatedly covering the ground between the savagely defended enemy fortifications and his platoon area, he systematically approached, attacked and withdrew under blanketing fire to destroy a total of six Japanese positions, more than 25 troops and a quantity of vital ordnance gear and ammunition.” Sadly, his Medal of Honor would be a posthumous award.

Though Gray survived that engagement, six days later he was killed in action by shrapnel.

In his first attempt to enlist in 1942, Cpl. Hershel W. Williams, USMCR, was rejected for being too short. But after the height restriction was lifted in early 1943, he was accepted, trained as a demolition sergeant, which meant he could operate a flamethrower and demolition charges, and saw action in Guam.

At Iwo Jima, he was serving with Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, 3rd Marine Division. When the attack on Feb. 23 bogged down due to fierce enemy resistance, Williams, one of the last flamethrower operators in the unit, volunteered to help open an infantry lane through the gauntlet of pillboxes that had, so far, successfully resisted attack by Marine tanks. Hoisting a 70-pound flamethrower onto his back, and covered by only four riflemen, his Medal of Honor citation recounted, “He fought desperately for four hours under terrific enemy small-arms fire and repeatedly returned to his own lines to prepare demolition charges and obtain serviced flamethrowers, struggling back, frequently to the rear of hostile emplacements, to wipe out one position after another. On one occasion, he daringly mounted a pillbox to insert the nozzle of his flamethrower through the air vent, killing the occupants and silencing the gun; on another he grimly charged enemy riflemen who attempted to stop him with bayonets and destroyed them with a burst of flame from his weapon. His unyielding determination and extraordinary heroism in the face of ruthless enemy resistance were directly instrumental in neutralizing one of the most fanatically defended Japanese strong points encountered by his regiment and aided vitally in enabling his company to reach its objective.”

Pfc. Douglas T. Jacobson lied about his age and enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1943 at age 17. By the time he landed with the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, 4th Marine Division on Iwo Jima, he was already a veteran, having seen action in the conquest of Saipan and Tinian. On Feb. 26, the division had overrun Airfield No. 2 and was encountering deadly resistance from Hill 382, called by the Japanese Nidan Iwa, located just east of the airfield and part of a particularly stout defensive stronghold that included what the Marines called the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, and the wrecked village of Minami, that got the collective name of the Meat Grinder.

When a bazookaman near him was cut down by machine gun fire, Jacobson grabbed the dead Marine’s weapon and used it to destroy a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun emplacement. Then, using a combination of bazooka fire and demolition charges, he destroyed two machine gun positions, a large blockhouse, a pillbox, and seven

Top: Sgt. Ross F. Gray, USMCR. Above: Pfc. Douglas T. Jacobson, USMCR.

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IWO JIMA MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS (*denotes posthumous award)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PHOTO

Pharmacist’s Mate 2nd Class George E. Wahlen, USN, receives his Medal of Honor from President Harry S Truman.

rifle emplacements. He then continued his attack, assisting a nearby unit. His citation would go on to report, “By his dauntless skill and valor, Private First Class Jacobson destroyed a total of 16 enemy positions and annihilated approximately 75 Japanese thereby contributing essentially to the success of his division’s operation against this fanatically defended outpost of the Japanese Empire.”

Pharmacist’s Mate 2nd Class George E. Wahlen, USN, was attached to Company F, 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines, 5th Marine Division. Though seriously wounded on Feb. 26, and wounded a second time on March 2, he refused evacuation, telling the surgeon, “Christ, Doc, I’m not hurt that bad and I’m a damned good corpsman. And besides, my outfit needs men, there’s just three medics left in the battalion.”

Hill 362B was located in the north-central section of Iwo Jima, just north of the ruins of Motoyama Village. On March 3, the assault on Hill 362B started out well, with the Marines quickly crossing 600 yards of open terrain in the initial drive against little opposition. But when they got close to their objective, the Japanese defenders replied with blistering counterfire.

Ignoring enemy fire, Wahlen went from one wounded Marine to another, rendering aid. As his Medal of Honor citation noted, “He persevered in his determined efforts

• Cpl. Charles J. Berry, USMC* • Pfc. William R. Caddy, USMCR* • Lt. Col. Justice M. Chambers, USMCR • Sgt. Darrell S. Cole, USMCR* • Capt. Robert H. Dunlap, USMCR • Sgt. Ross F. Gray, USMCR* • Sgt. William G. Harrell, USMC • Lt. j.g. Rufus G. Herring, USNR • Pfc. Douglas T. Jacobson, USMCR • Platoon Sgt. Joseph R. Julian, USMCR* • Pfc. James D. La Belle, USMCR* • 2nd Lt. John H. Leims, USMCR* • Pfc. Jacklyn Harrell Lucas, USMCR • 1st Lt. Jack Lummus, USMCR* • 1st Lt. Harry L. Martin, USMCR* • Capt. Joseph J. McCarthy, USMCR • Pvt. George Phillips, USMCR* • Pharmacist’s Mate 1st Class Francis J. Pierce, USN • Pfc. Donald J. Ruhl, USMCR* • Pvt. Franklin E. Sigler, USMCR • Cpl. Tony Stein, USMCR* • Pharmacist’s Mate 2nd Class George E. Wahlen, USN • Gunnery Sgt. William G. Walsh, USMCR* • Pvt. Wilson D. Watson, USMCR • Cpl. Hershel W. Williams, USMCR • Pharmacist’s Mate 3rd Class Jack Williams, USNR* • Pharmacist’s Mate 1st Class John H. Willis, USN*

as his unit waged fierce battle, and unable to walk after sustaining a third agonizing wound, resolutely crawled 50 yards to administer first aid to still another fallen fighter.” By rights that third wound should have been fatal, but somehow he survived even after having to wait 30 minutes before Marines could reach and evacuate him. Three months later, while recovering in a Guam hospital, he received word that he would receive the Medal of Honor.

Though fighting would continue for several more days, in CINCPAC communiqué No. 300 dated March 16, 1945, Nimitz stated that “organized resistance had ceased” and that “the battle of Iwo Island has been won. … With certain knowledge of the cost of an objective which had to be taken, the Fleet

Marine Force supported the ships of the Pacific Fleet and by Army and Navy aircraft fought the battle and won. By their victory, the Third, Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions and other units of the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully.

Among the Americans serving on Iwo island, uncommon valor was a common virtue.” The phrase “uncommon valor was a common virtue” was later included in the Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington Ridge Park outside Arlington National Cemetery.

As of this writing, Hershel Williams is the last surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Battle of Iwo Jima and one of only two living World War II Medal of Honor recipients.

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INTERVIEW

Hershel “Woody” Williams BATTLE OF IWO JIMA MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENT

H

ershel “Woody” Williams fought on Guam and Iwo Jima during World War II. On Iwo Jima, his actions during a single day of battle earned him the Medal of Honor, and today he is the last living Marine Corps recipient of the Medal of Honor during World War II. Today, Williams leads the Hershel Woody Williams Medal of Honor Foundation, which works to recognize and honor the sacrifices of Gold Star families – those who have lost a loved one in war. The foundation works to build monuments recognizing Gold Star families, conducts outreach to inform the general public of their sacrifices, and also awards educational scholarships to Gold Star family members.

Uncommon Valor: So, when and how did you join the Marine Corps?

Hershel “Woody” Williams: I tried to get into the Marine Corps in 1942. I didn’t know anything about war. I didn’t think that I would even leave the United States. I thought I was going to join the Marine Corps to protect my country and keep it from being taken over by people I had never heard of. But when I went to the recruiter and tried to enlist, they turned me down because I was too short. I didn’t meet the height requirement that they had at that time of 5’8”. The recruiter wouldn’t accept my application for enlistment, so I went back to the farm. My father died when I was 11 and my mother was still running it. But in early 1943, they lowered the height requirement, and the recruiter came and looked me up and asked me if I still wanted to go to the Marine Corps. And I said certainly. So, I was able then to enlist. I actually enlisted in February 1943, but they couldn’t take all of us who wanted to get in. In May of ’43, they finally took five of us from our hometown and sent us to California for bootcamp.

After bootcamp, I went through infantry training at Camp Pendleton in a replacement unit. They were training us to go overseas to replace those that had been wounded and killed. I took additional training at Camp Pendleton and then shipped overseas and finally joined the 3rd Marine Division on Guadalcanal.

So, you went through infantry training. At some point you also went through specialist training for demolitions, correct?

That happened in January 1944. I got overseas in December of ’43 on Guadalcanal. And then in January ’44, they came out with the flamethrower. None of us had ever heard tell of it and never seen it, of course. And we began training to be flamethrower operators. And at the same time, they were training us to be demolition people because we had to know both facets of it. If we burned out a pillbox or a cave or put flame in them, then we would use an explosive to seal the cave or to put in the pillbox to make sure that nobody survived.

So, they trained us both ways. We could do either one.

When did you actually land on Iwo Jima?

They tried to get us in on the second day. The other two divisions hit the beach on the 19th of February. They tried to get us in on the 20th of February. We were loaded aboard Higgins boats and went out to a

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PHOTOS COURTESY OF HERSHEL WOODY WILLIAMS MEDAL OF HONOR FOUNDATION

BY CHUCK OLDHAM

rendezvous area preparing to go ashore in waves like they did with every island. But the Marines ashore couldn’t get enough room [in the beachhead] to permit us to come in.

So, we rode Higgins boats all day, and then they sent us back to the ship that night. We got off the next morning, which would have been the 21st of February, and that day we got in just a little before noon.

Did you have any idea of what the conditions and casualties had been like on the island before you landed?

No, we had no information whatsoever.

None of that stuff was broadcast because that might be useful to the enemy. So none of that was ever fed down to the troops at all.

A lot of Americans’ conception of the Pacific campaign is jungles and white sand beaches – that sort of thing. I don’t think they necessarily understand what the conditions were like on Iwo Jima and I wonder if you could describe them.

Cpl. Hershel ”Woody” Williams receives the Medal of Honor from President Harry S Truman in October 1945.

Yeah, absolutely. The general in charge of the defense of Iwo Jima [Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi] sort of reversed the defense trend on other islands. [For] the other islands that we and others had landed on, the defense mechanism was to try to kill [the Americans] in the water. If they couldn’t get ashore, then they certainly couldn’t capture the island. But Kuribayashi reversed that to say, “No, let them come in, because the island was only two and a half miles wide, five miles long, and they are going to land 40,000 Marines at the same time on one day.” He knew all of that information before we ever got there. So he had erected, according to the records that I have from somebody else’s account, 800 different-size pillboxes or concealments, some of them

that were barrels just buried in the ground – you know, they had one man in them. And others were huge pillboxes made out of reinforced concrete cement with bars in it, iron bars through it. You couldn’t blow the thing up because it was so well reinforced.

So he let all of the Marines get ashore, and then that’s when he started with mortars and machine guns and artillery, because they couldn’t get off the beach. They couldn’t get back off the island and he had them pinned on the beach to where they couldn’t go anywhere. So that’s why we lost so very many in the first few days of the campaign.

He pretty much had every inch of that island zeroed in with one weapon or another.

Exactly right, exactly right. And digging holes on the beach was impossible because the soil or the sand – they call it black sand – from the volcano over the centuries was deep. If you tried to dig a hole, it was like digging in BBs or corn. You just couldn’t get any solid walls on it, so they just kept falling

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Left: Williams poses post-World War II with the type of flamethrower used in his Medal of Honor actions. Above: The Hershel Woody Williams Medal of Honor Foundation provides living legacy scholorships to eligible Gold Star children.

in. So most [Marines] were lying on top of the ground and no place to go. And there was just no organization, no formation. You just couldn’t miss.

Could you tell us a little bit about the actions for which you received the Medal of Honor?

Yes. When we got there, the 4th Marine Division had been able to move out off of the beach and began attacking Mount Suribachi.

They had been able to do that. And that’s where we got our space to come in. Our job was to go across the airfield and be the point heading to the northern part of the island.

And when we got across the airfield, [the Japanese] had set up a great number of reinforced concrete pillboxes to protect the airfield. And we attempted to penetrate those.

And of course, they were inside a protected area. We were outside trying to advance to-

ward them. And of course, you have to get up and move and run and walk and all that sort of thing. So we lost a tremendous number of Marines attempting to reach the pillboxes the first day and then the second day.

On the 23rd, which was the day that the flag went up on Mt. Suribachi, my commanding officer – his name was Donald Beck – called for a meeting because he had lost almost all of his officers except two. Most of the squad leaders and platoon leaders were already gone. We were so disorganized. We had no more organization.

