The European-Security and Defence Union Issue 41

Independent Review on European Security and Defence

Volume N°41

The geopolitical rivalry of great powers Does Europe have a say?

Russia is not a partner, but a political opponent the west needs to reckon with

Preparing for Taiwan contingencies

Dr Sabine Fischer, Senior Research Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Prof Hideshi Tokuchi, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo

www.magazine-the-european.com

Edition 4/2021

TWO MISSIONS. ONE SOLUTION. It’s your time to cook. Start cooking fresh and varied meals for your mission with our mobile catering systems. Whether with single modules, on a trailer kitchen or in a kitchen container. Discover the whole range at kaercher-futuretech.com.

Editorial

2021 was marked by the hope that the Covid-19 pandemic could be brought under control throughout the world. There was also hope that the newly elected the US Presi­dent could restore order to the world after his predecessor had wreaked havoc internationally and attempted in his own country, with the storming of Congress by his radical supporters on 6th January, to override the democratic process, usurp the office of president and present himself as the saviour of the US. At the start of this new year however, it is clear that the pandemic is still not under control, that the virus is not only causing suffering worldwide, but that our societies also face critical infrastructure breakdowns due to staff shortages. A further source of concern is that the longer the pandemic lasts, the longer disrupted supply chains will hold back global economic recovery and prosperity.

On the global stage, it is clear too that the US President has not yet been able to fulfil the hopes placed in him for the restoration of the world order, while Europe continues to wonder what America really wants and what the US can still achieve as a partner and an ally.

There is no realistic prospect of a return to normal for the time being, especially as 2022 will see emerging trends taking clearer shape in the world order.

In Europe, there are growing concerns about future stability, as alarming events in global politics increase and multiply. They could lead to armed conflicts of international proportion.

The world’s foremost military and economic power, the US, has, for the past decade, been withdrawing from its self-imposed role as the global regulator. Afghanistan in August 2021 was a moment of truth that has reinforced the existing mistrust of Washington, even under a new President.

China and Russia have taken advantage of these weaknesses to openly demonstrate their intentions to annex Taiwan and Ukraine respectively. As such goals can only be achieved by force, they create uncertainty worldwide.

In relation to Putin, it is mainly Europe and NATO that are on the front line, whereas in the Indo-Pacific region, the US is in the process of a strategic reorientation by gaining

new regional allies. A region in which Europe is not needed militarily.

New strategic equilibria and counterweights will emerge. Europe should concentrate on its strategic tasks in its own vicinity, including Africa and the Middle East and, together with, or in addition to, Hartmut Bühl the Atlantic Alliance, defend stability in such a way as to relieve pressure on the US and leave it freer to focus on its agenda in the Indo-Pacific region.

New instabilities are emerging in the Middle East, where Iran’s government – after the unilateral decision of the US to terminate the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) in 2015 – is escaping from the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran will shortly be able to wind up its uranium enrichment programme and produce its own nuclear weapons, threatening Israel as well as the whole of the Middle East and provoking a new proliferation crisis, as it will be an incentive for the Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia but also Turkey, to build their own nuclear weapons.

And what about Europe? Its misfortune is its lack of room for manoeuvre in the new powerplay of the great powers.

Europe alone cannot protect its geopolitical interests, let alone enforce them. It is not enough for Europe to be powerful economically, it must also become powerful politically and militarily. As the old world order crumbles, there is no other way for Europe to guarantee its interests and security than through its own strength and suitable allies. Europe will become strong if it can play its cards skilfully vis-à-vis the US and NATO, but also Russia, and not buckle under Chinese pressure. Europe must now avoid any marginalisation in geopolitics and prove itself!

At this very moment, Member States are joining forces in diplomacy to prevent war in Europe.

photo: private, LISphoto.com

2022 – a year of proof for Europe

IMPRESSUM: The European − Security and Defence Union Headquarters: International Consulting 6, Rue du Château, F 28260 Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Publisher and Editor in Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) Phone: +49/172 32 82 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris (FR) E-Mail: nannette.cazaubon@magazine-the-european.com

Editorial Assistant: Céline Angelov, Linz a. Rhein (GE) E-Mail: editorial.assistant.esdu@gmail.com Translator: Miriam Newman-Tancredi, Strasbourg (FR) and London (GB) Layout: Beate Dach, SpreeService, Berlin (GE) Advertisement & Sales: Hartmut Bühl, Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) Phone: +49/172 32 82 319 Print: Polyprint GmbH (GE) © 2022 by International Consulting, France

3

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION Vol. No. 41

Content 3 6

Editorial, Hartmut Bühl News, Nannette Cazaubon

17–36 MAIN TOPIC: The rivalry of great powers

8–16 In the Spotlight

“Recovery, strength and a sense of belonging”

18

The realignment of US geopolitical objectives in the world China is the dominant rival of the US

by Prof Thomas Jäger, Cologne

20

What the European Union has to realise in security and defence Acting strategically and pragmatically Interview with Moritz Brake, Bonn

8

Start of the French EU Presidency Documentation

9

France and Germany – so far apart and yet so close There is no alternative to this tandem

by Cyrille Schott and Hartmut Bühl, Strasbourg/Paris

12

Putin needs to receive a convincing answer!

Negotiating European security with Russia

by Jacques Favin Lévêque, Paris

24

A rising China reshapes the Asia-Pacific Competing in the same global system

by Ambassador Barry Desker, Singapore

14

Stop the COVID-19 pandemic!

Resources for healthy workplaces

by William Cockburn, Bilbao

26

Preparing for Taiwan contingencies Maintaining the international order

by Hideshi Tokuchi, Tokyo

16

The European Union is striving for more influence in the Arctic A turn in the European Arctic policy

by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

28

The Yellow Sea in an era of growing Chinese ambitions and South Korea China has the potential to escalate tensions

by Dr Eunsook Chung, South Korea

photos: © shutterstock / Frederic Legrand – COME (Cover); SWP (Cover left); private (Cover right)

4

Does Europe have a say?

photos page 4-5: © 2022 noriox/Shutterstock. No use without permission. (left); © 2020 helloRuby/Shutterstock.

Content

37–50 Security and defence

Is European strategic autonomy a reacheable goal?

30

32

34

36

India’s sea-based nuclear second-strike options Responding to menaces from China

by Debalina Ghoshal, Kolkata

38

New dimensions of Russia-China relations The consequences for stability

by Prof Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Bucarest

The future of European defence: beyond EU and NATO The EU must define its geopolitical position

by Gesine Weber, Paris

40

30 years of the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) Supporting the EU’s external action Interview with Sorin Ducaru, Torrejón

44

From strategic autonomy to strategic sovereignty Where is the European defence heading?

by Frédéric Mauro, Brussels/Paris

46

Europe and the sea No common geopolitical views Interview with Alain Coldefy, Paris

49

Enhancing resilience – preparing to protect against chemical threats Trust is the major driver

by Sebastian Meyer-Plath, Erkrath

Russia is not a partner, but a political opponent the west needs to reckon with Moscow believes that the EU is weak

by Dr Sabine Fischer, Berlin European Parliament Resolution on the Arctic Documentation

The European – Security and Defence Union is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence, and was awarded in 2019 the Jury’s Special Prize of the same competition.

. No use without permission. ; ©2020 Fred Marie/Shutterstock. No use without permission. (right)

5

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Ukraine crisis

Eurobarometer

Macron’s travel diplomacy

Optimism about the future of the EU

(ed/hb, Paris) With the aim of de-­ escalating and mediating the Ukraine crisis, French President Emmanuel Macron, who is currently at the head of the EU Presidency, accomplished a diplomatic marathon. After having met the Russian President Vladimir Putin on 7th February in Moscow, he travelled to Kyiv the next day to

The risk of war in Europe

photo: ©2014 petrmalinak/Shutterstock

discuss with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy before meeting the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz together with the Polish President Andrzej Duda in the Weimar Triangle format in Berlin.

During their talks, Macron and Putin agreed that risk of war must be reduced by common efforts to enable a new stability and security order. Putin underpinned Russia’s conditions to collaborate: no extension of NATO towards Russian borders, no stationing of aggressive weapons in former Soviet Union territories and turn back to the geopolitical situation in 1997. Putin refuses for the moment a meeting of leaders in the Minsk format (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine).

In Kyiv, Macron assured Ukraine of the solidarity of the west, and in Berlin, Macron and Scholz, just arriving from his visit to US President Joe Biden in Washington, shared their views on the conflict with President Duda. They stated that their overall goal was avoiding war in Europe by engaging all diplomatic means and showing solidarity with all border states to Russia. But the three leaders also made clear that they would not accept peace at any price. Scholz alerted Russia that in case of an invasion of Ukraine, the consequences would be “political, economic and certainly also geostrategic”.

(last update: 09.02.2022)

Press conference Macron and Putin https://youtu.be/QHDAYz7g4u4

Citizenship

European Year of Youth (ed/Nils Cazaubon, Saint Germainen-Laye) 2022 was designated by the European Union as the Year of Youth. The idea is to rise awareness about young people’s needs and bring their voices back to the Union’s policies and actions.

The youth suffered a lot from the two years of the pandemic, since The Year of Youth wants to give hope to young the restrictive Covid-19 policies ofpeople in Europe photo: © 2019 encierro/Shutterstock ten ignored the needs and perspectives of young people, negatively influencing their education and the access to jobs, leading to social isolation and increasing mental health problems. Many lost hope.

With the Year of Youth, the European Union aims to react to this situation to change young people’s perspectives on their future by creating quality employment, education and training opportunities. The EU also wants to further open political spaces to young people with the goal of systematically including youth in decision-making processes at the regional, national and EU levels, but also at the United Nations level. The EU promotes the participation of youth in UN events and conferences through the organisation of side events. EU Member States are, for example, strong supporters of the UN Youth Delegate Programme (https://bit.ly/3rH2CqO) where young people can participate in intergovernmental meetings at the UN. Web European Youth Portal https://europa.eu/youth/home_en

6

(ed/nc, Paris) The new Eurobarometer survey commissioned by the European Parliament (EP) and having been conducted between 1st November and 2nd December 2021 in all 27 EU Member States, revealed that EU citizens’ support for the European Union and the EP in particular has increased during the Covid-­19 pandemic. As regards the European values to defend, nearly one third of respondents (32%) chose democracy as the first, followed by freedom of speech and thought (27%), and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (25%).

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, welcomed the results of the survey and said: “As the citizens rightly point out, defending democracy is Roberta Metsola the most imporphoto; © European Union 2022, source : EP (Denis Lomme) tant European value above anything else. We cannot take democracy for granted; extremism, authoritarianism and nationalism are today rising threats for our common European project.” 42% of European citizens see public health as a continued top policy priority, followed closely by the fight against poverty and social exclusion (40%) and action against climate change (39%), whereas young people put the fight against climate change as their top priority. A majority of EU citizens (62%) see their country’s EU membership as a good thing and a majority of respondents (63%) say they are optimistic about the future of the EU. Eurobarometer surveys are the official polling instrument used by the EU institutions and agencies to regularly monitor the state of public opinion in Europe on issues related to the European Union.

Video: https://bit.ly/34Ei8ul

News

Migration and asylum

Climate

The European Agency for Asylum starts work

New office for climate modelling

On 19th January, the European Agency for Asylum (EUAA) replaced its predecessor, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The new agency starts work with a reinforced mandate under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The aim is to ensure that asylum Refugees crossing Europe photo: ©2020 Ajdin Kamber/Shutterstock decisions are taken in a faster and fairer manner and that reception standards converge across the EU, bringing by that more uniformity in decision-making and alignment between Member States’ asylum systems. Key objectives are: • more efficient asylum systems; • improved assistance through a reserve of 500 experts; • uniform decision-making by developing operational standards, guidelines and best practices for the implementation of Union law on asylum; • greater convergence in the recognition rates by developing country guidance on countries of origin; • better monitoring and reporting on Member States’ asylum and reception systems; • capacity building in non-EU countries to improve asylum and reception systems and support EU and Member State resettlement schemes and • an independent fundamental rights officer and a new complaints mechanism will ensure the safeguard of asylum applicants’ rights.

The new agency will receive €172m of EU funds in 2022. It will launch eight operations in Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Spain supporting asylum and reception authorities in Member States with almost 2,000 personnel.

Web www.euaa.europa.eu

On 1st March, the World Climate Research Programme will open a new international office in the United Kingdom that will coordinate the programme’s Climate Model Intercomparison Project. The office will be hosted by the European Space Agency’s Centre for Space Applications and Telecommunications (ECSAT) facility, alongside its climate office.

For scientists, climate models are an important tool to understand the past climate and provide projections of future change.

The Climate Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) brings together modelling centres from around the world. It has a large activity with 140 models from 52 institutions representing 26 countries. The project is providing huge impetus to climate science and its outputs provide foundational model datasets used by climate assessments that contribute to global climate negotiations and decisions.

The new office, headed by Eleanor O’Rourke, will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of support for national and international assessments. It will help to coordinate discussions with the scientific and user communities on further standardisation protocols, data policy and quality control of model output and analysis.

Video: Introduction to climate models https://bit.ly/3gz6gfU

Events

“La Fabrique Défense” (ed/hb/nc, Paris) ”La Fabrique Défense” (“The Defence Workshop”) took place from 28th to 30th January at the Grande Halle de la Villette in Paris. It was the second edition of this unique event, organised by the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy of the Ministry of French Armed Forces.

Our magazine was hosted at the booth of EuroDéfense-France

photo: © Nathalie de Kaniv

Aimed at contributing to develop a European strategic culture among young Europeans

aerospace, air-maritime and air-land envi-

directed by Cyrille Schott, Regional Prefect

(aged 15-30 years), the event with more than

ronments, youth programmes, research and

(ret), with the association ‘Jeunes IHEDN’

160 booths, 36 roundtables and 30 career path

training, intelligence, resilience and support.

(L’Institut des hautes études de défense na-

sessions, featured subjects such as Europe,

The editors of our magazine partnered with

tionale), how the young generation could be

cybersecurity, nuclear deterrence, energy,

the association EuroDéfense-France and ap-

addressed regarding subjects on European

climate and the environment, innovation,

preciated the possibility to discuss, in a session

security and defence.

News last update: 09.02.2022

7

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

documentation

In the Spotlight

Start of the French EU Presidency On 1st January 2022, France took up the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the next six months. President Emmanuel Macron addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 19th January.

Excerpts of President Macron’s speech: “(…) When it comes to defence, lastly, we cannot satisfy ourselves with merely responding to international crises. We need power to anticipate, organizing the security of our environment. Considerable progress, unprecedented in our history, has been made in recent years. During this semester, we will have to ensure considerable progress in many areas, with the adoption of the Strategic Compass that was launched under the German Presidency, with the definition of our own security doctrine, in complementarity with NATO, and with a genuine technological independence, industrial and defence strategy, without which this Europe of Defence is meaningless and an not embedded in reality. As you will have understood from this agenda, the aim is to restore, together, a Europe that is a power of the future: a Europe capable of responding to climate, technological and digital challenges, and geopolitical challenges; an independent Europe that continues to ensure it has the means to decide itself on its future, not depending on the choices of the other great powers. (…)

Lastly, Europe needs to build a collective security order on our continent. Our continent’s security requires a strategic reinforcement of our Europe as a power of peace, a balancing power, particularly in its dialogue with Russia. I have been advocating this dialogue for several years. It is not optional, for our histo-

8

+++ EU Presidency +++

ry and our geography are stubborn, both for ourselves and for Russia.

For security in our continent, which is indivisible. We need this dialogue.

We, as Europeans, must collectively set down our own demands, and put ourselves in a position to ensure they are respected. Frank, demanding dialogue is needed in response to attempted destabilization, interference and manipulation.

What we need to build is a European order founded on principles and rules to which we have committed, and which we established not against or without Russia, but with Russia, 30 years ago now. And I want to reaffirm that order here: rejection of the use of force, of threats and of coercion; the free choice for States to take part in the organizations, alliances and security arrangements they wish; the inviolability of borders, the territorial integrity of States, and the rejection of spheres of influence. I am talking about principles that we, Europeans, and Russia, signed 30 years ago. It is up to us, as Europeans, to defend these principles and rights that are inherent to the sovereignty of States. It is up to us to reaffirm their value and effectively sanction their breach. Sovereignty is a freedom. It is central to our European project. It is also a response to the attempts at

destabilization at work on our continent. That is why we will continue, alongside Germany in the Normandy Format, to seek a political solution to the conflict in Ukraine, which remains the source of the current tensions. (…)

Members of the European Parliament, I was born in 1977 and the time of my youth was the time when Europe was an evidence. On the bloodied fields of northern France where I grew up, Europe represented peace as an intangible evidence.

