Reformed Scholasticism and Reformational Thinking
The Root of Creation
The New Testament reveals explicitly the role of Christ Jesus as the one in whom all things are created and hold together and for whom all things exist (cf. Col. 1:15-20). The apostle Paul deepens our understanding of creation and re demption profoundly by showing that the tri une God is the root and end of all things: for from Him and through Him and to Him are all things” (Rom. 11:36).
The twentieth-century Dutch philosopher Her man Dooyeweerd drew out some important im plications of this scriptural truth when he taught that it is not only the Christian worldview, but all human thought which is embedded in a re ligious ethos (ground-motive) oriented toward an idea of origin and law-order. In his New Cri tique of Theoretical Thought Dooyeweerd ex pressed this reality in philosophical terms:
All meaning is from, through and to an ori gin, which cannot itself be related to a higher origin … all genuine philosophical thought has therefore started as thought that was di rected toward the origin of our cosmos.1
This is part of what makes the Christian worl dview utterly unique as a system of thought. In the Greco-Roman cradle of Western civil isation, there was no room in philosophical thought for a free creation by an infinite-per sonal God as revealed in the Bible. This is because the Greek understanding of nature (as it comes to full flower in Aristotle) was ruled by a ‘form-matter’ scheme that re garded reality as consisting of an uncreated, amorphous chaotic matter, which by a form ing activity of an impersonal divine principle achieves a coherence of ‘form and matter.’ This duality had the effect of dividing reality into two realms – the sensory and supra-sen sory – the former being the realm we can experience with our senses and the latter being the realm which we cannot. This latter realm was nonetheless thought to be know
SUMMER 2022 Ezra Institute
JOE BOOT is the founder and President of the Ezra Institute for Contemporary Christianity and the founding pastor of Westminster Chapel in Toronto.
Joe earned his Ph.D. in Christian Intellectual Thought from Whitefield Theological Seminary, Florida. His apologetic works have been pub lished in Europe and in North Amer ica and include Searching for Truth, Why I Still Believe and How Then Shall We Answer. His most noted contribution to Christian thought, The Mission of God, is a systematic work of cultural theology exploring the biblical worldview as it relates to the Christian’s mission in the world.
Joe serves as Senior Fellow for the cultural and apologetics think-tank truthXchange in Southern Califor nia, and as Senior Fellow of cultural philosophy for the California-based Centre for Cultural Leadership. Joe is married to Jenny and they have three children, Naomi, Hannah, and Isaac.
able by the intellectual contemplation of rational souls – an idea which influenced the thought of Augustine, for whom the soul was conceived as an immortal substance.
In our understanding of what it means to be human, the eventual re sult of these ideas was that man came to be seen as assembled from two components, distinct in principle i.e., a mortal, material body, and an immortal, rational soul. Plato considered the soul-substance of the human being primary, whilst regarding the body as merely its “tool,” the way a man drives a car. For Aristotle, form was the divine, higher principle that is embedded in non-divine, chaotic matter as its essential unity. Together they make up a substantial unity in which the rational soul is considered the “essential form.”2
This view is a radical departure from biblical revelation, in which there are no independent substances (uncreated soul substances, essences, or eternal chaotic material), over-against the all-conditioning Word of God. In Scripture creation is distinct from Christ but not separated from Him. The apostle Paul thus shocks the Greek philosophers in Athens with his application of this reality: “for in him we live and move and exist” (Acts 17:28). As Andree Troost puts it, “[Christ] is with God the Father, the creator and bearer of the entire cosmos which was created in him.”3
Scholasticism
Scholasticism can be broadly defined as an effort to blend Christian theology and ancient Greek dualism. In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas brought Roman Catholic Scholastic thought to its apogee by officially interpreting Aristotle’s views for the church. He attempts to build a formal bridge between the Greek dualistic worldview and Scrip ture. As Dooyeweerd notes, “Scholasticism seeks a synthesis between Greek thought and the Christian religion. It was thought that such a synthesis could be successfully achieved if philosophy, with its Greek basis, were to be made subservient to Christian theology.”4 Aquinas thus tried to accommodate the form-matter dualism of the Greeks to the Christian faith. In this marriage, ‘matter’ was the principle of imper fection, and the ‘rational form’ was the ‘thinking soul’ which participat ed in the divine.5 As a result, Aquinas divides the creation order into a natural and supernatural realm. That legacy has remained with us in various permutations ever since.
Eventually, in this accommodation, a theological trend developed that we might call a psycho-creationist anthropology. Such a para digm asserts that with each new life, God permits the implanting of
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Dr. Joe Boot, M.A., Ph.D.
an indestructible soul into a body from without –the body being prepared by an organic life prin ciple. So instead of maintaining the biblical unity of the human person, what emerges is the uncom fortable assemblage of two independent substanc es – body and soul. The flesh (non-divine earthly matter of the body) is conceived as a shell for the noblest ‘part’ of man – the immortal soul which es capes the corruptible material flesh at death. The rational soul ( anima rationalis ) is regarded as a spir itual complex of particular functions (i.e., thinking, feeling, willing etc.), the seat of true light, natural reason, and spirituality, whilst the body is implicit ly or explicitly denigrated in terms of lower desires and carnal appe tites. Sin’s root is then supposedly located in these ‘lower’ fleshly de sires. This teaching obviously en tails the problematic notion that God creates and inserts sinful souls into each new body – hence the need to shift the seat of sin to the body’s ‘lower’ capacities. This helps account for the rise of the medieval ascetic ideal and a vision of monastic life as manifesting the fullest expression of devoted ser vice to God.
The religious superstructure built up around this philosophical dualism steadily di vides all of life into two domains, the natural and the supernatural (spiritual) – a worldview expressed in the polarities of nature and grace . Nature is con ceived as form and matter, and grace (supernatural faith) as an additional gift to bring the immortal soul to perfection. This scholastic perspective is antithetical to the scriptural reality of the creation of human beings as a unity, along with a life-com prehending apostasy in sin and rebellion at the Fall so that humanity is in need of an equally life-com prehending redemption at the root of our being. Instead, though our ‘rational soul’ is wounded by sin and deprived of the gift of faith, it is not radical ly perverted and depraved by the Fall. Scholastic thought teaches the Fall really robbed us only of a supernatural gift of grace (i.e., true faith) which is
restored through Christ and the church – the church being the one supernatural institution of grace.
Reformed Scholasticism
Though the Reformation broke with much of this mischaracterisation of life and sought a renewal of the biblical understanding of a life-comprehending Creation, Fall, Redemption and Consummation by the power of the Holy Spirit, it did not complete ly destroy Scholasticism’s artificial bridge from Ar istotle to Christianity. Consequently, a ‘Protestant scholasticism’ soon became entrenched and has persisted into modern evangeli calism. As Dooyeweerd explained, “Protestant scholastics thought they could strip Greek philosophy of its pagan features by depriving it of all independence and turning it into a handmaiden. Thus, it was put to so-called formal use in sys tematic theology and theological ethics.”6 I’m reminded of recent assertions that Critical Race Theory can be a “useful analytical tool” for Christians.