We were just this group. And he called for a meeting of the NCOs [noncommissioned officers]. I was a corporal at the time, not considered an NCO, but I was told by my first sergeant that I was to go to that meeting. I had six Marines in my little specialty unit when we hit the beach. They were flamethrower/demolition operators, and

they were assigned to the companies – A, B, and C Company – and they had been involved in this advance trying to move forward, and they were gone. I never did know whether they were killed or wounded. That information was never furnished to me.

But by the time the commanding officer called for the meeting of his NCOs – those that were left – that’s when he asked me if I thought I could do anything with the flamethrower against some of the pillboxes that we were trying to advance toward. I was qualified, personally, because I had trained the others. I have no idea of my response.

Some of the Marines when we got back to Guam … had said that my response was “I will try.” So, he told me to pick out four Marines to help me, to give me protection, and to go to work. That’s what my job was.

So, I put on the flamethrower and started working.

You said that when you first tried to go into the Marine Corps, you didn’t meet the height requirement, which at the time was 5’8”. An M2 flamethrower weighs something like 70 pounds. Did you have to move through that volcanic sand carrying 70 pounds and trying to advance on bunkers?

No. Fortunately, once we crossed the airfield, the ground became more solid. We didn’t have all of that deep sand past the airfield. So, it was more solid ground – though the flamethrower did weigh 70 pounds. But we could dig holes – foxholes – once we got past the airfield. The ground was still

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INTERVIEW

An image of Williams wearing the Medal of Honor he was awarded for his actions on Iwo Jima.

exceedingly hot. We’d dig a foxhole for two people. Of course, you always had two people in a hole. One slept an hour and then he would wake the other guy and he’d sleep an hour. So we would rotate that all night long.

And if you laid on the ground too long without any protection on the ground, something to sleep on, the heat was so intense that it would make you sick. I woke up vomiting a couple of nights. And I learned that you had to have a poncho or cardboard, or whatever we could find we would put on the ground first to lay on so that that heat wouldn’t penetrate our bodies.

It was that hot even at night?

Yes, we would bury our C-rations. We were getting C-rations, and of course, they are in tin cans. And we could dig down about 10, 12 inches and bury that in the sand. We’d have a hot chow when we got ready to eat it.

That’s amazing, and not in a good way.

So, as you advanced on these bunkers, how did it work? You had the two-man teams on either side of you, and they would deliver covering fire to try to keep them down inside the bunker as you would advance?

Yeah, the four Marines that he told me to take with me, I divided them. I put two on my right side and two on my left side, if that makes sense. So, I put them in a position where, when I was approaching a pillbox – we called them pillboxes instead of bunkers – but when I approached a pillbox, they could see me operating, and their job was to shoot at the aperture. It had an opening in the front of the pillbox that the Japanese shot out of, [and they would] shoot at that aperture to try to keep the Japanese from being able to shoot at me. The first pillbox, I took what we called in those days a pole charge man. We had put together a 2 by 2 piece of wood about 8 feet long with a 12-inch board nailed to the one end of it that we would strap on explosives.

And it was just called a pole charge because it was on a piece of wood. And the pole charge man’s job was, once we put flame in a cave or in a pillbox, to run in and put that explosive in the hole or in the pillbox and set it off to make sure that everybody in there is dead. I took one guy with me, but he got wounded before we ever got started on the thing. So, I didn’t

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have anybody to help me from that point on. I was just by myself. But the four Marines that I had selected, two of those – and I didn’t know this until long after we got back to Guam – two of them had been killed protecting me.

I never did know who they were until about a year and a half ago. A group of people did some searching of records and came to the conclusion and identified two individuals who were killed that afternoon in the location where we were working. So, we assume it was the two Marines that were protecting me because at that particular time in that particular location, only two Marines were killed that afternoon.

So, you went after the first pillbox and neutralized that one. The flamethrowers didn’t hold a large amount of fuel. Did you destroy one and then have to go back and get a fresh flamethrower or get refueled?

Well, the flamethrower had four and a half gallons of flammable fuel in it. And we learned, we were trained, not to waste what we had. So, we would shoot it in 2-, 3-, 5-second bursts, depending on what we were trying to do. So, we would shoot it not in the air but on the ground, and roll a great

big ball of flame into a cave or into a pillbox. The flamethrower, if you opened it up and just let it go, would last 72 seconds. And then all of its fuel is gone. So, I would use one and then unbuckle it, roll out of it, leave it, and go get another one. We had serviced a great number of those before we ever left with a campaign. They were in our company headquarters. And I each time would have to go back and get one, and I used six that day.

Much of that day and how I got them and when I got them I have no memory of.

How far back would you have to go off the line to reach the company headquarters and get a new flamethrower?

That’s one of the things that my memory will not return. They tell me that’s pretty natural. I’ve talked to psychologists on why can’t I remember. I know I went and got them because nobody brought them out to me. I know that. So, I had to get them. But why can’t I remember going to get them? I know that I have no memory of that at all.

Were you under fire when you had to roll out of the flamethrower and go back to retrieve another one?

Yes, they were still shooting. You crawled more than you walked, I guarantee you.

You ended up expending six flamethrowers. So this wasn’t a short action. This went on for awhile?

Four hours, they tell me.

Four hours carrying 70-pound flamethrowers. How tired were you at the end of the day?

Well, you were always, I think, always exhausted, because you’re using up every bit of energy you’ve got. And you could sleep on nails. I’ve seen people standing on their feet sleeping because you just get to that point in time where you have got to – have to – sleep.

You don’t remember, because your adrenaline is running so high; and you make no effort to remember, and you don’t think you want to remember. So you just don’t.

How many pillboxes did you end up taking out that day?

I took out seven.

Why do you think that Iwo Jima is so important to the Marine Corps?

I’ve said many, many times it wasn’t the Marines that made Iwo Jima the icon that it is, because we actually suffered more casualties at Okinawa than we did at Iwo Jima. But it was Old Glory, Old Glory being placed on Mt. Suribachi and on enemy territory for the very first time in World War II. All the other islands that we had taken belonged to some other country, but this one was homeland of

Williams with one of the Gold Star family monuments his foundation has built.

Japan. And that gave it a significance that no other island had ever had. The image of that flag being placed, printed on the front page of practically every newspaper in the country when it happened – that really was what made Iwo Jima the icon that it is.

Could you tell us a little bit about the Hershel Woody Williams Medal of Honor Foundation and what it does?

Yes. For years and years, we identified and paid tribute, and some communities put up some form of a roll or a monumental recognition to honor Gold Star mothers. But we had never done anything for anybody else in a family. It was only Gold Stars for our mothers. We all know that our mothers – we’re closer to them than to our dad, generally. But that was what we talked about. I finally had a very vivid experience, where a dad told me that he had lost his son in Afghanistan, and he was the only survivor. The mother was already deceased, and he got the knock on the door. He was alone and had no other relatives to talk with, and the neighbors where they lived – nobody understood what had happened or how it had happened and that sort of thing. And he told me, “Dads cry too.”

That opened my eyes – why did we forget Dad and all the other family members

that are related to that individual? Because everybody grieves when you lose a loved one that you’re related to. It doesn’t make any difference what that relationship is. So that got us started, saying we needed something in our state of West Virginia to honor the families of those 11,434 names we have on a veterans memorial on our Capitol grounds. I don’t understand why somebody along the way didn’t say, “Hey, look at these families. They are giving more than anybody else and certainly more than us.” So, we needed some way to honor those families.

I decided we needed a Gold Star family memorial to honor all of those who grieve when their loved one is lost. We didn’t expect it to go anywhere except in our own state. But other states and other people in other communities heard about it and it started the ball rolling. The second one was done at Valley Forge, and the third one down at Tampa, Florida. And then it continued to gain momentum. Two days ago, we dedicated the 50th one in the country, and 42 states now have something. West Virginia – we’ve already got six of them, and we’re doing No. 7 in just a few weeks. And in October, we will do No. 8, which will be on our Capitol grounds, on the grounds of our Capitol where we have this veterans memorial with all those names on it. It will be bigger and better than anybody else’s in the country because it started in West Virginia. And our legislators felt that we ought to have something a little outstanding because we were the beginning of the notion.

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CREDIT

Pictured during the first flag-raising on Mount Suribachi are, left to right, 1st Lt. Harold Schrier (kneeling behind radioman’s legs); Pfc. Raymond Jacobs (radioman reassigned from F Company); Sgt. Henry “Hank” Hansen (wearing cap, holding flagstaff with left hand); Platoon Sgt. Ernest “Boots” Thomas (seated); Pvt. Phil Ward (holding lower flagstaff with his right hand); PhM2c John Bradley, USN; Pfc. James Michels (holding M1 carbine); and Cpl. Charles W. Lindberg (standing above Michels).

THE TWO FLAG-RAISINGS THE STORY OF THE FIRST AND SECOND FLAG-RAISINGS ON MOUNT SURIBACHI

BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN

“There goes the flag!”

– The cry from Marines and sailors upon seeing the raising of the first flag

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY SSGT. LOUIS R. LOWERY

J

ohn W. Gardner, educator, public official, and political reformer, wrote, “History never looks like history when you are living through it. It always looks confusing and messy, and it always looks uncomfortable.” Such an observation surely applies to the two historic flag-raisings on Iwo Jima’s Mount Suribachi on Feb. 23, 1945. It was recorded in both still and motion picture and produced the most famous and iconic image of World War II. Yet while the image is well-known, many of the facts about the raisings are not, starting with how many flag-raisings there were (to the general public there was only one), whether or not the second flag-raising was staged (it wasn’t), and, most importantly, the identity of all those who raised the flags, particularly the second one. The last inspired controversy and confusion that continued into 2019.

Located on the southern tip of the pork chop-shaped island of Iwo Jima, the 554-foot extinct volcano Mt. Suribachi ( Japanese for “cone-shaped bowl,” a reference to its summit) dominated the island. Marine Lt. Gen. Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, commander of V Amphibious Corps assigned to conquer this distant part of Japanese homeland, underscored its importance, saying, “The

success of our entire assault depends upon the early capture of that grim, smoking rock.”

The task of subduing the mountain the Marines code named “Hot Rocks” for the sulfur-scented steam it emitted through vents, was given to Lt. Col. Harry B. “Harry the Horse” Liversedge, commander of the 28th Marine Regiment of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Division. The Japanese commander of the forces on Mt. Suribachi equally determined to deny the 28th Marines was Col. Kanehiko Atsuchi. He led a garrison of 2,000 crack Japanese soldiers and sailors.

As the 28th Marines prepared their attack on the morning of Feb. 20, D+1 the regiment’s commander, Lt. Col. Chandler Johnson, commented, “It’s gonna be a helluva day in a helluva place to fight the goddamned war.” Already the 28th Marines had suffered almost 400 casualties during the drive across the isthmus that severed the Japanese in Mt. Suribachi from the rest of the defenders in the north. The overall commander of the Japanese garrison, Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi, had anticipated such a scenario.

Kuribayashi’s engineers had spent months creating a vast network of defenses on the mountain. Mt. Suribachi’s slopes were honeycombed with a formidable interlock-

ing array of concrete-walled bunkers and blockhouses and camouflaged spider-holes where individual soldiers or sailors could suddenly emerge without warning, shoot, and disappear in seconds. These and other defensive positions, including trenches and countless caves, were all connected by an elaborate tunnel system. The strongest Japanese defenses were fortified by a ring of almost 120 camouflaged concrete blockhouses, pillboxes, and bunkers that guarded the trails leading up the first 100 feet of the mountain. It was Kuribayashi’s hope that the defenders could hold out for 10 days, maybe even two weeks.

When the Marines landed, Atsuchi wanted to order a banzai charge. Though he had largely given the colonel autonomous control over his command, Kuribayashi nixed that. He wanted the Marines to pay as great a price as possible, and that meant forcing the Marines to come to attack the defenders protected behind their fortifications.

Meteorologists had warned that, given the season, bad weather would be a chronic problem. As the 28th Marines prepared for the assault on Mt. Suribachi, a light rain began to fall, adding to the morning’s chill.

After a combined artillery barrage and air attack by carrier-based Marine Corsairs, the

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY SGT. LOUIS BURMEISTER

attack kicked off at 0830 hours and quickly bogged down under withering Japanese combined gunfire that had seemingly been unaffected by the artillery and air attack.