Like many of you here, I then experienced the great European doubt, with the French referendum of 2005, the accusation of technocracy, and the risk of the Union breaking up during the sovereign debt crisis.

Today, it is up to our generations to renew our Europe to fulfil its promises of democracy, progress and peace. Collectively, we have provided the tools to make our Europe a democratic, cultural and educational power and a power of the future, and a balancing power. To do that, we will have many essential texts in the coming weeks and months and I am counting on close, harmonious work with the European Parliament, given all these texts, and shared ambitions. (…)”

Web EU Presidency website: https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/

France and Germany – so far apart and yet so close There is no alternative to the Franco-German tandem

by Cyrille Schott, former director of the National Institute for Advanced Security and Justice Studies (INHESJ), member of EuroDéfense France, Strasbourg, and Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris

W

hen the new French President was elected in 2017, the German weekly Der Spiegel devoted its front page to him, with the title “Teurer Freund”, “dear friend”, in the sense of “expensive friend”, and this comment: “Emmanuel Macron saves Europe... and Germany must pay.”1 Years before on 24th July 2013, the French daily Newspaper Le Monde published an article entitled “Germany, an egoist economic power”, a theme taken up by the weekly Le Point on 28th September 2021, in a free opinion “Let’s get out of the illusion of the Franco-German couple”, with a subtitle “German egoism.” “Farness” and “closeness” are indeed features of the Franco-German relationship.

World policy versus economic policy France, proud of its seat on the UN Security Council, its nuclear force, its expedition-experienced armed forces, the influence due to its language and its history as the nation of Enlightenment, Revolution and Human Rights, looks to the vast world.

France has a special view toward Africa and thanks to its ultramarine territories – its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with nearly 11 million km² under total jurisdiction is missing only a few km² to the United States’ EEZ – France has interest in all oceans and has a special view toward Africa.

Germany, only a nation-state since 1871, had there after a turbulent history, shaped by the 12 years of Hitler’s murderous dictatorship from 1933 to 1945. Today it is an advanced

photo: Elisabeht, stock.adobe.com

++ EU Presidency +++

democracy, deeply anchored in the population. Its foreign policy is oriented towards the continent, especially central and eastern Europe, where its interests are historically based.

Proud of the reconstruction of their country from ruins at the end of the Second World War, Germans are still working to find cohesion among their population after the reunification in 1990 of the separated country. They believe in the strength of their economy with strong small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the Mittelstand as the backbone of German economy, much envied in France. This Mittelstand allows Germany to be one of the world’s leading exporting powers. Germans see themselves as the main industrial nation of Europe and praise the “Made in Germany”.

The trade relations between France and Germany show an important imbalance, detrimental to the first. The same applies to the employment situation. But there are French capabilities balancing these lacks. For example, French demography is more dynamic with a younger population. The banking system is stronger, and the country has long coasts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Germans are easily irritated by the claims of France sometimes ironically called “the Great Nation”, unable to put its accounts in order. The French on their side like to criticise, together with some other Europeans countries, the German economic policy, considered as short-sighted, not using its budgetary capacities and drawing the benefits of the single market and the euro zone without thinking of returning to other countries.

→ Continued on page 10 1 ”Emmanuel Macron rettet Europa... und Deutschland soll zahlen”, Der Spiegel, 13.5.2017.

9

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ France-Germany +++

Different political cultures In the institutional fields there are indeed major discrepancies.

Germans believe in their federal system with the 16 Länder not being mere regions, but federated states, each with their own cultural capital and a complete government with ministers and financial authority. The regime is parliamentary, with parties fiercely discussing a government contract, which will have to be respected, and a Bundestag in Berlin, closely controlling the government and its commitments abroad, especially military. Decentralisation is rooted in the organisation of the country.

The French Republic is unitary and, although regionalised, the State remains well present in the administration of the territory. The governance of the country is dominated, except in times of “cohabitation” when the prime minister comes from another party, by the President of the Republic, endowed with a vast power, to launch for example external military operations.

However, France also shows flexibility: in budgetary management, French flexibility is opposed to German rigor, but in corporate governance, participation rights (Mitbestimmung) – where in Germany employee representatives participate in the management of companies – face a French system that is struggling, despite progress, to get out of the confrontation between employers reluctant to share power and unions that are not all reformists.

Compromise versus confrontation The life of society reflects these contrasts of the culture of consensus in Germany and in France rather that of confrontation, the object of an ambiguous judgment of the Germans: a criticism of the inclination to strike and the lack of discipline, combined with admiration for the ability of the French not to bow to authority and to defend freedoms.

Stereotypes live in popular culture. Germans are inclined to say : “Die Franzosen arbeiten, um zu leben und wir leben um zu arbeiten”, (The French work to live, we live to work), they will criticise French frivolity, but will immediately add, envious and admiring: “Leben wie Gott in Frankreich”, (Live like God

in France!) and they admire French elegance and songs, they dream of Paris and its lights. The Frenchman, on the contrary, will smile at “Germanic heaviness”, but will praise “Germanic seriousness and rigor.” When the French love greatness, the German favour caution, if the French wants to be a creator, the German makes sure to maintain what he has built.

The non-easy French-German dialogue The Merkel-Macron dialogue has shown these divergent traits: prudence and a culture of consensus from the first, acceptance of confrontation and the idea of embodying a great nation from the second; annoyance of the French partner at German slowness, irritation of the German at French ardor. There is no shortage of subjects of disagreement: the place of nuclear power in the energy transition, the future of the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU’s collective indebtedness, relations with the United States and definition of European sovereignty.

Temptations leading to distance exist indeed: the German to get closer to frugal northern Europe and to listen to central Europe, even sovereigntist; the French to a closer understanding with southern Europe, as evidenced by the agreement of the Mediterranean (2008) which sees France in a leading role and the Quirinal Treaty of November 2021 with Italy.

Paving the way to Europe’s unity And yet! The miracle of European peace is the fruit of Franco-German reconciliation, images of which are imprinted in the collective imagination: De Gaulle and Adenauer at the Mass for Peace in Reims Cathedral in 1962, then signing the Elysée Treaty in January 1963; Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing, living symbols of Franco-German friendship; Kohl and Mitterrand’s handshake in Verdun in 1984.

The links between the French and German leaders, their constant consultation in tandem, are unique in relations between nations. These ties have been further strengthened by the Treaty of Aachen, concluded in January 2019 in the city where Europe’s first unifier, Charlemagne, whose empire gave birth to both France and Germany, rests. A joint parliamentary assembly was formed in 2020 and set to work.

Europe’s major advances, such as the single market and the euro, come from the Franco-German duo.

It was the Macron-Merkel agreement in May 2020 that paved the way for the European recovery plan and the issuance of community bonds, a fiscal revolution for the EU. And behind this plan, the new German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, pushed –

truth, there is no alternative to the Franco-German “Intandem.

It is through its constant dialogue, even if it is not always easy, that initiatives are born and that crises, these engines of European construction, can be managed.

“

10

+++ France-Germany +++

French President Emmanuel Macron (left) and the new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the European Council, December 2021 photo: © EUROPEAN UNION

then as Merkel’s finance minister – to realise it, completely changing Germany’s finance doctrine. Despite their differences on many issues, Merkel and Macron worked to consolidate the Euro during the current health crisis. In armament cooperation they launched projects such as the fighter jet of the future – a programme Spain has joined – which are decisive for Europe’s security and defence.

Looking positively to the future is justified The November coalition contract of Berlin, between the SPD (social democrats), the Bündnis90/Die Grünen (greens) and the FDP (liberals), refers less to the special relationship with France than the previous one of 2018 of the grand coalition.

It proclaims, as is the tradition, the centrality of the transatlantic partnership. However, by affirming Germany’s European anchoring and the ambition of a European “strategic sovereignty”, by committing to a true security and defence policy in Europe, by deeming it possible to make faster progress with the voluntary states, by aiming to complete the banking union, by evoking the flexibility of the Stability Pact, by considering transnational lists and the extension of qualified majority voting, including for external affairs and defence, it opens up prospects for new collaborations in the spirit of Macron’s Sorbonne speech of 2017, “for a sovereign, united and democratic Europe”.

When the journalists of the German weekly DIE ZEIT asked Olaf Scholz: “Where will your first trip abroad take you?”, he

answered without any hesitation: “To Paris”, and he added: “The friendship between Germany and France is the basis for the success of cooperation within the European Union as a whole.”2 At this first visit the new German Chancellor confirmed that he had understood the essence of President Macron’s speech at the Sorbonne in 2017. And the young German Foreign Minister of the Greens, Annalena Baerbock, declared in the French capital that the consequence of European sovereignty is that there must be a state! She was in line with the coalition contract that calls for the further development of a European federal state. It is improbable that France and other European countries would go as far. In any case, the dialogue is reset with an overture the French government wasn’t waiting for! The dialogue will continue between these two fundamental countries for the progress of Europe.

In truth, there is no alternative to the Franco-German tandem.

It is through its constant dialogue, even if it is not always easy, that initiatives are born and that crises, these engines of European construction, can be managed. Simply, this tandem must be able to expand its one-on-one to other partners, so that the concerns of all parts of the continent are considered.

This is one of the angles from which the Franco-Italian treaty can be analysed.

We believe in a saying in Brussels, that “there is no need for fear about the Union when the tandem of France and Germany is doing fine.”

2 Olaf Scholz im ZEIT-Gespräch, DIE ZEIT n°49 2. Dezember 2021.

11

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ EU-Russia +++

The US and the EU together must negotiate European security with Russia

Putin needs to receive a convincing answer!

by Jacques Favin Lévêque, Général (ret), Versailles, and Claude Roche, Vice-President of the Académie de l’Air et de l’Espace, Paris

T

he recent draft security treaty presented by Russia proposes bilateral guarantees between Russia and the United States (US), with the aim of severely restricting NATO’s reach and any attempt to extend it closer to Russia. This applies to the territories of the former Soviet Union, countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states or other countries bordering on Russia. Many of them have already joined NATO, while others are seeking NATO membership.

President Putin’s provocative stance It is not entirely clear if President Putin’s goal is to restore the geopolitical situation that prevailed before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but in any case, the President is clearly affirming Russia’s status as a geostrategic power on a par with the US since the text does not even mention the European Union (EU).

It is often said that defence policy is a tool of foreign policy, and it is quite usual for a state to use it to support its negotiations with an interlocutor, which it thus puts in a position of inferiority. For its part, the EU is loath to use the threat of force to achieve its political objectives. This is due to the peaceful intentions on which it was founded after the second world war

12

and to an ethic linked to the very nature of democracy. But even if it wanted to, it would be incapable of doing so, because its means are limited, and it is deeply divided on the use of force. In this regard, the EU does not scare anyone...

Europe is therefore taken aback that Russia has resorted to a kind of 21st century “gunboat diplomacy”. We cannot fail to see the link between the spectacular deployment of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border and the draft security treaty presented

by President Putin. Of course, in the days of the USSR, the Donbas was at the heart of its defence industry and an important economic hub with a Russian-speaking population. But is this the real reason for the crisis? On the part of a Russia, which does not hesitate to show its strength to get what it wants, this draft treaty reveals a desire for geopolitical negotiation more than a desire for territorial reconquest.

What Russia really wants If this interpretation is accepted, the Russian military is simply engaged in a game of politico-strategic posturing and the invasion so dreaded by NATO headquarters will not happen!

Let us therefore be bold enough to adopt this hypothesis, even if it is not shared by the operational planners of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the officials of the European External Action Service (EEAS). They are simply doing their duty by considering possible reactions to a possible Russian offensive.

+++ EU-Russia +++

EU must assert, within NATO, enough European sovereignty “The as is necessary for peace and promote, in partnership with the US, diplomatic appeasement with Russia.”

photo: © 2011 E. O./Shutterstock.

The question then is how to analyse the Russian proposal and how to respond to it. But who should be the analyst? The Russian proposal is directed towards the Americans and it behoves them to respond first or, alternatively, to dismiss it out of hand.

However, as this proposal is largely about security in Europe, should the EU not be a privileged partner in the negotiation?

For the moment this is clearly not the case. Putin is studiously ignoring the EU as such and considers its 27 Member States as “vassals” of the US within NATO. This is not entirely untrue, as the EU hardly has the weight of a geopolitical player within the Atlantic Alliance. However, as curious as it may seem, the EU does not seem to take umbrage either at its lightweight status within NATO, nor at Russia’s snub of ignoring it completely. It remains silent, hiding behind the US and not realising that this proposal is principally about its own security.

The EU has simply not grasped the subtlety of President Putin’s manoeuvre, addressing it in a subliminal way and expecting a response from the US which, in his eyes, will also be that of “Europe”, in its broadest but also its most ambiguous sense.

In fact, while expounding the idea of ​​a balance to guarantee security, the text looks favourable to Russia. It says that NATO must not extend its influence to the edges of its western border and must cease to be the threat that Russia, rightly or wrongly, sees it as. In the 2000s, NATO, unfortunately, made an ill-considered commitment by referring to the vocation of Ukraine and Georgia to eventually join the Alliance. This is clearly a red line for Russia and could encourage it to go a lot further than simply engaging in politico-diplomatic posturing at the Ukrainian border.

A wake-up call for the EU The US seem to have already rejected Putin’s approach. And yet hasn’t the time come, at least for Europe, to swap its posture as an adversary for that of a strategic partner?

The Russian regime is, of course, far more autocratic than

democratic. So what? Is this a good enough reason to refrain from a dialogue in which everyone has an interest? Is it not axiomatic that we always have an interest in negotiating with our opponents and even our enemies? What this is all about, after all, is peace in Europe ... May the EU open its eyes and cease, under the false pretext of loyalty to NATO, to work against its strategic interests. The EU Member States should not follow the US – if this is their intent – in a spiral of confrontation with a Russia on which it depends, in particular for energy. But nor should they condone any attempt by Russia to reconquer lost territories. The more this infernal spiral develops, the more Russia will harden its position and stir up nationalist exaltation reminiscent of an era that was believed to be over. This tragic march towards a new cold war must be stopped and it is up to the EU to take the initiative.

The EU must assert, within NATO, enough European sovereignty as is necessary for peace and promote, in partnership with the US, diplomatic appeasement with Russia. Dialogue and negotiation, the very essence of diplomacy, have immense virtues and what is at stake here is the balance between world powers. Peaceful relations between the EU and Russia, and by extension between western countries and Russia, respecting the specificity of each other’s political regimes, are possible if the EU behaves like the geopolitical power it claims to be.

Only then will Putin respect the EU, instead of making chess moves with a party he considers merely as a player of checkers.

He knows full well that a player of checkers, unlike him, cannot understand the complexity of every possible chess move. But even worse for our self-esteem as Europeans, Putin might not even see us as a player of checkers, but simply as a carpet!

is studiously ignoring the “Putin EU as such and considers its

27 Member States as ‘vassals’ of the US within NATO.”

13

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Pandemics +++

Stop the Covid-19 pandemic

by William Cockburn, Interim Executive Director, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Bilbao

T

he Covid-19 pandemic continues to be one of the biggest challenges that our societies and economies are facing.

With most of Europe under lockdown for months in 2020 to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, recently we are again witnessing very high incidence rates, with illnesses and deaths in many countries.

This is putting significant pressure on health systems, but also on businesses. Decision-makers either have to implement new practices or suspend some activities altogether. As the virus will be likely to stay with us for a long while, many policymakers and employers are looking at how we can provide a safe and healthy working environment for both home-based teleworkers and those returning to their usual workplaces.

Guidance for safe and healthy working Policies and practices must be based on the application of sound occupational safety and health (OSH) principles to minimise the risk of exposure to the virus and minimise its spread.

Therefore, at the European Agency for Safety and Health at 1 https://bit.ly/3fX8Qw2 2 https://bit.ly/3qVOXvy

14

Work (EU-OSHA), we have compiled a range of guidance for safe and healthy working in the context of Covid-19. This initiative is fully in line with the European Commission’s response to the pandemic, and acts on one of the key priorities of the new EU Strategic Framework on Health and Safety at Work 202120271, namely the increasing preparedness to respond to current and future health crises. The collection of resources is available on our website, under the section ‘Healthy Workplaces Stop the Pandemic’2 An excellent place to start is Covid-19: Back to the workplace – Adapting workplaces and protecting workers. This EU guidance (available in 25 languages) provides important information on using risk assessment as the starting point for reducing workers’ exposure to the virus and describes how workplaces and work practices can be adapted. It provides over 600 links to guidance specific to sectors from all over Europe and beyond, for example on retail in the Netherlands or construction in Italy.

EU-OSHA has also published step-by-step guidance on getting back to work after Covid-19 infection for managers and workers. The guides explain the challenges that returning workers

photo: © olinchuk, stock.adobe.com

Resources for healthy workplaces

++ Pandemics +++

William Cockburn is Interim Executive Director at the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA). He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Law and a Master of Science degree in ergonomics (University of Loughborough).