The great reformer, Martin Luther, openly claimed to be of William of Ockham’s school – a perspective in which he was immersed whilst at Erfurt monastery. He was profoundly influenced by Ockham’s com plete separation of ‘natural life’ from the ‘super natural’ Christian life of grace – thereby driving a radical wedge between creation and redemption. So-called ‘nature’ was viewed exclusively in the light of sin, with ‘reason’ regarded as the only guide in the natural domain, clearly entailing the ubiquitous and secularizing notion of a radical separation of ‘reason’ and ‘revelation.’ Consequently, “[I]n mat ters of secular government, justice and social order, a person possessed only the light of reason.”7
This fundamental error also expressed itself in Lu ther’s attempt to set law (nature) and gospel (grace) in opposition to each other. The law was an order for sinful nature which Luther began to regard as
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This scholastic perspective is antithetical to the scriptural reality of the creation of human beings as a unity, along with a life-comprehending apostasy in sin and rebellion at the Fall.
antithetical to supernatural grace. Gospel love must overcome the ‘rigidity’ of law. Consequently, the link between creation-law and God’s grace was ef fectively severed. On this view, redemption came to imply the death of ‘nature’ rather than its restoration and renewal. Though he vigorously attacked pagan philosophy, because of his lack of insight into the full implications of a biblical worldview, Luther was unable to direct people to a comprehensive inner reformation of thought. As Dooyeweerd explains, “he did not see that human thinking arises from the religious root of life and that is therefore always con trolled by a religious ground-motive.”8
Calvin also, though clearly grasping the sovereignty of God over all creation and its life-com prehending char acter, was not able to fully extricate himself from this persistent Greek dualism because he lacked a truly scripturally ground ed ontology. Calvin follows Augustine (who unsuccessfully fought to shake off Neo-Platonism), and this is apparent in Calvin’s view of the human person where he conceives of the soul as the noblest ‘part’ of man – an immortal (though created) ‘being.’ The flesh is a kind of prison so that soul and body stand over against each other in un comfortable tension, never fully taking in the bibli cal unity of the human person.
Calvin’s reformational emphasis on Christ’s rule over all of life is thus pushed aside by a protestantized Scholasticism. Whilst wanting to honour biblical reve lation, there is no true inner reformation of all thought and so Christ’s kingship and scriptural authority are soon sequestered in the narrow realm of religious faith. Theology is consequently honoured as ‘queen’ of the sciences, whilst philosophy and other disci
plines must simply be ‘adapted’ to the church’s theo logical principles. The thought that philosophy, his tory, natural sciences etc. must be inwardly reformed from a scriptural worldview just doesn’t occur. These disciplines supposedly belong to the lower realm of nature, natural reason, and natural law, whereas theology is concerned with the higher supernatural realm of faith, grace, and the church.
It is then no surprise to find the eventual develop ment of dialectical theology in Protestantism which “sharply opposes the religious antithesis in the area of worldly life, rejecting the idea of Christian poli tics, of a Christian political party…and of Christian scholarship.”9 Karl Barth continues the identifica tion of nature with sin, separating nature from the Word of God which he and his followers regarded as ‘wholly other.’ Barth rejects any point of contact between the Christian faith and natural life so that he completely repudiates the idea of Christian cul ture – including Christian art, political life, scholar ship, and even social action. Here, the creation law and ordinances recede so far from view that Chris tian thought effectively begins with the idea of a Fall and then redemption – for Barth there could be no knowledge of creation law and norms.
With this continuation of Greek philosophical du alism in various branches of Protestantism, we can see the many ways in which a division of life into separate domains has stubbornly manifested it self. Consider some of these familiar polarities still emphasized to varying degrees by many reformed evangelical Christians and Protestants of all stripes: Body/Soul: We are a ‘soul’; we have a ‘body.’ Hu man beings are made up of two separate substanc es, one higher the other lower, easily distinguish able and separable. The soul (a complex of higher functions including reasoning and feeling) is the ‘real’ person; the body is merely a shell. The soul’s destiny is Heaven or Hell, the body and the earth are relatively less important.
Material/Spiritual: The Christian life is a ‘spiri tual’ life consisting of ‘spiritual’ disciplines. It is an inner battle against the desires of the lower
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Barth rejects any point of contact between the Christian faith and natural life so that he completely repudiates the idea of Christian culture
part of us – stemming from the body. The mate rial world is an incumbrance, lesser, or evil, and we will eventually escape it into Heaven. In the meantime, we must suppress the desires of our material nature.
Natural/Supernatural: Most life activities are just natural and about this world, but Christianity is about a supernatural world beyond this one, and therefore this natural life and creation are not as important as the supernatural world. The natural is mundane and boring and carries on largely in terms of its own impersonal laws, but sometimes God breaks in to do supernatural things like mira cles, which are much more significant than every day events.
Public/Private: Our spiritual life of faith is an es sentially private matter of personal conviction and should not be imposed on anyone else. Our private faith is not for the public space as it does not involve publicly accessible knowledge and in any case, God’s kingdom is not of this world.
Secular/Sacred: Most of life functions well in terms of neutral secular principles and concepts that ev eryone can agree on. Politics, education, law, sci ence etc. are secular areas of life for which man’s common natural reason is sufficient to govern. The church, however, is a sacred institution of grace which, unlike these other areas, is ruled by biblical revelation. This revelation must not be imposed or applied to culture and society, for to Christianize culture is mixing the upper and lower storeys, sec ular and sacred.
Law/Gospel: Law is concerned with the earth, the material world, and sinful natural desires, whereas gospel freedom is spiritual and concerns grace for the soul. The church is the institution of grace, not law – which is a matter for the state as a natural in stitution. Grace throws law aside because grace has no more need for the law than Heaven needs Earth, or the saved soul has real need for the body.
Common/Special Revelation: The natural creation is the realm of common grace, common principles,
natural law. By contrast, Christ is the source of spe cial grace and special revelation. The one is a ladder to the other, but we need the addition of faith and grace in special revelation to bring us to comple tion, salvation, and perfection.
Reason/Revelation: Human reason is sufficient for understanding most of life in the natural world and guides politics, education, culture etc. in terms of neutral, rational principles. Human reasoning, though prone to errors, is good as far as it goes and can offer high-probability proofs for God’s exis tence acceptable to logical and right-thinking peo ple. However, supernatural revelation to the soul is admittedly necessary for eternal salvation and to disclose certain spiritual doctrines.
Science/Faith: The sciences operate only in terms of objective natural reason and concern religious ly neutral knowledge of the natural world. The sci ences answer factual questions about how things happen in the world. Faith is unrelated to reason and is only concerned with the higher value judg ments of why things happen. The only truly Chris tian academic discipline is theology because it is concerned with studying religion and faith. There can be no distinctly Christian view of philosophy or science.
Culture/Kingdom: The kingdom of God is a purely spiritual and invisible reality that does not manifest itself outside the heart and supernatural institution of grace – the church. The kingdom of God funda mentally concerns a future heavenly reality, not the present earth and human culture. The earth is des tined for total destruction so nothing in human cul ture has any eternal value. Getting souls into Heav en and preserving them in the institutional church through this veil of tears is our calling.
Dooyeweerd has shown that these artificial sepa rations of domains in life ruled by different princi ples follow logically from the dualistic conception of the human person derived from the form-mat ter and substance concepts in Greek philosophy and then synthesized with the Christian view of cre ation and redemption.
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The Reformational Response
As with all errors, Scholasticism’s persuasiveness lies in its close imitation of the truth, together with its use of familiar biblical language. Scripturally, we may conceptually distinguish an inner and outer man (2 Cor. 4:11,16), fully dependent in every way and at every moment upon the sustaining Word of Christ (Acts 17:28; Rom. 11:36). But there is no in dependent ‘essence’ of human life, no higher and lower substances or ‘parts.’ The “I” or human ego cannot be identified simply with reasoning, feeling, willing, or any other aspect of our existence, be cause these functions all presuppose a deeper unity that transcends them.
