Brussels2014 - Academic Preparation Kit

ACADEMIC PREPARATION KIT 1

Welcome to Brussels2014

Dear Delegates, The chairs’ team of the 20th National Selection Conference of EYP-Europolis Belgium proudly presents the Preparation Kit containing 8 overviews for the topics that you will be tackling during your time in Brussels.

They serve as background material for your research and aim to identify the key issues at stake while synthesising the topic area. The links to articles, videos and additional information provided at the end of each overview are there to facilitate your further research. The chairpersons have put extensive effort into trying to give you the best possible starting point while getting acquainted with your topic. Therefore, I strongly advise you to put effort into finding further information from your part.

With the European Parliament elections in May 2014 approaching at the speed of light, our session topics are extremely important for all of us. Therefore, I would like to invite you not only have a close look at your own overview, but also scroll down to the 7 other topics that your colleagues will be working on. As when we come together in Brussels, we will bring all those different streams of work together. Even though you will make proposals on how to solve your specific issues in 8 committees, during the General Assembly we will see that the different threads can woven together and more topics than you can imagine, are actually interlinked.

The European Youth Parliament offers a remarkable platform for you to discuss and debate on current European issues, encouraging independent thinking and giving you multiple opportunities to challenge yourself. One crucial part of this self-development for this session and our vision is preparation. The entire officials team is here to support you in your preparation for the session and this Preparation Kit is a means of starting it.

I will now leave you to make the most of the topic overviews and start getting excited for Brussels. I can promise, there is a lot to be excited about.

Looking forward to meeting you all in Brussels very-very soon!

Best, Luca Olumets President of the Session

2

Committee Topics

1) Committee on Constitutional Affairs I (AFCO I): With the 2009 European Parliament voter turnout being the lowest since 1979, what measures should the European Union adopt to increase voter participation? To what extent should compulsory voting in the European elections be considered as a possible measure?

2) Committee on Constitutional Affairs II (AFCO II): A path to direct transnational participatory democracy or a failed attempt to bridge the democratic deficit: how could the European Union (EU) strengthen the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) as an instrument of inclusive democracy and which further steps should be taken in order to address the democratic shortfall in EU policy-making?

3) Committee on Constitutional Affairs III (AFCO III): How can the European Union and its Member States involve young people more actively in politics – in particular, should they consider lowering the voting age?

4) Committee on Human Rights (DROI): In light of the ongoing Greek presidency of the Council of the European Union and its emphasis on migration, what measures should the EU take in order to avoid or reduce illegal migration in an efficient way, while safeguarding respect for human rights?

5) Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL): In light of the ongoing European Union (EU) Year for Reconciling Work and Family Life, how can the EU help single parents participate in the labour market more easily? Besides flexi-time arrangements, what measures can help aid in balancing work and family life?

6) Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM): In light of the varied legal practices across Europe, how should the European governments review their prostitution legislation in order to minimise the negative consequences of prostitution for European societies?

7) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs I (LIBE I): In light of growing concerns over government surveillance in Europe and overseas, how should the European Union, together with the Member States, ensure their citizens’ privacy whilst addressing their legitimate security concerns?

8) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs II (LIBE II): In light of the rise of far right movements in several European states, how should the European Union tackle the rising xenophobia and extreme right parties in accordance with its democratic principles?

3

AFCO I COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS I (AFCO I) With the 2009 European Parliament voter turnout being the lowest since 1979, what measures should the European Union adopt to increase voter participation? To what extent should compulsory voting in the European elections be considered as a possible measure?

By Khalid El Ghoul (NL)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem In 2009 the European Parliament experienced its lowest voter turnout since the first direct elections of 1979; now, with the European Parliament elections of 2014 just around the corner, it is imperative to stimulate voter participation. The restricted power of the only directly elected democratic instrument within the policy-making maze of Brussels has allowed active citizens participating in European elections, as early as those of 1979, to question the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU). EU treaties, and especially the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, have awarded the European Parliament more power in decision-making processes.

However, since the first elections in 1979, voter turnout has continued to decrease with less than 50% of eligible voters participating in the elections since 1999. Even though the European Parliament can be prized for being the most democratic institution of the EU, it lacks democratic legitimacy.

The European Parliament’s democratic mandate to be the voice of the citizens of the EU continues to be a challenge as it fails to mobilise voters on issues relevant to, and handled by, the EU. Many people who vote do so, not on the basis of European issues, but on national political issues over which the EU as a whole exercises little or no control. Next to that, most Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected from national party lists via nationally organised elections. MEPs are not to be solely blamed for the increasing apathy of the citizens of the EU towards European elections.

Compulsory voting, where non-compliance is negatively reinforced by sanctions, would be a considerable alternative effectively leading to an increase of voter turnout at the elections to the European Parliament.

The most pronounced example of compulsory voting in the EU is in Belgium, where a system of progressive sanctions1 is imposed on citizens who do not honour their civic responsibilities. However, most countries that employ such a strategy allow for a considerably lenient range of reasons to miss out on voting in elections e.g. physical inability and absence. Luxembourg is another outstanding case as it also deploys a system of compulsory voting with relatively high fines. Despite the discouraging level of civic participation at the elections to the European Parliament, national governments maintain control over their respective electoral laws2. Should the EU extend its sphere of influence over national electoral laws aiming at reviving citizens’ participation at the elections to the European Parliament?

1 Progressive Sanction Scheme in Belgium: According to election law, abstaining voters are subject to progressive fines, which become higher with the number of elections missed. They start from €25-50 for the first time and can rise to €50-125 for the second abstention. Those who abstain for a fourth time are also subject to temporary disenfranchisement and ineligibility for public office (Constitution, 1893; Electoral Law, 1894) 2 West European countries with compulsory voting in the past or at present (level of enforcement as of May 2009; fines have been converted into euro): http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1886.pdf

4

AFCO I Key Terms Democratic legitimacy – It is argued that EU institutions including the European Parliament – the only directly elected political institution – lack democratic legitimacy. The low voter turnouts in past elections to the European Parliament, as well as the direct appointment of individuals to institutional positions without the citizens’ “seal of approval”, add to concerns of democratically deficient governance. The higher the voter turnout, the better the representation of citizens’ preferences in the policy-making processes of the EU. Democratic deficit – Regarding the EU institutions, what is generally referred to as a democratic deficit, is the questionable distribution of power and the appointment of important positions. This applies to the transfer of power from the national governments to supranational institutions that are not directly elected, such as the European Commission and Council of the European Union. A typical example would be the case of the president of the European Commission who is not directly elected by the citizens of the EU. Lisbon Treaty – The Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, amending the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A key component of the Lisbon Treaty is the strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of the EU by supporting the role of the European Parliament - the only directly elected body.

Compulsory voting – Voters who do not participate in elections face sanctions which vary from relatively low to relatively high fines.

Key Actors The European Parliament is the main actor when it comes to the elections, but when it comes to the organising thereof, Member States have an equal stake. As such, national political parties play a significant, yet questionable, role in influencing citizens to cast their vote, as the variance in voter participation among Member States does not fail to show. The citizens of the EU who participate in European elections are to be considered the pivotal actor of the political spectrum as their influence over the outcome of the elections ultimately defines the political balance of stakeholders’ power.

Key Conflicts There are countless issues that the European Parliament is facing at the moment and it is hard to imagine how they could be solved in a satisfactory way. Citizens of the EU are more likely to cast a vote in the European Parliament elections if the areas that the citizens are interested in, would be part of the Union’s competences. However, many areas that voters care about (i.e education, civil protection and taxation) fall under the exclusive competences of the Member States. Consequently, as the citizens have little interest in areas that fall under the Union’s competences, they are also less interested in casting a vote in the European Parliament elections. Even though the competences and powers of the European Parliament have been raised over the years, its activities and powers still do not appeal to the citizens of the EU enough to raise a more substantial interest in the Union’s activities, the elections to the European Parliament included.

5

AFCO I Additionally, the fact that the European Parliament’s monthly plenary sessions are held in Strasbourg makes it harder for other Member States to feel more connected to the activities of the European Parliament.

Consequently, most of the EU media correspondents are residing in Brussels and that further contributes to the perception that the European Parliament’s actions and decisions are not accessible by the citizens of the EU. More than once has media coverage of the European Parliament been about the institution’s costs, its accounts and its members’ absences, and not about its activities and decisions. Media attention as such definitely grabs the attention of the citizens, but not in a way that they would further like to contribute to the activities of the European Parliament and moreover, the European Union as a whole.

