Women in the Crossfire An exploration into the geographical intersection of two U.S. neoliberal economic policies (War on Drugs and Trade Deregulation) and their connection to gendered violence in the city of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Evelyn Cranston evelyncranston@live.ca November 24, 2013 Economic Geography, Department of Geography University of British Columbia Abstract People are caught in the cross fire of conflict by being the wrong place at the wrong time. Between 1993 and 2007, nearly 500 women were murdered in the northern city of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico (Monarrez, 2009), a city of 1.3 million on the border with Texas. This is a per capita murder rate higher than any other major city in the United States (U.S.) or Mexico (Wright, 2001). The circumstances that led to this mass feminicide 1, can be traced to two neoliberal economic policies in the U.S. The first is the “War on Drugs”, which has fuelled a lucrative and violent male-dominated drug trafficking industry in Juárez. The second is the deregulation of export processing by use of “Maquiladora” factories, an initiative enshrined in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The deregulated maquiladoras are primarily a female domain. Neoliberalism has built two parallel economies and social structures within the city of Juárez: a poor and vulnerable population of working women lives alongside an armed and violent population of drug trafficking men. This paper will explore mass feminicide as a consequence of U.S. neoliberal economic policies in the city of Juárez.
Ilisha (2011), Honor Killing: The Epidemic that Isn’t [photo]. Loonwatch. http://www.loonwatch.com/2011/09/honorkillings-the-epidemic-that-isnt/ 1 Feminicide is the word used to explain murder from a gender perspective. “Homicide” has been the word used to explain murder, but it typically invokes the thought of a man being murdered. Popular use suggests that “homicide” glosses over an important gender dimension of murder. Feminicide is generally any murder of a woman by a man, but in the context of this paper, it refers to the murder of women stemming from unequal and gendered power structures. This paper will use the spelling suggested by the Women’s Health Journal.
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Women in the Crossfire Painted pastel pink wooden crosses garnished in fake flowers have become emblematic of the border city of Ciudad Juárez (Juárez), Mexico. According to the Women’s Health Journal, nearly 500 women over a 14 year period have been murdered in the city (Monarrez, 2009). Due to the nature of the problem, and its lack of close management, exact numbers are hard to come by. Some estimate it to be much higher, especially if the number of missing women is also considered (Sarria, 2009). U.S. neoliberal economic policies on drug prohibition and deregulated export processing have altered the cultural and economic climates of Juárez, by feeding cyclical relationships of violence and vulnerability. Geographies of Neoliberalism U.S. economic policies concerning drug prohibition and manufacturing create specific geographies. Beginning in the early 1900s, the U.S. government championed the international suppression of drug production, trafficking and use (Toro, 1995, p5). However, drugs have low market elasticity; the demand is independent of the market price. Drugs do not play victim to hot and cold markets (Payan, 2006, p24). The industry perseveres through prohibition policies in a geographic phenomenon known as the “push-down, pop-up” effect (Gross and Duke, 1993, p249). When drug production was suppressed, or “pushed down” in the U.S., the industry did not dissolve. It simply “popped up” in Mexico (Redmond, 2013). Profits from drug production and trafficking are high, and risk can be mitigated with frequent relocation. Eventually, the industry popped up in Juárez, a city home to many major Ports of Entry (POE) to the U.S. Juárez is also located in a strategic border location for another thread of neoliberal economic policies. Beginning in the 1960s, under Mexico’s “Border Industrialization Act”, deregulated Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were set up along the border and low-cost maquiladora2 (maquila) factories proliferated inside Juárez (Wright, 2006). Maquilas in Juárez were designed to receive imports from the U.S., process them for very little cost, and quickly export the finished product back to the U.S. without tariffs on the value added (Wright, 2001). Regulations for Profit Some regulations are profitable to enforce, while others are not. Neoliberal economics will swing in favour of greatest economic gain, often at the cost of human well-being (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p9). Two prominent industries in Juárez, the illegal drug market and the maquila factories, fall within this logic. Drug enforcement has been profitable for the U.S. to enforce. Fighting a “war” that makes no progress keeps thousands of metaphorical combatants employed. These people include U.S. gun dealers, prisons, police, military contractors and producers of equipment bought by 2 The Spanish word “Maquila” means “processing fee” in English. Maquilas, often owned by U.S. corporations, import raw materials without duties. Workers assemble the products, and the goods are exported back into the U.S. They are an opportunity for U.S. corporations to make advantage of low-cost labour and reduce overall manufacturing fees (2013).