The “I,” our full human selfhood, the depths of the heart, is God’s mystery transcending the temporal functions of our existence and is grasped only in re lation to God who has placed in us a sense of the eternal (Eccl. 3:11). Critically, Chris tians shall one day fol low Christ out of the grave (Col. 1:18; 1 Cor. 15:20). It is the full person that is raised to life (inner and outer man), just as it is the totality of creation which will be released from its subjection to futili ty when we receive the fullness of our adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies (Rom. 8:19-23).
Reformational thought therefore resists every incli nation to divide up created reality in terms of philo sophical distinctions that are entirely foreign to the Bible. Our faith rests on the scriptural truth “that the mediating Word is the religious lifeline which links God and man together in a life-long, all-embracing covenant relationship of revelation and response.”10
All of creation in every part is governed by the mediating Word of Christ and in no domain of life do we escape the all-embracing relationship we have with Christ and His Kingdom. All of life is a religious response to that Word.
Dooyeweerd’s reformational philosophy translates this all-embracing, mediating, and holding pow er of the Word of Christ in terms of what he calls ‘ontic normativity.’ This is simply the recognition of a law-Word for creation that provides a normative structure for all spheres of life and every entity with in creation – it governs the law-conformity of all cre ated reality. As such, Christ cannot be ‘uncoupled’ from a so-called ‘natural’ realm of factual neutrality, an area of creation that can be withdrawn from the sovereign Lordship and authority of Jesus and His written Word-revelation. Christ Jesus, who holds all things together by the Word of His power, from whom, through whom and to whom all things exist, cannot be banished to a supposed upper storey of reality, a spiritual world of ‘grace,’ shunted out of history to a future age, nor imprisoned in the walls of the church institute so that the kingdom of God (Basileia) is limited to the institutional ekklesia
The central direction of Scripture is the unity and continuity of God’s creation and redemption within the rubric of the kingdom of God – an all-encom passing Creation, Fall and Redemption of the whole of life. This inescapable revelation must be the starting point for both our philosophical and theologi cal activity; it is not a theological product of human interpretation but is rather the motive-force of the biblical message. The radical character of this reli gious motive, argues Dooyeweerd:
…can only be revealed by the Holy Spirit, because he opens our hearts so that our faith will no longer be a mere acceptance of formal articles of our Christian confession, but a living faith, serviceable to the cen tral working of God’s Word in the heart – the religious centre of our life… In their radical meaning – as the ground motive of the Word-revelation and the key to true knowledge – creation, fall and redemption are no simple articles of faith; they are rather the Word of God itself in its central spiritual power, directed to the heart, the religious centre of our existence. Confronted by the Word of God in his heart, man can offer noth ing, but only listen and receive…The Word of God… must penetrate to the root of our being and become the central motive-force of our whole Christian life.11
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At the deepest level of our humanity, at the heart of our existence, all of life is a continuous response to the Word of God
This means that Christ’s restorative kingdom life cannot be restricted to a ‘part’ of the human person nor any isolated terrain of human existence or expe rience such as the church institute or our personal devotional lives. Rather, it breaks out in marriage and family, education and entertainment, science and arts, politics and law, business and economics. In each of these areas we are led either in terms of the kingdom of light or kingdom of darkness, obedi ence or disobedience. As Danie Strauss has noted, “It is impossible to speak of a neutral sphere within so-called common grace, where the total antithesis, for or against Christ, does not radically apply.”12 In all life aspects, in every activity, institution, and aca demic discipline, we will be for or against the Lord.
At the deepest level of our humanity, at the heart of our existence, all of life is a continuous response to the Word of God (Rom. 12:1) All the laws and norms Christ Jesus has ordained for creation which stand above us and yet are bound to us, call us to conformity to the Word! The matchless beauty of this gospel is that Christ’s Word is life and His total kingdom one of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit.
1 Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought: Col lected Works, Series A – Volume One, trans. David H. Freeman & William S. Young (Jordan Station, ON: Paideia Press, 1984), 9.
2 D.F.M Strauss, “Scholasticism and Reformed Scholasticism at Odds with Genuine Reformational-Christian Thinking,” in Ned. Geref. Teologiese Tydskrif Vol. 5, March 1969, no. 2 (97-114).
3 Andree Troost, What is Reformational Philosophy: An Introduction to the Cosmonomic Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, trans. Anthony Runia (Jordan Station, ON: Paideia Press, 2012), 166.
4 Herman Dooyeweerd, Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular and Christian Options, Collected Works, Series B – Volume 15, trans. John Kraay, ed. D.F.M Strauss (Grand Rapids: Paideia Press, 2012), 115
5 Dooyeweerd, Roots, 119
6 Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philoso phy: Collected Works, Series A – Volume Six, trans. Magnus Ver brugge, ed. D.F.M. Strauss (Grand Rapids: Paideia Press, 2013), 46
7 Dooyeweerd, Roots, 141
8 Dooyeweerd, Roots, 141
9 Dooyeweerd, Roots, 143
10 Gordon J. Spykman, Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 94.
11 Herman Dooyeweerd, Wat is die mens? Cited in Strauss, “Scholas ticism and Reformed Scholasticism.”
12 Strauss, “Scholasticism and Reformed Scholasticism.”
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Critical Theory and The Gospel
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND
While Critical Theory as a school or tra dition of thought is not new, it has come to some prominence in recent years. While there are numerous persons and writing with varied perspectives within this school or tradition, it is nonetheless possible to summarize the principles and convictions of Critical Theory in a gener al way.
In this article I will first summarize the key tenets of Critical Theory through an engagement with some of the seminal thinkers of Critical Theory. I argue that if Christians are to respond fully and properly to Critical Theory, such a response will need to be rooted in a truly Christian biblical-theological frame work. Such a Christian response will recognize that Critical Theory is in effect an alternative theology or religion.
A truly Christian response to Critical Theory will show that it is not—ironically—critical enough. Christianity truly gets to the heart of the matter and is the most truly “critical,” in that the Christian mes sage offers a true understanding of reality and what is wrong with the world, and likewise offers the true solution to the myriad challenges, problems, and sufferings experienced and seen in the world.
Critical Theory: A Brief Introduction and Survey
All roads lead back to the Institute for Social Re search, founded in 1923 in Frankfurt, Germany. Hence, this Institute, and its fellow-travelers, are of ten referred to as the “Frankfurt School.” The early Frankfurt School was composed of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, and Friedrich Pollock. Other associated persons would be the famous psychoanalyst and social psy chologist Erich Fromm, Otto Kirchheimer, Henryk
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REFLECTION
Grossman, as well as Walter Benjamin. Second generation persons who are associated with the Frankfurt School would especially include Jür gen Habermas (born in 1929). The school was unapologetically Marx ist, though it also felt free to try and advance, critique, and/or adjust the received Marxism of their day. With the rise of Nazism to increasing power, the Institute for Social Research moved to Geneva in 1934, and to New York City (Columbia University) in 1935.1
Critical Theory was birthed in the aftermath of World War I. It was hoped by many persons sympathetic to Marxism that this crisis would precipitate the revolutionary activity for which many Marxists hoped. But such a revolution did not occur after World War I, and this led to something of a crisis for the Critical Theorists in general. Thus, Critical Theory both accepts much of the general Marxist (and Hegelian) para digm, but is quite happy to re-work, re-think, adjust, extend, and even reject at points, various aspects of the Marxist paradigm. One of the “last” great thinkers of Critical Theory—Jürgen Habermas—has been more explicit about, at least in some senses, moving past Marx.