Marine tanks had been assigned to accompany the infantry at the line of departure, but the fierce fighting on D-day had exhausted their ammunition and fuel. Resupply and assembly were repeatedly interrupted by accurate Japanese mortar fire, and it was not until 1100 hours that Marine Shermans were able to add their much-needed firepower in support.

The battle up the mountain devolved into a deadly pas de deux in which fortifications were individually targeted, with a choreographed assault beginning with combined rifle and tank fire to draw and hold defenders’ attention while a flamethrower team crawled into position. A couple of streams of liquid napalm shot through an aperture were quickly followed up by a volley of grenades. Finally, a demolition team destroyed the fortification with satchel charges to

The first flag was raised on Mt. Suribachi Feb. 23, 1945, at around 10:20 a.m., but the fighting wasn’t over on Suribachi, and even after the mountain was secured, the battle on other parts of the island would continue for a month. In the foreground, facing the camera, is Pfc. Louis Charlo, who was part of the earlier morning patrol that found Suribachi nearly undefended, and was present for both flag-raisings. He was killed in action a week later while attempting to rescue a wounded Marine.

prevent its further use. Then it was on to the next one, where the process was repeated. By the end of D+1, the 28th Marines had overrun 40 strongpoints and advanced about 200 yards, at a cost in casualties of one Marine for every yard gained.

By the end of D+1, a storm with gale force winds hit the island. Landing supplies and reinforcements became impossible. Though the Marines could not know it, one bit of good fortune had fallen their way that day: At one point in the day’s assault, one of their

tanks had scored a lucky hit with a 75 mm round, killing Atsuchi.

When D+3 dawned, Navy ships offshore and Marine artillery near the landing beaches began their bombardment of Mt. Suribachi. Though high winds and heavy seas kept resupply to the island to a minimum, the rain broke long enough to allow Navy planes to finish off the preliminary bombardment with rockets, machine gun fire, and napalm bombs. At 0830, the 28th Marines renewed their slow, bloody advance up the rugged slopes.

First Battalion, 28th Marines, made the most progress that day, eventually reaching Mt. Suribachi’s shoulder on the west coast.

Second Battalion, 28th Marines, seemed to bear the brunt of the Japanese defenders’ fury, particularly mortar fire. Richard Wheeler, a rifleman in 3rd Platoon, E Company, later recalled, “It was terrible, the worst I can remember us taking. The Jap mortarmen seemed to be playing checkers and using us as squares.” Later wounded,

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY PFC. ROBERT CAMPBELL

THE TWO FLAG-RAISINGS

Wheeler would survive and go on to become an author, writing two accounts of the Battle of Iwo Jima, among other works.

The bad weather worsened on D+3. Rain mixed with the volcanic grit to create a mud that jammed Marines’ weapons. Despite this, by the end of the day, the men of the 28th Marines were close to their goal of conquering Mt. Suribachi. Johnson was determined that it would happen on D+4.

Preparatory bombardment of the slopes of Mt. Suribachi began at dawn and ended at about 0900. The rain that had made things miserable for the Marines began to let up by midmorning. Johnson had ordered two four-man reconnaissance patrols to search for a route to Mt. Suribachi’s summit, and soon he received word from Capt. Art Naylor, commander of Fox Company, that a team from his 3rd Platoon, led by Sgt. Sherman Watson, that included Cpl. George Mercer of Iowa, Pfc. Ted White from Kansas City, Missouri, and Pfc. Louis

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Charlo, of the Bitterroot Salish Tribe from Montana, had reached the top and returned without incident.

The stage was now set for an immortal moment in history – and enduring controversy.

THE FIRST FLAG-RAISING Johnson ordered Easy Company Commander Capt. Dave Severance to send a platoon to the top. Severance told 1st Lt. Harold Schrier to take his 3rd Platoon to Johnson’s command post for final orders.

There they were issued extra ammunition and Johnson told Schrier he’d have reinforcements that included a radioman, two teams of stretcher bearers, and Leatherneck magazine photographer Staff Sgt. Louis Lowery. It turned out Johnson’s orders were simple: Climb the summit and secure the crater. Then Johnson handed Schrier a 28-inch by 54-inch flag from the attack transport USS Missoula and said, “If you’re able to get up the mountain, I want

you to take this flag. ... If you can’t make it all the way up, turn around and come back down. Don’t try to go overboard.”

The platoon fell into an irregular column and began their trek up the slope. When the going got steep and more difficult, Schrier ordered flankers to spread out on both sides to guard against possible attack.

Though caves were sighted along the way, all was quiet, and within a half-hour they had reached the summit.

An eerie quiet had settled on the summit.

It ominously continued as the Marines slowly inspected the crater, finding caves, observation posts, and other evidence of Japanese activity, but no soldiers. Schrier ordered the men to fan out. Half the patrol took up positions inside the rim, fully expecting an enemy counterattack at any moment. The other half cautiously entered the crater, some probing the caves for the enemy, others looking for something they could use as a flagpole.

Suddenly a Japanese soldier appeared out of a spider hole. Harold Keller, firing from the hip, cut him down with three shots. Then grenades were tossed out of some of the caves at the group of Marines. The Marines responded with gunfire and a volley of their own grenades.

During this skirmish, Robert Leader and Leo Rozek found a long piece of water pipe

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

Left: Marines from the patrol rest below the first American flag raised atop Mt. Suribachi.

Above: The first flag is taken down and replaced with the second, larger American flag on Mt. Suribachi.

AP PHOTO BY JOE ROSENTHAL

Joe Rosenthal’s photo of the second, but iconic, flagraising on Mt. Suribachi.

The six Marines who raised the second flag have been identified as, left to right: Ira Hayes, Harold Schultz, Michael Strank, Franklin Sousley, Harold Keller, and Harlon Block.

and brought it up to the lip of the summit.

Schrier, Sgt. Ernest “Boots” Thomas, Sgt. Henry “Hank” Hansen, Cpl. Charles “Chuck” Lindberg, and Pharmacist’s Mate 2nd Class John Bradley quickly attached the flag to the makeshift flagpole. Then, at 10:30 a.m. on Feb. 23, 1945, with photographer Lowery recording the moment in pictures, a team from 3rd Platoon, Company E, 2nd Battalion, 28th Marines, raised the flag on Mt. Suribachi.

Far below, Marines who saw the tiny Stars and Stripes waving proudly over Japanese territory for the first time began cheering, “There goes the flag!” Their shouts were picked up and repeated by others on the island and soon by ships offshore, whose klaxons blared. Men cheered themselves hoarse.

Almost immediately after that flag went up, the Japanese tried to tear it down. But repeated attacks were fought back with a combination of gunfire, flamethrowers,

and finally demolition charges that sealed the caves.

Meanwhile, below, Johnson made what would become an historic decision. “Some sonuvabitch is going to want that flag, but he’s not going to get it. That’s our flag,” he said. And, observing that the flag was so small it was barely visible, he told his assistant operations officer Lt. Ted Tuttle, “Better find another one and get it up there and bring ours back. ... And make it a bigger one.”

Tuttle went off and from LST-779 got a larger, 96-inch by 56-inch flag. Johnson took that flag, handed it to runner Cpl. Rene Gagnon, and ordered him to take it to Schrier and to save the small flag for him. When Gagnon reached the summit, he told Schrier, “Col. Johnson wants this big flag run up high, so every son of a bitch on this whole cruddy island can see it!”

As for someone wanting to put dibs on the first flag, Johnson was right. Secretary of

the Navy James Forrestal was on the beach at Iwo Jima with Gen. Smith when it was raised. After telling Smith that the flag-raising “means a Marine Corps for another 500 years,” he expressed the desire to have that flag. But by then it was in Johnson’s hands, and he made sure it stayed with the Marine Corps. It eventually reached Washington, D.C., where it – along with the second Iwo Jima flag – is on permanent display in the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

THE SECOND FLAG-RAISING Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal was on the beach with Newsweek reporter Bill Hipple when they heard that a unit of Marines had taken the summit of Mt. Suribachi. They linked up with two Marine combat photographers, Pvt. Bob Campbell and Sgt. Bill Genaust, who planned to go to the mountaintop as well.

The unarmed civilians were happy to join

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

Right: Marines gather around the larger flag after the flag raising. Below Right: Joe Rosenthal atop Mt. Suribachi.

the armed Marines, as Mt. Suribachi had yet to be secured. At one point on the dangerous journey up, they encountered Lowery, who told them he’d taken photos of a Marine team raising a flag on the summit.

They were disappointed at having been scooped and considered returning down the mountain. But after Lowery told them that there was “a hell of a good view of the harbor,” the four decided to continue to the top anyway.

When they arrived, they discovered one group of Marines taking down the first, small flag and another group preparing to raise a larger flag in its place. The photographers quickly found a location about 35 feet away, and with two still photographers (Rosenthal and Campbell) and one motion picture photographer using color film (Genaust) to record the moment, the second flag was raised.

Almost immediately, the question was asked, “By whom?”

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

THE CONTROVERSY Who were the men who raised the flags at Iwo Jima? Specifically, because it was Rosenthal’s photograph that became famous to the public, who were the men who raised the second flag?

With faces obscured or hidden – and with one man almost completely blocked from view – the flag-raisers in Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph are anonymous as individuals, making the photograph a failure according to textbook criteria for a journalistically good photo.

But in all other respects, the Rosenthal photograph of the second flag-raising was a success that needed no written explanation. Finally, in this most terrible of wars and on its most terrible battlefield, the nation received what its people needed: an iconic symbol of American military effort in World War II. And, recognizing its value to help sell war bonds, the Marine Corps and Navy went into overdrive to name the second flag-raisers.

The problem began with the fact that there were two flag-raisings. Confusion immediately arose as to who participated in which one, or both. It didn’t help that in the middle of the two flag-raisings a battle was fought.

Neither Rosenthal, Campbell, nor Genaust had gotten all the flag-raisers’ identities, let alone in what order. Adding to the problems of identification was that by the time the Marine Corps wanted the flag-raisers, some had been killed in action. Further contributing to the confusion was an agreement by the Marine Corps not to release photos of the first flag-raising until 1947, unfortunately making that historic event an all-but-forgotten footnote in the public mind.

After decades of forensic searching and countless hours of study, the facts of who participated in which flag-raising are finally known, the last positive identification coming in 2019.

The men responsible for the first flag-raising were 1st Lt. Harold Schrier, Pfc.

Raymond Jacobs, Sgt. Henry Hansen, Platoon Sgt. Ernest Thomas, Pvt. Phil Ward, PhM2c John Bradley, Pfc. James Michels, and Cpl. Charles W. Lindberg.

The men responsible for the second flag-raising were Sgt. Michael Strank, Cpl. Harlon Block (correctly identified in 1947, replacing Hansen), Pfc. Franklin Sousley, Pfc. Harold Keller (correctly identified in 2019, replacing Gagnon), Pfc. Ira Hayes, and Cpl. Harold Schultz (correctly identified in 2016, replacing Bradley).

In a letter to his parents dated Feb. 26, 1945, well before he would be swept up in the flag-raising publicity and controversy, Bradley wrote, in part, “I had a little to do with raising the American flag and it was the happiest moment of my life.”

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Charles W. Lindberg IWO JIMA FIRST FLAG-RAISER INTERVIEW BY BOB YEHLING, WITH CHUCK OLDHAM

C

harles W. Lindberg’s life changed 10 days after he was evacuated from Iwo Jima. While lying in a military hospital in Saipan, between operations to repair a forearm shattered by a Japanese bullet, Cpl. Lindberg saw a photograph that set the tone for the next 50 years of his life. “Someone asked me if I wanted to see the first flag-raising,” Lindberg recalled. “I said, ‘Yeah.’ I looked at it and I said, ‘Oh no, that’s not the way we did it.’”

The-24-year old corporal didn’t know it at the time, but he was looking at a photo taken by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal. It was the image of five Marines and a Navy corpsman struggling to hoist a large American flag. “The photo” won Rosenthal a Pulitzer Prize; President Franklin D. Roosevelt the badly needed support of the American people to finish off Japan; the treasury coffers $220 million in war bond sales; unwanted fame for Pfc. Ira Hayes and PHM2c John Bradley; welcome fame for Pfc. Rene Gagnon; and the U.S. Marine Corps a symbol that would memorialize its grit and tenacity forever.

