The European Security and Defence Union Issue 3

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence

Volume No 3/2009

No 3/2009

The “New NATO” after the 60th anniversary of the Washington Treaty

The future of ESDP − ways to improve European Security and Defence Policy

Airbus strives for open competition

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, Brussels

Dr. Clemens von Goetze, German PSC Ambassador, Brussels

Dr. Thomas Enders, CEO Airbus, Toulouse

EDITORIAL

Europe has voted Non-voters now make up an absolute majority in Europe. In the midst of one of the most serious economic and financial crises in recent history, Europeans across the 27 Member States have elected their Parliament – if it can be called that, since only 43% of eligible voters bothered to go to the polls. Though the difficult times have made it abundantly clear that the EU offers the way out of the crisis, Europeans apparently don’t get it. And instead of pointing the citizenry in the right direction, the politicians harped on national issues – sending the message that when it comes to dealing with genuinely important matters, the EU is useless. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The European Crisis What was lacking in the run-up to the election was a stirring phrase – something on the order of the resounding lead-in to Thomas Paine’s since-famous essay “The American Crisis”*: “These are the times that try men´s souls.” Where was the European politician with the charisma to get away with such a statement? And where was the European politician with the mettle to make it?

There are a number of obvious and weighty reasons for the election debacle: · The electorate cannot make head or tail of the European Union’s institutional machinery; and Member State governments do not have the gumption to introduce policies that would make the vital importance of the EU clear to their citizens. · The neo-liberal approach to the common market threatens to overwhelm the principles of solidarity and fraternity. The result is that citizens tend to place their trust in national governments rather than in faceless Brussels. · The enlargement process sends the message that Europe has virtually no borders – a proposition that fails to attract support; and the confusing and emotional debate about accession negotiations with Turkey has unsettled Europe’s citizens even further.

Overhaul the campaign

Editorial

The European Parliament election campaign must be completely overhauled.

Before the next election, the citizen must be freed from his institutionally-imposed immaturity (to paraphrase Kant). He must be offered something with which he can identify. The citizen should be told how Europe might look once it is “finished”. It should be brought home to him that a combined effort is essential if we are to address such global threats as climate change, energy security and terrorism.

And it should be impressed upon him Hartmut Bühl that a supranational approach is crucial if such projects as the creation of European armed forces and European police forces – projects that bring Europe together – are to succeed.

It should be explained to the citizen that the European Parliament is the custodian of a European federal state that for the time being exists only as a concept, so that there is no reason for the citizen to fear for his national identity. It should likewise be explained that Parliament checks and balances the decisions taken by the other Brussels institutions, with the power to approve the budget and substantial influence over the selection of members of the Commission.

The Lisbon Treaty- the MEPs and the citizens The MEP must be freed from anonymity and become a face familiar to the public at large. Supranational election lists would be a good start. The next European election campaign should begin now, not a ludicrous two months ahead of time.

And what about forcing the parties to commit to their candidates for the Commission prior to the election?

The Lisbon Treaty will strengthen the European Parliament; but the European Parliament has not yet been brought closer to the citizen.

* Published in the Pennsylvania Journal on December 19, 1776, the essay reverberated across the colonies and the vastly outnumbered American troops went on to win a brilliant victory over the British.

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of the NATO , Brussels

Editorial

POLICY & POLITICS NATO at 60 – work ahead Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General NATO, Brussels ..................................................... 7 The future of ESDP – ways to improve European Security and Defence Policy Dr. Clemens von Goetze, German PSC Ambassador, Brussels....................................................... 9 The European Parliament's, real influence on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Elmar Brok, Brussels .................................... 12

Balkans The role and contribution of Macedonia in Stabilizing the Balkans Antonio Milososki, Foreign Minister of Macedonia, Skopje .............................. 25 What Europe should do for the stability in the Balkans – the human factor Doris Pack MEP, Brussels .......................... 27 Russia in the Balkans − traditional influence versus western interests Dr. Milos Solaya, Director CIR, Banja Luka.... 29

The ESDA, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Lisbon Treaty Robert Walter MP, President of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA)/Assembly of the WEU, London/Paris ............................ 14

SECURITY EU Military Staff and ESDP – a work in progress Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director General EU Milstaff, Brussels.............. 16 Working together, thinking differently – Cooperation amongst EU officials in ESDP missions Dr. Vasilis Margaras, Center for European Studies(CEPS), Brussels ............................... 19 EU-NATO Commentary Burying the hatchet in the EU-NATO turf war Giles Merritt, Director Security & Defence Agenda (SDA), Brussels............................... 23 4

A European energy policy for the 21st century Andris Piebalg, Commissioner for Energy, Brussels ................................................... 31 Cyber defence – the Estonian Experience and how Europe can protect its societies Tarmo Kõuts MP, Vice Admiral (R), Tallin......... 33 Cyber Security – the Industry point of view Bert Weingarten, PAN AMP AG, Hamburg......... 35 Can Industries take the lead in filling the gap between Defence and Governments' Security Luc van de Winckel, Brussels ........................ 37

CONTENT

Dr. Thomas Enders, CEO Airbus, Toulouse

EUROPEAN DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES Improving NATO'S expditionary Capabilities Jirí Šedivý, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, NATO, Brussels ................................................... 38

The Role of Industries in the Provision of Secure Information Infrastructures for NATO and EU Ingo Juraske, Vice President Hewlett Packard, EMEA, Böblingen......................................... 54

Addressing Helicopter Shortage: EDA’s role Andrew Gray, Helicopter Project Officer, European Defence Agency, Brussels ............................ 42

INSTITUTIONS and ASSOCIATIONS

INDUSTRIES Internal market for the EU’s defence and security industries by 2012 Günter Verheugen, European Commission Vice President responsible for enterprise and industry policy , Brussels.......................................... 45 Airbus strives for open cometition Interview with Dr. Thomas Enders, CEO Airbus Industries, Toulouse..................................... 47

The European Parliament’s role in the EU decision-making process Christoph Raab, Managing Director, COPURA, Brussels ........................................ 54

DEFENCE & SECURITY NEWS ESDP and NATO News European Union (EU) ............................. 58 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).................................................. 61 List of authors and articles published in former editions .................................... 62

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Documentation Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration (Experts) Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

Afghanistan: “Our security is closely tied to Afghanistan’s security and stability.

As such, our UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force mission (ISAF) in Afghanistan, comprising 42 nations, is our key priority. We are working with the Government and people of Afghanistan, and with the international community under the leadership of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

Together, in a comprehensive approach combining military and civilian resources, we are helping the Government of Afghanistan build a secure, stable and democratic country, respectful of human rights. We stress the importance of the protection of women’s rights. The international community aims to ensure that Al-Qaeda and other violent extremists cannot use Afghanistan and Pakistan as safe havens from which to launch terrorist attacks. Today we have issued a Summit Declaration on Afghanistan in which we reiterate our strategic vision and set out actions that demonstrate our resolve to support Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. Afghan ownership remains crucial for sustained progress.

Strong constructive engagement by countries of the region is also critical and, to this end, we pledge to reinforce our cooperation with all Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan. We encourage further cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and welcome the results of the third Trilateral Summit in Ankara on 1 April 2009. We also welcome the outcome of the International Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague on 31 March 2009.”

NATO-Russia relations: “The NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and we remain committed to it. Dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia are important for our joint ability to meet effectively common security threats and challenges. (…)

Since our last Summit, dialogue and cooperation with Russia have suffered from profound disagreements on a number of issues. The Alliance will continue to assess developments in relations with Russia. (…)

Despite our current disagreements, Russia is of particular importance to us as a partner and neighbour. NATO and Russia share common security interests, such as the stabilisation of Afghanistan; arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD, including their means of delivery; crisis management; counter-terrorism; counter-narcotics; and anti-piracy. Following through with the decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers at their meetings in

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December 2008 and March 2009, we look forward to the reconvening of formal NATO-Russia Council meetings, including at Ministerial level, as soon as possible before summer 2009. We are committed to using the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for political dialogue on all issues – where we agree and disagree – with a view towards resolving problems, addressing concerns and building practical cooperation. We are convinced that the NATO-Russia Council has not exploited its full potential. We therefore stand ready, in the NATO-Russia Council, to assess possibilities for making it a more efficient and valuable instrument for our political dialogue and practical cooperation.”

NATO-EU relations: “NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. In this light, NATO and the EU are working together and side by side in key crisis management operations and are cooperating, inter alia, in the fight against terrorism, in the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities and in civil emergency planning, and will continue to do so. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, and welcomes the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges that both NATO and the EU face today. These developments have significant implications and relevance for the Alliance as a whole, which is why NATO stands ready to support and work with the EU in such mutually reinforcing efforts, recognising the ongoing concerns of Allies. Non-EU Allies have made, and continue to make, significant contributions to these efforts. In this context, we continue to believe it important that all possible efforts should be made by all those involved in these endeavours, and also to render possible the fullest involvement of non-EU Allies. Since we last met in Bucharest, various initiatives have been taken as part of the continuing effort to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations. We are also willing to explore ways to further intensify work in the framework of the NATO-EU Capability Group. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for enhanced mutual commitment to ensure effective methods of working together. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, respecting the autonomy of the two organisations.”

POLICY & POLITICS

NATO at 60 – Work ahead

By Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO

terrorism − but where we do not shy away from discussing more When NATO’s Heads of State and Government met on 3-4 April difficult issues, if only to agree to disagree. in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany, for the Alliance’s 60th anniversary Summit, they certainly had much to celebrate. An Third New risks and threats: Cyber attacks and energy disputes Alliance that initially was little more than a piece of paper has can have a profound impact on the security and stability of a evolved into the world’s premier security organisation, and country without a single shot being fired. Piracy has quickly contributed to an unprecedented period of peace, freedom and become a serious security chalprosperity for all its citizens. We lenge, and it is becoming increawere also able at our Summit to We must demonstrate that the transatsingly clear that climate change salute France’s return to NATO’s has important security implicamilitary structures. And by wellantic community has a common future. tions too. At the same time, Iran’s coming Albania and Croatia as I have no doubt that that challenge can, nuclear programme continues to new NATO member countries, we and will, be met successfully. highlight the pressing challenge of contributed to greater stability in the proliferation of Weapons of the Balkans as well as the region’s Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. NATO may not be further integration into the European mainstream, which is the complete answer to all these questions, but it can be part of clearly where it belongs. the answer. Our recent Summit recognised the importance of But the Summit was also more than a celebration. It had to these issues to NATO, and the need to identify the Alliance’s deliver fresh thinking and new policies to meet a series of added value in addressing them. challenges that are more difficult than anything NATO has ever faced before. And as far as that work ahead is concerned, I This broad variety of issues on the agenda of our recent Summit believe that the Summit delivered in three key areas. is indicative of an ever growing set of tasks that NATO is expected to address. If we want to cope with this increasing demand, First Afghanistan: The Summit underlined that a stable and sewe need to take a thorough look at NATO’s conceptual foundacure Afghanistan is central to the security of all our nations. The tions − and, if necessary, to adapt them. For this reason, the NATO Allies committed to maintaining their own stabilising preSummit also set in train a review of NATO’s Strategic Concept. sence in, and beyond, this crucial election year in Afghanistan.

The current Concept dates back to 1999. The international They decided to step up their training and mentoring of the security environment has changed fundamentally over the past Afghan National Security Forces, strengthening the Afghan decade, and it continues to evolve. A new Strategic Concept will ability to provide security for their own country. But the Allies need to set out clearly NATO’s role and relevance in that fastalso acknowledged that there is a lot more that they − and the moving environment. international community as a whole − should do on the civilian The process of drafting such an ambitious Concept will certainly side, in helping the Afghans to build functioning institutions, to not always be easy, yet the Allies need to engage in it to lay the fight crime and corruption, and address the narcotics problem. groundwork for a new “transatlantic bargain”. In an increasingly The Allies stressed the importance of a comprehensive apcomplex world, that bargain must extend to a wider range of proach, where military and civilian institutions coordinate their concerns and interests − from territorial defence, through regioactivities better. And they recognised the need to reach out to nal stability, all the way to cyber defence, energy security, and Afghanistan’s neighbours interested in stability too. the consequences of climate change. But the political constellation for drafting such a new transatlantic bargain is favourable.

Second NATO-Russia relations: The conflict between Russia and There is a new US Administration that is determined to take a Georgia last summer raised serious questions about Russia’s fresh approach and re-engage with its Allies. There is a European commitment to a positive relationship not only with its own willingness to respond positively to this new US approach. And neighbours, but also with our Alliance. But while NATO and the return of France to NATO’s integrated military structure will Russia may not always see eye to eye, it is vital for European, strengthen the Alliance and help reduce the ambivalence in the and indeed global, security that we talk and work together. The NATO-EU relationship. The challenge before us is to translate Alliance underlines its strong commitment to building a genuine, this favourable constellation into real political momentum and a trustful partnership with Russia, where we cooperate on issues renewed sense of transatlantic common purpose. of common interest such as Afghanistan and the fight against

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POLICY & POLITICS

The future of ESDP – Ways to improve European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

By Dr. Clemens von Goetze, German PSC Ambassador, Brussels

ESDP has been an astonishing success story, given that it started at the Cologne European Council only ten years ago and that the first ESDP operation was launched only in 2003.

ESDP has developed dynamically ever since and has proven its value in more than 20 missions on three continents. This rapid growth of ESDP in quality and quantity requires a constant adaptation of its concepts, structures and capabilities. Javier Solana very rightfully stated in his recent report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy: “The more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be.

We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources.” The EU has constantly worked on improving its ESDP structures and has already made them more effective, notably through the appointment in 2007 of a Civilian Operations Commander for all civilian missions who is supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. But a lot more remains to be done.

Emphasis on military as well as on civilian capabilities Thus, the General Affairs and External Relations Council in November 2008 and the European Council in December 2008 devoted a considerable part of their work to developing ESDP further and put particular emphasis on military as well as on civilian capabilities. The European Council decided to create a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate to enhance the efficiency of the crisis management activities of the EU and to achieve a new quality in the comprehensiveness of its approach through a unified civil-military planning at the politicalstrategic level. The aim is further to ensure coherence with political-strategic objectives at all planning stages and to develop capabilities, exercises, training, concepts and doctrines. By reflecting this comprehensive approach in its structures the EU breaks new ground.

How does civil-military planning at the politicalstrategic level translate into practice It brings together civilian and military experts at the same table right from the beginning, independently of the final nature of the operation or mission. A continuous civil-military approach from advance planning up to the drafting of the Crisis Management Concept and the Joint Action will comprise all issues to be dealt with at a political-strategic level.

But making our political-strategic planning more comprehensive and effective alone will not suffice. In parallel, we have to

Dr. Clemens von Götze was born in Berlin on 29 March 1962. He studied law and history and joint the German Foreign Service in 1990. He has been Private Secretary to Federal Foreign Ministers K.Kinkel und J. Fischer (1997-2002) and Deputy Head of the Political Staff (Minister’s Office, Parliament, Press ) from 20032005.

Since February 2006 Dr. Clemens von Goetze is Ambassador of the German Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels, German representative to the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), Permanent Representative to ESDA/WEU Assembly and Head of the Political Section of the EU Representation.

advance the development of ESDP in several fields, notably by strengthening capabilities, rapid response capacities, exercises and training, lessons learned processes, contacts with third partners, institutional, financial and legal aspects and quite a range of horizontal and cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender.

The military and civilian headline goals defining our level of ambition have been synchronized, but could be further integrated and combined in a Single Comprehensive Headline Goal. To achieve better civil-military coherence in capability development, the interoperability of civilian and military means has to be assured, particularly in the fields of communication and information systems. Secure servers and secure communication and information systems deployable throughout the world that interconnect all EU actors on the ground and their control and command structures in Brussels or elsewhere are of vital importance. Information exchange requirements have been defined. A concept for network enabled capabilities could bring about further progress in this field in a mid and long term perspective.

The EU Capabilities Development Plan Military capabilities have already been driven forward in intense work at the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

Together they have worked out a Capabilities Development Plan on the basis of which identified shortfalls will have to be addressed and filled. EDA has proposed to the EU member states a list of shortfalls to be tackled as a priority. These

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Dr. Clemens von Götze during his speech in the Assembly 2009.

include inter alia enhancing the availability of helicopters through common training and modernisation of existing material, the establishment of a European Air Transport Command and Fleet and improvement of capabilities in the fields of sea de-mining, unmanned air vehicles, space-based satellite reconnaissance and network enabled capabilities. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a Permanent Structured Cooperation might offer an additional framework for intensified capability development for those Member States that want to go further than others.

Civilian Capabilities have not progressed as far as on the military side. This is due to the fact that policemen, judges, prosecutors and rule of law experts generally are not foreseen for external deployment, but are employed to fulfil certain tasks in their home countries. So, civilian experts sent out on missions normally leave gaps at home which have to be filled otherwise.

Hence, civilian force generation has been and further needs to be tackled and enhanced through a variety of measures. These include the establishment of an allowances system that takes into account the specificities of each mission and makes positions in missions financially attractive for qualified personnel. We also need to improve our system of calls for contributions and our selection procedures, for instance by standardized job descriptions and by showing more flexibility in the selection of available personnel. We should make more use of short term experts and, if personnel seconded by Member States is unavailable, contracted staff. For missions in a

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Photo: ESDU/ESDA

difficult environment, we could offer additional leave days and welfare facilities. Force generation seminars might help identify personnel with the requested qualifications. We should encourage third states´ participation and national action plans for civilian recruitment that offer career incentives for those externally deployed and allow those interested in missions abroad to be relieved temporarily of their functions at home.

The so-called “Goalkeeper” software currently developed by the General Secretariat of the Council will provide an extremely useful tool that offers standard job descriptions, national rosters of potential candidates, training opportunities and an overview on conceptual developments.

Critical factors-budget is one of them Mission support has often proven to be a critical factor and has to be put on a sound basis through financial, administrative and logistic measures: these include the use of the preparatory measures budget line, the development of standard planning procedures, the conception and constant update of a generic mission manual and the staffing of headquarters with sufficient financial and administrative experts, particularly in the procurement field. In the latter, serious problems have occurred in the Police Mission EUPOL Afghanistan, but also in other missions, and could be minimised through training programmes for procurement experts, use of framework contracts and possibly the development and implementation of a warehouse concept, for instance for armoured cars.

POLICY & POLITICS

Exercises and training remain key issues For rapid response, military and civilian capabilities already exist. With two Battle Groups available for military rapid deployment until 2013, the EU can act quickly with military means in unforeseen crises. The Crisis Response Teams provide a pool of civilian experts to be deployed within 5 days in teams of flexible size and composition for assessment and fact finding, mission build-up or reinforcing existing crisis-management activities. Further improvements should be possible through a rapid deployment capability for the start-up-phase of missions with core advance teams, a rapidly deployable force headquarters, start-up-kits including communication systems, handbooks, checklists, uniforms and a mechanism for the reception of personnel and equipment. Contacts with partners, notably with international organisations as NATO, the UN, OSCE and the African Union, but also with third states possibly contributing to ESDP and host states of actual or potential operations/missions have to be pursued and intensified.

The human factor Every operation and mission broadens our experience on our strengths, but shows us also where weaknesses remain. The regularly held lessons learned processes could be further improved by informal seminars on best practices and separate lessons learned staff elements on the strategic and on different subordinate levels.

As exercises and training remain key for the qualification of ESDP personnel, the ESDP College will have to play an important part in this, as well as comprehensive civil-military exercise programmes and pre-deployment training including hostile environment security training. Training curricula, in particular for civilian planners and actors, have to be developed and integrated into national training efforts. Further options might include combined training exercises of Member States, courses for specific missions and a regular evaluation of training activities.

Horizontal and cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender mainstreaming, generic concepts for security sector reform, and the seamless adaptation of our crisis management processes and procedures also play a pivotal role. To gain public support for our efforts, we have to raise public awareness of how ESDP can contribute to the security of Europeans.

The future of ESDP remains promising, but will require constant efforts, particularly in fields like civilian capabilities where the EU is entering new territory and a process of trial and error is inevitable.

Documents European Security and Defence Assembly/ Assembly of the Western European Union 56th Plenary Session, Press Release No. 30/2009 Assembly for reforming the funding mechanism for EU military operations Paris, 4 June 2009 – On Thursday the Assembly recommended “rapid reform” of the ATHENA mechanism for the funding of EUled military crisis-management operations in order to secure a financial participation on the part of all states involved in the decision to launch such operations.

Presenting a report on European Union military operations on behalf of the Defence Committee, Andrea Rigoni (Italy, Liberal Group) lamented the fact that the ATHENA mechanism “only covered about a quarter” of the costs of a mission and that the rest had to be borne by the contributing states. The ATHENA mechanism, which to date has been used for three EU military operations: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, was established because Article 28(3) of the Treaty on European Union does not allow operations having military or defence implications to be financed from the Community budget.

Speaking of operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, whose main mission was to ensure the security and protection of civilians and in which 10 000 troops from 20 countries took part, Mr Rigoni recalled that ATHENA had only provided some 120 million euros while total costs were estimated at almost half a billion euros. A delegation of the Assembly’s Defence Committee had been on a fact-finding mission to Chad to observe operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA last January.

In his report, Mr Rigoni described both the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission – taken over by the United Nations (MINURCAT) last March – and the ongoing EUFOR Althea operation as an overall success. In the light of these experiences, the Assembly nevertheless underscored the urgent need “to review the principles, structures and mechanisms for operational planning, force generation and the conduct of operations”. According to the Assembly, the EU must take the necessary measures to ensure that it “acquires a genuinely permanent and responsive operational planning and command capability”. The Assembly also wishes to ensure “the national parliaments are consulted before any decision to launch a military crisis-management operation and kept regularly informed of progress”.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European Parliament’s real influence on the CFSP

By Elmar Brok MEP, Foreign Policy Coordinator of the EEP in the EU Parliament In a democratic system, political legitimacy comes from the citizen’s representation. This is also true for the foreign and security policy, where parliaments are deeply involved in policy orientation and scrutiny. Originally granted with a mere right of consultation, the European Parliament (EP) became a full protagonist of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), contributing to the elaboration of policies, controlling the executive branch in their implementation, ratifying and co-deciding on the budget, legal instruments and treaties. The EP’s influence over trade, foreign, security and defence policy became stronger: the European Parliament has to ratify every enlargement or association treaty, “strategic partnership” agreements with third countries, as well as other foreign and trade policy agreements such as WTO agreements – particularly when they have budgetary or legislative implications. Furthermore, the European Parliament has to legislate on foreign aid instruments and programmes, such as the Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA), the Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (NPI), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) or the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Any EU foreign policy is without such programmes no more than a hollow and empty shell.

