The European Security and Defence Union Issue 6

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence

Volume No 2/2010

Main Topic

Protection of Management FCrisis orces

No 2/2010

Checks and balances in the EU after Lisbon: The “new” role of the European Parliament

Protecting our military forces is of fundamental importance in the conduct of crisis management operations

The Stockholm Programme – more security for European citizens

Jerzy Buzek MEP, President of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

Hakan Syrén, General, Chairman, EU Military Committee, Brussels

Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar MEP, Chairman, EP-Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Strasbourg/Brussels

EDITORIAL

Editorial The Afghan Dilemma Alexander the Great was the last foreign potentate to succeed in governing Afghanistan. All subsequent attempts to rule that country failed, up to and including Moscow’s effort to Sovietize the country in the late twentieth century. That venture took a heavy toll in lives and ended with the Soviet withdrawal following defeat by the Taliban - who are now trying to prevent orderly reconstruction.

The international forces that have set themselves the task of making Afghanistan into a strong, prosperous, free country where human rights are respected are having a hard time of it.

Despite all the setbacks, the objective remains: to ensure that Afghanistan ceases to be a refuge and staging area for global Islamist terrorism. This common goal is still worth pursuing.

But can it be achieved? Ten years of effort have, after all, come to naught. Can mistakes be mended? Is a turning point still possible, and how much longer will Western public opinion be willing to hold out in the face of mounting losses?

Afghan President Hamid Karzai caused widespread consternation when he called international troops invaders, accused the West of tampering with the election results in his favour and said that he is not an American puppet. He then told 1,000 tribal chiefs in the southern city of Kandahar that he would prevent the spring offensive planned by international forces if the tribal chiefs so wished. The Afghan President, accompanied by the commander of U.S. and NATO forces, U.S. General McChrystal, and the senior civilian representative of NATO, British Ambassador Sedwill, called for more autonomy for Afghanistan but also called on his tribal chiefs to cease supporting the Taliban.

ise he made in London to pursue reconciliation in the country by holding talks with the Taliban. The U.S. believes this to be too risky and has captured Karzai’s main negotiating partner, the Taliban’s second in command, Mullah Baradar!

Hartmut Bühl

Everyone involved knows the clock is running out but that success is still possible.

President Obama’s announcement that the United States will begin its pullout in 2011 has caused alarm in the region and been interpreted as a sign that the Americans are about to abandon Afghanistan to its own devices. No one in the region – and this includes all countries, from Russia to Pakistan and Iran – wants the Taliban to come back to power. Iran sees itself as a religious bulwark against the Afghan Sunnis, while the U.S. and Russia are doing their utmost to keep Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the Taliban.

Karzai for his part is anxious to avoid meeting the same fate as South Vietnam’s General Thieu in 1975. This constellation of circumstances could lead, if properly exploited, to success.

The window of opportunity is there and what counts in politics is action and success. They generate solidarity.

Public opinion in the West, upset over casualties among the international forces, is increasingly questioning the commitment. Rapid success is needed if support for the Afghanistan policies of the Western countries is to continue. Success would also pave the way for withdrawal.

Karzai’s objections to the military offensive are arguably just a matter of timing. Karzai is currently following up on the prom-

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Checks and balances in the European Union after Lisbon – the role of the European Parliament in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

by Professor Dr. Jerzy Buzek MEP, President of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg....... 7

The Stockholm Programme – more security for European citizens

by Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar MEP, Chairman, EP-Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Strasbourg/Brussels .......................... 10

POLITICS and POLICIES

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Editorial

Europe and Afghanistan How to realize a Comprehensive Approach for Afghanistan’s security

by General Egon Ramms, Commander, Allied Joint Force Command, Brunsum

The European Union

20

Apocalypse Now

by Dr. Bill Durodié, Coordinator, Homeland Defence Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security, Singapore 24

The Barroso II Commission 2010-2014 The Team for the future of Europe

66-67

European security needs a parliamentary dimension A commentary by Dr. Willem F. van Eekelen, Den Haag 9

The European citizen’s security – a perception

by Alexander Siedschlag, Professor for Security Research, Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna/Paris

27

The nuclear threat of Iran – no end in sight Interview with Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director, Institute for Near East Policy, Washington

29

Security solutions adapted to individual needs Interview with Dr. Matthias Möseler, CEO, Serco GmbH, Bonn

32

The European Security Strategy − national threat perceptions versus EU objectives

by Dr. Rachel Suissa, School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa 13 Turkey’s foreign and security policy − an asset for Europe

by John Greenway MP, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris Crisis management – Permananent Structured Cooperation

by Doug Henderson MP, London, Chairman of the Defence Committee, ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris

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15

18

External threats – customized concepts for effective site protection

by Manfred Busko, Gunnebo, Germany, Munich 35

CONTENT

Protecting our military forces is of fundamental importance in the conduct of crisis management operations

by Hakan Syrén, General, Chairman, EU Military Committee, Brussels .................. 39

MAIN TOPIC:

Protection of Crisis Managment Forces DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES The Transformation Process of Europe’s Armed Forces – The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) as an example.

by Bi Puranen, Associate Professor and Secretary General, World Values Survey Association, Stockholm 41 Situational knowledge superiority is the key to future operational success

by Lieutenant General Hans-Lothar Domröse, Commanding General, Eurocorps, Strasbourg

44

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance(AGS) – a decisive factor for the protection of forces

by LtCol (GS) Andreas Korb, Operations Specialist, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency, Brussels

47

INDUSTRIES for SOLUTIONS Closing an urgent capability gap – Europe needs an own Unmanned Air System (UAS) for better protection of its own Armed Forces

by Bernhard Gerwert, CEO, Military Air Systems, EADS Defence & Security, Manching 49

Force protection on the ground – how to optimize transport and combat vehicles for crisis management forces

by Dominik von Wolff Metternich, Rheinmetall Land Systems, Kassel 51

Essential progress in the development of armored transport and combat vehicles

by Dölf Greuter, Vice President, Technology & Advanced Engineering Programs, and Lutz Kampmann, Vice President, Sales & Marketing, GDELS, Kreuzlingen 54 IT-Protection for Crisis Management Forces

by Tobias Bahlinger, Hewlett Packard, Böblingen

57

INSTITUTIONS and ASSOCIATIONS Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)

by Kent Schneider, President and CEO, AFCEA International, Washington

59

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS European Union NATO

61 68

LETTERS to the EDITOR 70

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POLITICS and POLICIES

Checks and balances in the European Union after Lisbon – the role of the European Parliament in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

by Professor Dr. Jerzy Buzek, President of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg In today’s global and interdependent world, the European Union faces a daunting list of major challenges, including climate change, energy security and migration. It is living in the world exposed to both conventional and unconventional risks and threats, raging from natural and mad-made disasters to economic crises, global pandemics, cyber-warfare, piracy, ethnic conflicts, extremism and terrorism.

EU citizens strive for security Clearly, the European Union can not afford to remain just a bystander in global affairs, especially when its citizens are rightfully demanding from their governments and from the EU better protection, more predictability and an ever higher degree of security, stability and prosperity.

The time has come for the EU to become a player, and not just a payer, on a global stage, to become a real actor not only on major foreign policy issues, but also in the matters of security and defence. The European Parliament, which has recently acquired new powers, has also an important role to play.

The EU towards becoming a global player The Lisbon Treaty has created important tools to increase the visibility and the effectiveness of the EU’s external actions, yet much more is needed to make good use of these tools and to make sure that they translate into a more coordinated and effective EU policy. I believe that in order for the EU to be able to reassert and reposition its leadership on global issues, it needs first and foremost to show the capacity to tackle the challenges and solve the problems on its own borders. Only if the EU proves it is able to help solve the frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabach, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, if it proves able to bring stability and prosperity to the entire Western Balkan region, to name just a few, it will be treated by other global powers as a serious, capable and effective partner.

Energy security for Europe – a prerequisite Moreover, key to the EU’s global potential is its own security and independence, especially in the field of energy. Therefore, the creation of a common external energy policy and of a European Energy Community, further diversification of energy resources and further efforts to make the energy trade in the re-

Professor Dr. Jerzy Buzek Jerzy Buzek was born on 3 July 1940 in Smilovice what is now in the Czech Republic. In 1963 he graduated from the Silesian University of Technology, specializing in chemical engineering. He has worked for many years as a scientist, including at the Polish Academy of Sciences and Cambridge University, and since 1997 has been a professor of engineering. In the 1980s he was an activist of the democratic and anti-communist Solidarity movement. In 1997 he was elected to the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament, and appointed Prime Minister of Poland, a position he held until 2001. From 2004 to 2009 he served as a Member of the European Parliament, being a member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and Rapporteur on the EU’s 7th Framework Programme for Research and Development. On 14 July 2009, he was elected President of the European Parliament.

gion more open, transparent and predictable, would help the EU to escape the hostage situation of energy dependence and allow it to be more principled and outspoken on an equal-level dialogue with the major partners like Russia and China.

Coherence in politics and in actions- a sign of power Finally, the new posts of President of the European Council and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, created by the Lisbon treaty, as well as the soon-to-be established European External Action Service, should be used in the most effective way in forging a common position. They should enable the Union to finally prove to the world that it can speak in one voice on the most important global issues, whether concerning security challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the peace process in the Middle East and the nuclear ambitions of Iran.

CSDP – the parliamentary dimension Following the decisions made by the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, the security and defence policy of the Union has developed rapidly: As of now 24 missions and operations have been launched within this framework, seven of them military ones. Let me just mention the most recent ones: the

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The President at the ceremony of the Lisbon treaty coming into force Photos pages 7-8: photo©European Parliament

antipiracy naval operation off the coast of Somalia, the observer mission in Georgia and the most recent one, the military mission in Uganda to train Somali security forces.

The European Parliament should become a partner for scrutiny Decisions concerning war and peace are certainly the most important decisions elected politicians can take. These should not only be left to the executive branch. As such, we feel that in addition to the scrutiny exercised by the parliaments of the Member States, the European Parliament should also be part of this endeavour. Therefore, after the 2004 European elections the European Parliament set up a Subcommittee for Security and Defence. During these years, the European Parliament has also built up structures for information, budgetary control and legislation.

The European Parliament and information Firstly, if you want to exercise oversight, you have to be well-informed. The Subcommittee therefore has regular public meetings with the Council about planned and on-going missions. As regards confidential information, the Parliament has set up a Special Committee whose members are security cleared. This Special Committee has met at regular intervals with the EU High Representative for special briefings and has had access to confidential documents.

The European Parliament is aiming as well to be in a position to vote on well-prepared recommendations before an operation is finally decided on by the Council. Information visits within the countries concerned give us the necessary background to do so, as illustrated by the cases of operations or missions in the Republic of Congo, Chad, Kosovo, and Georgia. We followed this up by then visiting the troops under the EU flag to see how their mandates were being implemented.

Powers through budgetary control Secondly, we should not forget that so far we have had only seven military but seventeen civilian missions. The civilian

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missions are financed from the European budget and Parliament has to approve the respective budget lines. This concerns for example the CSDP missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Georgia. The use of the EU budget to finance these missions is monitored through regular meetings between the Council and the chairpersons of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Budget as well as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence.

Another element of parliamentary scrutiny by the European Parliament concerns research and development for equipment needed for civilian and military missions by the EU. This also covers satellite-based observation and navigation (Kopernikus and Galileo) as well as security research. Parliament voted, by a large majority, for Galileo to be available not only for civilian missions but also for the EU’s military operations. About 5 bn Euro have been earmarked for these purposes in the 7th Research Framework Programme approved by Parliament and the Council. These budgetary decisions came about also due to strong input from the European Parliament.

Legislative powers and cooperation with national parliaments Thirdly, the European Parliament participates in legislative decision making and has become a true co-legislator following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. For instance, just recently the Parliament and Council took legislative decisions on the so-called ‘defence package’: the two directives concerning defence procurement and intra-community transfers for defence products. It was the first time Parliament had acted as a legislator in matters of defence.

Last but not least, there is our cooperation with the parliaments of the Member States. The chairpersons of the defence committees of the national parliaments, European Parliament and parliaments of candidate countries meet at regular intervals and discuss on-going developments in CSDP. With the Treaty of Lisbon in force, this cooperation is being reinforced further.

Parliamentary scrutiny and the way forward These examples show that the first steps have been taken on the way to a checks and balances system in the CSDP area where the European Parliament, together with national parliaments, is ready to play its part in a full parliamentary scrutiny of the security and defence policy of the European Union.

Moreover, the European Parliament will remain committed to its vision of the European Union that enhances its strategic autonomy through a strong and effective foreign, security and defence policy. A policy that is so needed to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security. A policy that is indispensable to protect the security of our citizens, defend our interests in the world and uphold our founding values.

A policy that would help promote effective multilateralism, international law and advance the respect for human rights and democratic values worldwide.

POLITICS and POLICIES

European security needs a parliamentary dimension A commentary by Willem van Eekelen*, Den Haag

The news of the coming final demise of the Western European Union was not entirely unexpected, but leaves a serious gap in the parliamentary oversight of the common European security and defence policy (CSDP). As long as the European Parliament is not given competences in this intergovernmental area, the WEU Assembly performs an indispensable role in building consensus among national parliamentarians. The notification to terminate the Modified Treaty of Brussels will take effect after one year, but this time should be used to devise alternative parliamentary arrangements.

The historical background In 1948 the Brussels Treaty was the first sign of European countries (France, UK and Benelux) to work closely together on a wide range of subjects. Many of these were taken over by other organisations with a wider membership, like the Council of Europe, the Coal and Steel Community and ultimately the EEC. What remained was the security dimension with its automatic military assistance clause, which went beyond the more discretionary formula NATO would adopt in 1949.

The founding commitments The name WEU was suggested in 1954 by Sir Anthony Eden when the European Defence Community collapsed in the French Parliament and a way had to be found to bring Germany into NATO on an equal basis. Within the WEU Germany accepted the prohibition of producing ABC weapons and some controls over heavy armaments, but the other members also accepted reporting obligations on their military forces. Italy and Germany became members and the UK (which had not participated in the EDC) undertook to maintain 3 divisions and a tactical airforce on German territory.

The security dimension since 1982 It would not be the only time that the WEU acted as a reserve organisation which found solutions when others were unable to make progress. After President de Gaulle had vetoed British entry into the EEC, the WEU ministers of foreign affairs met quarterly to keep the UK informed and attached an “economic day” to their deliberations. When in 1982 the Genscher – Colombo initiative to include a security dimension into the European Political Cooperation failed to obtain the support of Denmark, Ireland and Greece, the WEU was “revitalised” with a session in Rome in 1984 with participation of the ministers of defence. A concrete result of this initiative was the mine-clear-

ing operation in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 when NATO was still restrained from engaging in ‘out-of-area’ operations.

Maastricht – Amsterdam – Lisbon The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in December 1991, asked the WEU, which by now included Spain, Portugal and Greece, to “elaborate and implement decisions having defence implications” and invited the non-EU members of NATO (Norway, Iceland and Turkey) to become associate members. Denmark and Iceland became observers and in 1994 the candidates for the EU who had also signed a ‘Europe agreement’ joined as associate partners. Four categories of participants was a bit much for some, but responded to the need for a sense of stability and shared belonging. The arrangement contributed to my vision of ‘security through participation’ with 27 countries around the same Council table. The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the functions of the WEU to the EU, which by now has conducted some 23 operations, often of a civil-military nature. In 2003 armaments cooperation was taken over by the European Defence Agency. The solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty is not as clear as the military assistance contained in Article V of the WEU and ambiguous about the so-called neutral countries. Yet, it was considered sufficient to abrogate the Brussels Treaty.

A gap for scrutiny in security and defence This mainly affects the Assembly, which has re-baptised itself as the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) and gave equal membership to the four groups of participants. It has played a leading part in involving the new democracies of Eastern Europe in the security debate. Working together on joint reports and resolutions enhanced the level of understanding of the concerns of the new democracies. The Assembly deserves to stay in place, preferably as a joint meeting of national delegates responsible for defence issues in their own parliaments and a group of MEP’s. The European Parliament itself was the big winner of Lisbon, but did not get any larger say in the CFSP than being regularly consulted on its “main aspects and basic choices” by the High Representative. Nor will national MP’s benefit much from the briefings and hospitality of the presidency country bestowed upon their colleagues of the Committees on European Affairs in the COSAC context. The essence of parliamentary oversight is more than that. *Dr. Willem F. van Eekelen was Minister of Defence of the Netherlands from 1986−1988 and Secretary General of the WEU from 1989−94.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Stockholm Programme – more security for European citizens

by Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar MEP, Chairman, EP-Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels/Strasbourg The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December of 2009 has represented a positive outcome of the Gordian knot that threatened the EU. Thanks to this Treaty, the Union can now face the challenges of the future with confidence. We are building a European political, economic and monetary Union between 27 Member States and almost 500 million citizens.

Citizens are the center of everything The EU is a process consisting of a set of treaties, the most significant being the Treaty of Rome. Its 50th birthday was held in March 2007 with the Berlin Declaration, which stated: “In the European Union we are realizing our common values: for us, “citizens are the center of everything“. The statement is a timely reminder of what has been achieved, peace and prosperity and a renewed commitment to continue working for a common future that overcomes several crises, among them the financial crisis, in order to guarantee survival in a globalized world where Europe is playing an increasingly a minor part.

The EU does not live in a bubble. In 50 years, its population has gone from one quarter of humanity to one eighth. Countries like China and India have reappeared on the scene and other markets such as Mexico and Brazil have emerged. Globalization has been accelerated through diffusion of technological progress, demographic change (migration), the momentum of global trade and the need to tackle climate change.

Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) After the 3rd pillar was opened for development by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and institutionalized by the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the European Council in Tampere in October 1999, the development of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has been a key objective of the European Union.

Surely, no other aspect of European integration reveals more political and constitutional ambition. The AFSJ makes European citizen the subject of European integration. It provides a framework of rights that improves and enriches that which they already enjoy as citizens of the Member States. It clearly sends an important message: if the internal market and the single currency was essential to build a political Europe, the same should be done with rights, freedoms and citizenship.

Deepening the path travelled thus far, the Hague Programme of 2005, “particularly in the area of civil justice,” added a second

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Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar Dr. Juan Fernando López Aguilar was born in 1961 in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. He graduated in Law from the University of Granada and received a Master in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University and a Doctorate in Law from the University of Bologna. He has spent much of his career as a Professor of Law at the University of Las Palmas, where since 1993 he holds the Chair of Constitutional Law. From 2000 to 2009 he was a member of the Spanish Parliament, serving as Minister of Justice from 2004 to 2007.

Since June 2009 he has been a Member of the European Parliament with the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. He serves as Chairman of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and is a Member of the Conference of Committee Chairs and the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

chapter to the ambitious agenda for the future set in Tampere in 1999. The importance of this legislation makes it essential to highlight the original ambition of the program, which covered all aspects of AFSJ, before the criminal justice dimension became a political priority following the need to combat terrorism in the wake of September 11, 2001. The Lisbon Treaty reformed and consolidated in depth the foundations, objectives and methods of AFSJ-related policies, and has become a joint project of shared competence with the Member States in areas that touch the core of the constitutional order.

The Stockholm Programme – a great step forward Spain took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2010 at a crucial time. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the beginning of a new stage in the development of European policy in AFSJ under the Stockholm Programme will provide a great impetus to the process of European integration and help significantly strengthen the capacity of the Union to ensure the safety and freedom of 500 million citizens, both at the European level and in the 27 Member States.

Spanish Presidency is fully committed The development of the Action Plan on the Stockholm Programme is therefore up to the Spanish Presidency. The Stockholm Programme’s main priority is strengthening the rights of citizens, judicial cooperation and combating all forms of organ-

POLITICS and POLICIES

ized and cross-border crime, including of course terrorism. Its aim is therefore none other than to provide citizens with a geographical and legal area where freedom, security and justice are guaranteed to a common standard, in a world in which threats are ongoing and new challenges are becoming more diverse and less predictable.

also sets the foundation for a greater European commitment to protect citizens. In particular, it does so through the provisions of Article 86 TFEU, urging the Commission to initiate consultations with stakeholders with a view to the creation of a European Public Prosecutor to combat crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests.

Democratic legitimacy The institutional role assigned for the first time by the Lisbon Treaty to national parliaments is already having a positive impact. Specifically, this is the development and operation of the AFSJ. Not only because of the subsidiary principle, but also because of the democratic association of European citizens to Europe, representing a contribution to the democratic legitimacy of European policy and to a broader European public space.

The European Protection Order

The key element of human rights The accession of the Union to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (provided by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 6.2 TEU), will also be a key element in the additional protection of fundamental rights, as listed in the legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, in developing EU policies to combat social exclusion and discrimination on grounds of gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, religious belief, ancestry, ethnicity or race, to fight anti- Semitism, xenophobia and homophobia, and to protect children and minorities.

Schengen is a driving factor It must be stressed that the original driving factor of Schengen cooperation is confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty as the core of the AFSJ. “The EU shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.” The Treaty of Lisbon gives us a lot of possibilities to work with.

A new legal framework allows profound progress The action of the European Union will be developed upon a new legal framework which includes provisions relating to the prevention of inequality, particularly between men and women (Article 8 of TFU), any form of discrimination (Article 10 TFU), transparency in all EU institutions, bodies and agencies (Article 15 TFU), data protection provisions in relation to the abuses made by public and private entities (Article 16 TFU), consular and diplomatic protection (Article 23 TFU), common policies on asylum and immigration (Article 77 TFU), the integration of third country nationals (Article 79 (4) TFU) as well as the right to a good administration (Article 298 TFU). The present dichotomy between the regular Community scheme (first pillar) and the intergovernmental, as established by the Treaty of Maastricht, has come to an end. This will require strengthening Member States’ mutual trust. The new Stockholm Programme

In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty stresses the importance both of strengthening Europol and Eurojust and of an evaluation and monitoring system of their activities. For the same reason, and in order to fully implement the existing instruments and measures to tackle violence against women, the Spanish Presidency decided to boost the European Protection Order to make victims a priority objective among all advanced penal policies.

Protection of victims The protection of victims requires the extension of appropriate mechanisms designed to avoid recurrence of the same crime by the same perpetrator against the same victim. This recurrence of criminal conduct is particularly common in cases of gender violence, but also occurs in other forms of crime such as sexual exploitation of children or human trafficking, and may occur in any other criminal event.

Physical and psychological freedom of victims All EU Member States provide measures intended to safeguard the life and physical, psychological and sexual freedom of the victims. However, its effectiveness is currently limited to the territory of the State. The protection afforded to victims by a Member State should not be confined to its territory, but should accompany the victim all around Europe with a forceful and effective prevention of further criminal acts.

The realisation of a genuine EU judicial area The AFSJ thus offers basic guarantees to citizens, which can only be achieved within a framework of mutual trust and active cooperation where citizens can enjoy an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights against all types of crime across the European territory. Finally, the new legal and institutional framework of the AFSJ must be developed involving the European Parliament, national parliaments and civil society. The realisation of a genuine European judicial area is reflected in the Stockholm Programme and should not be interpreted as a mere recast of his predecessors.

In its first stage, the European construction was made in a pragmatic and operational way without putting forward the principles and values upon which Europe was inspired. Since the creation of the Union, states and citizens have been two separate pillars. The task now is to consolidate definitively the European Union and the defence of European citizenship by developing its social dimension, open to the world as a pioneer of political response to globalization.

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6 European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management th

2010: Enhancing European and National Networks for a successful Civil Protection September 8th and 9th 2010 − City Hall Bonn Bad Godesberg

“Europe’s leading event in the field of Disaster Management.”

Registration and further information: www.disaster-management.eu

POLITICS and POLICIES

The European Security Strategy − national threat perceptions versus EU objectives

by Dr. Rachel Suissa, School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa

Threat perception is a central diagnostic element in the management of security objectives and foreign policy. At the level of grand strategy, planning the scope of threat perceptions is equivalent to the maximum scope of the definition of security and the capabilities to achieve them. Grand strategy is maximum policymaking toward maximum security concerns with maximum power and capabilities.

As Keukeleire S. and Mac Naughtan presented in their book “The Foreign Policy of the European Union” Maximum security concerns include: • Military security and territorial/national security; • Non-military security; • Global security, societal security and human security.

Maximum power and capabilities include: • Military instruments; material instruments; hard power; • Relational power; non-military instruments; immaterial instruments; • Soft power and structural power.