There was just one problem: Rosenthal’s photograph depicted the second flag-raising on Mt. Suribachi on Feb. 23, 1945. Four hours prior to that event, Lindberg and five other members of Company E, 28th Marines of the 5th Marine Division, had quickly raised a smaller flag on a 20-foot piece of iron pipe – then fought off Japanese resistance for three hours until the mountain was secure. Had Company E not mopped up the mountain, the second group may never have been sent up the hill by Lt. Col. Chandler Johnson, who ordered the flags switched to prevent any souvenir hunters from stealing the first flag.

From such an innocent switch grew the biggest avalanche and magnet of publicity the U.S. military has ever known. Timing was a factor, too. The photographer who accompanied Company E up the mountain on the morning of Feb. 23, Sgt. Lou Lowery of Leatherneck magazine, did not get his film off Iwo Jima until several days after the first flag-raising. Meanwhile, as a civilian member of the international media, Rosenthal was able to have his film rushed by ship to Guam, where it was developed and flown to the United States.

Uncommon Valor: Before Iwo Jima, you served with the 2nd Raider Battalion at Midway, then on Guadalcanal, and after that on Bougainville. On Guadalcanal, you were on the famous “Long Patrol.”

Can you describe that?

Charles W. Lindberg: We were sent back into the jungle. We spent 32 days behind enemy lines. We traveled all the way

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America’s propensity for creating big events and heroes took over. The second flag-raising became larger than life, and so did its three surviving participants. Lying in his hospital bed in Saipan, and later Oahu, Lindberg grew more and more chagrined with the developments in the States – as did his surviving fellow platoon members. “You can’t feel good about it,” he recalled. “We kind of did the dirty work and somebody else got the credit for it. Actually, in my own opinion, there shouldn’t have been any names there amongst the flags. Every man on that island put those flags up; we didn’t do it by ourselves. No way did we do it alone. But when those other names came out, I said, ‘To hell with it: I’m going to get the names out.’”

Like others fortunate enough to make it through the war, Lindberg made a life for himself far from any battlefields. He met his future wife at an American Legion dance in 1946 and married her a year later. He began a career as an electrician and they raised a family – three sons and two daughters; between them, the three boys served in the Boy Scouts and all four branches of the military. It was just as happy and ordinary as any other family in which the patriarch sharpened his determination during the Depression, strengthened his callused, paw-sized workingman’s hands on fence posts, farm tools, flamethrowers, and electrical equipment, then settled into semi-retirement.

However, because of a fateful moment in 1945 and the controversy that surrounded it thereafter, Lindberg’s life was not ordinary. He spent many of his hours sharing the story of the first flag-raising with the public, often speaking at schools to teach children about the sacrifices made by veterans at Iwo Jima and elsewhere.

This interview is the product of three different interviews conducted between 1995 and 2005, the longest by Bob Yehling. Two years after the final interview, on June 24, 2007, Cpl. Charles W. Lindberg passed away and was laid to rest at Fort Snelling National Cemetery.

His tombstone records his Purple Heart and Silver Star medals, and reads, in its last lines: “Iwo Jima First Flag Raiser.”

from where we landed [at Aola Bay] up to Henderson Field. And our job was to harass, destroy anything we could – supplies.

We took a toll of the enemy, over 480, and we destroyed a lot of stuff. We destroyed a cannon up there [nicknamed Pistol Pete] that was firing on the airfield and they couldn’t find it. We found it. We only lost 17 men.

You were involved in some of the first actions of the war as well as one of the last.

How did it help you in the heat of the moment at Iwo Jima to have been seasoned by other World War II assaults?

Well, let’s put it this way – you keep your cool. Stuff never worried me. I take it as it comes, and I don’t wonder why, and I don’t get nervous. You just go ahead and do it – do

Cpl. Charles W. Lindberg on Mt. Suribachi, looking for cave entrances on the crater’s rim.

across the island, because we cut Suribachi off from the rest of the island.

The real work started then, because we were given the task of taking the mountain. I don’t think we had a block and a half or so to go from where we landed to the mountain, but for all that distance, there was bunker upon bunker. And the caves? You’d go by one, and they’d come up behind you. It took us to the evening of the 22nd to get to that mountain and surround it, and we had casualties you wouldn’t believe. In our platoon alone, there were 17 Purple Hearts, one Silver Star, three Navy Crosses, and one Medal of Honor. Just one platoon. That’s to get the mountain. That’s out of 40 men!

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOS BY LOU LOWERY

What was the first night, D-day night, like on the island?

Creepy. I mean, we didn’t know what to expect. What I really appreciate was the people puttin’ the flares up all night, keeping that island lit all night so you could watch.

Nobody slept. There was stuff landin’ all night. Mortar shells were landin’.

what you’re supposed to be doing. There’s nothing you can do about what happens.

That’s my theory of the whole thing.

demolitions, charges of all types. We went through a lot of training before we ever knew where we were going.

Based on your experiences at Guadalcanal and Bougainville, what did you expect as far as resistance from the Japanese while you were on the island?

I didn’t expect any resistance. When they tell you they bombed it for 74 days around the clock, and that was steady, continuous, and they bombed it before that too ... and then the shelling they gave it the [first] day I saw it, planes were coming in from all directions, battlewagons were pounding the mountain ... I thought, “What could live through that?” But we got a helluva surprise when we got on that beach. They knew what they were doing. To fight us like that took a brain, and that Japanese general [Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi] had it.

What were your movements on D-day, as you recall?

I know we were trying to bury ourselves at first [in the sand], because mortar shells were falling all around us. But we were still trying to go forward. We got up to that first ridge there, and I’m sitting alongside [Richard] Wheeler, and he pokes me and says, “Hey, I’m going to get my first battle star.”

And I look at him and say, “Hey, we ain’t off this island yet.” I tried to poke my head up [over the ridge] and a mortar shell blows up in front of me and takes a nick out of my helmet, and I come sailing back down and I says, “See what I mean?”

When you were in your training in Hawaii, did you maneuver extensively in terrain similar to that on Iwo? Oh yeah. On Hawaii, we trained extensively for that, with flamethrowers, bazookas,

How long were you on the beach?

I’d say upwards of an hour. Then we started trying to climb the ridge, get on top of it, but it was rough going. It was hard to climb in the first place with the volcanic sand, and I was carrying 72 pounds on my back. But we did get up and start moving

On Feb. 23, didn’t someone go up to the top of Suribachi before you?

That morning, Sgt. Watson, [Louis] Charlo and another guy went up almost to the top.

They reported nothing, no sign of anybody.

They came back down, and this was around 0900 when they reported to Col. Chandler Johnson. That’s when he handed [1st Lt. Harold] Schrier that flag, and he says, “If you get to the top, raise it. If you run into too much opposition, come back down.” So we started out.

So the morning of the flag-raising, how long did it take you to get up there?

I’d say a half or three-quarters of an hour.

We had no opposition whatsoever. We saw some things up there, and guys would throw grenades into the entrances of caves, but they looked like they’d been beat up someway. We found other caves on the side of the mountain and found nothing in there ... beautiful places to live, though. Looked like they had regular homes in there! I figured we’d run into an awful lot of resistance up there, but if they’d come out ... well, I never did understand why they didn’t do that. We were lucky. Very lucky.

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Preparing to raise the first American flag atop Mt. Suribachi. Lindberg is at top left, helping tie the flag to the piece of pipe that would serve as the flagpole.

being souvenir hunters and he didn’t want anyone to get that flag. It was the first American flag to fly over Japanese home territory in World War II, and he wanted to preserve it. He wanted it replaced. I didn’t even know that.

When I came back up the mountain, the flag had been changed. I didn’t pay any attention to it. We came back about 5:00 in the afternoon, after loading and grabbing what little chow we could find. I saw the flag, but it didn’t even dawn on me that it was a bigger flag.

When you actually went into the caves, did you have any idea the construction was that extensive?

I was amazed. They really cut it in. You go into just a narrow hole to get in, and you creep in about 6 or 7 feet, and it starts to enlarge. It gets larger and larger, and then you get inside and they had dug trenches in the dirt so you could walk down there, and they had places cut in for beds. Incredible as could be.

When you got up to the top, how much time elapsed before you raised the flag?

What was going through your mind at the time? Obviously, you wanted to raise the flag, but you were in the middle of a war.

Well, trouble was, we put our skirmishers out on the ridge of the volcano, and we didn’t see anything. Immediately Schrier gave the order to get that flag up. So two of them found this piece of water pipe up there, a long one too. As a matter of fact, there was one bullet hole in the thing, just right to tie our rope on, to tie the flag to.

Kind of strange. But we tied the flag onto the pole [at 1030], and carried it to the highest spot we could find and up it went.

Then the noise came from down below, the ships started blaring horns, the troops started cheering. It was just like a big “Whoooomm” coming over that island. It gave you a funny feeling, you know ... My God. We didn’t think

nothing of it at first, you know, just raise the flag up and go about our work. But when that noise started, oh my God ...

How did you feel?

Oh, this chill that runs through you, the thrill ... I don’t know what it was, patriotism or whatever, I don’t know. I don’t think I’ve ever had that kind of a feeling before, or after.

It didn’t last long, though. All of a sudden, some shots were fired off to our side there.

Someone had come out of a cave, so we had to move against ‘em.

After the flag went up, how long were you engaged in skirmishes?

I think the time it took us to actually make sure the mountain was secure was three hours. The caves were mostly on the [north] side facing down toward the island, but then we had to go around the crater. We were followed up a little later by F Company, if I remember right. I seen them coming up to the top while we were coming around the side. So we had more people looking for ‘em. It was pretty well secured by 1:30 in the afternoon.

That’s when I decided to go back down and reload our [flamethrower] tanks, in case we had a counterattack that night or something.

So we left the mountain. That’s when Col. Johnson gave the word to replace that flag.

He said the Marine Corps was notorious for

You were wounded and evacuated shortly after the flag-raising.

We stayed on the mountain until the last day of February. We left the mountain that day and the next morning, 1 March, we were on the north side, working on Hill 362. I caught a bullet through the arm, and was evacuated.

The comment was made by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that the flag-raising ensured that there would be a Marine Corps for the next 500 years. As one who was right in the middle of it, what do you feel that the act of taking Suribachi, and raising the American flag, did for the Marine Corps?

Well, taking the island itself was the main thing. There’s a lot to say about the toughness it took to get that island. When you tell somebody that we lost nearly 6,000 Marines, one thing it explains about the Marine Corps: that they don’t back up. There’s a job to be done, and it is done. When I try to explain the casualties, I explain it the way it was told to me: A third of the Marines killed in the war were killed at Iwo Jima. On 8 square miles of land. That makes you wonder, but then when you counter it with what it did ... outside of saving these B-29 pilots and stuff like that, think what it did, you know, getting these planes to Iwo Jima and then attacking Japan and things like that. We had that there.

A lot of lives saved, too.

It was a real morale breaker for the Japanese. What I’ve heard from their messages and stuff like that, they were supposed to stay there until ... they were to hold it at all costs, in other words. I think it broke their

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INTERVIEW

One day, someone asked me if I wanted to see a picture of the “first flag-raising.” I said, “Yeah.” I looked at it and I said, “Oh no, that’s not the way we did it.” back, in a way, once we got that island and were able to increase the bombing of Japan.

How do you feel today about having been in the first flag-raising team?

I feel quite proud that I was a member of the first flag-raising. To raise the first flag over Japanese home territory in World War II, I’m proud of that. I didn’t do it alone, but I’m proud to be one of the bunch.

I’ve got nothing to hide in that, you know: I raised the real flag. I feel proud every day that I can tell somebody that.

How did you find out that there were two flag-raisings – and that the second raising commanded all the attention in the United States?

I was sent back to Saipan. I was there [in a military hospital] for a couple of weeks.

One day, someone asked me if I wanted to see a picture of the “first flag-raising.” And I said, “Yeah.” I looked at it and I said, “Oh no, that’s not the way we did it.” I didn’t know it, but I was looking at [ Joe] Rosenthal’s picture.

They switched me to Oahu eventually. I didn’t know how long I was in the hospital there until I saw this magazine, Yank magazine, with a picture of one flag on each side of the page. Then I knew what happened: Lowery’s pictures weren’t released right away. Rosenthal ... he took his pictures onto the ships, they got flown right back to Guam, they were instantly developed there, they saw the picture – beautiful picture, yeah it was a beautiful picture – and to the States it went, and took the country by storm. Nobody ever knew there was a first flag.