Since 2012 he has been in charge of EU-OSHA’s Prevention and Research

face after suffering Covid-19, whethUnit, which develops the occupational safety and health content. Mr er affected by acute illness or longer Cockburn has worked at EU-OSHA since 1998 where he focused on the photo: EU-OSHA term symptoms, also known as long areas of research coordination, emerging risks and was responsible for Covid. They provide simple solutions the first European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks for both managers and workers on (ESENER). Prior to joining EU-OSHA, he worked in academic research investigating company how to manage getting back to work. safety culture and in the private sector as an ergonomics consultant and research manager Tailored to either workers or managfor projects in health and safety at work. ers, each guide offers easy-to-follow advice on keeping in touch during sickness leave, the back-to-work online risk assessment. The aim of the tool is to emphasise interview, measures such as temporary adjustments to working the importance of adapting work processes to the Covid-19 hours or duties, and where to get help. measures and to assess the consequences for OSH. It contains Furthermore, a joint European Centre for Disease Prevention modules related to the risks associated with deliveries and and Control (ECDC) and EU-OSHA technical report provides working on customer premises. It also takes into account coman overview of the use of rapid antigen diagnostic tests for panies’ approaches to testing and vaccination.

SARS-CoV-2 in occupational settings. The report highlights that With Covid-19 demonstrating the impact that biological agents testing should be used to complement, rather than replace, can have on the workplace, it may be also helpful to read more other safety and health measures to prevent the spread of the generally about minimising work-related exposure to biological virus. It also stresses the importance of involving authorities, agents. workers, employers and occupational health services when developing a testing strategy for the workplace. Good cooperation between OSH and public health actors is vital to ensuring Understand how the virus is spread everyone is protected.

Raising awareness and preparing everyone for the ‘new norIn addition, within the existing collection of online interactive mal’ in the workplace are vital. It is hugely important that workrisk assessment tools for small and micro enterprises, a new ers and employers alike understand how the virus is spread OiRA tool is helping employers carry out their Covid-related and how it can be prevented from spreading, so that action plans are implemented consistently by all in the workplace. We have produced several short animated videos as a great way to raise awareness, as they are easy to share.

What’s more, although there are certain jobs and sectors in which workers cannot work from home, teleworking remains EU-OSHA an option – or indeed a requirement – for many. For example, our staff have been teleworking throughout the lockdown and Founded in 1994, EU-OSHA is the European Union informawe are still offering the possibility to do so. We have produced tion agency for occupational safety and health. The agency’s guidance on making teleworking as safe and effective as work contributes to the European Commission’s Stratepossible. The advice covers making sure equipment is safe, gic Framework on Health and Safety at Work 2021-2027 maintaining good mental health and keeping moving through(https://bit.ly/3J1nM8T) and other relevant EU strategies out the day. and programmes.

For our offices in Bilbao we have also developed a phased EU-OSHA’s mission is to promote a culture of risk prevenback-to-work protocol which is constantly updated, based tion to improve working conditions in Europe and to make on the current national and regional advice. Our number one European workplaces safer, healthier, and more productive priority is ensuring maximum protection for our staff. for the benefit of businesses, employees, and governments.

If businesses and organisations base their actions and the information they provide to their workers on accurate and Web EU-OSHA: https://osha.europa.eu/ up-to-date knowledge and guidance, the circumstances will be Video: https://youtu.be/Nu2fR-J7zxA right for a safe, healthy and effective return to the workplace.

15

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Arctic Strategy +++

Climate change leads to a strategic and security turn in EU policy

graphic: © esniewski, stock.adobe.com

The European Union is striving for more influence in the Arctic

by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris

T

he Joint Communication on ”A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic” (https:// bit.ly/3npDlii ) presented by the EU High Representative and the European Commission on 13th October 2021, cannot hide the fact that the Union has had problems gaining appropriate diplomatic status with the Arctic Council, as well as with its own long-standing Arctic policy.

The role of the European Parliament (EP) in the Arctic issue was highlighted by a report adopted a week before the Joint Communication, on 7th October 2021, on “The Arctic: opportunities, problems and security issues” (https://bit.ly/3I4xZ3A).

It aired clear concerns about Russia’s aggressive military buildup in the Arctic and China’s projects around the North Pole.

This Communication, described by the High Representative, as a “driver” for the EU’s strategic thinking, was definitely needed to shift the Union’s 2016 strategic approach to the Arctic from promoting sustainable development and calling for military restraint to making the Union’s Arctic policy a priority of its Green Deal. Indeed, this was the very point made by Commissioner Virginijus Sinkevicius in his presentation on 13th October.

20 years of inconsistent EU Arctic policy At the end of the last century, the EU, aware of the growing importance of the Arctic and observing the Arctic Council’s1 policy from the outside, felt the need to request an ad-hoc observer status at the Council.

For many years, its efforts to obtain this status were unsuccessful. In 2008, when the EP published a resolution on “Arctic Governance” calling for an “international treaty on the protection of the Arctic environment”, the initiative irritated the Arctic coastal states (CA, DK, N, RU, USA). Finally, however, in 2013 the Union was offered the somewhat discriminatory status of “permanent guest”, which it accepted.

In 2016, the Commission released a Communication on “EU Integrated Arctic Policy” pointing out Russian military activities in the Arctic and China’s positioning with its Polar Silk Road planning.2 To the Arctic Council’s disappointment however, the Communication did not fulfil expectations concerning the EU’s

the North of the globe, the Arctic, “Letbecome a zone of peace; let the North Pole be a pole of peace!”

Mikhail Gorbatchev

strategic positioning but climate change was already one of the three priorities, together with sustainable development and international cooperation.

One of the leading experts on the Arctic, Ambassador Laurent Mayet, chair of the think-tank “Le Cercle Polaire” in Paris and former French Ambassador for Polar Affairs (2009-2016) described, in a paper for the Robert Schuman Foundation, the Union’s naïve position in its 2016 Communication: “The choice has now been made to state bluntly, and without euphemism, that the current geostrategic situation involves the security of European citizens.” (https://bit.ly/3K0Q30q ). This approach contrasts sharply with the spirit in which multilateral diplomacy on the Arctic was developed at the end of the Cold War.3

The shift to a new engagement The recent Communication contains a more innovative approach, supported by concrete proposals such as the creation of a European Commission office in Greenland to “raise the profile of Arctic issues in the EU’s external relations”, a financial package to support the green transition for the benefit of Arctic peoples, and an indefinite freeze on exploitation of fossil fuel in the Arctic.

Climate change might well prevail over other important policy objectives like sustainable development, but I think the EU should try to combine both. → See also the documentation page 36

1 Arctic Council, Tromsö (Members, called the Arctic 8, are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States of America).

2 This magazine will continue reporting on the Arctic region in the next edition with an analysis of the military situation.

3 The initiative was launched by Mikhail Gorbatchev, president of Soviet Union, in a speech in Murmansk on 1st October 1987, calling for the creation of a regional cooperation body for making the Arctic a demilitarised and nuclear-free zone of peace.

16

MAIN TOPIC

The geopolitical rivalry of great powers is a reality: China has become the dominant rival of the United States by striving for regional and global dominance and keeping sound relations with Russia; Moscow, losing geopolitical influence mainly by occupying parts of Ukraine, is trying to weaken NATO and marginalise Europe; the US is realigning its geopolitical objectives in the world with a special view of the Indo-Pacific and is trying to keep influence in Europe through the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, where does Europe stand in this changing world?

photo: © CINEMA 4D, stock.adobe.com

The rivalry of great powers

17

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

China has become the dominant rival of the United States

photo: ©Rainer Fuhrmann, stock.adobe.com

The realignment of US geopolitical objectives in the world

by Prof Thomas Jäger, Professor and political scientist, University of Cologne

I

t continues to be an accurate definition of US central geostrategic interest that no power should become so dominant on the Eurasian continent that it dominates the other states and, building on this, can challenge the US in global politics.

The reconfiguration of US policy towards China in the 1970s followed this logic. Henry Kissinger remarked to President Nixon at the time that the rapprochement with China was based solely on containing the Soviet Union, ie pitting the weaker rival against the stronger. “Twenty years from now,” Kissinger continued, “your successor, if he’s as smart as you are, will take it up from the other side and approach the Russians as a counterweight to the Chinese.” He said that in 1972.

Redefining zones of influence As is well known, this rapprochement did not happen. At least not yet. Rather, the US defined the new conflict for world power, similar to the Cold War, as a competition between democracies and authoritarian systems, without Russia being able to prove China’s flexibility so far. In addition, from Russia’s point of view, the territorial zones of influence have not yet been satisfactorily clarified and the American position of power is no longer sufficient to implement a solution that is unfriendly to Russia. It is quite possible that Russia’s goal right now is to force a “Yalta Conference” for the 21st century. In other words, to redefine the zones of influence.

18

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China became the dominant rival of the United States in just a few decades and, according to its own plans, aims to become the international leader in all areas of politics and economics in the next 20 years. The US, it is believed among China’s political class, is a world power in decline and cannot defend its current status as a leading international power either technologically or economically, and therefore not militarily or diplomatically. China aspires to more than a regional sphere of influence. This is to be the basis for global dominance. In order to replace the US as the dominant world power, China is keen to maintain good relations with Russia.

Russia’s objectives On the contrary, US and Russian interests still clash in Europe, as the US seeks to keep the transatlantic counter coast in its network of allies, while Russia pursues three goals in parallel.

First, it wants to bind the former Soviet Union states – Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and the three Baltic states – very closely to itself, in whatever form can be implemented without full-scale military confrontation. Second, Russia seeks to dismantle the European Union to eliminate a competitor with influence over eastern Europe, which is why Polish EU policy is so significant.

Third, Russia seeks formative influence over Europe through energy and security relationships. The US recognises this counteraction by Russia and is eager to tie its allies more closely to itself. However, this clashes with central orientations of US policy towards China.

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

The geostrategic orientation of the US The US has always been a transatlantic and transpacific power.

The balance has shifted over the course of American history.

But even in recent decades both regions assumed high importance for US foreign, foreign economic, and security policy.

This is symbolised in two ports: one transatlantic at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; one transpacific at Naval Base Coronado, California. However, the US is not only a transatlantic and transpacific power in terms of security policy, but also economically.

The two free trade areas, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), were supposed to re-establish the central geoeconomic position of the US, which would have succeeded had President Trump not overturned both projects. Unlike presidents before him and his successor, President Trump minimally valued the contribution of allies and free trade relationships to secure America’s position in the world. Not only was this a wrong decision when it came to strengthening US competitiveness vis-à-vis China, but it also exposed a fundamental shortcoming – at least in the eyes of autocratic leaders – of democracies: periodically, new administrations in the US can enforce new fundamental different foreign and security policy decisions.

In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party has strengthened the position of President Xi with a historic resolution, setting the path until 2049, when it wants to become the dominant world power. In the US, six more presidential elections will be held between now and then. In the end, the US TPP project has been replaced by the Chinese Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

In the future, the competition for world power will be primarily technological, because economic and military competitive advantages will follow from these innovations. The US and China are now proceeding in parallel ways: both countries are pursuing a policy of locating production in their own countries again. The purpose is similar: the technological progress and production should take place in the home country. Both political leaders are convinced that in the end they will be the stronger economy and thus the power that sets the rules.

Global Gateway which is an EU contribution to narrowing the global investment gap worldwide. It is this difference which will become clear again in autumn 2022, when President Xi will very likely be confirmed as head of the Chinese Communist Party for another five years, while President Biden will have

long as the US does not find a balance with “AsRussia and the US-led alliance of democracies does not become significantly stronger than China and Russia together, this situation will lead to an unresolvable dilemma.”

Dependencies and polarisation The US is more dependent on allies for political and cultural reasons, but also for economic ones. While China is in a position to launch economic projects via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and gradually lead states into political dependence, the US lacks the strategic staying power to do so. The Build Back Better World (B3W) economic initiative for the infrastructure development of low- and middle-income countries undertaken by the Group of Seven (G7) in June 2021 as an alternative to China’s BRI is not yet fully developed. The same is with the

to fear for his party’s majority in the midterm elections. As an aside, the Longer Telegram’s recommendations (American-China Strategy) for action have become very frail with the historic November 2021 resolution. The question of which system can better organise wealth and power is one for both administrations. President Biden has not succeeded in showing American society the way to greater commonality in foreign policy, even though opposition to China’s grip on world power has now found a broad bipartisan base in Washington. The polarisation of American society remains the biggest problem facing the US.

US objectives – a dilemma for Europe?

Major EU states are seeking a balance with Russia and do not want to give up the economic advantages of trade with China.

The US is trying to integrate these EU states into a policy more strictly directed against the rise of China. This policy is also directed against Russia, which is to be denied access to eastern Europe. As long as the US does not find a balance with Russia and the US-led alliance of democracies does not become significantly stronger than China and Russia together, this situation will lead to an unresolvable dilemma. It confronts the US with the question of whether it can take on China and Russia at the same time. At present, Americans cannot expect effective support from their European allies because they lack the necessary capabilities. For the US, the differentiation between democracies and autocracies still guides its actions.

The question is how long this can be maintained internationally and what repercussions a change in policy will have on the state’s self-image.

Prof Dr Thomas Jäger, political scientist at the University Cologne, Germany

19

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

What the European Union has to realise in security and defence Interview with Moritz Brake, Kapitänleutnant and Lecturer for Maritime Security and Strategy, University of Bonn

T

he European: Mr Brake, the European Union (EU) is currently facing adversity, geopolitical competition and a broad range of social, ecological, juridical and political challenges. Is the Union strong enough to master these challenges?

Moritz Brake: The EU needs to act strategically and pragmatically to face increasing geopolitical rivalry in a multipolar world – but it also must remain true to its democratic value base, for it is the foundation of all its strength. The so-called “commons” – the sea, “big data”, cyber- and outer-space – do not just pose opportunities, they are key areas of competition in a world increasingly influenced by great-power rivalry.

The European: What do we have to do to not just be mere bystanders of events?

Moritz Brake: First of all, the EU has to muster the will to act.

The forthcoming Strategic Compass of the Commission needs to be sufficiently concrete! Despite significant progress in some fields, the EU still lacks many of the necessary instruments that support its political leadership in carrying out a coherent grand strategy. To enable what Helmut Schmidt called ‘Gesamtstrategie’, a civilian-military staff is needed that considers all dimensions of foreign and domestic policy, integrating information on all strands of potential concern to our society in its strategic outlook and contingency-planning.

Knowing what might threaten us, how we can prepare for risks and how we can seize and create opportunities is key to furthering European interests and defending our values with our allies and partners.

The European: You mentioned allies, this is NATO with the US as leading power. Is America back again?

Moritz Brake: After a disastrous four years under President

20

Trump, the US has returned as a responsible ally. Still, we must be aware that America is shifting its attention and power towards the Indo-Pacific region.

The European: Russia ought to be a partner but has shifted away from Europe.

Moritz Brake: I think there are limits to what Russia can achieve if it continues on its confrontational course with the west and the EU. President Putin’s short-term gamble with Crimea destroyed Russia’s hopes for a powerful place in a multipolar 21st century. And its recently increased military pressure on Ukraine only deepens the dilemma Russia is facing.

Still, if offered only half a chance to improve its own position at the cost of the EU, Russia will most likely grab it.

The European: China is claiming to be only an economical great power.

Moritz Brake: With China seemingly far away from Europe, falling for this narrative might be a likely mistake for Europeans.

But there is no denying that Peking’s bid for great-power status has a rock-hard military dimension: it is reinforcing its nuclear and naval forces continuously, has become increasingly autocratic at home, and muscular in its foreign policy, especially in its maritime neighbourhood.

The European: Great Britain has left the EU; what are the consequences in security and defence?

Moritz Brake: Let me say it this way: as regrettable as Brexit is on many levels, a major obstacle to closer European military integration has disappeared. In addition to this, there is reasonable hope that British strategic resources continue to be closely coordinated and aligned with the EU’s.

The European: What are the main challenges for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)?

Moritz Brake: Two mutually supportive perspectives need to

photo: Bundeswehr/Marine Nationale/Cindy Luu

Europe needs to act strategically and pragmatically to face increasing geopolitical rivalry

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

Strategic Compass of “Thetheforthcoming Commission needs to be sufficiently concrete! “ Moritz Brake is a German Navy officer. He holds a Master’s degree in War Studies from King’s College London, where he is currently a PhD candidate. He also holds an engineering degree in Nautical Sciences from the Jade University’s nautical de-

be addressed, both domestically and internationally: first, the EU is called upon to create positive conditions for sustainable human development – as expressed in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and second, it needs to prevent its own destruction, its disintegration, and fend for survival in the face of adversity – as associated with a traditionally more pessimistic view of international relations.