Threat perception is a crucial pillar in all these dimensions, and embodies the domestic element in the EU grand security strategy.

Challenges in managing the European Security Strategy The assessment of the EU threat perceptions reveals unique challenges in managing European Security Strategy.

The management of a pluralistic threat perception and its cost Threat perception at the national security level is subjective and pluralistic, and democratic modes of action have allowed the rotation of different threat perceptions to come to dominance as its representatives are elected. In a pluralism of threat perceptions, there may be a consensus or a non-consensus on types of threats, with a consensus or non-consensus on the means and mode of actions to address them, and on their magnitude.

The pluralistic character of threat perceptions at the national level cannot be copied to the supranational level. The national democratic rotation of threat perceptions is not congruent with structural and functional aspects of the supranational union policy and decision making. The union cannot embody the reflection of its member states in threat perceptions. It must adopt a consensual, stable synergy within a realistic grand strategy clairvoyance.

Dr. Rachel Suissa Dr. Rachel Suissa is a Researcher at the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa, where she received her doctorate in Political Sciences in 2006. Her research interests include security and military studies, intelligence cooperation, strategic alliances and EU foreign policy. Among her research projects is the mapping of intelligence cooperation via social network analysis, security planning vs. implementation in Germany, France and the UK before and after EU membership, military resilience in lowintensity conflict, and interstate vs. state and non-state actor conflict.

Dr. Suissa is spokesperson for the Center Against Antisemitism in Oslo.

Contradicting and hostile threat perceptions in the EU society There is no pluralism of threat perceptions based on an organic and integrated vision with a homogenous core of concern over one another’s security. Contradicting threat perceptions differ in their implications at the national versus supranational level. Whereas national states have a greater and more varied arsenal of legitimate means to deal with this challenge, the EU is much more limited. For the EU, hostile threat perceptions in European society challenge integration, its governability and raison d’etre. Moreover, the national management of contradicting threat perceptions in society becomes a domestic constraint. Thus, the effectiveness of an EU foreign policy initiative is not measured against its external impact, but rather against its internal impact.

The assimilation of threat perception is the essential domestic aspect of EU grand security strategy planning. The EU cannot accept that grand strategy planning and security white papers are “fantasies”, with any links between them and actual practice a pure coincidence. Here also, nation-states tolerate gaps between grand strategy and practice due to compensatory structural mechanisms, which a multinational organization like the EU does not posses.

The need for a European research agenda for threat perception In conducting its security objectives, the EU must strive to minimize gaps between planning and practice. Besides a dialogue among different threat perception detectors that should take place when assessing security objectives at a grand strategy level, the EU must institutionalize special measures for the detection and management of gaps between planning and

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practice. An initiative is needed for a research agenda that will focus on understanding factors at the EU level that hinder implementation and those that encourage it.

The rationales for the challenges facing the EU The challenges which the EU faces are based on the following rationales: • Gaps between grand strategy and practice tend to endanger multinational entities more than states • Congruency between Member States’ grand strategies and practice reduces gaps between the EU grand strategy and practice; Non-congruency increases those gaps and the gaps in security policymaking between the EU and Member States • The inclusion of domestic factors in grand strategy planning moderates gaps between this planning and practice • Threat perception is a crucial domestic aspect in grand security strategy planning

Mapping European threat perception In mapping threat perceptions in Europe, the congruency method is preferable to the comparative method. When applied at the level of society, national governments and the EU, the congruency method holds a normative value.

The pluralistic differentiation This implies that when one searches for differences in threat perceptions between the EU, national governments and European society, one acknowledges the existence of differences of views and opinions alongside a synergy on a common raison d’etre. The congruency method refers to similarities as a key value without ignoring the differences. As for the comparative method, its descriptive character tends to miss the pathological aspect of differences in regard to threat perceptions.

Congruency in grand strategy planning At the level of grand strategy planning, there exists a congruency of threat perceptions among the governments of the EU Member States, and a congruency of threat perceptions between them and the EU. All detect similar threats with nearly the same priorities. National governments and the EU perceive the following as current and serious threats at the national and union level: international terrorism, cyber threats, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failing states, regional organised crime, and natural disasters.

Non-congruency at the domestic level However, the non-consensus between the EU and its Member States derives from different perceptions of modes of practice and from domestic constraints. The first belongs to the realm of foreign and security policy; the second is embodied in the threat perceptions of the European society. A strong relationship exists between both aspects. The non-consensus between left and right political wings on the perception of

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threats and actual versus perceived security belongs to the legitimate political and pluralistic character of threat perceptions. In the social dialogue of threat perceptions, migrant minorities have added the aspect of countries-of-origin as a an indicator of the European social non-congruency of threat perceptions.

The pathological differentiation This well-developed security pluralism turns into a pathological differentiation of threat perceptions when social radicalism, such as the radical Islamist migrant minority that has taken up jihad against the West, holds threat perceptions in which native Europeans are the enemy.

Another pathological aspect is the non-congruency between the European society and national governments. Unlike the pluralistic aspect that may characterize legitimate differences of threat perceptions in European society, a non-consensus between national governments and society reflects a growing sense of alienation.

Pathological aspects of threat perceptions exacerbate the legitimate pluralism of threat perceptions. A European society threatened by radicalisation on one hand and alienated from its leadership on the other might develop feelings of insecurity and consider governmental threat perceptions, both at the national and EU level, as endangering it. In terms of foreign security policy, the EU bears the consequences.

Non-congruency of threat perceptions At the level of the EU, threat perceptions of the European society constitute a domestic aspect with implications for the gaps between its security strategy planning and practice.

Structural and functional differences between the EU and national governments point to different challenges which the pathological diversity of threat perceptions poses to each.

Moreover, unlike other domestic aspects relevant at national levels but not at the EU level, threat perception is a domestic aspect with relevance for both levels. Yet, the meaning and the consequences this aspect has in terms of policymaking is tremendously different at both levels. Thus, EU stability might be endangered due to a lack of symmetry in the consequences of domestic constraints on the EU and its Member States.

In terms of EU objectives, tensions will increase between European integration versus Atlantic solidarity. The issues include whether the EU is a civilian power versus a military power, whether the should EU adopt an intergovernmental approach (CFSP/ESDP) versus a community approach, whether it should focus on external versus interrelational objectives, and goals of integration versus identity.

Bibliography Keukeleire S., MacNaughtan J. The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008 Rosecrance R., Stein A.A., (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, Cornell University press, 1993

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Turkey’s foreign and security policy – an asset for Europe

by John Greenway MP, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris Turkey’s foreign and security policy could be a real asset for Europe. As a veritable bridge between East and West, Turkey holds a key geostrategic position: Europe would be wrong to deprive itself of such an asset. Not only is Turkey an active participant in several EU crisis-management operations and a major partner in the NATO operation in Afghanistan, it is also an important transit country for energy imports into Europe and a key player in any solution to the Middle East conflict.

Turkish relations with Armenia are also improving, which could help in resolving the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Turkey’s security policy and EU-NATO relations As a NATO member state and a pillar of western defence in Europe, Turkey’s quest for EU accession dates back to 1963.

The question of its accession to the European Union may raise concerns of a social, economic or cultural nature, but in terms of European common security and defence, Turkey can make a significant contribution to the EU given its geopolitical situation, wise diplomacy and substantial military strength. However, the Turkish authorities feel that the public at large, in both the EU and Turkey, is suffering from enlargement fatigue or becoming distinctly lukewarm about the project.

Engaged in Afghanistan The only Muslim country within NATO, Turkey has participated in ISAF from the outset and held the command three times: in

The Blue Mosque of Istanbul

John Greenway MP John Greenway has been a Member of Parliament for Ryedale (North Yorkshire/United Kingdom) since June 1987. He is currently Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA).

He is the author of numerous reports of the Assembly. In particular, together with Mr Muñoz Alonso (Spain), he recently submitted a report on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on “European security and enlargement: shifts in public opinion” (Document 2054), which was adopted during the December 2009 plenary session of the European Security and Defence Assembly. He is also the Chairman of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

2002, 2005 and now since November 2009. Although it has 1.750 soldiers in Afghanistan, it has never agreed to be directly involved in combat operations against insurgents.

Active in the ESDP – but no status within the ESDP structures The EU could take initiatives which might lead to a solution by granting Turkey a status comparable to that which it enjoyed as an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) and which, to Turkey’s great regret and resentment, it was not granted in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures.

Indeed Turkey is currently involved in several EU-led crisis-management operations.

Photo: www.citypictures.org

A EU accession process Regarding the negotiations for Turkey’s EU accession, since the start of talks in October 2005 only 12 out of the 35 negotiating chapters have been opened, but eight of them have been frozen by the EU since 2006 due to Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state. Turkey refuses in particular to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft.

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South Stream In parallel Russia is working hard on its own project in cooperation with the Italian company ENI. The project, which has been christened South Stream,2 aims as of 2015 to link Russia and Bulgaria via the Black Sea.

The current state of TurkishArmenian relations Another aspect to consider is Turkey’s renewed role as a regional power; particularly in the past year when we have witnessed its foreign policy moving away from the West and concentrating on developing relations with its direct neighbours.

The geostrategic situation of Turkey in the Near East

Europe’s energy dependence and the role of Turkey At a time when European gas and oil reserves are becoming depleted, Europe has on its eastern flank a number of hydrocarbon-producing countries with major reserves. Russia is the world’s top oil producer, accounting for more than 10% of world oil reserves, but it is also the leading gas producer, making it invaluable to Europe.

The two ongoing major pipeline projects for the supply of gas to Europe – Nabucco and South Stream – will pass through Turkey, which plays a pivotal role as a transit country.

Nabucco The gas pipeline linking Europe with the Caspian Sea has been one of the EU’s priority infrastructure projects.1 For Ankara it is also a new way of bringing pressure to bear in the EU accession negotiations as well as being a major source of tax revenue. The project made real progress in summer 2009 with the signing of an intergovernmental agreement making provision for the construction between 2010 and 2014 of more than 3.300 km of gas pipeline between central Asia and the Middle East on the one hand and Europe on the other, Azerbaijan having agreed to supply the gas. But for this project, which totally excludes Russia, to be profitable, other supplier countries are needed, such as Iraq, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan or even Iran, provided that it is possible to resolve the various disputes with it.

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Positive developments The signing of the protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of relations by the Turkish and the Armenian MinisSource: CIA ters of Foreign Affairs in Zurich on 10 October 2009, concluded two years of bilateral negotiations conducted under Swiss mediation. This first intergovernmental agreement to be signed between Turkey and Armenia since the Treaty of Kars on 13 October 1921 is a positive development in the South Caucasus where the status quo characterised by conflicts, blockades and trade restrictions is far from satisfactory. It would be naive and misleading to assume that the texts, which have yet to be ratified by Parliament; aim at full normalisation and an overnight settlement of all problems between Turkey and Armenia.

U.S. deliberations Another factor affecting developments is a resolution calling on President Obama to “characterise the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 a genocide”, which passed in the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on 4 March 2010 despite efforts by the White House and the State Department not to press ahead with the vote. It is, however, uncertain how the U.S. vote will directly affect Turkish-Armenian ties at this stage.

Settlement of the Karabakh conflict The process of normalising Turkish-Armenian relations and the resolution of Karabakh cannot be unlinked. The normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations has the capacity to foster new dynamics in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the most intractable and among the biggest obstacles to region-wide

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cooperation. At this stage, the interruption of Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations will decrease the chances of reaching an agreement on the conflict over Karabakh in the foreseeable future. The personal re-involvement of the presidents of both countries will hopefully push the issue of normalisation of bilateral relations beyond domestic politics.

Turkey and the Middle East conflict Turkish diplomacy is highly active when it comes to the Middle East conflict, offering its good offices to the West and acting as a bridge between the latter and its Muslim neighbours. Turkey has always endeavoured to strike a balance in its relations with the Arab states of the region on the one hand and Israel on the other. It can play an important role in finding a settlement to the Middle East conflict and the Turkish government makes every effort to do that.

Turkey and Israel Turkey has historic ties with the Jewish people going back over 500 years. Turkey and Israel are the only non-Arab countries of the western Middle East and are engaged in intensive relations on a number of basic issues at the political, military and commercial levels, based essentially on pragmatic considerations. Israel sees Turkish mediation as the visible proof of its positive role in bringing Syria and Israel together and it would seem that notwithstanding recent public incidents, this is a door that has not been closed. Turkey remains, if not a major intermediary, at least an important adviser and partner for the United States in this region.

In October 2009, Turkey cancelled Israel’s involvement in its Anatolian Eagle Air Force exercise for technical reasons.

However, military ties between Turkey and Israel remain strong. Israel continues to use Turkish air space for training its pilots and two important cooperation programmes are underway for the upgrading by Israel of Turkish M60 tanks and F16 aircraft.

to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) is allowed to have a civilian nuclear programme. Acquisition of nuclear weapons would not necessarily improve Iran’s security or that of the region. In its diplomatic contacts with Iran, Turkey tries to adopt a more moderate stance than many western countries and to create opportunities for a pragmatic dialogue. Turkey is opposed to sanctions, far preferring the diplomatic route.

Turkey has economic and strategic interests in common with Iran, the second largest supplier of gas to Turkey after Russia, and there is substantial trade between Turkey and Iran. The two countries have a shared interest in the struggle against the PKK, which is active on both sides of the border.

Disarmament and non-proliferation Turkey is in favour of transforming the Middle East into a nonnuclear weapon zone and has always supported United Nations Security Council Resolutions to that end. It is aware, however, that this is a goal that can only be achieved once there is a comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and all its neighbours.

Conclusion Turkey is actively increasing its diplomacy in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, central Asia and beyond. The country favours a proactive security policy in the region. Turkish government ministers are working with their counterparts in Iraq to restore bilateral institutional and economic relations, and for several years now Turkey has had good neighbourly relations with Syria. These two developments show that as far as the Kurdish question is concerned, normality is being restored – something that seemed unimaginable just five years ago. Trade with Iran has been growing and a protocol signed (but yet to be ratified) with Armenia aims to reopen the borders between the two countries. It is up to the EU Member States to take on board and make every effort to encourage these recent positive developments.

Hamas and the disputes among the Arab states Turkey sees Hamas as a political reality and hence argues that no stable or comprehensive peace can be achieved as long as the situation in Gaza is ignored. It has no intention of interfering in the mediation efforts that Egypt is currently conducting between Fatah and Hamas, but is willing to do everything it can to support the efforts aimed at reconciliation between the two factions. It takes the view that peace and stability in the region require the settlement of disputes between and among Arab states.

I believe that Turkey is a special and important partner for the EU and that in the long term its role in the area of security and defence can only strengthen Europe as a power in the making.

This reality gives rise to acute political difficulties for governments in the West, where public sentiment with regard to Turkey’s accession is at best negative. Yet a detailed and pragmatic analysis of the facts will show that Turkey’s current foreign and security policy is an asset. My report concludes that this fact alone would justify speeding up the process of Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

Turkey and Iran’s nuclear programme Turkey takes the view that the West is applying a policy of double standards in the present crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities, arguing that every other country that is a signatory

1 The Caspian Sea pipeline to Europe passing through Baku, Tbilisi and Erzurum in Turkey was extended to Greece in 2007 and will be further extended to Italy.

2 In Bulgaria the gas pipeline will split into a north-western branch leading to Austria and a southern branch to Greece and Italy in particular. It will circumvent Ukraine.

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Crisis Management – Permanent Structured Cooperation

by Doug Henderson MP, Chairman of the Defence Committee, ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris

The first Gulf War in 1990/91 demonstrated to the population of the democratic world that a core function of their Armed Forces was to be able to deploy in large numbers, as swiftly as possible, to far off places.

NATO and the European Union sought to redefine their foreign and defence policy roles during the 1990’s in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the 1999 summit in Helsinki, the European Union began to set out its strategy.

“The European Union Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”.

Headline goals largely failed A headline goal was set for 2003 to be able to deploy a 50/60,000 strong force in less than two months and to sustain it for one year – and to begin the deployment within five days of any Council decision. But, it was clear as the Lisbon Treaty was agreed that this goal was nowhere near being achieved.

There were two main problems. One was that the members did not have sufficant resources. The second was of decision-making – it was too cumbersome and too slow.

The deployment in Chad, for instance, took nearly 12 months to establish from the original Council decision in May 2007.

The Swedish battle group was expected to be deployed in a leading role, but the Swedish government declined to provide the leadership or the resources. The eventual deployment was - as is almost always the case in a European deployment – a deployment of the willing. This is clearly short-termism and ad hoc. This indecision and the lack of predictability is a major weakness of the European Union Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), or Community Security & Defence Policy (CSDP) as it is known after Lisbon.

How to become more effective in European defence Co-operation among European Union States on “enhanced cooperation” as it was defined in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) has always been possible since the Amsterdam Treaty. But, it has been used infrequently. Co-operation on procurement at a bilateral or multilateral level involving European Union States has taken place for many years, but not through the formal channels of the European Union.

Permanent Structured Co-operation (PSC) is an attempt to force European nations to spend more on defence needs, to

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Doug Henderson Doug Henderson has been MP for Newcastle upon Tyne North since 1987 and President of the Defence Committee of the ESDA/WEU Assembly since 2009.

He was born in 1949 in Edinborough and recieved his education at the Waid Academy, Anstruther; the Central College of Commerce, Glasgow; and the University of Strathclyde. He worked as an engineer, economist and trade union officer before becoming a Member of Parliament.

1982 – 1988 several positions as a Spokesman on Trade & Industry; 1988 – 1992 Opposition Spokesman on Trade & Industry; 1992 – 1994 Opposition Spokesman on Local Government; 1994 – 1995 Opposition Public Services Spokesman; 1995 – 1997 Opposition Home Affairs Spokesman; 1997 – 1998 Minister of State for Europe; 1998 – 1999 Minister of State for the Armed Forces; 1987 – 1997 Secretary, GMB Parliamentary Group; 1994 – 1997 Secretary, British-Russian Group; 1987 – 1988 Chairman, Treasury Committee; 2000 – 2001 Chairman, Northern Group of Labour MP’s, 2002 Chairman, GMB Parliamentary Group; 2002 Secretary, All Party Athletics Group; 2003 Vice Chair, All Party Philippines Group; 2005 Member of the Council of Europe and European Defence & Security Assembly.

bring about a coherent structure and facilitate much quicker decision-making.

But, like many EU decisions, it looks as though there will be a long gap in time between the agreement on a concept and operational capability.

What does PSC really mean Indeed, it is not clear if there is any understanding on what PSC actually means. When I first thought of Permanent Structured Co-operation after the agreement of the Lisbon Treaty, I had in my mind that PSC would be established in separate agreements covering different forms of co-operation. Where a country had a comparative advantage or military strength, then it would make sense to combine with other similar countries to make a common provision for the whole of the Union.

Disaster relief teams, heavy lift, medical corps the gendarmerie corps, were the kind of units that I thought could be set up relatively easily.

It may be that units like this will be set up in the early stages of development of PSC. But, in recent meetings in Brussels I was a little surprised to hear officials saying that there might be one all-embracing PSC. If this is the eventual outcome, then it can’t possibly involve all 27 EU nations unless barriers to

POLITICS and POLICIES

Documentation

EU Forces in the EUFOR TCHAD/ RCA mission (2008/2009)

Photo: ESDA

membership in the PSC are set at a low level. There are many commitments which are outlined in Protocol 10 of the Treaty of the European Union.

Setting the bar – a double-edged sword It has been suggested that a bar be set requiring a percentage of deployable troops in any country to be available for EU deployment. If the Council agreed to this regulation then a country like the UK could be excluded. For, as is widely recognised, the UK has already deployed a very large number of its available forces in other theatres – leaving little margin for a standby deployment for the EU. If, on the other hand, a bar was set requiring a higher percentage of GDP to be assigned for military budgets, then a country like Germany could possibly fail to meet such a target.

In effect, when one sets a target, one is determining who will qualify. If, therefore, conditions are to be attached to PSC membership – which clearly they should be – then great care will need to be taken to define those conditions so as to enhance EU capability. It would be ironic if conditions were set that were so severe that any EU capability under PSC ended up weaker than what is currently available through a process of negotiation among the Union.

Europe needs to change if its defence is to be strengthened If Europe is to strengthen its defence and security to meet the challenges of the 21st century, then it needs to change. PSC could be a process that drives us along that road.

It may be that an all-embracing PSC is a viable framework. But that will only be the case if the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. I think there is great sense in pooling many of our military and military/civilian resources. Everyone can then play to their strengths for the benefit of all. But, the real test of success in my view, is if PSC provides a vital catalyst to bring about a much greater capability and a much better decisionmaking process within the EU.

Excerpts from Protocol No. 10 of the Lisbon Treaty on permanent structured cooperation, established by Article 42 RECALLING that the Union is pursuing a common foreign and security policy based on the achievement of growing convergence of action by Member States, RECALLING that the common security and defence policy … provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets; that the Union may use such assets in the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, …

CONVINCED that a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance, in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements, …

RECALLING the importance of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy being fully involved in proceedings relating to permanent structured cooperation, Article 1 The permanent structured cooperation … shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to: (a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the [European Defence Agency], and (b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest … targeted combat units for the missions planned … capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days … and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.

Article 2 To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to: (a) cooperate … with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives; … (b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics; (c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces; … (d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good ... the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the “Capability Development Mechanism”; (e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency. (…)

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How to realize a Comprehensive Approach for Afghanistan’s security

by General Egon Ramms, Commander, Allied Joint Force Command, Brunsum

The idea of adopting a Comprehensive Approach to meet today’s security challenges is nothing new and has been fully embraced by NATO. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders endorsed an Action Plan for the development and implementation of NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. But why are NATO and other international organizations such as the EU and UN, as well as individual states such as the U.S., experiencing such difficulty in effectively implementing a Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan if it is a widely agreed concept that has been championed for nearly a decade?

Afghanistan − of what do we speak Let us first consider the extent of the challenge in Afghanistan: a country whose citizens have a life expectancy of 44 years and a literacy rate of 28% (far lower among women). Out of 182 countries, Afghanistan ranks next to last on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (just ahead of Niger).

Iraq, on the eve of the U.S. invasion, was ranked 126th; its literacy rate hovered around 70%. Afghanistan’s problems on a developmental level are not only more profound than Iraq’s, but vaster in scope, as Afghanistan encompasses 30% more land. Consider, also, that 77% of Iraqis live in urban areas (concentrated heavily in Baghdad), so reducing violence in greater Baghdad had a calming effect on the entire country; in Afghanistan, urbanization stands at only 30%, and so counterinsurgency efforts in one village may have no effect on another.

“After more than 20 years of ‘fruitless endeavours’, the Security Council might wish to consider adopting a Comprehensive Approach to settling the conflict in Afghanistan”

General Egon Ramms General Ramms has been Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum since 2007.

He was born in 1948 in Datteln, Germany, joined the Bundeswehr in 1968 and graduated as a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering from Darmstadt University in 1975. After numerous commands in maintenance units he served from 1978 to 1980 as G4 logistics officer of the 3rd Armoured Division, followed by two years of General Staff Training in Hamburg. 1982 – 1984 G3 operations officer in the 6th Armoured Infantry Division; 1984 – 1986 Chief of Staff and G3 in Home Defense Brigade 51; 1986 – 1988 Assistant Chief of Branch, Arms Control and Disarmament, Armed Forces Staff III 5; 1988 – 1990 Commander of Maintenance Battalion 120; 1990 – 1992 Assistant Chief of Branch, Office of the State Secretary for Procurement; 1992 – 1994 Director of Armament Section, Office of the State Secretary; 1994 – 1996, Chief of the Central Branch in the Army Staff of the Ministry of Defence; 1996 – 1998 Commander of Logistics Brigade 1; 1998 – 2000 Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Staff V (Logistics, Infrastructure and Environmental Protection); 20002004 Director of Armed Forces Staff in the Ministry of Defence; 2004 2007 Commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast.

Pakistan, or from Iran. Looking at a relief map, one could easily construct a country called Pashtunistan − home to the world’s 52 million Pashtuns − lying between the Hindu Kush mountains and the Indus River and overlapping with the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is in reality no border at all but a concoction of the British who, in 1893, instructed Sir Mortimer Durand to establish a strategic cushion between the great powers of the time as part of a series of moves and counter-moves that, collectively, have become known as the Great Game. And as circa 65% of the Afghan population lives within 35 miles of the main road system, which approximates the old medieval caravan routes, only 80 out of 400 districts are really key to military success.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 22 August 2001

Is there the political will for a comprehensive approach?