EU Parliament’s role reinforced The Lisbon Treaty, the last step of a long process of institutional reform which will bring many advancement for the EU institutions in terms of accountability, transparency and efficiency, strengthens further the European Parliament’s contribution on CFSP and puts the executive branch under the clear obligation to integrate the citizen representatives into each step of decision making on European external policies.

The new EU High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon, who will be at the same time Commission Vice-President and president of the Council for Foreign Affairs, will strongly depend upon the European Parliament. First of all, his nomination will have to be confirmed by the Parliament, as for the whole European Commission. He can be called by the European Parliament to comment on issues and answer Members’ questions, and will have the obligation to comply with this invitation. Moreover, the EP does have the right to be informed by the HR on confidential issues through a special committee, and to scrutinize corresponding documents. The EU will not draw a sharp distinction between the capacity in which the High Representative is called before Parliament, that of Vice-President of the Commission and Commissioner for External Relations, and his

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Elmar Brok MEP was born 1946 in Verl, Germany. He studied law and politics in Germany and Edinburgh. He worked as a radio journalist and newspaper correspondent.

Since 1980 Member of the European Parliament, Elmar Brok was member of the Convention on the Constitution for Europe and is a former chairman of the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs. He held also many leadership positions in the CDU in Germany .

On July 16th he was elected by the European Peoples Party as its coordinator of Foreign Policy. He is poised to be the chairman of the EP delegation for the relations with the US Congress and cochairman of the Transatlantic Legislation Dialog (TLD). In this function Elmar Brok will participate in the negotiations for a transatlantic market.

Council capacity. The “double-hatted” nature of the High Representative will therefore ensure that the whole scope of the CFSP will fall more and more under European Paliament’s scrutiny. It is not conceivable that a High Representative who needed parliamentary support for his appointment and may need it again on some sensible issues – such as his budget – will leave questions unanswered in Parliament, or try to play on his different attributions and the different processes that are linked to them to try to override the Parliament.

A power to pursue This scrutiny power gives the European Parliament a strong tool for monitoring foreign policy which is an effective adjunct to its robust budgetary and legislative powers. Indeed, the European Parliament does have a real “power of the purse”.

Administrative and operational matters pertaining to the external relations are financed out of the European budget.

The European Commission can therefore not engage any community funds without its assent. In practice, the European Parliament assumes budgetary responsibility for foreign aid disbursements that are four times higher than those currently allocated by the U.S. Senate. With regards to the financing of common foreign and security measures, the European Parliament can therefore be regarded as being on equal footing with the Council. And the EP is considering this power with the

POLICY & POLITICS

highest sense of responsibility: it always pleaded that more funds must be allocated to the CFSP/ESDP budget in order to make the EU a credible and capable actor at the international level. The total amount of 174 billion euro allocated to the CFSP for the period from 2007 to 2013 is for instance clearly insufficient to match our ambitions on the world stage.

Profound expertise The European Parliament not only acquired substantial rights to monitor and discuss Common Foreign and Security Policy issues, but also developed the expertise and tactfulness to deal with these new rights and competences. By now, when it wants to develop new policies, the European Commission already widely seeks advice by the European Parliament and its competent committees beforehand. On the other hand, members of the European Parliament nourish close ties and contacts to the competent decision makers and experts on CFSP within the Council and the Commission. Such a behaviour from both sides guarantees that any influence over the EU foreign and security policy will only be used to the benefit of the overall improvement of EU external relations, and not end up as a mere inter-institutional fight of influence.

5th European Congress on Civil Protection and Disaster Management 2009: New Ideas and Technologies for a modern Civil Protection

November 05 - 06 Bonn City Hall

The worldwide role of the EU The general reinforcement of the EP with the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the overall strengthening of the transparency and accountability in the EU system, is building the ground of what is now called the “spirit of Lisbon”: within the EU, legitimacy cannot be achieved without citizen representation. This is also true for foreign and security policy. But this evolution should not hide a reality: the rights and the influence of the European Parliament within the CFSP do not contradict the fact that the operational foreign and security policy is still a competence of the executive branch.

The Lisbon Treaty offers the opportunity for a new “constitutional reality”. However, many aspects of the daily work are not yet defined, for instance regarding the concrete cooperation between the president of the Council, the president of the Commission, or the High Representative. Unwritten developments will therefore occur parallel to these changes in primary law. They will most likely create a new and multilayered balance of power in Brussels. It is essential to have the political will and the right mindset if the treaty shall fulfil its potential and objectives. We have to influence this process and make sure that the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission work constructively together.

The success of the European common foreign and security policy, that means, European influence in the world, will depend on whether we manage to develop the attitudes and create the networks to allow this new type of cooperation to take place.

Main Topics • New Ideas and Impetus for Civil Protection • Technological Innovations for Civil Protection • Multilateral Operations – challenges for units and technologies • Security Research in the Euroepan Union – FP 7 and Civil Protection • Modernisation of Fire Brigades within the context of National and European Requirements • A common approach: the national Civil Protection-Architecture Examples from Operations

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The ESDA, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Lisbon Treaty

by Robert Walter, MP, President of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA)/ Assembly of WEU, London/Paris Strengthening Europe’s security and defence first and foremost requires the support of European citizens for joint operations launched by the member states, whether under the NATO or European Union “flag”. Successive European Councils have refined the objectives of EU crisis-management missions and the methods for their conduct, leading to a European doctrine founded on both a civil and military approach to crisis management.

The ESDP The Helsinki European Council, meeting in December 1999, decided to create a European rapid reaction capability (Headline Goal 2003). The objective was to “be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60 000 persons)” with a view to carrying out all the EU crisis-management missions. The Council also decided to set up new, permanent political and military structures – a Political and Security Committee (PSC), an EU Military Committee and a Military Staff – to provide the political control and strategic direction needed to carry out the EU missions.

The Headline Goals (HG) The HG 2003 is still an aspiration, but a new EU HG 2010 was adopted by the European Council in Brussels in June 2004, according to which the EU member states would, by 2010, be able to respond more rapidly to an emerging crisis by deploying a Battlegroup (of 1 500 soldiers) in less than 10 days. In fact two 1 500-strong Battlegroups have been available on permanent operational standby since 1 January 2007. But to date no HG configuration has been tested in conflict situations!

Operations Since 2003 the European Union has nonetheless conducted some 22 operations on the European continent, in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The EU has demonstrated its ability to conduct military and civilian operations, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo and Chad, as well as in Gaza and Georgia. These operations are a perfect illustration of what has come to be recognised as the EU’s “trademark”, namely its ability to bring into play a wide spectrum of instruments ranging from economic, political and diplomatic pressure to monitoring, police, peacekeeping and rule of law missions, without forgetting top-of-the-spectrum high-risk military operations like the one recently completed in Chad, the current anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, or the ongoing Operation Althea in Bosnia.

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The Lisbon Treaty: the main innovations in ESDP The 2000 Nice Treaty is currently the legal basis for the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy activities. The Lisbon Treaty was signed by the heads of state and government of the 27 EU member states in Lisbon on 13 December 2007. The aim was originally for this Treaty to be ratified by the member states before the European Parliament elections scheduled to be held in June 2009. But the Lisbon Treaty has not yet come into force, due to ratification problems in several EU countries. With the Lisbon Treaty, various innovations are expected in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

A President of the European Council will be appointed, whose term of office will be two and a half years renewable once. The post of “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” will be created, combining the roles of the current High Representative for the CFSP and WEU SecretaryGeneral, Javier Solana and the EU Commissioner for External Relations. He will be supported by a “European service for external action”.

A mutual assistance clause, stipulating that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”, has been incorporated into the Treaty (Article 42.7). This clause which does not mention military aid and assistance in so many words is not of the same nature as Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty (Paris 23.10.1954).

The European Defence Agency (EDA) The existence of the Agency is written into the Lisbon Treaty.

EDA, which has competence in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments, “shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities” (Article 42.3).

Permanent structured cooperation The Treaty also provides for permanent structured cooperation between those states “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria with a view to the most demanding missions” (Article 46)

POLICY & POLITICS

Robert Walter MP and for the possibility of entrusting a task to a group of states which are “willing and have the necessary capability for such a task” (Article 44).

Moreover, in the face of the new threats to European security, the Lisbon Treaty provides for the extension of the so called Petersberg tasks to include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories” (Article 43).

Finally, a new solidarity clause will require member states to assist each other in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster: “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to (…) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities (…)” (Article 222).

The European Parliament and the members of national parliaments have distinct but complementary responsibilities In a recent meeting with the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering and I discussed issues in connection with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and their implications for Europe, as well as the need to reinforce parliamentary scrutiny of Europe’s foreign, security and defence policy, for which the European Parliament and the members of national parliaments have distinct but complementary responsibilities.

Resources for the EU’s military activities are provided essentially by the member states where national parliamentarians decide in their home parliaments on defence spending, including equipment procurement and the deployment of troops. Recognising this, the Assembly of Western European Union has in the last year transformed itself into the ESDA.

The ESDA’s role in parliamentary oversight of ESDP The Assembly was originally founded in 1954 when the 1948 Brussels Treaty on European security and defence cooperation was modified to establish Western European Union. There is a clear institutional link between WEU and the EU: in addition to his role as the High Representative for the CFSP and SecretaryGeneral of the EU Council, Javier Solana is also WEU SecretaryGeneral. Since the transfer of WEU’s operational activities to the European Union in 2000, the Assembly has continued its parliamentary oversight of European security and defence matters working with national governments and through regular meetings with the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), whose members are the same Ambassadors who form the WEU Permanent Council.

The ESDA is the only inter-parliamentary assembly bringing

Robert Walt MP has been British Conservative Member of Parliament since 1997. He has been a member of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) since 2001 and is President of the largest political group, the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats.

He also serves on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where he is Vice-Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee.

Since December 2008 he is President of the ESDA/ Assembly of WEU.

together all 27 EU member states as well as the five non EU NATO European states involved in the security of Europe committed to examining European security and defence issues. Within our Assembly, members of the national parliaments, through the parliamentary scrutiny that they exercise at the European level, work together for peace and for our citizens’ security.

The consultative role of the EU Parliament (EP) In the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Lisbon Treaty, like the Nice Treaty before it, stipulates that the EP is to be “consulted and informed regularly” on the main aspects of and basic decisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (Article 36). Declaration 14 on the CFSP, appended to the Treaty, also specifies that the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty covering the CFSP “do not give any new decision-making powers to the Commission, nor do they increase the role of the EP”.

The way ahead together A new Article 12 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union states that “national Parliaments shall contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” and makes provision for inter-parliamentary cooperation “between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament”. These provisions take account of the member states’ desire to give national parliaments an enhanced role within the Union and to promote cooperation between them and the European Parliament.

In parallel, the European Parliament is playing a specific role in European security and defence matters. The EU Council is obliged to inform it about all aspects of CFSP, including ESDP. Some activities, in particular the civil aspects of security, are financed by the EU budget and involve the European Commission. The Parliament has co-decision, information and consultation rights in such areas.

I sincerely hope that the new European Parliament to be elected in June will continue to develop cooperation with the European Security and Defence Assembly in a joint effort to solicit greater public support for ESDP and to urge our nations to contribute more coherently to both military and civilian operations.

For Europe to work, it is essential for our citizens to understand and to take an active part in European political life. We Parliamentarians are a key part of this process.

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EU Military Staff and ESDP – a work in progress

By Lieutenant General David Leakey, CMG, CBE, Director General EU Military Staff (DGEUMS)1

Overview on the activities of the EUMS: The activities of the EUMS continue to be directed by and focussed towards the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Additionally, the EUMS is an integral component of the Council General Secretariat (CGS) and works in close collaboration with the Secretariat in support of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr Javier Solana, and also supports the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability2 (CPCC). The primary focus remains on the delivery and support of EU-led operations, for which the EUMS has direct responsibility in the planning and launching phase, ongoing review and analysis of all operational developments and drafting of military advices (e.g. for EUNAVFOR ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and OP ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Furthermore, the EUMS actively supports the EU’s civilian missions by seconding military experts, by providing military planning expertise from within the EUMS (i.e. Logistic, Medical or CIS), by providing EU Operations Centre3 (OPSCEN) infrastructure and Communications and Information Systems (CIS) for planning purposes and by contributing with general planning assistance to the CPCC and directly to its missions, such as: the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia, EU Security Sector Reform (EU SSR) Guinea Bissau, EU Security Sector Reform in Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX in Kosovo and EUBAM RAFAH in Palestine.

Despite a recent peak of work related to operations, the EUMS’ other routine work has continued at the same time, albeit disrupted by the operational tempo. Much effort is focused on the review of more than a dozen concepts and new conceptual drafts, while internally the Post Wiesbaden4 process, requiring a considerable re-organisation of the EUMS, is in its final stages. Now the EUMS faces new requirements and challenges originating from the proposed establishment of a new Civilian/Military strategic planning structure for ESDP operations and missions, which will demand further adjustments and amendments to the EUMS’ structure and Terms of Reference.

‘Change’ is seldom an event - but rather a continuous process!

Operations and missions EUFOR − OP ALTHEA The EUMS has contributed to the development of possible

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Lieutenant General a.D. Leaky Born in 1952, educated at Sherborne School, at Cambridge University and at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Commissioned into the Royal Tank Regiment in 1971,he has served in the UK, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Germany, the Balkans and Canada. Army Staff College at Camberley in 1984. In 1993 he was Colonel Military Operations 3 in the MOD, London.and became in 1995 the UK Military Representative in Dayton at the Bosnia peace negotiations. 1997-1999 Royal College of Defence Studies before assuming the post of Chief of Staff Northern Ireland in 2001. Commander of the European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004/5. He was appointed Director General of the European Union Military Staff in Brussels on promotion to Lieutenant General from 28 February 2007.

future options for the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and has continued to provide support to the Operation Headquarters (OHQ). The EUMS was also involved in the preparation of the Ninth SG/HR Operation ALTHEA Six Monthly Review which looks forward to the possible future evolution of the EU’s military “stabilisation” operation into a mission focussed on training and development of the Bosnian military.

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA On 15 March 2009, the EUMS and the wider international community witnessed the successful handover of EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the UN follow-on peacekeeping mission MINURCAT exactly one year after the declaration of Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The military bridging operation, which was launched on 28 January 2008, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778, was the most multinational military operation conducted in Africa by the EU to date.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA with an overall strength of 3,400 personnel from 23 EU Member States and 3 Third States (Russia, Croatia, Albania) achieved its objectives of establishing a safe and secure environment in its Area of Operation, thus contributing to the protection of civilians in danger (particularly refugees and displaced persons), facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel, and contributing to the protection of UN personnel.

Throughout the operation - planning, execution and recovery the EUMS has provided the necessary detailed military plan-

POLICY & POLITICS

ning, military advice and support from Brussels to the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and the OHQ at Mont Valerien (in Paris).

EU NAVFOR – OP ATALANTA (counter piracy) Op ATALANTA, the first EU maritime operation, was launched on 8 December 2008 to contribute to the protection of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, to the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

Op ATALANTA - a contribution to maritime security

To facilitate planning in advance of the launch of the operation the EUMS established a Mission Monitoring Team (MMT) to provide planning support directly to the EU OHQ at Northwood (UK) during November 2008. It also supported both the EUMC and the OHQ in the processing of the various planning documents up to the launch of the operation and ensured the proper consideration of military inputs into the political decision making bodies. The MMT continues to be closely involved in all relevant aspects of the operation in order to advise the EUMC and support the OpCdr/OHQ as required, in particular on interaction with Third States and their participation in the operation.

Uniquely, this maritime operation has seen the development of the ‘Maritime Security Centre − Horn of Africa’ (MSCHOA www.mschoa.eu) in which Merchant Navy Liaison Officers and representatives of the Fishing Industry are integrated with the OHQ staff to provide co-ordination with the maritime community in safeguarding freedom of navigation in areas affected by the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

When writing this in June, 13 naval vessels and 2 maritime patrol aircraft were taking part in the operation. To date, 26 WFP ships have been escorted by EUNAVFOR through which over 125,000 tonnes of food aid have been delivered, without interference from pirates, to Mogadishu in Somalia. In addition, as a result of EUNAVFOR interventions, a total of 52 suspected pirates have been handed over to the Kenyan authorities for prosecution and a dozen more have been detained pending legal processing. Operation Atalanta can be deemed a success, in this the first six months of the operation, with the rate of successful pirate attacks reducing from 1 in 3 to 1 in 8.

Photo: ESDU/dpa

EUSEC RD Congo EUSEC DR Congo is a Security Sector Reform type mission consisting of a staff of 50 personnel. Its objectives are to provide advice and assistance for the reform of the security sector focusing on restructuring and reconstructing the armed forces. The staff provide to the DRC Government both civilian and military expertise in defence, police, security, rule of law, human resources, administartive and financial regulations.

The EUMS continues to monitor the mission to advising the EUMC with respect to the military aspects of the mission and supporting the drafting of the Head of Mission action plan.

EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia This mission was launched on 1st October 2008 with over 200 EU monitors. The mandate is to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 12 August2008 between Russia and Georgia. EUMM Georgia is tasked to contribute to the stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the areas affected by the recent conflict, to oversee the deployment of the Georgian police and armed forces and to observe compliance of all parties with human rights and humanitarian law. Another important task of the mission is to assist in confidence building measures between the parties of the August 2008 conflict.

Following the surge contribution (of some 34 military staff) by the EUMS to the planning, preparation and deployment phase of the EUMM Georgia, the secondment of EUMS experts to the mission quickly reduced. However, on-call support by specialist military experts from the EUMS to the CPCC, for example in Medical, Logistic and Communications issues, continues to provide assistance for the ongoing mission and the related planning process.

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EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Guinea Bissau EU SSR Guinea Bissau was launched in June 2008 with the objective of providing advice and assistance on the modernisation of the armed forces and security forces. It also contributes to the creation of conditions for implementation of the National Security Reform Strategy. This is a relatively small EU mission consisting of some 21 military and civilian experts and 13 local staff.

A six month extension of the Mission , until 30 November 2009, has been agreed by PSC. In accordance with the CONOPS and the OPLAN, the EUMS continues to support the CPCC with regard to the military aspects of the mission.

Exercices and training • MILEX Exercise (MILEX 09) The EUMS has developed and continues to plan the execution of the next MILEX exercise as per the EU Exercise Program 2009-2013. MILEX 09, is a Command Post Exercise (CPX), focusing on the interaction between the EU OHQ in Larissa, Greece and an EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Naples, Italy, in an autonomous EU-led military operation which includes maritime aspects. Furthermore, the exercise marks the first time that the EU OHQ in Larissa will have been fully activated.

The EUMS, having completed the preparation and planning phase, will be directly involved directing the exercise in June 09.

• Crisis Management Exercise (CME) 08/09 The EUMS also contibuted to the planning as well as to the scenario of CME 08, which took place between 24 November 5 December 20086, The EUMS then participated with over 30 of its personnel in the Directing Staff of CME 08 and activated a Mission Monitoring Team (MMT) within the Operations Directorate, with contributions from all other Directorates7 of the EUMS. CME 08 provided for the first time an opportunity to undertake co-ordinated and synchronised planning for an ESDP military operation and the reconfiguration of an existing civilian ESDP mission in the same theatre. This was a test of the EU’s ability to coordinate planning of a Civ/Mil operation between the CPCC in Brussels and the EU OHQ (at Mont Valérien, Paris) which was conducting its ESDP operation (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) as well as participating in the exercise simultaneously.

The next Crisis Management Exercise, CME 09, will require even more direct support from the EUMS. CME 09 will feature an EU Crisis Rapid Response which will include operational planning for both a military and civilian operation, with the EU

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Operations Centre within the EUMS being activated as the EU OHQ. The exercise is due to take place at the end of 2009.

• Concept and doctrine Since October 2008, the EUMS has completed the drafting of a number of concepts adapted to EU-led operations such as for Special Operations and other specialist areas together with the revision of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept.

Following a comprehensive annual review process of future military concepts, the EUMS emphasis for the remaining part of 2009 will be on the Operating Impact of a Comprehensive Approach (OICA), the completion of the revision of the EU Use of Force Concept, the production of concepts for Expeditionary Operations and Force Protection and projects on HUMINT and Computer Network Operations.

Conclusion This represents just a snapshot of some of the work conducted at the EUMS. One lesson brought home time and time again since my appointment as Director General EU Military Staff is that we must constantly be prepared for and embrace ‘change’. I am confident that with the continued full support of the Member States we will be equipped to meet the challenges posed by change; to stand still in this environment is not an option.

1 Lt Gen Leakey was appointed Director General EU Military Staff (DGEUMS) in February 2007. The mission of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) “is to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, also encompassing identification of forces for missions and tasks referred to in the TEU, including those identified in the European Security Strategy”. In this article, Lt Gen Leakey gives a snapshot of some of the key areas of the work addressed by EUMS in the past six months focusing in particular on Operations and Missions, Exercises and Training, and Concepts and Doctrine.

2 The CPCC, which is part of the Council Secretariat, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian ESDP operations.

Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian ESDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.

3 The EU Operations Centre was established in January 2007.

4 At the Defence Ministers’ conference in Wiesbaden (May 2007), the SG/HR was invited to “address shortcomings in the EU Military Staff’s ability to conduct planning at the strategic level for EU-led operations”.

5 i.e. Initiating Military Directive (IMD), Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operation Plan (OPLAN) and related Military Advices.

6 CME 08 was originally scheduled to be conducted in September 2008 but was postponed due to the crisis in Georgia.

7 The EUMS consists of six directorates: Concepts & Capabilities, Intelligence, Operations, Civ/Mil, Logistics, Communications and Information Services.

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Working together, thinking differently?