Measures Already in Place The European Parliament elections in 2014 will be the first ones to be held since the Lisbon Treaty came into force. The aforementioned treaty has not only significantly broadened the legislative and budgetary power of the European Parliament, but has also given the European Parliament the responsibility to elect the President of the European Commission. The candidate will be proposed by the European Council, taking into account the outcome of the elections to the European Parliament, thus allowing the voice of the citizens of the EU to be heard in both the legislative and executive branch of the EU3. Casting one’s vote now carries more weight in the institutional balance of leadership positions of power are indirectly determined by the citizens of the EU. The idea of considering compulsory voting to be implemented in the Member States of the EU has gained little to no interest among the institutions. As long as the administration of the EU elections is run by each Member State according to national rules, there is little room for manoeuvre left for the EU to determine whether or not voting should be compulsory in each Member State. Moreover, when the EP’s Constitutional Affairs Committee put forward some proposals to boost participation in the 2009 elections, their impact was minimal.

Key Facts and Figures Figure 1: voter turnout throughout the years with an absolute low at the elections of 20094

3 Why a partisan Commission president would be bad for the EU: http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2013/esy_ commissionpres_11oct13-7937.pdf 4 An overview of data related to the 2009 elections: http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/News/EU-developments/Wednesday-01-July-2009-A-look-atthe-new-European-Parliament

6

AFCO I One important aspect to be kept in mind is the large variation of voter turnouts among Member States, both on a European and a national level. In the 2009 European elections, voter turnout in Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory, was 90% compared to a mere 45% in Sweden and a shockingly low turnout of 16% in Slovakia. The average voter turnout of the 2009 European elections was 43% compared to a 67% average turnout in national elections across EU Member States5. Public opinion is another important element of citizens’ attitude towards the elections to the European Parliament; a staggering two-thirds of Europeans consider their voice does not count in the EU while more than half are optimistic about the EU’s future as show by the Eurobarometer results.

Key Questions • • • • • • •

Should the representation of citizens at the European level be as important as the representation of citizens at the national level?

Does the transfer of more power to the European Parliament constitute grounds for re-engineering of the integration of citizens’ interests in the policy-making?

Will the indirect link between the elections to the European Parliament and the President of the Commission provide a spark of interest in the elections? Or is it yet another failed attempt to get the citizens more interested in the actions of the EU? Which factors constitute the overall low voter turnout and how can the differences between Member States be explained?

How will a higher voter turnout improve the democratic deficit of the European Union?

Should the enforcement of compulsory voting system be considered in the Member States? How should a system like that be shaped and implemented?

Would the introduction of compulsory voting merely increase the voter turnout in numbers or positively influence the citizens’ engagement in the EU’s activities?

Links and Further Research An explanation of the electoral procedure: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.4.pdf An elaborate reflection on the effects of new policy before, during and after the elections: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3699_ep_elections_2014.pdf Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in light of democratic reform: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-Institutions/Documents/EUDOreport922011.pdf A report with the numbers and figures by the Eurobarometer surveys: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_first_en.pdf “Participation in the EU elections and the case for compulsory voting”: http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1886.pdf 5 A figure of the voter turnouts per country in the 2009 elections: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/images/e/eb/Voter_turnout_ in_national_and_2009_European_Parliament_elections.jpg

7

AFCO II COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS II (AFCO II) A path to direct transnational participatory democracy or a failed attempt to bridge the democratic deficit: how could the European Union strengthen the European Citizens’ Initiative as an instrument of inclusive democracy and which further steps should be taken in order to address the democratic shortfall in EU policymaking?

By Oscar Stenbom (SE) and Jeroen De Marteau (BE)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem Policy-making within the scope of the European Union (EU) has not always been smooth sailing. In fact, it seems the history of the EU’s policy-making process is a rather turbulent one. However, we can identify one constant element among the different changes made to this process: there has generally been an increased striving for a more democratic and transparent decision-making process.

When the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded, policy-making adhered to the “Monnet Method”, in which the basis of power lay in a strong European Commission whereby normal citizens and even national parliaments had little impact on the decisions being made. At the time, the nature of the decisionmaking process was not yet of concern to Europe’s decision makers, because in its early days the EEC had little real influence.

As the EEC became the EU in the Treaty of Maastricht and its scope of influence gradually grew larger, the need for a more democratic and transparent system arose along with it. Consequently, the EU adopted new, more democratic, rules in the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and, finally, Lisbon Treaty.

Before Maastricht the Commission proposed legal acts, the European Parliament amended them and the Council had the power to dispose of them. To increase the democratic value of the decisions made on a European level the Maastricht Treaty introduced the “co-decision” procedure6, which today is the ordinary legislative procedure used by the EU and the only one that is explicitly outlined in EU law7. The Commission still has the exclusive right of legislative initiative, which means that only the Commission can propose legally binding acts8. After submitting the proposal to the European Parliament and the Council, both institutions start a first reading. If the EP and the Council both agree on the proposal, it is adopted and enforced9. If differences still exist a secondary reading by both the EP and the Council is organised. If the Council and EP cannot reach an agreement after the second reading, they have a last chance to do so in a re-conciliation committee10. If no agreement is reached at that point, the proposal is scrapped11.

The Lisbon Treaty also opened the door to a new way of actively including citizens in the European legal order and engaging them in the policy-making process: the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI).

6 The usage of the “co-decision” procedure has been extended with every Treaty reform (i.e. the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaty) 7 Art. 294 TFEU 8 Legal acts of the EU can take different forms: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, ‘delegated or implementing acts’ and opinions (Art. 288 TFEU). While the first four are binding, recommendations and opinions do not have binding force.

9 This possibility was inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty. Since 2004 a considerable increase in agreements reached during the first reading has been observed (from one-third to more than two-thirds of all legislation agreed under co-decision (see also: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/statistics/ index_en.htm) which has led to growing concern among MEPs about too many ‘quick deal’ agreements that may come at the disadvantage of the European Parliament.

10 Selected representatives from the Council, Parliament and Commission try to reach agreement.

11 However, this is not often the case. See also: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/statistics/docs/report_statistics_public_draft_en.pdf

8

AFCO II The ECI declares that a minimum of one million citizens from at least seven different countries can call upon the Commission to propose legislation on matters on which the EU has competence to legislate12. Given that the political engagement among Europe’s citizens is at an all-time low, it remains to be seen if the ECI will rekindle the engagement of European citizens and combat the EU’s democratic deficit. Will the ECI restore the confidence of Europe’s citizens in the institutions and decision-making process of the EU? Or should the ECI be disregarded altogether in favour of a different approach to ensure the engagement of Europe’s citizens?

Key Terms Transnational participatory democracy – a democracy where the European level is not considered to be above the national level of the different Member States. All Europeans, citizens from every Member State, together as a group form the basis of legislative power within the EU. In order for this power to be exerted, citizens have to actively participate to the decision-making process.

Inclusive democracy – A democracy where citizens participate in political life and play an active part in the decision-making process. In order for this to succeed, citizen engagement has to be high.

EU Citizens – according to article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)13 a citizen is “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State”.

Democratic deficit – the term used by scholars to indicate that democratic institutions fall short of their democratic character, because the decisions they make are not supported by the citizens who elected the members of those institutions. This can be because of lack of interest from the citizens or because a political system is in some way systematically removed from the people it effects or is biased towards certain groups.

Transparency – a measurement of how easy it is to gain insight into all aspects of a political process. A common requirement in a democratic order to ensure that decisions are made according to the wishes of the people and are not based on the arbitrariness of decision makers.

Key Actors The first step in launching an ECI is setting up a citizens’ committee, which will be in charge of the initiative.

This committee consists of at least seven EU citizens who reside in at least seven different Member States (one fourth of the Member States). The citizens’ committee formally registers the initiative with the European Commission, which has the exclusive right of legislative initiative. At this point, the European Commission already has the right to reject an initiative on the grounds that it is “manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious” or is “manifestly contrary to EU values as set out in Article 2 TEU”14. After the registration with the European Commission, the citizen committee has one year to collect at least one million signatures of European citizens that support the initiative. The signatures also have to be verified by the respective national authorities.

When the signatures are verified, the ECI is submitted to the European Commission. The initiators will then 12 See European Commission, “Guide to the European Citizens’ Initiative”, Brussels 2011, p.4 ff. (http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/guide) 13 Treaty on the Functioning oft he European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF 14 Art. 4.2 (b) and (c) of the ECI regulation. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:065:0001:0022:EN:PDF

9

AFCO II be invited to a public hearing in the European Parliament, where the Commission will formulate its opinion on the ECI. If the Commission decides to initiate the ECI, the normal legislative procedure starts.

Key Conflicts In order to identify the key conflicts we have to take into consideration whether the ECI remedies the democratic deficit or not. If we keep this in mind, two main questions arise.

The first is a question of power; does the ECI really create a new way of tackling the democratic deficit or is it just a variation on the already existing proceedings and institutions? At the moment, the ECI does not possess any real power to the extent that the initiators only have the right to propose initiatives to the Commission.

This is the same power the European Parliament and the Council of the EU possess. The Commission still obtains the exclusive right of legislative initiative.