Afghanistan is hard to even hold together as a country Moreover, whereas Mesopotamia, with large urban clusters across a flat landscape, is conducive to military occupation, Afghanistan is, in geographical terms, hard to even hold together. Huge mountain ranges help seal divisions between Pashtuns and Tajiks and other minorities, even as comparatively few natural impediments separate Afghanistan from

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Notwithstanding the physical and institutional challenges the international community finds itself confronted by in the nearfailed state of Afghanistan, part of the problem in operationalising any form of Comprehensive Approach lies within the NATO nations and Troop Contributing Nations themselves.

Why do I say this? There is no doubt that a Comprehensive Approach in the modern world constitutes the ideal solution to

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Afghan National Army soldiers patrol through the Musayi Valley

evolving security concerns but, for it to be an effective Alliance tool, member nations have to demonstrate the necessary political will. Bureaucratic wrangling at the political level, where national agendas often conflict and overlap with mission objectives, regularly foster protracted policy debate that results in inconsistent guidance being passed to the range of organizations, agencies and actors on the ground. I always say that the military effort in Afghanistan constitutes approximately 20% of the overall effort; by far the greater part (circa 80%) is required to be delivered by non-military partners in a synchronized and coordinated manner. And, after three years as the Operational Commander of the ISAF mission, I remain firmly of the opinion that this remains the case. Let me quickly touch upon several of the more significant issues that should be considered when attempting to rationalize the failure, to date, to operationalise a Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan.

Command (OPCON) to COM ISAF (Commander ISAF), they largely report to their own national capitals with the result that harmonization of their activities on a nation-wide scale is poor. Utilized in the main as national mechanisms, PRTs are unevenly funded and staffed, e.g. U.S. PRTs have access to CERP funding (recently increased to 1bn dollars per year by Congress) and increasingly have agricultural, governance and economic experts seconded to their staff. This is not the case in most of the non-U.S. PRTs, with the result that PRT influence is uneven. A final consideration Photo: ESDP is that some PRTs have been known to implement projects that bear no relation to the requirement as articulated in the Afghan National Development Strategy. This leads to uncoordinated development activity and a potential waste of resources.

UNAMA, whose mandate has just been extended and re-scoped until 23 March 2011 by way of UN Security Council Resolution 1917, is primarily charged with coordination of the collective activities of the International Community. Under-resourced and under-manned, this is something they have singularly failed to do and little has been done to remedy the situation.

Having very recently met the new UN Senior Representative of the Secretary General, Swedish diplomat Steffan de Mistura, in Kabul, I am cautiously optimistic that UNAMA’s influence may be about to improve.

NATO is at a watershed By any measure it is not disingenuous to say NATO is at a watershed. Still constructed, at the political level, to counter the Cold War threat and having recently implemented (1st March 10) a manning construct across Allied Command Operations that has not been, and is unlikely to be, endorsed by nations, it is in a state of flux. This is compounded by a severe in-year budget shortfall, largely as a consequence of the exceptionally high cost of the ISAF mission, a Strategic Concept that is out of date (although being addressed, the extant concept dates from 1999) and an inability, at the political level, to agree to Alliance policies that reflect the demands of the ISAF mission.

Significantly, these include policies on Counter Insurgency, much-needed adjustments to the Common Funding Process and Detention.

Fundamentally, there is disagreement within the North Atlantic Council on the role of NATO in the prevailing security environment. On one side there are those who are focused on the benefits of Collective Defence and the potential to spend less on security whilst, in a second camp, are those who believe in expeditionary warfare and the conduct of missions beyond the Alliance boundary. Only as these critical differences are ironed out can NATO truly progress in its attempt to operationalise a Comprehensive Approach in response to a security threat.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are performing but acting largely national The Provincial Reconstruction Teams collectively are performing extremely well and there is no doubt they are a vehicle that promotes development. However, although under Operational

No chance for a Super Coordinator Attempts to create the position of a ‘Super Coordinator’ charged with coordination of the collective international community effort have not been successful. Two years ago Lord Ashdown was recommended to fill this void but, although initially

The coordination of collective activities has failed

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supported by President Karzai, was subsequently rejected by the Afghan Government for reasons that were never really made clear. As a consequence successive COM ISAFs have struggled to oversee military campaign development whilst, concurrently, attempting to guide civilian efforts as part of a comprehensive Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transition strategy.

Time is running against us I anticipate that the current COM ISAF (General McChrystal) will enjoy greater levels of support in harnessing the civilian effort from the new NATO Senior Civilian Representative (Ambassador Mark Sedwill) and his newly appointed UN counterpart. In this, as already implied, I am positive that Ambassador Sedwill has been given a far more robust role than his predecessors, whilst early indications are that the UN SRSG is not averse to the development of closer cooperation with the military − a military that is any longer, purely acting in the traditional military way, because not doing so is no longer a choice. Time is running against us.

The problems of and with the Afghan government The Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) itself poses another obstacle primarily in two ways. The first is that there are numerous examples of the GIRoA entering into bilateral agreements with nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and others who all offer to provide developmental assistance. This gives rise to a spider’s web of activity that it is extremely difficult to gain transparency of and is almost impossible to harmonize. A second consideration is the lack of non-corrupt, efficient and capable government structures at all levels. The result is that the ability to instigate and deliver projects nation-wide is

Kandahar development project

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uneven due to the sporadic and uneven nature of governance instituted at national, provincial and district levels.

NGOs are fiercely determined to retain their impartiality Two final points should be borne in mind: The first is that many of the NGOs and other development-focused actors have no desire to be coordinated. Many have conducted their activities, over decades, in numerous countries and are fiercely determined to retain their impartiality. They conduct their own threat assessments and will only set offices up in areas that they believe are secure, not areas where the military, or the ‘Central Coordinator’, would like them to establish a presence.

The second important point is that NATO members and troop contributing partners cannot force civilians to deploy. Thus, although the requirement for a range of non-military skill-sets is clear, that requirement often cannot be met.

What we need is synchronization of efforts The obstacles to integrating the military and civilian aspects of a counter-insurgency go well beyond a potential lack of willingness to get along. Integrating civilian and military activities is not something that will happen automatically and traditional command, control, coordination, oversight and management constructs require review if we are to ‘make the pieces fit’. Lessons from Afghanistan reinforce the notion that the military forces only occupy approximately one fifth of the stability space – in the main they fulfill the ‘enabler’ function such that others can undertake the developmental activities that are so crucial to mission success. Stability, development and governance are intertwined and inter-dependent; they are overlapping and reinforcing. Their contributions are of equal importance but must be synchronized as any one without the others will promote failure or only partial success. Over the past six months great efforts have been made in parts of Afghanistan to better align military and civilian functions but they need time to get established and prove their worth. The challenge for us all is to overcome the difficulties posed by interagency cooperation. We owe it to our soldiers, sailors, airmen and civilians at the sharp end of this and subsequent missions to find a solution. Furthermore, we owe it to the indigenous populations of countries in which crisis response operations are conducted to reduce their suffering as quickly as possible. Kofi Annan identified the need for a Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan in 2001; it is not to our credit that his wisdom is yet to generate an appropriate response, although we may Photo: ESDP have just turned the corner.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Apocalypse Now

by Dr. Bill Durodié, Coordinator, Homeland Defence Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security, Singapore Who was it that said recently; ‘it really is all of humanity that is under threat’, and what were they talking about? The sorry fact is that it could almost be anyone, about anything. Maybe it related to international terrorism, or concerns about new scientific developments such as the advent of nanotechnology? Alternatively, it could have been said about the growing discussion of a supposed obesity epidemic in society, or the apparent spate and impact of earthquakes worldwide.

Such phrases are used so profligately, and by so many social leaders and commentators nowadays, that they have almost entirely lost their original purchase and meaning.

The use of apocalyptic phrases as self-fullfilling prophesy In fact, this particular formulation was uttered by Dr. Margaret Chan, the director-general of the World Health Organisation (WHO), as she raised the pandemic threat level from four to five in response to the outbreak of swine flu early last year 1.

Unfortunately, in recent years, there has been a marked tendency amongst certain professionals to use apocalyptic language in describing almost any emergency.

The real danger is that these terms help to shape a self-fulfilling prophecy. Part of the problem, it is held, is inherent to our period of globalization and modernity. This, it is asserted, generates uncertainty and unknowns. But when was human existence ever certain or fully understood?

Whatever happens, for doom-mongers, the world – it would seem – is always getting worse. And the source – as well as the victim – of these problems, is held to be abundantly clear – humanity itself. This strikes me as both implausible and selfdefeating.

Social constructs In fact, what is a disaster is both contextually dependent and socially contested. Emergencies are acted upon differently according to what they represent to particular societies at specific times. This social element explains why it is that, at certain moments, and in specific circumstances, a widespread loss of life can fail to be a point of discussion, but in other situations, even relatively minor events may become key reference points.

Catastrophes throughout history Earthquakes, for instance, may appear natural, but their impact is mediated by our level of development, as well as the meaning we attribute to them.

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Dr. Bill Durodié Dr. Bill Durodié is the Senior Fellow coordinating the Health and Human Security research programme in the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. A. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he teaches a course on ‘The Politics of Risk’ as part of the Masters programme.

He is also an Associate Fellow of the International Security Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House in London, having previously completed three years as Senior Lecturer in Risk and Corporate Security in the Resilience Centre of Cranfield University, part of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. He was previously Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis, and Senior Research Fellow in the International Policy Institute, within the 5* Research Assessment Exercise rated War Studies Group of King’s College London.

Lisbon earth quake − a turning point The first significant earthquake of the modern era, occurred almost halfway through the century of the Enlightenment, in 1755, in Lisbon. Debates were already raging then between the old deists and the new secularists, and this event, occurring as it did on ‘All Souls Day’, in the heart of Catholic Europe, posed quite a conundrum for believers.

It marked a turning point in history between a period when humanity accepted its fate stoically at the hands of a presumed God, and one where a new sense of human agency emerged, shaped by a determination that our own aims and purposes could shape history and mitigate the impact of such adversities in future.

9/11 − a new dimension More recently, the events of September 11th, 2001 can also be viewed from one of two diametrically opposed perspectives.

For some (the majority possibly), these atrocities are held to point to how vulnerable advanced capitalist countries have become through their complex structures, to the actions of a determined few.

Another, maybe more prosaic, interpretation would be to point to how the total cost of 9/11, both in terms of reparation and compensation, amounted to little more than 1% of U.S. GDP in any one year: a cost rapidly eclipsed by the size of the various financial crises and collapses that have since ensued.

In other words, how we define, understand and respond to such a situation is not solely determined by the number of

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Relief efforts in Haiti

lives lost or their financial cost, or even by the causal agent of the emergency, but rather by the meaning we, as a society, attribute to it. Historically evolving cultural attitudes, outlooks and narratives are extremely important 2.

The determining role of communication So it is that culture, communication and language can come to have a determining role in our perception of what is a disaster or a crisis. And our responses often teach us more about ourselves than about the problem at hand.

Not being able to make sense of threats or draw any positive conclusions from adverse events can be quite disarming. This determines whether our focus is on reconstruction, resilience and the future, or who to blame, our supposed vulnerabilities and the past.

Manila exposed After the recent deluge brought about by typhoon Ketsana to Manila, the capital of the Philippines, Dr. Nathaniel Cruz, head of the weather services bureau for the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), announced that the flood that ensued was caused by historically record rainfall 3.

Well, ‘yes’, and ‘no’. Those who follow such matters closely will know that weather records are relatively easily broken.

But without disputing the severity or extent of the problems that ensued, one can, and ought to, question the framing of matters in this way. Whether this relatively intense – but shortlived – downpour was really worse than that from any of the 63 typhoons that lasted over 10 – and as long as 18 – days, of the 445 typhoons that struck the Philippines between 1902 and 1921, is a moot point 4.

The region is well-known to suffer from such phenomena –

Photo: US-Navy

25% of all typhoons strike the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR). Indeed, cyclones bearing rain are at the root of its agricultural wealth. But accordingly, major floods occurred in every decade of the twentieth century, sometimes causing thousands of fatalities. As recently as 1990, typhoon Ruping destroyed large parts of Cebu.

The topography of Manila itself, situated between Manila Bay and a large inland lake, Laguna de Bay – whose water levels have risen due to silting-up – is hardly ideal.

Then, the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic process of urbanization. Roads and buildings enlarged impervious surface areas and the poor have little choice but to settle in lowlying areas.

Domain expansion Despite these evidently political failings, a narrative has developed that – far from promoting the much-needed economic growth and infrastructure improvements – proposes the very opposite be applied – restraint and human humility in the face of natural forces.

Creation of spectulations Writing in the Singapore Straits Times in the aftermath of these events – as well as a series of earthquakes across the South Pacific and Sumatra, and dust storms in Australia – senior writer Andy Ho pointed to the supposed evidence that these events could all be linked to global warming 5.

This was despite noting that the detection and reporting of such events inevitably increases with our technical capabilities, and that the definition of a disaster – being largely dependent on numbers affected and reparation costs – necessarily leads to a rise in incidence along with population and wealth.

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Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami

Photo: U.S. Government

In Manila, Dr. Cruz had suggested that the intensity of the typhoon “could be … a manifestation of climate change”, adding that “maybe ten years ago the floods might have not been this bad”. Unsurprisingly, many commentators discussing the matter subsequently omitted any reference to the speculative character of these statements.

Piggybacking new claims According to the American academic, Joel Best, “once a problem gains widespread recognition and acceptance, there is a tendency to piggyback new claims on to the old name, to expand the problem’s domain” 6. Another recent example has been the tendency by environmentalist groups to promote their long-standing opposition to nuclear power increasingly through reference to the contemporary fear of terrorist attacks.

Language of vulnerability But it is not just interest groups making use of such tactics.

Politicians, officials, businesses and the media – as well as NGOs and other civil society groups – have all become increasingly adept at posing the issues they wish to see being addressed and prioritized through such means.

This cultivation of a language of vulnerability is unlikely to resolve things. Instead, by presenting human beings as both the cause and victims of powerful forces, beyond our control, it helps breed a climate of apathy and disengagement.

Real responses Fortunately, the history of human responses to disaster – including terrorist attacks – is actually quite heartening.

People tend to be at their most cooperative and focused at such times. There are few instances of mass panic 7. Amidst the tales of devastation and woe from the recent earthquakes and floods, numerous individual and collective acts of bravery and sacrifice stand out, reminding us of the ordinary courage and conviction that are part of the human condition.

People often come together in an emergency in new and

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unexpected ways, using the experience to re-affirm social bonds and their collective humanity. Research reveals communities now considered to be better off through having had to cope with adversity or a crisis 8. Rather than being psychologically scarred, it appears equally possible to be enhanced.

Ordinary people are always the real ‘first-responders’ in any emergency. And disasters – whilst destroying physical and economic capital – also present a tremendous opportunity for the creation and enhancement of social capital – so long as the spontaneous need to exert and assume control is not subsumed to the agendas and presumptions of existing or external authorities. What may be needed most from outside agencies at such times then – in addition to physical aid and support – is a degree of moderation and circumspection in attempting to impose their interpretation of the events onto the situation and thereby seeking to steer future courses of action. Sadly, there are countless examples where this is not the case. Cutting out this growing, profligate and counter-productive narrative of doom would be a good place to start.

Securitization The tendency to associate an increasing number of phenomena – from climate change and energy supplies to population growth and the provision of food – with security is also likely to yield significant problems.

Not least of these is that once an issue becomes securitized, it also becomes open to the rules of discussion that relate to national security matters. Not only is this likely to lead to censorship, but in the future we may begin to see real conflicts emerge as countries are held not to have acted correctly in relation to what, once upon a time, would have been regarded as local environmental matters.

It seems, in this regard that those who once colonized the world territorially in the nineteenth century, are now seeking to re-colonize it mentally, with their dystopian visions of the future, today.

1 Margaret Chan, Press Announcement at Emergency WHO Meeting, Geneva, 29 April 2009, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8025931.stm 2 Bill Durodié, Limitations of Risk Management: Dealing with Disasters and Building Social Resilience, Politik, Vol.8, No.1, March 2004 3 Nathaniel Cruz, cited by Andreo Calonzo, Epic Flood in Metro Manila caused by Record Rainfall, GMANews.TV available at: http://www.gmanews.tv/story/ 173232/epic-flood-in-metro-manila-caused-by-record-rainfall 4 Greg Bankoff, Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazard in the Philippines, Routledge, 2003, p.44 5 Greg Bankoff, Constructing Vulnerability: The Historical, Natural and Social Generation of Flooding in Metropolitan Manila, Disasters, Vol.27, No.3, 2003, Andy Ho, Heavens and Earth in Turmoil, The Straits Times, 3 October 2009 6 Joel Best, Random Violence: How we Talk about New Crimes and New Victims, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999, p.168 7 Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectations, Cassell 1997 and Continuum 2002 Bill Durodié and Simon Wessely, Resilience or Panic? The Public and Terrorist Attack, The Lancet, Vol.360, No.9349, 2002

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

The European citizen’s security – a perception

by Alexander Siedschlag, Professor for Security Research, Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna/Paris The European Security Strategy of 2003 advocated a “culture of security” that should be established throughout the EU and among its member states. It is remarkable that in an era in which much was talked and done about development of material capabilities for more effective EU action in civil and military crisis management, a political-strategic document so distinctly addressed the relevance of “soft factors,” including the role of perception. Namely, one of the elements of the envisaged European culture is something comparable to what has been coined the “interoperability of minds” in the context of the transformation of NATO.

A culture of security In particular, a common situational awareness across all EU member states was one of the visions that stood behind the culture of security envisaged by the European Security Strategy, seeking to make the Union not only more capable but also more coherent by fostering common rather than fragmented perceptions by governments and agencies.

The subsequent report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) did not explicitly take up on this but rather concentrated on greater operational engagement with partners in realizing effective multilateralism.

However, the report concluded that public support for the Union’s “global engagement” is important to maintain.

Cultures of security continue to play an important role in this context – in particular as external and internal security and EU action are forming a common continuum, for example as far as disaster management, civil protection and the fight against terrorism are concerned. Remarkably, the report addressed the question of perception of security not only on the governmental level but also on the level of the citizens themselves.

Security continues to be perceived as a national – not a European – value Social science-oriented security research – for example as conducted in the EU research project “Changing Perceptions of Security and Interventions” (CPSI, http://www.cpsi-fp7.eu) – has shown that the citizens’ knowledge is a key factor for their perception of security (that is, their subjectively felt security as opposed to the security situation from a more objective point of view) as well as acceptance of public security policies and measures.

One should also take into account that the development of a common culture of security as addressed in the European

Prof. Dr. Alexander Siedschlag Professor for Security Research at Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna/Paris and Director of the CEUSS | Center for European Security Studies.

Born 1971 in West Berlin.

1994 Masters degree in Political Science, Sociology and Psychology from the University of Munich.

1996 Dr. phil. from the University of Munich.

1995-1996 NATO Research Fellow.

1996-2000 Postdoctoral Fellow at Free University Berlin and Humboldt University Berlin.

2000 Venia legendi in Political Science from Humboldt University Berlin 2000-2004 Senior lecturer at Humboldt University Berlin 2004-2007 Endowed chair for European Security Policy, University of Innsbruck Prof. Siedschlag is the chairman of the European Security Conference Initiative (ESCI) and editor of the Jahrbuch für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (Yearbook of European Security Policy, Nomos Publishers).

Security Strategy will not necessarily facilitate harmonization of national security policies. In the majority of the countries studied, security continues to be perceived as a national cultural value – both by governments and citizens.

On the one hand, this reflects the political state of the art.

Article 4, paragraph 2 the Treaty on European Union in the version of Lisbon stipulates that the Union “shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” On the other hand, EU citizens’ perception somewhat lags behind an important innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty: the concept of the security of the Union as a whole. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU “shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: … safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity.“

National traditions and limits to a European approach In addition, there are a couple of different styles of how European citizens and their governments perceive (in)security. Recent case study results include the following.

In Germany, security has become a symbol of preparedness

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strategies. A review of pertinent strategic documents of EU and ability to defend the nation against threats from without countries (plus Norway) which focus on research into citizen as well as from within. Both aims are perceived to require security shows considerable differences that illustrate just additional legitimacy from higher-ranking, international how long the way towards a European culture of security still values, such as democracy, rule of law and European integrais. This is depicted in the map below. tion. Consequently, Germany calls for increased compatibility between national and European security strategies and a The technology (especially information and communication more comprehensive approach on a European level. However, technology) bow from Spain to Sweden and Norway; the Germany’s perception of security as a task on the level of the climate change bow from Spain to the Netherlands the border state organization as a whole and a governmental matter in security belt from fact puts constraints Spain to France and on a comprehensive Italy; the transport and approach and coordinaWest European Belt and Axes on Security supply chain infrastructure tion on a European level. research topics and governance methods protection axis from Germany to Austria. Germany, France’s tradition of Austria and Italy together “sûreté“ puts the societal make up a civil protection (as opposed to the technoaxis, particularly combining logical and capabilitycritical infrastructure based) dimension of citizen protection as a prevensecurity in the first place. tive measure with This also limits the potential effective incifor common cross-national dent/disaster situational awareness and response approaches on a European aimed at level. restoring citizen securiThe Netherlands, Sweden ty in times of and the UK can be said to crisis. Sweden have a culture of social and Norway constifear, where citizens tute a communication perceive (in)security as infrastructure thematic axis. caused by factors France and the UK form a conventional threat/violence themabeyond their immediate life context. This perception interesttic axis. ingly does not necessarily go along with citizens’ acceptance of a supranational European approach to security. For example, UK security culture rests on homeland security, integratCitizens do not believe technology ing interventions against conventional and terrorist threats. to be the key solution This integration is based on technology, and political commuIt is important to note that while the majority of national nication highlights the need to protect critical infrastructure strategies rest on security-enhancing innovation in the techon all levels – from home to high-tech. The public in the UK nology sector, people do not believe that enhanced security will the more perceive a security problem to be solved the technologies alone can eliminate insecurity. more the solution is embedded into a comprehensive soluFrom a realist point of view, enhancement of nationally driven tion, addressing political, technological and normative coninitiatives for standardization and certification, including text. support for a multilateral repertories of action, may therefore be a more effective choice for EU action than a capability-centred approach that builds on harmonization and EuropeanizaMapping European citizen security initiatives tion.

At the same time, not only citizen security cultures but also national security cultures themselves lead to selective perceptions of security problems and divergent responses of The EU should accordingly support cross-national compatibiliMember States as to how to safeguard their citizens’ security. ty of citizen security policies and capabilities based on pertiThis is well exemplified by the transposition of the European nent perceptions of citizens and governments rather that try guiding principle of citizen security into very different national to foster a genuinely European culture of security from above.

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The nuclear threat of Iran – no end in sight An interview with Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director, Institute for Near East Policy, Washington

The European: Dr. Levitt, President Obama took the Iranian New Year as an opportunity to reiterate his offer to Iran for negotiations. Is this a special gesture towards the Mullahs for a last chance?

M. Levitt: This is the 2nd presidential message to the Iranian people on the occasion of the Persian new year and I think it is significant that the new administration sees this type of public diplomacy as a key backbone of its foreign policy agenda. This particular address, unlike last year’s, comes at the end of a failed effort to engage in direct diplomacy with Iran. In fact, it was Iran that at first accepted the U.S.-EU offer that would have enabled Iran to have a civilian nuclear energy program.

Iran not only later retracted, but in the course of those diplomatic engagements, was caught red-handed with smuggling ships sending weapons to terrorist groups targeting Israel.

The European: And what about the nuclear facility at Qom, which was far too small for any civilian purposes?

M. Levitt: In its response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran even admitted that this is only one of several secret facilities. Given Iran’s clear pursuit of its nuclear program, I think it is important that the Obama Administration would give diplomacy a serious chance. I think the very important message now, mostly to the Iranian people, is that the negotiation offer is still on the table but that the U.S. is not going to stop taking other necessary measures.

The European: What do you understand by other measures? Do you mean creating a sanctions regime?