The European: And the returns of military power?

Moritz Brake: The Union is right – but seemingly too eager – to believe that we live in an era of diminishing returns on military power. With nuclear armed great-power conflict an unacceptable prospect, it is evident that military power has lost a great deal of its utility.

The European: Military power will continue to be relevant.

Moritz Brake: Absolutely. It remains relevant to deter potential aggressors, manage rogue states and violent crises of the “new war” or “low intensity” kind. Military power will also play its part in enforcing international governance by policing otherwise ungoverned spaces like the ocean or outer space.

The European: In this regard, the EU seems to be lagging behind in providing competitive sea power…

Moritz Brake: … right, compared with the substantial naval build-up across the region in south-east Asia – especially on the part of China – we run the risk of “missing the boat”. EU navies have been substantially cut back over the past decades and the “hard-power” element for smart EU sea power is being dangerously neglected. On top of this, China’s expanding militarisation is not restricted to its official armed forces. Civilian maritime endeavors, such as fishing, have long since acquired a paramilitary dimension. Furthermore, the civilian instruments of sea power are also quietly slipping out of Europe’s hands: over 93% of global shipbuilding happens in Asia now, while over half of the world merchant fleet is owned by Asian companies.

The European: What about the free passage of goods across the world’s oceans?

Moritz Brake: All states in the globalised economy vitally

partment in Elsfleth, Germany. Mr Brake served on the UN mission UNIFIL (Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon, 2007) and the EU counter-piracy mission ATALANTA off the Horn of Africa (2010 & 2011). As a visiting lecturer, he teaches a course on ‘Maritime Security and Strategy’ at the University of Bonn, Germany.

depend on maritime security and global ocean governance. No modern economy can prosper without access to the sea and its maritime transport networks. However, there is no guarantee that this will continue at all times unhindered by malicious interference of state or non-state actors. As long as great-power conflict seems a possibility, the EU needs nuclear weapons at its disposal – something which, at least by proxy at present is covered by the French force de frappe.

The European: Enough to deter Russia from attempting any mutually destructive military adventures on European borders?

Moritz Brake: A difficult question. In order to not become hostages to “mutually assured destruction” as our only policy option, we have to be able to muster a credible defence with conventional forces as much as with nuclear weapons.

However, beyond having to sufficiently deter potential Russian military adventurism, the EU’s “level of ambition” with regard to military power, sea power, its naval tool-set and the capability to project force across the ocean, is not clearly defined. How much military power is enough to back up the EU’s strategic foreign policy beyond immediate self-defence?

The European: Economically a powerhouse, is the EU really acting strategically?

Moritz Brake: The EU has considerable economic power. But without a coherent grand strategy to guide it, it has yet to recognise and use its economic toolset strategically. There seems to be a widespread readiness to consider business and

→ Continued on page 22

21

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

foreign policy separately. This is not only dangerous in the face of adversaries that use all of their societies’ forces – including the economy – to achieve their aims, it also creates tremendous inefficiencies.

The European: You mentioned the “commons”. What role does cyber space play as a strategic element?

Moritz Brake: The digital realm or cyberspace has become just as crucial to modern societies’ success as the sea or outer space. From knowledge generation, access to information and learning, via modern medicine and all other critical infrastructure to military capabilities: precious little is left in utility, once it’s offline. Europe needs to brace itself for the confrontation that is already happening in the cyber domain and pull together loose, nationally organised strings in cyber security.

The European: And what is the role of EU industries?

Moritz Brake: The EU’s manufacturing industry could increasingly form the backbone for winning the race in AI-driven automatisation, robotics and cloud-based networked production in the so-called ‘Industry 4.0’. However, this requires the generation, storage, and processing of vast amounts of data.

A field which is not dominated by European enterprises but American and increasingly Chinese ones. For success in this domain, Europe needs to take all three aspects into its own hands, including the use of AI and quantum computing to handle and secure the data that is being collected.

The European: What is your opinion on the relevance of outer space for European security?

Moritz Brake: There is no doubt about the relevance of outer space for our present, let alone future strategic position. Still, EU space policy suffers from the same lack of comprehensive strategic action that other policy areas do. This may explain why Member States and the Union jointly dedicate such limited resources to a field that has clearly been recognised as highly relevant by its US partner and global competitors.

The European: The strategic relevance of the space domain seems to be bound to increase?

Moritz Brake: Yes, because all other elements of state power are already highly dependent on space infrastructure. The economy, our communications, knowledge-transfer, civilian infrastructure and military all run with crucial reliance on spacebased assets. Space infrastructure in turn depends on more than delivery rockets for satellites and launching capabilities.

In-orbit propulsion, maintenance and even construction play increasingly important roles. Objects in outer space are also not out of reach of hostile interference: defence capabilities against physical attacks will matter just as much as in-orbit computing power to handle cyber-threats. This in turn requires propulsion technology that can handle the necessary payloads and endurance to not only get bigger, more capable objects into space, but also to carry them far enough to strategically

22

relevant positions beyond the immediate proximity of our planet.

The European: Is climate part of the strategic competition?

Moritz Brake: Renewable energy and sustainability are becoming more and more important. But building a green economy is also driving a global multi-billion-dollar market in related technology. The inherent technological revolution also comes with geopolitical shifts with the creation of new dependencies and vulnerabilities, as well as a disconnection from old ones. Judging by the numbers of patents, the availability of key resources and components, as well as new installations of wind turbines or solar panels, the EU is lagging far behind and increasingly has to rely on China for its “green” transformation.

The European: Affected by climate change, migration is becoming more and more of a strategic factor.

Moritz Brake: Migration from the Middle East and the African continent is commonly identified as one of the main contemporary challenges to Europe. But it also holds opportunities to master positively or fail. One of the EU’s core interests and strategic advantages is its humanitarian value base: it must not give up on its commitment to help suffering people. It also has a lot to gain domestically and in its relationship with the regions people have fled from, if integration succeeds.

The European: And what is beyond a zero-sum game?

Moritz Brake: The EU has some key strengths to build on in contributing to a world that has so much more to offer than the spoils of a fight of all against all. First of all, its inclusive political, social and economic institutions empower its citizens and are at the heart of its successes. The EU thrives on this foundation, but the potential for power derived from this also needs to be enhanced, leveraged and directed smartly.

The European: Mr Brake, I thank you for this conversation and leave it to you to conclude.

Moritz Brake: I think it is crucial that we translate our innovative social and technological potential into the right kind of capabilities, while cultivating strategic leadership to handle them. The global “commons” are beyond the control of any single nation-state. Still, influence at sea, in the digital realm or in outer space depends on capabilities and how they are applied.

Just as sea power needs shipbuilders, Admirals and political leadership, we also need to cultivate the “shipbuilders” in the digital realm and for outer space, alongside the “Admirals” who translate these capabilities into the greatest possible leverage in the hands of our political leaders. Europe needs all its power to pursue its mission that lies beyond its self-interests: our values are universal and our desire for peace is without a sensible alternative.

The interview was led by Hartmut Bühl.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A rising China reshapes the Asia-Pacific

by Ambassador Barry Desker, Distinguished Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

T

he coming decade will see increasing competition between the United States, which has been the global superpower since the end of the Cold War, and a rising China. This competition will have a different dimension compared to US/Soviet rivalry during the Cold War as the Soviet Union posed a strategic and political challenge, but it was an economic pygmy.

By contrast, China’s prowess as a global exporter, centre for engineering innovation and manufacturing hub is enabling it to develop a significant edge in emerging and disruptive technologies such as the development of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, hypersonic missiles, and the use of dual use technologies in biotechnology, robotics and quantum technology. Foreigners are mesmerised by the command and control capabilities of the Chinese state and often fail to recognise that this achievement is a result of the cooperation between its private and public sectors. Whereas US/Soviet competition was between two fundamentally incompatible systems, the US and China are competing within a single global system.

US/China competition will occur in the Asia-Pacific, reflecting the shift from a world dominated by the Atlantic Ocean in the twentieth century to one shaped by the Pacific Ocean.

While regional states hope for a modus vivendi between these two powers, the parameters for competition are still unclear and there are major risks ahead. They seek good relations with both the US and China and hope that the two powers can cooperate in areas of common global interest such

as climate change, freer trade and sustainable development.

The management of relations with the United States and China will be a critical test for ASEAN, Japan, South Korea and other regional states.

ASEAN summits with the US and China China and the ASEAN states held a virtual special summit on 23rd November 2021. Chinese President Xi Jinping attended for the first time since he took office. Xi said that China would never seek hegemony nor take advantage of its size to “bully” smaller countries, and would work with ASEAN to eliminate “interference”.

The summit closely followed a US/ASEAN virtual summit on 26th October. While US President Biden’s presence marked a return to engagement with southeast Asia after a four year American absence, the focus was on security concerns, including “maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific” and addressing common challenges on maritime issues. The lack of attention to trade and economic issues highlighted the difference in China’s approach. In reaching out to its neighbourhood, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has emphasised infrastructure development assisted by Chinese loans, even though China’s critics highlight the unsustainable debt burden and the use of Chinese state owned corporations in development projects.

management of “The relations with the United States and China will be a critical test for ASEAN, Japan, South Korea and other regional states.”

24

China’s historical concerns China shares land boundaries with fourteen states and historically was focused on its western borders, the source of recurrent threats to Chinese dynasties. Even today, Uighur and Tibetan separatism are a major worry, although the unfinished civil war problem of Taiwan ranks first in China’s priorities.

photo: © 2016 Toa55/Shutterstock

The US and China are competing within a single global system

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

Ambassador Barry Desker relationships but are wary of being too closely tied to China, a sentiment shared

by Vietnam and the Philippines, which Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is a Member of contest Chinese claims in the South Chithe Board of Directors of the Lee Kuan Yew Exchange Fellowship na Sea. Under the Biden administration, and a Member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, the US has moved to strengthen relations Singapore.

Ambassador Desker was Singapore’s Ambassador to photo: private with these states and is perceived as Indonesia from 1986 to 1993 and CEO of the Singapore Trade balancing a rising China.

Development Board from 1994 to 2000. From 2000 to 2014, he was the Director Thirdly, the strait of Malacca and of Sinof the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and served as the founding Dean gapore are a potential choking point for of RSIS. In 2018, he was the Chair of the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission Chinese naval and commercial vessels. on Human Rights (AICHR).

Interdiction by its adversaries could adversely impact Chinese trade with the Middle East and Europe, especially oil and LNG imports. China Although China is wary of the Turkic linguistic and Muslim has attempted to overcome this potential obstacle by building religious links of the former Soviet republics on its border with ports facing the Indian Ocean in Pakistan, Myanmar and Thaiits Uighur minority, it has cultivated them through the establand, and connecting them to China through an ambitious road lishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and and railway network. participation in the BRI. China’s de facto alliance relationship Fourthly, miscalculation in the handling of Taiwan remains with Pakistan continues while ties with Iran have been nurthe critical challenge in the Asia-Pacific. While China insists tured. China’s Foreign Minister hosted the Taliban’s head of its on its ‘One China’ policy, including Taiwan as part of China, it Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in China in has acted with restraint, even with the coming to power of the July 2021, even before the Taliban seized power. pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan. US and Japanese policy makers need to recognise that pursuing China’s challenges in the Indo-Pacific independence for Taiwan is a ‘red line’ for China.

Despite the American defeat in Afghanistan, China remains concerned about the threat of encirclement. US naval and air superiority highlights the importance of the maritime domain Managing China’s rise in current US/China global strategy. Without much fanfare, Unlike the Cold War, where alignments were clearly drawn, this China’s navy has rapidly expanded. China’s extensive claims competition will result in fluid coalitions and shifting allegiances. in the South China Sea are contested both by other claimant While Europeans talk about developing an Indo-Pacific policy states in the region as well as external powers like the US, Ausor countering Chinese strategies in Asia, greater attention tralia and the United Kingdom, which are exercising freedom of should be given to China’s role in Europe. There has been a navigation and overflight through these waters. If it succeeds lack of recognition that China is now the world’s second largest in these territorial claims, for the first time in its history, China economy, the largest exporter by value and a growing hub of will be a maritime as well as a continental power. technological innovation. China will increasingly seek to shape Recent American moves to increase the visibility of the US Navy developments in Europe, build relationships with possible in the western Pacific reflect American wariness of Chinese allies and neutralise hostile parties. Europeans need to work ambitions. From a Chinese perspective, four challenges are with China, managing the challenges posed by a rising power. particularly significant.

First, India’s closer relationship with the United States, the new AUKUS security pact involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, Japan’s growing security role and the strengthening of the US/Japan alliance relationship, and the emergence of the Quad linking Australia, India, Japan and the United States highlight new alignments in response to China’s rise. For China, these alignments reinforce its concerns with the maritime challenges to China’s interests.

Secondly, the South China Sea is a major area of political contestation. In Southeast Asia, China’s political relationship is closest with the mainland states of Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, which share borders with China or are geographically close. By contrast, the maritime states of Indonesia, China's President Xi Jinping in Rome, Italy, 2019 Malaysia and Singapore have excellent trade and economic photo: ©2020 Alessia Pierdomenico/Shutterstock. is the Distinguished Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), and Professor of Practice at Nanyang

25

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Maintaining the rules-based international order

photo: © 2017 f11photo/Shutterstock.

Preparing for Taiwan contingencies

by Hideshi Tokuchi, Professor, President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Tokyo

T

oday, the Taiwan Strait is a frontline of the systemic rivalry between the US and China. Taiwan is not only a vibrant democracy but also a success story of democratic governance to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. Taiwan is also important from the economic security perspective as a centre of the semiconductor industry. It is indispensable in this digital age.

Security implication of Taiwan Reportedly, Paul Wolfowitz once said, “Taiwan is Asia’s Berlin,” but today’s Taiwan is in a much more difficult situation than West Berlin in the Cold War days.

Firstly, the US security commitment to Taiwan remains ambiguous. It seems clearer than before, but President Biden has not said, “Ich bin ein Taiwaner” compared to President Kennedy’s strong call to Berlin’s population in 1962: “Ich bin ein Berliner”.

Secondly, the former Soviet Union did not claim West Berlin, but China never abandons its determination to take Taiwan as its own territory.

Taiwan’s geography between the important sea routes, ie the South and East China Seas, could not be overstated for Japan’s national security. As Japan is a maritime country scarce in natural resources and much dependent on foreign trade, freedom of the sea is critical for the survival and prosperity of Japan faced with China’s maritime expansion.

26

Thirdly, Taiwan is a touchstone for security. Taiwan is part of the first island chain to check China’s expansion to the Pacific.

If Taiwan falls under China’s rule, the Chinese military will easily enhance its presence in the Pacific and operate more actively over there.

Taiwan is so close to the Japanese territories such as the Senkaku Islands that Japan would be inevitably affected by military contingencies involving Taiwan. Taiwan and the southwestern island region of Japan should be regarded as one single theatre. Australia’s defence minister is more candid on this point than the Japanese. He said, “If Taiwan is taken, surely the Senkakus are next.” As the US military would have to operate from Japan in Taiwan contingencies, Japan’s wartime host

tension between China “AsandtheTaiwan is rising, Japan will

have to squarely face the issue of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as a matter of Japan’s own security.”

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

Professor Hideshi Tokuchi joined the Defense Agency (the predecessor of the Ministry of Defense) of

nation support to the US forces would be critically important.

Also, Japan would have to help more than 20,000 Japanese nationals in Taiwan evacuate.

An increasingly important partner Last year the word “Taiwan” was used in a number of international documents including the Japan-US Joint Leaders’ Statement of 16th April, the Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communique of 13th June and the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 16th September.

When the Taiwan issue was touched upon in the Japan-US Statement, it was pointed out in Japan that it was the first time in the Japan-US bilateral statements at the leaders’ level since the Japan-US Joint Statement of November 1969 between US President Nixon and Japan’s Prime Minister Sato. It is true, but the context is completely different. In the late 1960s, the focus was much more on the security of South Korea and on the settlement of the Vietnam War than on Taiwan. Also, as Okinawa was under US occupation, the US forces freely used bases in Okinawa for combat operations elsewhere. Therefore, reference to Taiwan in the 2021 joint statement is very special.

The Government of Japan regards Taiwan as an extremely crucial partner and important friend, but it carefully avoids discussing a security partnership with Taiwan. The Japanese public did not pay much attention to Taiwan in security terms for a long time. The situation, however, is changing. In order to cope with the pandemic, Taiwan provided a large number of mouth coverings, protection gears, oxygen concentrators and pulse oximeters to Japan, and Japan presented millions of doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine to Taiwan. To say the least, Taiwan and Japan are health security partners now. Also, a Japanese public opinion poll conducted in April 2021 indicates that 74% of the Japanese are in favor of Japan’s engagement with matters pertaining to the stability of the Taiwan Strait.