Women in the Crossfire Economic Geography 364 cartels (Redmond, 2013). In May of 2010, the Mexican government estimated that of 75,000 firearms seized over a three year period, 80% were purchased in the U.S. (Goodman and Marizco, 2010). U.S. banks hold enormous sums of laundered drug money, even to the point where they have begun charging fees to accept deposits (Toro, 1995, p53). The National Drug Intelligence Center estimates that between $18 and $39 billion in drug profit is laundered into U.S. banks every year (2009). Wachovia, of the Wells Fargo group, was found guilty of failing to apply anti-laundering measures to transfers summing $378.4 billion, though their penalty fine represented less than 2% of their 2009 annual profit of $12.3 billion (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p210). The drug industry is illegal, so it is strictly cash-only, creating a huge liquid investment capital that the banks can rely on in economic crisis (Redmond, 2013). The head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime suggested that profit generated from the illegal drug trade and laundered into U.S. banks prevented complete collapse of the banking system during the financial crisis in 2008 (Syal, 2009). During that crisis, the U.S. government bailed out the banks with taxpayer money. According to Watt and Zepeda, this is classic neoliberalism; “profits are privatized, while costs are socialized” (2012, p211).The U.S. also has economic incentive to enforce drug prohibition because it justifies intervention into the internal affairs of countries where drugs are being produced. Once the U.S. has a reason to involve itself in one policy in another country, it is easier to implement other policies that would increase their domestic profit (Redmond, 2013). Mexico doesn’t profit in the same way that the U.S. does by enforcing prohibition. The drug industry is a multimillion dollar industry, but the bulk of the profit is made along the distribution network in the U.S., not along the production and shipping lines within Mexico (Toro, 2009, p51). Mexico’s revenue from the drug industry is negligible in the scope of its entire economy, while the U.S. profits heavily from prohibition and employs thousands (Toro, 2009, p51). Mexico has been complicit in the U.S. led “war on drugs”, but it was never their priority. In 1938, Mexico tried to enact a government policy that would centralize drug production and distribution in the hands of the state (Toro, 2009, p11). The idea was abandoned after the U.S. imposed an embargo on all medical drugs to Mexico, where after Mexico complied with a U.S. style prohibition (Toro, 2009, p51). On the flip side, labour regulations are not profitable for the U.S. to enforce or follow. The U.S. Department of Labour enforces 180 laws to protect workers and ensure they are not subject to discrimination, unsafe environments and otherwise (n.d.). Beginning in the 1960’s and solidified with NAFTA in 1994, U.S. corporations cut these costs by outsourcing labour protection responsibilities. Maquila workers are often employed by U.S. companies, but are physically located outside the legal jurisdiction of the U.S. state. Only the regulations of the corporation are relevant to the workers, not the regulations of the states that the factories happen to be located in (Redmond, 2013). Utilizing the maquilas, the U.S. government was no longer legally obligated to protect workers, because they were not citizens; they were just workers for a U.S. corporation. The corporations were not legally obliged to protect their workers either. Their transnational strategy worked to exploit legal loopholes that required enforcement of worker protection laws. Maquila workers were not protected by regulations on adequate minimum wages and working hours, safe housing and
Women in the Crossfire Economic Geography 364 transportation support, and job security. These processes of deregulation and outsourcing of production enabled the U.S. to cut costs while increasing ability to respond quickly to fluctuating market demands. NAFTA Enables Drug Industry NAFTA fed into the ballooning drug economy in Juárez. It deregulated U.S.-Mexico trade, and promoted easy movement of goods back and forth across the border. To support this, fast and efficient transportation networks were built, such as the Bridge of the Americas (Fig. 3). Predictably, huge amounts of drugs could pass through these networks unchecked. Checking every truck that crossed the border on these super-highways would have entailed enormous cost and effort, so the risk for profit trade-off to smuggle drugs was worthwhile (Payan, 2006, p34). Secondly, NAFTA worked at breaking up Mexico’s state owned economy, and integrating it into the U.S. market. Mexico was required to deregulate its own agriculture business (Redmond, 2013). Communal land-sharing farms were disallowed, public lands were broken up and sold to private firms, small farmer subsidies were eliminated, and government food price regulation was discontinued (Parramond, 2008, p359). Many small-scale subsistence farmers went bankrupt, unable to compete with incoming agri-business corporations (Redmond, 2013). Drug cartels were able to buy bankrupted farms for low prices, and begin production