The cooperation amongst EU officials in ESDP missions

By Dr. Vasilis Margaras, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels Considerable progress has been made in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since its establishment back in 1999. Ten years of ESDP developments brought a number of achievements in the field of security, most notably through the development of various ESDP missions in many parts of the world. New EU security institutions were developed that remain in charge of the strategic parameters of ESDP, thus facilitating dialogue, interexchange of security practices and the planning of various police and military ESDP missions. One of the major achievements of ESDP is the transfer of the security debate from national capitals to the PSC meetings which now take place in Brussels on a regular weekly basis.

Furthermore, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was presented in 2003, thus providing a long summary of ideas and beliefs regarding the EU use of police, military and economic instruments. Frequent socialization amongst ESDP officials brought common understandings that make up the basis of a primary EU strategic culture. Overall, progress has been the case. The process of ESDP development has not been troublefree. However, it is a steady and ongoing process.

The development of trust and understanding The development of trust and understanding amongst ESDP officials can be observed in various ESDP mechanisms and missions. Policy coordination and the harmonisation of national policies are also taking place but the pace of change is slow due to the predominance of national sensitivities, peculiarities and priorities. Frequent interaction amongst policy officials contributed positively to the development of ESDP as every day communication had a unitary impact on their mindsets and beliefs. Furthermore, the success of ESDP missions so far contributed to the consolidation of the idea that the European Union can be an actor in security affairs. This is an achievement on its own if one takes into account the failure of the EU to deal with the crisis of the Western Balkans in the 1990s. Therefore, ESDP actor-ness has contributed to a ‘proactive’ mentality amongst ESDP officials.

A smooth cooperation but no big vision Overall, cooperation amongst different national officials in ESDP missions has been smooth. Still, a big EU vision is missing and there are diverging ideas on the use of police and military instruments for implementing missions. Old habits die

Dr. Vasilis Margaras Dr. Vasilis Margaras was born 1978 in Athens , GRI .

He studied at the Universities of Wolverhampton and Batle (UK). He is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Wolverhampton. He has recently completed his PhD on the development of ESDP at the University of Loughborough in the UK.

hard and nation states remain the main players in the field of security and defence. The Iraq division between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe remains a good example of different belief systems amongst the Europeans. The lack of a clear European interest to which all EU member states can subscribes is a hindrance to ESDP. Various CFSP/ESDP officials continue to hide behind the delay of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in order to justify the inertia and lack of dynamism that characterise much of the EU’s external policies. Although the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty may bring some positive amendments in Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP, it is highly unlikely that these will provide a stimulus for further dynamic action on their own. Like most EU policies, ESDP has been characterised by a state of ‘bureaucratic boredom’: it moves just about so that it remains active but not enough to challenge widely rooted national perspectives on security. In this respect, NGOs, think tanks and the public opinion have a role to play by demanding further EU action and new dynamic initiatives.

Learning by doing but no clear leadership With the establishment of ESDP the EU member states accepted the fact that the EU had a role to play in security and defence issues. However, there is no clear definition in the minds of Europeans on what such role is. ESDP is still a ‘learning by doing’ exercise rather than a comprehensive policy aiming at tackling major security threats. ESDP is still suffering from a lack of vision and ambition. It has no clear leadership. ESDP structures are bureaucratic and slow to produce results. All these facts limit the ability of the EU to assume a decisive role in security issues. In addition, although ten years have passed

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also various countries which have considerable legal and political obstacles when it comes to endorsing a security mission and this makes the synchronisation of the EU an even more difficult task as certain countries require more time for an approval of a mission than others.

Undisputed: multilateralism

Information exchange of a Polish Patrol with Local Forces in the Chad Photo: EU Council

by, ESDP remains anchored to small missions which, although successful, still have a limited impact on the long-term security status in the geographic areas of deployment. Therefore, ESDP remains a policy of many limitations. This is because although EU officials act together they still think differently on various security issues. One of these differences is manifested in the emergence of different national priorities in the field of security. For instance, although various EU member states have transformed some of their security resources into troops/police instruments ready to be deployed in out-of-area missions there are a number of EU member states that is slow in modernising capabilities.

Difficult political and legal synchronisation Traumas stemming from the Western Balkans have contributed to the consolidation of a common European thinking vis-à-vis this particular region. However, this is the exception to the rule as a similar process did not happen in other parts of the world. For instance, although the ESDP African missions have been important, there is still no common EU strategic thinking regarding this particular continent or any other part of the world. Furthermore, when it comes to missions that need to be implemented far abroad, there is a ‘capabilities gap’ between small states and the bigger EU states such as France and the UK which possess the necessary means in order to deploy more demanding missions. In addition, there is a general attitude of unwillingness to participate in difficult far away missions, especially if a particular mission is seen as a risky one. Another point of division is the question of the UN Security Mandate which for some member states is an important prerequisite in order to assume a security mission whereas for others it is less so. Furthermore, there are

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On the other hand, there is the widely accepted idea that the ESDP is characterised by multilateralism. Indeed, the EU has been valid when it comes to working with other institutions and third countries. Various ESDP missions were open to contributions from third countries whereas the EU cooperated with institutions such as ASEAN, African Union, the UN and NATO. However, although the importance of NATO in ESDP is undisputed, there is no point of convergence on the issue of NATO dependence/European autonomy. Issues of transatlantic importance have caused various tensions in the past and have made the consensus on security even more difficult. It remains to be seen whether the new Obama era will ease past tensions thus bringing a new approach in transatlantic relations. However, the idea that in certain cases, an ESDP mission should take place under an EU flag independent of NATO for various political issues is slowly consolidating in the minds of ESDP officials.

ESDP – striving for harmonisation of national geopolitical priorities Although considerable progress has been achieved the EU now has to make further steps in order to acquire a consolidated strategic culture and a dynamic ESDP. An upgrade of institutional structures and a brave program of investment in the EU’s civilian and military capabilities are more than necessary. However, these on their own are not enough to solve the ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap of ESDP. Further interaction amongst ESDP officials and more policy initiatives are necessary so that the ESDP can be consolidated. Longer and bigger ESDP missions are more likely to bring common understandings in the field of security rather than the small short term projects that the ESDP undertakes today. Furthermore, a discussion on the utility of ESDP must take place at the national level as it is not a rarity to see member states whose various ministries involved in ESDP (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior) have different views on how ESDP should be developed. EU member states have to gradually harmonise their geographic priorities, find a consensus on the importance of NATO in ESDP and address the question of underinvestment in civilian and military capabilities. A lot depends on the political will of the EU member states but also on external circumstances and various geopolitical pressures. New crises emerge and hopefully the EU will be able to deal with some of the most demanding of them in the near future.

POLICY & POLITICS

Commentary

Burying the hatchet in the EU-NATO turf war

By Giles Merritt, Director Security & Defence Agenda (SDA), Brussels

The ESDP-NATO frictions that were a feature of the Brussels scene for much of this decade are now on the wane, even if not entirely smoothed over. Now the need is for an honest reassessment of European Union and NATO political strengths and weaknesses so as to define clear goals for the security strategies to be pursued by both organisations. NATO’s focus has for 60 years been on hard defence and security issues while the recent years of burgeoning ESDP peacekeeping operations have chiefly been about the European-badged missions’ growing capacity to plan and carry out cooperative civilian-military operations.

should be shared between NATO and the EU. That in turn is a question that in the years ahead is going to demand sensible diplomatic discussions with rising powers like India and China, to say nothing of Russia.

The likelihood is, now that Barack Obama is in the White House, that a shared approach will be deemed the only appropriate answer, but that doesn’t tell us whether effective cooperation and even action will be at some point overshadowed by inter-organisational tensions at the political level.

Giles Merrit, Director Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

The chief difference between NATO and ESDP activities is, of course, that the United States, together with its Canadian neighbour, is a member of the former and not the latter. Time will tell if this is of less importance under President Obama than during the eight long Bush years, but that was the salient factor during the formative Twenty one of the EU’s 27 period of ESDP. Today, with member states are NATO memtransatlantic relations Europe needs to decide collectively bers too, so some 94% of the apparently on the mend, the what sort of defence it wants EU’s population lives under the relationship between ESDP NATO defence and security and NATO clearly needs to umbrella. In the words of Finnish MEP Ari Vatanen, NATO is be re-defined. The question is open, though, as to how and by indeed the backbone of European security. That makes a whom the relationship should be reassessed, and how it unified EU position towards transatlantic security – and toshould be determined which organisation will in future do wards any future NATO enlargements to include countries like what.

Ukraine and Georgia – of critical importance.

Although the past six months have seen the review of NATO’s Put another way, this means that the current situation in which strategic concept and that of the five year-old ESDP security European sentiment towards NATO varies from one member strategy, it remains to be seen whether European governments state to the next must come to an end. Europe needs to decide are prepared to increase their defence commitments and collectively what sort of defence it wants. So far the reality is improve their combat capability. that the EU has only seemed willing to get involved in comparatively low-cost, low-intensity operations like Congo and The hope is that there may be a silver lining to the clouds of Darfur. the financial crisis, in that governments across the EU will be seeking to get better value for their defence budgets and will The good news, though, is that the last few years in which also be trying to minimise duplication between their NATO and ESDP has moved from the drawing board to become an operaESDP commitments. In political terms, the areas of concern tional reality has also brought it home to many politicians that that overlap between NATO and the EU range widely from defence is not a zero-sum game in which NATO gets stronger if weapons of mass destruction to terrorism, piracy and energy the EU gets weaker. But on both sides policymakers also security. appear to have understood that a sharper delineation of competences and responsibilities is vital. Now the challenge is And then there’s the question of whether NATO should be the to make ESDP more complementary to NATO. worldwide security provider, or whether this responsibility

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Documentation Kosovo Declaration of Independence Approved by the Assembly of Kosovo in an extraordinary meeting on 17 February 2008, in Pristine 1. We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

2. We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes.

3. We accept fully the obligations for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari Plan, and welcome the framework it proposes to guide Kosovo in the years ahead. We shall implement in full those obligations including through priority adoption of the legislation included in its Annex XII, particularly those that protect and promote the rights of communities and their members.

Human rights 4. We shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution shall incorporate all relevant principles of the Ahtisaari Plan and be adopted through a democratic and deliberative process.

5. We welcome the international community’s continued support of our democratic development through international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission. We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to retain the leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo and to implement responsibilities assigned to it under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Ahtisaari Plan, until such time as Kosovo institutions are capable of assuming these responsibilities. We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure Kosovo’s future peace, prosperity and stability.

Europe 6. For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

7. We express our deep gratitude to the United Nations for the work it has done to help us recover and rebuild from war and build institutions of democracy. We are committed to working constructively with the United Nations as it continues its work in the period ahead.

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8. With independence comes the duty of responsible membership in the international community. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, other acts of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the international legal obligations and principles of international comity that mark the relations among states.

Kosovo shall have its international borders as set forth in Annex VIII of the Ahtisaari Plan, and shall fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all our neighbors. Kosovo shall also refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

9. We hereby undertake the international obligations of Kosovo, including those concluded on our behalf by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and treaty and other obligations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to which we are bound as a former constituent part, including the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. We shall cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. We intend to seek membership in international organisations, in which Kosovo shall seek to contribute to the pursuit of international peace and stability.

Peace and Stability 10. Kosovo declares its commitment to peace and stability in our region of southeast Europe. Our independence brings to an end the process of Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution. While this process has been a painful one, we shall work tirelessly to contribute to a reconciliation that would allow southeast Europe to move beyond the conflicts of our past and forge new links of regional cooperation. We shall therefore work together with our neighbours to advance a common European future.

11. We express, in particular, our desire to establish good relations with all our neighbours, including the Republic of Serbia with whom we have deep historical, commercial and social ties that we seek to develop further in the near future. We shall continue our efforts to contribute to relations of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of Serbia, while promoting reconciliation among our people.

12. We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically, and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including, especially, the obligations for it under the Ahtisaari Plan. In all of these matters, we shall act consistent with principles of international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, including resolution 1244 (1999). We declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely upon this declaration, and appeal to them to extend to us their support and friendship.

POLICY & POLITICS

The role and contribution of Macedonia in stabilizing the Balkans

By Antonio Milososki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia,

The Macedonian public was at disbelief upon hearing the news from Bucharest: Macedonia was not extended an invitation to join NATO, despite the fact that two of its partners under the Adriatic Charter –Albania and Croatia, were invited! Shock and disappointment spread among the Macedonian public on that 3 April 2008.

NATO confirmed that the Republic of Macedonia fulfilled all conditions to be invited to membership. The only problem was the lack of consensus, the achievement of which was impeded by the Hellenic Republic, resulting in the condition that the Republic of Macedonia would be invited to NATO membership as soon as “a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue is found”. Thus, a new wall stood before the Republic of Macedonia – an additional criterion, based on a blackmail to change its national name if the country wants to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic family. The bare fact that Greece is a member of NATO, having the power to indefinitely delay its agreement for a new name of the Republic of Macedonia, makes the talks on the name issue, pursued for more than a decade under UN auspices, asymmetric and inequitable.

The dream of generations before us – the dream of Europe whole, free and at peace is crumbling down and sifts like sand through the fingers. In a situation featured by the unresolved (at that time) status of Kosovo, and an official position of Belgrade, that to this day has not changed, that it is a matter of illegal secession of part of the Serbian territory and Bosnia and Herzegovina lost in the labyrinths of the Dayton Accords − in Bucharest the historic chance of integrating the Republic of Macedonia into the zone of lasting security and stability was lost.

Difficult relations with the Greek neighbour Macedonia had a difficult start in 1991. It was the only country that came out of the break-up of SFR Yugoslavia without bloodshed, but paying the price of the then Yugoslav Army taking away the entire military means and armaments. With fervent desire for independence and sovereignty, with a fragile economy, without foreign currency reserves, Macedonia was immediately attacked and charged by its southern neighbour with irredentism and territorial claims, solely because of the country’s own name. The change of the Constitution and the national flag by the Republic of Macedonia were not a sufficient concession for Greece which in the 1994 – 1995 period

Antonio Milososki Antonio Milososki was born on 29 January 1976 in Tetovo, Republic of Macedonia In 1999 he graduated from the Faculty of Law in Skopje. After “Master of European Integration” postgraduate studies at the Universities of Bonn and Duisburg.

From 1999-2000 he was Chief of Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia and from May 2000-September 2001 Spokesman of the Government. In September 2004 he became Member of the Executive Committee of the political party VMRO-DPMNE and in July 2006 MP in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. Since 26 August 2006 he is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia.

imposed an economic embargo, entirely blocking Corridor 10 which is of vital importance for Macedonia. The embargo was lifted at the end of 1995, upon the signing of the Interim Accord, under which Greece has inter alia obliged itself not to object to the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to international organizations, if the country is admitted under the provisions reference used within the UN. In Bucharest, Greece did not think twice and overtly violated this provision.

Macedonia’s cooperation with KFOR Despite such circumstances, in the difficult years that followed, Macedonia showed great constructiveness and cooperativeness with the international community. In 1998, on the eve of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Macedonia allowed the stationing on its territory first of the Extraction Forces (of the OSCE observers in Kosovo), and of the Kosovo Verification Mission. The strategic importance of Macedonia was such that without Macedonia the NATO operation would have been impossible. On 12 June 1999, crossing the Macedonian territory, about 45.000 KFOR troops started entering Kosovo. Just for the sake of the so called Communication Zone West (the Duress port) to Kosovo there were 287 kilometers of very bad roads, while from the Skopje Airport there was a less than 100 kilometer modern 4 – lane motorway! This was an important element for fast advancement, but also for rapid evacuation of the KFOR, if necessary.

An open and proactive policy Macedonia paid a dear price in this context- an influx of about 360.000 refuges from Kosovo (which would equal 18% of its

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increase its troops in Afghanistan by as much as 50%, desiring to give the greatest possible contribution to the fight against terrorism, but also to the peace and welfare of the Afghan people.

As a responsible neighbour, Macedonia is prepared to share the valuable experience of its peacekeepers in the training of the new security forces of Kosovo and to offer to interested allies its military training grounds, where they can prepare for future missions even in the worst climate conditions.

Despite the diminished enthusiasm of investors, resulting from the global economic crisis, Macedonia is making intensive efforts to complete the AMBO oil pipeline, which would transport oil from the Caspian to the Adriatic Sea, enhancing thus the energy security in the regional countries.

The memories of recent cold winters in Bosnia and Serbia demonstrate the fragility of the Region, and of Europe, for that matter, when it comes to energy supply (oil and gas).

Macedonian Air Force ready to support Macedonian KFOR contingent in Kosovo Photo: www.skybird-ev.de/DirkPesiker

own population!), resulting in a strong pressure on its economy, and instant and dangerous change of the delicate ethnic balance in the country and strained relations with Belgrade.

Yet, unlike a large number of European democracies, Macedonia accepted the refuges, preventing thus a humanitarian and consequently a security crisis in the region.

Another great challenge- the 2001 crisis: the Republic of Macedonia resolved this crisis in a matter of 5 months only, through the system institutions, concluding in the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which can be used as a greatly invaluable object lesson in successful resolution of similar situations in the region and in the world.

Since then, owing to its open and proactive policy, Macedonia has become a serious factor of security in the region. Considering its geo-strategic position, the Republic of Macedonia is not only a passive, but also a very active regional factor, firmly committed to and most often assuming the leading role in the intensive regional cooperation in various areas (SEECP, Stability Pact, RCC, Adriatic Charter, SEDM process and others). As of 2007, the Republic of Macedonia has been autonomously providing complete logistic support to KFOR, the most important mission of NATO in Europe.

Macedonia’s contribution to international peace missions Macedonia exports security beyond the region, as well. In the past period, more than 1000 Macedonian troops have participated in international peace missions world wide (ISAF, Iraqi Freedom, Althea, and UNIFIL). In respect of military contributions, Macedonia conducts itself as a major player, fully dedicated and determined to succeed. Hence, next year, despite the fact that many countries will reduce their contingents, Macedonia plans to

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An active contribution to the region’s stability One does not have to be a political expert to understand that Macedonia is not a threat for any country in the Region. On the contrary, with its engagement and political positioning towards its neighbours, Macedonia actively contributes to the Region’s stability. However, all these efforts could be futile, if Macedonia is not promptly integrated into NATO, and then into the EU. The liberalization of the visa regime with the Schengen countries and the date for the start of EU accession negotiations are within reach. All that is required is good will in order that bilateral issues are not abused in the processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration at the detriment of Macedonia.

Many times, even in the most difficult situations, Macedonia has been proven itself as a reliable partner and a friend.

Integrated and stronger, liberated from unnecessary waste of its energy, Macedonia will reciprocate even more. As an equal member of the European family, the capacities of Macedonia for producing stability, security and long term progress will be significantly multiplied, to the satisfaction of the Region and wider.

* Greece is accepting the Republic of Macedonia under the UN-membership registration of “Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

POLICY & POLITICS

What the European Union should do for the stability in the Balkans – the human factor

By Doris Pack MEP, Brussels

Any potential opponents to further enlargement should keep in mind that the Western Balkan countries are located in the very heart of Europe, which means that any indication of instability in the region of Southeast Europe automatically represents a threat to the stability of its EU neighbours. That is a prospect, I am sure, nobody of us would like to see becoming reality.

We have experienced it at the beginning of the 1990‘s, with the break up of former Yugoslavia and the subsequent war in Croatia and Bosnia. The intervention of the international community was quintessential at that time, especially in regard to signing the Dayton Peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Helping end this war represented a success for the EU foreign policy, since it contributed to the ending of bloodshed, and also offered assistance to the postwar reconstruction of the involved parties. The creation of the Stability Pact by the EU was a sign of our determination to consolidate and restore the shattered relations among these countries, the presence of NATO in BiH, which is now transformed into the European Forces as it was the case with Macedonia some time ago, and the current presence of the EULEX mission in Kosovo are all EU contributions to the maintenance of peace in the region.

Preparing a decisive and effective enlargement stage The enlargement strategy of the European Union (EU) in regard to the countries of Southeast Europe (SEE) is a frequently discussed topic in European political circles nowadays. Some parties oppose new enlargement openly, others such as myself, endorse it. In this context we can often hear the term “enlargement fatigue” or the reluctance within these circles to continue the enlargement process at the same pace, especially due to the halt with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. One should be aware of the fact that citizens of the EU are first and foremost interested in the stability of the Union. That is why the Lisbon Strategy is needed, so that we can manage to stabilize our institutions and be able to enter a more decisive and effective enlargement stage.

As a matter of fact, I would not call this phenomenon “enlargement fatigue”; it is rather giving a chance to national governments of the Western Balkan countries to settle their internal problems and fulfil the conditions and obligations on their European integration path, as to be “fully equipped” for becoming EU members.

Doris Pack Graduated from teaching college in 1965. She taught in primary schools (1965-1974) and was employed by the Saarland Ministry of Education (1983-1985). She was Member of the German Bundestag (1974-1983/1985-1989) and Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the WEU Assembly (1981-1983/19851989). Doris Pack is Member of the European Parliament (EPP-ED Group) since July 1989. Since 1994 she is EPP coordinator on the Committee on Culture, Education and the Media and is chairing the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with South-East Europe. Only recently she was appointed Chairwoman of the Culture and Education Committee of the European Parliament.

The question at this point would be how we can further help maintaining stability in the Balkans and how these countries themselves can contribute to this effort.

Bringing stability into the Balkan region Transition to democracy requires a lot of hard work and efforts and a long-term involvement. However, the countries of SEE should not be investing efforts in democratisation for the benefit of Europe; they should do it for themselves and for the citizens living there, because all the reform processes, democratic government and rule of law are needed there, not only in order to fulfil the benchmarks set by EU, but to raise the living standards of ordinary people in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and their neighbouring countries, which means bringing stability to the region.

The EU must continue its presence and a strong political dialogue in the region in order to make sure that a successful transition to democracy is achieved; it has to show a continuous interest in current items on the political and economic agendas of SEE countries, to show support or disagreement, depending on the merits of every single state, maybe even more than it was the case up to now.

