The European Security and Defence Union Issue 13

ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 13

Main Topic Forces develop ment in the EU and NATO

Global Player in Security Photo: U.S. Air Force photo by Christine Jones

Is Europe powerful enough to master armed conflicts?

Croatia – the 28th EU-Member State

For a more dynamic and safer Europe

Dr Vesna Pusić, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb

Villy Søvndal, Foreign Minister, Kopenhagen

Edition 2/2012

EDITORIAL

Turkey – still waiting in Europe’s anteroom Under pressure from the EU to engage in reforms as a condition for its accession to the Union, Turkey has made considerable progress in the fields of democracy and human rights.

Indeed, over the last decade it has developed its democratic system. That is an achievement on the part of its young and dynamic population, but also on the part of the EU, which must continue to insist on reform: for unfortunately there is still room for improvement.

Although Prime Minister Erdogan was able during his second term of office to peacefully break the Turkish military’s hold on the country, since his sweeping election victory last year he no longer appears unduly concerned about the conditions laid down by the EU. His party is extending its influence to a growing number of areas and increasingly this ultra-successful prime minister himself is showing a propensity for more authoritarian forms of action: criticism is no longer welcome. Is Turkey distancing itself from the EU criteria?

Turkey was recognised as a candidate country in Helsinki in 1999 and the accession talks began in 2005, although thus far they have delivered little in the way of results. There can be no doubt that the Cyprus issue weighs heavily on the negotiations, but what worries me is that Europe’s dealings with Turkey continue to follow the same old pattern, as though nothing in the world had changed.

Yet in the meantime Turkey has become a success story in its own right, with a flourishing economy, and Mr Erdogan is seeking and finding a new geopolitical and geostrategic role

for Turkey in this region fraught with conflict. Moreover he has NATO’s numerically strongest armed forces to rely on for that purpose. The fact alone that last April’s talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions took place in Istanbul, where Turkey Hartmut Bühl played host not only to the EU, but also to China, Russia and the US, speaks volumes about the country’s new political role in the region. This positioning by Turkey shows that it has developed into Iran’s main competitor in the striving to become the leading regional power. So does it really need to continue down the road towards Europe, where attitudes to it anyway blow hot and cold with the vagaries of national politics?

The answer is that Turkey needs Europe, even if with its high growth rates it is economically better off than many EU member states. Europe is its biggest partner in the fields of trade and technology. But Europe too needs Turkey, and not just to provide it with geostrategic backing vis-à-vis the Arab world.

If Europe wishes to keep exerting “pressure” for still more democratic change in Turkey, then it must take account of the country’s new positioning and the accession talks must produce some tangible interim results at least that give indications where additional progress is indispensable. The opportunity must be grasped now: the EU should not wait so long that it will one day have to beg Turkey to join the Union, only then it will be on terms that are no longer defined by the EU.

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

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Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Gábor Iklódy NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Brussels

Maciej Popowski Deputy Secretary General, EEAS, Brussels

POLICY and POLITICS 3

Editorial

European Security and Defence Policy

Hartmut Bühl

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European Defence Policy on a post-Sarkozy continent A certain inconsistency is to be observe

The European Union 7

Villy Søvndal, Kopenhagen

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Dr Vesna Pusić, Zagreb th

28 Member State of the European Union Croatia –a veritable engagement for Europe

Defence and Security

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Maciej Popowski, Brussels

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Documentation

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Geoffrey Van Orden MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

The EU’s CSDP is a misguided irrelevance The transatlantic element is decisive for Europe

A view from the European Parliament

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Christoph Nick, Brussels

The lack of will to be a greater power The unconcern of the population

A view from the inside On the way to an authentic European diplomatic service

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Dr Klaus Wittmann, Berlin

“Pooling and Sharing” must be pragmatic and conceptual The decisive factor is common requirements

The European External Action Service (EEAS) one year on

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Delphine Deschaux-Beaume, Grenoble

Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany The different level of influence of parliaments

The EU's conflict prevention and crisis response Plead for a dynamic and safe Europe

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Robert Walter MP, London

Christoph Raab, Brussels

Between a rock and a hard place?

How to run a complicated organisation

NATO 25

Gábor Iklódy, Brussels

Crisis management – coping with asymmetric threats NATO is in first place a military alliance

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General (ret) Harald Kujat, Berlin

The credibility of NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan’s future A transition strategy is needed

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Dr Merle Missoweit, Euskirchen

Long-term strategic partnerships in defence National sovereignty will lose its importance

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CONTENT

Michael Eberhardt Vice President and General Manager, Enterprise Services Germany, Hewlett-Packard, Böblingen

General Fulgencio Coll Bucher Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Army, Madrid

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Conferences Report

32 ESRT-Cyber-conference in Washington

50

33 AFCEA – special aspect of Cyber Defence Prague 34

Michael Eberhardt, Böblingen

IT- Security is more than technology The human factor is part of the system

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Arnaud de Péchy, Kreuzlingen

The future of versatile platforms The real driver is reducing the life cycle cost

Stefan Dopp, Ralf Otten und Christina Janzen-Wolf, Bonn

Serco goes green and mobile Reduce the dependency of fossil fuel need

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Gerd Hexels, Erkrath

Police forces: personal protection during crisismanagement operations The human factor is essential

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Hartmut Bühl, Brussels

CBRN – The stockpiling of antidotes Anticipating needs following the release of toxic chemicals

Martin Stoussavljewitsch, Brussels

Renewable energy and military More than avision

Maritime security Crisis management forces

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Forces development

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Jürgen Bornemann / Ton van Osch, Brussels

Forces Development – synergy in EU and NATO Creating synergies

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57

Dr Michael Stehr, Bonn

Piracy off the Horn of Africa – 2012 Pirates continue going strong

Janusz Zakrecki, Warsaw

Helicopters in Crisis Management Manage the flight

Institutions 60 Organisation chart – EEAS-Organisation

Protection

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Maria Eleni Koppa MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

“Yes” to a robust EU counter-piracy strategy Some fear of militarisation

General Fulgencio Coll Bucher, Madrid

Protection in operations – an integrative approach Sound personal protection is a prerequisite

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

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Photo: cc European Parliament / flickr.com

The European Union The European Union has demonstrated that it has the political, civil- and with certain limitations- the military capabilities to contribute to the settlement of conflicts, and that it is co-operable with international organisations such as the UNO and NATO as a solid partner for peace keeping, crisis prevention, crisis and humanitarian aid management.

Crisis around Europe make it nessesary for the EU to be a comprehensive crisis-management player

The EU's conflict prevention and crisis response

by Villy Søvndal, Foreign Minister of Denmark, Copenhagen

The trends in new crises underline the need for the EU to act as a comprehensive crisis management player. We simply cannot afford the risk of using limited resources on uncoordinated activities. We must do better with less. The Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and South Sudan are all conflict ridden areas where the EU is making use of its wide range of instruments in coordination with local and international stakeholders. Three new possible CSDP missions are among the many EU tools in these regions. They cannot function in isolation from political and development efforts of other EU agencies or cooperation with international partners. A very important development in the EU’s approach is the formulation of overall, regional political strategies acting as a unifying framework for the efforts.

We have come some of the way but there is still a lot of work to be done. We must continue to improve our efforts to become even better at applying the comprehensive approach.

The EU has possibilities that individual states – and most other international organisations – do not have on a similar scale. The EU has great diplomatic capacity spearheaded by the EEAS, a significant economic size, strong multilateral contacts by the Commission, the possibility of deploying both military and civilian capabilities, just as the EU is the world’s largest donor of development assistance.

To apply the comprehensive approach In February, I hosted a conference in Brussels on the Comprehensive EU Approach to Crises. The purpose was not only to

Giving power to the EEAS One of the main goals of the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union has been to support the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and with it the establishment of a strong and resourceful EEAS. The economic crisis highlights the need to improve the EU’s efficiency. We need to be better at acting as “One” EU, across institutions and instruments, and must always adapt our response to the actual situation at hand. The strength of the EU lies in the variety of tools in our tool box. But we must improve the ways in which we use them, making them complement each other to create a sum that is greater than the parts. That is what the comprehensive approach is all about.