In this paper it is suggested that the key themes of Critical Theory can be viewed through the lens of traditional Christian insights and themes. That is, it will be argued that what Critical Theory offers is—in its own way—an alternative theology or religious vision of the world. My contention is that when we read the Critical Theorists we can see in their various convictions, arguments and theories a kind of echo of Christian themes—even if in Critical Theory they are distorted, twisted, and rejected. But because Critical Theorists are nonetheless creatures living in God’s world and on God’s terms, their themes and arguments can be rightly understood through the prism of key Christian themes and truths. For organizational purposes I will group the various insights of Critical Theory into three broad categories:
1. Creation, Man, and the Nature of Reality
2. Sin, Atonement, Sanctification, and Holiness
3. History, the Future, Redemption, and the Nature of Eschatology
Critical Theory as Theology
1. CREATION, MAN, AND THE NATURE OF REALITY
Herbert Marcuse, Ontology, and Technology
Let us begin with Herbert Marcuse, particularly his “From Ontology to Technology: Fundamental Tendencies of Industrial Society.”2 Marcuse, in a fascinating way, traces the birth of modern science and its entail
Bradley G. Green
Bradley G. Green is Professor of Theological Studies at Union Uni versity in Jackson, TN. He is the author of several books, including The Gospel and the Mind: Recov ering and Shaping the Intellectual Life, Colin Gunton and the Failure of Augustine: The Theology of Col in Gunton in Light of Augustine, and Covenant and Commandment: Works, Obedience, and Faithfulness in the Christian Life, New Studies in Biblical Theology. He also edit ed and contributed to Shapers of Christian Orthodoxy: Engaging with Early and Medieval Theologians. He has also contributed essays and reviews to International Journal of Systematic Theology, Chronicles, First Things, Touchstone, and The Churchman.
Brad and his wife Dianne have three children—Caleb, Daniel, and Victo ria. Brad and Dianne also helped co-found Augustine School, a Chris tian liberal arts school in Jackson, Tennessee.
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CRITICAL THEORY AND THE GOSPEL
ments. We must be content with a broad summary of Marcuse’s narrative here: the modern world saw a shift from seeing a telos built into the very structures of reality, and as even guiding history, to a situation where there is no telos whatsoever as constitutive of reality; the world comes to be seen in primarily mathematical categories; technology becomes vir tually ubiquitous.
For Marcuse, the rise of science and its ally technology is then linked to the rise of capitalism. We should not be surprised that as Marcuse and other Critical Theorists talk about “liberation” and the like, this entails the “liberation” from Capitalism, and from societies which create and perpetuate Capitalism.
For Marcuse, there are certain key “goods” with which persons ought to be concerned. These true goods, which should be at the heart of things are: “the ab olition of anxiety, the pacification of life, and enjoyment.” These are all “essential needs.” 3 And at the birth of modern science, there was a recognition of the impor tance and true goodness of these “goods.” There are also addition al realities (whether good or not) which Marcuse considers “intrin sic to the very notion of modern science.” These are “world harmony,” “physical laws,” and even of “the mathematical God,” which/ whom Marcuse calls “the highest idea of universal quality throughout all inequality!” 4 But, accord ing to Marcuse, what has in fact happened? The good things just mentioned, which were goals or even motivating factors for modern science, have all been abandoned or marginalized. The goods of “the abolition of anxiety, the pacification of life, and enjoyment” in a way helped birth modern science, but then modern science betrayed and turned on these key “goods.” Marcuse explains: “Industrial society clearly developed a notion of technology which undercuts its inherent charac ter.” 5 That is: Industrial society or modern science turned on those principles—those goods—which
were at the heart of the very project of industrial society or modern science itself.
We begin to get a real glimpse of Marcuse’s ontolo gy or metaphysic, and his anthropology, as we read on. Marcuse proceeds to write that civilization itself is foreign to, and hostile to, the nature of man. And bound up with civilization is work. Marcuse seems to assume that without civilization and work, man could meet his deepest needs and be happy and satisfied. Here we see most likely the Marxist-inspired utopi anism, in which in some mysterious way, food will be supplied, shelter will be found, and safety from crime will just somehow be present.
Marcuse’s anthropology is explicit in the following: “The primary instincts of man nat urally tend to immediate satiation and to rest, to tranquility through this appeasement; they oppose themselves to the necessity of work and labor and to the indispensable conditions of satisfaction in a world ruled by starvation and the insuf ficiency of goods.”6 Indeed, “so ciety” is intrinsically hostile to the good of the individual. As Marcuse writes: “Society therefore must turn the instincts away from their imme diate goal and subjugate them to the ‘reality principle,’ [i.e., the ne cessity of work?] which is the very principle of re pression.”7
But as Marcuse develops this line of thought—the repressive nature of society itself—things take a dark and odd turn. As they go about life in society, the instincts of persons change, and they in a sense embrace and accept repression. As Marcuse writes: “Their instincts become repressive; they are the bio logical and mental bases which sustain and perpetu ate political and social repression.”8 That is: persons instinctively embrace and perpetuate the political and social repression which is a natural corollary of society and work itself. Indeed: “All progress, all growth of productivity, is accompanied by a progres sive repression and a productive destruction.”9 As
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Marcuse proceeds to write that civilization itself is foreign to, and hostile to, the nature of man. And bound up with civilization is work.
this gets worked out: Society and work—especially in a capitalist mode—are by their very nature—inex tricably linked to, and entail: (1) “progressive repres sion” and (2) “productive destruction.”
Having considered the nature of man, let us turn to how Critical Theory understands the human dilem ma, what Christian theology has traditionally spo ken of as centered around sin.
2. SIN, ATONEMENT, SANCTIFICATION, AND HOLINESS
If one has read much of twentieth-century philos ophy, social theory, and social critique, one sees a pattern: a hunger and yearning to make sense of the times, and in a sense to ask a basic question: What has gone wrong? How did we get here? Or, what makes the modern world the modern world?
Theodor W. Adorno and the Nature of Society
One leading Critical Theorist response is suggested by the title of the important essay by Theodor W. Adorno, “Society.” We are placing Adorno’s reflec tions on society in this section on “Sin, Atonement, Redemption, Sanctification, and Holiness,” for here we glean insights on how at least Adorno thought of man as a social creature—but man as a social creature is already in a kind of system which is “sinful,” such that man is in need of liberation. As Adorno works through his understanding of society, it is clear that the chief culprit that plagues society today is “the market system.”10 He writes: “Behind the re duction of men to agents and bearers of exchange value [i.e., capitalism] lies the domination of men over men.”11 In short, at least one of man’s funda mental problems, if not the fundamental problems is a societal set of relationships in which something like “the market system” prevails. Something like socialism does not yet—on Adorno’s view—promise to clear the deck of all societal problems, frictions, “oppressions,” etc. But clearly, the societal reality which most concerns Adorno is that society in which “the market system” is generally prevalent. But we learn that Adorno seems to see virtually all societies as plagued by market realities. He can write of “the universal law of the market system.”12
Society, for Adorno, seems never to encourage right thinking, living, or “consciousness.” Rather, “society increasingly controls the very form of consciousness itself.”13 That is, “society”—and again essentially capitalism is in view here—conditions the very way we think of our own societal situation. Thus, one can think that making a middle-class income teaching at the local school, or pastoring a local church, or working in the local factory, etc., is leading a good life. But, one is conditioned to think that way. One is actually oppressed and downtrodden, due to hav ing to live out one’s life in a market economy. Thus, the oppressed and downtrodden may live their en tire life in that situation, and never know it. We will return to this theme in our “Reflections” section.