One thing I read was that President Franklin D. Roosevelt needed something like that to raise morale in the United States. Do you find that to be true?

In a way, yes. But in my situation, I didn’t like it. And you can’t blame me for not. Anyone connected with that flag like I was, they didn’t like it either.

Was it one of those things where the significance of raising that flag grew on you as time passed?

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No. It wasn’t then. When it started, I think, was in Hawaii, when I saw the two pictures.

Then they switched me to Great Lakes Hospital [in Chicago], and then I was transferred to Charleston, South Carolina. I found out Lowery was back at Leatherneck magazine in Washington, and I wrote a letter to him, and he sent me a bunch of pictures and stuff.

That’s when I started trying to explain to people what happened. I didn’t get too far; the other flag raising was too popular. They were going all over the country on the war bond drive.

It just got caught up in a publicity machine.

That’s right.

It’s something that’s obviously pretty close to you to this day. When did you start really getting it into gear as far as setting the record straight?

I’d say in the ’50s I really got the equipment and stuff to go after it right, you know, and got to talking about it. I never was too good at talkin’. I’ve learned a lot since. I got started more when I came down here.

How do you feel about that now? It’s pretty obvious that the record’s being set straight, at least to a certain degree. Does that make you feel partial vindication?

I think that maybe it’s accomplished something, anyway. It gets this out the way it should be. I know I’ll keep talking about it as long as I live, keep going out ... it’s history.

There are Marines that don’t even know it! It bothers me when I hear that; I’d think that they’d be the first to know.

But like I said, lately I’ve been getting invited all over the place to talk about this flag.

Of course, I’m the last one left, too.

You have a funny story connected to the day you received the Silver Star Medal.

I didn’t get it until I was down in Charleston, South Carolina [in 1946]. I was in a fight with a sailor the night before in a nightclub down in Charleston, and I gave him a pretty good beatin’, you know, and broke his nose and a few things.

Next morning, I’m all swelled up with a black eye and everything else. I get the word to report to the colonel. I said, “Oh my God, I’m gonna get a court-martial now.” Here I am, about a month from getting out of the service. So I get dressed the best I could, and I go up there, and I get to the door of the office, and I see two Marines standing on each side with pistols. I’m thinking, “Oh my God, this is going to be it now.” I was really feeling scared.

I get inside of this big room, and there’s officers lined up on both sides.

A sergeant marches me up in front of the colonel, and the colonel starts reading, “The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star Medal ...” I just about fainted.

After what you saw, the intensity of the battle that you fought, how do you explain that to someone who will probably never have any idea of what that intensity was like?

You can never explain it right ... it’s impossible. You can tell ’em what happened, then let their own judgment take over.

In retrospect, how did you come to regard the enemy and the way they defended the island?

Well, the way I got it figured, from Guadalcanal to Iwo, is that the closer you got to Japan, the better the fighter. I think we got into the Imperial Army on Iwo. On Guadalcanal, the fighters were a little small, didn’t seem to be the fighters like on Iwo. Even Bougainville seemed a little tougher [than Guadalcanal]. Maybe I’m wrong, but that’s the way I feel about ’em. But they were awfully tough fighters on Iwo Jima – of course, half of them were crazy with the kamikazes and stuff like that.

During the war, how much time did you spend overseas?

About 2 1/2, 3 years.

Was that a pretty typical tour, to go over there, come back, and then go over again?

No, not at all. Very few people ever went back overseas. I only went because they were

Some of the Marines who raised the first American flag over Mt. Suribachi gather around for a photo. Lindberg is at far left.

They train ’em longer now. They give ’em 11 weeks; they gave us five. They have better stuff to train ’em with, the rifle ranges and the weapons … to me, the weapons they have now are fantastic. I fired a few of them out at [Camp] Pendleton. It’s a remarkable change from an M-1 to an M-16.

Some of their laser deals ... wow, it’s fantastic. They’re showing me how you can hit a target 3 miles away. I’ll tell you, I was pretty impressed.

forming the 5th Marine Division. If it weren’t for that, I think I would’ve stayed [in the U.S.].

What was your first action on Guadalcanal like?

Oh, I was a little skittish, but you get used to it in a hurry. That was all jungle, and you couldn’t hardly see your way through, anywhere you were going. We did a lot of walking, and it was hot. Miserable. You lived on mostly rice and tea and chocolate bars.

That’s why I hate rice today.

This [2nd] Raider Battalion was a good bunch. I joined it right out of boot camp. I had my mind set on paratroopers, but at the end of boot camp, they marched us down to the end of the parade grounds and a big trailer sat down there. Here were these three guys sitting up there: Col. [Evans] Carlson, Jimmy Roosevelt, son of the president, and a Capt. West. Carlson was recruiting for the Raider Battalion. He says, “I want men who ain’t afraid to die, I want men who ain’t afraid to kill, I want men who’ll walk 50 miles a day.” So I immediately raised my hand. I don’t know why; I can’t tell you to this day.

Carlson was one of the finest leaders I ever saw. He was kicked out of the service, I understand, before the war. He’d fought

the Japanese in China, and he came out and told people that Japan was going to attack the United States. That’s why he was kicked out of the service. They did attack, and he was brought back in as a major, and then he went to colonel, and he was forming these raider battalions.

He was a jungle man. Man, he knew his business. He took us through those places on the island, and he knew everything he was doing. He was a wonderful man. He was good to his men. When I first joined the Raiders, he took us up to Jack’s Farm, near San Diego, and we were living in pup tents. I saw a house there, and I said, “Oh, that’s where the officers stay.” About 10, 11 o’clock here comes Carlson and Roosevelt and the others ... and they get into pup tents. I thought, “What kind of a strange outfit?” Next morning I’m in the chow line with ’em. Same chow, Roosevelt right in there, Carlson ... You know, that gives you quite a morale builder when the men are the same as the officers. He’s the only officer in the Marine Corps I ever saw do that. He was well-liked.

What are the biggest differences, from boot camp on up, that you see in the Marine Corps training since you were in?

What do you think of the Marine Corps today as far as its tradition and what is expected of its servicemen and women? What do you think of it as a service branch?

I’m very proud of the Marine Corps. I think they do what they’re supposed to do.

There’s no ifs, ands, or buts about it. They don’t back up. I think they go through some of the hardest training of any of the other services. They’re proud. I can see that on these guys coming out of boot camp; they’re just as proud as can be when they come marching down that aisle.

I had the honor of being the reviewing officer of a parade one time for graduation. I felt like I shouldn’t be up there, I’m just a corporal, but they had me do it. It’s something to watch those guys march, and they’re just as proud as can be. I think the Marine Corps will last another 500 years.

What do you see as the legacy of Iwo Jima, for our country and our people? What’s the most important thing for this country to remember?

To be on their guard. We were caught at Pearl Harbor; caught bad. People were wining and dining when they should’ve been on the ball. We should never have a let-down like that, and you can never tell what can happen. If we’d have been on guard, this [World War II in the Pacific and the Battle of Iwo Jima] would’ve never happened. People don’t know how close we came to being taken at Pearl Harbor. If they’d have kept coming after Pearl Harbor, they would’ve captured it; we didn’t have anything left! We were just very fortunate.

Also, if people just look at the Battle of Iwo Jima, what it cost us ... that should be a good lesson, too. We lost a lot of men.

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THE YOUNG MARINES ON IWO JIMA

THE YOUNG MARINES ON IWO JIMA

BY YM/SGT. MAJ. MEGAN LYNCH

National Young Marine of the Year 2019-2020

T

hirty-six days, 70,000 U.S servicemen, 7,000 lives lost, and 26,000 wounded people made Iwo Jima one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific theater during World War II. The Young Marines program has created an environment in which Young Marines across the nation have been able to see firsthand the island where this battle took place.

In an overwhelming one-day trip, Iwo Jima left me with a respect and knowledge of the struggle those men faced 75 years ago.

Every year, 10 Young Marines and an Adult Volunteer are selected to attend the Iwo Jima remembrance ceremony on the Island: six Young Marines take this trip because they each have won the title of Young Marine of the Year (each winner representing one of our six divisions); two of our Young Marines are the Jimmy Trimble scholarship winners; and the last two are the national executive director’s pick and the current National Young Marine of the Year. The Adult Volunteer of the Year is also honored with this trip.

The Young Marines have had the honor of engaging in this remembrance trip since 2004. Through these years, youth and adults alike have gained unique experiences that impacted each differently and deeply.

“While the experience of traveling to Guam and Iwo Jima was truly an amazing journey, what made this trip unparalleled

to any other was the opportunity to experience it with the veterans who lived through those battles,” said Jason Asbill, National Young Marine of the Year 2003-2004. “To hear the stories firsthand was humbling. To trek across the island unhindered by enemy forces was breathtaking (both literally and figuratively). To see the camaraderie of the veterans, not only among allies but former foes as well, was inspiring.”

“Visiting the Island of Iwo Jima was one of the quietest experiences of my life,” said Angel Orozco, the National Young Marine of the Year 2017-2018. “No one lives there, and no one was speaking when we were there. I was able to reflect deeply on not only the horrors of the battle but on how what happened on that small island changed the course of the war and the world. It was beyond humbling.”

The clarity of the indescribable event, known as the Battle of Iwo Jima, has been imparted on all who walk in the shadowy boot prints of the men – boys, really – who fought for freedom.

The greatest impact of this experience is interacting with the veterans who fought on this island. When asked about her experience with a particular veteran on the trip, the 2019-2020 Division 2 Young Marine of the Year, YM/Sgt. Maj. Macie Ross, said, “Mr. Gil is an amazing man with an incredible life. His life stories are something I will always remember, and I will cherish

the week I had the opportunity to escort him. Although I only knew him for a week, he taught me that no matter what you are going through, you can always look on the bright side.

“He also taught me that you can’t give up when one thing doesn’t go your way. You have to be resilient in everything you do.

Just because one thing knocks you down, it doesn’t mean you have to stay down. Get back up and give it everything you’ve got.”

The clarity of the indescribable event, known as the Battle of Iwo Jima, has been imparted on all who walk in the shadowy boot prints of the men – boys, really – who fought for freedom.

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY SGT. GABRIELA GARCIA

Escorting the veterans around Guam and Iwo Jima gives Young Marines the opportunity to hear their stories firsthand and live history through their eyes.

“Students learn about history through textbooks in school,” said Kayla Colacion, the National Young Marine of the Year 20182019. “However, I learned more about Iwo Jima talking to these veterans than I ever did in my classes.”

Although the responsibility of the Young Marines is to escort the veterans, in all honesty, they escort us. Their historical stories, meaningful insights into life, and their friendly natures made each of us feel like family, which is the true meaning of escort: protectors and guides.

The Young Marines program is home to many people who served in our United States military. One of our largest supporters, Gene Overstreet, the 12th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, who took this same trip in 1995 for the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima, expanded his thoughts about the Young Marines having the opportunity to attend this once-in-a-lifetime trip.

“I think it’s great that we take our Young Marines there,” Overstreet said. “But when you go there and you see it and you feel it, it is a sight, sound, and smell you’ll never forget, because you know what happened there. When Young Marines go there, and they hear the stories, they get the opportunity to talk to actual Iwo veterans who were

Then-Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. speaks during the Reunion of Honor ceremony at Iwo To (Iwo Jima), Japan, March 21, 2015. Iwo Jima veterans, families, Marines, Japanese troops, and officials attended the ceremony commemorating the lives of those lost in one of the most iconic battles of World War II.

on the island. They remember that. I think it’s important to teach them that history. It is important to know where we came from to know where we’re going.”

Col. Bill Smith, USMC (Ret.), the Young Marines chairman of the board of directors, also spoke of our legacy when he said, “If you’re going to be a Young Marine, you need

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(From left) U.S. Marine Lt. Gen. David H. Berger, retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Norman Smith, and members of the Young Marines approach an Iwo Jima memorial to participate in a wreath-laying presentation as part of the 72nd Reunion of Honor ceremony, March 25, 2017.

This event presented the opportunity for the U.S. and Japanese people to mutually remember and honor thousands of service members who fought and died on the hallowed grounds of Iwo Jima.

back to the island to pledge their peace, and to honor and remember all those who lost their lives on those fateful days.

One of the most extraordinary parts of the trip is the remembrance ceremony. Although the speeches and actions were blessings to witness, the thing that had the most powerful impact on me was the band’s performance.

Both American and Japanese musicians stood under the canopy playing music throughout the ceremony. The bands intertwined and played the same notes on the same instruments, and with one another.