Villy Søvndal speaking in the EP

Source: European Parliament

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Croatia is bringing added values to the European Union identify areas where the EU could improve coordination of our efforts, but also to focus on an intensified dialogue with other international organisations. During the conference, the High Representative Catherine Ashton outlined the important steps taken in the EEAS towards achieving this common goal, but also highlighted that the EU needs to be more comprehensive in the use of its instruments as well as in its approach to international partnerships.

The need is clear: The demand for civilian CSDP missions in particular is on the rise, but resources to staff and funds for them are becoming scarcer across Member States. At the same time, our political visions for integrating CSDP missions with other strategic efforts of the EU have become more ambitious.

The synergies between our EU tools are many. We simply cannot afford the risk of using limited resources on uncoordinated activities. We must do better with less. Building on comprehensive regional strategies, the EEAS and Member States are preparing for three new possible CSDP missions; countering piracy through maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa, improving security in the Sahel region through capacitybuilding of the security sector in Niger, and strengthening border control in South Sudan through support to the Juba Airport. The missions will have to have a comprehensive approach, coordinating all the tools of the EU.

The EU needs strategic partnerships The aspect of coordination with international partners is vital to fully achieve the ambitions of a comprehensive EU approach. In responding to crises, the EU will be one among several international partners. We need to work strategically alongside the UN, NATO, OSCE, African Union, Arab League, and other strategic partners – in better defining our respective comparative advantages and homing in on the most optimal division of labour between us in the crisis cycle. We also need to coordinate amongst ourselves. Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, we have systematically strengthened the cooperation between our national embassies and the EU delegations, just as the cooperation between the different EU institutions have improved. This increases our political weight and possibilities for action considerably.

The way ahead In the near future, with continued developments of new threats and security challenges, we must deliver on our high ambitions to further fulfil the potential of the EU as a comprehensive crisis-management player. This is a shared responsibility between the EEAS, the Commission and not least the 28 Member States. Denmark looks forward to continuing the good cooperation to achieve our common goals.

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28th Member State of the

by Dr. Vesna Pusić, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Zagr The Croatian citizens voted “yes” for Croatian EU membership on the referendum held on January 22nd this year. Following the ratification of the Accession Treaty in all Member States, Croatia will become the 28th Member State on July 1st 2013.

The Commission’s Monitoring Report, issued on April 24th, confirms that Croatia is maintaining a steady course towards EU membership, and will hopefully serve as an additional impetus for the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Croatian Accession Treaty in a timely manner.

A long and challenging process Spanning a decade, the process of Croatia’s EU accession was long and, at times, challenging; we had negotiated in more chapters than any previous EU candidate country and according to criteria stricter than ever. However, the resulting benefits for our society are invaluable. The perspective of membership was a strong driving force which accelerated adoption and implementation of numerous reforms in Croatia in the past years.

The reforms implemented as a part of the harmonisation with the acquis communautaire have led to the better functioning institutions, guaranteeing Croatian citizens higher standards of living. Croatia’s EU membership is, therefore, the logical followup to the overall political, institutional and economic transformation of the country. The EU integration was for Croatia, in fact, a process of state building. The process of reforms in line with high international standards is an unprecedented experience that Croatia is ready to share with all the countries which have a perspective of joining the EU, as well as with all the others countries which may benefit from similar reforms or are witnessing substantial changes in their societies.

Dr Vesna Pusic´ Vesna Pusić is Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia. She is also Vice-president of Croatian People’s Party Liberal Democrats and served twice as its President. She graduated from the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Philosophy, where she also earned her doctorate in Sociology. From 1976 till 1978 she worked on a research project on industrial democracy in 12 countries at the Institute for Sociology in Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Since 1978 she has been employed at the Department for Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy, where she became full professor in 1988.

Elected to the Croatian Parliament in 2000, Vesna Pusić was Deputy Speaker from 2003-2007 and Chairperson of the National Committee for Monitoring EU Accession Negotiations (2008-2011).

The European Union

European Union

reb

Stabilising the region of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) Croatia’s role in stabilising the region of SEE through the transfer of EU reforms’ know-how is its main added value in the EU institutions. Preparing for the European Union membership is in fact a process of stabilization and state building for the entire region of SEE. By assuming a crucial role in stabilising South-Eastern Europe, Croatia will perform an important, both regional and European task. This position makes the region an added value for Croatia in the EU and vice versa. However, the know-how from European reforms is suitable for institution building in any country, holding particular benefits for post conflict societies. Therefore, this know-how could prove to be a valuable tool for institution building in the countries of Southern Mediterranean. Croatia can make a significant contribution to EU Foreign and Security Policy by developing partnerships with those countries, aimed at the transfer of its EU know-how.

Having this goal in mind, the Croatian Government decided to entitle the 2012 Croatia Summit “EU Experience and the State Building”. Leaders and think-tanks from across Europe and beyond will discuss the potential benefits of EU reforms’ knowhow for peace-building and institution building in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and Southern Mediterranean.

Knowledge of conflict resolution and management The knowledge of conflict resolution and management acquired as a consequence of the Homeland war is our added value for sharing the responsibility in maintaining international security, with our current contribution to 13 UN, NATO and EU missions on four continents. Since our active engagement within the CSDP in 2007, Croatia is participating in the EU led missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and off the coast of Somalia, and supporting the development of EU Battle Groups.

In all these efforts, Croatia is establishing itself as a credible partner and stability anchor, whether in its endeavours in South East Europe, Southern Mediterranean, or elsewhere in the world. Through various facets of its foreign policy, geopolitical context and willingness to actively partake in international efforts, Croatia will add to a stronger voice of Europe in the global arena. Throughout the process of EU accession we were guided by common EU values – freedom, solidarity, justice and the rule of law, tolerance, the right to equal chance for success and happiness, to name just a few. This set of values induces an on-going progress, constantly pushing the institutional development forward, both in new and old EU Member States.

In the face of current challenges in Europe, it is more important than ever to safeguard these values and Croatia is dedicated to actively fulfilling and strengthening them.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The EEAS is organized to ensure the coherence of the EU external action

The European External Action Service – a view from the inside

by Maciej Popowski, Deputy Secretary General, EEAS, Brussels

Any evaluation of the European External Action Service, one and a half years after it was set up, should start by recalling the aims of those who framed the EEAS in the Lisbon Treaty.

Their aim was to build a service, under the leadership of the High Representative, to pursue Europe’s interests in the world, to help make EU foreign policy more coherent, to provide continuity in external representation.

While the Lisbon Treaty provides for the legal basis, many of the basic parameters of the EEAS required further work when it came to effectively creating the service. Teams had to be merged, new staff recruited, a budget prepared.

Beyond that, 2011 was a challenging year in many ways. The political and economic conditions were hardly the ideal backdrop for launching a new service: 2011 was marked by the eruption of the Arab spring and the euro zone crisis.

Yet, as Catherine Ashton has set out in her December 2011 report on the EEAS, much has been achieved already.

The new Service is ensuring coherence First, on coherence: the High Representative has taken over the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council from the rotating Presidency; she represents the European Union externally and is also the Vice President of the Commission.

The EEAS supports her in all these tasks. As part of this, the service chairs the Political and Security Committee and more than 20 other working groups.

The EEAS also prepares and conducts political dialogue meetings with third states at all levels. EU Heads of Delegations chair meetings of Member States’ Embassies and represent the EU locally. At the same time the EEAS ensures coherence with the activities of the Commission through the programming of EU assistance as well as in the inter-service consultations that precede of the commission decisions.