Secondly, we have to consider the scope of the ECI itself. Will the ECI actually reach the citizens it is trying to engage? Or is it more likely that the instrument will be used for the wrong reasons or, even worse, not used at all? Will the ECI, as it is currently formulated moment, be an effective tool in engaging EU citizens? As already mentioned, the lack of citizen engagement and the resulting democratic deficit should be taken into account. Is the threshold of one million citizens a reasonable threshold, taking into account both the necessity of a widely supported initiative as well as the democratic deficit among EU citizens?

There is a real danger that the ECI will be used for the wrong purposes, resulting in the opposite of a transnational participatory democracy. It is probable that established civil society organisations will use their established base of active members to initiate ECIs. The risk is that already active citizens who keenly advocate a specific political ideology will use ECIs to force the Commission to consider their arguments.

Therefore ECIs could potentially increase the gap in real political effect between active and disinterested citizens.

Measures Already in Place Considering that the ECI is a very new instrument, and considering the duration of every step in the ECI process, there are not many examples of an ECI in action. It is however noteworthy to mention that the first qualified ECI15 was submitted to the European Commission on the 20th December 2013.

Furthermore, the Commission has the duty to review the ECI every three years. A first evaluation by the Commission will take place before 1 April 201516.

15 Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity! http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/finalised/ details/2012/000003/en 16 How will the European citizens’ inititative work? http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/eci_work_en.pdf

10

AFCO II As already mentioned17 the usage of the co-decision process has been extended with every subsequent treaty reform in order to address the democratic deficit. Whilst the effect of the change in policy-process is disputed, the engagement of interest groups is also seen as a method of increasing legitimacy. By actively involving commercial and non-commercial interest groups predominantly in the Commission’s consultation phase of proposal initiation, civil society is viewed to be engaged in the legislative process. The true value of such lobbying is contentious. Even though lobbying mainly takes the form of information exchange and the provision of expert opinions by relevant actors, thereby supposedly bettering the quality of legislation, relatively weak ethical standards and the difference in resources available to business and non-business groups mean this form of ‘citizen engagement’ may also defeat its original aim.

The Lisbon Treaty also implemented other measures to address the democratic deficit. It strengthened the powers of the European Parliament on legislative and budgetary matters and enabled it to carry out more effective political control of the European Commission through the procedure of appointing the President of the Commission. Furthermore, the Treaty provides that the sessions of the Council of Ministers will henceforth be made public in order to promote transparency and information for European citizens18.

Key Facts and Figures The Standard Eurobarometer 8019 conducted in autumn 2013 shows an increase of three percent in Europeans not identifying as European Citizens. This is the strongest evolution registered since spring 2010 (Standard Eurobarometer 73).

There are currently eight ECIs open for signatures, six ECIs closed but not yet submitted to the European Commission, six ECIs that have been withdrawn by the initiators and four ECIs that have been deemed obsolete due to insufficient support20.

The voter turnout for the European elections of 2009 was measured at 43 percent of the European citizens, taken into account that voting is obligatory in Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg21.

Key Questions • • • • •

Does the existing European Citizens’ Initiative suffice to solve the democratic deficit within the European Union?

What steps can be taken in order to efficiently create a transnational participatory democracy in Europe?

Are there any alternatives to the ECI that are better suited to tackle the democratic deficit and lack of engagement among Europe’s citizens?

Should there be any measures taken to ensure that the ECI will be used by normal citizens instead of established organisations and networks?

Is the involvement of interest groups a legitimate alternate means of reducing the democratic deficit?

17 See footnote 4 18 Democratic deficit: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm 19 Public opinion in the European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_first_en.pdf 20 The European Citizens’ Initiative: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome?lg=en (under ”find an initiative”) 21 Turnout at the European elections (1979-2009): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009).html

11

AFCO II •

What should be the role of the European Commission in the decision-making process with regards to the democratic level of the decision and the exclusive right of legislative initiative?

Links and Further Research The Procedure step by step (The ECI Official Website): http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/how-it-works A Video by the European Parliament outlining the co-decision procedure and the ECI: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ypMvDKW5qm0 The regulation of the European Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative of 16 February 2011: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:065:0001:0022:EN:PDF Transnational Democracy In The Making: The Future of the European Citizen Initiative, Victor Cuesta: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/cuesta_victor_2_en.pdf Guide to the European Citizens‘ Initiative: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/guide The European Citizens‘ Initiative: Transnational democracy in the EU at last?, Maximilian Conrad: https://www.academia.edu/713759/The_European_Citizens_Initiative_Transnational_democracy_in_the_ EU_at_last The European Citizens’ Initiative is a significant move towards greater “participatory democracy” for Europe’s citizens, but there is still room for it to be improved., The London School of Economics: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/31/european-citizens-initiative-improvements/ The Citizens of Democracy: Participation for Integration in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, Rossana Deplano: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1780&context=hrbrief Direct Democracy for the EU: A place for Interest Groups in the European Citizens‘ Initiative, Adam William Chalmers: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Direct_Democracy_for_the_EU_ KS.pdf Europe’s Democracy Deficit: Putting Some Meat on the Bones of Habermas’ Critique, Steven Hill: http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/06/europes-democracy-deficit-putting-some-meat-on-the-bones-ofhabermas-critique/ A video about the 2014 European Elections and some relevant statistics on citizen engagement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hv60a9BEYPs

12

AFCO III COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS III (AFCO III) How can the European Union and its Member States involve young people more actively in politics – in particular, should they consider lowering the voting age?

By Karim Ben Hamda (NL) and Martha Saunders (UK)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem Youth participation in politics has long been a concern in Europe. This behaviour has been widely attributed to youth apathy, but recent protests and student demonstrations across Europe and neighbouring states have involved enormous levels of youth activism. Young people are hugely overrepresented in new or alternative forms of political participation such as expressing their opinions on social media channels and are often more likely than older generations to have strong and articulate political views. With these revelations shattering a myth of youth apathy, it seems that a more likely explanation for decreasing involvement is political disillusionment or exclusion, which many commentators suggest may be connected to recent high youth unemployment in Europe in addition to low levels of trust for politicians and cynicism towards democratic institutions.

Whilst it is promising that young people are using alternative channels to express their views, low and declining levels of participation in traditional methods of political engagement such as voting or joining a political party remain a tangible concern. A Eurobarometer survey22 found that many countries have observed a decline of between 20-28% in youth voter turnout just since 2011. Conventional political participation is one of the cornerstones of democracy and a failure to inspire young people to involve themselves in this aspect of society could have a damaging impact on their representation in the political system at both a national and European level and further contribute to the democratic deficit. Ageing populations could also contribute to an environment where the political process becomes dominated by issues concerning older people, further enhancing the need to involve young people to counteract this. The suggestion of lowering the voting age, generally to 16, is a potential solution to this issue, with many commentators feeling it would allow young people to feel more included as well as aligning more closely to the other rights and responsibilities young people gain at 16. Currently only Austria allows voting for under-18s for all municipal, state and national elections along with some German states and one Swiss canton.

Key Terms Democratic Deficit – a lack of adequate accountability or representation in an elected institution, in this case related to inadequate representation of young people.

Ageing population – a population in which the number of elderly is increasing relative to the number of 2064 year olds; recently observed in the EU and combined with decreasing political participation among the younger generation a potential problem in terms of representing youth issues.

22 Flash Eurobarometer 375, May 2013

13

AFCO III Apathy – a state of being passive or indifferent about politics, often linked to low turnout in elections particularly among young people.

Active Citizenship – The involvement of individuals in public and political life and affairs. Generally, being in a position empowered to play a part I the decisions and processes that affect them whether through knowledge or skills, whilst remaining within the bounds of democratic procedure.

Key Actors The prerogative for changing voting laws lies with the National Governments of EU Member States, only one of whom (Austria) currently allows voting at 16. As this topic is concerned with involving young people, national political parties and at a European level MEPs have a role in attempting to engage this group. The Council of Europe has taken a strong stance on promoting votes at 16, voting in favour with a high majority, but this has had no ostensible impact. Due to a feeling of disconnection with main institutions, specifically youth orientated groups could be more suitable for addressing the issue. The European Youth Forum, for example, is the platform funded by the European Commission for over 90 youth organisations in Europe which runs conferences, trainings and hearings with institutions for young people.

Key Conflicts The crux of the topic lies in whether the vote should be something accessible to all influenced by the bodies it elects regardless of mitigating factors, or whether it should be excluded from groups who may use the power irresponsibly. Young people are certainly influenced by decisions their governments and the EU makes, sometimes disproportionately so. But following this logic could lead to extending the franchise to incredibly young children. The conflict comes from where exactly to define the appropriate age to vote.

As for allowing the vote at 16 specifically, a key argument is the amount of other responsibilities and serious decisions young people gain at this age. Whilst these vary across the EU, they often include paying taxes, leaving home, joining the armed forces, having consensual sex and sometimes buying cigarettes and alcohol. This so called “consistency argument” contests that the vote should be a right that accompanies this development in their perceived responsibility. However, whilst most of these responsibilities mainly impact the individual, some commentators still argue that something as important and powerful as the vote should not be given to a group who could be insufficiently mature or well informed to use it wisely.