Reconciliation and regional cooperation On the other hand, a lot of responsibility lies on the governing structures, civil society and young people. Each country has been carefully examined in order to identify the fields in which reforms and changes are needed, ranging from judiciary reforms, building up of democratic institutions, economic

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The war in Bosnia-Herzegowina from 1992 to 1995 was not only dramatic for the population but also for the cultural heritage. The reconstruction of distroyed monuments and historical sites such as monasteries will take time.

A symbol for a slowly growing new spirit in the Balkans is the “Old Bridge of Mostar�; Built in the middle of the 16th century by the Osmans, the bridge was distroyed in 1993 by artillery.

The restoration started in 1996 and was mostly completed in spring 2004. Since then the bridge has become a symbol for the cohabitation of a population of different descent.

development, curbing corruption and organized crime, investing in education, etc. The EU is there to offer financial aid, know-how and the possibilities for young people from the Western Balkans to engage in educational programs in the EU and learn more about its structure and functioning. However, the most important elements for the perseverance of peace and stability in the region are reconciliation and regional cooperation, and it is truly necessary to stress this over and over again, because there are obviously political structures that decided to obstruct the process. We can see this everyday in the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Newspaper headlines expose corruption of ruling elites, mutual accusations and criminal activities, but above all their nationalistic rhetoric, which only causes distrust among ordinary people. The Serbs in Northern Kosovo are still under the grip of Serbia, instead of being encouraged to integrate into the Kosovar society. This is not a way of promoting regional security and economic development.

Focus on internal progress in the countries Ordinary people are sick of hate rhetoric, threats of potential hostilities. They are more concerned about how they are going

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to feed their family next month, or what they are going to do once they finish university and end up without the chance of having a job. Therefore, all the politicians in the region should focus on internal progress of their countries, fulfilling the benchmarks for a visa free regime so that their citizens can travel freely and discover Europe However, the overall situation is stable at the moment. With the recent accession of Croatia and Albania to NATO, significant progress for the maintenance of peace has already been made. Each step these countries make on their way into the European Union and NATO will be closely followed by the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament and with this I want to say that the EU is going to maintain a strong presence in the Western Balkans and that it would like to see these countries as its members as soon as all the requirements have been met.

POLICY & POLITICS

RUSSIA in the Balkans − traditional influence versus western interests

By Dr. Milos Solaja, M.A., Director Center for International Relations, Banja Luka

Any discussion of a Russian-European partnership must take account of relations between Russia and Southeastern Europe, the region known as the Balkans, a name with pejorative connotations.

Russias Interests in the Balkans Russia has a wide variety of interests in Southeastern Europe: • Geopolitical and geostrategic: Russia has traditionally sought to extend its influence to the Adriatic Sea and thereby gain access to the Mediterranean and a warm-water outlet for its navy and merchant fleet.

• Political: Many countries in Southeastern Europe tend to accept and follow Russia’s policies, for a number of reasons related to economics, security, culture, history, energy security etc. Good relations with Russia are important to these countries as a support and a counterweight to the United States and other western countries.

• Value-related: because of their long similar history, including their history of socialism and transition over the last 60 years, Russia and a majority of the Southeastern European countries have a mutual understanding based on processes of accommodation, security provision and shared experience; • Economic: longstanding economic relations involving military supplies and energy infrastructure such as nuclear power plants are an important factor, reflected in dependent technologies, trade and markets; • Religion: Southeastern Europe is mainly Orthodox, with even the All-Orthodox site in the region, which results in strong religious ties between these countries and Russia.

• US influence: Russia seeks to hinder or prevent the United States from extending its political and strategic influence in countries close to Russia’s border that were under Russian domination, and to pursue its own interests in the region.

Against this backdrop of interests, objectives and power relationships, Russia has not forfeited its presence in the Balkans and continues to foster dependence on Russia’s energy and supply routes based on resources under Russian control.

Regional cooperation –crucial prerequisite Southeastern Europe has undergone many changes since the beginning of the 1990s. The six countries of Southeastern Europe are a bridge between Europe and other major regions Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasus, Danube, Alps-Adriatic

Dr. Milos Solaya Dr. Milos Solaja was born in 1956 in Banja Luka. He finished primary and grammar school in Banja Luka. Studied political sciences in Belgrade and Zagreb and graduated in Zagreb. Postgraduate studies in Zagreb (MA) and PhD in international relations.

1991 -1997 Journalist with “Glas” Banja Luka and “Oslobodjenje” Sarajevo dailies. 1997-2001 “Tanjug”, Belgrade, as permanent correspondent.

Correspondent for “Reuters” London.

Dr. Milos Solaja founded the International Press Center, Banja Luka 1997 and created in 2001 the Center for International Relations, the first think-thank in BiH which has become politically relevant and is known over the region. He is currently the director of the Center for International Relations , and he is lecturing at the University of Banja Luka – Faculty of Policial Sciences on international relations and geopolitics.

and Adriatic – with which it shares substantial interdependence. As a result, Southeastern Europe is totally or partly affected by 14 different regional initiatives with varying impact.

Clearly, regional cooperation is crucial for the countries in the region if they are to achieve three main goals: • improving economic cooperation in Southeastern Europe; • providing a higher level of security and stability; • and achieving accommodation in the run-up to collective security and economic integration.

Nations are striving for membership in NATO/EU Geostrategic changes are conditioned by the fact that Southeastern Europe is the last part of Europe seen as belonging to the continent as traditionally defined and the last part of the continent to gain access the European Union, and by the fact that the region’s strategic importance as the link between different regions prompts all the “major” powers to seek to extend their influence there. Many regional initiatives have been taken by the USA and the EU and none by Russia, despite Russia’s ongoing interest in the region. After the transition, the focus of power shifted towards the West, with all the countries of Southeastern Europe now determined to join NATO and the European Union.

The Russian Influence The spirit of the West is pitted in the region against both the old and the new Russian influence in Southeastern Europe, the

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newly-forged term connoting the new geopolitics in the region.

Russian influence is traditional, historical and modern: • Political history: Russia played a great role in the decisions taken by the peoples of the Balkans and in creating their national states during the Ottoman Empire. Many ties with Russia − particularly spiritual, cultural and scientific − date from that time. Recent history has had similar impact: many countries received decisive Russian assistance at the end of the Second World War. During the socialist period, substantial economic ties were established and many of these still exist; • Traditional and cultural values: Russia is the biggest Orthodox and Slavic country. Throughout history, these two values played an enormous role in the history of the Balkan countries and in the life of their inhabitants.

Balkan nations’ ties to Russia Three different arcs with regional ties to Russia can be defined: • The Slavic Arc: the majority in Southeastern Europe is of Slavic origin in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, with Slovenia in the vicinity, in addition to significant Slavic national minorities in other countries; • The Orthodox Arc: in a different combination, another majority in Southeastern Europe is Orthodox, in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and also BosniaHerzegovina, where the Republic of Srpska is mainly Orthodox, alongside numerous Orthodox communities in Albania, Croatia and Slovenia.

• The (post)socialist Arc: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and nearby Slovenia are countries that share similar traditions, values and transition difficulties.

Herzegovina and Kosovo during that period while strengthening cultural and particularly energy-related ties.

During the third phase, after 2004, Russia has become a much bigger world player thanks to its enormous revenues from oil and gas, increased arms production and export and incipient industrial revitalization. In this period, which is still ongoing, Russia has significant projects related to the Balkans, particularly in the field of energy.

Kosovo Russia’s political presence is reflected in its very strong cooperation with and support for Serbia on the issue of Kosovo’s independence. For a year before the proclamation of independence by the Kosovo temporary authorities, Russia and Serbia had been coordinating and synchronizing their positions. For Russia, the example of Kosovo is a violation of international law and potentially a source of many similar separatist crises across the world. Meanwhile, Russia gained substantial support in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as sympathies in Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece. In line with Russia’s increasing activities and political presence in Southeastern Europe, it clearly aims to influence events in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Dayton Peace Accords and the Office of the High Representative.

Recent events in connection with Kosovo’s independence can also be seen in terms of modern geopolitics, with its relativization of borders and anticipation of interconnection and integration on a regional and global level. Though the US and some EU countries claim that Kosovo does not constitute a precedent, events show that a number of separatist regions are seeking to use Kosovo as an example in pursuing their own separatist independence goals.

Western alignment and Russia After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy went through three successive stages: From the collapse of the USSR to the end of the 20th century, Russia focused more on internal than on foreign policy issues transition of ownership, consolidation of the economy, democratic transformation and internal security. In the field of foreign affairs, the first task was to remain a partner of the West in the process of decision-making regarding a variety of international issues, in which the Balkan region was a major focus during the last decade of the century.

The second period saw the redefinition of Russia’s foreign policy, a strengthening of the Russian military and emphasis on the need for a greater Russian presence in the “near abroad”, i.e. the former Soviet sphere, and a greater Russian role in world affairs and global problem-solving. From the Balkan perspective, Russia withdrew its troops from Bosnia-

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To conclude, for Russia, Southeastern Europe holds out new political opportunities; for the US, the region offers a chance to get closer to Russia and Eurasia and to enhance its influence in the surrounding regions; for the countries of the region, the only way forward is the path to peace, stability and security. Today, a majority of countries in Southeastern Europe are close to NATO and the EU. Others are defined as the Western Balkans, a term created by the European Union to facilitate the efforts of these countries (the former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus Albania) as they strive to meet the security and economic standards required for broader European integration.

SECURITY

A European energy policy for the 21st century

By Andris Piebalgs, European Energy Commissioner, Brussels

As the current financial crisis leads us all to tighten our belts, we are increasingly forced to distinguish between products and services we can and cannot live without.

Energy is clearly essential; we need heat and light for our homes as well as for the computers and industrial machines that power the economy.

Energy is crucial for the EU’s competitiveness At the EU level we know the importance of energy for the European Union’s competitiveness and each citizen‘s quality of life. Indeed energy is at the heart of the EU’s strategy for growth and jobs. Ensuring competitive energy markets should, in the long term, help to reduce the rise in energy costs for consumers. Recent historical highs in energy prices have underlined once again how important it is to ensure that markets are competitive. But competitiveness is just one dimension to energy policy. Energy supply and production also has to be secure and sustainable. We have felt this in a dramatic way in the recent gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia. On security, we need to make sure that we are not overly dependent on a very limited number of suppliers - we need to diversify. As far as sustainability is concerned, there is an extra dimension where we will live with the consequences of our actions – or lack of them – during the years to come.

Initiatives taken by the Commission So when we talk about EU energy policy we need to have three guiding principles in mind. The energy markets need to be competitive and fully functioning. We need to be able to ensure that we will have sufficient supplies. And we need to make sure that energy production and use are sustainable. I would like to give just a few examples of initiatives that the Mission has taken, and what is the way that we are going to follow in the future.

• Energy efficiency. In 2006, the Commission drew up an Energy Efficiency Action Plan containing many initiatives to save over 20% of the EU’s annual primary energy consumption by 2020 compared to the business-as-usual scenario.

• Competitiveness. In 2005 the Commission launched a comprehensive competition enquiry into how the electricity and gas sectors work. This showed significant obstacles to completing the EU single market and the need for new initiatives to continue market opening and improve competition. In the second half of 2007 the Commission proposed legislation to make this happen. The key elements were more effective unbundling

Andris Piebalgs was born in Valmiera (Latvia) on 17th September 1957. In 1980 he obtained his degree in Physics from University of Latvia and worked as a teacher before entering Latvian politics. From 1990-1993 he was Minister of Education, in 1993 and 1994 he was chairing the Budget and finance committee of the Parliament of Latvia. In 1994 he became Finance minister of Latvia and held this post for two years. In 1995 he started his diplomatic career and became the ambassador of Latvia in Estonia. Between 1998 and 2003 he was the Ambassador of Latvia to the European Union, later Undersecretary of State for EU affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. He took up the post of Energy Commissioner in November 2004.

between transmission and supply, European cooperation by regulators and Transmission System Operators, independence of national regulators and increased transparency. On the 21st April of this year, the result of this proposed legislation, the Internal Energy Market package, was approved by the European Parliament, and it is expected that the Council will formally endorse the text within the next few months.

• Improving the share of renewable energy in the energy mix. In early 2008 the Commission proposed a directive to increase the share of renewable energy in the EU from 8.5% today to 20% in 2020. Reinforcing these proposals, the Commission produced a policy document on offshore wind power and next year it will move further forward in encouraging the use of sustainable biofuels.

The EU is promoting these objectives internationally both through promoting mutual understanding and transferring know-how. It has regular meetings with all major consuming and producing regions, including Russia, Norway, Algeria, Central Asia, China, India, OPEC and the Gulf States.

Finally, the Commission is working on promoting technologies that will contribute to achieving the EU’s goals for greenhouse gas emissions and the use of renewable energies. In 2007 it produced an Action Plan to promote sustainable energy technologies, which is now being implemented. One implementing action is to identify the financing of these technologies and the Commission will issue a policy document on this by summer 2009.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

How to secure EU’s energy supply?

A strategy to meet the challenges of the 21th century While implementing existing EU measures is important, all EU Member States agree on the need to go further to meet the energy security and climate change challenges of the 21st century. Since 2006 the European Commission, supported by all the Member States has been drawing up a comprehensive Energy Policy for Europe. On November 13th 2008, this policy went through already the Second Strategic review which updates this policy with a new set of priorities.

The first priority identified in the second Strategic Review is to adopt and rapidly implement the measures to reach European Council energy policy targets for Europe aiming at a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% share for renewables in final energy consumption and a 20% saving in future energy demand by 2020. Cleaner, more diverse and more efficient energy will be good for Europe’s energy supply and economy. The new rules will also create a more stable, consistent and transparent environment for new energy investments.

The second priority is to address the growing precariousness of Europe’s energy supply security. Even when the renewable energy policy goals are reached, Europe is likely to be dependent on more imports than today.

The Solidarity Action Plan Therefore, the Commission proposed an EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan with five areas where more action is needed to help set the EU on course for more secure and sustainable energy supplies in the future and to avert the risk of crisis in the EU as a whole.

More effective support is needed for projects to build the required infrastructure. Europe’s networks need billions of Euros of investment to replace aging infrastructure and adapt to low-carbon and renewable energy. The Security and Solidarity Action Plan identified six strategic infrastructure initiatives as

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essential for the EU’s energy security: • a Baltic Interconnection Plan, • a Mediterranean Energy Ring, • adequate North-South gas and electricity interconnections with Central and South-East Europe, • a North Sea Offshore Grid, effective liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies for Europe and a Southern Gas Corridor. In addition, a policy debate on the future of the Trans-European Energy Networks has been launched.

The EU has to make better use of its indigenous energy resources, both renewable Photo: www.eia.doe.gov and fossil, as well as nuclear for those Member States who decide to use it.

More attention has to be paid to solidarity, including EU crisis mechanisms, oil stocks and a variety of mechanisms to respond to possible gas disruption.

Additional efforts have to be made to improve energy efficiency. This year, for example, the European Union extended rules on the eco-design of energy-using products to other products that impact energy consumption. The Commission has made new proposals on the energy performance of buildings, as well as a new proposal on the labelling of tyres. Both proposals should be adopted by the co-legislation at the end of this year.

Greater focus on energy in the EU’s international relations, including through establishment of relationships with supplier, transit and consumer countries based on interdependence will contribute to the achievement of the EU energy policy goals and also increase the EU’s influence on international energy developments. In this winter gas crisis we have seen how important is for Europe to speak with one voice. Closer coordination among Member States and with the Commission in external energy relations have been detrimental to finding a solution to the crisis.

The Economic Recovery Package To conclude with, at the beginning of May the European Parliament approved the Economic Recovery Package, which marks the first time funding is allocated for improving energy infrastructure. This package includes 3.98bn Euro for energy investments, including 565m Euro for offshore wind projects and 1.05bn Euro to support carbon capture-and-storage (CCS) demonstration projects.

So, these are the strategic areas paving the way towards the EU’s energy goals of a safe, secure, sustainable and competitive energy supply. Energy is and will remain the backbone of our economy and a strong EU role – in cooperation with all Member States – is the best way of making progress towards achieving them.

SECURITY

Cyber defence – the Estonian Experience and how Europe can protect its societies

By Tarmo Kõuts MP, Vice-Admiral (R), Head of the Estonian Delegation to the European Security and Defence Assembly/ Assembly of the WEU Some time ago the notions of cyber warfare and cyber defence were not very familiar at the global level. But the emergence of the Internet made modern societies depend heavily on computers and computer network enabled capabilities bringing together new challenges like information warfare, cyber warfare and cyber terrorism. A secure cyberspace is vitally important to both developed and developing countries and not only with regard to economic wellbeing, but also with a view towards safety and security of its citizens.

Cyberspace under constant attack Cyberspace, is under constant attack. It can be assumed that the continuing globalization and interoperability of information systems will make cyber space even more attractive as a target and increase its vulnerability.

Cyber attacks can be viewed as contemporary asymmetrical threats to countries’ national security. As the attacks against critical infrastructure in the UK, France and Germany and against governmental networks in Estonia and Georgia have demonstrated, we have likely entered an era of cyber terror and perhaps even of cyber war.

Dr. Tarmo Kõuts MP, Vice Admiral Born 1953, educated in the Tallinn Maritime School, (shipmaster 1973) and the Kaliningrad Technical Institute, (maritime navigation 1985).

Career: Estonian Shipping Company, from Sailor to Superintendent, 1973–1990; Estonian Maritime Education Centre, Rector 1990–1993; Estonian Border Guard Administration, Director General 1993–2000; Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces 2000-2006; Member of the 11th Riigikogu, 2007, National Defence Committee and Head of the Estonian Delegation to the ESDA/WEU Assembly.

The experience of Estonia* Let me concentrate on the two latter issues as they are closely linked to Estonia. In April 2007, our country was subjected to a politically motivated offensive cyber campaign. The campaign targeted our advanced development by attacking government, industries, banks, media and private sites in two phases.

Phase I: During Phase I (27-29 April 2007) most of the attacks were carried out by hackers of different skills and sophistication. This phase could be called “hacktivism”.

Phase II: In Phase II (30 April – 18 May 2007) we found that three main categories of attackers were in operation: terrorists, cyber attack specialists and hackers. The hackers were in phase II smaller in number, but used more professional methods and instruments, such as botnets. A botnet links together many computers around the world and can mobilize zombie computers generating computing power beyond our imagination. It is a well known fact that botnet operators sell their services to the private companies in competition or to state actors trying to terrorize nonconforming media outlets and/or other countries.

A prepared Estonian reaction

The Baltic States, EU and NATO Members, and their geopolitical situation

The cyber attack specialists as we identified performed similar activities in Estonia as in the Moonlight Maze incident in the US in March 1998 where a pattern of illegal probing into computer systems at the Pentagon, NASA, Energy Department, private universities and research labs has been discovered.

The Estonian authorities reacted to the increase in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) by raising the throughput capacity of

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the state network. The reason why cyber attacks posed only a limited threat to our national security was the fact that we had been preparing for those attacks already for some years. One step on this way could be considered the foundation of the Estonian Cyber Defence Centre in 2004 and CERT – the Estonian Computer Emergency Response Team in 2006. Also in early 2008 on a proposal from the Estonian authorities, NATO members agreed to the establishment of a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD-CoE) in Tallinn. From November 2008 the accreditation procedure was completed and the CCD-CoE started to work as an official NATO competence center, having the status of an international military organization.

Consequences in Estonia • Creation of a national Critical Infrastructure Defence unit The preparations for the foundation of the national Critical Infrastructure Defence unit are underway in Estonia. The principal aim of its activities is communication with public and private sector institutions of major importance, evaluation of their IT-security means and surveillance on the innovation of their security measures.

• Estonian cyber security strategy (2008-2013) On 8 May 2008 the Estonian Government endorsed the Estonian cyber security strategy for the period 2008 to 2013. This document constitutes the strategic objectives of cyber security and the relevant activities for diminishing the vulnerability of cyber space.

Where is the EU policy on cyber security?

Securing our common purpose and interests in the cyber warfare area requires that we start understanding decisively the impact of cyber defence on our civilian military affairs. As cyber threats originate also from outside of the EU, an EU policy should be considered on international cooperation and assistance to third countries to raise cyber security awareness and to strengthen their law enforcement capabilities.

Real world versus virtual world Finally, I would like to raise an issue on global use of the internet and virtual world. Indeed the new IT-technologies are very sophisticated and most helpful in every field but at the same time they are also bringing together some threats, especially in our everyday life and for our younger generations. Our children are more and more dependent on computers which replace sometimes their social communication with human beings. They are often living in virtual worlds which could be exciting but can also orient them towards violence and exaggerations. Thus we should find a balance for making a difference between the real and virtual world. *see article Bert Weingarten page 35

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Documents Report on Cyber Warfare, adopted by the WEU-Assembly on 3 December 2008 (Document A/2022) Recommendations: “(…)

The Assembly (…) RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1. Take steps, as part of a common approach, to define and classify the risks and threats in the area of cyber security and defence; 2. Support European and transatlantic initiatives aimed at improving and building joint and national capabilities in this field, such as the establishment of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia; 3. Implement NATO’s cyber defence concept and encourage cooperation and the exchange of information between NATO and the EU in this domain; 4. Consider tasking the European Defence Agency with the responsibility for drawing up, developing and implementing a cyber security and defence concept under the ESDP; 5. Ensure cooperation between states and establish mechanisms for rapid assistance and the provision of storage and back-up IT infrastructure in the event of systematic multisectoral cyber attack on one or more allied states; 6. Engage in dialogue and set up cooperation mechanisms between other states in the world facing the same cyber risks and threats; 7. Seek to harmonise national laws and practices relating to the Internet and its use, with a view to minimising or avoiding the occurrence and development of geographic IT vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious state or non-state actors; 8. Keep the Assembly informed about the status of discussions and work carried out in NATO and the EU in the area of cyber security and defence and which have real implications for joint security and defence. (…)”

Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Christopher Chope (United Kingdom, Federated Group) and Tarmo Kõuts (Estonia, Federated Group), Rapporteurs

SECURITY

Cyberwar – NATO’s exposed flank

By Bert Weingarten, PAN AMP AG Board, Hamburg

The security and defence pact that is NATO (the North AtlanticTreaty Organisation) is able to pool the military potential of all its members. NATO’s defensive strategy is based on the continuous monitoring of land, sea and airspace far beyond the territory it is there to defend. In this way it can gain early warning of potentially hostile military movements and analyse the degree of threat they represent in order to react immediately and appropriately. Land, sea and air forces stand available if a military reaction is called for (including the NATO Response Force). In July 2006 Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced plans for expanding the Alliance’s defense strategy to embrace a Europe-wide missile defence programme that also included enhanced early warning through airspace surveillance. The level of sophistication attained in continuous monitoring of land, sea and airspace makes it extremely difficult for a tank regiment, formation of warships, or even smaller combat units to close in on NATO territory unnoticed. And there is virtually no chance of moving within NATO territory without being seen.