Ensuring coherence was always the key rationale behind the creation of the EEAS: the revamped European Neighbourhood Policy, the creation of a Crisis Management Board and ad hoc Crisis Platforms to function as coordinating platforms in times of crisis are examples.

Integration of CSDP structures into the EEAS The integration of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures into the EEAS serves this goal of coherence.

The EU is currently deploying over 5000 personnel in twelve missions and operations across the globe. European women

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Maciej Popowski Maciej Popowski is Deputy Secretary General of the External Action Service (EAS). He was born in 1964. He studied German and Dutch language and literature at the University of Wroclaw and participated in the Postgraduate Foreign Service Training at the Polish Institute for International Affairs in Warsaw (March-June 1991) and at the Auswärtigen Amt in Bonn 1991/1992.

Maciej Popowski joined the Polish diplomatic service in 1991. His previous posts include: Director of the Department of the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw (2000-2001), Ambassador, Representative of Poland to the Political and Security Committee of the EU, Deputy Head of Mission (2003-2008) and Director, DG Development, European Commission (2008-2009). Before taking up his current post, he was Head of Cabinet for the President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek.

and men are supporting the rule of law (Kosovo), training and mentoring police and judiciary (Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestinian Territories), monitoring a peace plan (Georgia), supporting security sector reform (Democratic Republic of Congo), training armed forces (Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and fighting piracy in the Horn of Africa.

We are starting to help improve the security situation in the Sahel and South Sudan: by this summer the EU will be running a total of fifteen missions and operations. These missions and operations are a tool in the overall EU toolbox, and need to be part of a global strategy. The EU’s action in the Horn of Africa is emerging as a good example of such a comprehensive approach. To further reinforce the comprehensive approach within the EEAS, the departments dealing with security policy, conflict prevention and non-proliferation have been functionally linked with the CSDP structures.

More continuity for CFSP Second, the EEAS has brought more continuity to Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is worth highlighting two qualitative changes relative to the rotating Presidency system: continuity within the EU, with High Representative Ashton as the permanent Chair of the FAC. And external continuity, when it comes to dealing with third countries and most importantly with the strategic partners.

Internally, six-monthly presidencies priorities are now replaced

The European Union

High Representative Catherine Ashton in Baghdad, meeting with Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi Prime Minister, before the Iran talks (23/05/2012).

Source:European Commission, Audiovisual service

by long-term actions translating European overall objectives.

The EEAS can focus on the Southern (response to Arab Spring) and Eastern neighbourhood (Eastern Partnership Summit) at the same time. Externally, we have now the capacity to build relationships with interlocutors on the long-term.

Continuity, predictability and effectiveness are a fundamental pre-condition for achieving results in our strategic partnerships. The EEAS is becoming a more reliable interlocutor towards third countries precisely by ensuring continuity of interlocutors and policies. For instance, the High Representative has developed a close working relationship with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, allowing the EU and the US to increasingly work hand in hand on a number of important dossiers – the Western Balkans, the Iran nuclear issue, Belarus, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East peace process.

Finally, the EEAS is a service provider. We are working hard to ensure that Member States feel ownership of the EEAS, and that the European Parliament and Commissioners are properly and timely briefed. Fiscal austerity is providing an opportunity to work with Member States to further enhance the role of EU Delegations. We have established an ongoing dialogue with Member States through the Secretaries-General of the Foreign Ministries, focused on how to better implement cooperation.

As an example, Luxembourg is opening an Embassy in Addis Abeba, to be co-located with the EU Delegation.

The creation of the EEAS – a long-term challenge So while we can look back with a certain satisfaction to the first year, many challenges remain. We need to work on improving communication, quick response, the sense of ownership by Member States, developing an esprit de corps. The EEAS still faces some working conditions constraints, some of a very operational nature such as the absence of a protocol service or conference organisation team and a continuing structural deficit of staff and other resources.

The creation of the EEAS is a long-term challenge that will take several years to reach maturity. It is obviously too soon to make definitive judgements. Among the priority areas for future work, Catherine Ashton has identified consolidating the capacity to deliver policy substance; an enhanced emphasis on the work of the EU delegations as the front-line presence of the EU’s external action, and progress in building a shared organisation culture. The breath and geographical spread of the activities of the EEAS is very wide. Many go beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy, drawing more and more on policies managed at EU level with an important external dimension, including global financial regulation, climate change and energy security, migration and poverty reduction, non-proliferation and disarmament, the fight against terrorism, the promotion of human rights and democracy. These are all areas where the EEAS can promote the potential for the EU to add value through the coherent use of national and EU policy instruments, working closely with the Commission services and the Member States.

Documentation Report from the High Representative on the EEAS One year after the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), High Representative Catherine Ashton issued a Report in December 2011 assessing the record of the service over the past 12 months and identifying the challenges it might face in the future. Ashton identified four priorities for the future of her service. She expects to consolidate the “capacity to deliver policy substance,” increase “the emphasis on the work of the EU delegations,” work on “building a shared organisational culture” and resolve “the outstanding issues in the relationship with the Commission”. > The Report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/7wq9cbl

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The European Union

Documentation The EEAS – a view from the European Parliament (Edit/nc) In May 2012, the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) issued a draft report assessing the 2010 Council Annual Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Rapporteur for the Parliament’s draft report, AFET Committee Chairman, Elmar Brok, critizised in his draft report that the Council’s Annual Report is not giving a sense of priorities or strategic guidelines for the CFSP and is avoiding important questions on the role of the EEAS and the Delegations in ensuring that the Union’s resources (personnel, financial and diplomatic) are aligned with its foreign affairs priorities. The draft report recognises the essential role of the EEAS (including its Delegations and EU Special Representatives) in assisting the HR/VP in pursuing a more strategic, coherent and consistent political approach to the Union’s external action. It stresses the importance of strengthening relations between the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States with a view to achieving synergies in the effective implementation of external action and in delivering a single EU message on key political issues.

Mr Brok’s Report will be voted in the AFET Committee on 2 July and in Plenary Session in September 2012.

The European Parliament “(…) Calls for the further development of an appropriate mechanism in the EEAS, with the participation of the relevant Commission services, where geographic and thematic expertise are integrated and drive a comprehensive approach to policy planning, formulation and implementation;

or region; welcomes the innovative introduction of a new Partnerships Instrument which brings important added value to the EU’s CFSP by providing a financial framework for cooperation with the EU’s Strategic Partners and in the follow-up to important international summits;

(…) Reiterates its call for the HR/VP, the Council and the Member States to Recognises the essential role of the overcome the imbalance between EEAS (including its Delegations and EU Rapporteur Elmar Brok MEP civilian and military planning capabiliSpecial Representatives) in assisting the Source: European Parliament ties in the EEAS and the general HR/VP in pursuing a more strategic, difficulty in achieving staffing requirecoherent and consistent political approach to the Union’s external ments for CSDP missions and operations, in particular for staff in the action; affirms its intention to continue monitoring the geographic and gender balance of staff in the EEAS, including in senior positions, fields of justice, civilian administration, customs and mediation, so as to ensure that adequate and sufficient expertise can be provided and to assess whether the appointment of Member State diplomats for CSDP missions; calls for the HR/VP to come forward with specific as Heads of Delegation is in the interests of the Union, not of Memproposals for making up these staffing shortages, in particular in the ber States; stresses the importance of strengthening relations area of civilian crisis management and the sectors described above; between the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States with a view to achieving synergies in the effective implementation of external action and in delivering a single EU message on key political issues; (…) Calls on the HR/VP to come forward with proposals to further encourage Member State cooperation under the CFSP, specifically by setting out a process that will lead to European Council conclusions on Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of security and defence and guidelines for more systematic use of coalitions of the willing, such as in the ‘core group’ concept for CSDP missions and operations, as a means of overcoming the limits of the ‘battlegroup’ concept; (…) Stresses the importance of ensuring coherence between policy planning, formulation and implementation through an appropriate mix of external financial instruments in the area of foreign affairs; calls among other things for continued complementary between the CFSP and the Instrument for Stability in the areas of mediation, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace-building, as well as for further work towards complementarity with the geographical instruments for long-term engagement with a country