This leads us to another conflict – young people tend to be more impassioned about single issues and more easily influenced and led by external factors such as their families or the media. Is this passion a valuable resource to European politics, or potentially damaging?

Another conflict about lowering the voting age is whether it would really have an impact on young people’s involvement in political procedures. Whilst some argue that it would increase a sense of engagement and representation, others contest that considering eligible voters of 18-24 have such low turnout levels, lowering the voting age would not make a substantial difference.

14

AFCO III Measures Already in Place There are many pan-EU initiatives such as the European Youth Forum (see Key Actors) and the League of Young Voters in Europe, which aims to amplify young people’s concerns and expectations in the run-up to European elections and also encourage political parties and candidates to directly target young people in their campaigns. Another group is ThinkYoung, a think tank focused on lobbying Brussels to represent young people’s issues. A notable mention goes to the European Youth Parliament (EYP) which attempts to further engage young people by allowing them direct involvement in a mock up of the decision-making process.

Some Member States have already lowered the voting age below 18 at different levels. Some German states allow voting at 16 in local elections, and Austria became the first Member State to extend the national vote to all 16 year olds in 2007, and the University of Vienna found that as a result Austria has seen a significant increase in young people’s interest in politics.

Key Facts and Figures In European Parliament elections held in 2009, 50% of over 55 year olds made use of their vote, whereas only 29% of the 18 to 24 year olds voted23.

A Eurobarometer survey discovered that less than half of young Europeans surveyed realised that members of the European Parliament are elected by citizens of the Member States24.

The same survey found that 64% of respondents believed their European elections vote would not change anything and that 61% felt insufficiently informed to vote.

Only 2 Member States have more than 9% of their young people as members of political organisations or parties – Malta (14%) and Luxembourg (10%.) The average is around 5%25.

In seven Member States (UK, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, Lithuania, and Sweden) less than half of eligible young people have voted in any kind of election the past three years26.

Key Questions • • • • •

What are the main problems resulting from low youth participation in politics?

What benefits would the EU gain from further involving young people in the decision-making process?

How can Member States ensure young people are more politically informed?

Why do young people feel disillusioned with politics?

Eurobarometer surveys indicated that young people actually believe voting to be the best way of getting their voices heard, yet still their voting levels are extremely low. Why could this be?

23 European Social Survey, 2010 24 Flash Eurobarometer 375, May 2013 25 Flash Eurobarometer 375, May 2013 26 Flash Eurobarometer 375, May 2013

15

AFCO III •

Would lowering the voting age have an impact on young people’s turnout at elections?

Links and Further Research Summary of some of the policies adopted by the EU and within member states to engage young people: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/youth/c11200_en.html Report on European youth voting and political behaviour: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth.../tools/documents/perception-behaviours.pdf The main campaign website supporting votes at 16: http://www.voteat16.eu LSE article on the new ways young people are finding to engage in politics: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/07/19/young-people-are-less-likely-to-vote-than-older-citizens-butthey-are-also-more-diverse-in-how-they-choose-to-participate-in-politics/

16

DROI COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (DROI) In light of the ongoing Greek presidency of the Council of the European Union and its emphasis on migration, what measures should the EU take in order to avoid or reduce illegal migration in an efficient way, while safeguarding respect for human rights?

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem

By Matthieu Loup (CH)

Illegal migration is a major downside and a great factor of instability for the European Union (EU). It makes headlines almost everyday and the political as well as the public pressure on governments is getting higher and higher. There are no easy solutions, yet undeniably, we have a duty to help people seeking for protection.

While the illegal migration flow is impossible to accurately measure, the number of unauthorised residents in the EU is roughly estimated at 1.9 to 3.8 million, a significant number considering the global population is 500 million27. While illegal migration did decrease in previous years, namely due to the extension of the EU and the financial crisis which affected the labour market in Europe, illegal migration increased again in 2011 as a consequence of the Arab Spring28.

Europe is pictured as a safe-haven; impoverished people living in their respective countries often justify dangerous journeys across deserts and seas to obtain improved living conditions. One such example is the tragedy near Lampedusa in October 2013, where more than 360 migrants lost their lives trying to reach Italy29.

Illegal migration also has disastrous consequences for both countries of transit and of arrival, The movement of such large amounts of people puts a lot of pressure on systems designed for legal migration. Beside Italian’s shores, the border between Greece and Turkey is another entrance door for Europe and this is certainly led to the Greek government deciding to put a particular focus on migration in its programme for the presidency of the Council of the EU30.

Key Terms Third-country national – Any person who is: • not a citizen of the Union, meaning any person who is not holding the citizenship of a Member State (Article 20 of the TFEU) • not enjoying the Community right of free movement, (Article 2 § 5 of the Schengen Borders Code, family reunification)31.

Illegal stay – Presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State32.

27 MOREHOUSE & BLOMFIELD, Irregular Migration in Europe, Migration Policy Institute 2011.

28 FARGUES & FANDRICH, Migration after the Arab Spring – MPC Research Report 2012/09, Migration Policy Centre 2012.

29 Lampedusa tragedy: Migrants raped and tortured: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24866338 30 Programme of the Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union: http://www.gr2014.eu/Programme-Greek-Presidency-EU 31 Article 3 § 1 of the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 16 December 2008 & http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0001:0032:EN:PDF (Schengen Borders Code) 32 Article 3 § 2 of the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 16 December 2008.

17

DROI Readmission agreements – Readmission agreements are used by the EU in its relations with third countries, which set out clear obligations and procedures for the authorities of the non-EU country and of EU States as to when and how to take back people who are irregularly residing in the EU33. This is a key instrument for a comprehensive return policy and for a sustainable policy regarding illegal migration.

Duty to render assistance – The duty to render assistance is an international law principle. The Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that the captain of a vessel has “to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress”34. This is particularly relevant for the migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea because it forces costal Member States to intervene and rescue illegal immigrants trying to reach their shores.

Non-refoulement principle – This principle is of utmost importance as it sets the interdiction, with some exceptions, to expel or return a refugee when their life or freedom is endangered in their country. This is a core principle and a clear limit in the way Member States are allowed to deal with migration flows. It was codified in 1951 in the Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees35.

Key Actors Member States Member States are on the front lines. They are responsible for executing the EU policies on migration and have to deal with numerous migrants both legal and illegal on their territory. They have a limited impact on the issue of regulations but are able to conclude bilateral agreements with third-countries as long as the European law is respected.

European Union The Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) gives the EU, namely the European Parliament and the Council, the right to take measures to tackle the issue of illegal migration (§2 lit. c) and to conclude readmission agreements with third countries (§3). The goal of regulations in the field of illegal immigration should be to prevent or reduce it.

Third-countries Third-countries play an essential role in the migration policy of the EU. Negotiations need to take place in order to be sure that expulsions requested in the EU are efficient, in the sense that the home country of the expelled third-country national agrees on cooperating to put the decision in force. Those negotiations often include financial support or clauses for facilitating the delivery of Schengen visas. Cooperation with thirdcountry can also help preventing illegal migrants to leave their country and to face multiple dangers on the road to Europe.

33 European Commission, Home Affairs: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/return-readmission/index_en.htm 34 United Nations Convention on the Law oft he Sea: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 35 Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf

18

DROI FRONTEX et up in 2004 by the FRONTEX Regulation36, the FRONTEX Agency – European Agency for Management of Operational Cooperation at External Borders of the Member States of the European Union – has the duty to reinforce and streamline cooperation between national border authorities37.

Key Conflicts Extensive border control vs. obligation under international law A way to solve the illegal migration issue could be to stop rescuing vessels in distress on the Mediterranean Sea or to erect fences all around the EU. However, aside from it being technically impossible, it would be a clear violation of international law, in particular the Status of Refugees and other UN Conventions.

Need for simple and quick procedures vs. respect for fundamental rights and freedoms Due to the large amount of legal and illegal migrants reaching borders of the Member States, administrative structures, responsible for controls, are overwhelmed. Once it is clear that a third-country national does not have the right to stay on EU ground, Member States need to proceed to the expulsion as soon as possible.

But during this procedure, fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual have of course to be guaranteed, slowing down the proceedings.

Inequalities among Member States facing the issue of illegal migration As mentioned above, Member States lying on the external border of the EU are put under a bigger pressure by illegal migration than countries at the centre of the Schengen area. There is a tension while trying to distribute the burden of illegal migration as equally as possible between all Member States. The Article 80 of the TFEU states that policies in the field of migration and their implementation have to happen in application of the principle of solidarity.

Measures Already in Place Readmission agreements Readmission agreements are a way to build a bridge with third-countries. If the problem of illegal migration cannot be solved by preventing people from coming into the EU, then a coherent strategy must be defined to make sure that third-countries nationals staying illegally in the EU are sent to their home country as soon and as smoothly as possible. In June 2011, 13 Readmission Agreements with third-countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Serbia, were in force38.