Like the band, the World War II veterans sat looking at one another and at their past enemies in a completely peaceful setting.

No anger or resentment are left over. It was

there that I saw both sides had fought a battle for the same reasons. For home. It was this experience that left a deep impression to be forever ingrained in my heart.

Young Marines are the only members of a youth organization who have been welcomed on the island for the annual ceremony. Only 10 teenagers are allowed on that island that one day a year. Ten teenagers earn their way to the top, and they are rewarded with a trip that gives them a story so unique and so humbling that they leave with immeasurable gratitude.

I believe all Young Marines who were in attendance gained a newfound respect for the veterans of our nation and for all they sacrificed. Although we may not have a lot of time left with these veterans, their legacy lives on in our freedom.

The Young Marines is a national nonprofit 501(c)(3) youth education and service program for boys and girls, age 8 through the completion of high school. The Young Marines promotes the mental, moral, and physical development of its members. The program focuses on teaching the values of leadership, teamwork, and self-discipline, so its members can live and promote a healthy, drug-free lifestyle.

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U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY LANCE CPL. BROOKE DEITERS

to understand your heritage. The raising of the flag on top of Mount Suribachi was the picture that summed it all up. It took six men to raise that flag, and it took teamwork. It isn’t a monument to one person; it is a monument to a team. It took teamwork, leadership, and discipline to take that island. That photo is an embodiment of the Young Marines. The Young Marines is about looking forward.”

Both Overstreet and Smith agree that Young Marines should appreciate the history and understand its importance so as to never repeat what happened.

“Every Young Marine who makes this annual trip treasures the experience,” said Col. William P. Davis, USMC (Ret.), national executive director and CEO of the Young Marines. “They learn history from those who made history. Truly it’s a once-in-alifetime event.”

In my personal experience, I gained something I never imagined I could: a true understanding of compassion, forgiveness, and appreciation of one another. Spending just six hours on the island was enough to realize just how lucky I am. These men spent 36 long, bloody days defending and protecting their brothers in arms and their nation.

Now, 75 years later, these same men come

MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES

MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW

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BY SCOTT R. GOURLEY

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U.S. MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTER PHOTO

LVT(A)-4s head for the Iwo Jima beach. The LVT(A)-4 was a specialist variant of the LVT based on the LVT-2, with added armor and an open-topped turret mounting a short-barreled 75mm howitzer to provide fire support on the beach.

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any written histories of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious vehicles proclaim an irony between the fact that they were invented to serve as lifesaving platforms but have been primarily employed as amphibious assault vehicles.

In reality, it is coincidence rather than irony since both current and future generations of these amphibious platforms continue a proud tradition of saving the lives of embarked and supported Marines in operations around the world.

In the mid-1930s, about the same time that the Marine Corps was concluding two of its so-called “Banana War” involvements – Haiti (1915-1934) and Nicaragua (second time, 1927-1934) – other amphibious service planners were looking toward possible future Marine Corps military actions and the equipment requirements necessary to support those actions.

Some of those investigations were focused on the potential applications of emerging tank designs in an amphibious environment.

In fact, several countries were experimenting with concepts for amphibious tank designs, with many tank histories highlighting the early design work performed in England

by Lt. Col. Philip Johnson. Like later models of Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicles, the early English models relied on the turning of the tracks to provide motion in the water.

In the United States, early amphibious vehicle experimentation utilized a self-propelled gun design developed by American inventor J. Walter Christie. As early as 1924, the Marine Expeditionary Force took a Christie amphibian tractor on winter maneuvers off Culebra, Puerto Rico, and in 1927 used six of them in China.

Although the Christie design was not adopted by the Marines, their experience with these vehicles contributed to the finding outlined in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations of 1934: “The difficulties of transport and movement from ship-toshore indicate that only light tanks can be used in the landing operation. These may be land tanks or amphibious tanks.”

In another historic coincidence, what would become the precursor to those “amphibious tanks” was being built in Florida at about the same time that manual was being printed.

Originally envisioned as a “mercy machine,” that first amphibious tractor was the brainchild of Donald Roebling, who was the

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son of financier John A. Roebling and grandson of Col. Washington Roebling, who built New York’s Brooklyn Bridge.

After moving to Clearwater, Florida, Donald Roebling had witnessed the impact of several devastating hurricanes, including the tragedies surrounding hurricane victims trapped in the then-impenetrable reaches of the Okeechobee area of the state.

As he described it in later years, his vision focused on a vehicle that “would bridge the gap between where a boat grounded and a car flooded out.”

With funding from his father, Roebling began building a prototype of this rescue machine, now dubbed “Alligator,” in his own workshop. Early prototype performance results led to a series of mobility and weight modifications, leading to a 1937 model amphibious vehicle that had a weight of 8,700 pounds, land speed of 18 - 20 mph and water speed of 8.6 mph.

It was a picture of this model that reportedly appeared in an October 1937 issue of LIFE magazine, and it was a copy of that magazine that caught the eye of Marine Corps leaders. Representatives of

An early prototype Roebling “Alligator” tractor climbs ashore from the water. Donald Roebling originally developed the vehicle to rescue hurricane victims as well as serve other needs in marshy terrain.

the Marine Corps’ Equipment Board visited Roebling in Clearwater and returned with a favorable report on the Alligator’s potential.

In May 1938, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended that a process be undertaken to obtain a prototype of the vehicle for further testing during upcoming military exercises. By May 1940, Roebling had completed the newest prototype design, an amphibious craft that was 20 feet long, 8 feet wide, and weighed 7,700 pounds. A second similar craft, measuring 20 feet long by 9 feet 10 inches wide, was delivered to the Marines in November and performed extremely well in testing during late 1940 and early 1941.

In an anecdotal story that appeared later in local papers, Roebling related that he had been questioned by the military about how he arrived at the width of the final prototype design. After reminding the question-

er that the prototypes had been built in his home workshop, he pointed to the fact that his workshop doors and entrance gate were both 10 feet wide.

Regardless of the validity of that particular design criterion, in July 1941, after shifting from the prototype’s aluminum construction to an all-steel design, the first original model Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT-1) came off the Dunedin, Florida production line of Food Machinery Corporation (later FMC Corporation).

The LVTs would be known by many names, with the earliest designs dubbed “Alligators” and later models bestowed names ranging from “Water Buffaloes” to “Bushmasters.”

The December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor forced recognition of the acute need for LVT capabilities, prompting a “freeze” in the LVT-1 design in order to get the vehicle into mass production. Contracts were soon let to multiple companies – including Food Machinery Corporation, Borg-Warner Corporation, Graham-Paige Motors Corporation, and St. Louis Car Company - for Navy and Marine Corps amphibious tractors, with U.S. Army orders following in April 1942.

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According to the Dec. 1, 1945 “History of Landing Vehicle, Tracked,” prepared for the Secretary of the Navy, “While the LVT(1) was still being built, representatives of the Bureau of Ships began working with Roebling and Food Machinery engineers on an armored amphibian, resulting in the pilot model LVT(2) in October 1941. The importance of the Landing Vehicle, Tracked soon became apparent, and in November 1941, at their own expense, Borg-Warner Corporation submitted the first model ‘A’ forerunner of the turreted vehicles.”

Borg-Warner’s turreted A model design incorporated a light tank turret with 37 mm cannon as well as two bow machine guns, setting the stage for A model amphibious tanks to accompany the more utilitarian amphibious tractors.

In December 1941, Roebling completed designs for the LVT(A)-1 and in June 1942 the pilot model (A)-1 came off the line at Food Machinery’s plant in Riverside, California.

“However, development work did not cease, and in August 1942 Borg-Warner’s model ‘A’ and Food Machinery’s LVT(2) satisfactorily met the Bureau of Ships requirements in trials at Banana River, Florida,” according to the official history. “In January

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1943 integral armor became a part of the LVT(2)s, and with the success of the trials, went into production in April as the LVT(A) (2). The same month Borg-Warner developed the model ‘B’ tractor, the first ramptype, which was tested at Camp Pendleton four months later. While the vehicle was not accepted, the subsequent model ‘D,’ a similar vehicle, was put through the course at Camp Pendleton in April of the next year, accepted, and renamed the LVT(3). Meanwhile, Food Machinery engineers were also at work on a tractor with ramp, and in August 1943 produced the pilot model LVT(4) in their Riverside plant… After surf tests the following month at Camp Pendleton, the vehicle went into production in December to fill the vital need in the Pacific for amphibians. Further trials were held in January [1944], and subsequent modifications later incorporated as a result of these tests.”

That early 1944 test and modification process led to the LVT(A)-4. Featuring an M8 howitzer motor carriage turret and multiple supplementary machine gun mounts, the LVT(A)-4 represented the most heavily armed and armored model of LVT produced to that time. The design would be later modified in April 1945 through the incorporation

of a gyro stabilizer and power traverse of the turret. The resulting model became known as the LVT(A)-5.

According to official Coast Guard historical summaries, the Feb. 19, 1945 D-day operations at Iwo Jima featured an established line of departure 4,000 yards off the southeast beaches, with the first five assault waves being comprised only of LVTs. The first wave, consisting of 68 turreted A model vehicles, reached the beach at 0900, with the next four waves following within 23 minutes.

While the realities of the beach geology, topography, hydrology, and enemy artillery seriously limited the LVT’s onshore mobility, they did open the way for the follow-on arrival of the critical tank assets that freed the LVTs to perform combat support functions for which they were better suited.

As demonstrated on Iwo Jima, the LVTs were not without their vulnerabilities.

Some of those vulnerabilities were clearly demonstrated five weeks after the Iwo Jima landings, on March 26, 1945, when the U.S. Army’s “Americal” Division conducted landings in the southern Philippines near Cebu City. The elaborately mined landing beach destroyed 10 of the first 15 LVTs to move ashore.

While these types of wartime experiences trended toward heavier and heavier vehicles, other service visionaries also realized that heavier is not always better. Consequently, in June 1945, just a few months after the landings on Iwo Jima, service representatives witnessed a demonstration of new lightweight LVT designs from both Food Machinery Corporation and Borg-Warner at Camp Pendleton, California.

Counting these lightweight prototypes (two from each company), the Secretary of the Navy’s 1945 history indicates that a total of 18,620 LVTs of all types were produced during World War II. The history lists Iwo Jima as one of 34 major World War II amphibious operations in which LVTs were used. The complete listing includes: • Guadalcanal, Solomons (Aug. 7, 1942) • French Morocco, Africa (Nov. 8, 1942)

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

Marines take a break to rest beside an LVT on the beach at Tarawa. A low tide at H-hour meant that 125 LVTs became the only reliable way to transport groups of Marines back and forth to the beach. While the unarmored LVTs took heavy casualties, without them the landings on Tarawa might well have been beaten back.

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• Attu, Aleutians (May 11, 1943) • Shemya, Aleutians (Aug. 15, 1943) • Rendova, New Georgia (Solomons) (Sept.

1, 1943) • Bougainville, N. Solomons (Nov. 1, 1943) • Tarawa, Gilberts (Nov. 20, 1943) • Makin, Gilberts (Nov. 21, 1943) • Arawe, New Britain (Dec. 15, 1943) • Cape Gloucester, New Britain (Dec. 26, 1943) • Kwajelein, Marshalls (Feb. 1, 1944) • Namur, Marshalls (Feb. 3, 1944) • Roi, Marshalls (Feb. 3, 1944) • Eniwetok, Marshalls (Feb. 17, 1944) • Emirau, Admiralties (March 20, 1944) • Hollandia, New Guinea (April 22, 1944) • Biak, New Guinea (May 27, 1944) • Saipan, Marianas ( June 14, 1944) • Noemfoor, New Guinea ( July 2, 1944) • Guam, Marianas ( July 21, 1944) • Tinian, Marianas ( July 24, 1944) • Cape Sansapor, New Guinea ( July 30, 1944) • Peleliu, Palau, Carolines (Sept. 15, 1944) • Morotai, New Guinea (Sept. 15, 1944) • Angaur Island, Palau (Sept. 17, 1944) • Scheldt Estuary (Oct. 6, 1944) • Leyte (Oct. 20, 1944) • Belgium (Nov. 8, 1944) • Lingayen Gulf, Luzon ( Jan. 9, 1945) • Iwo Jima (Feb. 19, 1945) • Philippines (Feb. 28, 1945) • Rhine Crossing (March 7, 1945) • Okinawa (April 1, 1945) • Balikpapan, Borneo ( July 1, 1945) According to the wartime history, “While production continued through 1944 on all types except the LVT(1), reports poured in from every theater of the war, praising the vehicle’s performance. ‘LVTs, probably more than any other single piece of equipment, contributed to the success of the campaign.’ ‘This operation would have been impossible without the LVTs.’ ‘LVTs are our most versatile craft.’