of poppies and marijuana plants (Redmond, 2013). Women in Juárez: Deregulation, NAFTA and Maquiladoras NAFTA also encouraged the proliferation of maquila factories and workers in Mexico. In NAFTA’s first year, Mexico suffered a million layoffs and mass bankruptcies (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p123). It drove many Mexicans into desperate poverty. Some were able to find jobs in the newly established maquilas. The maquilas have a specific gender and power structure. Women made up 80% of the factory workforce for the first 30 years of their existence (Wright, 2001). Although the split between maquila employed men and women is now closer to 50:50, women still hold 70% of the assembly line jobs, while men hold the higher-up salaried management positions (Wright, 2001). Mainly women were hired to work on the assembly lines because they apparently would work longer hours at repetitive tasks with more patience and fewer complaints and their fingers were more nimble (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p160). Maquilas operated on neoliberal ideology, characterised by retreat of state intervention in working environments (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p160). Maquilas sprung up in huge numbers, but the factories were not matched with an increase in social housing, public green spaces, hospitals, schools or public transportation networks (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p160). Women hired to work in maquilas lived in inadequate housing, had to rely on unsafe transportation to get to work, worked long hours and earned about four to six dollars a day (Redmond, 2013). They often had come alone, without family or friends, from their rural homes. In essence, female maquila workers were transformed by neoliberal feminization of the international division of labour into a vulnerable population. This reshaping coincided with another gendered economic movement happening within Juárez.
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Men in Juárez: Unemployment, Cartels and Violence Due to NAFTAs effect of creating transportation networks between Juárez and the U.S. to transport maquilamade goods, the drug trafficking industry was booming (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p160). Additionally, male unemployment was high, as the maquila jobs were filled by women. Mexico’s economy was not able to keep up with a growing labour force. Although reliable unemployment statistics are difficult to obtain 3, an obvious disparity exists. Mexico’s labour force grows by about a million workers per year while only 500,000 new formal jobs are added (Payan, 2006, p25). The profits of the burgeoning drug smuggling business appealed to a poor, young and unemployed male population (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p160). If these men stayed within the formal economy, they would average $5 an hour, while along the U.S.-Mexico border, estimates of annual profit are upwards of $80 billion (Payan, 2006, p26). Please see Fig. 1 for an understanding of the connection between profits and prohibition. Predictably, the cartels recruited many men at this time. The violence associated with the drug industry is not a coincidence (Payan, 2006, p41). In a legal and regulated market, disputes between territories, and over matters such as products, trade and distribution are resolved by means of a standard set of resolution procedures. In a black market, such as the illegal drug industry, those parameters do not exist (Payan, 2006, p41). Drug trafficking under prohibition carries high risk. Please see Fig. 1 for a further explanation of the link between drug prohibition and violence. Conflated Geographies: Vulnerable Women in Deregulated Industries and Armed Men in Illegal Industries Juárez was the focal point of colliding economic geographies. On one side, there was a large population of unprotected women who worked long hours, were not provided with safe housing or transportation and who lived alone. On the other side, there was a large population of men involved in a lucrative and violent illegal drug industry. It is largely agreed that the huge increase in violence and homicide originated from the boom of drug trafficking and the “war on drugs” (Monarrez, 2009) (Muggah and Vilalta, 2012). The sharp increases in murder are not the result of random acts, or indicative of a fundamentally more violent population. Violence in Juárez is highly organized, and feminicide is strongly correlated with the co-existence of cartels within the city (Muggah and Vilalta, 2012). Cartels are violent because that is how a risky, underground business operates, not because they enjoy it nor do they have innate violent tendencies. Mexican President Calderon’s declaration of “war on the cartels” in 2006 also served to exacerbate 3 This is largely due to two reasons. Firstly, people do not generally report in as “unemployed”, because there is little to no existing social infrastructure that they could benefit from. Secondly, the household statistics surveys used in Juárez use the word “occupation”, rather than “employment”. Because the informal economy is very large, many people are “occupied”, even if formally unemployed (Watt and Zepeda, 2013, 161).
Women in the Crossfire Economic Geography 364 the problem (Redmond, 2013). The cartels, uninterested in losing their profitable business, amped up their violence. The massive drug industry financed violence and the corruption of local law enforcement degraded the trust in the state to protect its citizens. Out of the 500 feminicides, nearly 10% could be clearly attributed to the drug networks, whether the women themselves were directly involved or not (Monarrez, 2009)4. However, violence in the drug industry is not limited to those directly involved. During the same time period, 62 murders were attributed to community violence (Monarrez, 2009). The Women’s Health Journal states, “They [women] were often killed because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, passing through the "battlefield." The deaths by community violence were not accidental, but rather an outcome of rampant violence in society that has an unequal gender and power division. Feminicide occurs when there are vulnerable unarmed women living in the same geographies as armed men in a grossly violent industry. The women working in maquilas are vulnerable because neoliberal policies dictate that their safety and worker protection is less important than cost-cutting. Between 1994 (NAFTA signed) and 2001, the feminicide rate in Juárez shot up 600% (Wright, 2006). The homicide rate for men rose by half that figure (Wright, 2006). Perhaps the corporations simply found it easier to divest responsibility than deal with safety. The director of the Ciudad Juárez Maquiladora Association (AMAC) said he saw no connection between feminicide and the working conditions of maquilas. However, women are often exposed to dangerous situations because of those conditions. They must walk to distant bus stops through unlit and remote stretches of desert without security assistance at late hours. In March 2009, a 13 year old girl was using the bus service of a U.S. owned factory. The driver, also employed by the factory, raped and beat her, before leaving her to die in a nearby stretch of desert. The intention of AMAC, even in such obvious and horrific cases of violence within the industry, is to shift responsibility to the victim. A spokesperson was quoted as saying, “Where were these young ladies where they were seen last? Were they drinking? Were they partying? Were they on a dark street? ” The corporate response has been to suggest that individual decisions put women at risk, rather than to consider that women are vulnerable because they work in an industry that does not protect them (Wright, 1999, p459). The increase of women living and working alone, and shopping or travelling on public transportation late at night influenced public imagination of women in Juárez (Wright, 2006). They were deemed “maquila whores” or “public women” (Wright, 2006). The Women’s Health Journal reports that a third of the feminicides showed evidence of sexual violence before death (2009). 4 10 cases: women killed with primary target. 12 cases: women killed over debts owed to cartels and traffickers. 4 cases: women killed in literal crossfire, when rival groups opened fire on each other and the women were in the wrong place at the wrong time. 3 cases: women killed becaU.S.e they reported drug crimes and the accU.S.ed sought revenge. 18 cases: no additional details provided, only a link to drug trafficking or organized crime (Monarrez, 2009).
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Women were made vulnerable by the neoliberal policies of largely U.S. owned maquiladora plants, and then caught in the crossfire of the surging, violent drug industry, which was another result of U.S. neoliberal economic policies. The War on Drugs prohibition coupled with deregulation of EPZ and the proliferation of maquilas created a dangerous economic and social climate in Juarez. Feminicide could have been prevented with adequate working regulations in factories and a centralized or decriminalized set of drug policies. Juรกrez was the eye of the perfect storm; the geographic collision of the gender segregated industries that spawned from U.S. neoliberal economic policies. If the women were involved in a literal war, their bodies would not be dumped in abandoned lots. Their coffins would be carried through the streets draped with the flag of neoliberalism.
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Figures and Images
Fig 1. Drug without Decrease
Prohibition leads to Increased Violence in Supply
The “War increased violence the U.S. Demand for
on Drugs” cannot be won. Prohibition has led to without a decrease in users or products entering
drugs is very inelastic. People will always have an appetite for drugs, independent of the cost (Payan, 2006, p24). A large increase in price will only be matched with a small decrease in demand. However, a large increase in price will be matched with an equal increase in production (Watt and Zepeda, 2012). Price of drugs rises under prohibition because demand remains constant while access becomes harder and production and trafficking become riskier (Payan, 2006, p30). People in illegal markets need money for firearms protection, bribes and need to be able to relocate quickly if the law steps in. A rise in price of drugs increases the available profits to be made. More promised profits encourage more people to enter an industry. The key feature of the “War on Drugs” is to enforce stricter penalties for traffickers, producers and users (Toro, 1995, p31), increasing risk. Cartels use violence because legal dispute procedures do not exist in an illegal market (Payan, 2006, p41). Risk and rewards are both magnified in a black market (Payan, 2006, p24). Operation Condor (OC) proves this point. With $150 million in financial help from the U.S. government, over 5000 Mexican police and military forces used a toxic defoliant spray called “Agent Orange” to put poppy and marijuana plantations out of production (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p48). 21,000 opium fields were destroyed in the first year (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p50). After three years, heroin imports to the U.S. had been reduced by half (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p50). Even this extreme effort did not eradicate the heroin industry. Demand stayed constant while the market price shot up. This triggered the “cartelization” of the industry (Toro, 1995, p17). Only the most daring, most highly organized and most violent (most willing to assume risk for profit) producers survived after OC (Toro, 1995, p17).
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Fig 2. A young woman working in a typical maquiladora factory. Women were preferentially hired because of their nimble fingers and propensity to work long hours without complaints (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p160). (2011), The Misfortunes of the Maquiladoras [photo]. The Commodified Life. http://gameofroles.wordpress.com/2011/11/30/the-misfortunes-of-the-maquiladoras/
Fig 3. “The Bridge of the Americas” connecting Ciudad Juárez to El Paso, Texas. NAFTA initiatives helped fund large, expansive transportation networks to facilitate fast import and export movement between the maquiladoras and the U.S. Predictably, these networks were heavily utilized for drug trafficking. With over 5 million trucks crossing the main bridges every year, thorough checking of cargo would be a complete impossibility (Payan, 2006, p34). (2012), Bridge of the Americas port of entry in El Paso–Ciudad Juárez region [photo]. U.S. Department of Transportation: Federal Highway Administration. http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop12049/ch2.htm
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Works Cited Duke, S. B. and Gross A. C. (1993), America’s Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade Against Drugs. New York: Putnam. Encyclopedia Britannia. (2013), Maquiladora. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/363663/maquiladora [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Goodman, C., Marizco, M. (2010), U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New Data and Insights Illuminate Key Trends and Challenges. Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars; Trans-Border Institute. University of San Diego. http://www.comunidadesegura.com.br/files/U.S.20Firearms20Trafficking20to20Mexico20Goodman20Final.pdf[Accesse d Nov 24 2013] Monarrez Fragoso J. E. (2009), An Inventory of Feminicide in Ciudad Juárez. Women’s Health Journal 1:23. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE %7CA205495049&v=2.1&u=ubcolumbia&it=r&p=HRCA&sw=w&asid=469076e04f44e479029b0b7b4039e [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Muggah, R. and Vilalta, C. (2012) Violent Disorder in Ciudad Juárez: A Spatial Analysis of Homicide. Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War. http://hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/68/doc/1934668792.pdf [Accessed Nov 24 2013] National Drug Intelligence Center (2009), National Drug Threat Assessment. http://www.jU.S.tice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs31/31379/finance.htm#text33 [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Parramond, E. P. (2008), The Rise, Fall, and Reconfiguration of the Mexican Ejido. The Geographical Review 98:3, 356371. http://www.academia.edu/211314/The_Rise_Fall_and_Reconfiguration_of_the_Mexican_Ejido [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Payan, T. (2006), The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars. Westport CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Redmond, H. (2013), The political economy of Mexico's drug war. International Socialist Review 90. http://isreview.org/issue/90/political-economy-mexicos-drug-war [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Sarria, N. (2009), Femicides of Juárez: Violence Against Women in Mexico. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. http://www.coha.org/femicides-of-Juárez-violence-against-women-in-mexico/ [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Syal, R. (2009), Drug money saved banks in global crisis, claims UN advisor. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/global/2009/dec/13/drug-money-banks-saved-un-cfief-claims [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Toro, M. C. (1995), Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. United States Department of Labour (n.d), Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor. http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/lawsprog.htm [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Watt P. and Zepeda R. (2012) Drug War Mexico: Poltiics, Neoliberalism and Violence in the New Narcoeconomy. Zed Publishing. http://ubc.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=933048 [Accessed Nov 24 2013]
Women in the Crossfire Economic Geography 364 Wright, M. W. (2001), A Manifesto Against Femicide. Antipode, 33:550-566. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/10.1111/1467-8330.00198/abstract [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Wright, M.W. (2011), Necropolitics, Narcopolitics and Femicide: Gendered Violence on the Mexico-U.S. Border. Signs 36:3, 707-731. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/10.1086/657496 [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Wright, M. W. (2006), Public Women, Profit and Femicide in Northern Mexico. South Atlantic Quarterly 105:4, 681-698. http://saq.dukejournals.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/content/105/4/681 [Accessed Nov 24 2013] Wright, M. W. (1999), The dialectics of still life: Murder, women, and maquiladoras. Public Culture 11:3, 453-473. http://publicculture.dukejournals.org/content/11/3/453 [Accessed Nov 24 2013]
Further Reading Craig, R. (1980), Human Rights and Mexico’s Anti-Drug Campaign. Social Science Quarterly 60:4. Naylor, R. T. (2002), Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press Women’s Health Journal (2009), Women Femicide/Feminicide: Extreme Gender Violence. Latin American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network 1 Palma-Solis, M. And Vives-Cases C. (2008), Gender Progress and Government Expenditure as Determinants of Femicide. Annals of Epidemiology 18:4, 322-329 Prina, S. (2013), Who Benefited More from the North American Free Trade Agreement: Small or Large Farmers? Evidence from Mexico. Review of Development Economics 17:3 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12053/abstract Martinez, O. J. (1978), Border Boom Town: Cuidad Juarez since 1848. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cravey, A. J. (1998), Women and Work in Mexicos Maquiladoras. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Truett, D. B. (2007), NAFTA and the Maquiladoras: Boon or Bane? Contemporary Economic Policy 25:3, 374-386 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/274224885 Gaspar de Alba, A. and Guzman, G (2010) Making a killing : femicide, free trade, and la fronter. Austin: University of Texas Press Radford, J. And Russell, D. E. H. (1992), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing. Toronto : Maxwell Macmillan Canada Staudt, K. (2012), The Femicide Machine. CHOICE 50:1, 164 http://ow.ly/rcP6Q Maingot, A. P. (1988), Laundering the Gains of the Drug Trade: Miami and Caribbean Tax Havens. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30:2/3, 167-187 http://www.jstor.org/stable/165985