“Return” Directive (2008/115/EC)39 The so-called “Return” Directive was issued in 2008 and contains common standards and procedures for the return of third-countries nationals staying illegally in a Member State. This harmonisation allows a better cooperation between Member States. It also contains the principle of a period of voluntary departure, the possibility of detention during the return procedure and the notion of entry ban.

36 http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_amended_regulation_2011.pdf 37 http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks 38 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/eu_readmission_agreements_en.pdf 39 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF

19

DROI EU Action on Migratory Pressures – A Strategic Response40 The Council of the European Union has issued in April 2012 a Strategic response to migratory pressures in the EU. This document lists 6 strategic priority areas and assembles possible solutions to address these problems.

Key Facts and Figures Figure 241: Dynamic aggregate estimate of the irregular foreign resident population in 2002, 2005 and 2008.

Figure 342: Estimates on irregular foreign residents for EU 27 in 2008

Figure 4: Apprehensions at Selected European Borders

40 EU Action on Migratory Pressures – A Strategic Response: http://goo.gl/nKMRLb 41 Clandestitono Project : http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/clandestino-final-report_-november-20091.pdf , p.12 42 Clandestino Project: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/clandestino-final-report_-november-20091.pdf, p. 107

20

DROI Key Questions • • • •

What is the appropriate balance between (a) preventing illegal migrants to enter the territory of Members States by any means and (b) respecting obligations deriving from international law?

How can the return-policy be implemented comprehensively?

How can decided expulsions be put in force with due respect to international law obligations?

Beside an effective return policy, what else should policies regarding illegal migration include?

Links and Further Research Fact Sheets on the European Union – Immigration Policy: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.htm The Stockholm Programme, is a plan over 5 years (2010 – 2014) with guidelines in the fields of justice and home affairs. It contains guidelines for common policies on the topics of human rights, minority rights, the protection of populations groups with special needs… The chapter 6 is relevant for migration, both legal and illegal: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0001:0032:EN:PDF EU Action on Migratory Pressures – A Strategic Response. This document, issued by the Council of the European Union, identifies a non-exhaustive list of strategic priority areas that need to be considered in order to prevent or control existing pressures caused by illegal migration: http://goo.gl/nKMRLb Size and development of irregular migration to the EU, Clandestino Research Project - Counting the Uncountable: Data and Trends across Europe. The Clandestino project was designed to help stakeholders to adopt appropriate responses to the problem of illegal migration by providing them with reliable data and comparative analysis: http://goo.gl/s7P9iS Clandestino Project – Final Report: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/category/projects-reports/final-report/

21

EMPL COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (EMPL) In light of the ongoing European Union (EU) Year for Reconciling Work and Family Life, how can the EU help single parents participate in the labour market more easily? Besides flexitime arrangements, what measures can help aid in balancing work and family life?

By Marie Dromey (IE) and Malou Vandevorst (BE)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem Being a single parent is a daily struggle. Not only does the main responsibility of family life fall on just one person, but also many single parents find it hard to maintain sustainable employment. It is important that employment for single parents can balance both earning a stable income and the demands of family life43.

Given that single parents bear the full responsibility of household and child-rearing duties, finding gainful employment becomes difficult, because generally working hours, or business hours, are incompatible with the opening hours of childcare centres and schools.

Studies44 show that single parents face higher odds of being unemployed than married people without children, regardless of age, education, or race-ethnicity. It is also worth noting that single mothers tend to suffer from harsher effects of unemployment than single fathers45. As well as that, unemployment or living in poverty has a number of direct and indirect effects which includes but is not limited to; stress, depression, social unrest, tension, physical health problems, and increased risk of suicide46.

Time management is the key to achieving a fair balance between work and family life. However, companies tend to ignore important requirements of single-parents such as; the need for predictable and reliable working hours, flexibility to address family-related needs, different options in the area of working time duration (for example switching between full-time and part-time and vice versa), and the option to obtain time-out phases for busy periods and minimising weekend or evening work47.

It is also worth noting how employers must be motivated to implement family-friendly working-time policies not only for core, highly skilled employees or when qualified employees are scarce but also for employees with lower skill levels. While these employees may be easier to replace, they still have rights, needs and requirements. What can the EU do to single parents receive and benefit from the same opportunities as other job seekers? Furthermore, what can the EU do to ensure that employers are motivated to provide such flexibility to all level of employees?

43 In 2013 around 4.8% of couple households with dependent children were workless, much lower than the 36.3% for lone parent households with dependent children.

44 Unemployment in the Great Recession, Single Parents and Men Hit Hard: http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/IB-BeanUnemployment.pdf 45 Single mothers feeling harsher effects of unemployment: http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=162931 46 Psychological Effects of Unemployment and Underemployment: http://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/socioeconomic/unemployment.aspx 47 Reconciling labour flexibility with social cohesion – Ideas for political action: http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/ Trends/Trends-16_en.pdf

22

EMPL Key Terms Single-parent family – Single parent families can be defined as families where a parent lives with dependent children, either alone or in a larger household, without a spouse or partner.

The “make work pay” principle – Making it more cost-effective for inactive people to start working; and, at the same time, softening the transition from work - to - non - work periods and from one area of support measures to another.

Skilled employee – Any employee who has some marketable skill, knowledge, or (usually acquired) ability in their work. A skilled worker may have attended a college, university or technical school. Or, a skilled worker may have learned their skills on the job.

Low-skilled worker – Any employee without any college education, secondary education, or formal training.

Gainful employment – Any employment that is suited to the ability and the potentiality of the one employed.

Gainful employment is typically characterised by; variety in duties performed, safe working environment, income for family and oneself, a purpose derived from providing a product or service, happiness and satisfaction, positive engagement and involvement, a sense of performing well and meeting goals, friendships at work, an environment that respects and appreciates diversity.

Family-friendly workplace – A workplace with arrangements that facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life, and which firms introduce practices which complement statutory requirements. Family-friendly arrangements include: extra-statutory leave from work arrangements; employer-provided childcare, OSHcare, and elderly care supports and flexible working time arrangements.

Key Actors The primary actors can be divided into the European level actors and the national actors.

The European Commission provides action plans, with proposed laws, to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.

Within the last few years, the Commission of the European Communities, the European Parliament, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have begun to explore the factors leading to the increase of unemployment of single parents and to suggest appropriate responses.

The European Social Fund is involved as a main provider of funds. As one of the structural funds of the EU it reallocates money from Member States to different projects targeted at European regions with the aim of improving employment.

23

EMPL On a national level, it are the Member State governments who are responsible for the motivation of companies and of course the companies and its leaders itself are becoming increasingly important as complementary actors on the ‘work and care’ stage and are responsible for the provision of jobs and the adaptation of working hours etc. to the needs of the employees.

Key Conflicts Member States define and count single-parent families in different ways48. Some report as single-parent families only those with children under age 18 or 16; others ignore age. Some even report those whose children have moved away. Moreover, while some count those legally married, those cohabiting but not legally married, and those not married and living alone as three separate categories, others combine them in different ways.

In countries with weaker or non-existent family polices, lone parents do have access to jobs. However, these jobs are mainly poorly paid, unsatisfactory and do balance time between work and family life.

There must be a balance between an economically sustainable employment contract and providing single parents with the flexibility they need.

How this issue has been approached varies between Member States. Some Member States have addressed the single-parent question directly, while others have considered it only as part of a larger poverty problem.

More or less, there are 4 different approaches to the unemployment of single-parents49: 1.

2.

3.

4.

An anti-poverty strategy.

A categorical strategy for single mothers A universal young-child strategy Combining labour-market and family policy to permit a successful combination of parenting and work.

Measures Already in Place All European countries have some legal options for adjusting working time or temporarily leaving the labour market (at least for maternity leave). But it is not enough. There is no uniform European policy as a response to these problems, but some measures have already been taken.

On a European level Europe 2020 initiatives50 – Europe 2020 is the EU’s growth strategy with five ambitious objectives – on employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy - to be reached by 2020. One of their three flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy is: European platform against poverty and social exclusion: aims to bolster work at all levels to reach the agreed EU headline target of lifting at least 20 million 48 http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080709_1988935whateuropedoesforsingleparentfamiliessheilabkamerman.pdf 49 See previous 50 Europe 2020 initiatives: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=956

24

EMPL people out of poverty and exclusion by 2020.

The European commission has funded the project ‘Supermom Kick-Off 2010’ – a European Transfer of Innovation project, funded by the European Commission. The aim of the international partnership project is to transfer the Supermom training programme51, developed in Germany, to Italy, Poland, France, and Northern Ireland. Supermom offers vocational orientation and training in film skills for unemployed single parents, both mothers and fathers. The training combines vocational training courses and practical work with informal learning and confidence building.