‘The men in the field soon came to look on the tractors as the ‘jack of all trades.’

In addition to their early military use as troop carriers and artillery support, LVTs were utilized as command posts,

LVTs carry Marines toward Iwo Jima on D-day.

supply vehicles, for aircraft salvage and shallow-water minesweeping. As tho’ never forgetting their origin, LVTs fulfilled their inventor’s purpose by evacuating wounded, carrying medical supplies to the front, and even serving as mobile hospitals for emergency operations.”

While recognized for their extreme versatility, the immediate post-war period witnessed the cancellation of remaining production contracts and a retrenchment of service capabilities that saw the Army withdraw from the amphibious tank/amphibious tractor arena.

For their part, the Marines focused their post-war capabilities on their newest model production vehicles: LVT-3 and LVT(A)-5.

With wartime experiences still fresh, the post-war years saw a significant number of LVT-3 vehicles “upgraded” with the addition

of armor protection for the troop bays. It was many of these vehicles, redesignated as LVT-3C, that were used in conjunction with LVT(A)-5 amphibious tanks, during the Korean War Inchon landings.

Although very low levels of technology prototype activity had taken place in the years between World War II and the Korean War, the Korean experience prompted the Navy to proceed with the development of new LVT designs. Plans called for these new vehicles to include a basic personnel carrier model (LVTP-5) with specific variants tailored to command (LVTC-5), recovery (LVTR-1), fire support (LVTH-6), and other tactical missions.

The LVTP-5 vehicle was larger than the LVT-3C that it replaced (29 feet 8 inches long by 11 feet 8.5 inches wide for the LVTP-5 versus 25 feet 1.5 inches long by 11 feet 2.5 inches

While recognized for their extreme versatility, the immediate postwar period witnessed the cancellation of remaining production contracts and a retrenchment of service capabilities that saw the Army withdraw from the amphibious tank/amphibious tractor arena.

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wide for the LVT-3C. Initial deployment of these vehicles took place in 1956, with subsequent mobility enhancements expanding the identification on some vehicles with an additional “A1” designator.

Both LVTP-5 and LVTH-6 series (which incorporated a 105 mm howitzer for both direct and indirect fire support) saw employment during the Vietnam War. The lessons learned from the combat employment of these systems fed into Marine Corps investigations of design concepts for a new LVT. In 1966, FMC Corporation received a contract to design, develop, and fabricate approximately one dozen of these new vehicles, tentatively designated as LVTPX12s.

Incorporating twin hydrojet engines for enhanced water propulsion, the “PX-12s” measured 26 feet by 10.5 feet. Prototype deliveries and testing ran from late 1967 through 1969.

The vehicle family, soon renamed LVT-7, consisted of three configurations: the primary model LVTP-7 (Personnel); LVTC-7 (Command and Control); and LVTR-7 (Recovery).

In 1970 FMC received an initial multiyear production contract for the LVT-7 series with initial deliveries beginning in late 1971.

The new vehicles were hailed during the formal acceptance ceremonies held on Aug. 26, 1971, when Rear Adm. Nathan Sonenshein,

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Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, observed that “…the LVTP7 family of vehicles is superior in every respect to all its predecessors. They will be faster and more maneuverable on land and in the water, lighter in weight, more reliable and more easily maintained; moreover, they will have improved firepower and a reduced price tag …”

While these features and capabilities provided the LVTP-7s with greater tactical flexibility than their predecessor LVTP-5s, evolving Marine Corps strategies envisioned an amphibious assault capability that would be better suited for land combat. The result was a notional LVT(X) exploration effort that examined the development of a potential fighting vehicle design that resembled a cross between an LVT and a Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Although several companies began development of concepts the program was terminated for a variety of reasons before prototypes were completed.

Meanwhile, the demonstrated durability of the LVT7 series led to a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) that saw a combination of vehicle conversions and new production of a fleet of LVTP-7A1s, LVTC7A1s and LVTR-7A1s.

In 1985, at about the same time as the final deliveries of the A1 series, the Marine Corps changed the designation of the series from

Landing Vehicle, Tracked to Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), a name change that signified the expanded roles and missions inherent in amphibious operations.

The A1 SLEP was seen by planners as a way to extend the utility of the AAV7s “into the 1990s.” However, it would be these same basic platforms in early 2003 that would help conduct the longest sequence of coordinated overland attacks in Marine Corps history.

According to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force summary of action, “From crossing the Line of Departure (LOD) on the border between Kuwait and Iraq, to the culmination of hostilities well north of Baghdad, the Division covered 808 kilometers in 17 days of sustained combat.”

Meanwhile, amphibious service planners and industry designers were hard at work, developing a replacement for the Marine Corps’ aging AAV7A1 series of assault amphibians.

The initial vision for that replacement was reflected in the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program. In July 2001, the program moved into its System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase with a Marine Corps contract awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems.

Renamed as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in 2003, the program represented the Marine Corps’ No. 1 priority ground weapon system acquisition program as well as the only ACAT 1D program managed by the Marine Corps.

Service descriptions noted that the EFV would provide the capability to maneuver, combat loaded, with a Marine rifle squad at 20-25 knots in the water and maneuver cross country with agility and mobility equal to or greater than that of the M1 tank – capabilities that would allow the Navy and Marine Corps “to link maneuver in ships and maneuver ashore in all types of amphibious operations, and will provide a new capability in support of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.”

The Department of Defense restructured the program in June 2007 and awarded a follow-on development contract in July 2008, focusing on redesigning

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY CPL. JACOB A. FARBO

Marines assigned to the 3rd Assault Amphibious Battalion, 1st Marine Division conduct a mobile beachhead patrol in an AAV7A1 during Exercise Iron Fist 2018. The Marine Corps is planning to replace the AAV7A1 with the ACV.

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

Renamed as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in 2003, the program represented the Marine Corps’ No. 1 priority ground weapon system acquisition program as well as the only ACAT 1D program managed by the Marine Corps. some of the key EFV subsystems to improve reliability.

In July 2010, the Marine Corps received the first prototypes of the redesigned SDD-2 EFV, paving the way for the start of government developmental testing at the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp Pendleton, California.

The SDD-2 prototypes delivered to Camp Pendleton incorporated more than 200 design changes from earlier models, with many of those changes focused on enhancing vehicle performance and reliability.

At the time of the prototype deliveries, the Marine Corps had an Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 573 EFVs with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2016 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2026.

Service representatives also pointed to the myriad changes incorporated in the SDD-2 prototypes, characterizing them as “extremely significant” and calling for a “new perspective” on the EFV program.

However, on Jan. 6, 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced termination of the EFV program, with the Marine Corps

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) offered exceptional speed, mobility, and lethality on land and water, but after delays and difficulties with the program it was canceled in 2011.

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Above and right: The Marine Corps’ next-generation amphibious assault vehicle will be the eightwheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), now planned to include three different variants.

turning its focus instead to the rapid development of a “more affordable and sustainable” replacement for the EFV. The notional replacement effort featured an Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), which would incorporate some EFV amphibious capabilities, as well as a Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC), which would serve as a survivable platform to transport Marines once ashore. Although MPC was put “on hold” over budgetary concerns in June 2013, it was “resurrected” in March 2014 and redesignated as ACV Increment 1.1. The plan announced at the time was to acquire approximately 200 ACV 1.1s, and then follow with the acquisition of approximately 470 ACV 1.2 variants, with the 1.2 vehicles featuring greater amphibious capabilities.

In late November 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes, with those prototypes delivered for testing early in 2017.

In June 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems, along with teammate Iveco Defence Vehicles, to produce the ACV 1.1 and awarded the low rate initial production contract for the personnel variant.

Less than a year after that award, service leadership testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2019 acknowledged that ACV 1.1 prototype testing in the fall of 2018 had actually met the amphibious mobility requirements envi-

sioned for ACV 1.2. As a result, the formerly separate programs were consolidated into a single ACV family of vehicles intended to replace all AAVs. Just two months later, BAE Systems and Iveco Defence Vehicles announced receipt of a contract modification to develop two new ACV designs to support the ACV Personnel (ACV-P) variant.

The new contract modification calls for the design and development of new com-

mand (ACV-C) and 30mm medium caliber cannon (ACV-30) variants. Developers note that the ACV-C incorporates seven work stations to provide situational awareness and control of the battle space, while the ACV-30 integrates a 30mm cannon to provide the lethality and protection the Marines need while leaving ample room for troop capacity and payload.

It’s a long way from Donald Roebling’s garage.

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BY J.R. WILSON

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t dawn on Feb. 19, 1945, some 70,000 U.S. Marines – the largest Marine deployment in history – began landing on the powdery volcanic ash shore of Iwo Jima, a tiny 8-square-mile island 760 miles south of Tokyo, at the end of the Japanese island chain.

Its capture was considered vital because Japanese aircraft using the 5-mile-long island’s two airfields were successfully intercepting U.S. B-29 Superfortress bombers attacking the main islands.

Before the invasion, the U.S. 20th Air Force lost more B-29s to interceptors flying from Iwo Jima that it did in attacks over the Japanese homeland.

Despite months of preinvasion shelling by U.S. ships and bombers, the estimated 21,000 Japanese soldiers were well protected by hundreds of caves and man-made tunnels. Those ran from near the shore to the island’s highest mountain, the 554-foot-tall Mount Suribachi, home to a seven-story fortress equipped with weapons, communications, and supplies.

By sunset on the first day, 2,400 Marines had been killed or wounded. Four days of bloody fighting later, Mt. Suribachi was captured and the most iconic photo of Marine warfighters was taken: the raising of the American flag at its peak.

That was just the opening engagement in what was to be five bloody, hard-fought weeks for Operation Detachment, which U.S. military planners had expected to last only a few days with little Japanese opposition after nearly a year of air and naval bombing of the island. Those assessments had led Pacific Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, who was in charge of the operation, to comment: “Well, this will be easy. The Japanese will surrender Iwo Jima without a fight.”

By the end, more than 26,000 Marines were dead or wounded and all but 216 Japanese had been killed, making it the first time total U.S. casualties exceeded those of the enemy.

The Marines who ran from their landing craft onto the black sands of Iwo Jima’s shore to begin what Lt. Gen. Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith called “the most savage and the most costly battle in the history of the Marine Corps,” were equipped with little more than basic armament of the day – sidearms, rifles, machine guns, grenades, flamethrowers, knives, and dogs. Their combat boots, thin metal helmets, and camouflage uniforms offered no real protection against a rain of Japanese bullets, grenades, and mortar shells.

“You could’ve held up a cigarette and lit it on the stuff going by,” Lt. Col. Justice M. “Jumpin’ Joe” Chambers, who led the landing of

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M4A3R3 Sherman tanks equipped with the Navy Mk. 1 flamethrower proved to be among the most valuable weapons systems on Iwo Jima. Between arming Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LVTs) with cannon, howitzers, and machine guns, and transporting tanks to the beach via specialized landing craft, Marines were able to bring their own armor to the fight.

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the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, recalled. “I knew immediately we were in for one helluva time.”

Continued bombardments of the rugged terrain and jungle by U.S. Navy ships had little more effect than had 74 days of unrelenting pre-invasion bombing by B-24 Liberators based on the recently captured Marianas.

Once they were able to get them ashore, flamethrower-equipped M4A3R3 Sherman tanks proved the most efficient weapon at clearing enemy bunkers. The Marines also received significant close air support from carrier-based aircraft and later from P-51 Mustangs of the 15th Fighter Group, which arrived on March 6.

What eventually won the day for the Marines was their training, experience, determination, and toughness. They were arguably the toughest fighting force ever deployed in human combat. However, although they outnumbered the Japanese by more than 3-to-1, they lacked physical cover, up-to-date intel, and were facing an enemy sworn to fight to the death – which they did.