Calls for the HR/VP to put forward proposals for boosting the capacities of the EEAS on conflict prevention and peace-building, with particular reference to the Gothenburg Programme, and to further expand the EU’s capacity to prevent conflict and provide mediation capacities alongside its better-resourced crisis management capacities; calls as a matter of priority for stock to be taken of EU policies in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building with a view to the HR/VP reporting back to Parliament on proposals for strengthening the Union’s external capacity and responsiveness in this area; (…)

(Excerpts) Draft Report on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 29 May 2012, Rapporteur: Elmar Brok MEP > The full version of Elmar Brok’s draft report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/csjfsnh

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

How to run a complicated organisation

The European External Acti

BSC Berlin Security Conference Congress on European Security and Defence

by Christoph Raab, Chairman of the European Security Round Table

SAVE THE DATE

The Lisbon Treaty brought with it the historic task of creating the European External Action Service (EEAS), a new institution separate from the Commission and the Council designed to make EU foreign policy action more efficient and effective. That in itself would have represented a formidable undertaking even under the best circumstances. However, the circumstances were not exactly the best and so the newly established institutions became overloaded with expectations and have so far underperformed, leading to very negative press about the Service and its management. A lot of criticism can be put down to the excitement of the early days. However, there are a number of issues that reflect more structural underlying failures and which merit closer analysis.

Europe and its neighbours – common responsibility for a stable continent 27 – 28 November 2012 andel’s Hotel & Convention Center Landsberger Allee 106 D - 10369 Berlin, Germany

The right idea - but complicated implementation

More Information: www.euro-defence.eu

Foto: Bordignon V. Eurocorps

The proposal of those who drafted the text of the Lisbon Treaty, and before that the European Convention, to merge Commission services, Council staff and national diplomats into one service was daring, but they certainly had the right idea. At the same time, it is absolutely clear that bringing at least three different (if not two plus 27) cultures together necessarily creates friction and requires periods of adjustment before the full potential of such a new organisation can unfold.

But to make the task even more complicated, the EEAS and the conditions that would govern it became, even before its existence, the subject of a bitter power struggle between the European Parliament and the Member States. It took months of armwrestling before the Parliament negotiators forged a solution accepted by all sides in a showdown night two years ago in Madrid. So rather than conceiving the Service from scratch as would have been most useful and functional, it had to be established on the basis of constraints imposed by the Parliament and Member States and serving their interests but not necessarily those of the EEAS. In the end, the Parliament played its hand to the full and managed to secure more oversight and influence over the EEAS than had originally been foreseen; Elmar Brok, one of the key European Parliament figures in those negotiations, played a crucial role in that.

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The structure There is another factor that made for a less than optimal outcome when it comes to the structure of the EEAS. The task of setting up the EEAS was put into hands of people who arguably may not have been the most qualified in terms of their career records to fulfil that job. More worrying still as it looks now, is that this was not a one-time event but rather is an ongoing

The European Union

ion Service – between a rock and a hard place?

e (ESRT), Brussels

pattern. It is a pity that while there is a substantial number of highly qualified people who are trying to do their best every day, the lack of an efficient structure renders such efforts less valuable than they could be, which is a major source of frustration. The frequent changes in the EEAS organisation chart also indicate a certain lack of a chartered path in the establishment of the EEAS. A closer look shows that, when it comes down to it, the EEAS consists of the Council’s old crisis-management structures and something that bears a lot of resemblance to the old DG Relex. This seems to be a missed opportunity for creating genuinely new structures in order to generate synergies and avoid duplication and friction. One may also wonder whether it would not make more sense in terms of efficiency, for Agostino Miozzo, for example, who is responsible for crisis response, to be part of the crisis-management structures. All in all, taking the analyses of the organisation chart and performance together, one gets the strong feeling that the whole EEAS structure is too people-oriented and too little oriented to issue areas.

It must also be stressed that the EEAS does not have an operational budget at its disposal. The money sits with the Foreign Policy Instrument Service, which has been placed under the High Representative but is part of the European Commission, which is certainly an odd structure that is difficult to understand to say the least. More importantly, it puts it under pressure from several sides that would rather see the financial services integrated into their own structures.

A chance All of the abovementioned matters may or may not be addressed over time, but they are probably manageable. Even if they are not properly addressed they do not make the EEAS dysfunctional. We are now entering a period when more and more studies and assessments of the first phase of the EEAS will

Christoph Raab Christoph Raab was born on 18 April 1974 in Karlsruhe.

He obtained his degree in Economics at the University of Trier. He holds a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (Natolin) and is a trained journalist. From 2002-2005, Mr Raab was Personal Assistant to Karl von Wogau MEP in the European Parliament. In November 2005, he founded COPURA, an event management, consulting and communications company that specialises in European affairs with a focus on issues of security, defence and research policy. In 2009, he transformed the European Security Round Table (ESRT) into a full-fledged, neutral event platform on EU security and defence issues. Since then, it has established itself as a key Brussels discussion forum for current and future topics in the field of European security and defence policies. He is a regular contributor on EU-Institutions issues for “The European − Security and Defence Union”.

be published. An internal assessment of the Service’s performance is also coming up on the agenda. This will be an opportunity to correct some of the glitches of the beginning.

There is, however, one other aspect that raises deeper issues: National foreign services have certain security cultures that give them the wherewithal to stand up for the interests of their respective countries. The European Union is not a state, but this does not mean that it does not have interests that need to be formulated and defended in the international arena. Currently, it seems that the Member States are somewhat uneasy about the character of the EEAS in this regard. Between national security cultures and the culture of the European Commission, there is probably no easy answer as to what kind of culture the EEAS should acquire over time. It would seem that this question has to be answered in the wider context of the debate on where the European Union is headed for.

13 Volume No

Independen

2011 for Citizenship, European Award Winner of the & Defence − European Security t Review on

Defence Security and

The magazine for European Security

ISSN 2192-6921

November edition No 14 /3 – 2012 Main Topic Forces development in the EU and NATO

Jones

in Security

th

28 Croatia – the State EU-Member

Foreign Minister for Dr Vesna Pusić, Affairs, Zagreb and European

Photo: U.S.

Air Force photo

by Christine

gh to werful enou Is Europe po conflicts? master armed

Global Player

• The EU and Russia • The EU Security and Research Policy • The EU Common Security and Defence Market • Naval power and crisis management

Release date: November 10th 2012

Deadline for advertisem ents: October 15th 2012

ic For a more dynam e and safer EuropMinister, Villy Søvndal, Kopenhagen

Foreign

Edition 2/2012

Further Information about the magazine: www.magazine-the-european.com

15

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Doubts about the reliability of allies and plea for deeper cooperation

EU Defence Policy on a post-Sarkozy continent

by Robert Walter MP, London

France’s rejoining of NATO’s military structures in 2009 under Nicolas Sarkozy was in my view a step in the right direction for European Defence and Security co-operation. However, now that he has been replaced by the Socialist François Hollande, will this practice continue?

President Sarkozy’s decision to opt back in to the NATO military structures after France’s withdrawal in 1966 under General Charles de Gaulle was ultimately vindicated following the war in Libya. France and Britain assumed the role of leadership with America playing more of a supporting role.

With President Obama’s foreign policy appearing to be more and more wary of global leadership, it is likely in future to fall to Europe to lead and defend itself.

As Philip Hammond, the British Defence Secretary pointed out in his speech to the British Embassy in Berlin, the United States has shifted its strategic posture to meet the challenges posed by the emergence of China as a world power. In Ham-

16

mond’s words, this now means that “we, the nations of Europe, must take on more responsibility for our own back yard.”