On Member State level Single Parent Action Network (SPAN)52 – is a broad umbrella organisation representing the diversity of one parent families across England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Membership includes single parent self-help groups, individual single parents, large charitable organisations, and all kinds of support groups which are concerned in some way with supporting the needs of one parent families. Members may be divorced, separated, never married, widowed, heterosexual or gay, and from many different backgrounds and cultures.

In Britain: the anti-poverty strategy53 – they try to meet the general needs of the poor, and thus help the family headed by a single parent as well. A single mother in Britain today may remain at home and receive a means-tested assistance grant until her child or children are 16 years of age. Mother-only families are also helped by child allowances, the national health service, and priority access to public housing.

In Norway: A categorical strategy for single mothers54 – they provide special financial aid, such as the transitional Benefit to single mothers, supporting them so that they can remain at home with their children until they are ten years old.

In France: A universal young-child strategy55 – They provide cash benefits for all families with children, in particular those with children under age 3, so that a parent may choose to remain at home during the child’s first years. Its main instruments are an elaborate system of both universal and income-tested (but nonstigmatized) family allowances, including a basic family allowance, family-allowance supplements, housing allowances, maternity and paternity leaves, and special allowances In Sweden: Combining labour-market and family policy56 to permit a successful combination of parenting and work. They provide a variety of cash benefits and policy supports for families with children. They use social policies that stress the importance of full employment and the role of labour-market programmes.

51 Research report on the situation of lone parents in supermom partner countries: http://www.supermom-kick-off.eu/assets/plugindata/poolr/ supermom-research-report_eng_final.pdf 52 Single Parent Action Network: http://www.patient.co.uk/support/single-parent-action-network 53 What Europe does for single-parent families: http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080709_1988935whateuropedoesforsingleparentfamiliessh eilabkamerman.pdf 54 See previous 55 See previous 56 See previous

25

EMPL Key Facts and Figures In most Member States, as well as in most non-EU countries, the poverty risk for children living in lone-parent households is almost twice as high as the average poverty risk for all children together (34% versus 19%)57.

The tax-benefit systems for 22 European countries indicate that the unemployment based net replacement rates for single persons are much stricter in the course of unemployment in relation to a couple with two children58.

Working single parents are much more likely than working couples to find it difficult to meet childcare costs (32% compared to 22% of couples where one partner is in work, and 20% of couples where both work)59.

In Britain, of the single parents who do manage to find a job, almost a quarter are out of work again within a year as they struggle to find a job that offers security60.

Research found the biggest barriers to work for single parents are childcare costs and a shortage of flexible jobs that pay enough to make work worthwhile61.

Key Questions • • •

What are the major difficulties faced by single parents in their search for a job in Europe?

How can the EU and the national governments convince their companies to hire both skilled and lessskilled employees who need more flexibility etc. than others?

How can the EU provide accessible childcare to single parent families?

Links and Further Research What Europe does for single-parent families: http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080709_1988935whateuropedoesforsingleparentfamiliessheilabka merman.pdf Reconciling labour flexibility with social cohesion – Ideas for political action: http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/Trends/Trends-16_en.pdf Transitional benefit: https://www.nav.no/English/English/Transitional+benefit.805369198.cms

57 Single parents in Europe: http://www.supermom-kick-off.eu/single-parents-in-europe/index.php 58 http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/Trends/Trends-16_en.pdf: Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for net replacement rates at the start of unemployment or after sixty months’ unemployment, two family types at APW wage level in 1999 59 http://www.gingerbread.org.uk/content/365/Statistics (study in the UK) 60 See previous 61 See previous

26

EMPL Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for social protection and social inclusion: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_inclusion_fight_against_ poverty/em0011_en.htm The European commission on employment, social affairs and inclusion: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1 Supermom Kick-Off – EU project for single parents: http://www.supermom-kick-off.eu/

27

FEMM COMMITTEE ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY (FEMM) In light of the varied legal practices across Europe, how should the European governments review their prostitution legislation in order to minimise the negative consequences of prostitution for European societies?

By Theodor Hall (CH)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem Prostitution may be have been a subject for discussion for a while, but even the millennia of discussion have not helped conclude what must be the world’s oldest debate. Very little common ground has been agreed upon as the morality, legality and goal of prostitution legislation are all consistently called into question. A big difficulty within the debate is a lack of exact information, as it is hard to garner details about criminal and black market industry. This also makes the success of previous measures very difficult to properly adjudge.

Across Europe thousands of women operate as sex workers, most of them under unsanitary conditions.

Many do not choose this life and a large number suffer rape, other physical as well as psychological abuse and are victims of human trafficking. Some feminists believe the sex industry blocks the path to a more equal society by supporting a purely sexualized image of women that has been fought against for a long time.

Based on diverse cultural backgrounds and perspectives, European countries have taken very different stances on prostitution legislation with varying success. Considering the French government’s decision to adopt the Nordic Model, France’s future is very much in the spotlight. Scepticism of the Dutch regulatory model is on the rise and many have begun to question whether it is not simply a failed experiment. Meanwhile the Nordic Model is gaining traction in Western Europe but is yet to prove itself as critics suspect the positive statistics do not tell the whole story of a traditionally underground industry. In many countries in Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic, much remains grim for those women involved in prostitution, as the sex industry thrives under the government’s radar and existing prostitution laws are not enforced. The question of human trafficking through Eastern Europe, especially Romania and Bulgaria, also represents a substantial problem.

Key Terms Prostitution – The sale of sexual favours in exchange for money, drugs, protection or everyday needs such as rent or food.

Nordic Model (also known as Swedish model) – The system of prosecuting those who pay for sexual favours rather than those receiving payment. Prostitution is legal, customers risk prosecution.

Decriminalisation – The system of making prostitution legal whilst prohibiting any form of state or lawenforcement official involvement in prostitution-related activities. Prostitution is tolerated, rather than fully accepted.

28

FEMM Legalisation – Prostitution is treated like other business and regulated by the government. Sex workers classified as “self-employed”. Prostitution is legal and regulated.

Criminalisation – The legislation adopted in most of the US, all forms of trade in sexual favours are illegal.

Sex workers and purchasers are prosecuted.

Procuring – The facilitation or provision of a prostitute’s work for commercial profit, e.g. in form of protection, advertising or trafficking. More commonly known as “pimping”.

Human trafficking – The illegal transport of human resources through nations with the goal of exploitation, which consists mainly of prostitution, forced labour and organ trade.

Key Actors On the whole, the sex industry’s legislation is up to nation states rather than being a European competence, however the European Commission can propose pan-European decisions via the Directorate Generals on gender equality, violence against women and human trafficking, which all ties in closely to the topic at hand.

The European Parliament also addresses the issue in its committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)62.

The European Women’s Lobby (EWL), an extensive NGO that works with over 200 different NGOs also advises the European Commission and Member State governments on potential decisions63. With studies, recommendations and reports they have a certain influence over the European Commission’s propositions, however do not have any direct influence beyond awareness raising and lobbying.

Key Conflicts One of the main questions is whether legalised prostitution harms or furthers women’s rights in the long term.

Some say it is empowering letting women choose for themselves and thereby have the possibility to engage in prostitution legally and relatively safely. The legalisation of this underground industry also facilitates the tracking and protection of prostitutes. Others argue that prostitution further objectifies women and is both a cause as well as a consequence of gender inequality.

Furthermore, even if a Member State decided to legalise or criminalise it, little is solved. It remains unclear what form the legalisation or criminalisation would take and opinions vary starkly on which degree of legalisation and toleration is most effective. It is also crucial to keep the radically different cultural opinions and social circumstances in mind, since it is irrational to, for example, equate the effects of a passed law in The Netherlands to the potential effects in Romania.

62 EU institutions and other bodies: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm 63 The European Women’s Lobby http://www.womenlobby.org

29

FEMM A huge issue for debate is a lack of reliable information, as it is difficult to gather exact statistics on an illicit business. There are many estimates, but often these estimates diverge quite strongly.

It is important to keep in mind that prostitution is one of the main pillars of organised crime and that sexual exploitation is the most common form of human trafficking. The conflict lies in the argument over whether the legalisation of prostitution does enough to fight this or if an alternative path is necessary.

Ultimately, much of the debate revolves around the effectiveness of the Nordic Model as it seems to be a success story on paper, but it is argued that the statistics given are only valid for street prostitution which makes up for only 20% of sex workers in Sweden. Others also argue that what remains of prostitution has been driven underground and sex workers therefore cannot receive adequate protection.

Measures Already in Place There is little to no unanimous legal stance concerning prostitution across Europe, since it is predominantly dealt with on a national level. The following countries are of specific interest in terms of their legislation: The Netherlands (and Germany to a large extent): Prostitution is legal and regulated. In The Netherlands prostitution has never been illegal and since 2000 brothels and pimping have been legal as well. The sex industry is operated and regulated under standard labour law.