Herbert Marcuse and Eros
One of Marcuse’s key books is his 1955 Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.14 His thesis is quite clear. Every effort must be made to liberate persons from anything that will inhibit erot ic pleasure. Marcuse writes: “the new direction of progress would depend completely on the oppor tunity to activate repressed or arrested organic, bi ological needs: to make the human body an instru ment of pleasure rather than labor.”15 In short, he is arguing that the forces and reality of the “market economy” (i.e., capitalism) mitigate against erotic satisfaction. He writes: “the erotic energy of the Life Instincts cannot be freed under the dehumanizing conditions of profitable affluence.”16
Marcuse takes for granted “Freud’s proposition that civilization is based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts…”17 Indeed: “Free gratifica tion of man’s instinctual needs is incompatible with civilized society: renunciation and delay in satisfac tion are the prerequisites of progress.”18 And again: “The methodological sacrifice of libido, its rigidly enforced deflection to socially useful activities and expressions, is culture.”19 Hence, culture is the cul prit, for culture by its very existence hampers or impedes the “free gratification of man’s instinctual needs.”
Marcuse summarizes Freud. There exists both a “Pleasure Principle” and a “Reality Principle.”
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The Pleasure Principle is just that—man is driv en to various forms of pleasure, including (or especially) sexual pleasure. The Reality Princi ple is that in any given society there are barriers which keep persons from seeking to fulfill the Pleasure Principle. These two principles are in fundamental conflict. 20 Like other Critical Theo rists, “society” or “civilization” mitigates against true human freedom. As Marcuse writes: “The replacement of the pleasure principle by the re ality principle is the great traumatic event in the development of man…” 21
In summarizing Freud, Marcuse does not hesitate to speak in architectonic terms of this struggle between the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle: “Freud considers the ‘primordial strug gle for existence’ as ‘eternal’ and therefore be lieves that the pleasure principle and the reality principle are ‘eternally’ antagonistic.” Where we have something like the old Manichean dualism between good and evil, transposed into different categories: the “eternal” struggle between (1) the provenance of true freedom, which is sexual—the Pleasure Principle, and (2) that which constrains and leads to repression of one’s desire—the Re ality Principle.
The clash between these two principles is again spoken of in terms of revolutionary liberation. Psy choanalysis can help recover the deep repression which both the individual has done to himself, and which the larger culture—also shaped by the Real ity Principle—has inculcated. But what happens as someone who is seeking psychoanalysis to come to terms with their sadness, or depression, or anx iety, or anger—or whatever it might be—starts to discover these deep repressed desires which flow from the Pleasure Principle? These desires “must eventually shatter the framework in which they were made and confined” [vis-à-vis the Reality Principle]. 22 “The liberation of the past does not end in its reconciliation with the present. Against the self-imposed restraint of the discoverer,23 the orientation on the past tends toward an orientation on the future. ”24 Indeed, “The discovery of lost time becomes the vehicle of future liberation.” 25
So, Critical Theory offers its own understanding of sin and the human dilemma. It has Gnostic and du alistic (even Manichean) overtones, since the prob lem of man appears to have always been in exis tence. There is no pre-fall realm from which man has fallen. Further, community or civilization is by its very nature oppressive and mitigates against true freedom. Let us turn to what Critical Theory tends to say about history, the future, and even the nature of eschatology. In this last section we will get a sense of Critical Theory’s understanding of redemption.
3. HISTORY, THE FUTURE, REDEMPTION, AND THE NATURE OF ESCHATOLOGY
There are several points where Critical Theory ad dresses the future, a future hope, redemption, or es chatological goal it is seeking in history. Generally, when it is looking ahead to that to which it aspires, it speaks in utopian or even revolutionary terms. Let us return to Herbert Marcuse’s essay, “From Ontol ogy to Technology.”
Herbert Marcuse and Redemptive Revolution
Marcuse laments that what he calls “the technologi cal project” should have eventually “annulled” itself. As Marcuse writes: “the necessity for domination was supposed to disappear.”26 We are clearly in Marxist territory here. There is need for centralized power— which is centered in and flows from the revolution— to exist. But it will fade away once the revolution has accomplished its goal of destroying the capitalist or der, and once the subsequent centralized state has accomplished its goals. We get a sense of the not-sosubtle dystopianism when we read Marcuse’s lament that the technological project or “technicity” did not in fact fade away. What should have resulted is as fol lows: “The triumph over misery and the insufficiency of goods should have made it possible to ‘abolish labor,’ to put productivity to the service of consump tion, and to abandon the struggle of existence in or der to enjoy existence.”27
But it is worse on Marcuse’s reading. The “domina tion and destruction” of the technological project continues. Indeed, “domination and destruction themselves become the conditions of progress.”28
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Marcuse finally gets to his own solution to this tech nological dilemma. The answer is revolution. Mar cuse writes: “all liberation presupposes a revolution, an upheaval in the order of instincts and needs: a new reality principle.”29 Marcuse then writes: “This total transvaluation of values would affect the being of nature as well as the being of man.”30 It is not wholly inaccurate to see this “total transvaluation of values” as a kind rebirth of both man and nature albeit a rebirth quite different from the rebirth of biblical faith.
Walter Benjamin and Messianic Hope
We complete this section on history, the future, and the nature of eschatology by looking at a seminal essay by Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philoso phy of History.”31 This is a provocative essay, twen ty separate theses or paragraphs (reminiscent of Blaise Pascal’s Pensées, in the sense of an almost stream-of-consciousness flow of thought). The bo geyman of the essay seems clearly to be historical materialism—the notion that matter is all there is, and that history “marches” (without meaningful hu man agency?) to its end. We might think we have some true kind of freedom or agency, but really this “historical materialism” wins all the time, something which Benjamin laments.32
For Benjamin, the kind of happiness we experience is inextricably bound to our own particular human circumstances and human situatedness. This—in one sense—is almost self-evident, but there is a dark and somewhat depressing way that Benjamin construes our situatedness, as we shall see.
Benjamin writes: “The past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redemption.”33 He continues, in almost a cryptic way: “There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of this.”34
It is striking how this notion of redemption and Mes siah shows up in this essay. Benjamin continues on
the same theme: “only a redeemed mankind re ceives the fullness of its past—which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become cit able in all its moments. Each moment it has lived becomes a citation à l’ordre du jour—and that day is Judgment Day.”35
It is hard to know exactly what to do with Benjamin’s images of redemption, Messiah, and judgment day. This may simply be a rhetorical flourish. But I suggest that this imagery—at one level—more likely reflects an image-bearer stumbling upon central Christian truth claims and realities, even if one never ulti mately accepts these truth claims and realities.