As the tension between China and Taiwan is rising, Japan will have to squarely face the issue of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as a matter of Japan’s own security, but this challenge is not just a matter of Japan or of the Indo-Pacific region. It is a global issue in view of the great powers’ systemic rivalry.

Partnership with Taiwan is increasingly important in order to maintain and strengthen the rules-based liberal international order as the US-China rivalry is over the difference of their world views. From this perspective, it is a natural progression that the EU Strategy has regarded Taiwan as a partner.

Japan-Europe security cooperation Today’s China is very different from the former Soviet Union in the Cold War era. China is an attractive business and trade partner to many countries. It is already integrated in the world

Japan in 1979 and served as Japan’s first-ever Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs from 2014 to 2015 photo: private

after completing several senior assignments including Director-General of the

Defense Policy Bureau. He is the President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) and teaches international security studies as a visiting professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS).

economy as an indispensable player. According to a survey conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) from October to December 2020, the number of Japanese companies willing to expand overseas business in the next three years is at the lowest (43.9%), but 48.9% of them would like to expand their business with China. China remains the top priority. Although attention to Taiwan is rapidly growing and it is in the top five countries/areas, the percentage for Taiwan (33.3%) is much lower than that for China.

Japan will be forced to make a difficult choice should a Taiwan contingency take place. To say that national security interests should prevail over short-term economic benefits is easier said than done. The same will probably be true for many other countries.

Capitalising on the increasing attention of the international community to Taiwan in security terms, those trying to uphold the rules-based liberal international order, including EU countries, NATO countries and Japan should be united to raise their respective public awareness of the critical importance of the Taiwan issue for their own national security.

It is important to recognise the importance of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait as a matter of declaratory diplomatic policy. It is, however, much more important to put the shared recognition into action. Taiwan contingencies may or may not happen, but it does not make much sense just to speculate. It is important to work together to deter the contingencies.

Hybrid warfare just like the one Russia has engineered in Eastern Europe may be conducted by China against Taiwan. If so, democracies in Europe and Asia should cooperate to counter the common challenges. In doing so, a holistic approach is indispensable. Military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, economic and all other instruments of their national power should be integrated to maintain the rules-based order.

27

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Yellow Sea in an era of growing Chinese ambitions and South Korea

by Dr Eunsook Chung, Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Department of Security Strategy Studies, The Sejong Institute, South Korea

A

ccording to the US Department of Defense’s annual China Military Power Report released on 3rd November 2021, China has the biggest maritime force on the globe with an inventory of about 355 vessels. The report describes China’s navy as having growing ambitions to operate with more versatile platforms beyond the Indo-Pacific region. As a matter of fact, in July 2013, during a Chinese Communist Party session, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech on building China into a maritime great power by the middle of the 21st century. Like the South and East China Seas, the Yellow Sea has also seen progression of China’s military activities since the 2010s. The following could be some indications of it.

South Korea) is located 80 nautical miles southwest of South Korea’s Mara Island and 155 nautical miles from China’s Sheshan Island. South Korea found the reef in 1984 and built a scientific research station on it (1995-2003). China objected to South Korea’s construction and asserted that the Socotra Rock area belonged to its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The first Chinese buoy near the Socotra Rock was discovered in 2014.

Secondly, the People’s Liberation Army forces conducted mil-

Dr Eunsook Chung is a Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Department of Security Strategy Studies at the Sejoing Institute in Seoul. She is a graduate of Korea University and obtained her Ph.D in

Political and military pressure from China Firstly, in 2013, China announced the 124th meridian east as the line of its naval area of operation in the Yellow Sea, unilaterally claiming that South Korea’s naval ships should not operate west of the line. Yet, the incidence of the Chinese naval ships crossing the line to the east has been increasing.

China’s naval activities in the southern part of the Yellow Sea have been a particular concern for South Korea due to the maritime dispute in the region. The Socotra Rock (“Ieodo” in

28

photo: © 2014 Anton Balazh/Shutterstock

China has a wide range of options to escalate tensions over the Yellow Sea issues

photo: private

Political Science from Ohio State University. Dr Chung has been a visiting

fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, and the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt. She served on the board of directors at the Academic Council of the United Nations System (AUCUNS) from 2015 to 2018.

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

EU’s newly adopted Indo-Pacific Strategy of “The September 2021 reflects the growing importance

of the region to the EU’s prosperity and security as well as its rule of law principles.

Beijing’s assertiveness has impacted the EU’s strategic interests in the region.”

documentation

itary exercises in the Yellow Sea more frequently than before and on a bigger scale. For instance, in December 2013, approximately 20,000 troops participated in the joint exercises among the three branches (army, navy and air force) in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Strait. In September 2020, China’s two aircraft carriers (Liaoning and China’s newest aircraft carrier Shandong) conducted drills simultaneously in the Yellow Sea. In October 2021, China conducted two simultaneous exercises in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. China also conducted joint military drills with “Russia” in the Yellow Sea as well. For instance, their navies conducted the joint exercises near Quingdao in 2012, which was referred to by Chinese high-ranking officers as the largest-scale combined exercises with foreign countries in recent years. The Chinese government often explains China’s large-scale exercise in the Yellow Sea as necessary to heighten the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s overall combat readiness. It is observed that topographically, the Yellow Sea delivers a comparatively safe space for military exercise in preparation for actual combat in other areas.

Thirdly, Chinese military aircraft frequently enter South Korea’s air defence identification zone (KADIZ), further adding tensions above the Yellow Sea. Moreover, China conducted joint air exercises with “Russia” in the region first in 2019 and 2020.

On 23rd November 2013, Beijing proclaimed the forming of an air defence identification zone, which shields two-thirds of the East China Sea, including the area of Socorta Rock. And on 9 December 2013, South Korea declared the expansion of KADIZ to include the disputed area in the Yellow Sea. Nonetheless, China refrains from posing strategic challenges in the Yellow Sea compared to the South and East China Seas. It

may be because of the topographical features of the Yellow Sea that provide a defensive advantage for China and strategic interests in maintaining friendly relations with South Korea since the 2010s. Frictions between China and South Korea over the Yellow Sea issues have never been included as an agenda item in the summits since the 2010s.

Changing South Korea’s naval strategy However, having seen the patterns of maritime conflicts in the South and East China Seas, analysts in South Korea increasingly worry that China has a wide range of options to escalate tensions over the Yellow Sea issues, including possible applications of the newly adopted Chinese Coast Guard Law of January 2021 with regard to South Korea’s scientific research station on the Socorta Rock, or mobilising maritime militias for its maritime claim over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

They argue that South Korea needs to diversify the focus of its naval strategy, which has exclusively concentrated on deterring North Korea, and that the resilience of the US-South Korea alliance needs to be maintained. Meanwhile, the EU’s newly adopted Indo-Pacific Strategy of September 2021 reflects the growing importance of the region to the EU’s prosperity and security as well as its rule of law principles. Beijing’s assertiveness has impacted the EU’s strategic interests in the region. In this context, the Yellow Sea together with the South and East China Seas are expected to be of importance to the EU as well.

EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (Ed/nc, Paris) On 16th September 2021,

tribute to the region’s stability, security,

leading development cooperation partner

the European Commission and the EU High

prosperity and sustainable development, in

and one of the biggest trading partners in

Representative adopted a Joint Communi-

line with the principles of democracy, rule

the Indo-Pacific region. Our engagement

cation on the EU Strategy for cooperation

of law, human rights and international law.

aims at maintaining a free and open In-

in the Indo-Pacific.

On 16th September, High Representative/

do-Pacific for all, while building strong

With this new strategy the EU aims to

Vice-President, Josep Borrell, said: “The

and lasting partnerships to cooperate on

deepen its engagement with partners in

world’s centre of gravity is moving towards

matters from the green transition, ocean

the Indo-Pacific to respond to emerging

the Indo-Pacific, both in geo-economic and

governance or the digital agenda to se-

dynamics that are affecting the region.

geo-political terms. The futures of the EU

curity and defence.”

The objective is to promote multilateral

and the Indo-Pacific are interlinked.

cooperation on global challenge to con-

The EU is already the top investor, the

Web factsheet https://bit.ly/3GrAsUB

29

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A credible response to China’s menaces

photo: © 2020 Tomasz Makowski/Shutterstock

India’s sea-based nuclear second-strike options

by Debalina Ghoshal, non-resident fellow at the Council on International Policy and Indian corres­pondent to this magazine, Kolkata

N

uclear Weapon States (NWSs) – China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States – and other so called nuclear powers strive to develop technologies and systems that allow them to survive enemy nuclear or conventional attacks on their nuclear forces, and then strike against the enemy capabilities. For the survivability of nuclear weapons and nuclear forces, sea-based nuclear deterrence is one of the best forms that ensures survivability of own weapons on submersible ballistic nuclear ships (SSBN). When they enable states, after an attack, to inflict the assured destruction of an adversary, then the concept of mutual assured destruction is credible. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fired from SSBNs provide the best form of sea-based nuclear deterrence owing to the fact that SSBNs can be submerged in water for months and hence the scope of being detected remains low. This provides states with an assured second counter-strike capability. That is what India is striving for.

The Indo-China standoff In the recent past, given the Indo-China standoff, India has focused largely on exerting greater influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This region is also a hotbed for nuclear escalation especially as both China and India work towards strengthening their counter-strike and second strike capabilities, focusing on sea-based nuclear deterrence. Consequently, maritime prowess in the IOR would strengthen India’s naval deterrence against China. Several of

India’s warships were deployed in 2020 in the region to deter China. For the moment, India’s dissuasion relies and will continue to rely on India’s “no first use” doctrine, which means for the moment, that platforms and weapons are separated in peace time.

How to keep a balance China has already developed SSBNs like the Jin and Xia class and SSNs. China’s naval presence is not just restricted to the IOR. The People’s Liberation Army/Navy (PLAN) has exerted its influence in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) regions and also in the Arctic. Slowly, China could deploy its SSBNs in the Arctic region too. Hence, India would need to keep up the pace with this growth and global presence of Chinese naval power.

In November 2018, India’s first SSBN, “INS Arihant”, commissioned into the Indian Navy in 2016 as its first deterrence patrol, is now ready to perform a deterrence role. As stated in the Indian Navy doctrine, “SSBN due to stealth characteristics enabling discrete and prolonged deployment, and combat capabilities including weapon outfit, provides a credible, effec-

prowess in the Indian Ocean Region “Maritime would strengthen India’s naval deterrence against China.”

30

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

Debalina Ghoshal is a non-resident fellow with the Council on International Policy. Prior to this, she has worked with the Centre for Air Power Studies and the Delhi Policy Group. Her areas of specialissation include nuclear issues, missile defence and strategic issues. She photo: private

has completed her master’s degree in International Studies from Stella Maris College, Chennai and also

holds a post-graduate diploma in international humanitarian law from the National Academy of Legal Sciences and Research in Hyderabad.

tive and survivable capability, and contributes to assurance of punitive retaliation in accordance with our nuclear doctrine”.

Exert greater maritime influence The doctrine further states that SSBNs “also counter an adversary’s strategy of seeking advantage for nuclear posturing and escalation.” Consequently, India is developing and building up state of the art SSBNs. The INS Arihant series will carry SLBMs with a 750km range (K-15), but India has already tested a longer, 3,500km range, the K-4 SLBM, and is also developing an intercontinental K-5 SLBM category with a range of 6,000km. The intercontinental SLBM K6 being developed is supposed to carry Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) that would enable the SLBM from remaining unintercepted, a solution for India to exert greater maritime influence not only in the IOR, but also in the South China Sea. India is also testing INS Arighat with a more powerful reactor, capable of displacing a load of more than 1,000 tonnes, and also carry more missile load.

As SSBNs will need SSNs to support operations, India plans to build six SSNs with a displacement load of 6,000 tonnes.

Partnering and cooperation In March 2019, India signed a contract with Russia to lease an Akula-2 class nuclear attack submarine for a period of ten years commencing in 2025. France is supposed to also be a partner in helping India develop SSN technology. Other plans are to construct more advanced S5 ballistic missile submarines, capable of displacing 15,000 tonnes, with 12 to 16 launch tubes to fire K-6 missiles. The S5 will be the Indian version of the Vanguard class SSBN operated by the United Kingdoms’s Royal Navy and using a 190MW pressurised

heavy-water reactor, the same that would be used even for attack submarines.

Not only nuclear, India’s conventional powered submarines are also being modernised. By 2016, the Indian navy signed a contract with Germany’s Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS) to upgrade two of the four Shishumar class diesel electric attack submarines, which also included arming the boat with US Boeing anti-ship missiles. By 2018, Russian shipbuilder Zvezdochka and India’s Larsen and Toubro partnered to upgrade the Kilo class submarines. All the six new Scorpène class submarines will be delivered to India by France’s Naval Group by 2022.

India has been building for years its submarine base on the east coast of Rambilli, located 60km from Vishakapatnam. A Naval Alternate Operating Base (NAOB) is under construction with a command and control area, as well as an institutional area, providing recharge and technical support for future nuclear powered vessels. Underground tunnels have been constructed to provide underground facility. The forested land would provide the camouflage and the base is located close to Sarada and Varahat rivers which open up into the Bay of Bengal.

Green footprint to blue water operations All these developments surely would ensure that the Indian navy lives up to its doctrine of “green footprint to blue water operations.” However, as of now, India has only maintained a “recessed deterrence” nuclear posture by separating warheads from their delivery systems. Nuclear warheads will be mated with the SLBMs and fitted into the SSBNs for deterrence patrol.

This could risk command and control issues. A weak navy lacking blue water capability leaves India vulnerable especially as it relies on a “no first use” doctrine. India surely has realised this gap and is focusing on bridging it.

31

The current international power play and its consequences for stability

New dimensions of Russia-China relations

by Prof Ioan Mircea Pașcu, former Defence Minister of Romania and former Vice-President of the European Parliament, Bucarest

A

ny attempt to better understand the current relations between China and Russia and their impact on regional and global stability should consider at least four perspectives: the general shift of attention from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the rivalry between the US and China, the impact of climate change, and arms control. For some time now, the volume of the transpacific trade has surpassed the value of the transatlantic one, pointing towards an increasing accumulation of wealth in the Indo-Pacific area, which, in turn, triggers an inevitable increase of political and military attention in that region.

Russia and the rivalry between China and the US The rise of China contributed substantially to this shift; consequently, today, Russia has been relegated to the second place in the threat analysis of both the US and NATO, after China.

This “demotion” has important potential consequences. First, Russia has not become less assertive in the North Atlantic area covered by NATO, quite the contrary (see Ukraine), indicating even a certain “competition” for attention with China (every time the Indo-Pacific takes center stage, Russia “orchestrates” something negative in the North Atlantic and recaptures the attention).

Second, NATO is facing its biggest challenge with this in-

32

photo: ©2020 natatravel/Shutterstock.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

creased focus on the Indo-Pacific: how to continue to deal with the threat posed by Russia, thus maintaining peace and stability in the traditional North-Atlantic area, while attempting to become relevant to the situation in the Indo-Pacific, contributing to peace and security in that region, too.

The perspective to evaluate the Russia-China relationship from is the increasing competition/rivalry between the US and China. Compared to the US-Soviet competition and rivalry from the Cold War, which was a structured one with mechanisms and communications capable to avoid uncontrolled escalation, the current US-China nascent competition is still fluid, lacking those mechanisms and communications, bearing a relevant potential for miscalculation.

Compared to the time of President Nixon’s surprise visit to Beijing in 1972, when a new “triangular” relationship was established – with the US-China “tandem” confronting the Soviet Union – today the US is confronted with the “tandem” of China and Russia, based on their mutual dissatisfaction with and desire to terminate the US domination in the post-Cold War international order.

However, in this context, it is perhaps of interest to note a difference of approach towards that order between Russia and China. While the former rejects it in its entirety, China, which fully exploited it to reach its current status, is attempting to “capture” it from the interior, by trying to get control over its institutional architecture.

Third, from the climate change perspective, two factors seem

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

Russia has been relegated to the second place in the threat analysis “Today, of both the US and NATO, after China.” to take precedence, both pointing towards an increased Russian-Chinese cooperation: first, the availability of the Siberian resources triggered by the global warming, and second, the opening of the Arctic route. China has important stakes in both but needs Russia’s permission in both cases.

If one takes into consideration that the territorial access of China to Central Asia, the Caucasus and beyond to Europe passes through the former Soviet Union territory (see the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative/BRI), one comes to the logical conclusion that Russia’s “permission” is obtainable only through a cooperative attitude on the part of China.

Forth, when it comes to arms control, here one can detect a different alignment, in which Russia has more in common with the US than with China. That is because the current generation of disarmament and arms control agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War

do not cover China, which, therefore, enjoys a “free ride” in armament development, which could create problems for both signatories.