M. Levitt: Certainly, and I think the Supreme Leader’s predictable response to President Obama’s offer will ring hollow for most Iranians. I think that gives momentum to the U.S. administration’s efforts to seek international consensus on a serious UN sanctions regime.

The European: And what makes a serious sanctions regime?

M. Levitt: One that is holistic, that is a combination of multilateral sanctions at the UN level; regional sanctions, especially by the EU; unilateral sanctions by individual states, especially the U.S.; and informal sanctions, as the U.S. and many European countries are doing: engaging with domestic and foreign private sectors including finance, insurance and other industries.

The European: What does it mean, in this context, that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has recently declared to take up cooperation in nuclear matters with Iran?

Dr. Matthew Levitt Dr. Matthew Levitt is director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He received his B.A. from Yeshiva University and his M.A. and PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He was a graduate research fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation. Dr. Levitt is a professorial lecturer in international relations and strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). From 2005 to 2007 he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and has previously worked in anti-terrorism at the FBI. Dr. Levitt has written extensively on terrorism, the Middle East and ArabIsraeli peace negotiations, and is a frequent commentator in the national and international media. His latest books include Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (Yale University Press, 2006) and Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

M. Levitt: Overall, the Russian response has really changed, and their response to the concept of sanctions is much more positive. Putin likes to be confrontational, I’m not sure he knows how not to be. He surely plays a very prominent role, but I think Russia has turned a corner and is unlikely to provide surface-to-air missiles to Iran any time soon.

The European: Will Russia follow a sanctions regime?

M. Levitt: I think it is likely Russia will not only ultimately vote in favour of sanctions at the UN Security Council, but will also be supportive overall of the concept of sanctions. Russia doesn’t want these to be too strong, but I think we need to sometimes separate in the world of diplomacy what politicians say publicly to the press and what they do behind closed doors.

The European: What is the role of the European Union in the Iranian nuclear issue, especially regarding its relations with the U.S.?

M. Levitt: We can say the EU is in line with the U.S., perhaps with a stance which sometimes seems too soft to the public, but which emphasizes diplomacy.

The European: And what about the emerging China?

M. Levitt: China plays an important role when we want to get sanctions through the Security Council. China is a key lynchpin

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on multiple levels, not only on the Security Council but in terms of investment in Iran and its desire for cheap, efficient, quick industrial growth. In terms of a Security Council resolution, I have every expectation China will abstain, as will Brazil, Lebanon, and Turkey. For some that will be a problem, in part because we have set the bar too high with the first and second Security Council resolutions by establishing that unanimity is crucial.

don’t have a whole lot of time, especially since the longest interpretations of the timeline get us to Iran having a nuclear device on the top of a missile, which misses the point. The real deadline is much earlier: it is when Iran achieves domestic full capability to arm a missile with a nuclear device in a short period of time.

Dr. Matthew Levitt during the interview with Editor-in-Chief Hartmut Bühl in Brussels Photo: Thomas Zlamal

The European: Unanimity certainly provided us with the needed force to affect Iran. But do we not need to create a different standard for a multinational body that works by consensus where unanimity is not required, because otherwise we are talking about ‘lowest common denominator’ diplomacy?

M. Levitt: You are fully right. This is the intention and I think China will come on board with that, and there are signs China is already making the turn: the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based out of the OECD, has issued six different warnings on Iran. China joined at the 5th, and Russia is also a member. A few weeks ago, the FATF reinstated its black list, which for years had been seen as too political, at the top of which is now Iran in its own special category.

The European: The FATF works by consensus, so we already have signs of a growing multilateral understanding. But what is the FATF calling upon? What repercussion will it have on China as a major, but no so much controllable, player in this field?

M. Levitt: FATF calls on all member states to engage in proactive countermeasures to deal with Iran’s deceptive financial practices in the context of money laundering, terror financing and proliferation. Concerning China, I think it will, while trying to extract as many concessions as it possibly can, at the end of the day come on board for what will be a weak UN Security Council resolution. But that resolution will provide the umbrella for what I expect will be much more substantive U.S. unilateral sanctions, perhaps European country unilateral sanctions, and, most importantly, sanctions by the EU as such.

The European: This is certainly a positive development. But when we come to the threat of actual nuclear programs, experts do not always agree on the extent of Iran’s development. What is your assessment of Iran’s current nuclear capabilities?

M. Levitt: Depending on who you ask, you will get different answers on the timeline. I think the only consensus is that we

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The European: And why is this shorter deadline significant?

M. Levitt: In my argumentation, I see two points: 1. the Mullahs could arm nuclear missiles within a short period of time from the breakout of warfare; 2. but even if we take as a given, which we can not, that Iran gets a nuclear weapon and does not use it due to the threat of retaliation, the real issue is the prospect of a nuclearempowered Iran and the kind of aggressive behaviour it would likely pursue in the region.

“I believe that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon” The European: Iran is the pre-eminent power in the region. How do you understand Iran’s hegemonic intent in the Middle East?

M. Levitt: Let us take the Gulf States. The real issue to the Emirates and others in the Gulf is the prospect of a nuclear-empowered Iran and the kind of aggressive behaviour it would likely pursue in the region and elsewhere. A senior Emirati official told me, “Iran is already so incredibly aggressive in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, the Gulf states and beyond - imagine them having nuclear capability.”

The European: When the last U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) came out in 2007, it caused a great stir. As you mentioned, depending on who you ask, you will get different answers e.g. on the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program. Most people read the NIE as saying Iran is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapon.

M. Levitt: What it actually said, if you read more carefully, is that Iran had ceased development of the weaponization of its nuclear program. But that is the quickest part of the process.

Once you have the material, you can weaponize it in a matter of weeks. Apart from that, a new NIE under development is widely expected to indicate that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear program.

The European: Do you believe that Iran is pursuing his own nuclear weapon?

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Discovered uranium enrichment plant at Qom

Photo: satimagingcorp.com

M. Levitt: I believe Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, and this based on a variety of sources including seized laptops, defectors, IAEA material, and others.

The European: Would this mean that the problem might be solved militarily?

M. Levitt: If we are committed to trying to resolve this in a nonmilitary fashion, as we all should be, because a military response by anyone would be very messy, then we have to do everything we can now, and sanctions offer one of the best tools. It is no panacea, but real sanctions can, on one hand, create leverage for diplomacy and, on the other hand, significantly disrupt Iran’s efforts now and thus buy us time, so that in the end we could have significant success.

The European: What is the role of President Ahmedinijad in this issue of nuclear power? Is he a puppet?

M. Levitt: I think he has nothing to do with this. The elected leadership is irrelevant; the only leadership that matters is that of the Ayatollahs. They control the military, the intelligence, the nuclear program, the judiciary and the media.

Therefore, Ahmedinijad, while an irritant, to be sure, is not the problem. So it is not clear whether any democratic change in Iran, short of complete regime change, would really mean anything.

The European: Let us now come to Israel. Its recent diplomatic row with the United States is making headlines. No doubt the U.S. and Israel will remain interdependent allies, not least because of the potential danger of a nuclear-armed Iran. But will Israel be under the control of the Americans if there is one day news of nuclear weapons in Iran?

M. Levitt: There is a cabal out there saying Israel controls America or America controls Israel. While I am proud to say, as an American, that there is a very close U.S.-Israeli relationship, Israel being the only democracy in the region, the fact is that both the United States and Israel are independent countries. I think it is very good that there are close and ongoing discussions between the U.S. and Israel on Iran’s nuclear program.

The European: Nevertheless, could these developments play into Iran’s hands on the nuclear issue? For a lot of Europeans, the protection of Israel is a sine qua non and thus a top policy priority.

M. Levitt: I think it is in fact not the case that tensions between the U.S. and Israel play into the hands of Iran. Rather, the regional and international tensions which Iran has created have given rise to a perhaps unlikely alliance between Sunni Gulf States, the moderate Arab regimes in the Levant, Israel, the U.S. and Europe in particular. You have now Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, etc. all very much on the same page with the U.S. and Europe on the need to contend with a very aggressive and untrustworthy Iranian regime.

The European: You have been briefing members of the European Parliament on the issue of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. What are your recommendations to EU policymakers?

Is Europe able to play a unique role in dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons?

M. Levitt: I think the EU has a major role to play in securing a deal with Iran. There will likely be a relatively weak UN Security Council resolution, and while I wish it were stronger, it will open an opportunity for the U.S. and EU to engage in regional and unilateral sanctions that will have a lot of teeth.

The European: And if the UN fails e.g. to designate more banks on the Iranian shipping line, as the U.S. already do successfully, should it be done by the EU? M. Levitt: That would be very significant. Let us take the example of the Iranian shipping line, which has been publicly tied to shipments of weapons and components for the nuclear program. The UK has already designated the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) for sanctions, and the Dutch have put IRISL on an automatic 100% customs inspections list, which, given the major ports in the Netherlands, has a strong impact on Iran’s ability to transport illicit and dual-use cargo.

The European: Could the EU mark other banks and targets?

M. Levitt: Certainly, and with very significant impact. And it is not just the formal sanctions that could come out of the EU – and keep in mind that the EU has designated more entities for sanctions than the UN – but also informal sanctions involving reaching out to the private sector.

The European: For the private sector to pull out of Iran?

M. Levitt: There is a whole host of companies pulling out of business in Iran, and that could have a huge impact on disrupting the country’s ability to pursue its nuclear program in as timely a manner, and this buys us time to pursue – in tandem with the financial tools – diplomatic tools, leverage for military tools, and others.

The European: Thank you for the interview.

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Security solutions adapted to individual needs Interview with Dr. Matthias Möseler, CEO, Serco GmbH, Bonn

The European: What makes Serco so successful in the area of security? You once said that you bend sheet metal and at the same time you provide services in Europe and around the world.

What holds the whole thing together?

Dr. Möseler: The service concept. We are independent of manufacturers and therefore very broad-based and in a position to integrate highly complex systems from disparate parts.

For example, we assemble medical components in steel shipping containers to form mobile operating theatres for use in military operations.

The European: There is a lot of demand for shipping containers.

What else do you do with them?

Dr. Möseler: We can, for example, build prisons from container systems. We recently did that for the German Armed Forces.

Essentially, what we are doing is providing a service.

The European: Is that the mobile prison solution for the African coast?

Dr. Möseler: Yes. The European: And you operate the facility in-country?

Dr. Möseler: We commissioned it. We train the user, of course, to operate the finished system before we hand it over, but if subsequent difficulties arise that for whatever reason cannot be solved locally, then our employees naturally fly to the area of operations and troubleshoot.

The European: Are there other national and international missions carried out by governments for which you provide similar services?

Dr. Möseler: In the armed services, such partnerships between public authorities and private-sector service providers are very widespread. Take another example in Germany, the Army’s Letzlinger Heide National Training Centre near Magdeburg: we operated that facility for five years up to the late autumn of 2008.

The European: You are talking about technically operating the battle simulation facility?

Dr. Möseler: Right, a battle simulation facility. I can describe it very briefly: soldiers come for a two-week training course and are completely outfitted in preparation for the combat exercises. They don’t fire live ammunition but rather have battery-operated devices that simulate a battle. The soldiers then go to

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Dr. Matthias Möseler Dr. Matthias Möseler is the CEO of Serco Germany in Bonn since 2008.

He was born 1969 in Bonn and studied policy, history, philosophy and laws. He hold a PhD since 1997. Matthias Möseler was a member of the German National Team in fencing between 1989 and 1995. In his professional career he held different management positions in the IT sector and became in 2007 Head of Serco IT Projects; in 2008 he was appointed as the General Manager of Betatech GmbH.

the national training centre, which is 23 km long and 18 km wide. The exercises are monitored by vehicles fitted with video cameras that transmit movements of personnel in real time to a communications centre, where instructors have audiovisual equipment enabling them to see what the soldiers are doing on the battlefield in real time.

The European: Dr. Möseler, where are the international growth markets?

Dr. Möseler: You are referring to the Serco Group. For us there are, first of all, potential projects for NATO. Then there are functional growth markets. Here, too, there are mobile solutions for military operations, such as armoured command and control vehicles, for which there will be demand not just here in the German and European but in the global context. The manufacturers are keen to sell their systems and ensure that they are serviced. So operational logistics is an area in which we see very strong growth potential.

The European: Could you describe these vehicles?

Dr. Möseler: There are the armoured vehicles used in operations, and then there are armoured command and control vehicles – modified versions of an ordinary 4-wheel drive vehicle hardened with steel plates on the underside, top and sides.

The European: And you handle the logistics?

Dr. Möseler: We handle the logistics. We are in talks with a variety of partners − vehicle manufacturers, manufacturers of security systems of steel ballistic armour plate − about integrating their products and taking part in the corresponding tendering procedures.

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

The European: And this is an ongoing trend?

Dr. Mรถseler: There is strong demand in the military sector and automotive manufacturers will not be able to provide these very specific military upgrades by themselves. It therefore makes sense for us to talk to automakers about providing this service and also taking on systems integration, which lies outside the core business of the automotive industry. We are currently in talks with them.

The European: What about military logistics and NATO? Dr. Mรถseler: That is one part of our core business. One example is radar facility maintenance and parts management. What often happens is that smaller NATO countries do not have the financial capability to do these things themselves, or they find that the manufacturer no longer supplies the spare parts for these old devices. So they come to us.

The European: Do you acquire customers through NATO agencies?

Dr. Mรถseler: We are in a position to source such parts, to supply and procure them worldwide through NATO agencies such as NC3A, NAMSA and NACMA.

View of the interior of the deployable custody container

Deployable multifunction container

Photo: Serco

The European: Radar was one of your initial core business lines.

Dr. Mรถseler: Correct, that was part of our initial core business when the company was founded in 1961 and we are still working in that field. We still operate radar facilities, providing spare parts and monitoring the facilities from the air to determine, for example, whether a mobile radio communications structure set up next to our radar facility obstructs its focal length.

The European: Radar maintenance is a subject dealt with in NATO. Dr. Mรถseler: When it comes to radar maintenance, regular user conferences are held and in October of last year we were given an opportunity to make a presentation at such a user conference. We will again give a presentation at the user conference to be held in the spring of this year. Meanwhile, we have

Photos: Serco

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signed a framework agreement with the Agency. And as is always the case with a framework agreement, we now have to flesh it out and give it content. We have signed it and we are now taking the first orders.

The European: Let’s move on to the civilian sector. The Serco Group operates the Copenhagen metro and the Dubai airport.

Dr. Möseler: Yes, it does. We are in constant touch with our colleagues and when we take on a project of this kind, we follow the best practice models and get our own employees to participate in day-to-day operations. It is a give-and-take process. It generates the kind of synergy that can be achieved in a company that operates globally. And it is very beneficial to myself and my employees because I can offer them an international perspective.

The European: You made a name for yourself in e-learning models. Are you still involved in that business line?

Dr. Möseler: We have complex operator models of all types and technical and general training in our portfolio as a service offering for public-sector clients as well as the automotive industry, where we have recently been very successful. We provide product launch training for automobile, motorcycle and agricultural machinery manufacturers. And we not only carry out the training – that is, we not only provide methodological and didactical training given by an instructor in a lecture hall – but we can also operate a comprehensive training centre for our clients and have done so in many cases.

The European: What does this involve? Do you draw up manuals, for example?

Dr. Möseler: In the automotive industry, what we do is to train garage mechanics for the manufacturers in the run-up to the product launch. This means that six months to a year before a new model is brought onto the market, we obtain the vehicle at the training centres we operate. The authorised dealers send their garage employees to the training centre where they spend one to two weeks learning about the vehicle. We also

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give them training manuals or computerised training CBTs on a CD that they can take home with them and continue to study.

The European: With computer-based simulation?

Dr. Möseler: Yes, when our customers request it, we use these simulation techniques.

The European: How is your organisation structured to handle these very different lines of business?

Dr. Möseler: We have a broad-based core team of highly specialised engineers in Bonn. They are, naturally, constantly called on to delve into new subjects. They provide the basic foundation for the company and the various projects. And then for each project we take on staff under limited term contracts – or for that matter people under unlimited term contracts who are assigned to specific projects – to handle project implementation, and our core team is available to support them. In other words we build a basic support structure in our central offices that project teams can build on when implementing specific projects.

The European: So your team is a hodgepodge.

Dr. Möseler:Yes, it is. You could almost say a hodgepodge of scientists and engineers from a wide variety of technical disciplines that very few companies in Germany offer in this particular combination. It is a hodgepodge of know-how that I have to have in reserve, to a degree.

The European: And how do you handle market screening?

Dr. Möseler: I have what you could call a small department responsible for ongoing strategic business development. Its members are constantly on the move, attending events of all kinds and talking to current and potential clients. What we do is this: we throw 100 ideas into the air and of the 100, five, six or seven eventually come to fruition and end up as projects.

We have any number of balls that we are juggling at the same time and it is sometimes hard to keep track of them. So I have a group of employees who are exclusively focused on monitoring these strategic ideas and submitting them to the operational specialists when an opportunity arises to put together a concrete project.

The European: By way of conclusion, could I ask you a personal question? You have an international reputation as a fencer and have won many titles. What has fencing taught you that you have found useful in your business?

Dr. Möseler: Concentration, ambition and an instinct for taking the right decision in the right situation, right away. I once compared fencing to a very fast game of chess on a 14-metre board.

July 2010 The European: Thank you for the interview.

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SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

External threats – customized concepts for effective site protection

by Manfred Busko, Gunnebo, Germany, Munich

The issue of security not only concerns crisis-ridden states, but increasingly enterprises and institutions in Germany. The problems they face range from Internet crime, industrial espionage, organized crime, sabotage and even terrorist threats. The industry is responding to demand for comprehensive, sophisticated security concepts in the shape of improved products and equipment, as well as intermeshing systems and solutions that meet the very highest standards.

Damage from industrial espionage Enterprises and business establishments in Germany alone have to contend with the huge problem of industrial espionage: according to the 2007 Corporate Trust Study, one-infive companies has lost information in this way. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior puts the resultant damage at some 20 billion euros a year. No less worrying is the number of recorded break-ins: The police’s criminal statistics registered more than 188,000 cases involving considerable economic damage last year. Terrorist attacks have long since become a real threat in Germany: as the suitcase bomb attacks in 2006 show, it is primarily infrastructure facilities that are at risk.

However, exposed institutions and international enterprises could also suddenly become the target of politically motivated or fundamentalist perpetrators.

As the figures from the 2007 European Electronic Security Barometer show, the private sector is drawing the right conclusions from this and intends to make additional investments in

Gunnebo protecting Burj Khalifa, Singapore.

Manfred Busko Manfred Busko is a graduate in engineering. Since 2007, he has been Business Line Manager for the Site Protection division at Gunnebo Deutschland GmbH, whose main line of business is offering integrated security solutions for banks, retailers and other facilities with high security requirements.

Manfred Busko has extensive experience in fitting properties with complex technical equipment, among other things thanks to his 13 years of service at ABB Gebäudetechnik GmbH, where his last post was as head of the Düsseldorf branch office.

security solutions. In this survey of 167 security experts from major European companies, Gunnebo found that almost 45 percent were planning to spend more on electronic security precautions this year. In many cases, this is also in response to the fact that insurance companies demand additional security standards from their clients.

Security with precisely tailored solutions There is no hard and fast answer to the question of how industrial or infrastructure facilities can best be protected. The nature and extent of the threat and the specific circumstances at the location differ too greatly. And because customized, perfectly fitting solutions are required, careful and competent

Photo: Gunnebo, Stockholm

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customer consulting has top priority. The first step is to analyze the risks and security situation precisely. For example, a picture of the risks is drawn up and specific problem zones are identified together with representatives of the customer who best know the characteristics of the object to be protected.

Other questions relate to the type of access control desired or the chain of reaction to be set off after an alarm has been triggered, for example. Once the concrete requirements have been defined, cutting-edge planning techniques are used to formulate a security concept that covers every aspect and dovetails with the environment. The best-possible protection is usually delivered by a combination of standardized products, custom-made special components and electronic equipment for remote control, surveillance and alerting. Full-line vendors like Gunnebo offer a one-stop shop for such integrated solutions and also a permanent contact person to assist customers.

Deterrence through indoor and outdoor protection Depending on the ascertained security requirements, an object may only require basic protection or may need medium to very high security.

Companies and institutions that wish to ensure a medium level of security supplement basic exterior protection with observation and regulation of pedestrians and traffic.

If an object requires a very high degree of protection, this will include full surveillance of its interior. Electronic locks are a proven means of securing doors at entrances and transition points. Their prime purpose is to prevent entry by intruders from outside the company. In many cases, however, theft and business espionage are perpetrated by a company’s own employees, who may know the codes required to gain access.

Integrated security management The objective of protecting a location with an ideal security concept means that sensible intermeshing of the individual measures described in the box on the right is necessary. That demands mutually compatible products that can be connected with each other and analyzed by means of a suitable software solution. As a full-line vendor, Gunnebo provides the SMI server system, which is able to pool all information from the electronic surveillance systems. The costs for such an integrated security management system soon pay off – not only because the volume of damage is reduced sharply, but also because fewer guards are needed. Moreover, the system’s functions can be used for other areas of control, such as time data entry and production or booking systems. Here too, Gunnebo’s experienced technicians can provide assistance.

Reliable after-sales service Comprehensive security is a mission that the internationally operating company aimes to and must address. Moreover, it believes that its obligations do not end when the installation

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phase is over. Consequently, its all-round, seamless support is backed by training courses for users and repair and maintenance services. Customers can rest assured of having invested in a smoothly functioning system and of also having a reliable partner behind them.

Effective practical measures Basic protection focuses on delimiting the perimeter of a facility and usually consists of an at least two-meter fence, as well as double, sliding or revolving doors at the entrances. The more stable these barriers are (for example in the shape of doublebarred palings), the greater their deterrent effect. Security can be boosted by means of effective boom barriers, road blockers or bollards at vehicle access points: Gunnebo offers the appropriate high-security solutions for this in its Elkosta series. They are not only able to stop a 6.8 or 7.5-ton truck travelling at 80 km/h, but also to destroy it completely. For example, the K12 road blocker, the new wedge barrier, the high-security K12 bollard and the BLS Defense Barrier have gained anti-terror certification from the U.S. Department of State (DOS K12), the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD K12) and the British Standards Institution (PAS 68).

Combined access surveillance There are various systems that are suitable for entrance areas, such as barriers or turnstiles, if necessary in combination with airlocks. Equipped with card readers or PIN pads, these fully automated means of access control ensure that only authorized persons can enter the premises or building. Additional protection is offered by video cameras and alarm systems – for instance, fences can be supplied with high-voltage electrical pulses (Power Fence) or electronic alarm systems based on microwaves (WaveSec) or hydraulics (GroundSec) can be installed. If these systems signal that there has been an unauthorized intrusion, the guards can obtain a picture of the situation thanks to video surveillance and take quick and appropriate action. According to the European Electronic Security Barometer, that is why most security officers rely on a mix of intruder alarms, access checks and installed cameras.

Security indoors Very high security requirements also mean that the interior must be monitored comprehensively. Electronic locks are a common solution for securing doors at entrances and checkpoints. Additional video surveillance may therefore make sense, as can further means of access control. Maximum standards of security are advisable for areas and departments where there is an above-average risk potential, such as research & development or data centers: they include airlock functions fitted with biometric identification solutions to reliably prevent unauthorized entry. Documents and objects that need to be protected within individual departments should be stored in burglar-proof safes or at least fire-proof reinforced cabinets. Gunnebo offers a particularly flexible solution with its Module Guard vault: its ready-made elements come in various dimensions, and so adapt to existing building structures, and can be assembled quickly and easily, even on upper floors, thanks to their low weight. The vault is as secure as if it were embedded in the building’s foundations.

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

Protecting our military forces is of fundamental importance in the conduct of crisis management operations

by General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, Brussels The engagement of the international community in multinational peace building is presently greater than ever, responding to challenges around the world. The ongoing international crisis management operations on the mandates of United Nations today involve around 250.000 military personnel.

About 4.000 of those are EU-led, while the large part is led by either the UN itself or NATO.

Commitments with inherent risks The operations represent great commitments by contributing nations as well as by every individual soldier. The risks for the involved personnel vary depending on the kind of task and on the environment, but we are continuously reminded of the dangers to our personnel in the field. Peace enforcement in hostile environments such as Afghanistan for obvious reasons imply direct physical threats, which are far greater than we find in peace keeping operations with the explicit consent of conflicting parties.