Internet − the underestimated danger In order to appreciate the risk that the internet poses to NATO a basic definition of the word itself would be helpful. It has often been falsely assumed that the term refers to an “INTERnational NETwork”, but ‘inter’ is taken from the Latin for “between”. In fact, the internet established links between many smaller networks using a common basic language (TCP/IP). In the early days of the internet back in the sixties, military networks in the USA were linked together under the so-called “Arapnet”. Then the universities, net operators and private individuals all connected up, ultimately forming the network of all networks, today’s “Internet”. Thanks to the speedy interconnection of international networks, today’s worldwide web facilitates global communication but it also means that virtually all military networks, wittingly, and sometimes unwittingly, contain gateways to the internet. The upshot is that almost any military network can be accessed and attacked from the internet whereas the net cannot be monitored to give advance warning of an impending attack.

What’s more, an attack on military networks over the internet may come from outside Alliance territory, but it may actually originate inside the networks of NATO member countries.

Cyber attack on Estonia* Contrary to the initial suspicions of the Estonian government, the attack on Estonia’s IT infrastructure in 2007 was not the first act in a cyberwar launched from the Kremlin, but a coordi-

Bert Weingarten Bert Weingarten, CEO of PAN AMP, Hamburg.

Born 1978 in Hamburg, Bert Weingarten graduated from the Max-Planck-Institute, Hamburg, in information and communications technology.

He created the first “internet project house” in Germany and developed and managed concepts for using internet access in the public sphere. He operated the first public internet focal points in Germany, and thus had a decisive role in the enlargement of the internet in Germany. With the foundation of PAN AMP in 1998, Weingarten was responsible for the development of internet electron filters and security technologies as well as automatic internet analysis and forensic processes.

Weingarten supports the security scene of Europe through KeyNotes to Ministers of the Interior, Police Presidents and Directors of State Offices of Criminal Investigation. Furthermore he is as a specialist a solicited lecturer in the audiences of the offices of the German Federal States and the Federal Government, where he optimises the skills of internet agents. With those activities Weingarten could early contribute in an essential way to the preventive calculation of dangerous situations in Europe.

nated attack by a few Russian IT experts and fellow hackers.

The removal of a Russian war memorial from the capital Tallin at the end of April 2007 sparked off two weeks of cyber attacks against the servers of Estonia’s government, political parties, banks and media companies. These attacks isolated or shut down government and administrative IT systems. Estonia’s leading bank had to suspend international payments for two days. Hospitals and power grids were also affected. And the attacks went beyond targeting banks, ministries and the government: dramatically, they also went for the numbers used to contact the country’s emergency services. Estonia’s Computer Emergency Response team had already run a range of simulations and IT crisis scenarios but the sheer scale of these attacks overwhelmed them, coming as they did from many different networks or subnets across the globe, for example in the US or Vietnam.

Individual attacks were carried out at different bandwidths of below 10 and up to 100 megabits per second. Most were in the 10 to 30 Mbps range. Three quarters lasted fewer than sixty minutes and only 5.5% more than ten hours. For some IT security experts, the internet attack on Estonia, a country which, even by EU standards, boasted massive internet ac-

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Cyberwar − conflict in virtual space

Bert Weingarten during his speech at the Police Congress 2009 in Berlin

cess, high e-government standards and many online services, constitutes a new form of retaliatory action.

The Estonian government brought in NATO and the EU and called for action, including the development of a strategy to deter future cyber attacks. The Estonian incident is being taken extremely seriously in NATO circles, and one point now at issue is whether such cases should be used to invoke collective defence on the part of Alliance member countries.

Immediately after the event, IT security experts travelled to Tallin from the US Department of Homeland Security as well as the Secret Services, responsible for protecting US financial services. One priority is to identify the point of origin of the attacks as the aggressors are using new peer-to-peer techniques.

IT security of NATO’s Member States The first assessment of a NATO member state in the wake of the cyber attack on Estonia was voiced by Mike Witt, the deputy Director of US-CERT. Thanks to their greater size, sophistication and variety, US government networks would resist attack more effectively, but the Estonian example had shown just how easily a country’s infrastructure could be brought to a standstill. There are already criminal communities at large today offering to carry out this type of attack anywhere in the world. Even networks perceived to be secure are beset time and time again by relatively easy-toproduce IT viruses and worms. In February 2009 NATO members were hit by the “Conficker” computer worm. After several hundred German Army computers had been contaminated, individual stations cut themselves off from the army network to prevent further spreading of this malicious software. In mid-January as “Conficker” successfully penetrated as far as the French Navy’s intranet, the British MOD and other NATO partners were feverishly directing resources against this new threat.

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Cyberwar is a contraction of Cyberspace War and refers to military conflict [kriegerische Auseinandersetzung] waged in and around virtual space, chiefly using instruments from the realm of information technology. So far cyberattacks have only succeeded in paralysing computerised links. Hence, cyberwar is the term used to describe military conflict waged in data networks through a combination of cyber attacks and countermeasures.

It is, however, conceivable that security technology could be overcome and computer systems hijacked for nefarious purposes.

Misinformation could be convincingly generated and, say, computer-driven guidance and fire control systems induced to report friendly forces as hostile. Cyberwar might ultimately lead to unintentional attacks on friendly troops or allies.

It is therefore becoming a part of asymmetric warfare and, in certain circumstances, could be an effective counter to Network Centric Warfare e.g. if a force with inferior military resources and technology were ranged against an enemy heavily dependent on electronic communication systems. In particular, the fact that a cyberwar could be mounted against the NATO Alliance from within member countries begs the question of whether, and how, the partners could stand together in the event of a cyberwar. So far there is no rule to follow on this in the NATO treaty. Under Article V, the member states undertake to ensure their collective security by taking an attack on any one of them as an attack on all and assisting the aggrieved partner. However, Article 6 limits the obligation to assisting a partner against armed attacks in the North Atlantic area.

IT line of defence of the NATO member states Essentially, the internet has blurred front lines, connecting almost any potential aggressor to its victim and allowing no early warning. National territories now extend into the internet and whole areas there stand virtually unprotected. Moreover, conventional military means are no defence against the attack scenarios of a cyberwar. Hence the importance and urgency for all NATO member states to introduce an active line of defence into their internet backbones and gateways so that, in the event of an attack, the IT structure and equipment of Alliance states can be actively protected without delay. * see article Tarmo Kõuts page 35 f.

SECURITY

Can Industries take the lead in filling the gap between Defence and Governments' Security?

By Luc van de Winckel, Brussels

Everybody agrees and knows security is a global issue, yet everyone fails to act with a global response. It may be naïve, and economical and political aspects are inhibiting this vision but should we stand on sidelines and wait?

Transatlantic cooperation and sharing experiences will benefit all, governmental research on both sides of the ocean and beyond need to collaborate to set common standards if we want to achieve our goals. Industry needs to agree on these standards and develop solutions that fit the global threats.

Customization and Localization of solutions is and will remain part of the game and ensure survival of smaller local companies. Custom proprietary solutions however will only isolate the country or department using it and will lead to an incapacity to predict, collaborate and respond to an international threat.

No structure solution in sight We slowly see progress on the EU and US, NATO and EU sides that collaboration, leveraging of knowledge is taking place , yet we are far from a structure solution. Many of these contacts are based on goodwill and personal involvement. Having attended numerous conferences, debates and speeches on the topic, I can say YES everybody knows the above, everybody agrees on the above yet all fail to act on it, which is understandable as no organization has a clear responsibility.

The defense and security arena which is relatively new and has no clear boundaries has as many suppliers, as it has official organizations interested in solutions. The EU is soon to draft an ESDP white paper. NATO has its own guidelines and then all member states ( EU, NATO and others) have their own vision.

We, the industry and think tanks owe it as a civic duty to reach beyond borders and start sharing our experience and wisdom today, not by reflecting who needs to lead, what regulations need to control and so on, our politicians are already doing that. We need to start discussing among industries and researchers in the defense and security field where are the critical spots that need standards, which experiences can we share (without touching, conflicting with security regulations or ITAR). Clear and easy communication channels between agencies, countries and local law enforcement would be a major step forward in fighting terrorism and organized crime, protecting critical infrastructure, advocate cyber security etc.

Industries’ Advice We need to look at it bottom up rather than top down.

We as an industry need to agree on what makes the most sense

Luc van de Winckel Born 1974 in Brussels. With a technical degree of the KHI De Nayer, St Kateleine Waver he joined Hewlett Packard in 1998 where he held various technical and sales positions, for the last 3 years focusing on Business development and marketing in Europe for the UN, EU and NATO. He is currently the EU chair for the European American Business Council’s defence workgroup.

and validate with our political leaders and customers on what their most critical issues are presently.

This should be one string of industry advice − commonly with the research advise towards our political leaders on a European, NATO level and on a country level. Currently the confusion spread around in the defense and security community is increased by the amount of committees, research studies and organizations floating around.

Surely we must be able to discuss collaboration standards among this global community. I see these steps as follows We need to map current interest groups currently involved in creating white papers and advice to EU, NATO, US an nations.

Having these organizations collaborate and discus on the 10 most important success factors for a global defense strategy would be the start. This would allow a platform for enhanced transatlantic collaboration between industries as well, albeit shielded by the organizations.

We need urgently a breakthrough Once the industry − think tanks’ conclusions and priorities have been set, they should be shared with the overall political establishment, validating it and ensureing our political leadership can craft the laws and regulations to increase the security with utmost efficiency. Leaving room for local adaption to specific needs yet ensureing standardization, collaboration remains rigorously in place.

Achieving this would be a breakthrough milestone and the start of an integrated global defense community which will allow easy, cost effective local implementations of solutions that fit everyone’s special needs.

We owe it as a citizen to our governments to ensure investments are made wisely and usefully, these investments protect our children and our future.

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Improving NATO’s Expiditionary Capabilities

By Jirí Šedivý, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, Brussels

does much to set the standard against which our capabilities are measured. The requirements set by Ministerial Guidance to be able to handle a larger number of operations simultaneously – is, in many respects, a more demanding role than during the Cold War. The Strategic Concept of 1999 and the documents based on it NATO Summit 2009 focused on the future have provided a sound vision of NATO’s purpose and objecSome of NATO’s critics have hinted that 60 is a good retirement tives. Nevertheless, the time has now come to adapt our age. Contrary to this view, the Summit was much more than strategy in response to developments just a commemorative event. It was during the last decade. The security focused on the future of the Alliance.

Deployable capabilities are environment itself has of course The decision of France to take its full today a firmly integrated part of evolved. The 11 September 2001 place again in our integrated military fundamentally altered the security structure was both immensely imporNATO’s roles and missions outlook of much of the international tant in its own right and a testimony to community. The number of NATO confidence in the Alliance’s continuing Allies has increased from 16 to 28, and NATO has become relevance. Of particular significance was the endorsement of a engaged in significant operations well beyond Europe’s borDeclaration on Alliance Security, which re-affirms the basic ders. We now face a number of very challenging new risks and values, principles and purposes of NATO. A further outcome of threats: terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of major importance for the future was the agreement to launch weapons of mass destruction, as well as cyber attacks, the risk work on a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. This docuto vital energy resources, piracy and, potentially, even the ment will define NATO’s strategic functions and tasks for at security implications of climate change. Most of the new challeast the next ten years. lenges are not of a purely military nature and need thus to be addressed in a holistic, comprehensive manner.

The NATO strategic concept 1999 The 1999 Strategic Concept provided a carefully considered balance between continuity and change in the Alliance’s securiThe new Strategic Concept ty tasks, giving greater weight to crisis management. It also The new Strategic Concept should lay out convincingly the role called for military capabilities that would be effective under the NATO can and should play in the emerging security environfull range of foreseeable circumstances, from deterrence and ment and define what place or comparative advantage our collective defence to peacekeeping and crisis response operaAlliance will have in the international division of labour. The tions that do not fall under collective defence. debate on this will be profound and time-consuming. It will In 2006, the 1999 Strategic Concept was amplified and suppleneed to find a new balance among NATO’s traditional core mented by the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). It activities, including between those that serve its indispensable provides a conceptual framework for further transformation collective defence role and those relevant to complex and and capability development and it underlines the requirement remote crisis response operations. for nations to develop and field ready, flexible and sustainable forces, able to fulfil a wide spectrum of military operations at a Key issues of a new strategy strategic distance, with little or no host nation support. The To have real impact and relevance, the new Strategic Concept CPG ensures a focus on enablers for deployed operations − must address such key issues as: such as tactical and strategic airlift; communications; and the • new strategic challenges and threats; so-called usability and deploy ability of our ground forces. In a • the link between North America and Europe; way we can see the CPG as a bridge between the 1999 and 2010 • the meaning of collective defence in the future and the Strategic Concepts. balance between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations; Another key policy document, Ministerial Guidance 2006, is the • the Comprehensive Approach and NATO’s contribution to a basis of NATO’s defence planning process and establishes civil-military approach to crisis management; NATO’s level of ambition (LoA); that is, the number and type of • defence transformation including capability development; the operations the Alliance wants to be able to conduct. Thus it future of enlargement;

This theme needs to be addressed in the wider context of NATO’s roles and missions today and tomorrow. To see expeditionary capabilities as a part of the wider picture, let us start by recalling the relevant outcomes of the last NATO Summit.

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Jirí Šedivý • the future of the Alliance’s partnership; and relations with Russia.

We will also have a debate about the nature of deterrence in the 21st Century, • the role of nuclear weapons, • arms control and disarmament and, perhaps, • the requirement or otherwise for a UN Security Council Resolution before embarking on operations.

Transformation as a continuous process NATO has already undergone a thorough transformation of its political and military structures, procedures, and policies.

Transformation is, however, a continuous process and must continue at the level of the organisation itself. Here three current topics of discussion should be mentioned: • Headquarters Reform; • the New Defence Planning Process; and, • the NATO Command Structure.

But it should also be clear that transformation is not only about NATO as an organisation: even more important is the willingness and ability of the defence establishments and armed forces of the individual Allies to adapt to new challenges and threats as it is nations that develop capabilities.

Adaption of Forces is an urgent need For example, although Allies have between them nearly 2 1/2 million land forces, of which more than 1 1/2 million are deployable, we continue to experience significant shortfalls on operations, in the NATO Response Fora (NRF) and in our reserves – shortfalls of troops, shortfalls of equipment, and shortfalls of a qualitative nature. Some high-value capabilities and key enablers are or have been particularly problematic, for instance helicopters in Afghanistan. We know that there are some 5000 helicopters in national inventories but the Afghanistan CJSOR identifies a requirement for just 400 and the reality is that only 300 have been made available for operations.

The underlying causes are interrelated and complex − but they centre on political will and resources. First, Allies have many commitments outside NATO − to the UN and the EU, and to national and other purposes. Hence, NATO has to compete with other missions. Second, one should not underestimate the political sensitivity for some Allies with respect to transformation from a traditional territorial defence posture to a posture that emphasises expeditionary operations. And, there is no doubt that costly, long-lasting operations resulting in significant casualties are burdensome and potentially demoralising even to the larger nations with more experience of expeditionary combat.

Is a graduate of Charles University, Prague (PhD in Political Science) and of King’s College , London, where he acquired an MA in War Studies. Ambassador Šedivý , joined the NATO International Staff as Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning in 2007. Prior to his appointment he served the Czech Republic as Deputy Minister for European Affaires, and as Minister of Defence, in 2006. Between 1999 and 2004 he was Director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Charles University in Prague and played an important role in the Czech accession to NATO. He served in this period also as an external adviser to President Vaclav Havel. From 2004 to 2006 he was Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

The political will versus economic burdeen But clearly, political will is vital in these circumstances. And we have to understand that NATO operations in far off places do not have the same intrinsic support that they would enjoy if we were defending our own territory. Here national leaderships play a crucial role but such decisions need courage.

But even where there is a political will to support deployed operations, the economic burden is significant and getting worse. This is limiting the preparedness of nations to offer personnel and equipment. Under the current funding system, the cost of providing high value or scarce capabilities owned by only a few Allies inevitably falls disproportionately on those Allies. Several efforts are currently being undertaken to develop more equitable burden-sharing, including reviewing the current funding policy for non-Article 5 NATO-led operations.

“The article 5 dimension” As I have pointed out, the new Strategic Concept will need to combine the Alliance’s core purpose of collective defence − “the Article 5 dimension” − with the many requirements associated with expeditionary operations. Over the past year we have had in NATO a debate about the balance between these two dimensions.

There is no divergence in principle among Allies that both are required. However, there is some difference in emphasis. Some Allies on NATO’s geographic periphery expressed fears that an increased focus on operations far from NATO territory together with a lower visible presence in areas closer to home may erode NATO’s relevance and thereby its popular support. Though there seems to be no clear evidence that this support is diminishing, NATO takes this concern seriously and we have initiated measures aimed at ensuring that the basic security concerns of Allies are taken duly into consideration throughout all relevant parts of NATO’s defence and military planning. We should also be able to

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better communicate the fact that expeditionary capabilities have a dual use, being perfectly able to deploy outside NATO’s area of responsibility for crisis response operations and within NATO territory for Collective Defence.

“We need to consider carefully how to balance the requirements of current operations against future capability requirements and in making cuts now we must not mortgage our future”

NATO versus international institutions The new Strategic Concept should also make clear, in more general terms, that no international institution is self-sufficient, and that NATO cannot deal with all the security challenges of, for example, Afghanistan in isolation. Enhanced co-operation with other actors, such as the UN and the EU, will be essential to achieve success. We are already seeing a cultural change here with the World Bank, the EU, NATO and NGOs sitting down together to discuss how best to assist Afghanistan to achieve the stability it needs.

• Improvement of existing instruments-example NRF In addition to developing new initiatives and approaches we need to maintain and improve existing instruments, in particular the NATO Response Force. However, almost since its inception in 2002, NRF force generation has been problematic with current low fill rates being a particular concern. As a result, Defence Ministers have called for additional political-military options to ensure its success. In principle, the new approach should be more flexible and less demanding than before, but still provide a capable response force. Whatever the decision, the success of the NRF remains critically dependent on nations’ ability to provide the necessary resources for it and their demonstration of the political will to use it. Here, of course, there is a dilemma because on one hand commitment to the NRF involves a decision that forces will not be deployable for a certain period unless there is consensus to do so and on the other hand we need forces to be deployed now to maintain the high operations tempo.

With a view to making more efficient and flexible use of the single set of deployable forces from which the NRF must be resourced there is a need for greater coherence in NATO’s various deployable force concepts culminating in a single overarching concept. The achievement of such an objective should ensure a more focused pursuit of NATO’s LoA and of equipment procurement to sustain deployed operations.

• Usability of forces − new expeditionary requirements As NATO became engaged in concurrent deployed operations beyond its borders, it became clear that the forces of many Allies were not optimised to support the new expeditionary requirements, particularly in remote and austere locations with little or no host nation support. In 2008, the deployability target was raised from 40% to 50% and Allies are discussing raising the sustainability target from 8% to 10% as well as the possibility of introducing usability targets for air forces.

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NATO ‘s future lies in a comprehensive strategic approach

Deployable capabilities are today a firmly integrated part of NATO’s roles and missions and, accordingly, of our planning processes. The transition from territorial defences to deployability has been a demanding process that is still going on. It is also clear that Allies still need to do more in order to meet the objectives they have set themselves. However, I believe the strategic choices we made in the 1990s have been fully justified, and that this strategy should continue to be developed in the future. And it would be a mistake to see an emphasis on deployable capabilities as in any sense inconsistent with the demands of collective defence.

The ultimate imperative that should always orient and lead our efforts is to make sure that our men and women on operations are well trained, properly armed and equipped, protected, connected and interoperable − that our Alliance has, for operations today, and will have, for operations tomorrow and in a more remote future, a well balanced and comprehensive portfolio of capabilities.

HQ Reform aims in the right direction, seeking more flexibility and civil/military synergies. To that end we have begun to implement a new Defence Planning Process. This is a great challenge, truly a cultural change, and – as in HQ Reform – enhancing civilian/military synergy and establishing joint working habits and procedures will be crucial fore its success.

Furthermore the lessons learned from operations clearly point to the fact that we can still further rationalise and streamline the NATO Command Structure.

All this operational and transformational work is being conducted in an unprecedented context – a world economic crisis.

Next to all nations are facing budget cuts and many have already informed us of their in year budget reductions – there are undoubtedly more and worse to come. The main concern in this respect is that nations are making cuts now while restoration of budgets for essential programmes is left until last. And so far we are seeing individual, national approaches that are not coordinated within a wider NATO framework. We need to consider carefully how to balance the requirements of current operations against future capability requirements and in making cuts now we must not mortgage our future. At the same time, when discussing the new Strategic Concept, we should resist the possible temptation to lower NATO’s LoA in the context of the current restrictive budgetary situation. But besides imposing a big challenge on us, the crisis could be also seen as an opportunity for accelerating NATO’s transformation, introducing innovative solutions to capability development and getting rid of obsolete structures and work practices.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Addressing helicopters shortage: EDA’s role

By Andrew Gray, Helicopter Project Officer, European Defence Agency, Brussels

There is a shortage of helicopters ready to support deployed operations. At the heart of the capability gap is the unwillingness of nations to deploy their helicopter assets. However, this simple statement is just the final manifestation of a complex blend of national political sensitivities, resource constraints, equipment shortfalls and personnel deficiencies.

In order to try and alter the willingness, we must analyse each of the underlying causes and attempt to counter or at least mitigate their effect.