The future of stability The strong anti-NATO declaration of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at their Olympiad meeting in Beijing is not yet the creation of a military block, but it is evident that the China-Russia relationship is a powerful factor in the current international power distribution. As for the contribution of this relationship to peace and stability, although both Russia and China equate it with their opposition to the US and the current status quo, it seems useful to remember that the theory of international politics makes a clear distinction between those powers which support the status quo and those which reject it, concluding that the former contribute more to peace and stability than the latter.

COMPRESS Video Stream Optimizer

DELIVERING

UP TO 90%*

VIDEO COMPRESSION PER STREAM xCompress is the world’s first dedicated video compression application designed for mission-critical surveillance installations.

OTHER BENEFITS INCLUDE: • Reduced up-front investment on storage • Greater retention with existing storage • Lower cost of transmitting video • High-quality remote video applications

SEE KEY FEATURES AT SENECADATA.COM *Video file compression up to 90% is based on camera model

33

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Russia is not a partner, but a political opponent the west needs to reckon with

by Dr Sabine Fischer, Senior Research Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

A

as a new reason for tension in a region close to us, for putting pressure on Minsk. […] But Russia will undoubtedly continue its policy of strengthening ties and deepening integration with Belarus.” Two weeks later Moscow published draft treaties it wants to conclude with the United States and NATO which would stipulate an end of NATO’s open door policy and the division of Europe into an American and a Russian sphere of influence.

fter almost eight years of conflict since Russia’s annexation of Crimea it is difficult to imagine that relations between the EU and Russia can get worse – and yet events of this winter teach us that we may not have reached the bottom. As tensions flare along the Russian-Ukrainian border and around Belarus, Russia acts from a position of strength: Moscow believes that the EU is weak and inward looking, and the Biden adminisMoscow’s destabilisation policy on neighbours tration is continuing the gradual exit of the US from Europe. NASince the beginning of 2021, Russian policy has been creatTO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is seen in Russia as inflicting ing a triangle of insecurity along its western border. Russian severe damage to the west’s (and particularly the US’s) reputation of being a reliable ally.

The takeover of the Taliban in Kabul is a challenge to Russian security but opens a window Dr phil. Sabine Fischer of opportunity to shape the regional order has been Senior Fellow at the Division Eastern Europe around Afghanistan. and Eurasia of the German Institute for International Moscow clearly feels encouraged to push for and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin since May 2021. its goals. President Putin has become much Her research focuses on the foreign and security poli­ more outspoken on “red lines”. At the begincy of Russia, EU-Russia and Eastern Europe-Eurasia ning of December, he said: “[…] we will insist relations. Since 2021 she is, amongst other functions, photo: SWP on the elaboration of concrete agreements Member of the Europe/Transatlantic Advisory Board that would rule out any eastward expansion of of the Heinrich Böll Foundation and Member of the Executive Board of the NATO and the deployment of weapons systems German Association for East European Studies (DGO). Before taking up her posing a threat to us […].” He also accused current post, Ms Fischer was Team Leader for the Public Diplomacy – EU western countries of “using the migration crisis and Russia Project at the Goethe Institute in Moscow. on the border between Belarus and Poland

34

photo: ©2020 Asatu r Yesayants/Shutterstock.

Moscow believes that the EU is weak

MAIN TOPIC The rivalry of great powers

policy jeopardises the security not only “Russian of the Ukrainian and the Belarussian people, but, indeed, Europe, to achieve its goal of a sphere of undisputed control in its neighbourhood.”

troops are amassing on the border with Ukraine. Putin has said and written many times this year that Russia and Ukraine constitute a “historical unity”.

Moscow has disseminated more than 600,000 Russian passports to inhabitants of the disputed territories in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It has also distanced itself from the Normandy Four Format. Russia accuses Kyiv of not implementing its obligations under the Minsk agreement. At the same time, it pursues a policy of permanent destabilisation vis-à-vis Ukraine. An escalation, intended or unintended, of the Donbas war and a Russian military invasion in eastern Ukraine cannot be ruled out in the coming months.

Ukraine’s neighbour in the north, Belarus, has turned into another hotbed of instability since the fraudulent 2020 presidential election. Moscow supports the Belarussian ruler, Alexander Lukashenko, against his own population with the aim of preventing another democratic revolution in its vicinity, but is pulled deeper into its struggle with the EU.

Lukashenko’s geopolitical strategy What makes the domestic crisis in Belarus so dangerous is Lukashenko’s strategy to “geopoliticise” it. Since the summer, the Belarussian regime has been orchestrating a migration crisis along its borders with Lithuania and Poland to pressure the EU into negotiating with Minsk and lifting sanctions. But Lukashenko is also sending signals to the east. His dependen­ ce on Russia is almost complete now. Still, he fights hard for wriggle room, and the upshot is that the Kremlin supports an authoritarian ruler whose main survival strategy is to escalate the geopolitical confrontation with the west. Meanwhile relations between Belarus and Ukraine have been deteriorating as well. And the Russian troops on the Russian-Ukrainian border are perilously close not only to the Donbas, but also to the flashpoints at the Belarussian-Polish border. Russian policy jeopardises the security of the Ukrainian and the Belarussian people, and, indeed, Europe, to achieve its goal of undisputed control in its neighbourhood.

Moscow voluntarily misunderstands the EU In the previous issue of this journal (https://bit.ly/3wnqAYJ), the Russian ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, accused the Union of double standards, the non-recognition of Russian vaccines for political reasons, and a chaotic pandemic policy.

This is a misrepresentation of the EU’s Covid-19 policies. The EU made numerous offers for cooperation, particularly on joint research, in the early months of the pandemic. Moscow, however, preferred to focus on a national response to the virus.

The approval of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine by the European Medical Agency is not delayed by the EU’s double standards, but by problems with documentation and access of the EMA inspectors to production sites in Russia. The EU has certainly been struggling with its own response to the pandemic – but it was Moscow’s choice to politicise it instead of taking a constructive approach vis-à-vis the EU. A similar politicisation can be observed in the area of climate change. Putin’s 2020 acknowledgement of the anthropogenic causes of climate change and the necessity of a political response had raised hopes in Brussels and some EU Member States that Russia could become a partner of sorts in the realisation of the European Green Deal. One year on, the Russian president is convinced that “our diplomacy should be more active in countering attempts by the European Union and the United States to assume the right to dictate the climate agenda single-handedly”. In light of the current security crisis, constructive cooperation on climate change is not a likely option.

Russia’s inside autocratic entrenchments Finally, EU-Russia relations suffer from the Russian leadership’s loathing for liberal democracy and the rules-based international order, which goes hand in hand with autocratic entrenchment inside the country. 2021 has seen severe repressions, combined with a policy of systematic extinction of political opposition ahead of the September 2021 Duma election. As the latest example, the fate of Memorial, Russia’s oldest and most important human rights NGO, seems to be sealed. With the question of Putin’s succession looming over the 2024 presidential election, no easing of tensions should be expected in Russian domestic politics or foreign policy. Antagonism with the west in a post-western world, in which Russia plays the part of a geopolitical great power, is an important pillar of the Russian political system and a key message to the Kremlin‘s domestic and international audiences.

This does by no means imply that the EU should stop trying to find ways of meaningful interaction with Russia. The country is too big, political, economic and societal ties are too important to be ignored. But it must do so based on the assumption that Russia is not a Transatlantic-European partner, as Ambassador Chizhov suggests, but a political opponent the EU needs to reckon with.

35

European Parliament Resolution on the Arctic On 7th October 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution entitled “The Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges”.

photo: © Larwim/Shutterstock

documentation

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

[The Parliament] 1. Reaffirms that the Arctic is of strategic and political importance to the EU, as an Arctic stakeholder and global actor, and underlines the EU’s commitment

36

to being a responsible actor, seeking

tion; calls for the EU to continue to

cerned about the negative effects of

the long-term sustainable and peace-

contribute to the Arctic Council through

climate change, notably the rapidly

ful development of the region by fully

expertise and financing by increasing

melting ice and resource overexploita-

cooperating with international partners;

its engagement in the Arctic Council

tion, which create new elements and

considers it crucial that all stakehold-

working groups and its various projects;

realities for certain forms of economic

ers, including the EU and its Member

believes that the northern region should

development and further disruption

States, act to maintain peaceful and

be viewed as part of the EU’s northern

to the increasingly fragile Arctic eco-

intense international and regional coop-

neighbourhood, with increased partic-

systems;

eration, scientific research, prosperity

ipation in existing forums; highlights

8. Emphasises that the comprehensive

and low tensions in the Arctic, as well as

that the Northern Dimension serves as

governance model based on interna-

to respond to the very alarming effects

a constructive arena for cross-border

tional law has benefited all Arctic states

and consequences of climate change

cooperation, with a successful model

and the region as a whole, and has

in the region; considers that the Arctic

for sectoral cooperation, in which the

provided predictability and stability in

plays a crucial role in maintaining the

EU contributes equally to the joint pol-

the region; underlines that the existing

environmental balance of the planet,

icy with Russia, Norway and Iceland,

regional structures foster trust and

is satisfied that the region has long

as well as other observers; welcomes

cooperation between Arctic states;

been a place of peace and fruitful in-

further practical cooperation on a broad

stresses that the Arctic states hold

ternational cooperation;

range of areas; highlights the coopera-

the primary responsibility for tackling

2. Supports the validity of the three

tion between local and national state

issues within their territories; points,

founding pillars of the integrated EU

and non-state actors within the Barents

however, to the fact that external forces

policy for the Arctic, namely responding

Euro-Arctic Council, of which the EU is a

have a key impact on current and future

ambitiously to climate change and

full member, on issues with particular

challenges in the region; reiterates that

safeguarding the Arctic environment,

relevance to the Barents region; notes

international law is the cornerstone

promoting sustainable development

that the Barents Euro-Arctic Council has

of the legal framework regulating in-

and strengthening international co-

played an important role in building

ternational relations in the Arctic (…);

operation; stresses the importance

trust and mutual understanding in the

9. Recognises the status of Arctic states’

of a balanced EU Arctic policy and is

North while enhancing cooperation

sovereignty and their sovereign rights

of the opinion that the EU is uniquely

between Arctic countries; notes that

in accordance with international law;

well-placed to help coordinate and

the EU should also aim to participate

believes that safeguarding the achieve-

complement Member States’ Arctic

in other political forums linked to Arctic

ments of three decades of peaceful

policies, and therefore stresses the

development;

cooperation is crucial; stresses that

need for more coherence between the

6. Is of the opinion that the new EU Arctic

the EU’s capacity to provide solutions to

EU’s internal and external policies as

policy should be used more broadly as

potential security challenges should be

regards Arctic matters; urges the EU to

an opportunity to increase awareness

fully harnessed; underlines that, given

include an Arctic dimension wherever

and engagement among EU citizens,

the multitude of complex and inter-

appropriate in its sectoral policies;

academia and businesses as regards

twined issues related to the economic,

(…)

Arctic issues; calls for the creation

environmental and security develop-

4. Stresses that the EU must contribute

of a single Arctic portal covering all

ment of the Arctic, global, regional and

to enhanced Arctic multilateral govern-

Arctic initiatives and activities of the

local venues are required for dialogue

ance, promote the sustainable use of

EU institutions;

on the region’s security needs;”

resources, and protect and preserve

7. Notes that interest in the Arctic and

the Arctic in unison with its popula-

its resources is growing; is deeply con-

Web: https://bit.ly/3scACKH

Security and Defence

photo: © 2016 Sinisha Karich/Shutterstock

The European Union holds a broad spectre of diplomatic tools and civil military capabilities, making the Union capable of responding to global political developments.

And it seems that the Union is addressing security and defence challenges more systematically. However, Europe is still missing the military capabilities necessary to build a strategic autonomy.

The strategic compass to be adopted in March 2022 is only the beginning of an answer.

37

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Rethinking European strategic autonomy with new formats of defence cooperation

The future of European defence: beyond EU and NATO

by Gesine Weber, Program Coordinator, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Paris

S

ince 2016, European defence cooperation has made great leaps forward: the EU has launched the European Defence Fund (EDF), started cooperation within the framework of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) now allows EU Member States to better identify and fill capability gaps. At the same time, NATO has announced the DIANA (Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic) programme to strengthen capabilities.

After years of inertia on long-term defence planning, it seems that Europeans are now addressing security and defence challenges more systematically, while European defence cooperation in the early 2010s was mostly driven by immediate crisis management in the neighbourhood based on instruments rather than strategy. It is promising that European states are finally making use of institutional mechanisms, which shows that they are willing to make Europe more than a paper tiger in international security.

Ad hoc format solutions are en vogue In this light, another trend in European defence may seem paradoxical: in parallel to the new institutional initiatives, the landscape of European defence cooperation has been characterised by the emergence of several ad hoc formats, often called “coalitions of the willing”, such as the European Intervention Initiative (E2I), the task force Takuba in Mali, or the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH). These formats have been harshly criticised, as some see them as an alternative and hence an obstacle to long-term defence integration through the institutions.

However, a closer look at their actual purpose reveals that this is not the case – and that, on the contrary, these formats can enhance European strategic autonomy and crucially strengthen European defence cooperation.

38

From lowest common denominator defence policy...

The new formats, launched outside the existing institutional frameworks, bring together a group of states who have already agreed on an objective and a method to attain it, while enabling them to do so with only a minimum of organisational structures. This effort seems promising when rapid decisions and actions are needed and major disagreements among EU Member States complicate joint action due to the unanimity requirement for decision-making in the Council of the EU. The task force Takuba, a unit composed of European special forces to enhance the fight against terrorism in Mali, underlines this: while it was politically impossible to obtain a more robust mandate for a CSDP mission in Mali, deploying forces to the task force, which is fully integrated into the French mission, Barkhane, allows European states to jointly step up their military commitment if they wish to.

... to “coalitions of the ambitious” Yet, especially those states emphasising the long-term goal of creating a federal European State, fear that these ad hoc European defence coalitions might curb efforts of defence cooperation throughout the EU. According to this argument, these formats could prompt groups of states to opt for the faster, more flexible and more convenient coalitions of the willing and therefore reduce incentives to cooperate through the CSDP. Likewise, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg continuously underlines that European allies should refrain from creating new structures, but rather invest their resources in stepping up capabilities. Nevertheless such claims ignore the fact that coalitions of the willing have emerged precisely because of the absence of consensus within institutions to tackle a security challenge. These coalitions could even be labelled “coalitions of the ambitious”, as they often bring together the states willing to commit to more joint action than

Security and Defence

Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (left) and President of the European Council Charles Michel, 2021 © European Union

the minimum consensus would allow. In other words, their launch allows Europe as a whole to move beyond a defence policy of the lowest common denominator, and this is globally good news.

play the long game, “ToEuropeans need a strategy

that only an approach through the EU and its partners can provide.”

detached from institutions and is conceptualised as “security and defence of European countries”.

New formats of cooperation are an add-on

If these coalitions of the willing are so promising and can tackle the many shortfalls in European security and defence, why should we bother about strengthening it within the instiBesides their adaptability to specific security challenges, fortutions, particularly the EU? First, the mandates of coalitions mats of European defence cooperation outside the institutionof the willing and the CSDP are complementary, as coalitions al frameworks offer more flexibility in terms of membership: of the willing often fill a void in addressing pressing security both the task force Takuba and the European Intervention challenges or allow deeper cooperation among ambitious Initiative bring together European states independently of countries, as is the case for the European Intervention Initiatheir institutional membership, namely as members of the EU tive. In this sense, coalitions of the willing can be understood or NATO or both. as a “bridge technology” until states find a way to use the Accordingly, they can serve as a tool to enhance the capacity CSDP to take action. If this is the case, they can be included of Europeans to act together in international security beyond within CSDP structures and procedures, and if not, they still these institutional frameworks, for instance through strengthserve as a backup. Second, the flexiening interoperability or fostering the ble formats are highly specialised and emergence of a common strategic focus on one single aspect of European culture. Particularly in the context of defence, whereas the CSDP can, through post-Brexit Europe, this is a promising its Strategic Compass to be adopted in tool to circumvent the politics of Brexit, Gesine Weber March 2022, provide a long-term vision. which make meaningful institutionis a Program Coordinator at the German This strategic component of defence alised EU-UK cooperation in the field Marshall Fund of the United States in integration is missing in coalitions of the of defence policy impossible for the Paris. She is also a PhD Candidate at willing due to the absence of bureaucrattime being. Nevertheless, British and the Defence Studies Department of ic structures or defence doctrines. CoaliEuropean security objectives converge King’s College London and holds an tions of the willing in European defence in many areas, for example the Southern M.A. in European Affairs from SciencesPo are thus an important “add-on” that alneighbourhood. As cooperation through Paris and a M.A. in Political Science lows Europeans to level up in internationNATO in this region appears less likely from Freie Universität Berlin. Her real security by taking meaningful action to due to the strong focus of the US on the search focuses on European security address pressing security challenges. But Indo-Pacific, coalitions of the willing and defence, including EU-UK relations, to play the long game, Europeans need can bring Europeans closer to attaining Franco-German relations, and the EUa strategy that only an approach through shared objectives. Consequently, EuroUS-China triangle in geopolitics. the EU and its partners can provide. pean security becomes to some extent

Rethinking European defence

39

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

30 years of the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) Interview with Sorin Ducaru, Director of the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen), Torrejón

T

he European: Mr Ducaru, allow us to express our warmest congratulations on the 30th anniversary of your agency! For three decades now the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) in Torrejón has been actively supporting European foreign and security policy and has by now become the prime provider of geospatial intelligence analysis for the European Union (EU).