Sweden: In 1999 as part of a Violence Against Women bill Sweden introduced what is now called the “Nordic Model”, under which the customers of sex workers are punishable by law and sex workers themselves are not criminalised.

France: The French parliament has recently approved a bill that imposes a large fine (1500 Euro) on anyone paying for sex. Prostitution is legal while soliciting in streets or a public place is illegal after a law set in 2003; the proposed bill would overturn this legislation.

Czech Republic: The commercial sex industry works in a legal grey area where prostitution is legal but organised prostitution is prohibited. Generally a blind eye is turned to brothels; prostitution is not regulated and the sex industry thrives.

Key Facts and Figures • • • •

68% of prostitutes suffer from PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder)64.

In Europe, 47% of prostitutes are migrants65.

In 2009 crime fell to an all-time low in The Netherlands.

In Germany it is estimated that there are around 400000 sex workers and that 10-30% of men have experiences with prostitutes.

64 The European Women’s Lobby http://www.womenlobby.org 65 See previous

30

FEMM • • • •

70% of prostitutes in Belgium originate from Bulgaria66.

Nowadays 80% of prostitution in Sweden is “hidden” indoor prostitution, contrary to 67% prior to the ban; this indicates the unreliability of statistics on prostitution67.

62% of victims of human trafficking in Europe are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation68.

From 1996 (prior to the introduction of the Nordic Model) to 2008 the number of male sex buyers in Sweden sank from 13.6% to 7.9%69.

Key Questions • • • • •

Should our priority lie in minimizing the number of prostitutes or ensuring the working prostitute’s safety?

Should- and could- there be a unified policy for Europe concerning prostitution or should a country’s sovereign right to self-regulation remain untouched?

Does legalisation damage women’s rights by sustaining a wrong image of women or does it reinforce women’s right to choice?

To what extent can prostitution be compared to other markets or business? What are the similarities, what are the differences?

How are cultural backgrounds influential on prostitution policy? What European examples clearly show this?

Links and Further Research An international organisation that aims to observe and help migrant workers across Europe, with a focus on sex workers: http://tampep.eu An organisation that works for the protection and promotion of women’s rights across the world: http://www.equalitynow.org A website that looks at the different sides of the argument: http://prostitution.procon.org An article criticising legalised prostitution: http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2013/12/across-europe-growing-sense-legalized-prostitutionisnt-working/7777/ An analysis of the red-light district in Amsterdam and what it means to us: http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/312-the-audacity-of-tolerance-a-critical-analysis-oflegalized-prostitution-in-amsterdam-s-red-light-district A paper analysing the success of the Swedish model: http://maggiemcneill.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/dodillet-ostergren-the-swedish-sex-purchase-act.pdf 66 70 per cent of prostitutes in Belgium are from Bulgaria – report: http://sofiaecho.com/2009/04/07/701626_70-per-cent-of-prostitutes-in-belgiumare-from-bulgaria-report 67 The Swedish Sex Purchase Act: Claimed Success and Documented Effects: http://maggiemcneill.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/dodilletostergren-the-swedish-sex-purchase-act.pdf 68 Trafficking in human beings: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/docs/20130415_thb_stats_report_en.pdf 69 What ist he Nordic Model?: http://www.equalitynow.org/sites/default/files/Nordic_Model_EN.pdf

31

LIBE I COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS I (LIBE I) In light of growing concerns over government surveillance in Europe and overseas, how should the European Union, together with the Member States, ensure their citizens’ privacy whilst addressing their legitimate security concerns?

By Laura Julia Blagoev (FI)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem As the services the Internet provides in our everyday lives continue to expand, from online banking and e-voting to grocery shopping, storing personal information on various websites becomes normalised and the risks entailed can often be overlooked. If a person can be identified via his or her Internet Protocol (IP) address, the activities of that person can be tracked by almost anyone and be used to target them. Privacy breaching is by no means a novel problem, yet, in light of the revelations in 2013 about the extent of the US National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance programmes, securing the privacy of the individual has gained new urgency. In Europe, several acts of espionage undertaken by the British intelligence agency, called Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the German counterparts, BND and Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) raises questions of security and trustworthiness at the European level too. If Member States maintain increasing doubts about the protection of private information by the Union through legislation such as its data-sharing agreement with the US, a further increase in Euroscepticism may well be the result.

Gathering information and spying in the name of global security is a grave issue, and the privacy versus transparency debate is by no means simple. If Member States keep spying on each other in order to ensure greater national safety, the collective agenda of the European Union (EU) could be consigned to oblivion, which is not in the best interest of anyone. The espionage done on the ‘average citizen’ raises not only questions of ethicality but of redundancy; will scrutinising individuals who are not a part of any criminal activity whatsoever actually make a difference to national security? Therefore, in order to establish protection from harm and maintaining an acceptable degree of privacy, it may be necessary for the EU to present its citizens with alternative solutions and find a way for the Member States to co-operate in matters of safety.

Key Terms Personal data – Any information concerning a person’s private, professional or public life. It may be a name, a photo, an email address, bank details, posts on social networks or a computer’s IP address.

Data breach – The intentional or unintentional release of secure information to an untrusted environment.

32

LIBE I Digital Single Market – the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE), which contains 101 actions in 7 pillars aims to reboot Europe’s economy and help Europe’s citizens and businesses to get the most out of digital technologies.

It is the first of seven flagship initiatives under Europe 2020, the EU’s strategy to deliver smart sustainable and inclusive growth. The aims are to boost the music download business, establish a single area for online payments, and further protect EU consumers in cyberspace.

Legitimate Interest Clause – In data protection, this refers to a data processor having a legitimate claim to personal data e.g. a government institution storing and using your data. However, due to its vague definition, data controllers have often misused this clause.

Cyber security – Measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorised access or attack.

Data Protection Officer – The European Commission would require large companies, and those organisations that heavily engage in personal data processing, to appoint DPOs in order to keep a register of all the processing operations on personal data carried out by the organisation.

Key Actors European Commission – In 2012, the Commission proposed a major reform of the EU legal framework on the protection of personal data. The new proposals will strengthen individual rights and tackle the challenges of globalization and new technologies.

The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the EC’s Data Protection Officer are the EU-level bodies responsible for data protection.

The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) – ENISA is the EU’s response to cyber security issues of the EU. As such, it is the ‘pace-setter’ for Information Security in Europe, and a centre of expertise. Together with the EU institutions and the Member States, ENISA seeks to develop a culture of Network and Information Security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, business, and public sector organisations in the European Union.

European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – In 2013, it issued the Committee’s draft report on the proposed Regulation from 2012, proposing a number of significant amendments.

Key Conflicts To what extent can spying and the gathering of information be justified as a measure of ensuring safety before it becomes a breach of privacy: how can we find the balance between safety and privacy? Or, is privacy something that should never be breached in the name of safety?

33

LIBE I What should be the role of intelligence agencies and their co-operation with the EU? The EU’s potential cooperation with national intelligence agencies can be on the one hand used to enhance safety, but the conflict lies in the lack of transparency, national interests, measures taken by the agencies and whether the EU wants to partake in espionage. Right now, the EU has no power over national or European security, nor its own intelligence service.

The future relationship of the EU and the US – keeping in mind that the NSA has also spied on European governments and their citizens, the issues between the EU and the US need to be dealt with in order to re-establish a trustworthy relationship. Data privacy in the EU was almost entirely under the authority of national governments with standards varying across the Member States, which made it complicated to reach a consensus on a common data transfer agreement. In October 2013, however, new EU rules aimed at hindering questionable transfers of data from EU countries to the US were being finalised in Brussels as the first concrete reaction to the NSA scandal.

Measures Already in Place Renewal of the current Data Protective Directive70. Dating back to 1995, the EU’s Data Protective Directive is in the need for an update, because of the myriad of technological developments and changes that have taken place ever since. In early 2012, the European Commission launched plans for a renewal of the current Directive and the establishment of a new Directive which would focus on criminal offenses and judicial activities as well as on the protection of personal data. This new proposal, namely the EU Data Protection Regulation, aims at strengthening individual rights and tackling the challenges of globalisation and new technologies. The Civil Liberties committee of the European Parliament voted to approve the regulation, and before voting, the committee inserted stronger safeguards for data transfers to non-EU countries, an explicit consent requirement, a right to erasure, and larger fines for noncomplying businesses. The new regulation Directive should take affect by 2016 in all EU states.

New EU breach regulation71 – in August 2013, a notification regulation takes effect across the EU. The Regulation specifies the technical measures of how Internet service providers, telecommunications providers and other public electronic communications service (“ECS”) providers must notify of data breaches.

Key Facts and Figures72 74% of Europeans see disclosing personal information as a fact of modern life.

43% of Internet users say they have been asked for more personal information than necessary when accessing or using an online service.

70% of Europeans are concerned that their personal data held by companies may be used for a purpose other than that for which it was collected.