Nations are hesitating to deploy their helicopters Responses to an EDA survey suggests that there are three main strands – outside of the political decision to support a particular operation – that prevent nations from contributing helicopters to multinational deployments. The first is the belief that existing aircraft are not suitably equipped to operate in the environment or threat presented by recent operations. The second is that the aircrew do not have sufficient experience or training to successfully conduct missions in the theatre. Lastly, there is the cost of the deployment itself – the logistical support needed to keep the aircraft flying away from their main base.

There are three main players currently focussed on this issue: the European Defence Agency, NATO and the International Helicopter Fund (IHF), albeit the latter is established to meet a specific need. Whilst it would be improper for the EDA to comment in detail on what work the others are undertaking, it is possible to give a flavour because, although individual work strands are being progressed by the individual players, there is an overall cohesion to the work. This has not been mandated or enforced, it has evolved out of a common understanding

Design of a Mi-17 Full Mission Simulator (FMS)

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of the problem and mutual respect for the strengths that each of the organisations processes.

EDA is focussing on training The EDA has been focussing on training participating Member States’ (pMS) aircrew to enable them to deploy with confidence. To kick-start this process, we launched a website where pMS can request assistance in meeting their training requirements and/or offer courses, facilities or mentorship to help others meet their training needs. This allowed an open understanding of what was required and what was available.

The Agency then launched two studies. The first study was designed to assess the feasibility of teaching helicopter tactics on static simulators. These simulators are more affordable than the more expensive full motion simulators and therefore are more likely to be procured by the nations in the early stages of developing their expeditionary capability. This study took place over six months, and used Czech Republic helicopter crews preparing for their deployment to Afghanistan as a test-case. As a result, 20 Czech aircrew attended a two-week course delivered by training staff used by the UK military.

Although only an introduction to helicopter tactics, the course was a distillation of the UK experience on deployed operations and was prepared with help from the UK Rotary Wing Operational Evaluation and Training Unit. Consequently, in addition to the study outcomes, EDA also delivered a pre-deployment training opportunity to help meet the Czech urgent operational requirement. The study report has yet to be completed, however early analysis suggests that this type of training is viable and meets an existing shortfall in many nations training capabilities. Consequently, it is hoped that this project can be expanded.

The second study is designed to try and identify the training requirements of the pMS and to attempt to quantify the training capabilities available. Comparison of the two should allow more efficient use of existing capability and identify critical shortfalls were new or additional capability needs to be developed. This study should report in the summer, but is dependent on pMS’ engagement.

Flying exercises and preparation for operational challenges Concurrent with the studies, the EDA also plans to conduct a series of flying exercises. France hosted the first EDA multi-national exercise in Gap in March 2009. It brought together aircraft and crews from Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Hungary and Spain, as well as personnel from Austria, Greece,

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Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, who acted as facilitators and observers. The aim of the exercise was to develop interoperability through mutual understanding and this programme will be taken forward with the next exercise likely to take place in Spain in June 2010. Norway and Sweden are potential hosts.

Using all the findings and experiences of this initial activity, the EDA will look to develop a Helicopter Tactics Programme (HTP) which will prepare crews for the operational challenges of the future, thus increasing the number of crews ready to deploy. The programme is likely to consist of several modules that nations could use or not, depending on their particular requirements. It is likely to be collaborative in nature and involve a series of exercises and events that will, in the initial phases, be distributed across Europe.

Andrew Gray joined the RAF in 1985 and is a Qualified Helicopter Instructor and a Qualified Helicopter Tactics Instructor. He has commanded Puma operations in Northern Ireland and Belize and the UK Chinook deployment to IFOR. On the ground, he served in the Directorate of Air Operations, involved in strategic planning for operations in Sierra Leone and Kosovo, became an Assistant Professor in Military Strategic Studies at the USAF Academy, and instructed on the UK Command and Staff Course. In 2005, he rejoined the front line, where he commanded the Joint Helicopter Force (Iraq) and served as the Chief of Staff, 904th Expeditionary Air Wing, Kandahar, Afghanistan. On return from Afghanistan in Aug 08, he joined the EDA as the Helicopter Project Officer.

NATO is focussing on helicopter upgrades NATO has been focussing on the immediate needs of its operation in Afghanistan. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirement has yet to be fulfilled with regard to helicopters.

With estimates of the shortfall ranging from 80 to 200 utility helicopters, NATO is addressing this problem in many ways from encouraging nations to upgrade their helicopters to the desired theatre standard to investigating common logistical support programmes. This latter discussion is being facilitated

by NAMSA, through several working groups based around the commonality of platforms grouped by region of origin. NATO is also developing the concept of a multinational helicopter unit – currently focussed on the Mi-17/171 – with the Czech Republic taking the lead in the NATO Hip Helicopter Task Force (HHTF). As another example of the close working relationship between all parties, the EDA sits as a member of the HHTF working group for C2/Ops and Training to provide advice and assistance on the training for the Hip Helicopter Force should it be required.

The creation of the International Helicopter Fund The IHF was an outcome of the same initiative that started the EDA work: a joint declaration by France’s President Sarcozy and UK’s Prime Minister Brown on the lack of availability of helicopters at their bilateral Summit in March 2008. The UK was the first IHF contributor, donating 3 million pounds. Since then contributions have been made by nations as diverse as Australia and Japan. The funds are distributed by the IHF Steering Board after receiving business cases from potential beneficiaries. It is not a NATO or an EU fund – it is independent of both organisations and distributes funds solely on the merits of the business case and its alignment with contributing nations’ policy aims. The fund has helped the Czech Republic procure key technologies for its upcoming deployment, has undertaken to assist in the upgrade of Hips for Hungary and is supporting the upgrade of Slovenian Cougars.

New mechanisms are needed Consequently, although the outcomes of these programmes are conventional – improve training, upgrade technology, reduce cost – the mechanisms are not. If they act alone, nations within Europe are unlikely to have the resources to solve the helicopter shortfall. Consequently, new relationships have to be formed and different ways of working have to be found. This is already happening to an extent. The first EDA multinational helicopter exercise was hosted, organised and delivered by France, and yet was largely financed by Luxembourg through the fund. The ground school, designed to share best practice and give the crews a baseline from which they could build their understanding and develop true interoperability was delivered by the UK. The next flying exercise will be hosted by Spain, but nations attending may be helped by contributions from any combination of willing nations.

All these are good indicators, but they do not go far enough.

For the costs of deployment to be reduced to a minimum, supply lines, life support and spare parts provision has to be shared and truly collaborative. This requires a common understanding of asset tracking, certification, maintenance procedures and qualifications to name but a few of the obstacles.

For a truly multinational unit, the training standards, doctrine, tactics and procedures have to be agreed and uniformly applied. From an initial cost, interoperability and through life support perspective, future platform procurement must look to large collaborative programmes to reduce cost, but without creating “fleet within fleets” that immediately degrade the benefit. All of which requires tough decisions to be taken on national independence of action and protection of the domestic defence industrial base, but the lack of resource and the pressing operational requirement demands that these difficult decisions have to be taken, and taken now.

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Internal market for the EU’s defence and security industries by 2012

By Günter Verheugen, European Commission Vice President responsible for Enterprise and Industry Policy , Brussels Since the end of the Cold War, defence has slipped down the agenda of most Member States as we face the rising challenges of climate change and the increasing competition from the emerging economies of the East.

The Cold War may have ended but the challenges and individual threats we face have multiplied, and we depend on highly sophisticated and expensive technology. Many countries are discovering that they do not, or will not anymore have, resources and/or the capacity to face these challenges. There needs to be a European response.

Europe and its global role If Europe’s voice is to be heard, and we are to ensure a global role for the Union, we must be serious about maintaining a strong, competitive and innovative defence industry. A defence industry that not only provides Europe with equipment and, perhaps even more importantly, the technology to ensure that Europe can have full autonomy over its own defence policy.

Of course, we should also not ignore the significant contribution the industry makes to providing Europe with high quality employment. However, in order to encourage this, measures must be taken at the European level. With this in mind, Member States established the European Defence Agency in July 2004. Of course, the main responsibility lies with Member States. Only they can manage their requirements and demand side so that economies of scale can be attained. However, the Commission can also contribute. In order for the demand to meet supply a well functioning European Defence Equipment Market is necessary.

From a strict economic viewpoint, the fragmentation of the European market and divergent national policies prevent larger industrial specialisation and integration which stakeholders are now calling for. This is what the two legislative initiatives on procurement and transfers are aiming at.

While matters of defence policy are for Member States, the Commission can make a contribution to the industrial policy and to the market’s efficiency.

Günter Verheugen Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of Enterprise and Industry Policy since 2004 Günter Verheugen was born on 28 April 1944 in Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

Studied history, sociology and politics in Cologne and Bonn from 1966-1969 General Secretary of the FDP from 1978-1982 before joining the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). From 1983-1999 Member of the German Bundestag. From 1987-1989 Editor-in-Chief of “Vorwärts” before becoming Chairman of the Radio Broadcasting Council of Deutsche Welle until 1991. Verheugen became Chairman of the European Union Special Committee, Bundestag and was from 1993 -1995. Federal Party Manager of the SPD. 1994-1997: he assumed the responsibility of a Deputy Chairman of the SPD, Parliamentary Group for Foreign, Security and Development Policy in parallel to his membership of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In 1997 he became Chairman of the Socialist International Peace, Security and Disarmament Council and Member of the SPD National Executive before he became Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office. His Brussels career started in September 1999 when he became Member of the European Commission, Enlargement.

sectors in the EU. But we were faced with numerous obstacles to cross frontier trade in defence related products within the EU and cross border industrial cooperation was low. The circulation of defence related products within the internal market was constrained by a web of heterogeneous and disproportionate national licensing procedures.

Therefore I was happy when we were able to present to the European Parliament and the Council in December 2008 the defence package proposal aiming to streamlining those procedures and making European defence industries more competitive. The package comprised two legislative proposals.

Where do we stand today Today when the end of my mandate comes closer, I am very happy to see that the Directive on intra-EU transfers of defence products is already approved by the EU institutions. Also the new defence procurement directive has been adopted.

My commitment to contribute When I took up my post as Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry in 2004 I felt strongly committed to contribute to fighting these challenges with the help of the relevant industry

The directive for intra-EU transfers The directive for intra-EU transfers tackles national restrictions of transfers of defence related products within the EU. We still

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do not distinguish between exports to third countries and transfers between Member States. Extensive licensing requirements stand in the way of the development of a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) and impede any genuine integration of the EU defence industrial and technological base. We will overcome these difficulties soon as the directive is approved and being transposed into national law which will apply as from June 2012.

The defence procurement directive The new defence procurement directive is a major step towards the establishment of a common European Defence Market. It will introduce fair and transparent procurement rules which will enhance the openness of defence markets between Member States to the benefit of all. European industries will get a much larger home market and become more competitive; our armed forces will get better value for money, which will help to improve Europe’s defence capabilities, and, last but not least, taxpayers will benefit from more efficiency in public spending. Member States will have two years to transpose the directive into their national legislation.

The defence package For the implementation of the defence package a series of measures is planned, such as EU wide certification guidelines that are to be developed in consultation with Member States and industry. We are currently working with industry and the European Defence Agency to identify ways to improve the integration of SMEs into the market. We also need to address how to control our strategic assets. We are also currently financing the development of a European Handbook on Defence Procurement which identifies existing defence standards and best practices. The issue related to the Security of information also needs to be tackled; a common EU regime for the exchange of classified information between national authorities and industry is a key aspect. And last but not least, we need to develop a position in our relations with non-EU partners, especially the USA.

What do we have in front of us New threats caused by our changing environment are emerging. We see borderless cyber-threats. World-wide travel causes viruses to spread more easily thus causing pandemics and other health issues. Climate change has a serious impact on the availability of water, which can cause food shortages, leading to involuntary migrations.

What we now need is a comprehensive industry policy that allows for the EU to sustain a holistic approach. We need to progress towards an industry policy that goes beyond the defence sector so that it allow the EU’s holistic approach to security to be supported.

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Documents The creation of a European Defence Equipment Market – Initiatives taken by the European Commission 1996 and 1997: The European Commission produced two Communications [COM(96)10 and COM (97)583] on defence-related industries to encourage restructuring and the setting up of an efficient European defence equipment market. But regarding the most essential reforms, Member states considered action on the European level premature.

April 2002: After a period of considerable change in the industrial armaments sector and in the institutional framework of the EU, including developments in ESDP, the European Parliament, in a Resolution of 10 April 2002, invited the Commission to address the issue of armaments in a new Communication.

March 2003: The European Commission adopted the Communication “European Defence Industrial Market Issues − Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy” This Communication launched seven initiatives aimed at establishing a European Defence Equipment Market.

(European Commission’s Communication “European Defence Industrial Market Issues − Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy, 2003) September 2004: The Commission’s initiatives led to the publication of a Green Paper on Defence procurement.

On 23 September the Commission launched a public consultation to gain a clearer idea of stakeholder's interests and concerns. The Consultation confirmed in particular a widespread misuse of Article 296 of the EC Treaty, which allows Member States to exempt defence contracts from EU procurement rules if this is necessary for the protection of their essential security interests.

December 2005: The Commission announced two further initiatives based on the findings of the Consultation (COM (2005)626): - An Interpretative Communication [COM(2006)779], which clarifies the conditions for the use of Article 296. This Communication, adopted in December 2006, gives guidance to national awarding authorities for their assessment of whether procurement contracts can be exempted from Community rules or not. The aim of this Communication is to enhance legal certainty and to limit possible misuse of the exemption.

- A proposal for a new procurement directive [COM(2007)766], adopted in December 2007 as part of the Commission’s so called “Defence package”, which includes also a proposal for a directive on intra-community transfers [COM(2007)765], aimed to facilitate the circulation of defence-related products within the EU-internal market, as same as a Communication on the competitiveness of European defence industries [COM(2007)764].

Both Directives were adopted in December 2008 and January 2009 with a large majority by the European Parliament.

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Airbus strives for open competition Interview with Dr. Thomas Enders, CEO Airbus, Toulouse

The European: Dr. Enders you signed an order intake of some 130 Airbus aircrafts during the Paris Air Show up with a volume of some $13 Bn. Other companies were less successful. How is Airbus doing?

Dr. Enders: Airbus is doing quite well despite the crisis and a number of challenges in our programs. We aim to deliver around 480 aircraft in 2009, and with 254 aircraft delivered by the end of June, we are more than halfway towards that target.

It is also important to remember that we have a backlog of more than 3500 aircraft orders, and at current delivery rates that gives us seven years of production.

The European: However, the crisis is not over yet, we stay alert and try to manage the situation proactively as much as we can.

And we have contingency plans in case of further deterioration.

Dr. Enders: At Le Bourget, we signed firm orders for 56 aircraft and MoUs for a further 69 aircraft, worth 12.9 billion dollars, so you can say we did better than we had expected! This proves that despite the crisis, there is still a demand for modern highly efficient aircraft, as airlines realise that they need to prepare for when the economy picks up. Aviation is cyclical, and this is not the first downturn we have managed.

The European: Is the value of an airshow like Le Bourget simply to be measured by the number of contracts signed?

Dr. Enders: Not at all. An airshow is an opportunity to communicate with customers, partners, and the interested public alike.

We at Airbus met with many of our customers and talked to them about their situation, how they see the market going forward, and the capacity needs they have etc. We also had discussions with our suppliers to ensure that they understand our forecasts and are in sync with our plans, so we can meet our delivery commitments. Our focus for this year is more on deliveries than orders, as that is what brings in cash and profits.

The European: What was that about?

Dr. Enders: Our industry needs to continue to improve efficiency and environmental performance. We invest around 2 billion euros annually on R&D. However, we also need to encourage students to pursue engineering & science and we want to attract top talent for Airbus. So last year, we launched a competition for students, called Fly Your Ideas. The aim was to help raise aware-

Dr. Thomas Enders was born in 1958 in Neuschlade, Germany.

CEO of Airbus Industries, Toulouse (F) since 2007. He studied Economics, Political Science and History at the Universities of Bonn and Los Angeles (UCLA). He earned his PhD 1987.

Enders is a Reserve Officer (Major) of the German Bundeswehr.

Started his career in 1982 as an assistant to the German Bundestag.

He was a research assistant of the Konrtad Adenauer Stiftung (1985). From 1989 to 1991 member of the MOD Bonn Planning Staff.

In 1991, Dr. Enders joined MBB/Dasa, holding marketing positions before becoming Corporate Secretary and Head of the Dasa Chairman Office. After the creation of EADS he was appointed CEO of the EADS Defence and Security Division and was nominated Co-CEO of EADS in 2005.

In 2005 he was elected President of the BDLI (German Aerospace Industries Association) and he became Chairman of the AtlantikBrücke. On 26 February 2008 he received the distinction of the “ Best of European Business” in the Category Transatlantic Relations

ness about what Airbus and the industry is doing in the area of eco-efficiency and encourage the continuation of this work. And we want to encourage the best and the brightest worldwide to work in aeronautics and to work with us in the future. Nearly 2400 students from 82 countries around the world signed up to participate, and we held the final at Le Bourget. I was truly impressed by the quality of the projects, and the command the students had of their subject areas. The winner this year proposed a project on the use of the castor plant to develop the first ever single plant-based high performance composite materials for aircraft cabin components. The process for patenting has already been launched. We also saw promising proposals about the use of solar cell technology on aircraft, and V-formation flights to reduce energy consumption. Your readers can find out more about these projects on www.airbus-fyi.com. I am sure that many of the projects that have been proposed definitely have potential for our industry, and we will be looking at how we can develop these with the appropriate stakeholders - Airbus, our suppliers, the airlines or airports, for example.

The European: You took over, about two years ago, Airbus in a deep crisis. You managed to bring a lot of stability into programmes such as the A380 and A350 and implemented the

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The world's most modern Transport Aircraft − the A 400 M will soon be operational

integration and restructuring programme Power 8 successfully.

How could you imagine to bring Airbus through the actual worldwide crisis which will touch Airbus certainly, in the next month?

Dr. Enders: The aviation industry is already being affected by the worldwide crisis. The drop in passenger numbers is affecting the airlines profits, and as a consequence, our order intake this year will be much lower than in previous years.

However, we are actively managing the situation. We are in constant discussions with our customers and have set up an internal early warning system that we call the watchtower. Our commercial, production and finance teams monitor a number of parameters on a daily, weekly and monthly basis to make sure that we are not taken by surprise. We also have a policy of overbooking, especially on the Single Aisle aircraft, and this gives us some buffer.

We have already taken the decision not to go up to the production rates that we had initially planned. A year ago we had planned production of 40 single-aisle aircraft per month, 10 Long Range aircraft per month, 20 aircraft this year on the A380 programme.

Now these numbers have come down considerably. We are currently at rate 36 on the Single-Aisle and will slightly further reduce the production rate in October, down to 34. For the Long Range we’ll stay at around 8 to 8.5, and we plan to deliver 14 A380s this year.

These are not the huge reductions some people are calling for, but we don’t see a need to come down any further at the

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Photo: Airbus

moment. We also need to be prudent about how we handle this, and consider the impact on our supply chain, our workforce and the ability of the system to ramp up again when the time comes.

We are lucky that we launched our turnaround programme Power 8 at the end of 2006. It was in response to a different crisis – the exchange rate, the A380 losses, but it has put us in a good position. If we didn’t already have it, we would have had to invent it now.

The European: You did a lot of organisational reforms in your house and one of them was to split up Airbus into a civil and a military branch. What was the reason and how do the two sectors work now?

Dr. Enders: Just to be clear, we didn’t split up Airbus, quite the contrary, we integrated the former military transport aircraft

The Airbus/Northrop Grumman Airtanker KC 45 − poised to be the future US Air Force Tanker?

Photo: Airbus

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division (MTAD) of EADS into Airbus as Airbus Military, a new business unit of Airbus. We did this because we recognised that the only way we can ensure the future is to work as a fully integrated team.

This integration brings a simpler, leaner organisation with clear lines of command, and will allow better allocation of industrial and engineering resources to where they are needed most across the whole Airbus product range.

Airbus Military is accountable for all military activities within Airbus, and the Head of Airbus Military sits on the Executive Committee of Airbus and reports directly to me.

The new organisation provides the right capabilities and structures to address the programme challenges ahead, particularly those of the A400M. It also gives Airbus Military the resources and the capabilities to pursue other largescale defence programmes such as the US tanker competition.

The European: I would like to go a little deeper into the military issues. Let me first ask you on the subject of the US future Tanker Aircraft where you are teaming with Northrop Grumman.

You won the competition against Boeing because you presented the better aircraft and you had been poised for getting a huge contract. This didn’t happen because of the intervention of Boeing based on legal issues. There will be a new tender and what might happen?

Dr. Enders: Indeed, we won simply because we have the better product offering. And if the future competition is about capabilities and product offering, we should be able to win again. The A330 MRTT, on which the KC-45 is based, has become the clear military tanker of choice. It has won five consecutive competitions – Australia, UAE, Saudi-Arabia, UK and the US. The KC-45 has the right combination of fuel carry and offload; range; multi-role capability and cost to meet the requirements of the US airforce today and in the future. We continue to be part of the Northrop Grumman team and we look forward to supporting them in their response to the RFP when it is issued.

The European: You are known as a protagonist of transatlantic industrial cooperation. Did this experience change your mind? What could be a realistic picture of European and US Cooperation in the future?

Dr. Enders: I continue to believe that open competition is best – for the men and women in the military who need the best available equipment, for the taxpayer on both sides of the Atlantic and for our industry. Competition and cooperation will bring technology progress at affordable cost. Ideally, we should see more transatlantic and international teams compet-

Dr. Thomas Enders with Hartmut Bühl at Paris Airshow 2009 Photo: © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2009 _ photo by e xm company / H. GOUSSÉ

ing with each other in the future. The Northrop/EADS tanker team could be a good precedent for this.

The European: Let me come back to your other military programme, the A 400 M transport aircraft. It seems that the technical problems with the A 400 M will be resolved. The first flight is scheduled for the end of this year, three years later than planned. On the political side, Mr. Sarkozy and Mrs. Merkel are willing to give Airbus more time to resolve the legal and commercial problems with the customers. Will there be − as an outcome − a risk sharing or do you have to take over eventually the total commercial risk?