In addition to the threats from hostile actions, the local health risks in the mission areas are often substantial. They largely depend more on environmental factors than on the character of the mission. Missions in disease-stricken areas with primitive medical infrastructure incur special risks.

“The safety of the military personnel is always at the centre of attention of commanders on all levels”

Håkan Syrén General Håkan Syrén was born on 31 January 1952 in Växjö, Sweden. He graduated in 1973 from the Swedish Naval Academy as a Lieutenant in the Coast Artillery.

Career: 1973-79 Instructor and Platoon Commander. 1980 Student at the Swedish War College, Stockholm. 1984 Staff Officer at Navy Staff, Stockholm. 1988 Student at the Naval War College, Newport, USA. 1989 Teacher of Strategy, Swedish War College, Stockholm. 1990 Head of Planning Department, Navy Staff, Stockholm. 1992 Commanding Officer, Marine Amphibious Battalion and Coast Artillery Regiment. 1996 Head of Operations, Planning Department, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. 1999 Secretary to the Defence Commission, Ministry of Defence. 1999 Chief of Joint Military Intelligence and Security, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. 2004-09 Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces.

on all levels including all the Chiefs of the Armed Forces. Force protection is always of fundamental importance. The risks have to be carefully assessed and to be managed in a transparent way. The individual soldier must know that all reasonable measures are taken to ensure that he can solve his tasks in the safest possible way. In the absence of such an understanding, the willingness to contribute of the individuals as well as of nations would rapidly be undermined. In the end the contributions from the international community would be at risk if force protection were neglected.

Håkan Syrén

Risks can of course never be totally eliminated in military operations. Neither can we maintain that risks should always be eliminated to the maximum extent possible. Our engagements in international peace missions will always involve careful balancing between aims, results and risks. The only way to avoid all risks is to stay at home. That is obviously no alternative, since it would mean achieving nothing. We have to take risks to achieve our aims. Sometimes the risks are quite significant as we are right now experiencing in Afghanistan.

The safety of soldiers is central That said, it goes without saying that the safety of the military personnel is always at the centre of attention of commanders

Force protection- a panoply of moves against threats Force protection builds on a number of elements that must be appropriately balanced.

Prevention: Much is about prevention. Appropriate training and equipment matching the tasks are obviously of critical importance.

Situational awareness: Understanding the situation and the requirements of the missions are equally important. Good intelligence and situational awareness as well as competent command and control in action are vital in order to control the risks as the operations evolve.

Interoperability: A multinational framework incurs special challenges. Interoperability in all its aspects is just as impor-

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tant for force protection as it is for the efficient conduct of multinational missions.

Medical support: Notwithstanding, if soldiers come in harm’s way, the medical support in the field and behind the lines is the final link of the chain. We need to be able to provide efficient medical backup both in terms of logistics and medical capabilities.

All these elements are linked together. We have to look at protection in a comprehensive way while at the same time also considering the aims of our missions. We have to make sure that protective measures as a whole - soft and hard - are in balance.

We need a comprehensive approach for forces protection

“Faceless statistics can never counterbalance the cruel sacrifice of the lives of named individuals” Håkan Syrén

The example of Afghanistan Afghanistan provides a good illustration of how different factors have to be assessed together. Afghanistan of course is mainly a NATO task. Nevertheless, Afghanistan today presents the most challenging military task also for the EU Member States. It should be remembered that the EU Member States are contributing about ten times more troops to ISAF in Afghanistan than to the ongoing EU-led operations in BosniaHerzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA) and outside the Somali coasts (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA).

Mission versus safety From a force protection perspective, Afghanistan represents an extremely difficult task and environment. The aim of the whole effort by the international community is the development of a functioning Afghan society built on the rule of law and respect for human rights. The establishment of a trustful relation between the international military forces and the Afghan population is a prerequisite for achieving success. This inevitably means that the forces and the soldiers have to expose themselves.

Reducing risks – not always compliant with the mission Fortified bases and armoured transport vehicles reduce the exposure to the direct physical threats, but similarly reduce the opportunities for direct and confidence-building interaction with the Afghan population. Lack of communication with the local population has direct implications for situational awareness, as vital information about hidden dangers in the local environment can be missed.

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Conscious decisions to save individual lives When our soldiers have come in harm’s way, public attention is almost always focused on the protective measures that had been taken and on possible weaknesses and mistakes in the actual situation. In those situations it is for obvious reasons hard to make the argument that the individual lives that were visibly lost should be seen in the light that many more but nameless lives are continuously being saved by a conscious decision to compromise on certain protective measures.

Faceless statistics can never counterbalance the cruel sacrifice of the lives of named individuals. This is a truth that is further enhanced by the real-time reporting by media.

Nevertheless it is vital that we to the maximum extent possible are able to take a comprehensive approach to force protection. In spite of pressures introduced by individual circumstances, we have to maintain a high consciousness about the balance between risks and aims and we also have to maintain a clear perspective on the overall risk management dilemmas.

This has to be done continuously and proactively. Therefore I very much welcome the initiative by this publication to focus on force protection in all its dimensions.

General Håkan SYRÉN, Chairman EU Military Committee Role and Responsibilities General Syrén is the permanent Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC).

He has been selected by the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) of the 27 EU Member States and appointed to the post by the Council. He entered his office on 6 November 2009.

Gen. Syrén leads the works of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and liaises with the Presidency in the development and implementation of its work programme.

He is the military adviser to the Secretary General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR) on all military matters and represents the primary Point of Contact with the Operation Commanders of the EU’s military operations.

Gen. Syrén is the spokesman and representative of the EU Military Committee at the meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). He also attends the meetings of the Council when decisions with security and defence implications are to be taken.

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

The Transformation Process of Europe’s Armed Forces – The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) as an example.

by Bi Puranen, Associate Professor and Secretary General, World Values Survey Association, Stockholm The rapid pace of today’s communications and modes of transport has created new security issues, while increased media coverage has at the same time put higher popular demands on rapid response capabilities. Governments, or Member States, are supposed to be able to rapidly initiate military or civil rescue operations. There is also a growing expectation that the EU should be an international actor that contributes to world security, promotes and defends democratic values and assists in humanitarian activities. Such expectations require that armed forces change their organization, their methods of training and the nature of their operations.

The EU’s joint security and defence policy The EU has begun to implement its vision of a shared security and defence policy. However, recent political events illustrate the need for increased coherence in the politics of the Union and the politics of its Member States. In order to succeed with a joint security and defence policy and for the EU to take a more proactive part in world events, it is necessary that the Member States share a common view on such a policy’s purpose, means and limits. A prerequisite for achieving this view is that the Member States and their armies share a number of basic values. For many armed forces, this includes operating in new coalitions or in new ways, for instance in close collaboration with civil governments or aid organizations. This will create not only pressure but also new demands on the 2.5 million people employed in the national armies within the EU.

How values transform military culture – the case of Sweden The transformaiton of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) through values as a change agent might serve as an example of how the armed forces of the European nations can be a partner in the development of a greater coherence between a European vision and the values of its employees in order to facilitate “a secure Europe in a better world”.

Values as a driving force When in 2004 the new Supreme Commander Håkan Syrén, today chairing the EU Military Committee, assumed command of the SAF, he started a thorough transformation of the institution. As part of that change, the VDF (Values as a Driving

Bi Puranen Bi Puranen is Associate Professor at the University of Stockholm Sweden and Secretary General in the World Values Survey, which monitors values and development globally since the early 1980’s. She is also the scientific leader of the Values Research Institute (VRI), seated in France and Sweden. She has been scientifically responsible for the research project ”Values as a Driving Force (VDF) for the Swedish Armed Forces, 2004-2009. The project was run in close cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) and the labour unions.

Force) process was initiated to create a sustainable change in the organization’s values and to create coherency between the values of the employees and the new mission of the SAF. The SAF’s participation in the European defence system, leading as well as manning the major part of the Northern Battle Group (NBG), have yielded valuable knowledge of how the SAF’s activities can be incorporated into European security cooperation.

“Our core values are the starting point for everything we do within the Swedish Armed Forces. They influence the way we work and how we treat each other and how we behave on the international stage”.

The preliminary results indicate that the EU Battlegroup concept, with battle forces composed of a mixture of military and civilian personnel, has been successfully implemented within the Swedish contingent. The most common reason for this success by participants was that they wanted to take part in an international operation in order to make a difference.

Knowledge about culture and values was one of the most requested improvements to the training given.

Integration into a new international context One of the main reasons for the transformation was a re-evaluation of Swedish security and defence policies, where no immediate threats to Swedish sovereignty could be discerned

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within a foreseeable future. On the other hand, there was also an outspoken ambition within the EU that there should be a strong solidarity among its member countries and that countries should help EU members with antiterrorism and military assistance. There were furthermore demands for reductions in the expenses of armed forces.

Shaping armed forces for international cooperation The aim of the transformed SAF was to have most of its staff either partaking in international operations or actively supporting them. To reduce costs, the SAF has explored the possibility of an extended cooperation with other Nordic and European armed forces, and also scrutinized its acquisition of new materiel.

the assigned mission. The process emphasizes the importance of practical issues, but also the value of insight into and knowledge of how values are transmitted through daily activities and interpreted in context.

Internal confidence in the upper management backed by strong leadership is a prerequisite to change. Furthermore, the SAF do not act independently, but are used as a strategic instrument by the Swedish government. Therefore, it is equally important to achieve external confidence. The citizen, and its representatives, must perceive the national army as credible, which should be one of the top strategic priorities.

Due to the changes in the assignments, core values are more important than ever before. Following the increasingly international focus, the abstractions caused by globalization become

“Everyone who works for and in the Swedish Armed Forces must understand and share our core values. Every individual, irrespective of gender, age, ethnic origins, religious convictions, sexual orientation, skin colour, service grade or similar is to be respected and treated equally”.

The changes to the organization have been demanding and have affected almost every employee of the SAF. The transformation has affected the staff organization, the acquisition of materiel, logistics, as well as the training of soldiers and conscripts.

real as the defence of the nation shifts to defending and protecting human rights or democracy. This change also creates higher demands on issues concerning intolerance and credibility. An organization that protects tolerance on behalf of differences must itself be guided by the same principles.

Cost reduction versus more efficiency The number of employees has been reduced by 20% since 2004. Units have been closed down or moved as part of a centralization process. Meanwhile, political ambitions to participate in international operations have grown. As a result, the SAF has carried out international operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Liberia, Congo and Lebanon in addition to its active role in the Nordic Battle Group. The conscript system has been reformed to be further applicable to international operations, and a system of contracting soldiers for a restricted period of time has been launched.

The objectives The three key concepts – Openness, Result and Responsibility – describe what values and conduct should characterize the SAF and its employees. The VDF process aims at reducing possible conflicts between the two existing sets of values and to speed up the desired change of the internal culture.

When an organization is in such turmoil, as the SAF has been for the past years, and when many of the organization’s workplaces are focused purely on survival, there is a risk of the core values being neglected or even lost. In order for the process to succeed, it is necessary that all personnel understand, embrace and live by these core values.

Sustainable change and credibility through active work with values To work actively with core values is a method for achieving sustainable change and credibility, both internal as well as external. A major transformation that conflicts with the values of the employees or strives to achieve changes in a prevailing set of attitudes has a smaller chance of success. Such changes take time and demand substantial efforts.

The purpose of the Values as a Driving Force process The purpose of the VDF process is to make different parts of an army share some core values that relate to common goals –

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The shifted focus toward international cooperation The project was initiated in early 2004 and ended in 2009, but the process itself is intended to be long-term and continuous.

The focus has shifted toward cooperation with other countries and organizations – cooperation on an international level that puts new demands on the employees, on their work and their competence.

These changes have certainly left a mark on the workforce and on the organization. The importance of clear core values in such situations cannot be overestimated. Core values are the foundation for the SAF’s work: for how the coworkers interact

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

with each other and for which strategies are used to fulfil the organization’s mission.

Quality control In the work on core values and organizational culture, it is just as important to have means of measuring change and progress as in other fields, such as in business where ratios are used in order to keep track of profitability, efficiency, etc.

Thus, surveys need to be carried out within the framework of the process as an important instrument for defining the impact that specific improvement actions have had on the organization.

The employees’ work satisfaction and loyalty towards the SAF has been examined both through questionnaires and interviews. Results from this research project show that a great majority – both military and civilian staff – is proud to work for the SAF.

Results in short from those who have done international services in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Liberia, Lebanon, Chad (in total 2 522 before mission and 2 870 respondents after mission) • Employees are in favour of international missions, 78% are prepared to enrol for a new mission.

• Only 2% regret that they did the mission.

• Improvements needed on the preparatory education, more country specific prep is needed, more knowledge un culture and values of the target countries.

• Cooperation with other countries in the missions should bee improved, especially skills in language, harmonisation on rules, alcohol policy and welfare is needed.

• Leadership is crucial for the end result, differences from mission to mission in each area influence the overall results more that anything else.

Conclusion The new forms of collaboration and the operational capabilities of the transformed national armies are also in line with the new demands that the globalization process places upon both Member States and the EU. In the future, national borders will be further dissolved and the importance of individual countries and their possibility to influence other countries will be reduced. A larger and larger part of the world is further and further tied up together in economic, political and judicial knots.

To defend a nation has historically been equivalent to protecting its border, air and sea territory. Today, defending a nation can take place far away, through (re)creating peace, stability and prosperity in a turbulent part of the world. In this manner, defending a nation has come to include defending its values, whether protecting democracy and human rights or preserving the conditions for international trade which is the cornerstone of European and Swedish wealth.

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Situational knowledge superiority is the key to future operational success

by Lieutenant General Hans-Lothar Domröse, Commanding General, Eurocorps, Strasbourg

The statement by the former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, that in guerrilla warfare, “…the conventional army loses when it does not win. The guerrilla wins if it does not lose” has gained tremendous relevance in today’s military commitments throughout the world. But at the time, this famous politician was referring to the Vietnam war, and since then, the guerrilla tactic has become a common method for “insurgents” eager to reach victory through other means than classic military ones.

What success in operations means The world has entered an era where winning is no longer synonymous of “beating the enemy”. Peace now demands a holistic solution to be implemented in the long term and with the cooperation of many non-military actors, amongst them the population living in the deployment theatre, which can no longer be regarded as a battlefield. Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently Pakistan, give daily examples of the “hit and run” tactic employed by insurgents with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), which proved most valuable during the war in Lebanon between Tsahal and Hezbollah. Except for the last example, which relates more to a way of fighting an invasion from Hezbollah’s point of view, the examples stated concern long-term fighting, for which politicians and top military leaders do not expect any purely military solutions.

A new kind of “war” by asymmetric threats Facing an asymmetric threat amidst the population, commanders are fighting “insurgents” or, more precisely, an undefined adversary. Is the civilian firing at our own troops a “Taliban”,

Hans-Lothar Domröse Lieutenant General Hans-Lothar Domröse, Commander of the Eurocorps (2009), was born in Hanover in 1952. He joined the Bundeswehr in 1973 and studied economic and organisational sciences at the Bw- University of Hamburg, from which he graduated in 1977. Domröse has discharged a multitude of staff and command functions at home and abroad. He served at the Federal Chancellery in Bonn, was commander of an Airborne Infantry Battalion, a member the policy planning staff of the German MOD and a section chief at NATO Headquarters SHAPE. 1998, Chief of Staff at Military District Command VII / 13th Mechanised Infantry Division in Leipzig and was selected as Chief of Staff of Multinational Brigade South in Prizren/Kosovo. In 2000, he assumed command of Mechanised Infantry Brigade 41. 2003, head of the German liaison team at CENTCOM in Tampa/Florida/ USA. 2004, Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Staff at the German MOD. 2006, commander of the Special Operations Division in Regensburg. 2008, Chief of Staff at HQ ISAF in Kabul/Afghanistan.

or someone obeying a warlord who does not want his territory to be searched for drugs? Is he just trying to take revenge because a NATO bomb killed a member of his family by mistake?

Should he be treated the same way as every insurgent, irrespective of his motive? Obviously not, and this task makes the new military commitments a hard job to be done, because force, both in terms of troop presence and the use of military power to make things better, has to be accepted by the local population and the populations of the sending nations lest we give people more arguments against us. This war acceptance has to be reached at home as well to ensure support for our own troops and their actions in the theatre.

The influence of modern communication means This is all the more difficult as war has entered new fields. Internet and cyberspace represent a new dimension in which information of all types is shaping the minds of thousands whilst escaping any control. Moreover, while wars were formerly conducted to secure the terrain, nowadays the society as a whole, material and non-material, has become the real stake of this new warfare. Since winning over the population is contradictory to killing parts of it when fighting against insurgents, force acceptance amongst the local population now has to be achieved through other means than purely military ones, as this way of doing business contributes to military success.

BU Vincent Bordignon-20091124-wildflecken-002.jpg

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DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

To understand hearts and minds is a prerequisite For many years, military experts boasted they would beat the asymmetric threat by winning the “hearts and minds” of the people. This seemed quite a good and promising idea. However, it did not really work since the Western coalitions and institutions as well as the Alliance simply got confused about what they could bring to the population living in the deployment area. They thought that western-style democracy was the solution for all types of societies throughout the world. They just did not take into consideration that the Western democratic construct had taken hundreds of years, the influence of Christianity, the century of the Enlightenment, as well as wars and revolutions to take shape… Therefore, they basically tried to sow a seed on an inappropriate ground. But over time Western armed forces have understood that prior to gaining the local population, the military leader in theatre today has to understand their “hearts and minds” first.

Political: What kind of regime? How are institutions organised, and how do they function? Is there a real governmental effectiveness? In this environment, how much manoeuvring space do our forces have?

Military: What are its capabilities? Is it willing to cooperate? How much room for improvement is there? What about police and security forces?

How trustworthy and reliable are they really…?

Economy: How is it characterised (industrial, more agriculture-based…) ? What difficulties does it face? How is business made there? What about taxes, land reforms …?

Social: What are the values ruling daily life? Is the population eager to change in a Western way? How is the income distributed? Is there a national and social cohesion, or is it a tribal society? Is it rather centralized or federal? What about health care…?

Information: What is the information flow in that country? What about press and censorship? Is there easy access to the internet? Do they have cellular phones, and is there any possibility to the control this communication network?

Infrastructure: Are there enough schools, institutions, roads, railways, air and seaports? What state are they in? Is this satisfactory?

This has prompted military authorities to try and grasp the complex environment of their commitment, comprehensively taking into account all dimensions of society.

The knowledge development – new approach This so called “knowledge development” is hence not a “genuinely” military approach. All areas to be covered for military success now need some sort of civil expertise to converge efforts into a new way of doing business: the comprehensive approach. To meet this tremendous challenge, NATO has developed a new concept: “knowledge development” and its corollary, the PMESII. This acronym describes

the various fields to be tackled in any operation dealing with an asymmetric threat.

To get a clear picture of the deployment area The PMESII are in fact the various fields the commander in theatre absolutely needs information about. Getting an overall picture of the deployment area will help him to determine his “manoeuvring space” and the means he can employ to have his actions accepted by the local government and the population as well.

• What do the population and the “bad guys” think about us?

• Where do they stand in comparison with the force’s desired end-state?

• To what extent are they ready to cooperate and reach an end-state acceptable for us and for them as well?

These concerns directly impact the planning as well as the duration of the operation, and they take into account the main features of the nation concerned.

• Culture is one of the keys to understanding. Tradition, habits and values may constitute common anchor points between Western-shaped forces and the population, to whose profit and well-being they are committed.

• Religion, which is closely linked to culture, is equally of outmost importance. How strongly does it influence daily life and the values shared by the country‘s population?

To understand the complexity of the engagement area All of the above factors contribute to the shaping of the society in the end. But the military commander has also to perfectly understand the complexity of the “engagement area”: • What is the stance of local authorities and elites toward our point of view?

• What is the influence of warlords? Are they willing to cooperate? Should the country rather be organised around several tribes?

• What are the interactions, and how can we avoid shattering the fragile balance of power resulting from their relationship?

All this brings me to the acceptance of change, the permeability to “modernity” as it is understood in Western countries: human rights, equality of men and women vs. the Sharia, eagerness to go for “another world”, the real influence of Western-like local elites on their own population…

To conduct operations only under knowledge superiority Though complicated and difficult to control, all this has to be taken into account in the planning process at both the strategic and the operational level with one single main concern above all others: What do we want to achieve? But the commander also needs a “control panel” enabling him to monitor the progression of the situation. This essential tool called “assessment” is the only way to react properly, together with non-military actors. Basically, this dashboard answers two main questions:

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• Are we doing the right thing?

• Are we doing things right?

The assessment of the situation that takes into account the specific features of every theatre of deployment: Afghanistan is very different from Lebanon, which in turn has nothing much in common with the Ivory Coast…

Comprehensive civil and military engagement There is therefore a permanent monitoring of the PMESII in conjunction with a common effort with non-military actors in theatre. The civil leaders may not share the same agenda nor may they use the same assets as the military commander, but they work in a mutually complementary way with military forces in order to reach a common goal.

But in addition to considering and implementing all these concepts and assessments, the military still has to wage a war…

All the above-mentioned aspects of the comprehensive approach cannot succeed without a secure environment, even if on the other hand, security cannot be maintained without improving the non-military part of the PMESII. At the tactical level, in order to be victorious, combat intelligence remains an absolute “must”.

Local population eager to cooperate. Overall situation secured; good conditions for development

Local population reassured. Support from own population at home

Credibility at home goes along with credibility in the field On the one hand, a “kill-them-all” approach will definitely lead to a rejection of the force by the people. On the other hand, being beaten will without doubt cause a loss of confidence in the force amongst the local population. At the end of the day, both will lead to a major failure. Another risk exists with regard to a potential loss of support for the war in the public opinion in our countries. A “dirty” conduct of war is morally unacceptable when innocents are killed. It would put into question the efficiency of our own forces and finally raise doubts about the legitimacy of the overall operation. Therefore, the question of military intelligence remains at the very heart of modern warfare.

“It is all about the people” Accurate Intelligence at Tactical Level

Tactical efficiency: not to be beaten, not to kill innocents, and to defeat the «bad guys» source: Eurocorps

Correct decisions need Information Superiority As a result, there remains a need for pure military intelligence allowing a more accurate use of military power. War actions must nevertheless be conducted with great caution. If it is to be in a “kinetic” way, that is to say through classical “war actions”, Special Operations Forces, which represent the most well-adapted asset in such a case, are to capture or eliminate only the identified insurgents. Therefore, the use of non-kinetic means, through psychological operations to prevent unwanted kinetic effects, has gained importance and increasingly prepares the “engagement field” for the most appropriate commitment of combat units. Under the close scrutiny of the media, with daily reports in the news related to combat in theatre and the way operations are really conducted, all military actors – may it be the simple rank and file or the

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military leader himself – are liable for any mistakes that may occur.

General Charles Krulak, former Commander of the U.S. Marines Corps, described it with the “three block war” concept and the “strategic corporal”: In a conflict in which our own troops have to provide food to starving people in the morning, face a riot in the early afternoon and fight a fierce combat against wellarmed insurgents at twilight, the complexity of these conditions can ultimately make an operation fail.

Hans-Lothar Domroese

Situational knowledge superiority as the capability of understanding the complex engagement environment and of monitoring the results of our actions at any level is therefore paramount in all modern warfare.

My conclusion: It is all about the people The comprehensive approach at the strategic level is to determine an achievable political end-state. At the operational level, it is to determine the means and assets to keep the balance between security and development. Its main challenge is then to ensure that efforts made for securing do not ruin the efforts made for developing the country. It moreover closely monitors the progression of the politico-military situation in theatre.

At the tactical level, certainly more than ever before, accurate intelligence is the only way to ensure an appropriate use of military assets (kinetic and non-kinetic) in order to win without putting the overall politico-military plan in jeopardy. This level of war has always been the most demanding. It still is, but with much more far-reaching responsibilities: it has to ensure security in the most appropriate possible way. This is the foundation for all the rest, and it is also the place where all can fail…

Lastly, we should always remember: It is all about the people.

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) – a decisive factor for the protection of forces

by LtCol (GS) Andreas Korb, Operations Specialist, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA), Brussels One of the indispensable keys to successful military operations anywhere in the world is undoubtedly information superiority; knowing as much about the adversary as possible provides forces with an invaluable advantage. Therefore, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, commonly referred to as ISR, plays a vital role in practically any ongoing or future conflict. NATO so far had primarily to rely on ISR assets provided by its member nations, but this is about to change.