You are going to align the Centre’s evolution with the EU’s increased level of ambition in the fields of space, security and defence. Let us have a look both back and ahead.

Sorin Ducaru: Thank you very much for your kind words, and I gladly accept the congratulations on behalf of an amazing team of expert staff, some of which have indeed been working at the centre since its foundation 30 years ago! We will be celebrating the agency’s anniversary and it is therefore a special occasion to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to all those who have contributed to the amazing development of this unique autonomous operational entity since its beginning.

I have to say that I am proud of heading this agency at this special moment not just because of the 30th anniversary, but also because it is a time of important developments for SatCen based on the growing level of ambition of the EU in the field of security defence and space, the fast growing user demand and the opportunities offered by technological developments in the Information Technology and Space domains.

Nannette Cazaubon: What will be the challenges?

Sorin Ducaru: We currently face a double challenge: a continuously increasing demand for analysis services from our customers, who are mainly the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), EU missions and operations, Member States and cooperating entities like those under Copernicus SEA. And at the same time, we feel the clear need to constantly adjust to the rapidly evolving security environment.

Hartmut Bühl: I remember the day, 30 years ago when SatCen started under the Western European Union (WEU) with – for those days – a visionary concept.

Sorin Ducaru: That is correct – SatCen was created in 1992 as a body of the Western European Union (WEU), incorporated 10 years later into the EU, and is now supporting the Union in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as other polices related to security such as border monitoring.

It was already the original intention at the set-up to provide complex and actionable geospatial intelligence analysis, by exploiting satellite imagery and other relevant data. In fact, in the early 90s, this was indeed as you said, an extremely visionary decision, masterfully prepared by the strategic minds around the WEU Deputy Secretary, Mr Horst Holthoff.

We still honour this legacy by having our main meeting room named after him.

“The European Union Satellite Centre (...) is a pillar of our strategic autonomy.”

Florence Parly, French Minister of the Armed Forces, visit to SatCen, 24th September 2020

40

photo: SARah © OHB System AG

Geospatial intelligence in support of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy and beyond

Security and Defence

Ambassador Sorin Dumitru Ducaru is the Director of the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) since June 2019. He has previously held the positions of NATO Assistant Secretary General and Head of the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division, as well as the positions of Romania’s ambassador to NATO, USA and to the UN in New York. He also assumed various positions in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) such as: spokesperson of the MFA, director of the Minister’s Office and head of the Directorate for NATO and Strategic Issues. Holding degrees in Applied Electronics & Computer Studies, Political Science & photo: ©SatCen

International Relations and International Economic Relations and Institutional Management, he has been also engaged in academic and scientific activity.

Nannette Cazaubon: I would like to know more about the time of the foundation of SatCen. The early 90s saw new conflicts like the Gulf war, with coalition forces around the United States responding to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Did this play any role in the foundation of the centre?

Sorin Ducaru: Definitely – and if you look at the political context of that period, following the Iraq war, there are quite a few similarities with today’s European interest for strategic autonomy. Already then, there was a clear desire to create a more independent capability for situational awareness, for the WEU Member States to have a better picture of the relevant developments around crises events. This is still one of the driving factors for SatCen’s operational work now, to empower the EU and its Member States in informed decision making and actions in the field of foreign, security, and defence policy.

Hartmut Bühl: There is a broad spectrum of activities in the European Union. What interests does SatCen cover?

Sorin Ducaru: We cover the full spectrum of European interests, from political planning and operational decision making to supporting external action in missions and operations. In fact, the support of SatCen to EU missions and operations has increased more than five times in the last two years, like for Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, being currently a very important user of our products.

Nannette Cazaubon: You are one of the few operational entities in the EU working for security and defence. To what extent do you thus consider SatCen an institution predominantly shaped by its impressive legacy, and how has the work changed over the period of three decades?

Sorin Ducaru: That is indeed an interesting aspect. When the Centre was set up 30 years ago – and this is also what I am

told by our staff who experienced those early times of SatCen – the atmosphere was like working for a startup. Everything was new, all processes and product standards had to be created from scratch, and everyone was extremely motived to be able to support this agency from its inception through the initial growth phase.

Nannette Cazaubon: Has this spirit survived?

Sorin Ducaru: I can assure you that you can still feel this startup spirit and it has even amplified over time, keeping SatCen at the cutting edge of technological developments.

When I joined SatCen in 2019, I was amazed to find myself in the middle of an extremely vibrant, professional, and motivated team, constantly driving the centre forward, to keep abreast with both the evolving customer needs and the rapidly developing technological tools. This really is a special working atmosphere and experience, and I have much respect for these achievements, especially to maintain such a dynamic climate over such a long period! I had the same feeling when I visited Silicon Valley as a young ambassador in the USA. Hartmut Bühl: Focusing on the geospatial work itself, could you tell us a bit more about the most relevant changes since the beginnings of the Centre?

Sorin Ducaru: Sure – and this change is really quite evident. It has to do with a dramatically enhanced quality, quantity and speed of delivery of SatCen geospatial analysis products. We benefit from an increased volume of satellite data, with higher resolution from electro-optical sensors and enhanced quality from multi-spectral radar satellites. We combine organically

→ Continued on page 42

41

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

is a growing seed of the European “SatCen Union, contributing to the sovereignty of Europe in matters of satellite imagery analysis and to our security from space and in space”

Nathalie Loiseau, Chair of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) at her visit to SatCen, 22th September 2021

satellite data with other data from air and ground sources and from open sources. And what is key for our improved efficiency and responsiveness, we increasingly employ modern Information Technology (IT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools, not to replace the human analyst, but to empower and amplify the unique value added of human expertise.

Hartmut Bühl: In fact, this evolution is drastically speeding up in the current period, what is your strategy to handle this phenomenon?

Sorin Ducaru: We are now contracting archive and streaming services, have constant and near-real time access to new imagery, and even employ pre-analysis services offered by innovative data providers as well as AI tools, co-developed by our own IT experts in-house. Due to these developments, the productivity of SatCen is increasing substantially.

The adaptation of the Centre to the evolving operational reality has been achieved thanks to the professionalism of its staff; underpinned by state-of-the-art training; by cooperation with Members States and the European Commission; and with help of specifically developed IT tools and infrastructure. Another important aspect in the development of SatCen is the increase of users.

Hartmut Bühl: Who are the users and in which administrative form are you cooperating?

Sorin Ducaru: From Member States to EU institutions and bodies, and other international organisations, upon specific mandate from Member States. SatCen has developed valuable cooperation within different components of the EU Space Programme, being the entrusted entity for the Copernicus Support for External Action (SEA) and the Front Desk for the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) consortium.

Furthermore, in the framework of EU research and innovation initiatives such as Horizon Europe, it has successfully applied and delivered projects relevant to its core mission. We have developed important partnerships with the EU Commission, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Space Agency (ESA).

42

Nannette Cazaubon: To what extent does all this high-tech help in providing better services? I assume that it is not a purely technological necessity to adapt to the IT revolution…

Sorin Ducaru: …yes, indeed Ms Cazaubon. On the one hand, the new IT opportunities are absolutely necessary to simply manage the ever-growing amount of data we are handling. The availability of imagery and collateral data has been increasing exponentially: just the mere size of one single satellite data set could not even be processed with the computer capacities from just a few years ago.

It is both speed of delivery and resolution of imagery data that keep improving, making our business constantly more complex and increasingly fast-paced.

On the other hand and at the same time, the new IT tools help to pre-define certain areas of interest, to set up semi-automatic alert services, and to request and integrate first-level analysis from commercial providers and other partners, which in turn help our dedicated specialists to focus on the most value-added parts of the analysis chain.

Nannette Cazaubon: How are you optimising the processes to achieve what results?

Sorin Ducaru: Today, we employ AI and Big Data tools to optimise our data management and the tasking and analysis processes. This way, we manage to provide more, faster, and better analysis to all our customers, improving their situational awareness on the basis of our operational support services.

Hartmut Bühl: I would like to ask you about the political context of your work: the EU and its Member States are working intensely on the forthcoming “Strategic Compass” – to what extent does this interact with your field of responsibility or has an impact on your mission?

Sorin Ducaru: SatCen as an operational entity is firmly embedded in the political context, and its enshrined in our founding document, that the Member States perform the political guidance and supervision, while the High Representative provides the operational direction.

Regarding the Strategic Compass specifically, SatCen contrib-

Security and Defence

Civilian distress call detected by SatCen in Misurata, Lybia photo: © ASI (2011), distrubuted by e-GEOS S.p.A.

specific challenges you foresee for the further evolution of the Centre?

Sorin Ducaru: Demand for support has actually multiplied over the past years, and we estimate that this trend will further increase in the near future. Furthermore, the current Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the specific value of space assets and geospatial analysis capabilities in times of crisis, especially when ground access and mobility is severely impacted.

The European Union is increasingly taking over more responsibility for its own security and in the field of defence. The Centre is ready to meet these new challenges and to continue its close and trustful collaboration with our partners. Our mission remains to provide comprehensive situational awareness and to match the EU’s increased ambitions in external action, as reflected in the Strategic Compass debate.

utes directly to its four dimensions through the centre’s core mission, namely: supporting EU crisis management through its geospatial analysis; increasing responsiveness and operational readiness; optimising strategic foresight and strengthening European resilience. This is reflected in its operational lessons learned during crises like the ongoing pandemic, as well as through its role in the Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) activities when linking security from space with security in space. The Centre helps to reinforce EU partnerships through the mandated support for the UN, OSCE and OPCW. In addition, SatCen continuously invests in capability development to remain at the cutting edge of relevant technological developments, like with the mentioned AI and Big Data from space technology.

Nannette Cazaubon: Increased global instability, growing strategic competition and complex security threats produce greater demand and need your attention. Are there any

Hartmut Bühl: Mr Ducaru, thank you very much for this conversation.

plays a fundamental role in the decision-making under the Com“SatCen mon Security and Defence Policy, and actions of our 17 civilian and military missions and operations around the world. From Torrejón de Ardoz, it offers geostrategic analysis of intelligence for both the EU’s institutions and its Member States.” HR/VP Josep Borrell at SatCen, 24 February 2020 th

43

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Where is the European defence heading?

From strategic autonomy to strategic sovereignty

by Frédéric Mauro, lawyer at the Brussels’ bar and associate researcher at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), Brussels/Paris

A

draft of the “strategic compass”, the first White paper on European defence, was released to Member States in last December. Astonishingly, the phrase “strategic autonomy” appears only once. And it is only mentioned with the aim of reducing its scope since the paper says that “this Strategic Compass will enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests”, which is a diplomatic oxymoron.

At the same time, the coalition agreement between the political parties that will rule Germany in the coming months and years does not contain any reference to strategic autonomy.

However, it does mention “strategic sovereignty”, the latest semantic innovation in the fertile ground of European gibberish, whose goal is none other than to please the French without frightening the Atlanticists.

One wonders, after Donald Trump’s whims, Recep Tayyip Erdogn’s outbursts, Russia’s provocations and the uncoordinated departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan, whether Europeans still strive for strategic autonomy. Why such a renouncement?

First, the goal is neither clear nor ardently desired The fact is that strategic autonomy has three faces.1 The original one, should be sought in the Franco-British declaration of Saint-Malo on 4th December 1998, which gave rise, after much shilly-shallying, to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. It applies only to the management of international crises in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood through the dispatch of an expeditionary force, when the Americans do not want to get involved. In theory, it is fully compatible with NATO but in practice it has never been implemented. Proof of this is the Union’s inaction in Syria, Libya and, to a lesser extent, Mali.

The second understanding, which can be qualified as extended, was enshrined in the 2016 “Global Strategy of the European Union”. It overlaps with the desire to ensure “an appropriate level” of military independence. The concept is no longer

Frédéric Mauro is an Associate Research Fellow at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), and a Lawyer at the bar of Brussels. He is specialised in defence matters Photo: private

and legal questions related to the Common Security and Defence

Policy. He is a former clerk of the House of the French Senate and spent the last years of his career at the “Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee” where he took part at numerous works on procurement and defence research.

only about projecting power beyond the borders of the Union, but about the Union assuming responsibility “for its own security” both “within and beyond its borders”; desire which is reflected in the “level of ambition “ of the Implementation plan of the Global Strategy and its three objectives: (i) “Responding to external conflicts and crises”, (ii) “Capacity building of partners” and finally (iii) “Protecting the Union and its citizens”.

And it is precisely because it implies the defence of the Union on its own territory that this version of strategic autonomy has faced strong resistance from some Central European states as well as the Baltic and Nordic states, all anxious not to trigger the departure of American forces from European soil.

The third meaning, aimed at smoothing over disagreements, is a concept of strategic autonomy developed by the European authorities, encompassing trade, finance and investment. This is notably the vision of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, in which strategic autonomy is almost the same thing as independence. It is also the one defended by the French President. But in the face of fears that this global strategic autonomy might conceal a form of protec-

1 See Frédéric Mauro « l’autonomie stratégique, cet obscure objet du désir » in Analyse n° 13 IRIS - Octobre 2021, https://bit.ly/3KtacWG

44

Security and Defence

EU High Representative Josep Borrell (right) together with Dmytro Kuleba, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a visit to Ukraine, 5-6 January 2022

tionism, Emmanuel Macron finally proposed to use the even more all-encompassing term of “European sovereignty”.

It is this third meaning that we find in the German coalition agreement hiding behind the phrase “strategic sovereignty” since it is a question of strengthening the “capacity for action (of the Union) in the global context and to be less dependent and less vulnerable in important strategic areas, such as energy supply, health, raw material imports and digital technology, without isolating Europe”2. In good French, this is called “drowning the fish”. Indeed, what is the destination: crisis management, military independence, or independence writ large? As old Seneca said: “there is no favourable wind for the sailor who doesn’t know where to go”.

From this point of view the strategic compass provides the beginning of an answer: the desired strategic autonomy should be understood as the capacity to manage the full spectrum of crises and the beginning of some sort of military independence, especially with regards to cyber defence, although the collective defence of the European Union should continue to be ensured by NATO. Yet, Europeans are not at the end of their sorrows.

Second, the price to pay for strategic autonomy might be too high The equation of strategic autonomy was clearly posed in Saint-Malo: if the European Union wants to play its “full role on the international stage”, it must have: (i) a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, (ii) the means to decide to use them, and (iii) a readiness to do so.

Since this equation is a multiplication, if only one of the terms is equal to zero, the total will also be equal to zero.

Let’s start with the political will to achieve strategic autonomy. Whatever the form, very few countries really want it. All the Nordic, Baltic and Central European states are remotely concerned with crisis management and fully satisfied with US 2 Mehr Fortschritt wagen - Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit

photo: European Union, 2022, EC – Audiovisual Service / Genya Savilov

protection when it comes to collective defence. In addition, full independence is no more than a theoretical consideration for them. Germany and Italy for their part are trying to maintain a balance between the transatlantic relationship, especially its military dimension, and the European project. Breaking out of the status quo would require political will, which, for the moment, seems lacking.

Only France, Greece and to a lesser extent Spain seem genuinely willing to pursue strategic autonomy, although we don’t know for sure that they have the same understanding of the phrase.

The ability to decide, is undoubtedly the most sensitive point, because it presupposes moving from the intergovernmental framework, in which decisions are taken unanimously, to a new framework in which decisions would be taken by a qualified majority. And here we find the whole ambiguity of the French position, which would like to see European strategic autonomy but is unable to give up its veto rights.

strategic compass “The provides the beginning of an answer.”

Capacity for action would be, finally, the easiest to achieve, provided of course that the first two elements are met.

However, if we focus, as always, on capacity without having taken care to establish a “permanent” and “structured” decision-making procedure beforehand, there is a great risk of making the same mistakes that led to the abandonment of the Helsinki objective (1999) to constitute a European military capacity of 60,000 men (an army corps) or the establishment of tactical groups (2004).