Dr. Enders: The A400M will be a great aircraft; it will be better than any aircraft of its kind in terms of technology, performance and capabilities. I want it to be a success for our customers and for the industry, but not at any cost. The programme is still under review, and we are working very hard with our customers to resolve the issues and find solutions.

We want to get the programme on a successful track with conditions that are acceptable to all involved. As to the outcome, discussions are ongoing, so we all need to be a bit patient.

The European: Does this mean that Airbus can write at least a “Black 0” in a medium perspective and which are the realistic chances to get this transport aircraft later exported over the world?

Dr. Enders: As I mentioned before, the A400M will be the best in its class. It has been designed to meet the needs of the world’s armed forces for the 21st century. We see a significant export market for the A400M, on top of the current 192 orders.

Once the future of this program is secured, and the aircraft is

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Also, we have started construction, with our Chinese partners, of the Harbin Hafei Airbus Composite Manufacturing Centre.

The centre will manufacture composite parts and assemble composite work-packages for the A320 and the A350 XWB aircraft.

The European: To discuss the worldwide activities of your company without speaking of Russia would be a missed chance.

How will Airbus develop business with this important aircraft industry?

Celebration at the occasion of the delivery of the first A 320 from the Tianjin Assembly line on June 23, 2009 Photo: Airbus

flying and demonstrating its impressive capabilities, I’m sure we’ll see a surge in exports.

The European: Last month, we hsaw the first Airbus A320 delivered at the site of Tianjin. There had been a lot of warning to take the risk of teaming up with China after the deception of McDonald Douglas in 1990 and Embraer in 2002. Apparently you will succeed and China proves to be a reliable partner.

Which role will China play for the business development of Airbus?

Dr. Enders: China is a strategic region for Airbus. It has a huge market potential, in the long run on par or even ahead of the US. We assume that China will need around 3000 large aircraft in the next 20 years. The Airbus share of all large commercial aircraft in service in China is roughly 40% today, whereas in 1995 it was only 29%. Our share in new orders in recent years has been above 50%.

We just delivered the first A320 from our final assembly line in Tianjin, to Sichuan Airlines. This was a key milestone in our relationship with China, and in our internationalisation strategy. We plan to deliver 10 more A320 family aircraft from Tianjin this year, and will reach four per month in 2011.

But overall, we will deliver over 70 A320 family aircraft to China in 2009, more than will be produced by our FAL in China when it reaches the full rate of four per month in 2011. With some 15% of our total aircraft production delivered to China each year, our industrial cooperation strategy with China is clearly paying off.

Our relationship with China dates back to the mid 1980s and we now have six Chinese manufacturing companies making parts for Airbus aircraft. Over half of the Airbus worldwide fleet already has components produced in China. China has very talented engineers, and we have 200 of them working in our engineering centre in Beijing.

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Dr. Enders: Russian industry is another important partner for Airbus. Our cooperation with the Russian aviation industry has intensified over the years and proved to be very successful for all parties involved: some 200 Russian engineers are currently working in Airbus’ engineering centre in Moscow and production of A320 components is successfully progressing at Russian aircraft plants (Irkut and VASO). Our project with UAC/Irkut to convert A320 passenger aircraft to freighters is on track for first aircraft deliveries in 2011.

Our cooperation was further strengthened this year when we signed a huge long-term contract on titanium supply between Airbus/EADS and VSMPO-Avisma. We are committed to continuing our partnership with the Russian aviation industry and believe that Russia can make a significant contribution to the future of Airbus through the existing and future co-operation programmes.

The European: A few months ago you created together with your employees your own Foundation. What is the idea behind and how is the foundation running?

Dr. Enders: Our Corporate foundation will focus in on using our aviation and innovation spirit to ensure the sustainability of our industry.

We want to support our employees in getting involved in the communities where we operate, specifically in youth and environmental projects. Biodiversity is a big focus area as well, as engaging future citizens in respecting the environment is crucial for the future of our planet. We are about to launch a biodiversity project for our employees as it is an issue where we think our employees and their families can make a difference. Humanitarian projects are also very important to us, so we are working with our customers to use delivery flights to carry relief aid to help people less fortunate than ourselves.

Through the Foundation we want to give something back to the community to help develop a sustainable future for the next generation.

The European: Thank you for the interview and good luck for Airbus.

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The role of industries in the provision of Secure Information Infrastructures for NATO and EU

By Ingo Juraske, Vice President Hewlett Packard, EMEA, Böblingen The requirement for NATO and the EU to successfully manage and exploit its information securely is paramount. Many national governments are striving therefore to achieve Network Enabled Capability (NEC), which is also the top level goal for NATO: NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC).

The illustration on the next page is one depiction of NNEC as fundamentally a system of systems for Defence and, as in the EU’s case, wider business enterprise purposes.

The Goal of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) Ultimately NATO and the EU need comprehensive effect from their respective systems. They require, amongst other capabilities, decision superiority, agility and multi-national interoperability. What is common throughout, and integral to the ultimate goal of NEC, is a heavy reliance on the network infrastructure and how it can be enabled securely, efficiently and effectively. This is where the Technology Industry as a whole is contributing, and where Hewlett-Packard (HP), with other companies, is playing a major part in assisting NATO and the EU.

The industrial contribution to NEC HP is a technology solutions provider to consumers, businesses and institutions globally. The company’s offerings span IT infrastructure, global services, business and home computing, and imaging and printing. The recent acquisition of EDS has made HP the largest technology company and the secondlargest technology services company in the world, with 210,000 employees and with operations in 80 countries. This powerful combination of resources and talent gives HP the scale and scope to manage the critical business technology needs of all its customers, no matter what the scale or scope of their enterprise issues. HP’s portfolio of technology and services capabilities can increase the business (or operational) value from IT. The company prides itself on being a trusted business partner to both NATO and the EU. Moreover, through its investment in future technologies, its objective of solving client challenges through practical, innovative and efficient solutions, HP will continue in its goal of delivering effective business outcomes.

Vital projects in NATO and the EU More specifically within NATO and the EU, HP, with industry

Ingo Juraske Ingo Juraske holds a degree in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering from the Technical University in Berlin, Germany. He held from 1991various leadership positions in HP’s EMEA Alliance Marketing and Presales Competence Centers, the Storage business in Germany and the EMEA Enterprise Server and Storage Sales.

Ingo Juraske leads now the Public Sector, Health & Life Sciences (PSHLS) segment in EMEA where he is responsible for driving profitable growth and customer satisfaction of HP’s PSHLS business across the entire HP portfolio of products, solutions and services.

partners, is increasingly driving its presence into the key infrastructure elements and contributing to the architectural, hardware and software components that provide the required security, management and services. For example, within NATO’s NEC programme, called the Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information Systems (AIS), HP is actively contributing to the core infrastructure upgrade projects for Public Access and Secure local area networks. In the EU, HP is working in the sTESTA project which is replacing several data communication networks with a new, reliable, classified telecommunication network. sTESTA is a response to the growing need for secure information exchange between European and National administrations. It will allow these entities to exchange data in several policy areas in a secure and reliable way. NATO is also responding to one of the overarching network requirements, namely IT consolidation.

HP’s practical experience of its own Data Centre Transformation is helping to provide some guidance to NATO on how best to move towards a more consolidated network, efficient data storage, applications consolidation and secure enterprise management. NATO is just starting out on this programme but it is fundamental to the end goal of NNEC. In addition to the network issues, HP, with many other companies, is contributing widely to the secure enablement requirements for both NATO and the EU. In NATO, HP has helped shape Tactical Data Link capabilities for NATO and Partnership countries and contributed to the management of complex

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• Interoperability. The need to pass information between different systems. Cross-security domain gateways will be required if the information needs to move between different security domains.

• Differing service levels depending upon the user requirement.

Multiple environments. Such as fixed locations, mobile or deployed.

• Large resilient data centres.

Depiction of NNEC as fundamentally a system of systems for Defence and, as the EU’s case, wider business • Application hosting environenterprise purposes ments.

• Resilient and encrypted Wide Area Network connectivity. programmes such as NATO ACCS (Air Command and Control • A multiplicity of bearers from Satellite to Wireless.

System) which will provide a unified air command and control • A coherent enterprise-wide Service Management Model. capability. Through its newly-acquired EDS business, HP has designed, implemented and supported a highly successful, All this demands an end-to-end Service Management Model deployable, NATO C4ISTAR applications hosting and delivery that ensures users are provided with the contracted level of system for UK Forces supporting the ISAF Mission. Furthersupport. Typically, in such agreements a Single Point of more HP is involved in the provision of both common core Contact ensures that the user hands the fault off at the earliest management services and special functional services within available opportunity and the providing organisation is then the NATO Bi-Strategic Command AIS. responsible for its resolution, no matter where in the network the issue resides. What is required is the ability to deliver core At the heart of NEC enablement is an information infrastructure services and access to a set of user defined applications to a that is flexible, scalable, secure and resilient, and which given set of predefined performance criteria. The complexity is provides the medium through which, or on which, applications often driven by the need to integrate legacy applications. can be accessed or hosted. A Services Framework, with agreed standard semantics and ontology can provide the basis for a Service Orientated Architecture (SOA). A SOA approach Shaping ideas and roadmaps provides an architectural coherency which, through the increThe procurement of secure information systems needs to be mental acquisition approach, can respond to a managed aligned with the operational imperative. Adapting, or adapservice or a traditional system delivery, dependent upon the tive, procurement processes to effectively meet the urgent client’s requirement. In either case there is an overriding need demands of Crisis Response Operations is an integral part of to ensure a close working relationship between client and flexible procurement and understanding the customer’s needs. supplier. This will alleviate some of the challenges in EnterHP understands the challenges of Crises Response Operations prise Integration where joint programme management, multiand Urgent Operational Requirements and has delivered supplier and enterprise architecture management can serve to capabilities to military customers in operational areas under complicate the service delivery. The expertise and skills the most stringent timescales. The need for operationally required to do this lie within HP. aware people and the provision of capabilities across all delivery lines of development demands a strong customer and supplier collaboration and a one-team approach. FurtherThe Provision of Secure Information more, there is also the need to understand the NATO procureInfrastructures ment dynamics of spiral development. As a technology comProviding secure information infrastructures is a complex pany with a strong culture of providing solutions to meet requirement that is exacerbated by a multitude of factors.

These include: customer needs, HP understands the technology and the art of • Multi-domain requirements. The ability to handle different the possible and can pragmatically work with NATO and the EU levels of classified information. to help shape ideas and roadmaps.

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INDUSTRIES

Countering the threat of cyber attacks Numerous infrastructures and different physical systems have an inherent resilience. The procurement of a single information infrastructure provides many and significant advantages, but does make the system vulnerable, in that “all eggs are in one basket”. HP understands and can advise on the tiered approach and layered architecture needed for cyber defence.

HP has experience in international, national and organisational-level Computer Emergency Response Teams and Warning, Advice and Reporting Points which issue alerts and warnings, broker for advice and best practice and gather, sanitise and share incident reports. Through its delivery and support of secure information infrastructures HP has first-hand experience in countering the threat of cyber attacks.

8th Congress on European Security and Defence Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz

A new Spirit for the EU Security Strategy – starting into a realistic dimension 8 - 9 December 2009, Berlin Congress Center (bcc)

Success through extremely close working relationships HP is currently the largest international provider of secure military infrastructures, the largest of which is the US Navy Marine Corps Intranet. With standardised hardware and software more than 700,000 personnel (military and civilians) are provided with services from a secure infrastructure covering in excess of 600 locations. It handles more than 100 million e-mail messages per month and over 3 terabytes of data a day. Additionally, the UK Defence Information Infrastructure is supplied to the UK forces. The UK MOD has a vision of “One Information Infrastructure”; its scope is to provide information services to around 300,000 users in about 200 locations. Significantly, these users can be in the deployed or fixed space and the infrastructure provides access to legacy functional applications as well as replacing legacy infrastructure. Extensive knowledge and experience has been gained by HP through being embedded with clients and providing capabilities in an operational environment. Project OVERTASK is one such capability, where UK Forces are being supplied with access to the command and control application requirements of NATO’s ISAF. This is enabled through the provision of an in-Theatre Coalition Information Infrastructure provided in challenging timescales and the resultant success, in no small part, is due to the extremely close working relationship between HP and the client.

Continuous Partnership with NATO and the EU through confidence HP is already delivering into NATO and the EU a significant number of the network and enablement requirements that will provide, ultimately, NEC. HP is positioned, and now equipped better than ever, to continue its respective partnerships with NATO, the EU and other key Industry companies.

Main Topics • Strengthening Europe's Security and Defence Capabilities • The use of Space for Europe's Security • EU Civil Operations – more challenges than solutions • Masterplan for the Balkans • EU and NATO – harmonization of responsibilities for Security and Defence • Transatlantic Armament Cooperation • The European Defence and Technology Industry Base (EDTIB) • Russia − a reliable Partner for Security? www.euro-defence.eu

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The European Parliament’s role in the EU decision-making process

By Christoph Raab, Managing Director, COPURA*, Brussels

The recent European elections have brought home the message that for many policy areas, the decision-making centre these days is Brussels and not the national capitals any more.

Especially since the end of the Cold War a series of Treaty revisions have dramatically increased the powers vested with the European institutions. It is probably fair to say that the European Parliament emerged as the biggest winner among these. Actually, two-thirds of all legislative decisions for the EU are now said to come out of Brussels and for most of them, the European Parliament works now on eye-level with the Council.

When dealing with European institutions, one is confronted with structures which are very different from the national level.

As an example, the amount of practical influence of a civil servant in the European Union depends less on the formal position – literally any civil servant can be the one to talk to since they have ample room for maneuvering in drafting texts and reports. Moreover, unconventional procedures are accepted in an environment where there is no government to instruct an administration and in particular when it helps overcoming a blocked situation.

What is also different is the fact that civil servants work for specific projects, not for specific countries, which has a great affect on where their loyalties lie. On the other hand, structures and personnel are being rearranged more often than on a national level which means that address books and networks are out-of-date at a rather high pace.

The institutional triangle in decision-making The decision-making process in the European Union in general involves the three main institutions: • The European Parliament (EP) which represents the EU’s citizens and is directly elected every five years.

The EP has currently 736 members, but will increase to 750 if the Lisbon Treaty eventually enters into force. The number of MEPs per country is in relation to its population but is capped at 99 for Germany and the smallest countries have a minimum of 6 MEPs (Luxemburg, Malta).

• The Council of the European Union which represents the individual Member States.

Due to the enlargement, the Council has grown to now 27 Member States. Since the rules for decision-making among these have only hesitantly been streamlined, taking decisions in the Council now is often a lengthy and painful process.

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• The European Commission which by the Treaties is meant to defend the “Community interest” as a whole.

With enlargement, also the number of Commissioners has grown to currently 27 and chances are that the principle of “one-country-one-Commissioner” is here to stay.

Policies and laws This “institutional triangle” produces the policies and laws that apply throughout the EU. The main forms of EU law are directives and regulations. The rules and procedures for EU decision-making are laid down in the Treaties. In principle, it is the Commission that proposes new laws. Therefore, the first attention of lobbyists should be on the European Commission.

However, since Parliament and the Council have to adopt the legislative proposals, its members and committees are crucial once legislation has been initiated by the Commission. The remainder of this article will focus on decision-making and how to influence it in the European Parliament.

The Parliament’s role The monthly plenary sessions in which all Members of Parliament (MEPs) participate take place in Strasbourg which is the official seat of Parliament. The parliamentary committee meetings as well as additional plenary sessions, the so-called Mini Plenaries, take place in Brussels, while the background administrative offices are located in Luxembourg. This is however not the case for the secretariats of the Committees, which are located in Brussels. The Parliament has three fundamental tasks: 1. It shares legislative power with the Council.

2. It exercises democratic control over all organs of the EU and especially over the Commission.

3. It shares the budgetary responsibility with the Council, and therefore can exercise influence over the expenditures of the EU.

Lobbying Actually, lobbyists can easily get access to the European Parliament and attend committee meetings, work together with advisory panels and support the independent experts who serve on them.

In order to have an influence on upcoming EU laws it is, of course, necessary to understand the European legislative procedures and processes which are fairly complicated. On the other hand, forging a political will in the EP takes relatively

INSTITUTIONS and ASSOCIATIONS

little time, because EP resolutions are decided by simple majority voting. This raises the chances to produce reports that are very clearly formulated and do not suffer from too many political compromises. Those reports can then serve as support for further lobbying in other places. It can be a useful point of addressing specific items in order to receive rather quickly a formal document formulated by one of the European institutions. Such resolutions regularly also serve as an “excuse” or political backing for the Commission to initiate legislation it would otherwise not have undertaken.

The below decision-making process is subject to influencing at any stage. Interestingly, lobbying input is in fact more than tolerated by the Parliament: Due to a lack of personnel and time, MEPs themselves often lack the necessary inside knowledge for a specific issue. Therefore, many MEPs welcome this kind of legwork. This is particularly true for those lobbying organizations who see this a long-term information process rather than pushing for one concrete point on the agenda. As a consequence, European politics deeply relies on trustworthy cooperation and valuable relationships between politicians and interest groups.

Christoph Raab Mr. Raab was born on 18 March 1974 in Karlsruhe and has received his degree in Economics at the University of Trier. He holds a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (Natolin) and is a trained journalist.

He has worked on behalf of the German government on several media projects in Poland. From 2002 to 2005, Mr. Raab was Personal Assistant to Dr. Karl von Wogau MEP, in the European Parliament. In this period, he was closely involved with the growing number of EU activities in the field of security and defence. In November 2005, he founded the company COPURA, and has since been its Managing Director.

passes about 40% of the EU budget would fall under the codecision procedure. This raises the prospect of major changes in the overall spending structure of the EU budget as Parliament has in the past been rather critical of the size of agricultural spending. At the very least, under the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament will become a real decision-maker whether to spend money on agriculture, or on research or on foreign and security policy matters.

Legislative procedures The three main legislative procedures are ‘consultation’, ‘assent’ and ‘co-decision’.

• The Co-decision is the procedure now used for most EU lawmaking. That means that the European Parliament shares legislative power with the Council on an equal base. This means that both institutions have to approve of the legislative proposal for it to pass. There can be up to three readings between the two institutions before a dossier is finally approved and officially published in the Official Journal. Most laws passed in co-decision are, in fact, adopted either at the first or second reading as a result of good cooperation between the three institutions. There is actually a growing tendency to adopt legislation in first reading to speed up decision-making. What seems to be a good tendency at first glance may not always be to the benefit of the quality of the legislation passed.

• The Assent procedure means that the Council has to obtain the European Parliament’s assent before certain very important decisions are taken, and it is mostly used for agreements with other countries, including the agreements allowing new countries to join the EU • The consultation procedure is used in areas such as agriculture, taxation and competition. Based on a proposal from the Commission, the Council consults, besides other EU institutions, the Parliament, which can approve or reject the Commission proposal or ask for amendments but can, in the end, not stop the Council from proceeding in a situation of disagreement. Under the Lisbon Treaty, agriculture which still encom-

Step-by-step decision-making The decision-making procedures at EU level are quite different from those at national level: In most cases, the European Commission initiates legislation in publishing a new document, e.g. a communication, a proposal for a directive or a proposal for regulation. It could also be a White Book, which is best described as an action plan, or a Green Paper, which is a very general document meant to prepare the ground for future legislation. The Commission then passes it on to the Council and the European Parliament.

Inside the EP, the Conference of the Committees then decides which parliamentary committee/s will be responsible for this dossier. It has become a trend to select more than just one committee, which means that there is a lead committee and up to several opinion committees who work together on the draft report.

In a complex procedure of a credit system based on the size of political groups, it is then decided which party “gets” the report. The group then decides upon who should act as rapporteur. At the same time, the other factions choose so-called shadow-rapporteurs who are supposed to bring as much as possible of their groups’ priorities into the report in providing the rapporteur with their own suggestions and thoughts.

The role of the rapporteur The “rapporteur” of the lead committee is the one in charge of

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the dossier. The opinion committee/s usually finalize their report first to feed it into the main report. The lead committee can but is not obliged to take the opinion committee’s views into consideration for its overall report.

First, the rapporteur usually drafts a working document in which he/she lays out the issue and outlines how to tackle the various questions. Then the rapporteur submits the draft report to the committee/s where it is discussed, sometimes several times. Next, a delay is established during which every member can hand in amendments. This is often a time of

European Elctions 2009 − Results

EPP/ED: Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) S&D: Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament ALDE: Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe GREENS/EFA: Group of the Greens / European Free Alliance ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists Group GUE/NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left − Nordic Green Left EFD: Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group NA: Non-attached

intense lobbying from the outside on MEPs to hand in specific amendments. This lobbying can be as much from the private sector as from NGOs or from governments. In some cases, MEPs are very dependent from their home governments. For big dossiers, there can be several hundred amendments.

The report After the various amendments have been discussed, the committee votes on them by hand signing and finally votes on the amended report as a whole. The result is the final report.

The report is then put on the agenda at a next plenary session to get adopted or not by Parliament. After a recent change, for this voting, only the rapporteur is now allowed to hand in further amendments which makes the position of the rapporteur even more powerful.

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The European Parliament as a public arena for security and defence issues The European Parliament represents the perfect place to kick off public discussions about specific aspects of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The most relevant parliamentary committees in terms of European security and defence policies are the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE), the Committees on Budgets (BUDG), Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) as well as on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). For the new Parliament, no major changes are expected in the scope or competences of these committees.

The European Parliament has become as much an active promoter of ESDP as a critical companion. It has passed number of resolutions since 2002, some of which instigated concrete action by the European Commission. Since 2004, the newly formed Subcommittee of Security and Defence became very actively and constructively involved in the European Security and Defence Policy under its Chairman Karl von Wogau.

But more than just a public arena, the European Parliament’s strongest political tool are its budgetary powers. Over the course of the last legislative period, parliament has strongly pushed for increasing security and defence-related spending to several billion Euros. This includes the whole area of security research with Euro 1.4 bln over seven years. It includes spending on Galileo, which is now financed out of the Community budget (Euro 2.4 bln.) as well as the earth-observation system Kopernikus (Euro 1.2 bln.). It also involves a whole range of Justice and Home Affairs programmes. Also, Parliament decides about the budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (just under Euro 300 mln.).

With regards to the sensitive area of security and defence, the Parliament’s power will not be extended under the Lisbon Treaty. However, the spirit of the Treaty of Lisbon aims to overcome the old division between the three pillars within the Community and intergovernmental area. Thus, the European Parliament can more legitimately speak about security and defence issues.

Parliament will however gain major powers in the whole area of Justice and Home Affairs which, under the Lisbon Treaty, will become an area of co-decision between Council and Parliament.

Other tools to feed into Parliament’s deliberations are the regular hearings where experts are invited to present their views. These hearings are prepared by the committees’ secretariats often in conjunction with external service providers.

Another tool of the Parliament is to send delegations to areas of interest, such as to ESDP missions. The SEDE subcommittee has used that right extensively during the last period.

NEWS

+++ ESDP and NATO NEWS +++ EUROPEAN UNION continuation from page 56

The new European Parliament 2009 The outcome of this year’s election brought a clear trend for the European political scene, with the Greens and the far-right parties on the rise while the far-left parties could not benefit from the current economic crisis mood and also the socialist/social democrats are on decline. Only the conservative party reached constant results.

No clear majority in the new EP Nevertheless, as in the past, neither the left nor the right will have a clear majority. Thus, the problem of finding majorities for each and every decision will continue. Following the elections, there will be a substantial number of new Members of Parliament. About half of all MEPs are newly elected, the biggest changes are among the Italians, the least among the Germans. Moreover, the outcomes of the elections also effect the composition of the parliamentary committees. In this first phase after the elections, there is a highly complex and extremely opaque horse-trading process going on to establish which political group, which national delegation gets which position. This process came to an end with the formal voting and distributions of the committees during the last week of July (see page 58).

The actual uncertain legal environment This Parliament begins its work in a highly uncertain legal environment as the destiny of the Lisbon Treaty is still in limbo given the second referendum in Ireland in early October. Also, more than before, we may see a kind of “in-house” opposition to a otherwise staunch pro-European integration Parliament.

Former changes have generally, one way or the other, worked out to the benefit of the Parliament. It may well be the same this time around.

* COPURA is an event management and communication company specialised in European Affairs with a focus on European security and defence issues.

One of its major projects is the information and communication portal SecurityCommunity.eu for opinion-leaders, experts and others working in the area of EU security and defence and provides an extended “Premium” service for all those who are dealing with these topics in more depth (www.securitycommunity.eu).

COPURA also organizes the “European Security Round Table”, a membershipbased forum for information and discussion of European security and defence issues amongst EU Institutions, NATO and other relevant actors (www.securityround-table.eu).

COUNCIL of the EUROPEAN UNION: SWEDISH PRESIDENCY “The European Union is facing a crucial period. Together we must deal with the economic crisis and unemployment, but also unite the world to tackle climate change.

The Swedish Presidency is ready to take on the challenge.” Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt Fredrik Reinfeldt

Work programme for the Swedish Presidency of the EU 1 July - 31 December 2009 (excerpt) “(…) The coming six months will be characterised by both change and renewal. The newly elected European Parliament will begin its work and a new Commission will be appointed.

The conditions for cooperation will change if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.

The biggest and most important challenges are the economy, employment and climate – issues that affect each and every citizen of the EU. The following are the primary objectives of the Presidency: - The EU must emerge from the economic crisis in a stronger position. The world is experiencing one of the most serious financial and economic crises in modern times. The economic situation remains very difficult. Public finances are becoming more and more strained and unemployment is expected to increase during the autumn. A common capacity for action in both the financial and economic fields and in the labour market is necessary if the EU is to be able to meet the crisis in an effective manner. The Presidency and the Member States will jointly continue to work to counter the negative impact of the crisis on growth and jobs with the aim of realising economic recovery as soon as possible.

- The EU must continue to take responsibility for the climate threat. The great challenge of our time is to avert the climate threat and combat global climate change. Climate change has a major impact on societies, individuals and coming generations. The EU will continue to pursue global climate efforts.

The task of the Presidency, together with other parties, is to work for the adoption of a new climate agreement during the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December. “

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+++ ESDP and NATO NEWS +++ EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT European Parliament elected its new President On 14 July, during the opening session of the new European Parliament in Strasbourg, Polish MEP Jerzy Buzek (EPP) was elected by a large majority Parliament’s President for the next two and half years.

Jerzy Buzek started his political career as an Jerzy Buzek activist for the « Solidarity » trade union movement in Poland and became Prime Minister of his country between 1997 and 2001. He was elected MEP in 2004 and has been a Member of the EP’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the Parliament’s delegation for relations with Ukraine.

The 14 Vice-Presidents elected PITTELLA Giovanni (S&D, IT) KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU Rodi (EPP, EL) LAMBRINIDIS Stavros (S&D, EL) MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍNEZ Miguel Ángel (S&D, SPA) VIDAL-QUADRAS Alejo (EPP, SPA) ROTH-BEHRENDT Dagmar (S&D, DE) ROUCEK Libor (S&D, CZ) DURANT Isabelle (Greens/EFA, BE) ANGELILLI Roberta (EPP, IT) WALLIS Diana (ALDE, UK) SCHMITT Pál (EPP, HU) McMILLAN-SCOTT Edward (ECR, UK) WIELAND Rainer (EPP, GER) KOCH-MEHRIN Silvana, (ALDE, GER)

Leaders of the new EP’s political groups: • • • • • • •

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Joseph Daul (FRA): European People’s Party – EPP Martin Schulz (GER): Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Guy Verhofstadt (BEL): Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Rebecca Harms/Daniel Cohn-Bendit (GER): Greens/ European Free Alliance Michal Kaminski (POL): European Conservatives and Reformists Group Lothar Bisky (GER): Confederal Group of the European United Left − Nordic Green Left Nigel Farage (UK) & Enrico Speroni (ITA): Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group

European Parliament’s Committees Chairman/Chairwoman Foreign Affairs Gabriele Albertini (EPP, ITA) Development Eva Joly (Greens/EFA, FRA) International Trade Vital Moreira (S&D, POR) Budgets Alain Lamassoure (EPP, FRA) Gabriele Albertini MEP Budgetary Control Luigi de Magistris (ALDE, ITA) Economic and Monetary Affairs Sharon Bowles (ALDE, UK) Employment and Social Affairs Pervenche Beres (S&D, FRA) Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Jo Leinen (S&D, GER) Internal Market and Consumer Protection Malcolm Harbour, (ECR, UK) Number of seats Industry, Research and Energy per country Herbert Reul (EPP, GER) (2009 – 2014 parliamentary term Transport and Tourism in alphabetical order according to the country’s name in its Brian Simpson (S&D, UK) own language).

Regional Development • Austria 17 Danuta Hübner (EPP, POL) • Belgium 22 Agriculture • Bulgaria 17 • Cyprus 6 Paulo De Castro (S&D, ITA) • Czech Republic 22 Fisheries • Denmark 13 Carmen Fraga Estévez (EPP, SPA) • Finland 13 Culture and Education • France 72 Doris Pack (EPP, GER) • Germany 99 Legal Affairs • Greece 22 • Hungary 22 Klaus-Heiner Lehne (EPP, GER) • Ireland 12 Civ. Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs • Italy 72 Fernando Lopez Aguilar (S&D, SPA) • Latvia 8 Constitutional Affairs • Lithuania 12 Carlo Casini (EPP, ITA) • Luxembourg 6 • Malta 5 Women’s Rights and Gender • Netherlands 25 Equality • Poland 50 Eva-Britt Svensson (GUE/NGL, SWE) • Portugal 22 Petitions • Romania 33 Erminia Mazzoni (EPP, ITA) • Slovakia 13 Subcommittees: • Slovenia 7 • Spain 50 Human Rights • Sweden 18 Heidi Hautala (Greens / EFA, FIN) • United Kingdom 72 Security and Defence TOTAL 736 Arnaud Danjean (EPP, FRA)

NEWS

EUROPEAN COMMISSION EU Action Plan to better protect European citizens On 24 June the European Commission adopted a policy package that should contribute to limit possible terrorist access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials. The core of the policy package is an EU Action Plan on countering CBRN threats, which involves all relevant stakeholders, including industry representatives. The Action Plan includes 133 concrete measures that should be implemented over the next three years. In December 2007, the Commission had been invited by the Justice and Home Affairs Council to further develop its work in the CBRN field together with the Member States and the relevant stakeholders. The proposed Action Plan puts the focus on three areas of action: prevention of unauthorised access to CBRN materials of concern; detection of CBRN materials; efficient response to incidents involving CBRN materials and preparedness to quick recovery. The Commission’s CBRN Action Plan will be discussed with Member State representatives in the Council in the 2nd half of 2009. If Member States agree, the implementation of the Action plan may start in 2010.

European Parliament will vote the Commission President in autumn The leaders of the political groups in the European Parliament, the so-called Conference of Presidents, on 10 June took note of the official proposal by European governments of José Manuel Barroso as Commission President for the next five years. However, they decided not to schedule the confirmation vote for the July plenary session to leave time to assess his candidacy more thoroughly. EP President Hans-Gert Pöttering said after the meeting: “The Conference of Presidents decided to have the election of the Commission President not in the July plenary. But there seems to be a broad majority to vote in September but this still needs to be formally decided in one of the next meetings. It is quite normal that Council and Parliament sometimes have different opinions. The groups can now invite Mr Barroso and then he will certainly also present his programme formally before the vote in plenary.”

Energy • European Commission proposes new rules to manage gas supply crises On 16 July 2009 the European Commission adopted a new regulation to improve security of gas supplies in the framework of the internal gas market. The aim of the proposed regulation is to create mechanisms for Member States to work together in order to deal effectively with any major gas dis-

ruption which might arise. The new regulation will repeal the existing Directive 2004/67/EC, no longer sufficient in a context of growing import dependence and increased supply and transit risks in third countries as well as increasing gas flows and the development of the internal gas market within the Community. The new regulation calls on all Member States to be fully prepared in case of supply disruption, through clear and effective emergency plans involving all stakeholders and incorporating fully the EU dimension of any significant disruption. Even in an emergency case, market based instruments should be given priority to mitigate the effects of the supply disruption.

• Nabucco agreement signed Four EU countries, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey signed an agreement on 13 July on the legal framework for the Nabucco gas pipeline, which is expected to decrease Europe's dependence on Russian gas − operational by 2014 −.

Nabucco will bring Caspian gas to a hub in Austria via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Iraq has pledged to supply the pipeline with half of its capacity, without giving a detailed timeframe.

Turkey has started to use the Nabucco project as a bargaining chip with the EU. Ankara is also seeking to use 15% of all natural gas flowing through the pipe as part of the deal for letting it pass through Turkish territory.

GENERAL COUNCIL Presentation of the Presidency report on ESDP On 19 June the European Council presented the Presidency report on ESDP that covers a range of subjects including operations and missions such as EU NAVFOR - Atalanta, EUSEC and EUPOL DR Congo, EUMM Georgia, EULEX Kosovo, civilian and military capabilities, including capability projects developed in the European Defence Agency, training activities of the European Security and Defence College and cooperation with international organisations, Mediterranean partners and third states.

European Defence Agency • Code of Conduct on Offsets comes in force On 1 July the Code of Conduct on Offsets (industrial compensations) took effect. The Code aims to introduct much needed transparency to offset agreements, which up until now has often been lacking. An offset portal has been launched on the EDA’s website, where the 26 countries that signed up to the Code publish information on their national offset policies and practices, including national regulations and guidelines, offset requirements criteria and modalities. Furthermore the

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Code introduces a 100% cap on offsets. Consequently, subscribing governments will neither request nor accept offsets exceeding the value of the relevant procurement contract, which is a crucial enabler in the process to reduce reliance on offsets. Similarly the Code’s provision for mutual abatements will help cut down reciprocal offset obligations. The Reporting and Monitoring system - commonly developed with participating Member States and agreed by the Steering Board on 2 April – should help to implement the Code of Conduct by ensuring mutual transparency and accountability among subscribing Member States and Norway, so that they can be confident that the Code is working as intended. The Code will be applied to offsets agreements signed from now on by all EDA participating Member States (except Romania) and Norway.

• EDA launched Midcas Project On 17 June, during the Paris Air Show, five EDA members (Sweden as lead nation, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) signed a project arrangement on MIDCAS, the mid-air collision avoidance system for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). On behalf of the participating countries, the Agency also signed the corresponding contract with the MIDCAS industry consortium, consisting of 13 co-contractors.

The MIDCAS-project will serve as a development and demonstration platform for « sense and avoid » technologies. Once developed they should enable UAS to fly in non-segregated airspace. This work will be conducted in close co-operation with European organizations, e.g. EUROCONTROL, EUROCAE (European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment) and EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency). Transatlantic coordination will happen throughout the project with organisations such as the Radio Technical Commision for Aeronautics (RTCA) and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA).

EU-Missions • EU Atalanta On 15 June the Council of the European Union decided to extend Operation EU NAVFOR –Atalanta for one year from its current end date of 13 December 2009. The Council noted that the Operation had demonstrated its ability to act effectively against piracy, that piracy off the coast of Somalia was likely to remain a serious threat beyond the date of 13 December 2009, and that early agreement on extending the operation would facilitate the necessary force generation.

EU NAVFOR – Atalanta was launched on 8 December 2008 in support of UN Security Council resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846 adopted in 2008. It is the first naval operation launched by the EU. Thirteen warships and three maritime patrol air surveillance aircraft are currently taking part in the Operation.

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• EUMM Georgia On 22 June EU High Representative Javier Solana condemned the attack against an EUMM patrol near the Abkhazian administrative boundary: “I strongly condemn the attack yesterday against a patrol of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia near the Akhazian administrative boundary, in which the driver of an acompanying medical vehicle was killed. I want to extend my most sincere condolences to the family and relatives of Avtandil Akhaladze.

EUMM is an unarmed mission that aims at improving the lives of the people in the region. Any attacks on our unarmed monitors and their patrols are completely unacceptable. I remind all the parties of their responsibilities to ensure stability and security in the territories under their physical control.”

• EUJUST LEX On 1 July the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) started its fourth phase (as per the PSC decision of 24 March 2009 and the new Council Joint Action 2009/475/CFSP of 11 June 2009, the mission was formally extended for one more year, specifically mandating EUJUST LEX to pilot in-country training interventions). In the run-up to phase IV, three preliminary in-country activities to support the Iraqi Criminal Justice System were held in various locations throughout Iraq.

These activities are currently being evaluated and the lessons learned will form the basis for the next 12-month period.

Total number of trained Iraqi senior criminal justice officials since July 2005, the start of the mission: 2691 On 3 July 2009 Head of Mission Stephen White was re-appointed for six months.

MISCELLANEOUS European Security Round Table The quarterly ESRT, the European Security Round Table, organised by Christoph Raab, discussed the future of EU-NATO relations after the Strasbourg/Kehl summit.

In the debate on the Afghanistan-Pakistan area it became clear that there is currently a window of opportunity for Europeans to convince the United States about a stronger civil-military approach. On EU battle groups, political decision-makers have started to question their operational added-value. Another finding was that a well set-up EU civil-military HQ would be necessary.

The event was hosted by MEP Michael Gahler with the presence, among others, of the Director-General of the EU Military Staff, Lieutenant-General David Leakey and the German PSC Ambassador, Clemens von Goetze as well as the Acting US Ambassador to the EU, Christopher W. Murray. The Annual Conference of the “European Security Round Table” will take place on 9 September. Internet: www.security-round-table.eu

NEWS

NATO NATO Defence Ministers announce gradual reduction of troops in Kosovo Taking into account the steady improvement of the security situation in Kosovo, NATO Defence Ministers agreed on 11/12 June to begin a gradual adjustment of KFOR’s force presence.

Ministers agreed that the transition of KFOR to a so-called “deterrent presence” will be implemented in a gradual and phased manner. While stressing that a gradual reduction in the number of troops is part of the normal evolution of a successful military operation, Ministers noted that there will be no automaticity in this process. Situational awareness and enhanced flexibility will be important components of the new KFOR force posture. While downsizing troops on the ground, KFOR will continue relying on quick, capable − over the horizon reserves. Defence Ministers reaffirmed that KFOR will stay in Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 as long as necessary and as long as the UN Security Council does not decide otherwise.

NATO Allies agree on key ISAF issues Following their meeting in Brussels on 11 and 12 June, Allied Defence Ministers agreed to the establishment of a NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), in line with the decisions by Heads of State and Government during the StrasbourgKehl Summit, last April. This decision will initiate a series of tasks to expand the role of NATO regarding the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In recognition of the changing scope and scale of the responsibilities at ISAF HQ, Defence Ministers agreed in principle to the establishment of an intermediate 3 star ISAF Headquarters, responsible to Commander ISAF (COMISAF). This will allow COMISAF to focus on operational issues, such as training and development, and the coordination between the Afghans and the International Community in Afghanistan, leaving the intermediate command to take responsibility for operations. Finally, Ministers also decided to deploy NATO AWACs to assist with air traffic control in Afghanistan in recognition of the significant increase in both civilian and military aircraft over Afghanistan and the lack of a ground-based radar network to manage this from the air.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) Facts and Figures In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, which is co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122 000 personnel with a 12 000 man training margin.

In June 2009, the ANA had a strength of approximately 89,500 personnel. This represents 67% of the 134 000 approved

strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Today, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA. Source: www.nato.int

NATO’s SNMG2 took over counter piracy mission On 29 June the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) took over responsibility from Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) for conducting counter piracy operations off Somalia as part of the ongoing Operation ALLIED PROTECTOR. In order to ensure a seamless transition, maintaining the pressure on the pirates, the exchange of responsibilities was conducted in the Red Sea. Rear Admiral José Pereira da Cunha (Portuguese Navy), Commander SNMG1, has been in theatre for over three months.The incoming Commander SNMG2, Commodore Steve Chick (Royal Navy) said “The successes achieved against the pirates over the last few months off the Horn of Africa by SNMG1 have really demonstrated the effectiveness of NATO’s standing maritime forces.

US Flag officer becomes new SACEUR On 2 July Admiral James Stavridis became NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) assuming command of Allied Command Operations from outgoing SACEUR, General John Craddock. Admiral Stavridis is the sixteenth American officer to hold the prestigious post, and it is the first time in NATO history that a Flag officer assumes the post since the position was established in 1951 when General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first SACEUR.

MISCELLANEOUS Improving Regional Cooperation on Water The EastWest Institute’s (EWI) Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention and Human Security, in cooperation with the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy’s Regional Center on Conflict Prevention, will convene key experts and parliamentarians from water-stressed regions around the world to build capacity and develop new strategies to enhance regional cooperation on water. The two-day meeting from November 3-5, 2009 in Amman, Jordan will focus on overcoming challenges posed by potential water conflicts and develop recommendations for parliamentarians to play a bigger role in strengthening trans-boundary cooperation. The meeting is part of EWI’s preventive diplomacy work on natural resources, aimed at reducing tensions and increasing trust and cooperation in potential zones of conflict around the world.

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Baroness Taylor of Bolton ESDP − What we have achieved and next steps Bayer, Tomur The Role of Turkey for European Security Beer, Angelika MEP Interview: Is Energy a Factor of Instability for Europe ?

Brook, John Interview: A plea for organized cooperation between transatlantic industries for Security and Defence Bruzek, Oliver European Industry is ready to close EU’s Capability Short falls − Example Transport Helicopters Budde, Hans-Otto Protection on Operations − The Army's Protection Philosophy Bühl, Hartmut EU-NATO Relations − grave deficiencies Eyes in the sky to protect forces Cameron, Alastaire Testing Times for European Crisis Management Chizhov, Vladimir Russia and the European Security Favin Lévêque, Jacques, General (ret.)

The French and Europe united in diversity D. F. Froh, Richard NATO Ballistic Missile Defence – a Capability for the Alliance and Protection for Europe Gayet, François The role of ASD in European Security and Defence Guillou, Hérvé Interview: A Natural Marriage – Conversation of the Civil and Military Security Market Hammer, Andreas A European Defence Market − from vision to reality Dr. Hellenthal, Markus Maritime Safety and Security as a Central Piller of a comprehensive Security Strategy Herteman, Jean-Paul Interview: A strong Base in Europe for Global Ambitions Höfer, Gerd MP Towards a European Army Iturrioz, Elvira Cortajarena MP Forces Protection − the soldier of the future Kujat, Harald NATO-Russia Relations: Press the Reset Button Laitinen, Ilkka Interview: Border Security: FRONTEX is operational and steadily improving

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Lambsdorff, Alexander Graf MEP The Defence Package: An important step towards a better ESDP Dr. Lazarevski, Pande Security Network Innovation − Macedonian’s Contribution to the European Union Dr. Lutz, Reinhold Galileo – on Giant Leap for Europe Mahon, Tim Journalist Adequate forces and equipment for the right strategy Masseret, Jean-Pierre European Defence: Where do we go from here?

Nash, Patrick EUFOR Chad/RCA – Progress and Ongoing Success Ortega, Manuel Medina MEP Russia and the Defence of Europe Pirlet, André The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Pitarch, Pedro What Legitimacy for the EUROCORPS? Raab, Christoph The Politico- Military Organization of the European Union Rebuffi, Luigi The European Organization for Security (EOS) – Strategy ahead Solana, Javier European Security and Climat Change Dr. Stehr, Michael ATALANTA − Europes first naval Anti-Piracy-Operation as part of ESDP Taylor, Adrian EUSG A European White Paper on Security and Defence is not sufficient Walter, Robert MP Realistic Structured Cooperation Procedures in the Field of Security and Defence Voigt, Karsten Interview: What Europe can expect from the new US-Administration Dr. Paul Weissenberg The Role of the EU Security Research Weis, Alexander The European Defence Agency (EDA) Wenzler, Bernd The Protection of the Soldier − Concepts and solutions Protecting our soldiers Dr. von Wogau, Karl MEP The Role of the European Parliament for Security and Defence

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PREVIEW 4/2009 Main issues of the Autumn Edition (October 2009)

Policy and Politics Afghanistan and Europe – re-consider policy and change of military strategy?

Security

Terrorism – investigation strategies for international counter terrorism

European Defence and Armed Forces The future of the EU-Battlegroups Industries IT- International and economy crisis in Europe Institutions The European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

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