70 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 71 Regulation on the measures applicable to the notification of personal data breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC 72 Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ eb_special_359_340_en.htm

34

LIBE I Almost all Europeans are in favour of equal protection rights across the EU (90%).

More than four in ten Europeans would prefer the use of European level of administration to enforce regulation (44%).

Key Questions • • • • •

What measures can be taken by the EU to ensure online privacy for its citizens?

How can the EU further integrate its Member States in matters of safety?

What role should the national intelligence agencies in Europe play, and is their co-operation with the EU possible?

How can the renewal of the Data Protective Directive help decrease the risk of privacy breaching?

In light of the NSA scandal, how can the future relationship between the EU and the US be guaranteed?

Links and Further Research ePrivacy Directive - data breach notifications: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eprivacy-directive-data-breach-notifications It’s Not Just The NSA: Europeans Spy On Europeans Too: http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/11/02/its-not-just-the-nsa-europeans-spy-on-europeans-too/ EU citizens to remain in the dark on data breaches: http://euobserver.com/justice/120622 EU data retention law said to breach privacy rights: http://euobserver.com/justice/122459 NSA surveillance: Europe threatens to freeze US data-sharing arrangements: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/nsa-surveillance-europe-threatens-freeze-us-data-sharing MoJ wants obligation to appoint data protection officers scrapped from EU reform proposals: http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/january/moj-wants-obligation-to-appoint-data-protection-officersscrapped-from-eu-reform-proposals/ Data Breach Maps: Data Breach Notification in Europe: http://databreachmaps.com/ GCHQ and European spy agencies worked together on mass surveillance: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/01/gchq-europe-spy-agencies-mass-surveillance-snowden Digital Agenda for Europe: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/digital-agenda-europe

35

LIBE II COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS II (LIBE II) In light of the rise of far right movements in several European states, how should the European Union tackle the rising xenophobia and extreme right parties in accordance with its democratic principles?

By Berkok Yüksel (TR)

Relevance and Explanation of the Problem Xenophobia has been a social fact since the first interaction between separate communities in human history.

Europe has witnessed many big scale examples of the phenomenon: the Crusades, the Spanish invasion of the Americas, the Jewish genocide, etc. Today, on a more political basis, xenophobia threatens the social cohesion in Member States and results in discrimination, violence and radicalism. As stated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 22, ‘The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’.

In the light of this principle, xenophobia and right extremism are against the basic principles of the European Union (EU). With the current high in youth unemployment and the still-lasting effects of the 2008 crisis, Europe has found in itself a stronger hostility towards immigrants; the fear of foreigners therefore nourishes the shift of Europeans towards far-right extremism. This shift is reflected upon the political platform through the popularity of extreme right parties such as Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France and The Netherlands’ Freedom Party led by Geert Wilders. In line with rising Euroscepticism, these parties get greater voter turnout and take their places among the leading parties of Europe. To ensure both internal social unity in Member States and international cooperation on a European level, social discrimination nourished by xenophobia and far-right political parties must be tackled.

Key Terms Xenophobia – Intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries.

Discrimination – The unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, age, or sex.

Extreme right (far-right) – Extreme supporting or advocating of social, political, or economic conservatism.

Social cohesion – Sociological term to suggest stability and integrity in a group or society, in this case especially in the context of cultural diversity.

Euroscepticism – Body of criticism of the EU and opposition to the process of political European integration.

Multiculturalism – A process of interpretation of different cultures in the same organisational level from small institutions, like a school to the biggest, like society.

36

LIBE II Key Actors In succession to the crisis and the wave of Euroscepticism it created, far-right parties have gathered a wide voter base and increased their influence on the European political platform. They have done so not only because of their anti-immigrant agenda but also thanks to their more conservative economic policy and opposition to further EU integration. As the current popularity of far-right parties results in a harsher approach towards immigration, the issue involves all other parties that have an effect on immigration restrictions and regulations, as well as national-level legislative bodies.

Key components of EU structure regarding the issue would be the European Charter of Fundamental Rights protecting the basic rights of all EU citizens. The European Court of Justice as well as the European Court of Human Rights are the judiciary organs of the EU that guard the implementation of EU law. Finally, it is the European Commission’s Directorate-General of Home Affairs and Directorate-General of Justice, which manage policies regarding the issue.

One of EU’s decentralised agencies focusing on the matter is the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Through the collection and analysis of data in the EU, FRA assists EU institutions and Member States in understanding and tackling challenges to safeguard the fundamental rights of everyone in the EU. On the transnational level one can also find organisations like the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), a European-based network of non-governmental organisations in all EU Member States, or the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), a human rights body of the Council of Europe, composed of independent experts, which monitors problems of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, intolerance and discrimination.

However, above all institutions and bodies the most important and powerful actor in this context remains the European voter. We must remember that it is the average European who has an irrational fear and discriminating predispositions of immigrants that fuels the influence of right extremism. This fact also brings into the picture the possible sources of social predispositions, such as media, education, religious beliefs, etc.

Key Conflicts The main conflict in the issue is social biases and stereotyping. As the increase in far-right supporters is based on xenophobia and the negative perception of immigrants, the issue must be solved on a social basis.

In the background of social exclusion and discrimination is the problem of acceptance of immigrants, both new and past generations. Migration is said to be adding to Europe’s cultural richness and diversity as well as to its young workforce and economic growth in the long term. However, some counter this idea with a more traditional perception of European identity and the failure of social welfare systems due to sudden increase in population and need for basic welfare services of immigrants. Which in the end brings up the question: what is the European identity and who can benefit from being European?

37

LIBE II One of the main conflicts usually overlooked is the legitimacy behind the rise of far-right parties. Although violence, discrimination and extremism are social happenings that must be prevented, conformist economic and social policies are legitimate political opinions of free European citizens. The distinction must be made between out-dated extreme ideologies and rational requests of conservative citizens, such as increasing restrictions in immigration policies. It must be noted that xenophobia is not the only reason of far-right parties’ increasing vote rates. What must be tackled is the unreasonable fear and social exclusion of foreigners in the European society, not the right wing parties themselves.

Measures Already in Place The very basic expression of fundamental rights and equality among all citizens can be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, namely Part I, Article 9-10 and the whole of Part II: Nondiscrimination and Citizenship of the Union.

The key piece of EU legislation for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and for giving effect to the principle of equal treatment is the Racial Equality Directive, adopted in 2000. To accompany it, there is the Employment Equality Framework Directive, a major part of EU labour law which aims to combat discrimination on any ground in the workplace.

On a more national level, all EU countries are required, according to the Racial Equality Directive, to designate ‘National Equality Bodies’ for the promotion of equal treatment. The Belgian example of this would be the ‘Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme’.

Although there is a good framework on the theoretical ground, discrimination and xenophobia are still social facts experienced on a daily basis. Especially in regards to indirect discrimination, Member States must adapt their legal systems to the ever-increasing diversity of their societies.

Further recommendations, opinions and communications of the EC can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/law/index_en.htm

Key Facts and Figures While the highest vote for the far-right was in the Netherlands for the Freedom Party with 17 per cent, accompanied by other extreme right-wing parties’ vote ratings in the following countries: Belgium with 16%, Denmark with 15%, Austria with 13%, Italy and Finland with 10%, etc. When compared to the 90s, far-right parties have had a staggering increase in their votes, some of the parties doubling or even tripling their seats in their respective national parliaments.

38

LIBE II When it comes to foreigners in Europe; the number of people residing in an EU-27 Member State with citizenship of a non-member country in 2012 was 20.7 million, representing 4.1 % of the EU-27 population. In addition, there were 13.6 million persons living in an EU-27 Member State with citizenship of another EU-27 Member State. It should be noted that contrary to common belief, the share of immigrants from high and medium Human Development Index countries (%90 – refer to the table below) is the highest among all citizenship groups.

Figure 5: Share of immigrants by citizenship group, EU-27, 2011 (%)

Eurobarometer survey on public opinion regarding discrimination in EU (2012): http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_393_sum_en.pdf

Key Questions • • • • • •

Is xenophobia a social problem? Or should it be accepted as a rational political opinion, as xenophobes are legitimately represented in the democratic context?

What negative effects does xenophobia and extremism cause in the society?

Why is there a trend towards far-right parties in EU? How can xenophobia be tackled?

Whose responsibility is it to tackle xenophobia and discrimination?

Is there a certain ‘European identity’?

Links and Further Research Historical review of xenophobia and extreme right movements in contemporary Europe by historian James Mayfield: http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/the-rapid-rise-of-the-xenophobic-right-in-contemporaryeurope

39

LIBE II Website of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), more to be found under the tab ’Activities’: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights Annual Report 2012: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual-report-2012_en.pdf Intolerance, Prejudice and Racism: a European Report, by University of Bielefeld: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/IntolerancePrejudice.pdf A recent press release on extremism by the European Commission: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-18_en.htm

40

41

Brussels2014 is a project of: