liberatory as well as repressive possibility” (2001, p. 199). The state as an institution has a privileged position from which advantage can be taken to manipulate the meaning or the degree of intensity of these principles. The new alteration of the geometries of power caused by globalisation and its neoliberal ideology has modified state sovereignty (see Sassen, 1996; Smith, 2005). If the liberal revolutions in the 18th century turned sovereignty from the private to the public (from the Ancient Régime to the nation-state), neoliberalism is acting conversely. Power is being transferred to private (today corporate) hands, instead of maintaining it in the state, in the public. Though institutions still exist, they are being hollowed out since its political (democratic, plural) nature is denied by identifying it with the governance. The nation-state raison d’être is questioned and therefore the rule of the majority, democracy, is currently being threatened (Harvey, 2007). The role of the state in this globalised society no longer seems to be that of the preservation of democracy and the social principles that it represents, but rather the maintenance of a system ruled by the market. Here, social injustice, is partially concealed by a national affiliation discourse and the orchestration of a neoliberal ‘cultural hegemony’, which, following Gramsci draws a sort of ‘common sense’ (as opposed to a ‘good sense’; see Harvey, 2007). This means a sort of domination, “...no longer directly based on military force, but on forms of ideological consent that call for new kinds of political and cultural resistance” (Anderson, 1998, p. 120). How has this alteration of the geometries of power by globalisation turned into such a hegemonic scenario? One of the theoretical answers is found on the re-scaling of the national discourse and the new goals given to nationalism. For instance, national differentiation that used to be fostered within Europe a century ago, has shifted towards mutual recognition of national cultures, especially after the Second World War and the necessity of an integration process in Europe. Nonetheless, the global capitalist system needs state structures and state economic competition, so integration has limits. While this is contradictory in a society which is more globalised every day, it explains why differentiation discourses in Europe are still alive, normally pointing towards other objectives, while national discourse is nowadays structured differently, but is still feeding from the culture of fear.
Fear, like love, is incredibly powerful. The neoliberal nation-state has also benefited from reinforcing fear among its citizens to maintain its sociopolitically privileged position. If there is an enemy, an antagonist, the national rhetoric is managed and designed in opposition to it (or usually, them), which at the same time helps to consolidate in-group (intra-country) sentiments. However, nationality has not been exclusively used, but rather, a wide range of discourse, lately based primarily on ethnicity and religion. Todorov (2008), in his Fear of barbarians, defends the plural and dynamic identity of individuals and the two main inherent characteristics of cultures: their plurality and variability3. Precisely, these concepts, in their pure essence, cannot be totally accepted under the capitalist system as it is conceived today, because what is constantly evoked is the exclusive belonging to a nation, a religion, a race, a group, etc. This neoliberalised national discourse is ideologically hegemonic and thus, as a general rule, unlikely to be pluralistic, being at the same time opposed to any sort of universality (see Maalouf, 1998). In order to legitimise the difference in that new global scenario, that hegemonic discourse (always strongly mediatised) has adopted innovative tactics. A classic example, is the employment-related speech, by which others (immigrants) are coming to our country to steal our jobs, which belong to us as nationals (please notice emphasis). Albeit it is a discourse on ethnicity and religion, as I was saying, it is usually connected to illegal activities, the one that has a deeper impact in Europe. In a work about fear and terrorism, Altheide writes: “It is not fear of crime… It is what this fear can expand to, what it can become… The major impact of the discourse of fear is to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that “things are out of control”…” (2009, pp. 57-58). At the end, the objective is remarking on difference, and is persuasively used – without forgetting, by those who are in power – are forms of non-physical violence. Appadurai reminds that it is in “…events of extreme collective violence [non-physical, and especially physical, such as terrorism or foreign military intervention] that we can see the spiralling loop which produces predatory nationalisms” (2000, p. 138). In a recent work, Merrifield points out that: “The people can’t be wrong, Rosseau always insisted, but they can, he warned, often be deceived, deceived into acting for what isn’t in their own interests. One of the most effective forms of deceiving people is fear, and today a big perpetrator of fear is austerity”
(2014, p. 127). Merrifield refers to austerity measures that are currently taken by the elites and the political and economic establishment across Europe through the policy regime, as Peet (2011) calls it. Such measures in times of crisis provoke, among others, scarcity in the labour market and the reinforcement of the discourse of fear of immigrants ‘stealing’ jobs, following the previous example. It is a discourse driven by fear and focused on individualism and difference to others and carries first scepticism and distrust, followed by isolation, discrimination, and xenophobia. This can ultimately be done thanks to rescaling nationalisms to make them politically and culturally hegemonic within the globalised neoliberal state capitalist system4.
In the preface of the Statute of the Council of Europe, also known as the Treaty of London, signed in May, 1949, the states that first joined stated, among the reasons to sign, the necessity of: “Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy”. The momento when the treaty was signed cannot be forgotten: after the end of the Second World War, in the context of the increasing Cold War. Shortly after, in 1952, what would be the European Union embryo was established: the European Coal and Steel Community. What I want to be emphasised is that the economic grounds of the current EU diverges from the democracy-based Council of Europe motivation. That is why it is not difficult to state that the EU project has had a biased economic cause since its foundation. Maintaining peace was essential, but it was mainly thought and done through the sharing of a common market for goods. In contrast, EU citizenship is only a twenty year-old phenomenon. Belina explains how this economic, neoliberal character of the EU is sustained and fostered by a triad fetishisation working at the same time: the fetishisations of credit/debt, competitiveness, and territories. Nowadays these processes “…hide relevant aspects of the politicaleconomic reasons for the current Euro crisis and the way in which it is dealt with politically” (2013, p. 33). In this context, compromises towards sociocultural and economic integration within Europe are encountering major difficulties. Identity seems to be crucial.