However, with British defence capabilities lessened by the cuts outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, Germany’s leadership left in question after abstaining over Libya and now with the French President’s promise at the NATO summit in Chicago this week to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2012, are the three biggest military powers in Europe still up to the job? Whether they are or not, they are going to have to be.

Cooperation to answer transnational threats The threats posed to European and global security are increasingly transnational in nature. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union over 20 years ago there is no great state with which we sit at the edge of the abyss that is state vs. state war. Conflicts in the near future are likely to be so-called ‘low-intensity’

The European Union

conflicts involving protracted counterinsurgency, active assistance in state-building and cross-border cooperation. The enemies of Europe do not stop at frontiers and there is no reason that the efforts to thwart them should do so either.

The Anglo-French Security and Defence Co-Operation Treaty, signed on 2nd November 2010 was, at first, an encouraging sign of defence co-operation. However it may now already be in jeopardy. The first problem with the operation of the treaty is political will, something that there was much more of between Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy than there is now between Prime Minister Cameron and President Hollande.

Mr. Hollande has outlined his plans to back an “EU army” on the one hand, whilst also establishing an aggressive position in his relationship with the United Kingdom, the nation with the fourth highest defence budget in the world. The second problem is a technological one. With the British Ministry of Defence’s recent announcement that it will now be purchasing the F-35B Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter and will no longer be fitting catapults and arrestors to its new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier, it will no longer be possible for France to operate its aircraft off British carriers.

45% of the defence budget and 50% of the military capacity of the entire EU is provided by France and the United Kingdom. If military co-operation between these great nations cannot be achieved and maintained effectively then what hope is there for a common European defence effort at all?

French-British co-operation must become reality So, what must be done to improve co-operation? Firstly, the political will must be restored to continue co-operation between France and the United Kingdom, to ensure that the terms and the intentions behind the Treaty signed in 2010 are upheld. The politics within and between these countries must not be allowed to jeopardise or hamper co-operative defence.

Both the President and the Prime Minister need to maintain the good relations Britain and France had previously on defence co-operation, even when they were on different sides of a political debate.

Secondly, the technological issue must be addressed. It is necessary for both the United Kingdom and France to be able to operate aircraft off each other’s aircraft carriers. Whilst we must look at this issue through the far from rose-tinted lens of our current economic situation, without security economic growth is a hollow objective. The decision to abandon the installation of catapults and arrestors on the new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers was taken partly in light of the fact that they could not be delivered until 2023 at the earliest, leaving the United Kingdom without a carrier-strike capability for an unacceptable length of time. One solution would be to build one aircraft carrier without catapults and arrestors, likely to be delivered by 2018 and to build another with them, to be

Robert Walter MP Robert Walter MP has been British Member of Parliament since 1997. He also serves as Chairman of the European Democrat Group and Vice President, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Born in 1948, he graduated in 1971 from the University of Aston in Birmingham.

Before he entered the House of Commons, he was an international banker and farmer. Mr Walter was President of the European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU in Paris from December 2003 until June 2011. In 2011 he was elected President of the European Security and Defence Association (EASD).

delivered later. This ensures the long-term possibility of cooperation without jeopardising the short-term defencibility of the United Kingdom.

President Hollande – a less cooperative approach?

We do not want to create a Fortress Europe and implement a new isolationism which shuns our allies beyond the continent.

This, if anything, would undermine European security goals.

Nicolas Sarkozy understood this, which is presumably why he chose to re-engage with the NATO military structures, at the same time pushing for greater unity of policy within the European Union. Germany has a key role to play here. With one of the best equipped and best trained militaries, she should be fully engaged in this project.

Unfortunately, at this critical time, President Hollande appears to be signalling a neo-Gaullist approach to foreign affairs. He has adopted an adversarial posture towards the United Kingdom, France’s erstwhile closest military partner; his intention to withdraw from Afghanistan early would seem to indicate a less co-operative approach with NATO and his call for a European army would suggest that he does not take Sarkozy’s position on defence affairs.

Europe has to champion its values abroad To conclude, with America more concentrated on Asia and less focused on world leadership, it is time for Europe to come into its own and champion its values abroad, particularly on its own door-step in the Middle East and North Africa. The shape that this will take depends on the approaches taken by President Hollande as the new leader of the militarily crucial France.

We have proven ourselves more than capable of operating effectively within the NATO structure in Libya. President Hollande should maintain the healthy military co-operation between France and the United Kingdom established under President Sarkozy, and also capitalise on the nascient Weimar Triangle of France, Germany and Poland. Recent experiences in Libya show us that multi-lateral co-operation works very well and presents a real milestone on the road to structured cooperation in Europe.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Deficient parliamentary scrutiny at European Level

Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany

by Dr Delphine Deschaux-Beaume*, Associated research fellow at PACTE, Grenoble

The use of armed force and its political legitimation are handled differently in each EU Member State. So far the Common Security and Defence Policy has been unable to bring about greater convergence among parliamentary practices. The ideological and practical differences among the national parliaments when it comes to conferring legitimacy on military operations remain substantial. Yet those missions have become crucial for the credibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy. That being the case, a comparison of the respective roles of the German and French Parliaments in the field of European defence policy should allow a better understanding of the challenges confronting this policy area in the field of democratic scrutiny.

Parliamentary scrutiny of defence in Germany...

There is a traditional relationship between the State and the armed forces in France, while in Germany the approach is more pragmatic; there, in accordance with ideological principles, the army is placed under the highest democratic authority, the Bundestag. Since 1945 Germany has acquired contradictory constitutional provisions that restrict the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO territory.

Contradictory constitutional provisions Indeed, Article 87a of the German Constitution requires constitutional authorisation for the deployment of Germany’s armed forces outside the national territory, while Article 24 asserts Germany’s responsibility in the area of collective security, including in the case of external interventions.

Those conflicting articles are put to the test when it comes to

the resolution of regional conflicts: military operations conducted within the framework of European defence policy clearly extend beyond the borders of NATO territory. Against the backdrop of intensive debate in the German Parliament between the Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats, the German Federal Constitutional Court finally ruled in 1994 that the participation of German soldiers in out-of-area military missions conducted under a UN mandate is consistent with Germany’s 1949 Basic Law, even when those missions entail the use of force.

A binding instrument for parliamentary scrutiny Every deployment of German armed forces in an external operation, be it military or civilian, must be approved by the Bundestag by a simple majority (Article 87a). Through the organisation of parliamentary debates on defence matters as well as by making use of its right to establish at any time a committee of inquiry in order to question the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, the Standing Committee on Defence exercises effective scrutiny over the government in this area. Furthermore, the Bundestag elects a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (Wehrbeauftragter), whose task is to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary oversight. Moreover the Wehrbeauftragter represents the German armed forces in the Bundestag, giving them a direct link with Parliament. In France no such system exists. In addition, as in all European democracies, the Bundestag must approve the defence budget as part of the Federal budget.

… and France In France the army holds a special position within the state through its link with the supreme political authority: the President of the Republic (while in Germany the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is the Federal Minister of Defence).

French President François Hollande is the new Chief of the French Armed Forces.

Source: Council of the European Union

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A minimum of parliamentary scrutiny In the event of recourse to the use of armed force, parliamentary scrutiny in France is in no way comparable to that which exists under the German system. Only the Chairman of the Assemblée nationale’s Defence Committee and a few members of his office are entitled to more substantive information. It is true that Parliament votes the financial acts that determine in particular the defence budget and the five-year military programming law. Thus, until the constitutional reform of July

The European Union

The sober plenary chamber of the Bundestag (rebuilt in the 1990’s) and the splendid Assemblée Nationale (used as such since the 1830). These two chambers with their different traditions and practices exert a different degree of influence on national and on European security and defence policy.

