their awareness, not for their coordination." 150 The emails, which the Committee received later, clearly show that the White House was, from the earliest moments, asked to "coordinate" on the talking points. 151 This may seem, to some, like a distinction without a difference, but in the world of Federal government interactions, "coordination" carries with it a level of involvement and responsibility to overrule or influence that is not present when information is conveyed simply "for awareness." The measure of White House influence can be seen in a September 15, 2012, email 152 from then-CIA Director David Petraeus acknowledging that, in spite of his own misgivings, the final content of the talking points was the "[National Security Staffs] call, to be sure." In contrast, the Acting Director's testimony perpetuated the myth that the White House played no part in the drafting or editing of the talking points. Today, it remains unclear exactly what was discussed during the Deputies Committe¢ meeting that resulted in the final version of the talking points--or even who was present besides the Acting Director of the CIA, who actually made the edits. These ate basic questions that should have been readily answered in the interests of transparency and accountability.
Disturbing Lack of Cooperation by the State Department As the Committee attempted to piece together key events before, during, and after the attacks, we faced the most significant and sustained resistance from the State Department in obtaining documents, access to witnesses, and responses to questions. The Committee does, on occasion, deal with "jurisdictional" obstacles that bureaucratically arise when we seek information relevant to an intelligenc~ matter, simply because the holder of the information is not an element of the IC. Ou.r review of the Benghazi attacks was no different. Even though the attacks involved IC employees and the CIA Annex and it was CIA personnel who came to the aid of the personnel at the Temporary Mission Facility, the State Department swiftly asserted questionable jurisdictional objections and resisted full cooperation with our review. We surmise that this lack of forthrightness stems from a desire to protect individual political careers, now and in the future, and the Department's reputation, at the expense of learning all the facts and apportioning responsibility.
150
SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Attacks in Benghazi, November 15, 2012, p. 54. See Jonathan Karl and Chris Good, "The Benghazi Emails: Talking Points Changed at State Dept.'s Request," ABC News, May 15, 2013, abcnews.go.com/Politics/Benghazi-emails-talking-points-changed-state-deptstequest/story?id= 1918713 7 (provides a link to the declassified and redacted emails at abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/white-house-benghazi-emails.pdf, p. 9). 152 Ibid., p. 95. 151
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