The NATO owned and operated AGS core, when operational, will provide different levels of command with a clear picture of the situation on the ground. It will be able to cover wide areas and provide near-real-time data to a multitude of users via Line-of-Sight- and Beyond-Line-of-Sight-Datalinks during peacetime, crisis or war. The NATO AGS Programme will provide the alliance with an urgently needed and truly transformational capability.

AGS – the long road travelled Operation Desert Storm in 1991 saw the first operation of the U.S. E-8 Joint Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), although it was still in development. In 49 combat sorties, the system successfully tracked mobile Iraqi forces, including tanks and Scud missile launchers. Immediately, the NATO Defence Planning Committee identified that Ground Surveillance was a NATO capability shortfall. NATO already owned a fleet of E-3 NAEW aircraft providing air situation data to the Alliance´s political and military leaders, however a similar capability to cover ground activities was missing. Work to exploit this capability began, however it was not until September 2009 that 15 Members of NATO1 finally agreed to a Programme Memorandum of Understanding serving as the basis for the procurement of a NATO owned and operated Ground Surveillance Capability, the AGS core. During the process, several solutions were considered and then rejected, the last major decision being to discard the mixed fleet solution and to rely on a system with unmanned air vehicles only.

Andreas Korb LtCol (GS) Andreas Korb was born in 1964 in Rhede/Germany.

He joined the Federal German Navy in 1983 where he was trained as Fast Patrol Boat Officer and Tornado Pilot. Having changed service in 1993, he attended the Luftwaffe´s 42nd General Staff Course from 1997 to 1999. Among other assignments, he served as Commander Flying Group of Fighter Bomber Wing 31 “Boelcke” and as Assistant Branch Chief in the Air Force Staff III 3 in Bonn and Berlin, where he was responsible for Luftwaffe Operations abroad. He now serves as Operations Expert and PR Officer at the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA) in Brussels.

LtCol Korb is a Command Pilot and has accumulated more than 2.000 flying hours on T-37, T-38, Alpha Jet and Tornado.

forming its mission regardless of the actual size or composition of the NATO force or forces it is supporting. The system will comprise of two primary elements, the air and the ground segment. The air segment will consist of 8 RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40, capable of loitering on-station for an extensive period of time and carrying the MP-RTIP (Multi Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program) advanced radar sensor. As an integral part, the segment also includes the control stations to plan and control the operation of the Global Hawks, i.e. the pilot and sensor manager roles.

The ground segment will comprise of a set of ground stations of different sizes and capabilities. These ground stations will be available from the strategic down to the tactical level and the analysts will be able to combine the AGS data and derived information with additional information from other sources, resulting in an improved operational understanding of the situation and providing a basis on which the different users can make various operational assessments and decisions.

The AGS Main Operating Base The AGS system The mission of the NATO AGS system will be to “provide NATO command authorities, down to Brigade level, with near-realtime, continuous information and situation awareness concerning friendly, neutral and opposing forces and to support targeting”. In doing so, the system must be capable of per-

The Main Operating Base of the NATO AGS Core will be Sigonella Airbase on the Italian island of Sicily. It is foreseen that the U.S. Air Force and also the U.S. Navy will base some of their Global Hawks, respectively BAMS, at Sigonella, which will in turn lead to synergetic effects concerning e.g. logistics and maintenance.

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AGS data The NATO AGS System will provide two primary data types, namely detection of moving objects throughout a very wide area on the ground or surface (Ground Moving Target Indicator; GMTI) and generation of high-resolution radar imagery of specific and typically rather small areas (Synthetic Aperture Radar; SAR). The resulting data is to be disseminated in near-real-time to multiple operational users. Both modes of operation (GMTI and SAR) can be executed simultaneously without interference.

AGS performance U.S. HALE GLOBAL HAWK for AGS Photo: Northrop Grumman, Washington To the majority of users in the ground domain, the surveillance mission of the AGS system represents a totally new vehicles or just to assess whether they have stopped temcapability. Traditionally, these users are more familiar with porarily (e.g. for refuelling) or for another purpose (e.g. an reconnaissance (observation missions carried out at a specific air defence unit setting up for operations). location and at a specific time) and intelligence (information It should be noted that the AGS capabilities are best suited from one or more sources that has been analyzed or otherwise for, but not generally limited to, operations on the ground; exploited before being provided to the user). AGS, however, they can, however, significantly enhance situational awareness offers three unique capabilities above and beyond traditional in other environments, such as maritime surveillance or in reconnaissance and intelligence: anti-piracy operations.

• First, the continuous flow of observation of a defined and rather large area on the ground will enable users to maintain much more up-to-date situational awareness than before, AGS contribution to force protection with identified vehicles and units being tracked second by Situational awareness is the key when it comes to the protecsecond as they move throughout the observed area. tion of forces. To achieve a high level of situational awareness, • Second, the system will enable multiple users throughout it is imperative to be able to use all available sources of the operational area to receive the data in near-real-time. information; in addition this information has to be as up-toThis will not only enable each user to filter out the areas of date as possible. With its sophisticated sensor suite and the specific interest to him based on his tasks, capabilities, capability to disseminate huge amounts of gathered data in plans and intentions, but will also permit the same data to near-real-time to a multitude of different users, the NATO AGS be used for different purposes by different users in a comcapability will have a considerable effect on the protection of plementary manner. As an example, a tactical commander forces. Being able to detect and identify all movements in an may use the AGS data to get real-time warnings of ground area of interest in near-real-time, tracking them down to where movements that represent an imminent threat to his forces, they came from, getting additional background information while at the same time the data could be used by higher and combining different methods of radar modes simultaneechelons to track the moving objects back to their origin to ously will provide NATOs strategic, operational and tactical assess whether that could be an enemy strongpoint or other commanders with an unprecedented information advantage facility that could warrant further investigation or even and with up-to-date knowledge, which will in the end save targeting. lives in the field. NATO AGS will therefore be a decisive factor • Third, the AGS system will enable even individual users to for the protection of forces in almost any conceivable scenario. request specific sensor data to be collected on a near-realtime basis and without interfering with the overall mission and flight plan that has already been approved and which is being executed. For example, a user could request the 1 The 15 AGS Participating Nations are Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Densystem to shoot a radar image of an area, where moving mark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, objects have just stopped, either to try to recognize the Slovenia, Slovak Republic and the United States.

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INDUSTRIES for SOLUTIONS

Closing an urgent capability gap – Europe needs an own Unmanned Air System (UAS) for better protection of its own Armed Forces

by Bernhard Gerwert, CEO, Military Air Systems, EADS Defence & Security, Manching Leading European nations have repeatedly expressed the urgent need to close the current capability gap in the area of surveillance and reconnaissance. This requirement is derived from the necessity to enhance the protection of its armed forces during their operations in Europe and around the world.

New responsibilities for Europe The next-generation Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is able to provide political and military decision-makers with real-time, high quality and secure intelligence information. It can enable an independent assessment of crisis situations without relying on support from non-European nations and thus facilitate rapid political decision-making.

Means for assessing complex military situations This capability is more important than ever before. The reasons are based on Europe’s growing political responsibilities in the world because it is now playing a more decisive role in preserving stability, peace and security than in previous years.

European governments and their respective armed forces must be able to assess complex military situations, anticipate crises and deploy troops for the protection of their common interests. Germany, France and Spain, for instance, are currently engaged with about 20,000 soldiers in more than 15 theatres of conflict worldwide.

A French-German-Spanish initiative These three nations defined their common operational requirements for a future unmanned reconnaissance system in 2007.

In the same year, the common requirement profile was decided upon by the respective general staffs of the partner nations. Upon definition of the necessary performance characteristics, military representatives and engineers were able to rely on comprehensive simulations. Then, in the summer of 2008, the Ministers of Defence of the three nations stressed their common will to cooperate on this UAS programme for Europe and gave it the name Talarion.

Operational capabilities Talarion is an unmanned aerial reconnaissance system capable of delivering uninterrupted, precise data of operational areas or territories under all weather conditions at all times. Ground operators can assure that information gained by the system

Bernhard Gerwert Bernhard Gerwert was born in 1953.

He is presently CEO of Military Air Systems and Member of the Board of EADS Defence & Security (DS).

Bernhard Gerwert has an economics degree as Industrial Engineer from the University of Bielefeld and a degree as Electronics Engineer from the University of Paderborn. Until July 2007 he was CEO and President of the EADS Business Unit Defence Electronics and Board Member of the DS Division.

Prior to these positions, he was Senior Vice President of the Line of Business Air and Naval Defence and a Member of the Executive Committee of the Business Unit Defence and Communications Systems.

will be disseminated to military commanders, security centres as well as political decision-makers.

Part of the reconnaissance network With its high-performance sensors and specific flight parameters, the UAS can offer reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities over large areas paired with a high rate of information regeneration and short flight times to the area of operation.

Also, due to different payload packages and the capability to be tied into the reconnaissance networks of NATO and other partners, Talarion can be quickly adapted to individual operational requirements. The innovative UAS will cover an area twice and up to even four times larger during a single reconnaissance or surveillance mission than other systems. This advantage enables the reduction of respective fleets and guarantees an outstanding price-performance relation as well as lower life cycle costs.

Information superiority for leaders in security and defence The design allows a vast flight envelope and enables not only continuous surveillance, but also precise identification and locating as well as real-time reconnaissance.

Highly modern technologies have been used for the sensors, avionics and ground and communication systems and also for the sensor-carrying vehicle, guaranteeing supremacy in performance. Talarion will also incorporate a next-generation active electronically scanned array radar instead of the tradi-

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tional radar technology with a mechanical beam.

Minimised risks The main contractor and system architect will be Military Air Systems, a Business Unit of EADS Defence & Security (DS). Radar research studies were carried out by Thales, Indra and the DS Business Unit Defence Electronics. Experienced representatives of the three partner nations and engineers of the respective industries have closely cooperated in defining the optimal solution with regards to the required performance. Risks have been thereby identified and minimised, ensuring successful development.

The future UAS Talarion

A job creator in European industries The programme will directly and indirectly secure more than 10,000 jobs for highly qualified workers in about 100 companies in Germany, France and Spain, as well as in other European countries. Several small and mid-sized companies (SMEs), which have in the past served as highly reliable suppliers of technological contributions, will also participate in this innovative high-tech programme.

Responding to the needs of global security Talarion will be the first UAS able to operate within civilian airspace and will fulfil, in addition to the military capabilities, the full range of requirements of the growing global security market. Improvements in the safety and certification of UASs will allow Talarion to fly in non-segregated airspace and will enable the use of Talarion not only for military applications, but also for national and global security. For example, the UAS has the capability to support operations against terrorism and piracy, prevent illegal immigration and drug smuggling, support response to emergencies and detect oil spills or other ecological catastrophes.

A strong presence in the global market Europe needs a strong presence in the international UAS segment due to the expected high growth rate in this global market. EADS Defence & Security has therefore begun to invest in technologies and demonstrators to react to the capability gap in this area. With the Talarion programme, Europe will have the opportunity to gain a significant role in the competition for UASs in the global defence industry.

Contribution to a common European Defence Market In past decades, major defence and security programmes in Europe have demonstrated that they can only be realized via international cooperation and not through national efforts. It

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Photo: EADS

is obvious that national markets are too small to secure longlasting industrial capacities. Therefore, the programme was launched as a tri-national endeavour from the very beginning.

Due to unified specifications of the three nations, the UAS programme improves standardisation as well as interoperability with NATO AGS and individual EU systems. Thus, Talarion can contribute to stimulating efforts toward the development of a joint defence policy in Europe, as it is to be done through the European Defence Agency Rebalance the international competition situation Indeed, the high technology programme is a significant milestone for increasing core competencies within Europe‘s defence industry. Talarion will give the three nations a strong position in the strategically important market for UASs, which is dominated at present by the United States and other nonEuropean countries. The U.S., for instance, have a budget for UASs at least 30 times higher than that of nations like Germany, France or Spain. The U.S. have developed a full range of systems and produce equipment in impressive numbers. As a result, the UAS is currently the sole defence segment in which non-European companies are leading the market without any strong presence of an established European manufacturer.

With Talarion, Europe has the unique opportunity to rebalance this situation.

Political decision needed As a truly European development, Talarion will provide possibilities for unlimited operational use, offer flexibility for future enhancements and secure operational capabilities according to the defence requirements of Europe. The need to close the existing capability gap in the area of surveillance and reconnaissance is urgent indeed. The French, Germans and Spanish can effectively close this gap for Europe. Therefore, a clear political decision for its development is rapidly needed.

INDUSTRIES for SOLUTIONS

Force protection on the ground – how to optimize transport and combat vehicles for crisis management forces

by Dominik von Wolff Metternich, Rheinmetall Land Systems, Kassel The deployment of Armed Forces is usually based on a mandate with the intention of changing the political framework “on the ground”. This is currently the case with ISAF in Afghanistan, or with the EU-mandated Chad and Congo missions.

The broad spectrum of engagement The intended impact of the use of military force does in most cases necessitate the employment of ground forces. This was clearly demonstrated in connection with the NATO air raids on targets in Serbia in 1999. The spectrum of missions for land forces includes combat, patrols, “Human Intelligence”, training of forces of the supported nation, direct support for (re)construction of that nation and many more. In order to fulfil this broad array of missions, the presence of soldiers in the entire mission area is indispensable. Thus the alternative use of “Unmanned Ground Vehicles” (UGV) is limited by the intentions of political decision makers and the resulting profile of missions. Given this background, for the foreseeable future the protection of crews will have the utmost priority for the use of ground vehicles.

Challenges for the land systems industry The present non-linear and asymmetric conflict scenarios are characterized by the absence of clearly defined front lines. As a result, the danger of attacks by opposing forces is omni-present. The former distinction between high protection levels for vehicles in the front line and low or no protection requirements for vehicles in rear areas is not valid any more.

Even logistics and support vehicles need to meet increasing protection requirements and have to be able to effectively defend themselves. The use of “Improvised Explosive Devices” (IEDs) by opposing forces is not governed by any regulatory framework. For regular forces a clear picture exists as to the impact of the weapons and munitions used. The use of IEDs, however, is only limited by the inventiveness and technical know-how of the “users” and is subject to increasing technical sophistication, as demonstrated by the growing occurrence of “Explosively Formed Penetrators” (EFP) following the hollow charge principle.

A continuous adaptation of the protection requirements both for the development of ground vehicles and for the decision of procurement organizations is the result.

Dr. Dominik von Wolff Metternich Born in 1966, Dr. von Wolf Metternich is Manager of Business Development with Rheinmetall Land Systems. He is a lawyer and received his Ph.D. in Political Science on “Privatization of military tasks and parliamentary control”. He is a Lieutenant Colonel with the Army reserve, posted at German Army Forces Command (GARFCOM). He has conducted numerous trips to Afghanistan and Iraq as part of his functions in the defence industry.

The protective function of a vehicle does not start with it being hit by a projectile or a shock wave. Along the links of the socalled “Survivability Chain” (Encounter-Reconnaissance-Target Acquisition-Hit-Penetration), a vehicle needs to be integrated into a command, control and information network, ideally in connection with inherent reconnaissance sensors, in order to avoid the encounter.

Furthermore, the vehicle should be equipped with means to optically, acoustically and thermally mask its signature to avert target acquisition. Finally, and in addition to such existing or future protective measures, a vehicle still needs to offer the payload required for the purpose and must be strategically, operationally and tactically mobile for transport by fixed or

AMTV − the future protected vehicle for the German Forces Photo: Rheinmetall

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operational mobility, such as for PUMA in the A400M aircraft.

The key element is the ability of the vehicle platform to accommodate modular protection elements, which is not the case with current civilian “Commercial-off-the-Shelf” vehicles. Here too, common platforms for tactical vehicles and support vehicles provide the solution.

PUMA Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Photo: Rheinmetall

rotary wing aircraft. Based on the individual requirements for a vehicle fleet, the right balance needs to be struck between protection, payload and mobility.

Solutions The increasingly blurred distinction of mission profiles and requirements for tactical combat vehicles on one hand and logistics and support vehicles on the other hand provides an opportunity to establish a much higher degree of commonalities for vehicle components such as motor, drive train, protection etc. for the two different vehicle fleets. This results in easier training, maintenance and logistics in particular under field conditions. Within the German land systems industry, Rheinmetall and MAN have reacted to this trend by creating a joint venture of Rheinmetall Land Systems and MAN Military Division to significantly reduce the number of vehicle platforms in theatre and achieve the positive effects described.

Remote Controlled Weapon Stations For the self-defence of logistics vehicles an increasing number of weapon stations which can be operated from within the protected crew compartment, ”Remote Controlled Weapon Stations (RCWS) are in use by contributing nations. This solution also entails a significant reduction of the overall vehicle weight since heavy protection of the unmanned weapon station or turret becomes obsolete. Consequently, for tactical combat vehicles the use of unmanned turrets, e.g. the PUMA Infantry Fighting Vehicle, is also the preferred solution.

Modular protection devices The imponderability of the IED threat is being countered by the use of scalable modular protection with varying protection levels, which can be adapted in theatre depending on the tactical situation. As part of this solution the vehicle comes with a defined basic protection which can be increased flexibly by means of modular armour. The separation of base vehicle and protection elements also enhances the strategic and

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Integration into the Battlefield Management System With the integration of the individual vehicle into command, control and information networks (“Battlefield Management System”), which provide the military leader on the ground with data about location, combat effectiveness and logistical status of the vehicle and deliver situation reports on enemy and friendly forces in real time to the crew, the platform crosses the line to “Vehicle Systems”. For the German Armed Forces the command and information system “FueInfo Sys” provides a recent example. The integration of such systems into a multitude of vehicle platforms and the assurance of operability under extreme mission and climate conditions manifests a challenge to any equipment manufacturer. In addition, “Electronic Countermeasures” as protection against target acquisition and jamming systems against IEDs also need to be supported by the vehicle electronics as protection elements.

Active protection systems As part of an innovative approach complementary to the traditional passive armour protection, so-called active protection systems, which destroy incoming projectiles before they hit the vehicle (“Hard Kill”), are under development. Traditional reactive protection systems, based on projectiles fired from the vehicle under attack, lose their effectiveness after the first shot and endanger surrounding dismounted soldiers and the civilian population. The reaction times of these systems, especially with anti-tank weapons or EFPs fired from short range, have also been critical. New solutions are therefore based on “directed energy”. Nonetheless, classic passive armour protection will remain indispensable as a fall back for the foreseeable future.

Outlook The current ISAF mission has proven to military users (e.g.

Danish and Canadian Forces) that the use of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) may not only be appropriate but essential due to local conditions. Tracked combat vehicles are more mobile off roads, where the “channelling” and predictability of vehicle movements significantly increases the danger of ambush and IED attacks. The higher vehicle weight resulting from heavy armour provides better protection against the vehicle turning over. In addition MBTs are equipped with more powerful armament against fortified positions.

The “paradigm change” to purely wheeled vehicle-based fleets of tactical combat vehicles is therefore far from certain.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Essential progress in the development of armored transport and combat vehicles

by Dölf Greuter, Vice President, Technology & Advanced Engineering Programs, and Lutz Kampmann, Vice President, Sales & Marketing, GDELS, Kreuzlingen As a result of the evolution of threats and the shift in conflict paradigms from symmetric to asymmetric worldwide over the last ten years, the market for armored transport and combat vehicles has changed radically. This paradigm change has a significant impact on armored vehicle development. Ten years ago, armored transport or logistics vehicles were relatively unfamiliar on the market - transport vehicles in a symmetric warfare scenario used to operate behind the “line of fire”. At that time, combat vehicles were designed to withstand small and medium caliber ammunition – ballistic protection was the main focus with a certain level of protection against anti-personnel mines.

Today’s entirely different scenario The scenario today is completely different – improvised explosive devices, RPGs and anti-tank mines overmatch mere ballistic protection. Looking at the armored vehicle market today, all vehicles including logistics vehicles are heavily protected.

The highest mine and improvised explosive device (IED) protection levels are attractive to customers worldwide – however, if we take a closer look, things are much more complicated than just dealing with mine or IED protection.

Protection means a combination of multiple measures Protection is always a combination of multiple measures to counter threats in the field – a holistic approach is needed to deal with all aspects of protection. Keep in mind, protection includes not being detected (signature management) and not being hit (mobility, countermeasures) – just to name a few elements of the holistic approach General Dynamics European Land Systems (GDELS) applies in the design of its vehicles.

Protection is of primary importance in design and development and is not an afterthought. Protection at GDELS starts in the concept phase and is designed to be modular, scalable and adaptable to meet current customer needs and provide a platform to meet future needs throughout the anticipated service life.

Mobility and protection The General Dynamics European Land System company motto is “Protected Mobility”. This concept clearly combines worldclass protection against mine, ballistic, IED and explosively formed penetrator (EFP) threats while at the same time providing optimal mobility in each vehicle class. To us, it is a “must”

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Lutz Kampmann Lutz Kampmann is Vice President for Sales & Marketing with General Dynamics European Land Systems, Austria.

He was born in 1964 and holds a Certified Engineer Diploma (Dipl.– Ing/Material Science/Welding Technology) from Clausthal University, Germany.

Mr. Kampmann started his professional career as System Engineer with MBB ENRO, Germany. In former positions he was Director of Program Management with MOWAG GmbH, Switzerland (2003-2006) and Vice President for Wheeled Vehicles with General Dynamics European Land Systems, Austria (2006-2008).

Dölf Greuter Dölf Greuter is Vice President for Technology & Advanced Engineering Programs with General Dynamics European Land Systems.

He was born in 1954 and holds a Machine Engineer Diploma (Dipl.-Ing.FH) from the University of Constance, Germany. Mr. Greuter has more than 25 years of experience in the field of light armoured vehicles. In former positions he was Director and Executive Director of Engineering with MOWAG GmbH, Switzerland (1991-2006) and Vice President for Engineering and Development with General Dynamics European Land Systems.

for a combat vehicle to be able to go off-road while being fully protected. All of our vehicles - no matter if tracked or wheeled – are designed in accordance with the holistic protection approach. This approach is the key to “Protected Mobility by General Dynamics”, and is very well recognized by customers around the world. The latest success with our vehicles in the UK and Germany confirms our outstanding achievements in vehicle development.

Essential changes to vehicles Let us take a more detailed look at the different GDELS vehicle families in order to describe the essential changes made to the products within the last 10 years. Today, the EAGLE vehicle provides the highest level of protection with outstanding automotive comfort, while maintaining the capability to go offroad whenever and wherever needed. This unique combination allows the German and Danish Armies to perform their tasks in different theatres of operation.

INDUSTRIES for SOLUTIONS

Heavy combat vehicles The PIRANHA vehicle family today consists of four weight classes – PIRANHA Class 2 (up to 18 tons), PIRANHA Class 3 (22 tons), PIRANHA Class 4 (25 tons) and PIRANHA Class 5 (27 to 30 tons).

The PIRANHA Class 5 is another example of successful application of the holistic development approach. This vehicle is the benchmark in the 27 to 30 ton class of combat vehicles. It was selected as the preferred platform for the Future Rapid Effects System Utility Vehicle (FRES UV) in the UK because An Eagle platoon surveilling a valley in Afghanistan Photo: GDELS, Kreuzlingen of its unique protection and mobility features combined with growth potential of 3 tons, providing the design reserve for new threats in the future. The PIRANHA Class 4 also has growth Light combat vehicles potential of an additional 2 tons of payload to provide a We will present at the Eurosatory Exposition - near Paris midreserve for future growth.