Source: © Deutscher Bundestag, Marc-Steffen Unger, cc Richard Ying/LePost.frt

2008, the only military act requiring authorisation by Parliament was a declaration of war. New Article 35 of the Constitution, however, aims at making a vote by Parliament on military operations the normal procedure. The first historic vote took place on 21 September 2008 on the occasion of the decision to extend the French armed forces’ mandate in Afghanistan.

National parliamentary practices and the CSDP The reason for the problems posed by the democratic scrutiny of the Common Security and Defence Policy is the lack of a European security identity. This shortcoming is reflected in the diversity of procedures for the parliamentary scrutiny of defence questions at national level, scrutiny that ideally should be backed by a system of oversight at European level, which for the moment remains largely to be developed.

The Bundestag – an important actor in CSDP The German Government tends to be strict in its compliance with the procedures foreseen by the Basic Law for the parliamentary scrutiny of external operations, whether these are conducted in the framework of the CSDP, the UN or NATO. For a long time Germany’s politico-military players contented themselves with the image that Germany had established for itself as a civilian power, in particular as of 1998, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder defined security in terms of peace policy (Friedenspolitik). While Germany has understood the importance of gaining visibility and power at international level, which European defence policy enables it to do, it must consider one major factor that barely exists in France: the pressure of public opinion. Much more than in France, the cooperative federal system facilitates a direct link between the Bundestag and German citizens, with the result that parliamentary scrutiny over the government is much more stringent than it is in France’s semi-presidential system. Moreover, German public opinion remains relatively wary about the participation of

German troops in combat missions2: in 2005, 43% of respondents took the view that Germany should focus on its own problems and refrain from intervening in other nations’ crises, while 34% were in favour of active engagement by Germany in resolving crises in third countries.

Since the Bundestag must approve all Bundeswehr deployments and determine the operational mandates in detail, its decisions are a crucial factor in European military operations.

The intensive parliamentary debate that preceded the launch of the EUFOR mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in spring 2006 clearly showed that it takes a long learning process in order to establish the link between the Common Security and Defence Policy and parliamentary oversight. On 17 May 2006, 440 Members of the Bundestag approved the deployment of 780 German soldiers in Kinshasa; there were 135 votes against and six abstentions, predominantly among the members of the Green Party, the Liberals and the SPD. Notwithstanding the importance of intensive debate on such a subject, this constitutes a major caveat with regard to the immediate response, often necessary in the context of the CSDP. The question is how the requirement for democratic scrutiny of the CSDP can be reconciled with an effective rapid response.

A tenuous role for the French Parliament in the area of CSDP Although Article 88.3 gives the National Assembly the right to examine questions pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in practice, for each military operation, the Government has made a case for the need to use urgent procedures in order to be able to deploy troops rapidly without any parliamentary debate. The pre-eminent role of the French President in military affairs makes this possible. Parliament’s role is made even more tenuous by the broad consensus that exists on defence questions in France, in contrast to Germany where the Greens have been particularly active in keeping the debate on that topic alive. In France, since the 1980’s and

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

François Mitterrand’s support for a foreign policy in line with the Gaullist, defence in France has been the subject of a national consensus based on several fundamental principles: nuclear deterrence, building a European defence, participation in international military operations, strategic autonomy. National defence remains the preserve of the French President: it is he who decides, on the advice of the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces in the framework of a restricted council on defence, on the deployment of troops abroad.

Deficient parliamentary scrutiny at European level The role of the European Parliament, EP which could provide a bridge with the national parliaments in the field of European defence policy, is reduced to a minimum. No significant role in the field of CSDP has been assigned to it de jure: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) makes provision solely for the EP to be consulted and informed about defence in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in connection with matters pertaining to the common budget (Article J7.V). In addition the EP may put questions to the Council and present opinions on developments within the CSDP (Article 21 TEU). However, the EP has no means of influencing the decision-making process in the run-up to a new European military mission – it is neither required to give its prior approval nor has it the right to be consulted – given the intergovernmental (as opposed to supranational) character of European defence policy. A further major shortcoming of the EP is its lack of powers of scrutiny over member states’ military expenditure for CSDP missions and over the common costs arising as a result of intergovernmental arrangements: here again. The EP merely has the right to be informed by the Council about the expenditure incurred as a result of such common costs. Basically, the difficulty of reconciling the need for parliamentary scrutiny at national and European level over defence issues with the existence of the CSDP is due mainly to the strictly intergovernmental nature of this policy area. This question of parliamentary oversight over the CSDP is starting to arise in connection with the traditional debate between the advocates of federalism, on the one hand, and those who favour an intergovernmental approach to European integration, on the other. For the moment, the European Parliament – the very symbol of democracy at supranational level – is only a minor player in the Common Security and Defence Policy.

But reading between the lines, it is obvious that the fundamental problem facing European security and defence policy is that it involves nations with very different relationships between Parliament and the armed forces. In truth, the crux of the problem is one of national sovereignty and the need for nations to delegate portions of that sovereignty for the purpose of a common European defence. * Delphine Deschaux-Beaume is a Doctor of Political Sciences. She is Associate Research Fellow at PACTE (IEP – Institute of Political Studies – Grenoble), and teaches at the IEP in Grenoble. She is also in charge of research within the NGO Ecole de la Paix (School for Peace).

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The principle of pooling and sharing is not new – but it is

“Pooling and Sharing” mus

by Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.), Berlin In Europe, for many years defence budgets have been sapped by the avid cashing-in of the post-Cold War “peace dividend”, by the priority of social spending and by the absence of a threat perception – until the next ugly surprise? Now, because of the financial and economic crisis, NATO and EU member states drastically shrink their expenditure and forces for the sake of debt reduction (which a former German Defence Minister even elevated to “the highest strategic parameter”).

Not a panacea, but urgent Is “pooling and sharing” of military capabilities a panacea for dwindling resources? The European Union, in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is pushing this concept, and NATO, in the same vein, has proclaimed “smart defence” - following the Defence Capabilities Initiative (Washington 1999) and similar efforts at Prague 2002, Istanbul 2004 and Lisbon 2010.

“More bang for the buck” is the motto – putting scarce resources to better use, setting priorities, avoiding duplication and pursuing multinational solutions. “Pooling” means the common use of national capabilities (like in the European Air Transport Command), while “sharing” refers to using the capabilities of allies (example: the integrated air defence of Europe during the Cold War). Even more integrated are “common assets” such as NATO’s AWACS fleet. “Specialization”, i.e. the concentration of smaller nations on “niche capabilities”, also belongs in this context.

As the examples show, the principle of “pooling and sharing” (P&S) is not new. But it is becoming more urgent with the money-driven reductions of the armed forces of many European countries, which threatens to erode NATO’s “European Pillar” and the EU’s capacity to act militarily. Yet, “burden-sharing” appears ever more imperative with the U.S.’ turn to the Pacific and European nations having to shoulder greater responsibility for the security of their continent and its periphery. The Libya operation demonstrated significant shortfalls.

Difficulties Political momentum for the EU’s effort was generated by the 2010 “Ghent Initiative”. The survey among member nations about which capabilities might be eligible for pooling and sharing and subsequent discussions had, however, a non-spectacular outcome. This reveals the difficulties: Larger nations want to retain the full spectrum of military capabilities (land, air, sea), and with defence the sovereignty issue comes up quickly.

Also, there is not general trust in the assured availability of pooled or shared assets in case an ally differs with others about

The European Union

s becoming urgent

st be pragmatic and conceptual

At the Strasbourg/Kehl summit in 2009, the Heads of States and Governments asked the Secretary General to elaborate with the member nations a new strategic concept and to be submitted at the Lisbon summit 2010.

The review at the 2011 Chicago ended in a convincing plea for a substantial EU-NATO-Cooperation.

Photo: www.nato.int

a planned mission. (The withdrawal of German personnel from the AWACS fleet in the Libyan context was ominous.) Further difficulties arise from armaments industrial competition, different national views about whether the P&S effort should be preferably pursued in the EU or in NATO, the lack of concertation between the two, and the diminution, by many, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to an “armaments agency”.