Indeed, I believe we are forced to conclude that Benjamin is en gaging in a kind of mockery and denigration and perversion of Christian imagery. The language of redemption, Messiah, and judgment is being reworked or “transvalued” into Marxist categories. Thus, Benjamin writes: “The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of the Antichrist.”36
As Benjamin proceeds his own (presumedly) phi losophy of history emerges quite clearly: “Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate.”37 Benja min continues: “According to traditional practice, the spoils are carried along in the procession.”38 Again, this may be generally true. But then Benjamin writes: “For without exception the cultural treasures he surveys have an origin which he cannot contem plate without horror.”39 What kind of philosophy of history is emerging here? If the Whig view of history interprets the past and says that what happened is good—the past occurred as it did because things
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Benjamin seems to be saying that all history has been the victory of folks, powers, institutions which should not have been victorious.
ought to have happened that way, Benjamin seems to be saying that all history has been the victory of folks, powers, institutions which should not have been victorious. But this general thesis is asserted, not explained.40 In short, Benjamin seems to view the historical past as simply or only the victory of “barbarism.”41
This is of course fundamentally a non-Christian un derstanding of history. The Christian is quite free to draw attention to the many and variegated exam ples of sin in the world, the way man’s sinfulness has wreaked havoc in the world since the garden, and the many ways in which man’s sin has caused, con tributed to, and exacerbated hu man suffering. But what the Christian cannot do is pic ture all history that way. Can a Chris tian really look at the incarnation, life, death, resur rection, ascension, and exaltation of Jesus as just one more example of the victory of bar barism in human history? Of course, there is no subtle irony here, for assuredly the evil one—and various Jewish and Roman authorities—were engaged in a kind of barbarism when they put the Lord Jesus to death. But Christians know the fuller story.
The “subduing” of the anti-Christ (which appears to be primarily understood as economic forces), is ultimately portrayed in revolutionary terms. And for Benjamin this revolutionary moment is shot through with Messianic hope and overtones. For Benjamin a “historical materialist” [which seems to be Marxism in Benjamin’s preferred sense] “approaches a histor ical subject only where he recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed
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past.”42 The present for Benjamin is “a model of Messianic time.”43 Rather than think or work in “his toricist” terms (where one identifies many causal links in a kind of chain from past to present), we should think or work in terms of “Messianic time”— for in this construal there is a real hope of meaning ful revolution which can set all things right: “[the non-historicist historical] establishes a conception of the present as the ‘time of the now’ which is shot through with chips of Messianic time.”44 Indeed, in this, Benjamin’s preferred way of thinking, “every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter.”45 We will reflect on how to respond to Benjamin’s provocative essay in the reflections section below.
Theological Reflections
1. CRITICAL THEORY AND THE NATURE OF REALITY
Christian readers of Critical Theory will likely be struck by the passion and desire of many of these writers to grasp what has gone wrong with West ern society. For example, in their seminal work, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (originally published in 1947, though distributed in a more informal way in 1944), Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno could explain the impetus and goal of this work as follows: “What we had set out to do was nothing less than to explain why humani ty, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”46
It is something of a challenge to remark upon Crit ical Theory’s understanding of the nature of reality without also speaking of Critical Theory’s under standing of the human dilemma. The reason for this is straightforward. Critical Theory does not posit any sort of pre-fallen era which then becomes fallen or sinful. There is no pre-sin realm or era, as Chris tian theology has traditionally asserted. Thus, to explain or explore Critical Theory’s understanding of the nature of reality is to explain the various chal lenges, problems, difficulties that face mankind. As noted, this means that for Critical Theory there can be something like a Manichean tendency to see re
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In short, Critical Theory does not have a larger theological framework of creation—fall— redemption— consummation against which to interpret and make sense of life in the world.
ality as inherently or essentially problematic. None theless, we will try to first offer a theological analysis of Critical Theory’s understanding of the nature of reality, and then shift in the second section of these theological reflections to focus more on what Chris tian theology calls sin.
We saw, especially in Theodor Adorno’s “Society,” a kind of aversion towards, and even hostility towards the reality of “society,” and in Marcuse an aversion towards “work” as something inherently repressive and destructive. Do we see a similar concern as expressed by Jean-Paul Sartre, when he could say that “hell is other people”? On a theological level the frustration, nervousness, skepticism, and hostil ity toward “society” might be what emerges when one (1) notices or recognizes the pain, unfairness, awkwardness which exists in so many social rela tions; but (2) does not have an understanding of the goodness of creation and this good, created order combined with the reality that sin has tainted, cor rupted, and marred this world and all of life within this world. In short, Critical Theory does not have a larger theological framework of creation—fall—re demption—consummation against which to inter pret and make sense of life in the world.
It is intriguing that Critical Theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer lamented the “dialectic of Enlight enment”—the idea that the Enlightenment, which began ostensibly as an attempt to liberate persons and provide for the well-being of persons, ended up becoming a tool of oppression and subjugation. What is intriguing is that the Critical Theorists—at least at some level—are still working with a commit ment to the centrality and primacy of the individual. Persons like Marcuse will focus on the sexual de sire and pleasure of the individual, but all or most of the Critical Theorists place the individual at the center of things. In that sense the Critical Theorists are working in the key modes of the Enlightenment: the centrality of the individual.
In the course of redemptive history, we learn that oth er civilizational entities are good and proper. For ex ample, the family—ultimately a pre-fall reality—is not hostile to truly being human. Ephesians 6:1-4 reads:
Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. “Honor your father and mother” (this is the first commandment with a promise), “that it may go well with you and that you may live long in the land.” Fathers, do not provoke your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and instruction of the Lord.
Children here are told to obey parents “in the Lord” (v. 1). Paul quotes the fifth commandment, remind ing his readers that there is a covenantal blessing which attaches to obeying parents (vv. 2-3). Fathers are indeed commanded to raise children in the “dis cipline” (παιδείᾳ) and “correction” (νουθεσίᾳ) of the Lord. Children, then, in part through godly parents, are being shaped under God into being the per sons they ought to be. There is a “paideia” of the Lord, into which parents (here explicitly fathers) are commanded to lead children.
The most obvious example of civilization/communi ty in Scripture, after the family, would of course be the Church itself— “the pillar and buttress of the truth” (1 Tim. 3:15). The Church is at the heart of redemptive history. Rather than the Church being an institution which harms or hampers or mitigates against being most fully human, the Church is that institution in which, and through which, and in re lationship to which, persons can truly become who they ought to become. Indeed, it is the “plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God” that “through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places” (Eph. 3:9-10).
In short, while Adorno can say “society increas ingly controls the very form of consciousness it self ,” 47 the Christian can say that certainly “so ciety” (here think of the family) is by God’s command through Paul—to “condition” persons within a family. Fathers are to “condition” children and do so by inducting them into a certain reali ty—the paideia of the Lord. To push this further, we should say that all fathers induct or “condi tion” their children. The real question is simply: In what way and into which culture is a father train ing his children?
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Critical Theory, by seeing “society” as fundamentally and essentially hostile to human well-being, is working with an anthropology wherein what is most important is the solitary individual and his or her desires and will. The Critical Theorists, although lamenting the Enlightenment, are still staunchly committed to at least one Enlightenment principle: the unchallengeable place and sovereign role of the isolated individual.
Critical Theory is right to look at the world and say, “Something is not right here.” Traditional Christian ity asserts that there was indeed once a pre-fall era. Adam’s sin has disrupted this, and now all persons come into the world in what is now a post-fall era. Christianity therefore posits a radical and necessary disjunction between these two eras or moments of history: That era which precedes the fall, and that era (our own) which comes after the fall. Like every philosophy or theology which denies this key asser tion, Critical Theory must cast around for explana tions for our current dilemma but excludes in princi ple the Christian understanding of these two eras in history. But there is a deeper problem, which we will explore in the next theme.
Rather than seeing civilization as inherently hostile to human well-being, the Christian faith posits a prefall era, in which “civilization” (the union of the first human pair) as a good thing, and this union of man and woman, is pictured—at least in Genesis 1—as a part of God’s created order. It should be no surprise when we see present-day heirs of Critical Theory expressing clear contempt for the traditional fam ily. Indeed, Theodor Adorno, in The Authoritarian Personality, considered support for the traditional family as one of the markers of being a “fascist.”48
2. CRITICAL THEORY, SIN, HUMAN DILEM MA, AND REDEMPTION
As we noted above, it is difficult strictly to differenti ate (1) Critical Theory’s understanding of the nature of reality from (2) Critical Theory’s understanding of the human dilemma or sin. Nonetheless, in this sec tion we reflect on Critical Theory’s understanding of the human dilemma, or sin.
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We noted a tendency, especially in Adorno’s essay “Society,” that one can spend one’s entire life ap parently happy, making a middle-class income, etc., and never realize that one has been conditioned to think one is happy and generally free, while one is actually oppressed and downtrodden by the market system in which one has lived one’s life. Now, on the one hand—and dealing at the level of abstraction or generality—it is of course the case that one can be radically self-deceived. Indeed, Jeremiah 17:9 can speak of the heart as “deceitful above all things.” And in the story of Saul and the Amalekites in 1 Samuel 15, Saul’s frankly bizarre dialog with Samu el—when Samuel confronts Saul after failing to fol low God’s command to wipe out the Amalekites— can only be read as an exercise in self-deception.
Perhaps the key example of self-deception in the Bible is in Romans 1, where Paul can argue that all persons know God. What can be known about God “is plain to them;” God “has shown it to them;” even God’s “invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly per ceived;” “they knew God.” But in their suppression of this knowledge “they became futile in their think ing, and their foolish hearts were darkened.” Thus, self-deception is a reality and category the Christian can and should affirm, but it must be construed, un derstood, and conceptualized within an overarching biblical-theological framework which will ultimately take into consideration a biblical theology of God, man, sin, person and work of Christ, redemption, soteriology, church, and last things.
But Critical Theory’s concept of self-deception seems to misfire at several points. The heart—it seems—of man’s problem is that he is conditioned by “society” or “the market system.” There is cer tainly an anthropology at work here. Man is the in nocent creature, caught in a conditioning world in relationship to which he seems to have virtually no ability to exercise any true agency. Is this a kind of Manichaean world in which reality is by nature evil, and over which man has no real redemptive solu tion—besides revolution? In an odd way, man seems absolved of any responsibility for his current dilem ma. Man may play a role in the regenerative work
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of revolution, but man—in a kind of hyper-Pelagian sense—seems to bear no real responsibility for his dire situation. While the Christian is quite happy to affirm a notion of “self-deception,” the conceptu al framework within which Critical Theory construes “self-deception” or being conditioned must be ul timately rejected as deficient. Why is this? Because on a Christian understanding man has plunged himself into misery. Yes, the Christian worldview ac knowledges that there are forces arrayed against us, forces both in the heavenlies (Ephesians 3 and 6) as well as more mundane, earthy forces. But the heart of the dilemma, on a Christian understanding, is that man—both our representative head Adam, and each one of us—has placed himself in his dire situation.
Perhaps the key weakness with Critical Theory’s understanding of the human dilemma—on Christian terms—is that it misses the heart of the matter. When one reads the literature of Critical Theory, man seems to be a cog in a world which is way beyond his control. That is, man is—in one sense—simply an “innocent” creature caught in a world of political and cultural and economic forces. Thus, it is “market forces” or the like that is corrupting or controlling man. Those things out there are making one’s life miserable. And again, of course it is partially true—in a Christian analysis and understanding of culture—to note that there are all sorts of forces arrayed against persons in this life. But what seems to be completely absent within Crit ical Theory is the notion that the real problem lies deep within the human heart.
One is reminded of G.K. Chesterton’s quip when a newspaper in London ran a series of guest editori als, asking the guest editors to respond to the ques tion, “What is Wrong with the World?” Chesterton’s answer was short and to the point: “Dear Editors. I am.” And this was the point of Alexander Solz henitsyn’s 1978 commencement address at Harvard
University, where Solzhenitsyn argued that the real problem of Western culture in the modern world runs right through the middle of every human heart. Thus, while Critical Theory seeks to be “critical,” it is ironic that in the end it is not really critical enough
3. CRITICAL THEORY AND ESCHATOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONARY REDEMPTION
As we saw above, it is intriguing how often Critical Theory makes recourse to language of redemption, and even does so with eschatological overtones or imagery or language. We saw this above, especially in the work of Walter Benjamin.
As Stephen Eric Bronner writes concerning Benjamin: “the revolu tion becomes an apocalyptic ‘leap into the open skies of history.’”49 Bronner could also write: “New forms of redemption may still exist for the neglected utopian shards that have been littered through out history.”50
The use of Christian imagery, in cluding redemptive imagery, by non-Christian, and especially rev olutionary groups, is not uncom mon, and not unique to Critical Theorists. As James Billington re counts in his history of revolutions, the various strands of the French Revolution used explicit Christian imagery—at times perverting them in sordid ways—to describe their various revolutionary acts. For example, Count Mirabeau, who was at one time a French ambassa dor in Berlin, and an early leader in the French Rev olution, appears to have popularized the phrase, “revolution of the mind.” He also explicitly uses re ligious imagery to describe the French Revolution. Billington writes:
The purpose of the Estates-General51 was not to reform but ‘to regenerate’ the nation. He subse quently called the National Assembly ‘the inviolable priesthood of national policy,” the Declaration of the
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Self-deception is a reality and category the Christian can and should affirm, but it must be construed, understood, and conceptualized within an overarching biblical-theological framework.
Rights of man ‘a political gospel,” and the Constitution of 1791 a new religion ‘for which the people are prepared to die.’52
We are suggesting in this essay that Crit ical Theory also failed to recognize that their own system of thought was ultimate ly a religious scheme, though parasitic on fundamental Christian realities, prin ciples, doctrines, and concepts. This is especially clear when we reflect upon Critical Theory’s use of redemptive and messianic themes, and its call for a revolutionary redemption.53
Critical Theory is most certainly not wrong to think in redemptive and eschatological terms. Besides Wal ter Benjamin, this revolutionary thrust was explicit in Herbert Marcuse as well. Marcuse was right, in a sense, in recognizing that “a new reality principle” (Marcuse’s language) is needed. The Christian faith asserts that the gospel which Christians proclaim calls for a new birth or a new creation. This new birth or new creation is that which man most truly needs. But this new birth or new creation is more radical than Critical Theory realizes or calls for. The new birth and new creation at the heart of the Christian gospel is a rebirth which requires death and resurrection. It requires that the power used or needed to create the world (2 Cor. 4:4-6) is the exact power necessary to re-create a person. While Critical Theory calls for “a new reality principle” which requires death (simply a part of revolution), the Christian faith heralds the need for death, but a death which is then followed by resurrection for those who put their faith in Christ.
Marcuse, in the tradition of Engels (and Marx), follows a very provocative thesis of Sigmund Freud—at least as Marcuse understand it. That is, Freud could teach that civilization is by nature hostile to human instincts. Again, there is an odd kind of hyper-indi vidualism lurking at the heart of Critical Theory. Lib eration—at one level—has to do with liberating the individual from the constraints of civilization, and this includes the liberating of sexual or erotic desire. As in so many strands of Critical Theory, the Critical Theorists are correct to discern the need for libera tion, but on Christian grounds there is much askew.