A lot has changed in the 75 years since the invasion of Iwo Jima. U.S. Marines are still one of the toughest fighting forces on

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LVT-1s and an LVT-2 (foreground). At Tarawa, LVTs were the only vehicles able to make it over the reef at low tide and take Marines directly to the beach, but there were far too few of them, and most were knocked out. In the aftermath of the battle, the Marines built many more LVTs and used them extensively. From that time onward, the Marine Corps has always had an amphibious vehicle in its inventory that can carry Marines to shore and onward from there.

the planet or in history, but 21st century Marines are even more deadly, efficient, capable, and effective than their World War II counterparts due to advanced technologies. Those technologies affect everything from their combat uniforms to their training, personal weapons, communications, air and sea support, land weapons, field medical support, and on-site intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Although it is impossible to be certain, these advantages likely would have significantly shortened the time it took to seize Iwo Jima and greatly reduced the number of U.S. casualties. That takes nothing away from the Marines of World War II, but merely recognizes how things have changed in an

historically short period of time. Given the same technologies available today, the Iwo Jima Marines would have been an even more formidable force.

Begin with training for the Pacific Theater.

There were three primary Marine boot camps during World War II: Parris Island, South Carolina; San Diego, California; and Montford Point at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, a segregated training facility for African-Americans, as the Marine Corps was not integrated at that time. Initial training at each lasted seven weeks, although the time spent on weapons, physical, garrison, and field training varied slightly.

After hundreds of hours of hiking, swimming, rifle range, bayonet, and hand-tohand combat instruction, the new Marines were transferred to Fleet Marine Headquarters at New River, North Carolina (now Camp Lejeune), for more training on obstacle courses, rifles, improvised rope bridges, and debarking from ships’ cargo nets onto Higgins boats – Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) – and then hitting the beach.

From there, they went to Camp Elliott in San Diego for desert training and more intense instruction on ship disembarkment and beach landings. Their final stop was San Francisco to prepare for overseas transport into the Pacific theater.

Today’s Marines still go through boot camp at either Parris Island or San Diego. But today’s Marines receive much more training beyond that, and know far more combat skills once their training is complete.

After going through “receiving,” during which they are given physicals, haircuts, fill out paperwork, and are stripped of all civilian items, recruits dive into their three months of training. Early days include instruction on Marine history and culture – including rank structure and insignia, protocol, customs and courtesies, the 11 General Orders, and aspects of the five paragraph order – as well as first aid and care and use of their assigned weapon.

Intense physical training marks the entirety of the training period. Recruits engage in strength and endurance training, work toward earning their tan belts in the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program, and take part in runs of various distances, among other activities.

Physical fitness and combat fitness tests are periodically given.

Combat and field training includes pugil stick and bayonet training, marksmanship,

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO

U.S. MARINES YESTERDAY AND TODAY

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Above: The Marine Corps pioneered close air support and fought to keep its own organic squadrons in support of Marines whenever they went into battle. Here, a Vought F4U Corsair fires rockets at Japanese positions on Okinawa. Right: Many Marines began World War II with bolt-action M1903 Springfield rifles, but the need for more firepower was clear, and they were superseded by necessity with more lethal small arms such as the M1 Garand semiautomatic rifle, and the Thompson M1 submachine gun and Browning Automatic Rifle being used by these 1st Marine Division Marines on Okinawa.

close-range and distance shooting, land navigation with a map and compass, as well as the aforementioned martial arts training.

Toward the end of the three months, recruits put all they have learned to use in a field training exercise dubbed the Crucible. Over the course of 54 hours, recruits undergo food and sleep deprivation as they tackle obstacle courses, day and night assault courses, land navigation courses, large-scale martial arts challenges, simulated medical evacuation exercises, and miles of marching. Upon completion of the Crucible, recruits earn the title of Marine.

Following graduation and dismissal from recruit training as well as a 10-day leave, the new Marines attend a school of infantry at Camp Geiger (on Marine Corps Air Station New River) or Camp Pendleton. Non-infantry Marines will

attend a 29-day Marine combat training course before going to the appropriate school for their military occupational specialty (MOS), where training varies in length. Infantry Marines attend the Infantry Training Battalion for 59 days. All new Marines are then assigned to their

first unit in the operating forces, by which time they are far more highly trained than their World War II predecessors, including in field medicine.

Today’s Marines also have a greater variety of far more advanced combat equipment, from their combat uniforms to

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U.S. NAVY PHOTO BY PHOTOGRAPHER’S MATE 1ST CLASS ROBERT J. FLUEGEL

personal weapons, unit weapons, ISR robots and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ground transport, close air support, shipbased support, communications, field medical support (from Navy corpsmen as well as formerly medic-level training of individual warfighters), combat rations, and shelter.

The Marines at Iwo Jima wore two-piece pattern utility uniforms made of heavy, sage green herringbone twill cotton, devoid of unnecessary features and easy to maintain, along with M1 steel helmets and canvas leggings. Boots were heavy, toughened leather, designed to withstand the various harsh environments in which Marines operated.

The 21st century Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU) is a departure from past battle dress uniforms, which were shared with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Exclusive to the Marine Corps and Navy corpsmen assigned to them, it features a distinctive (and patented) camouflage pattern, MARPAT, available in two color schemes – woodland and desert. It was designed to be used with body armor and

A Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams main battle tank is unloaded from a Landing Craft Air Cushion. A World War II Marine would be astonished at the speed with which heavy armor can be landed on a beach today.

features reinforced knees, elbows, and seats; internal pockets for elbow and knee pads; tan rough-out combat boots in hot or temperate weather versions; and (under development) moisture wicking T-shirts.

The Lightweight Helmet (LWH) is a significant advance in combat head gear, providing ballistic protection the old “steel pot” lacked. Featuring padding and a fourpoint retention strap, it is considered more comfortable than previous, smaller (but heavier) helmets. The LWH’s shell can be fitted with desert or woodland MARPAT cloth helmet covers, as well as a mounting bracket on the front for any sort of night vision device, such as the AN/PVS-7 night vision goggle or AN/PVS-14 monocular night vision device. A sling or pad suspension helps fit the inside of the helmet to the head, while a nape protection system adds ballistic protection to the rear of the

head while reducing strain and improving comfort to the back of the neck. The Corps is looking to replace the LWH with an even more advanced helmet soon.

With all of those features, the modern Marine’s MCCUU provides not only greater comfort but physical protection in combat, while also enabling the use of advanced vision systems.

The biggest difference between the Marines of Iwo Jima and their modern counterparts, however, is in weaponry.

At Iwo Jima, the individual Marine typically carried either an M1 carbine or M1 Garand rifle and an M1911A1 .45-caliber automatic pistol. Marine Corps units also were equipped with the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), Thompson submachine gun, flamethrowers, bazookas, and mortars. Larger support equipment included howitzers, anti-tank guns, Sherman tanks, and jeeps.

Close air support was provided by the Marine Corps air arm, which, by that time, had become a major part of American military air power in the Pacific.

Seventy-five years later, 21st century technology has led to significant changes in

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BAE SYSTEMS PHOTO

U.S. MARINES THEN AND NOW

Marine Corps MOS designations (prior to June 1945, the Corps generally followed U.S. Army MOSs). Those reflect new weapons and systems that did not exist during World War II, from unmanned aircraft systems

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operator, and helicopter pilot to cyberspace exploitation operator and satellite communications operator.

For the individual combat Marine and small unit, weapons include the M16A2, M4

carbine, and Beretta M9 pistol, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), and M224 60 mm mortar (far from a comprehensive list).

The Marine Corps has carried on its line of amphibious tracked vehicles with the AAV7, but is planning on replacing it with the new wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicle; likewise, the Corps plans to replace the older LAV-25 with the Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle to compliment the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. Marines can also call upon the Avenger, a fully automated, short-range shoot-on-themove air defense weapon, and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, which can carry a single six-pack of rockets or one ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) surface-to-surface missile on the Army’s Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 5-ton truck and can launch the

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY LANCE CPL. CAMERON E. PARKS

Above: The Marine Corps is procuring the wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicle as its 21st century amphibious assault vehicle.

Left: The Marine Corps desire to provide its own air cover is reflected today in two F-35B Lightning ll fighter aircraft assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (Reinforced) aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1).

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY CPL. KENNY GOMEZ

entire Multiple Launch Rocket System family of munitions.

Marines pioneered close air support and having their own organic close air support, a tradition that continues to this day. Present-day aircraft include: the F-35B Lightning II 5th-generation short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) stealth fighter, F/A-18C/D Hornet jet fighter/ bomber, AV-8B Harrier II V/STOL (short take-off/vertical landing) jump-jet, MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor V/STOL multi-role combat assault and support aircraft, AH-1Z Viper attack helicopter, UH-1Y Venom utility helicopter, and a variety of UAVs – again, not a comprehensive list.

The Marine Corps also utilizes a number of marine vessels, including the LHA amphibious assault ship (capable of carrying a variety of Marine aircraft, including the F-35B), Special Operations Craft-Riverine (short-range insertion and extraction of

U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Africa 20.1, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, prepare to extract Marines from a landing zone during quick-reaction force training at Naval Station Rota, Spain, Sept. 30, 2019.

After World War II, the Marine Corps embraced the potential of rotary-wing aircraft for their speed and utility in transporting, supplying, and supporting Marines on the ground.

Marine special operators in river and littoral environments), and the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles to support Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) at over-the-horizon distances while operating from amphibious ships and mobile landing platforms.

This combination of extensive training, small arms and fragmentation-protective clothing, advanced weaponry (including some precision-guided munitions), individual

satellite-based communications and computing, and air and sea power exceeding that of most of the world’s militaries makes today’s Marine Corps one of the most potent assault forces on the planet.

Yet today’s Marine will be to the Marine of 2025 what the Marine of 1945 is to the current Corps. As Billy Epperson, infantry weapons capabilities integration officer, told the Marine Corps Times in October, “Across the board for all weapons modernization, pick a weapons system, the intent for everything we’re doing is to increase the lethality of the Marine rifle squad.”

One thing that will not change is the heart of the Corps – every Marine is a rifleman, including aviators who, for whatever reason, cannot fly. But the rifle those Marines carry is changing dramatically from the standard M16 they have used since Vietnam.

The M27, adopted to replace the SAW, has a rate of fire three times that of the

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M16, with fewer jams and a barrel and bolt that last 3.5 times as long as the M4.

As a result, it has become a replacement for the rifle, carbine, light machine gun, and marksman rifle, the latter, with better optics, named the M38 Squad Designated Marksman Rifle. Even so, the Marines and Army are looking at a next-generation squad weapon that is lighter and more lethal, using a 6.8 mm round able to penetrate body armor at greater ranges. A decision on three competing versions is expected in the next two years.

A replacement for the M9 Beretta pistol also is underway. The Sig Sauer 9 mm M17, part of the Modular Handgun System, which includes day/night optics and suppressor options, was selected by the Army, while the Marines opted for the compact version, the M18.

The Corps also has replaced the M203 40 mm grenade launcher, which was attached beneath the barrel of the M16, with the M320,

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U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Logan Campbell, a rifleman with Lima Company, Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), fires an M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle during a live-fire range aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4). The credo “every Marine a rifleman” has held for generations, but the firepower of the individual Marine has dramatically increased.

a stand-alone grenade launcher able to fire a wider range of munitions. At the same time, the Carl Gustaf Recoilless Rifle, an 84 mm shoulder-fired rocket for anti-barricade, anti-armor, and bunker busting, is being issued at the squad level to replace the Mk 153 Shoulder-launched Multi-purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW).

The Vietnam-era M40 sniper rifle is being replaced by the Mk 13 Mod 7, which fires a .300 Winchester Magnum round at greater lethal range – 1,000 meters – than the M40’s 7.62 mm round. However, the Mk 13 Mod 7 is likely to be replaced in 2022 by U.S. Special

Operations Command’s newly developed Advanced Sniper Rifle (ASR), with a .338 Norma Magnum round.

In 2019, the Marine Corps put out a request for a new scope to engage targets at 600 to 900 meters, slightly more powerful than the 4x magnification and 800-meter range of the current Rifle Combat Optic.

Marines also have begun receiving a new squad binocular night vision goggle with significantly improved night vision, depth perception, and targeting.

Modern technology and its resulting impact on tactics, techniques, and procedures and concept of operations makes a comparison between the Iwo Jima Marines and today’s Marines nearly meaningless.

But today’s Marine is continuing to evolve, becoming more flexible, and more lethal as technology continues to advance the Corps’ weapons. The only constant among the Marines of World War II, today, and tomorrow is the “platform” at the center of it all: the individual Marine.

U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO BY CPL. DALTON S. SWANBECK

U.S. MARINES YESTERDAY AND TODAY