Pragmatic and conceptual Moreover, is pragmatic development of individual initiatives (“bottom up”) or a conceptual approach (“top down”) preferable? The answer is: both! Individual projects such as air-to-air refueling capabilities on which EU Defence Ministers recently made a “political declaration” (March 2012) can encourage the process and increase the thrust; and other fields identified so far include helicopter training, maritime surveillance networking, military satellite communications, medical field hospitals, pilot training, smart munitions, naval logistics and training. It will be essential to move to increasingly important areas and to have more key member states participate.

But in the longer termn only a concept of capability development on a European scale will yield the desired results. Although in the EU “communitarization” of defence is still far away, jointly developing a model of future European armed forces could provide orientation. The way in which the UK, Germany and France went about their recent resp. current defence reform is an example of missed opportunities for coordination.

What needs to be done What is required? To develop promising initiatives in non-controversial areas; at the same time to think about future European armed forces in a very concrete fashion regarding task and role sharing; to conduct capability development from such a conceptual vantage point and not merely motivate P&S with financial constraints; to develop trust among Member States about assured availability of capabilities; to think more about “common assets”; and to harmonize the parallel efforts of NATO and EU.

Klaus Wittmann Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.) was born in Lübecki in 1946 is Senior Fellow at the Aspen Institute Germany.

In 2008 his 42 year career in the German Bundeswehr came to an end. It included troop command, academic phases (university studies in history and political science as well as a year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), political-military work in the German Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headquarters, and positions in higher military education. His last assignment was that of Director of Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defence College, Rome).

In September 2009 Dr Klaus Wittmann published “Towards a new Strategic Concept for NATO” (Forum Paper 10, Rome) and in September 2010 he presented “NATO’s new Strategic Concept. An Illustrative Draft” (http://www.natowatch. org/node/400).

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European Population is relatively unconcerned about security

The lack of will to be a greater power

by Christoph Nick, Journalist, Brussels Since 2008 at the latest, crisis has become the most familiar word in politics: financial crisis, economic crisis, Greek debt crisis, euro crisis, NATO in crisis, etc. Nowhere in the western world in general and in Europe in particular are politicians and people talking first and foremost about solutions, challenges and opportunities. It is significant that name coined for the fundamental political crisis in the Arab states, which runs much deeper than Europe’s various crises, is one that expresses hope: the Arab spring. It is too easy to say that in the Arab countries the young generation is standing up against old dictatorships and that an ageing European population is not ready to cope with future challenges. What really makes the difference is the fact that the Arabs have a vision of the future, be it modern democracy or Islamist fundamentalism, and that the Europeans only have a vision of the past.

Europe needs more common sense 2012 is the fourth year of the most severe economic crisis since 1929. Compare 2012 to 1933 and you know that we are doing not too badly. But, we are not doing well either. The very diverse problems facing the Europeans have one thing in common: the best solution lies in more supranational cooperation and in giving up more of one’s national sovereignty.

What is true for the economy is also true for the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. European integration has reached a crucial point. Either nations or people go further towards the long proposed ever closer union – a United States of Europe – or the European Union will fall back on more intergovernmentalism, a proven means for not solving the existing problems.

The trouble is that nobody apart from enthusiasts wants a United States of Europe. Timothy Garton Ash, the renowned British historian, stated in 2011 in an interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel that Europeans are still doing too well to be ready for more radical steps. Almost a year ago

Christoph Nick Christoph Nick, born 1958 in Duisburg is a freelance journalist in Brussels, Belgium. He studied History and English and French literature at Heidelberg University and has been working for over two decades for Germany’s Green Party, in the Bundestag in Berlin and the European Parliament in Brussels. In the 1980s he was Director of a development project in Chad.

22

outgoing US Defense Secretary Robert Gates deplored Europe’s demilitarisation and Europeans’ unwillingness and incapacity to defend themselves.

The recent threat, in Soviet style, of Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov to, maybe, attack NATO missile defence installations in the European Union once put in place went largely unnoticed or was not taken seriously. The Russian criticism of NATO missile defence boils down to the fact that Russia wants to be completely unhindered in her capacity to eradicate Europe with her strategic missiles. Europeans do not even dare to discuss this in public. George Friedman, founder and CEO of STRATFOR, predicts in his book “The Next 100 Years”, published in 2009, that Russia will try to expand westwards again and that the Baltic States will be the first victims.

The dilemma faced by the French and British in 1939 – whether or not die for Poland – and their negative answer before they themselves were attacked a year later might have inspired Friedman.

Time for Europeans to decide their future The Second World War was the aftermath of an economic crisis. Politics gave the wrong answers after 1929, and not only in Germany. The Europeans might miss their chance this time as well. In 1950, Robert Schuman was ready to give up France’s sovereignty over her coal and steel resources in order to prevent Germany from regaining hers. In the fifties coal and steel were seen as decisive for winning wars. Today, pooling economic sovereignty would be a smart answer to the European debt crisis and creating a truly European army would lead to a smart defence that can practise what it preaches. Strong national interests are working against these two obvious solutions. The British are not willing to give up what they already lost decades ago, the French believe that they are being truly European when fighting for their own interests and the Germans have delved so much into the 12 dark years that they are not willing to give up Parliament’s right of say over the use of German soldiers to an institution that they cannot control entirely.

The European Union is not ready to cope with the multiple crises it faces. No head of state or foreign minister is painting a bright European future for the Europeans by proposing to create political union and a common army now. When they are ready to go for it, it may be too late. Europe is lacking the will to decide its own destiny.

The European Union

European forces would bring no added value to security and defence

The EU’s CSDP is a misguided irrelevance A commentary by Geoffrey van Orden MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg You cannot get closer to the bone of national sovereignty than defence, and the European Union has regarded fulfilment of its ambitions in this field as a major political objective. As part of an increasingly federal union where the EU acquires more and more of the attributes of an integrated state called ‘Europe’, then of course it would want it to have its own currency, fiscal policy, diplomatic service and, ultimately, military capability.

The aspiration for the creation of a ‘European army’ is rarely expressed in such blunt form. Yet if this is not the goal, why does the EU want an operational planning HQ and a commitment to “deploy 60,000 men in 60 days”? Why is it so keen to stick the EU badge on a succession of military operations?

What justification is there for the panoply of EU structures to control these operations? Why is there a European Defence Agency and such an effort to create an EU defence industry and an EU defence procurement market? And why do we have a virtual European Defence College to promote an EU defence culture?

Geoffrey Van Orden MEP Geoffrey Van Orden has been Conservative MEP for the East of England since 1999. His last military appointment, as a Brigadier (BrigadierGeneral), was at NATO HQ. He spent many years in Germany, including five in Berlin where in 1989 he was Chief of Staff and Chief G2 of the British Sector. He attended the Indian DefenceServices Staff College and was a member of the Directing Staff at the German GeneralStaff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr). He is Conservative Spokesman on Defence & Security Policy, and long-standing member of the Foreign Affairs committee of the European Parliament, and of its Defence & Security sub-committee. He is also a Member of the Parliament’s Delegation to India, to Turkey, and to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He has led opposition to EU involvement in defence.

value, the EU has placed its institutional footprint on an increasing range of defence-related activities, and wastefully duplicated staff and decision-making structures that are all already very well established at NATO.

Duplication of staff and structures Institutionally there have been a plethora of initiatives over the years that have gradually built up the EU’s desired military identity. The UK brake on EU involvement in defence was removed by Mr Blair at St Malo in 1998 when it was formally agreed with France that the EU should develop an autonomous military capability. Since then, while contributing no additional military capabilities or adding any practical

EU battlegroups – just a retitling of existing units Clearly, the ability to recruit, train and deploy personnel is the most critical of requirements of an autonomous military force, and with this in mind the 1999 European Council in Helsinki gave birth to the idea of a 15-brigade EU force of 60,000 troops, sustainable in the field for a year. Of course, these were not additional troops, but the same ones that nations had for national, NATO, UN or other operations. This ridiculous idea didn’t get far at the time - but, as in other sensitive areas of policy, the EU proceeds by small steps, and decided instead to create so-called “EU battlegroups” that have never been deployed on operations and are really just a retitling of already existing units.