June 2010 - the newest model of the EAGLE family, which comAll members of the PIRANHA family are state-of-the-art vehibines the superior mobility customers have come to expect cles offering the latest vehicle technology, tailored to meet from the EAGLE with increased payload and Mine Resistant customer requirements. The latest drive train technology Ambush Protected (MRAP)-levels of protection. This vehicle reducing fuel consumption and the unique protection suite provides a new standard in protection in its class, in other developed for PIRANHA 5 have been transferred to the other words: the new EAGLE offers protection against Anti-tank (AT) members of the PIRANHA family. The newly developed Fuel mines, IEDs, EFPs, RPGs and ballistic protection against kinetic Efficient Drive Train System (FEDS) offers a significant reducenergy (KE) rounds. tion in fuel consumption to reduce through life costs and the Looking at the automotive side, the EAGLE uses the same logistics burden in the field. The protection layout is modular basic components as the well-known DURO, which is used by and can be adapted for different scenarios and threats. This different armies as a protected logistics transport vehicle and offers greater flexibility to the users and gives them more ambulance, among other roles. Forces are asking for a highly options for engagement in different battle environments. mobile vehicle that can cross obstacles, that offers great offroad mobility in mud and sand, while at the same time ensurTracked vehicles ing the driving safety of a commercial car on the road. With the The latest product using the “Protected Mobility by General new EAGLE we have succeeded in fully achieving these reDynamics” motto is the ASCOD2 tracked vehicle, which has quirements. And the exceptional mobility is provided by the just recently been announced as the preferred vehicle for the patented suspension with roll stabilizer, which reduces rolling FRES SV program. The ASCOD2 successfully demonstrated its of the vehicle when driving around curves, yet on the other unique capability to provide protection against all defined hand allows axle twisting to overcome obstacles. threats, while providing modularity and growth for adaptation to meet future threats. The running gear and power pack are designed for growth into the medium tracked vehicle weight class of 42 tons.

Synergies and leading-edge technology

A PIRANHA of the Belgian Forces

Photo: GDELS, Kreuzlingen

Thanks to the standardization of engineering processes and solutions within GDELS, we achieved many synergies between tracked and wheeled vehicles. This is a great advantage to customers and users, who run a mixed fleet of wheeled armored and tracked vehicles. LS constantly enhances the “Protected Mobility” of its vehicles by state-of-the-art engineering in the development of leading-edge technology for the satisfaction and safety of our clients.

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Analysis software for the German Navy

rola Security Solutions GmbH in Oberhausen delivers a maritime operations support system to the German Armed Forces Protection of merchant ships and their crews and cargoes, combating piracy, and prevention of maritime terrorism are currently the predominant challenges facing the Germany Navy.

Monitoring operations can not, however, rely solely on local intelligence information. The preparation and execution of these types of operations demand comprehensive and accurate information gathering, and efficient analysis and evaluation of that information, in order to have the best possible overview of the situation and potential dangers. In the context of operations support for ongoing maritime operations, the collaboration and coordination between the military task forces and the relevant authorities in Germany must be optimised via continuous exchanges of situation information.

With the rola ‘rsIntCent®‘ analysis and evaluation software package, the German Armed Forces IT Procurement Office has now been provided with a highly efficient tool to support fulfilment of these requirements. Information such as basic ship data (size, tonnage, type), AIS (geotracking) data and boarding information (cargo documents, crew details), and also shipspecific occurrences (boardings/ inspections, hailings, ports visited etc.) and other information are processed and continuously updated by the mobile task forces and the shorebased units and authorities in Germany. Already available data is merged with newly won information, and is then analysed and presented graphically in the form of diagrams and charts, thus ensuring that all information is available promptly to all units and organisations involved in an operation. Coordination processes between mobile task forces and authorities in Germany can thus be noticeably expedited, which in turn significantly increases operational efficiency and also makes an important contribution to Force Protection. rola Security Solutions delivered the turnkey IT system with the full specified functionality in only six months, including the development of project-specific concepts (IT security concept, data protection concept etc.), and within budget. rola Security Solutions GmbH - Essener Strasse 5 - 46047 Oberhausen, Germany Telephone: +49-(0)208-30 66 16-0 - Fax: +49-(0)208-30 66 16-1 E-mail: vertrieb@rola.com – www.rola.com

INDUSTRIES for SOLUTIONS

IT-Protection for Crisis Management Forces

by Tobias Bahlinger, Hewlett Packard, Böblingen

The European Union has become, following its last enlargement and with the new internal structures under the Treaty of Lisbon, one of the main pillars for stability and security in the world. This has happened in a security and defence environment that is multilateral and more equitable worldwide.

Therefore, the EU is now expected to possess the required capabilities to fulfil this new role.

One duty of this role is providing military and civil crisis management all over the world. Due to the types of crises and conflicts which we will face in the future, the integration of military and civil (NGO) crisis management is essential. To master this mission successfully and to simultaneously ensure the maximum protection of forces and organizations, IT-based protection strategies will play a leading role.

Requirements for IT solutions There are several requirements for IT solutions resulting from the described status quo. European Crisis Management missions need IT solutions which: • reduce the labor and the complexity of processing and presenting information • provide security resulting from accurate and real-time information that leads to better decision making • enable the exchange of information across organisations and countries • safeguard highly sensitive Information Hence, the IT requirements of Crisis Management operations require modification.

Operating picture One of the best ways IT can support crisis management is to generate an accurate and real-time operating picture with essential information leading to an enhanced decision making process. Providing intuitive and comprehensive information improves the quality of decisions and therefore could save the lives of military forces and civilians while also reducing costs. The IT systems currently employed for these duties focus primarily on assisting the operator in manual duties. This basic level of automation commits too many staff that are desperately needed for other functions including field operations. To improve this situation,

Tobias Bahlinger Tobias Bahlinger was born in Sindelfingen, Germany. He has been working at HP since 1995 and has held different positions in consulting and sales.

Tobias Bahlinger is the responsible Client Principal for HP’s Public Sector, Defense and Security segment in Germany since November 2006. In this role, he is accountable for driving growth, revenue, profitability and customer satisfaction of HP’s Public Sector Defense and Security business across the entire HP Technology Service Portfolio.

the goal must be to achieve the highest possible level of process- and IT-automation for military and civil crisis response forces.

For quick responsiveness in a crisis situation, actionable intelligence is a prerequisite. The Haiti relief effort, for example, demonstrates that UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) like the European project Talarion are one component of a modern IT − and intelligence-based protection shield for civil and military forces.

Military and civil joint activities – the”comprehensive approach” Modern multilateral strategies for crisis stabilization are no longer one-sided, based upon either military or civilian activities, but rather on both. In particular, the EU Member States are focusing on civil-military reconstruction. There is a requirement for a partial information exchange to coordinate crisis activities between the different types of crisis management forces: a direct IT-solution requirement. Current systems are built to work more or less for themselves, without data exchange with foreign countries or organizations, something that is necessary for the European Union to successfully face the challenges of a potential crisis. This capability depends on the standardization of information formats and interfaces, which are also required by today’s corporate IT. This standardization has to be integrated into all systems of crisis management forces worldwide, because different crisis

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human lives are in danger and need protection. Consequently, an IT operation without a local staff is preferable. The first step toward this goal is to standardize almost all IT processes and thus approach automating them. A further advantage of standardized IT processes is that less experienced personnel can operate them. Unfortunately, complete centralization and virtualization of mission-critical IT solutions at a safe and stable area is prevented in most crisis theaters by very limited communication bandwidth and reliability. Therefore, in all cases a base IT infrastructure needs to be located and operated near to the crisis.

will require handling by different coalitions of countries and organizations. The ongoing standardization effort by NATO and the EU Member States for military IT systems could be directed toward civil forces as well. In general, the requirements for information systems align between military and civil crisis forces as they become more industrialized.

Data protection The development of IT-based crisis information management is, on the one hand, a milestone on the path towards more efficiency and security for crisis response forces and leads, on the other hand, to emphasize the importance of data protection. This is in reference to data security and data safety. It is one thing to operate a datacenter in a stable and secure area like the EU and another to be responsible for a mobile data center with sensitive and classified information in a crisis field environment. It is critical to mission success to protect crisis management data against unauthorized access and destruction, as this would cost lives in a crisis situation. Modern IT solutions can now handle these requirements even in the field and are fully automated. Toward these purposes, IT solutions for military and civilian crisis forces benefit from mature IT technologies like virtualization, redundancy technologies, flexible scalable backup systems, climate management, identity management, access control mechanisms and encryption.

Future development Member States of the European Union need to fulfill the duty of crisis response and relief efforts under the constraints of cost and the danger of losing public political support for certain missions. As a direct consequence, military and civil crisis force protection is vital. A strong focus lies on IT force protection due to the many positives contributions it can make.

The requirements of a mission are clearly defined by the local political, economic and security conditions. These lead directly to requirements for IT solutions. The systems of course need to have certain essential properties, but the IT processes and operations supporting the protection of forces are of utmost importance under any circumstances. Last but not least, the IT itself has to be to some extent self-protected. These combined requirements, which assure the needed mission support from an IT solution, will be met only together with experienced companies providing mature solutions.

Standardized processes saving lives The fewer staff attending a crisis mission in the field, the fewer

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INSTITUTIONS and ASSOCIATIONS

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)

by Kent Schneider, President and CEO, AFCEA International, Washington

We are in a world at change. Nowhere is the change more apparent than in the global security community. In the past three decades, we have seen a shift from the Cold War to a much less stable world of local and region conflicts, asymmetric warfare, terrorism applied globally, and rapidly shifting alliances. NATO has grown dramatically and is fully engaged in Afghanistan. Military and security force structures have been changed to meet the threat environment we face today and weaponry is being adjusted as budgets allow. All of this is occurring as budgets tighten during a period of economic challenge.

Foundation in 1964 AFCEA International (The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association), established in 1946, is a non-profit membership association serving the military, government, industry, and academia as an ethical forum for productive dialogue in the fields of communications, information technology, intelligence, and global security. In addition, AFCEA promotes the advancement of technical education in support of the global security community through professional development training and a program of scholarships and grants, applying approximately two million dollars per year globally.

Worldwide organization AFCEA is a chapter-based organisation with 146 chapters and subchapters worldwide. We have approximately 33,000 individual members and over 1800 corporate member companies. We support the spectrum of the global security community, including defence, intelligence, and homeland or internal security/counter-terrorism.

Our focus extends from the international alliance or coalition level, to the national level, to local first reponders (police, fire, emergency services).

Partnership provider Given the pace of change, the ongoing operational tempo, and the limited budgets available to

Kent Schneider AFCEA President and Chief Executive Officer Mr. Schneider earned a bachelor’s degree in business management from Augusta College, and a master’s in information systems management from the University of Southern California. He is also a graduate of the National War College.

He is a 26-year veteran of the U.S. Army Signal Corps. After retiring from the Army in 1994, Mr. Schneider jointed Litton PRC and comes to AFCEA from Northrop Grumman Corporation’s Information Technology sector, where he served among others as president of the Defense Group, as president of Northrop Grumman Information Technology Global and as president of the Defense Systems division. Mr. Schneider brings to AFCEA the wealth of experience he gained while working for the Army in the early years of information technology, and his experience in industries. He was named “AFCEAN of the Year” in 2004.

achieve both, the need for AFCEA to promote partnership among government, industry and academia is greater than ever. We can achieve this dialogue through scheduled events (AFCEA conducts approximately 160 events per year globally), through tailored workshops to produce government-specified deliverables (white papers, draft policy documents, etc), or through round-table discussions. There is no better environment to bring together government, industry and academic perspectives in an ethical forum. This can only work where a substantial relationship exists between our AFCEA chapters and the appropriate government authorities. Coordination is needed to ensure proper focus, format and deliverables.

The role of AFCEA-Europe

Kent Schneider, President and CEO of AFCEA International, hands over an AFCEA Award to MajGen (ret) Klaus-Peter Treche, President of the AFCEA Bonn Chapter

AFCEA Europe consists of 37 chapters and sub-chapters and approximately 20 percent of our individual members. Our focus in Europe is clearly NATO and the European Union, but, in the past decade, national programs for homeland/internal security have gained importance. Like every-

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9th Congress on European Security and Defence Berlin Security Conference - 2010

The future European Security and Defence Architecture – a challenge for the EU and NATO 9 – 10 November 2010, Berlin Congress Center (bcc)

Main Topics • A new Security and Defence Architecture for Europe • Turkey − a specific role for Europe's security • Energy Assurance − a prerequisite for the security of Europe • Maritime Security − a new strategy required?

where globally, Europe is undergoing change in defence and security. Let’s examine some of these trends.

Budget numbers for NATO as a coalition and for each member nation are declining. Diversion of resources to Afghanistan is further constraining these budgets.

NATO is undergoing a strategic review to determine the way ahead and to decide whether the current threat demands realignment of forces, priorities, and/or missions. Considerations include asymmetric versus full spectrum capability, whether to eliminate the boundary between strategic and tactical information sharing, level of focus on cyber warfare, and whether there is a need for redefinition of coalition relationships.

The current range of missions in asymmetric warfare and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief are putting unprecedented emphasis on the enterprise viewpoint.

• Organisations at every level are moving as quickly as budgets allow to an enterprise posture.

• Cloud or, at least, shared computing will happen broadly.

• Federation of networks and systems is occurring and will accelerate in NATO. • Security will be the driving factor.

• Identity and attribute services that extend across NATO are key.

• Cyber defense realignment will force consolidation at every level.

Budgets are suffering Research and development budgets are suffering more than most in the current environment. Much of the research burden will fall to industry.

There will be fewer new programs begun as a greater share of the budget goes to sustaining current programs and paying personnel costs.

More emphasis in NATO will go to national shares and to inclusion of small businesses in contracting and procurement.

Responsiveness in acquisition will continue to get attention, particularly for expeditionary forces. Emphasis will continue on speed of service to the war fighter.

• Afghanistan − stabilization versus exit strategy • Arms Control and Non-Proliferation after Prague • A White Book for European Security and Defence • Copernicus and Galileo satellites • Transatlantic Armament Cooperation • R&D and Procurement − the role of European Industries

www.euro-defence.eu

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AFCEA is looking ahead Given these trends, what can AFCEA do to help? First, by bringing industry together with government, we can help lay out a feasible roadmap for change that addresses direction, pace, resources needed, and solutions available that can mitigate risk.

Second, we can help with strategic planning. Planning cannot be done effectively without understanding available capability. No one understands potential solutions like industry. To the extent we can bring together those in industry who understand capability with those in government that command the requirements, we have advanced understanding for both government and industry, and promoted a better outcome.

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS

European Union COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Establishment of the new European External Action Service (EEAS) On 25 March, Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, presented the “Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS)”. The proposal defines the basic rules for the establishing and functioning of the new EEAS, which will be established directly after a unanimous vote of the Council. According to the proposal, the EEAS will be an autonomous operative instrument of the High Representative. The Commission will continue its activities already related to foreign affairs under the responsibility of the High Representative. The EEAS is cooperating with the Council and Commission as well as with the diplomatic services of the Member States. The central administration was designed after the French administrative model and will be managed by a secretary general assisted by two deputies. A crisis management and planning directorate will be comprised of the civilian planning and conduct capability, the European Union Military Staff and the European Union Situation Centre.

Herman Van Rompuy at the Nuclear Security Summit On 12/13 April, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, participated in the Nuclear Security Summit convened in Washington by President Obama. During those two days, 47 countries discussed the challenges linked to nuclear security and, in particular, the need to reinforce nuclear security worldwide in order to prevent any unauthorised access to nuclear materials and radioactive sources. In his statement, the President of the European Council said that the EU supports all international instruments aimed at strengthening nuclear security. He called on all countries to sign and ratify the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Furthermore, Van Rompuy called upon the countries to fully implement their international treaty obligations. The summit concluded with a joint declaration to guide future work toward keeping atomic weapons out of the hands of terrorists.

EDA will organise training course on Improvised Explosive Devices Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) currently represent the main threat to participating Member States’ forces deployed in crisis management operations. Last year, the European

Defence Agency (EDA) organised an intermediate “Train the Trainers and International Search Advisors” course to teach the necessary skills and knowledge to conduct searches in an environment with inherent risk of IEDs. This year in July an “Advanced Search Advisor Training” will take place in Italy’s National Military Engineering School.

EUMC Chairman on visit to Greece On 18-19 March, the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), General Syrén, attended to a detailed presentation of the Greek military capabilities and commitments, in particular those related to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, such as the contributions to the EU-led operations and to the Battlegroups stand-by roster. He also met the Minister of Defence, Evangelos Venizelos, with whom he had an exchange of views on global and regional security issues.

EU Missions EULEX Kosovo supports riot control exercise In April, the EULEX Special Police Department supported a Kosovo Police (KP) exercise on riot control. The exercise took place at Camp Vrello near Prishtine/Pristina Airport. Training was provided on the use of tear gas guns, water canons and armoured vehicles. The aim of exercises like this is for the Kosovo Police to enhance their capacity to handle potential unrest. During any such situation, EULEX Special Police Units act as second responders after the Kosovo Police. The newly appointed Minister for Internal Affairs, Bajram Rexhepi, was present during the exercise.

Change of force command at EUNAVFOR Atalanta On 14 April, Rear Admiral Jan Thornqvist from Sweden took office as the new EU Force Commander of EUNAVFOR Somalia. He succeeds Italian Rear Admiral Giovanni Gumiero. Every four months a new Force Commander takes the lead of the force in the zone. Rear Admiral Peter Hudson is the Operation Commander, based in the Operation HQ in Northwood (UK).

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EUPOL Afghanistan: “Train-the-Trainers” In April, police officers at the Kabul central training centre are getting an inaugural five week course in becoming police trainers. This initiative is seen as a fundamental step in Afghans taking control of the future of their police training and it will be carried out over the next month. The Afghan Police Training Team (APTT) is an initiative of the Minister of Interior Affairs and forms an integral part of his Afghan national police strategy. The 53 students from various precincts will begin lessons in how to teach fundamental police tactics to other police officers. Partnered with coalition forces and EUPOL, these students will be responsible notably for conducting the basic training of Afghan national police in the framework of the focused district development program. According to the national police plan, up to 400 Afghan police training teams will be deployed to the districts. EUPOL plans to continue delivering training courses in order to achieve the overall target of 1000 trainers

by October 2010.

EU military training mission in Uganda On 25 March, the Council approved the decision to carry out a military training mission in Uganda in order to contribute to strengthening the transitional federal government in Somalia. The EU has decided to conduct a military training mission, at the invitation of Uganda, with the objective of contributing to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali security sector. Under its resolution 1872 (2009), the UN Security Council urged the international community to offer technical assistance for the training and equipping of Somali security forces.

The EU reaffirms its commitment to northern Kosovo On 26 March, during a visit to North Mitrovica, an EU delegation re-emphasised the European Union’s commitment to Kosovo, including northern Kosovo. The EU’s objectives for the north of Kosovo are the same as for the whole of Kosovo: to promote good governance, socio-economic development and the strengthening of the rule of law whilst, at the same time, contributing to a stable and multi-ethnic society. As part of these efforts the EU has decided to increase its presence and activities in northern Kosovo with the establishment of an “EU House”.

New Special Representative for Afghanistan On 22 March, at their Foreign Affairs Council meeting, EU ministers appointed former Lithuanian foreign minister Vygaudas Usackas as the new EU Special Representative (EUSR) for

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Afghanistan. The new EUSR’s mandate starts on 1 April. Mr Usackas will also hold the office of Head of the EU Delegation in Afghanistan. He succeeds Ettore Francesco Sequi, who was EUSR both for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Arnaud Danjean calls for the setting-up of a permanent EU operations centre On March 10, the motion for a resolution, presented by Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Common Security and Defence Policy was accepted by a large majority in plenary session.

The report calls for the setting-up of a new headline goal, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions, and the drawing-up of a White Paper on European Security and Defence. It calls for the setting-up of a permanent EU operations centre and supports the establishment of both a European civil protection force and a civil-military Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).

MEPs criticize European External Action Service (EEAS) On 25 March, MEPs criticized the proposal by HR/VP Catherine Ashton on the new European External Action Service as “not acceptable” to the Parliament. Five MEPs from the main political groups in the Parliament - including German Christian Democrat Elmar Brok and the former Netherlands Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt MEP, the leader of the liberal ALDE group - said in a statement that “despite many contacts over the past weeks, the High Representative has chosen not to take Parliament’s views sufficiently into account”. The group had presented a counter-proposal on 23 March.

Western European Union / ESDA On 31 March, The Western European Union`s (WEU) interparliamentary assembly (ESDA), based in Paris with some 60 employees and an overall budget of 13 million Euro, might be phased out by the end of June 2011 following a UK initiative of 31 March supported by Germany.

The WEU comprises 10 full Member States (Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, UK), more than 18 associate countries, observers and

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

associated partner states associate the WEU’s dissolution with the “entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty” in December 2009 which heralds the “start of a new phase for the security and defence of Europe.”

President Robert Walter regretted that governments had started a movement to close down the WEU before a new arrangement was established, he said at a hearing of the Belgian Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee on CSFP and CSDP issues and on the future of parliamentary scrutiny of those EU policies.

MISCELLANEOUS ESRT High-Level Round Table: The Afghanization of Afghanistan On 26 January, two days before the official London Conference on Afghanistan, the European Security Round Table (ESRT; www.security-round-table.eu) held a roundtable on “The Afghanization of Afghanistan − Which Role for EU and NATO?”.

There was a consensus among the participants in understanding the “Afghanization of Afghanistan” as putting Afghan people at the centre. The discussion was opened and guided by the moderator of the event, Hartmut Bühl, publisher of “The European − Security and Defence Union”. Speakers on the high-level panel were Jamie Shea, NATO’s Director of Policy Planning, Stefano Sannino, Deputy Director General of the DG Relex, Kees Klompenhouwer, EU Civilian Operations Commander and Pino Arlacchi MEP, Rapporteur on Afghanistan.

Results from the discussions were that the next 18 months constitute a limited window of opportunity to shape the time after and that there will be a delicate tipping moment when military engagement will be reduced and civil efforts have to be maintained. Depending on political developments, the ESRT may pick up the issue again before the spring conference in Kabul.

The EuroDefense Presidents meet in Friedrichshafen/Germany The Presidents of the NGO EuroDefense* met from 15 to 17 April 2010 for their biannual meeting to discuss current EU Security and Defence issues under the headline “The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP”. One of the main subjects was the future of parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP and CSDP. The Presidents noted that the government of the UK, supported by Germany

and followed by the other member states, had announced the winding up of the ESDA/ WEU Assembly by June 2011, before new arrangements for scrutiny were established. They pleaded that “there has to be found a mechanism adapted to the necessity for interparliamentarian scrutiny”, one of the Presidents said. A new mechanism needs to be compatible with the Lisbon Treaty and should receive a formal recognition by the Council.

The President of the Belgian section was asked to contact the Belgian government − as it covers the next EU Presidency − for taking up this issue in its presidency programme.

The Presidents took also the opportunity to reflect with Prof.

Dr. Holger Mey, Vice President of EADS/DS, on the subject of how to mould security and defence in the EU and which information and communication technologies are needed to implement a comprehensive approach.

The next meeting will be held in October 2010 in Baden, near Vienna, Austria. *EuroDefense was created in 1982 as an NGO open for personalities of European countries supporting the public discussion of a realistic European contribution to security and defence. Currently, 13 associations are working together (AUS, BEL, FRA, GER, GRE, HUN, ITA, LUX, NL, POR, ROM, SPA, UK). www.eurodefense.net

The European Security Conference Initiative On 4-5 March 2010, the IV. European Security Conference Initiative (ESCI) took place on the Zugspitze in Bavaria/Germany. The conference put the focus on EU citizens’ approach to security, which needs to take on an international and integrated nature suited to the increased dynamism of the emerging European security culture. Almost 30 speakers from 15 countries, including representatives of the current Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, brought together perspectives from academia, think tanks, politics and industry. Panelists and contributions from the floor emphasized the role of cultural knowledge blended with technologybased information and called for expanding on professional training, especially in policing and disaster response. The increasing relevance of and attention to ethical issues in security research was intensively addressed. Challenging questions from the ecurity industry stimulated the discussion on issues such as psychological and social development and in what way it will have an impact on security.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

INDUSTRIES Strengthening the European defence industry On 30 and 31 March, the final conference in a series of seven on “Strengthening European small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence sector” took place in Brussels. These conferences aimed at rising awareness among SMEs about the new opportunities in defence procurement resulting from the Defence Package adopted in December 2007. One of the objectives is to achieve tangible results and, in particular, to improve access to the market, to information and to financing for SMEs operating in the defence sector. There will be new opportunities as the internal market for defence opens up. In 2009 the Council adopted the Defence Package which includes two directives, aims at strengthening the European defence industry and encourages a more European approach to business cooperation in the currently segmented national defence markets. It also contains proposals for the support of SMEs. To follow-up on the Defence Package, it was agreed to explore concrete ways to support SMEs through a study on “the competitiveness of European SMEs in the defence sector”, which was finalized in October 2009, and a series of seven conferences within Europe.