CRITICAL THEORY AND THE GOSPEL
Because Critical Theory understands the human di lemma—at least in part—as the oppressive nature of society itself, Critical Theory likewise construes its understanding of redemption in a certain way. We must be “liberated”—at least in Marcuse’s sense— from reality itself. In Marcuse’s terms we must be “liberated” from the “Reality Principle,” such that we might enjoy the virtually unfettered “Pleasure Principle.”
If biblical Christianity proclaims that God accom plishes His redemptive purposes through the blood of His Son, Critical Theory teaches that all will be made right through revolutionary activity, and in the case of at least Marcuse, this revolutionary activity is tied inextricably to erotic pleasure. Thus, we are left with a kind of deracinated redemption through sexual activity and pleasure.
If the Christian account of man and reality more gen erally is correct, how could someone not bump into eschatological themes in his or her intellectual delib erations? Has not God indeed placed eternity into the heart man (Eccl. 3:11)? Thus, it makes sense that we should see redemptive and eschatological yearn ings and reflections in the thought of those who have not bowed the knee to the risen Lord Jesus.
While recognizing that the use of eschatological, and even messianic, imagery by a non-Christian may in fact be driven by animus, a desire to mock, etc., this does not annul the theological significance of the fact that unbelievers do indeed bump into ex plicitly Christian theological verities, images, tropes, and concepts in their intellectual deliberations and reflections. We should not be surprised. We all live in God’s world, and think, argue, deliberate, and en gage in intellectual deliberation against the back
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Critical Theory also failed to recognize that their own system of thought was ultimately a religious scheme, though parasitic on fundamental Christian realities, principles, doctrines, and concepts.
drop of just such a world, a world which is created, ruled, and sustained by the God of Holy Writ.
But it is also worth noting that Critical Theory is not bumping into this or that Christian theme and offer ing some vague affirmation of something Christians also believe. Rather, Critical Theory is reconfiguring, indeed corrupting or perverting, central Christian truths—like the nature of redemption. Nonetheless, the fact that Critical Theory speaks of the need for “redemption,” and even speaks of the need for a Messiah is striking.
So, to summarize our last key theme—the central ity of an eschatology revolutionary redemption.
First, Since Critical Theory appears to posit “sin” as something that has always existed (there is no pre-fall state), it has no echo of how things ought to have been. Second, since man’s problem is pri marily economic, there is an inadequate grasp of what needs to be done to set things right. Third, since Critical Theory is by definition atheistic, there is no good, holy, loving, and righteous God who is reconciling persons to Himself and to one another.
Even as Critical Theory cooled to traditional Marx ism as it developed as a school, the reality or force or power behind revolutionary redemption could almost not help to be some form of human-gener ated revolution. Nonetheless, historical materialism remained lurking in the background as Critical The ory developed. Critical Theory ultimately appeals to revolution as the hope or means of redemption, but “redemption” appears to bow the knee to the prior commitment of Critical Theory or revolution.
CONCLUSION
The Critical Theorists were (and almost 100 years later, still are) trying to come to terms with the var ious pathologies of the modern world. They have their own understanding of: (1) creation, man, and the nature of reality ; (2) sin, atonement, sanctifica tion, and holiness ; and (3) history, the future, and the nature of eschatology . Like all persons living in God world, the Critical Theorists thought, re flected, and intellectually wrestled as created men to whom God had clearly revealed Himself in and
through the created order (Romans 1). We should not be surprised, then, that Critical Theory can be understood as a kind of religion—an idolatrous en deavor which cannot but help—in a sense—think about ultimate realities in a way which both bor rows from traditional biblical themes and catego ries, while simultaneously corrupting, marginaliz ing, and even mocking some biblical themes and categories. The definitive Christian critique of Crit ical Theory is yet to be written, but it is hoped that this paper has at least provided something of what such a critique might look like.
1 Some histories place the move to New York in 1934.
2 Herbert Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology: Fundamental Tendencies of Industrial Society,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, edd. Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Kellner (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 119-27.
3 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 124.
4 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 124.
5 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 124.
6 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 125.
7 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 125. In this section Marcuse makes explicit his dependence on Sigmund Freud.
8 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 125.
9 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 125.
10 Theodor W. Adorno, “Society,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, edd. Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Kellner (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 271.
11 Adorno, “Society,” 271.
12 Adorno, “Society,” 271.
13 Adorno, “Society,” 271.
14 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966 [originally published in 1955]). I will be working from the 1966 publication in this paper.
15 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, xv.
16 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, xxiii.
17 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 3.
18 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 3.
19 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 3. Marcuse’s emphasis.
20 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 12-15.
21 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 15.
22 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 19.
23 This restraint is “self-imposed restraint” because persons them selves inevitably embrace the necessity of the Reality Principle.
24 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 19.
25 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 19. Marcuse’s text actually includes some French, which I have rendered into English above. His text
25
CRITICAL THEORY AND THE GOSPEL
reads: “The recherché du temps perdu becomes the vehicle of future liberation.”
26 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 126.
27 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 126.
28 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 126.
29 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 126.
30 Marcuse, “From Ontology to Technology,” 126.
31 This essay was published in 1940, before Benjamin committed suicide later in that same year. The German title is Über den Begriff der Geschichte, and is sometimes translated as “On the Concept of History.”
32 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, edd. Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Kellner (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 255.
33 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 255. Em phasis mine.
34 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 255-56.
35 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 256. The French is in italics in Benjamin’s text. Other emphasis mine.
36 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 257.
37 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 257.
38 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 257.
39 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 257. Em phasis mine.
40 I am not here complaining of a lack of “proof.” Many good essays simply summarize the author’s convictions and general principles. But it would certainly be helpful if there were even some illustrative examples given.
41 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 257.
42 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 261-62.
43 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 262.
44 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 262.
45 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 261.
46 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlighten ment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002 [originally published in 1944]), xiv.
47 Adorno, “Society,” 271.
26 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE GOSPEL
48 This theme runs throughout The Authoritarian Personality. For one example, in the “Conclusions” to their studies the editors ponder what might be done to prevent the development of the “authori tarian personality,” or “fascist.” The editors express concern that it almost must be the case that any successful effort to resist fascism must start rather early in the life of children. This is because “ethno centric parents” will undoubtedly get in the way: “For ethnocentric parents, acting by themselves, the prescribed measures would probably be impossible. We should expect them to exhibit in their relations with their children much the same moralistically punitive attitudes that they express toward minority groups—and toward their own impulses.” He continues: “But more serious, because much more widespread, is the case of parents who with the best will and the best feelings are thwarted by the need to mould the child so that he will find a place in the world as it is.” That is, even for parents who want to resist parenting in an “ethnocentric” way, the parental passion and concern for one’s children will ineluctably lead most parents to prepare their children for the world as it is, and this world is more encouraging of “fascism,” than not. See Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, 975-76.
49 Stephen Eric Bronner, Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 25.
50 Bronner, Critical Theory, 115.
51 The “Estates-General” consisted of the “First Estate” (clergy), the “Second Estate” (nobility), and the “Third Estate” (the majority of the people).
52 James Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolu tionary Faith (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 20.
53 Peter Thompson recounts this insight from Ernst Bloch from Bloch’s Heritage of Our Times. See Thompson, “The Frankfurt School, Part 6: Ernst Bloch and the Principle of Hope,” The Guardian (online), April 29, 2014. Cf. Ernst Bloch, Heritage of Our Times (Polity: 2009 [originally published in 1935]).
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