It seems that the Strategic Compass has clearly identified the question of the ability to decide, which also includes common funding. But it must still come up with a more convincing answer than simply identifying the problems. Member States will consult in the spring and the President of the Commission will present the results of their consultation in May 2022. To be continued… https://bit.ly/32MVcbF

45

Europe and the sea No common geopolitical view among EU Member States

Interview with Alain Coldefy, Admiral (ret), former Major General of the French Armed Forces, Paris

T

he European: Admiral, in your book “Amiral – Le sel et les étoiles” you have succeeded in describing the multifaceted profession of the sailor with all its lessons and dangers. What are the differences between the sailors of yesterday and those of today?

Alain Coldefy: The evolution of society in terms of education, social behaviour, attitudes towards one’s professional life, has resulted in a similar evolution among seamen of all ranks, aboard warships, surface vessels or submarines. Notions of “idealism” and “vocation” have not disappeared, but it is clear that in the 21st century, the work/life balance, essential compromises within a couple in terms of work and salary constitute a big change. In addition, sailors’ communications on social networks are hardly compatible with the discretion required for operational deployments. So, our young sailors, including officers, have to be educated in such matters.

The European: And how has the French Navy managed the feminisation of crews?

Alain Coldefy: There has been no particular difficulty as long as women’s accommodation was part of the initial design.

Today, all surface vessels have mixed crews and the generation of “Barracuda” nuclear attack submarines – the first SNA, Suffren, is currently in testing - is designed to take on board female personnel.

The European: The French navy enjoys an enviable status in the population. Is this reflected in the investment budget? What line do you take on technologies of the future?

Alain Coldefy: These are indeed the essential issues. Let me give you some short answers: First, it is true that the French

46

photo: (c) 2019 Joris van Boven/Shutterstock

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Navy enjoys great popularity among the French. Second, investments are guaranteed, but there are still two permanent weak points: the ability to maintain high intensity combat over a long period and the inability to protect all maritime areas under our national jurisdiction. And third, for the technologies of the future, it is a question of making the right choices: onboard drones, cyber ships protected by design, all areas that are currently being implemented.

The European: What distinguishes the French Navy from the navies of other EU Member States?

Alain Coldefy: The French Navy is the only navy in Europe that has the triptych of the following vessels: nuclear powered aircraft carriers capable of delivering nuclear weapons (Nuclear Carrier Vessels/CVN); nuclear missile submarines (Nuclear powered Submarines with nuclear Ballistic missiles/SSBN), and nuclear attack submarines (Nuclear powered Submersible Ships /SSN). The five permanent members of the UN Security Council have similar warships, but among them, the French navy is autonomous in nuclear armaments. This is not the case of the United Kingdom, which completely depends on the US Navy for its deterrence and, in addition, has no CVNs. The European: And what about more traditional vessels such as frigates?

Alain Coldefy: Frigates are a good example: some EU countries have ships in this class that are equivalent in quality and sometimes higher in number to our own.

The European: What is the reason for France’ self-confidence in its national capabilities as a sea power even with restraint means? Does it simply feel pride of being owner of the so called “France Maritime” covering France’s overseas territories?

Security and Defence

military might of its navy is only “The the final building block of a nation’s

sea power. It comes on top of geographic, historical, political, cultural, social, scientific and commercial factors.”

Amiral Coldefy (right) with Hartmut Bühl in front of the “Dôme des Invalides” in Paris

Alain Coldefy: The reality is that, thanks to its overseas territories, France has the second largest ​​Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), nearly 11 million km² under its total jurisdiction, just a few km² short of the United States’ zones. Paradoxically, only strategists realise its true value!

The European: France has therewith obligations towards its overseas territories and guarantees their security. Is France able to protect them?

Alain Coldefy: The military might of its navy is only the final building block of a nation’s sea power. It comes on top of geographic, historical, political, cultural, social, scientific and commercial factors. Finally, we should not forget our merchant fleet, even if it has a different rationale.

The European: In that case, protection means projection. Are there enough power projection capabilities?

Alain Coldefy: When it comes to the projection of French forces, I am confident there is a real capacity for their projection.

The European: Should it come to two parallel missions, France’s forces would be overstretched very quickly. Wouldn’t it be good to have a “standing” EU Naval Group for such cases?

Alain Coldefy: In reality, in the logic of a national policy based on two pillars, strategic decision-making autonomy and loyalty to alliances including the Atlantic Alliance, the French Navy has been reconstituted around nuclear deterrence and aircraft carriers since the end of post-colonial conflicts. Another consideration has been the protection of the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of our overseas territories.

Partnership with other European nations, however, is increasingly necessary in the maritime area. But here, it’s not just for France to adapt.

The European: You refer in your book to the irreplaceable cooperation with the Royal Navy. Can Europe really count on the Royal Navy in case of need? London is apparently going its own way in defence and security, as it demonstrated a few months ago by ejecting France from an armaments contract with Australia.

photo: ESDU

Alain Coldefy: Yes, of course, you are referring to the AUKUS, the defence treaty between Australia, the UK and the US that was signed some months ago. This was indeed an undignified event. However, if we focus on Europe rather than the Indo-Pacific region, the UK has always had its own defence and security policy, partially independent given its ties to the US, but has constantly reaffirmed its participation in European defence.

The UK is a member of the “European Intervention Initiative” (E2 I) launched by France outside the EU institutions in June 2018. I am very confident that Europe will be able to count on the UK and its ability to operate with its allies.

The European: In reality though, is it not true that the UK will not be a part an integrated and veritable “European Maritime Power” on the basis of the EU Commission’s Green Paper on EU maritime policy? I detect a certain scepticism in your book about the integration of French forces.

Alain Coldefy: There are only a few concrete elements in the European Union’s integrated maritime policy paper. It refers to defence in the context of maritime surveillance, but that’s about all. Having a European identity of any kind recognised within NATO remains difficult, but we have every right to hope that when it comes to concrete maritime issues, there will eventually be more cooperation between partners.

The European: But no integration! You justify this in your book by saying that the French fleet must remain independent as the main component of the French nuclear deterrent, which is not divisible, as your President confirmed on 17th February 2020.

Alain Coldefy: French deterrence is based on forces on permanent alert (the strategic air forces), forces on permanent operations (the strategic oceanic force) and a force on call, the nuclear naval air force. It is easy to understand that these forces, in particular those operated from the sea, must be permanently available to the Head of State. France has therefore had to find an operational link, even if our European partners are not entirely happy with it. France participates in NATO and

→ Continued on page 48

47

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Admiral Alain Coldefy born in 1946, has sailed the seas of the world from ensign to commander of the aircraft carrier ‘Clemenceau’. As a Rear Admiral, he led a Franco-British fleet in the Adriatic during the Balkan War and served various ministers in Paris. In 2002 he

The European: I sense a clear rejection of such constructs. But, coming at it from another perspective, is the naval rearmament of the great powers not worrying? Does it not require the Union to react?

Alain Coldefy: Extremely worrying and even dangerous for Europe!

was appointed Major General of the French Armed Forces and subsequently became President of the Académie de Marine before joining industry. He has been President of the Society of Members of the Legion of Honour (SMLH) since 2018.

EU operations, in which the coalition is shaped by the mission.

But France also has strictly national operations.

The European: But what does this relative independence mean for European strategic maritime cooperation?

Alain Coldefy: You are right to speak of “relative” independence, because the strategic autonomy requested by France clearly distinguishes between independent national choices with full knowledge of the facts and the indispensable military cooperation in operations that very few countries can carry out alone beyond a certain level of commitment. Strategic maritime cooperation is based on the same principles The European: But how can EU Member States be encouraged to make the EU a real maritime power, combining parts of national naval forces into a standing naval force, as air forces and armies are doing? What is the scope for France to participate in such a project?

Alain Coldefy: I am indeed sceptical and I have my reasons: while the mine warfare force has played a real operational role, the frigate forces have never opened fire. Of course, there are permanent groupings like AWACS, the NATO surveillance system and the air transport group in Eindhoven, which are up and running, but, for whatever reason, there is no permanent multinational combat air wing. Moreover, the Franco-German brigade, that was formed in 1989, has never been engaged, as such, in operations. I therefore do not believe in a permanent European naval force except in the aforementioned fields of mine warfare and the armed surveillance of European economic zones.

The European: And for the “fishing war” between the UK and France after Brexit?

Alain Coldefy (smiling): A nice symbol would be to entrust the maritime prefect of Cherbourg – a Vice-Admiral – with Dutch frigates to patrol the disputed fishing grounds between the EU and the United Kingdom! Why not?

The European: In which oceans do you feel exposed?

Alain Coldefy: There are two areas that hold my attention: First, the Indo-Pacific zone, where China is in the lead. It builds the equivalent of the French fleet every four years and aims eventually to have six American size aircraft carriers. Second, the Mediterranean, where Algeria is making a considerable effort to modernise its fleet with submarines and missiles.

The European: What threats do you see?

Alain Coldefy: There is definitely a new threat to our energy supplies as well as the global scope of our trade. Finally, there are also new weapons – hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, etc. But, as in the past, the submarine threat is the most dangerous and will remain so.

The European: What lessons should we learn from all this?

Alain Coldefy: There is a very wide-ranging area of strategic thinking and financial commitments that it would be smart to broach with those Europeans who are willing to engage in it.

The European: Admiral, let me turn to a public “domain”: You are the president of the SMLH (Société des Membres de la Légion d’Honneur) that brings together the holders of the most prestigious decoration awarded by France for the past 200 years: la légion d’Honneur. What is the purpose of your society?

Alain Coldefy: In addition to the obvious missions of promoting the values ​​of France, of supporting and helping our elders who have served the country, the duty of the SMLH is to develop national cohesion, primarily social cohesion and ​​ the link between generations. It is in the spirit of First Consul Bonaparte, who, in 1802, wanted this decoration to reconcile the French after the years of revolution and civil war.

The European: Admiral, thank you for this conversation.

In the first part of his book “Amiral – Le sel et les étoiles” (“Admiral – the salt and the stars”) Admiral Coldefy impressively explains the life of a sailor – in all ranks.

The European: Is it more than a vision?

Alain Coldefy: Well, any vision requires a single and shared political concept. The same goes for the utopian ”European Army” as long as essential topics like nuclear weapons, intelligence and industry are not yet – unfortunately – on the table.

48

In the second part he reflects on French maritime policy, geopolitics and strategies on the seas.

Alain Coldefy, Amiral - Le sel et les étoiles, Edition Favre SA, 2020, ISBN: P78-2-8289-1847-7

Security and Defence

The higher the trust, the higher the resilience

by Sebastian Meyer-Plath, Sales Director, BLÜCHER GmbH, Erkrath

R

esilience is a term that has been increasingly used in the recent past to describe the capability of a community, organisation, state or society to withstand threats, catastrophes or any other substantial hardship which it may encounter. The major driver of the level of resilience is the trust of the people involved in the ability of their government, command structure or organisation to deal with the situation and protect their lives and their standard of life. The higher this trust, the higher the resilience. But it goes without saying that the organisation entrusted to deal with the situation needs to have the wherewithal in equipment and trained personnel to live up to the task.

Harrowing news in the media Regardless of what news medium we look at, it seems that the world has certainly taken a turn for the worse. Natural disasters of various kinds, man-made threats in the form of armed conflicts, terror or hazmat incidents or the pandemic with all its

Sebastian

photo: © Blücher GmbH

Enhancing resilience – preparing to protect against chemical threats repercussions form a major part of our daily news diet.

Of course, many of these situations have occurred in former times as well, however, one may think that the resilience of societies, states or organisations has been higher in the past.

There may be a plethora of reasons for this impression. One of them might be the missing balance between communicating a threat or incident on one hand and the capabilities at hand to deal with the situation on the other. The latter is hardly ever addressed in widely distributed media.

When it comes to incidents involving Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) and Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs), societies are reacting very attentively and with fear of being powerless. This feeling of powerlessness is often due to a lack of information about official possibilities and capabilities for protection and resistance. But there are strategies and means to counter it.

Countering CBRN incidents

There are four main areas defining the capabilities to respond adequately: Intelligence, Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM), Recovery and Protection.

I would like to focus on the area of protection. Of course the capabilities are influenced by the number of available personnel, their training levels Meyer-Plath and of course the technical equipment. is the Sales Director at BLÜCHER GmbH. After graduating Whereas collective protection can shelter large in Microbiology at the University of Bonn, he joined Bruker number of people not necessarily involved in Daltonics in Bremen and held the positions of Product dealing with an incident, it is individual protecManager and Head of Military Sales. After a term with tion which defines the resilience of the military or the German bio startup Advalytix GmbH in Munich, he civil responder. joined Smiths Detection in Watford, UK, as the VP Sales

photo: private

& Marketing. Coming back to Germany, he was President

of the Bruker Detection Division and a member of the Management Team of Bruker Daltonics, before joining BLÜCHER GmbH in 2020. Sebastian currently holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the CBRN Defence Corps of the German

Individual “comfortable” protection Well known from pictures from the news are the heavy, impermeable, pressurised suits used by

Army as a reserve officer. → Continued on page 50

49

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The SARATOGA® technology allows the combination of different layers for user specific configurations

responders, mainly firefighters, when dealing with spills or leakages involving TICs or TIMs. Since the location of the threat is known and the boundaries of contamination established, there are not many unknowns left. Yes, wearing such a protective suit is putting a heavy burden on the responder, but he or she knows exactly that the suit will protect him or her and the time spent working in the suit is limited. The level of resilience of the responder is high, because the level of protection is high, and the duration of suffering is limited.

In unclear and undefined situations however, where neither the location nor the threat is known, the resilience of the responding individual is certainly in danger of decreasing. Since the potential tasks for the individual may involve more physical activities and longer periods under protection, it is mandatory to reduce the additional burden due to the protective suit.

Though comfort in these conditions seems to be a relative term, there are two important factors to look at in this regard.

Apart from the ability to move as freely and unobstructed as possible, the reduction of the heat stress and the capability of the protective suit to remove water vapour from the skin and from the interior of the suit as quickly as possible are of utmost importance for the individual whilst maintaining its protective characteristics against chemical and particulate hazards for long periods of time, even after multiple washing cycles.

Filtering technologies There are different technologies available affecting the removal of water vapour either by diffusion or by active air flow through the protective garment. The latter obviously requires a filtering technology, which is able to immobilise the hazardous compounds away from the skin whilst allowing an airflow comparable to normal garments used in non-CBRN or non-hazmat missions.

50

photo: © Blücher GmbH

Spherical activated carbon adsorbents One of the most widely used filter materials is based on spherical activated carbon adsorbents and is known under the SARATOGA® brand.

The adjustable properties of the specific activated carbon in the adsorptive layer and the combination with further functional layers for aerosol protection, flame retardancy or colour/camouflage allow a user- and mission-specific configuration of the material performance. Depending on the operational needs, the materials can be implemented into different garment concepts, such as CBRN protective overgarments, duty uniforms, undergarments, which can all be completed

by CBRN protective boots, socks, gloves or separate head protection like balaclavas.

The technology is currently fielded with more than 60 nations, including most of the NATO Member States, with users ranging from military ground forces and aviation personnel, civil users like first responders, CBRN specialists to police forces.

Confidence in material empowers users Based on the excellent wear physiology and the proven high level of protection the individual equipped with such a suit starts his or her mission with a high degree of trust to finish it unharmed and with the confidence to be able to finish the mission without testing his or her stamina to the limit.

This confidence in the protective equipment coupled with a thorough training regime wearing a training suit with similar wear characteristics to the “life” suit obviously add to the resilience of the individual, its organisation and ultimately to the trust of the populace into the capability of their state organisations to deal with any CBRN threat coming their way.

The leading magazine for Europe’s security and defence community Independent Review on European Security and Defence

Volume N° 38

Climate and Security Protecting our planet and its people

Facing the Covid-19 crisis in conflict zones worldwide

The green deal in the Asia Pacific Region

Hilde Hardeman, Director, EU Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Brussels

Olzod Boum-Yalagch, Chairman of the Mongolian Green Party, Ulaan-Baatar

www.magazine-the-european.com

Edition 1/2021

The magazine is the first winner of the CIDAN European Award for “Citizenship, Security and Defence”, organised in 2011 under the patronage of Mr Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, in order to reward outstanding efforts towards promoting European citizenship and European security and defence awareness.

On 26 November 2019, the magazine was awarded from the same organisation with the CIDAN Special Jury Prize for its outstanding quality and efforts in promoting European citizenship, security and defence.

MEDIA AND CONTENT SALES / SUBSCRIPTION FOR DIGITAL AND HARD COPIES Hartmut Bühl •Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Phone: +49(0)172 32 82 319

E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr

For further information: www.magazine-the-european.com