Airbus intends to submit proposal for U.S. Air Tanker EADS North America announced on April 20 that it intends to submit a proposal on July 9, 2010 for the U.S. Air Force tanker modernisation programme and will offer the KC 45, “the most capable American-built solution that is flown, proven and in production now” as EADS North America Chairman, Ralph D. Crosby Jr. described it. While the former partner, Northrop Grumman, has resigned, EADS North America is progressing in discussions with potential U.S. partners to build a winning team.

The KC-45 is the U.S. military version of the proven A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRRT), of which 28 systems have been ordered by four other nations. Australia will get its first A330 MRRT in late 2010. This multi-role aircraft has demonstrated its unparalleled capability by refueling a variety of military aircraft, utilizing both “boom and hose” and “drogue” systems, as well as operating in the receiving position. The KC-45 builds on the EADS-based tanker that was selected already in 2008

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by the Department of Defense and that has won the last five consecutive tanker competitions worldwide. EADS North America intends to build and modify the U.S. Air Force tanker along with the A 330 commercial freighter, at a site to be built in Mobile, Alabama, creating tens of thousands of valuable jobs for U.S. industries.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION European Commission publishes political work programme for 2010 The European Commission has adopted its work programme for 2010, agreeing on a list of 34 strategic priorities that will be implemented before the end of the year. It has also agreed on another 280 major proposals under consideration for 2010 and beyond. The Commission work programme sets the scene for the major policy commitments that the Commission will make in the coming years. The new Commission will take action along four main strands: a) Tackling the crisis and sustaining Europe’s social market economy, including enhanced fiscal surveillance, proposals to repair the financial markets, the five Europe 2020 flagship initiatives and tackling Europe’s bottlenecks and missing links. b) Building a citizens’ agenda, including the Stockholm Action Plan, procedural rights for citizens, enforcement of judgements in civil and criminal matters, revision of the working time directive, a Green Paper on the future of pensions, a new biodiversity strategy and the EU’s disaster response capacity. c) Developing an ambitious and coherent external agenda with global outreach, including the establishment of the European External Action service, a trade strategy for Europe 2020, steering the enlargement process, an action plan in the run up to the 2015 Millennium Development Goals summit and continuing to develop key bilateral relationships. d) Modernising EU instruments and ways of working, including a stronger focus on smart regulation and adapting the EU financial framework to serve policy priorities through the Budget Review.

Qinghai earthquake: Europe offers China assistance from space Through its Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) initiative, Europe will provide very high resolution optical satellite and radar images of the disaster zone in China.

The images will focus on a 30 square kilometer area near the epicenter. On the basis of these images, the GMES emergency response project SAFER is able to assess damage on infrastructure such as roads and bridges, and also identify land-

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS

slides that may have been caused by the earthquake in the mountainous disaster area on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, lying at an altitude above 4,000 meters. Information about landslides is particularly critical in the days and weeks following an earthquake, since rivers might have been blocked by the slides, causing artificial dams to build up that, once the water eventually breaks through, might flood areas further downstream. SAFER will transmit information to the Chinese National Disaster Reduction Centre by means of GMES ‘situation maps’.

New proposal to strengthen Frontex On 24 February, the Commission made proposals to strengthen the European Union’s border management agency, Frontex.

EU governments had called on the Commission to propose improvements to Frontex, as part of the Stockholm Programme, at the European Council on 10-11 December 2009.

The proposals include reinforcing the legal framework to ensure full respect of fundamental rights during Frontex activities and enhancing the operational capacity of Frontex to support Member States. According to evaluations carried out by the Commission and by an independent evaluation, cooperation between EU countries on managing immigration through the EU agency Frontex has so far been limited by its lack of resources and insufficient coordination between national authorities. With the new proposal Member States would put more equipment and more personnel at the Agency’s disposal.

The new proposal would ensure that Frontex could provide appropriate technical and human resources in the framework of joint border patrols. EU countries would have to ensure that a pool of equipment such as boats and planes would be at the disposal of the Agency, which would also be able to gradually buy or lease equipment. Frontex would also be able to co-lead border patrol operations with EU Member States, provide technical assistance to third countries and deploy liaison officers in said countries. The proposals have to be debated and approved by the European Parliament and EU governments in the Council. The Parliament’s Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIB) is responsible for preparing a draft report on the subject.

Commission proposes Action Plan on Stockholm Programme On 20 April, the Commission turned the political objectives of the Stockholm Programme, which was endorsed last December, into an Action Plan for 2010-2014 with set timetables. The measures are aimed at creating a genuine European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the next five years. In the

justice, fundamental rights and citizenship area, the plan includes the following proposals: • Improving data protection for citizens in all EU policies – including law enforcement and crime prevention – and in relations with international partners. The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive will be modernised to respond to new technological challenges.

• Strengthening the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings to have a fair trial with proposals on informing them about charges, providing legal advice, communicating with relatives and ensuring special safeguards for vulnerable persons.

• Cutting red tape for citizens and businesses by ensuring that judicial decisions and civil documents are recognised across borders without cumbersome procedures or excessive costs.

• Simplifying the cross-border recovery of debt and alternative dispute resolution. Today companies only recover 37% of cross-border debts.

• Boosting online commerce by offering companies an optional European contract law. In 2008 only 7% of internet transactions in Europe were cross-border.

• Increasing protection for citizens traveling outside their home countries in the EU when they book a holiday package or file a claim after a road accident. For travel outside the EU, citizens will have better consular protection.

In the Home Affairs area, the plan includes the following proposals: • Defining a comprehensive security strategy to strengthen cooperation in law enforcement and civil protection as well as disaster and border management.

• Negotiating a long-term agreement with the U.S. on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data for the purpose of fighting terrorism (Terrorism Financing Tracking Programme – TFTP).

• Looking at an EU approach for the use of Passenger Name Record (EU-PNR) data for law enforcement purposes and creating a European framework for the communication of PNR data to third countries.

• Protecting European citizens from cybercrime by criminalizing identity theft as well as malicious software that is used to attack information systems, and by reinforcing border security by setting up an entry-exit system.

• Evaluating and, if necessary, amending the Data Retention Directive.

• Clearing the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for purposes of seasonal employment and intra-corporate transfers; introducing a common EU asylum system and fostering solidarity between Member States.

As the next step, the Commission plan has to be politically endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Barroso II Comm José Manuel Barroso President President Barroso drives the development of the EU and gives a sense of direction to the Commission. He calls and chairs meetings of the Members of the Commission and can assign to them specific responsibilities. He represents the Commission in meetings of the European Council, the G8 and major debates of the European Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers.

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Joaquin Almunia

Siim Kallas

Neelie Kroes

Vice President for Competition

Vice President for Transport

Vice President for Digital Agenda

VP Almunia ensures the competitiveness of the EU economy by enforcement of rules on anti-trust, mergers and state infringement. He develops means for EU market monitoring and promotes international cooperation on competition.

VP Kallas promotes a transport policy addressing competitiveness, sustainability and citizens’ welfare. He develops transport networks driven by pan-European objectives and leads research toward next-generation transport technology.

VP Kroes prepares the European Digital Agenda, an integrated ICT policy framework. She promotes a single market for delivering electronic services, greater ICT skills among European citizens and investment in high speed internet.

László Andor

Michel Barnier

Dacian Cioloş

Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Commissioner for Internal Market and Services

Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development

Commissioner Andor seeks to stem and reverse rising unemployment in the EU. He works to reform social protection systems and, via a ‘flexicurity’ agenda, labor markets. He also manages the ESF and several other financial instruments.

Commissioner Barnier works, following the economic crisis, to reinvigorate the single market while ensuring effective EU regulation. He also promotes initiatives in public procurement, intellectual property and free movement of services.

Commissioner Cioloş promotes a globally competitive European agriculture and prepares EU agricultural policy for the post-2013 period. He also supports a broad strategy for rural development and works to improve the food supply chain.

S̆tefan Füle

Kristalina Georgieva

Johannes Hahn

Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy

Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response

Commissioner for Regional Policy

Commissioner Füle heads negotiations with EU candidate countries and develops alternatives for countries that will not become members.

To ensure a coherent neighborhood policy, he works closely with HR/VP Ashton and the future EAS.

Commissioner Georgieva is responsible for delivering humanitarian aid worldwide under the principles of neutrality and for promoting humanitarian law. She works closely with the MIC, HR/VP Ashton, and the Home Affairs Commissioner.

Commissioner Hahn works with actors at all levels to define and apply new concepts of territorial cohesion under the Lisbon Treaty. He promotes sustainable development in the EU regions and prepares a future regional cohesion policy.

Günther Oettinger

Andris Piegalgs

Commissioner for Energy

Commissioner for Development

Commissioner Oettinger handles energy security policy, develops EU energy infrastructure and ensures nuclear safety. He promotes renewable energy and decarbonization efforts and research on industry-driven energy technologies.

Commissioner Piebalgs ensures that the EU fulfills its commitments to the developing world and works to improve aid effectiveness. To promote a coherent external policy, he works closely with HR/VP Ashton and various EU bodies.

Olli Rehn

Algirdas S̆emeta

Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs

Commissioner for Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and Anti-Fraud

Commissioner Rehn leads work on a sustainable EU strategy to overcome the economic crisis. He develops the euro area, represents the Commission in international economic discussions, and works to implement the EU 2020 strategy.

Commissioner S̆emeta develops effective EU tax policies while reducing compliance costs, improving the VAT system and fighting tax fraud. He is also responsible for IAS, OLAF and the strategic framework of the EU customs union.

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS

mission 2010-2014 Catherine Ashton Vice President and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security HR/VP Ashton’s mandate is to make the external voice of the EU more unified by increasing consensus on CFSP. As High Representative, she takes part in international negotiations of the Council of the EU. She will also head the External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic network. As a Vice-President of the Commission, she ensures that the EU Commission and the EU Council work together effectively in the area of CFSP.

Vivane Reding

Maros̆ S̆efc̆ovic̆

Antonio Tajani

Vice President for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship

Vice President for Competition

Vice President for Industry and Entrepreneurship

VP Reding ensures basic rights in EU policies. She promotes mobility of people and business within the EU, access to information and protection of citizens abroad. She is also negotiating a plan to implement the Stockholm Programme.

VP S̆efc̆ovic̆ ensures smooth cooperation with the European Parliament, Council of Ministers, EESC, and other EU bodies. He also develops relations with national parliaments and ensures the Commission’s efficient internal organization.

VP Tajani develops industrial policy to ensure continued economic growth in the EU. He promotes innovation and a strong internal goods market.

He fosters the development of European SMEs and, in space policy, of the GMES initiative.

John Dalli

Maria Damanaki

Karel De Gucht

Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy

Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

Commissioner for Trade

Commissioner Dalli promotes human and animal health as well as consumer rights. He supports the effectiveness of healthcare in the EU, helps coordinate reactions to pandemics and handles policy on medical products and GMOs.

Commissioner Damanaki is responsible for reforming the Common Fisheries Policy toward environmental, economic and social sustainability.

She also manages the EU Integrated Maritime Policy as a generator of economic growth.

Commissioner De Gucht promotes open markets via international trade agreements, the Doha trade round and other initiatives. He holds dialogues with strategic trade partners and helps developing countries increase trade with the EU.

Connie Hedegaard

Janusz Lewandowski

Cecilia Malmström

Commissioner for Climate Action

Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget

Commissioner for Home Affairs

Commissioner Hedegaard leads the internal and international EU response to climate change. She works to reduce emissions, develop carbon trading systems, promote relevant technologies and ensure a climate aspect in all EU policies.

Commissioner Lewandowski manages the EU budget in support of policy objectives and ensures its sound day-to-day administration. He also develops new concepts for budgetary review ahead of a new financial framework after 2013.

Commissioner Malmström develops policies on legal and illegal immigration and an internal strategy against terrorism and organized crime. She develops the Schengen area and is negotiating a plan to implement the Stockholm Programme.

Janez Potoc̆nik

Máire Geoghegan-Quinn

Commissioner for Environment

Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science

Commissioner Potoc̆nik promotes environmental policies for a greener economy, including resource efficiency and new technologies. He contributes to EU air, land and water management policies to protect ecosystems and biodiversity.

Commissioner Geoghegan-Quinn supports EU research cooperation via pooling and free movement of resources and via coordinating EU and national activities. She streamlines EU support to scientific research and will prepare the FP8.

Androulla Vassiliou Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth Commissioner Vassiliou ensures that education in the EU reflects the needs of society. She promotes synergies in education, innovation and research policies and is to launch in 2010 a youth initiative focusing on mobility and learning.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO NATO reform and Afghanistan at the heart of discussions with French Defence Minister On 31 March, the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussens talked with French Defence Minister Hervé Morin, allowing a fruitful exchange of views on Afghanistan and particularly on the training of the Afghan security forces, which needs to be speeded up yet further. The Secretary General thanked France for its contribution to ISAF and discussed with Minister Morin what help France could provide to meet this pressing requirement, which is key to transferring to the Afghans responsibility for their own security. The Secretary General also discussed the prospect of missile defence with the Minister. On this issue, Fogh Rasmussen outlined his vision of missile defence, which is recognized as one of NATO’s missions. He thanked Minister Morin for his support in regard to current and future reforms, with a view to profound transformation of the Alliance this year.

13th NATO Cyber Defence Workshop The 13th NATO Cyber Defence Workshop will take place from 26 to 28 May 2010 in Tallinn, Estonia. It is jointly organised by the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).

The workshop is aimed at bringing together high-level experts from NATO member states as well as from industry to discuss and enhance cyber defence-related co-operation among Allied countries.

Subject matter experts will present topics such as critical information infrastructure protection, dynamic risks management and remedies to victims of cyber attacks. The workshop will also feature a number of syndicates to discuss legal aspects of cyber defence, cyber defence-related mutual assistance among nations and sharing experiences on cyber defence exercises.

Ministers discuss NATO’s nuclear policy NATO Foreign Ministers discussed during their meeting in Tallinn on 22 and 23 April how to take forward the Alliance’s nuclear posture as well as issues surrounding missile defence.

Ministers agreed that the nuclear issue is important in NATO’s work on the Strategic Concept, and that the Alliance remains firmly committed to maintaining the security of its members, but at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons. Allied ministers highlighted that NATO must continue to maintain a

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balance between credible deterrence versus support for arms control disarmament and non-proliferation. The Secretary General said that in a world where nuclear weapons exist, “NATO needs a credible, effective and safely managed deterrent. Nevertheless, the Alliance must also do what it can to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation”.

Foreign Ministers stated that missile defence, while not replacing deterrence, can complement it. Allied representatives considered during a dinner discussion issues related to missile defence, including cost, command and control, as well as how to engage Russia on this issue. At the Lisbon Summit in November, NATO nations will decide whether to take on Alliance missile defence as a NATO mission.

More synergy in NATO-EU police training The Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, took part in the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Monday, 26 April 2010. During a session devoted to Afghanistan attended by both Foreign and Defence Ministers and chaired by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, the Secretary General presented his views on cooperation between NATO and the EU on the ground in Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of both organizations’ efforts to ensure progress in developing all branches of Afghan security institutions. Regarding police training, Mr. Rasmussen called for greater synergy and a more efficient division of labour, closer alignment of concrete police training projects, including through a greater use of Regional Police Training Centres, as well as increased support to the Afghan National Civil Order Police. The Secretary General said that overall, a greater EU contribution to police training will help the Alliance to fulfill the ambitious targets of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A). It would bring the international community closer to the ultimate goal of ensuring Afghanistan’s ability to provide for its own security.

NATO and Russia join efforts in Counter Air Terrorism NATO and Russia have begun the testing phase of a joint system for air traffic coordination. This first NATO-Russia system of this kind to be fielded focuses primarily on the fight against terrorism and will provide a shared radar picture of air traffic and early notification of suspicious air activities. The new system has two coordination centres – in Warsaw and Moscow – and local coordination sites in Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don, Murmansk (Russia), Warsaw (Poland), Bodø (Norway), and Ankara (Turkey). The development of a joint air traffic coordi-

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS

nation system is a result of the NATO-Russia Council’s (NRC) Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI). NRC nations, including Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, have so far contributed more than 10 million Euro in aggregate to the CAI project. CAI is one of the priority areas set by the NATO-Russia Council’s Work Programme for 2010.

Beyond its practical objectives such as improving air safety and security, the NRC CAI project also significantly contributes to building mutual trust between NATO and Russia. The CAI system is expected to be operational in 2011 and is open for participation by other nations.

NATO Ministers launch Afghan First Policy The NATO Foreign Ministers´ meeting in Tallinn on 22 and 23 April marked the launch of the NATO Afghan First Policy, aimed at increasing NATO-ISAF´s support to the Afghan local economy. The policy aims at facilitating procurement of local goods and services through simplified bidding and contracting procedures in Afghanistan. This will allow qualified and certified Afghan firms to run as prime competitors for NATO-ISAF contracts. Spending in Afghanistan rather than on Afghanistan is the core message of the NATO Afghan First Policy, which should not require increased funding but consists of a reorientation of NATO-ISAF common resources towards the Afghan private sector (see documentation below).

Documentation NATO Afghan First Policy Supporting Afghan Economic Development 1. Recognizing the crucial link between maintaining stability and delivering development aid to Afghanistan, the NATO Heads of State and Government (HOSG) adopted at the Bucharest Summit “a comprehensive approach across security, governance and development efforts and between all local and international partners” in order to support Afghanistan’s transition from conflict to stability, reconstruction and sustainable development. NATO HOSG also set out the growth of Afghanistan’s licit economy as one of the strategic desired outcomes.

2. In implementation of this approach, the NATO Afghan First Policy is developed by the NATO Economic Committee in coordination with the NATO Senior Resource Board, following an agreement by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2009, to maximize, to the extent possible, the positive impact of ISAF presence in Afghanistan. It aims at strengthening NATO’s contribution to the development of the Afghan economy by increasing local procurement of goods and services whenever the acceptable standards for security, quality, price and reliable supply are met; including the use of Afghan contractors and the employment of Afghan labor for works and jobs in Afghanistan.

Benefits of Procuring Afghan Goods and Services 3. Increasing local procurement in Afghanistan is considered the most important step in promoting the development of the Afghan private sector and supporting the economic development of the country.(…)

4. Together, the expenditures of NATO and ISAF Contributing Nations in support of ISAF activities are significant. By reorienting resources towards the Afghan economy, ISAF has the potential to enhance Afghan economic development. (…).

Released by NATO on 23 April 2010 5. Procuring goods and services from Afghan companies promotes sustainable economic development by creating jobs, building economic capacities, developing the private and banking sectors, encouraging the development of infrastructure and generating tax revenue to support the delivery of services to the people of Afghanistan. (…)

Procuring Afghan Goods and Services Using NATO Common Funds 6. The Afghan First Policy and the proposed practical steps, set out below, are aimed at strengthening NATO’s contribution to the economic development of Afghanistan and provides for fair and equal opportunities for Afghan companies and employees through the following measures: 6.1. Allowing for Afghan participation in the NATO procurement process, wherever possible, without requiring ad hoc decisions on waivers.

6.2. Increasing local procurement of goods and services that originate in Afghanistan whenever the acceptable standards for security, quality, price and reliable supply are met; making a clear preference in statements of work for local Afghan content, including the use of Afghan contractors and the employment of Afghan labour for works and jobs in Afghanistan.

6.3. Local procurement should not be hindered by procedural obstacles, but should be actively encouraged at all levels. All relevant stakeholders and NATO bodies are encouraged to consider adjustments to their practices according to the following practical recommendations to maximize, to the extent possible, the positive impact of NATO/ISAF presence and support the development of the Afghan economy.

6.4. (…)

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Letters to the editor Maritime Security Obserations on maritime security N° 5/2009

Diego Ruiz Palmer, Operations Division, NATO

based on board the ship. The American and

takes into his focus the Alliance and its

British view that the payment of ransom

important maritime component and envis-

encourages piracy has some merit. We need

(March, 2010) The periodical “The European

ages that the work on the new NATO Strategic

to discuss and set out the terms and condi-

Security and Defence Union” must be praised

Concept will also help to define the maritime

tions under which armed guards might

to have given the topic “Maritime Security” in

dimension of Alliance security.

operate. Private security companies over the past years have gathered a great deal of

the European Union a prominent position.

Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO, Thales offers

Nine authors of high expertise have appro-

technical solutions in the field of surveillance

experience in protecting assets in such

ached the subject with a wide view, political-

to maritime security.

countries as Iraq and Afghanistan.

ly, strategically, geographically, economically,

Michael Lenton, Director, Selex Galileo calls

We recognise that this is a highly controver-

environmentally, technologically and scientifi-

for more action and cooperation between

sial subject. It is for this reason that a serious

cally. All call for a comprehensive approach in

NATO, the EU and the Mediterranean Union.

debate on the response to maritime piracy

internal and external security. It seems worth-

Michael Isherwood, Northrop Grumman

and maritime terrorism is overdue.

while to highlight the essentials of what the

elaborates on the High Altitude Long Endu-

authors expressed.

rance Unmanned Air Systems (HALE UAS ) as

Christoph Raab, General Manager, COPURA,

an effective and interoperable intelligence,

Brussels points to the basis for EU activities

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) force.

Dr. Peter Roell, President, ISPSW, Berlin, www.ispsw.de

and tools for the Integrated Maritime Policy (IIMP). It is important is to realize that the EU

Jörk Reschke, Rear Admiral (ret.)

President, EuroDefense Germany, Bonn

Critically, he states that maritime policy work

No security against Russia Observations on N°4 2009

in the Commission does not enjoy the same

(April 19, 2010) Recalling one of the editorial

is the leading maritime power in the world.

backing at the higher political level as soon

correctly emphasizes that a Maritime Strategy of the EU must be seen in a comprehensive

(March 30, 2010) The Berlin Think Tank

Russia, but from a wide array of regions and

approach, in a hierarchy of documents,

ISPSW welcomes the fact that your magazine

organizations affecting European and transat-

starting with the EU Treaty of Lisbon, the EU

has devoted a number of articles by high-

lantic security.

Security Strategy and finally an EU Maritime

ranking experts to the important subject of

As someone whose research focuses on

Strategy.

maritime piracy. We do, however, believe that

NATO’s military and organizational transfor-

Vice Admiral (ret.) Hans Frank focuses on the

the thorny issue of armed guards on board

mation in the post-Cold War period, I often

development of the Baltic Sea and calls for

ships needs to be addressed. What we are

lack the perspective of actors who have been

the integration of Russia into Baltic maritime

dealing with off the coast of Somalia is

a catalyst of that transformation but who are

cooperation. He proposes a “Real EU Task

nothing much more than organised crime

not European or North American. This is at

Force” of mine sweepers to demonstrate

which, however, given the increasing pres-

odds with a commonly held view that such

solidarity and to foster integration.

ence of terrorist organisations in the region,

actors are critical to the transatlantic security

Vice Admiral Xavier Magne, Deputy Chief of

could be exploited by terrorists. Home

architecture.

Staff, Maritime Operations, Paris looks upon

Minister Wong Kan Seng of Singapore recent-

Hearing on a regular basis what politicians,

the Mediterranean Sea and its strategic

ly warned of possible terrorist attacks on

NGOs or defense industry representatives

importance as a crossroads between Europe,

shipping in the Straits of Malacca. U.S. Navy

from the Balkans, Russia, Afghanistan or

Africa and Asia. Improving maritime security

intelligence has warned of possible terrorist

China have to say about their perceptions of

is not only about dealing with risks but also

attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Aden and

international security would contribute to a

about reinforcing partnership.

off the coast of Yemen. Given the double

more quality debate across the spectrum of

Ioan Mircea Pascu, MEP, Deputy Chairman of

threat of piracy and possible terrorist attacks,

interested parties.

the Foreign Affairs Committee, elaborates on

we need to reconsider the levels of response

the Black Sea and citizens. He proposes to

to this threat. Last month’s attack (March

LtGen (ret.) Dr. Klaus Olshausen, President of the Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Hamburg

70

remarks in Volume 4 of 2009 that “there is no

Maritime Security A debate on maritime piracy and maritime terrorism is overdue − remarks on N° 5/2009

as security aspects are concerned.

the EU to be more engaged in solving the

2010) on the Panama-flagged MV Almezaan

problems in the South Caucasus.

was successfully beaten off by armed guards

security against Russia, only in cooperation with it”, I would like to invite you to consider expanding the list of contributors to your magazine by involving authors not only from

Bojan Savic̆, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of Kent at Brussels School of International Studies