EU headquarters vetoed by the UK

British army between traditions and modern warfare

Source: flickr.com/cc by 2.0

In the years that followed, the Nice Treaty saw the creation of an EU Military Committee (replicating the similar body long-established at NATO) that would be served by an EU Military Staff, and the intention of having an operational headquarters (OHQ) with all the associated command and communications capabilities (again duplicating structures at NATO in its SHAPE HQ). The idea of a perma-

23

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

nent EU OHQ was the ‘logical’ next step for Eurocrats, but when it was finally presented to the Foreign Affairs Council in July 2011, the UK Government took a tough line, insisting the EU focuses on more constructive areas of work – and effectively vetoed the proposal. It has since re-emerged in different clothing.

No EU will for a comprehensive approach EU efforts have been both institutional and conceptual. Adept at identifying fresh justifications for its ambitions, the EU now claims some unique amalgam of civil and military capabilities through its ‘comprehensive approach’. This is what generations of soldiers have known as CIMIC or ‘hearts and minds’. Unfortunately, while NATO’s budget is being pared, the EU seems to have largesse to throw around. The reality is that the EU is incapable of getting both parts of the civil-military equation right. Apart from the fact that most of those that inhabit the EU civil sphere, including NGOs, have little understanding of, or taste for, the military, the EU has difficulty coordinating its own activities. At one stage, for example, its civil delegation in Kampala had nothing to do with its Uganda-based military training mission for Somali recruits. In Afghanistan EU personnel sat in offices in different parts of Kabul, rarely communicated with one another and had little coordination with the main effort which was being run by NATO. In European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso’s socalled ‘State of the Union Address’ in September 2010, he declared “[The EU] will not have the weight we need in the world without a common defence policy. I believe now is the moment to address this challenge.” His words confirmed the

British forces in Basra during the 2nd Iraq-War.

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real purpose of CSDP - not to do anything militarily useful but to enhance EU ambitions.

The EU brings no additional military capabilities In Britain, the Coalition Government’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review reluctantly set out the biggest defence cuts since the Cold War. Budget sacrifices included an 8% cut in defence spending by 2014.This bleak picture has been replicated across Europe: most European nations have inflicted major cuts in their defence budgets since 2008. Some naively imagine that the EU will provide a more comprehensive solution – this misses the point about the essential purpose of a nation’s armed forces. It would also entrust the same people that created the Euro with responsibility for our defence.

The fact is, the EU brings no additional military capabilities to the table and takes on no additional European share of the transatlantic defence burden. Instead, European defence ambitions are yet another call on the same diminishing pool of national armed forces, and are a very serious distraction from NATO – the long-established institution which should be the clear and natural focus of international military commitment for Western democracies. The defence and security challenges that confront us today – Afghanistan, international terrorism, piracy – and as yet unknown for the future, are too serious to be playthings for the EU’s political ambitions. CSDP has not added one more bullet, one more gun or aircraft to our military capabilities, nor will it. The whole logic of CSDP – essentially French driven – was removed when France rejoined the integrated military structure of NATO. Libya proved its irrelevance.

The military efforts of the European nations should be concentrated on reinvigorating NATO.

Source: www.defenceimagedatabase.mod.uk © Crown Copyright

Photo: Utenriksdept/flickr

NATO Today’s conflicts are fought with asymmetric means. Against such threats, traditional notions of defence are meaningless. Thus NATO needs to invest in prevention and resilience as well as to bolster its analytical capabilities.

NATO needs a new business model

Crisis management – coping with asymmetric threats

by Ambassador Gábor Iklódy, Assistant Secretary General, NATO, Brussels

The Cold War in Europe was an unnatural state of affairs, but it was an excellent compass. Two alliances faced each other, with roughly similar military potentials. Both sides knew a lot about one another, be it military technology or combat tactics.

And both sides assumed that the other was acting rationally, i.e. that its cost-benefit calculus would lead it to conclude that initiating a major war for the sake of conquering territory was simply not a feasible option. In short, despite different political systems, the military situation between both opponents was largely symmetrical. It were these very symmetries that made deterrence work – to buy time until the social forces did their job and dismantled the unnatural Soviet empire from within.

Traditional notions of defence are meaningless But that was then. Today, with the threats to NATO’s nations more likely to come through a fibre optics cable than through the “Fulda gap”, and with Improvised Explosive Devices having become the main cause of death of our soldiers in

Afghanistan, the situation has fundamentally changed. Today’s conflicts, whether they are fought in the real world or in cyberspace, are fought with asymmetrical means – from the small pirate ships that attack an oil tanker to a cyber attack on a nation’s electricity grid, or a terrorist’s “dirty bomb” that causes the radioactive contamination of large areas. Against such threats, traditional notions of defence are meaningless – and, consequently, so is deterrence.

NATO must effect change in five key areas If NATO is to provide security in these circumstances, it must effect change in five key areas.

A broader understanding of solidarity First, Allies need to develop a broader understanding of solidarity. In the symmetrical situation of the Cold War, an attack against one Ally would have triggered a collective selfdefence mechanism that would have made it next to impossible for any Ally to stand aside. Through NATO’s defence

News: NATO leaders took key decisions in Chicago NATO leaders concluded a decisive summit in Chicago on 21 May, taking key decisions on the Alliance’s future engagement in Afghanistan, military capabilities and worldwide partnerships.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said after the two-day summit: “We

came to Chicago with three goals. And we have met them. We have focused on the future of Afghanistan. We have decided to invest smartly in our defence even in times of austerity. And we have engaged with our partners around the world to address the challenges we all face in the 21st century”. He

added that the decision taken in Chicago “will reinforce the vital bond between North America and Europe and strengthen NATO for the years ahead. “ > All official NATO summit declarations are available at: http://tinyurl.com/bnjrdtg

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

planning and force deployment solidarity was institutionalised. By contrast, many new security challenges affect Allies differently. Countries that suffer a terrorist attack or an energy cut-off will be more alarmed than their more fortunate neighbours, who may think that these problems are not really theirs. However, if the transatlantic community were to fail to understand the new security challenges as collective challenges, the very notion of Alliance would quickly fade away.

NATO would not survive a compartmentalisation of solidarity.

In our interconnected world, a major national vulnerability becomes almost by definition a collective NATO vulnerability.

the issue is cyber defence, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism or energy security. Accordingly, NATO needs to further enhance its ties not only with international actors, above all the European Union, but also with the academic and scientific communities and the private sector. For example, an effective cyber defence without the expertise of major IT companies will remain as elusive as reducing energy vulnerabilities without the advice of the private sector. To put it bluntly: when it comes to meeting asymmetric security challenges, NATO will have to be a team player, or it will be no player at all.

Invest in prevention and resilience Second, NATO must invest more in prevention and resilience.

If asymmetric threats cannot be deterred by the threat of a military response, protection has to be achieved on a different level. For example, new technologies to detect explosives or to trace their origin will gain in importance. The same applies for measures to enhance the resilience of cyber systems or critical energy infrastructure: the key to security lies in the resilience of the infrastructure itself. Redundancies make it possible to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil and gas, the rapid repair of the damaged pipelines can keep the losses within acceptable limits, and the electronic systems in a control centre must be designed in such a way as to ride out even a sophisticated cyber attack. The integration of such measures into NATO’s defence planning process will ensure that prevention and resilience become firmly ingrained in the Alliance’s approach to security.

NATO as a forum for political debate Fourth, NATO Allies must rediscover NATO as a forum for political debate about long-term security developments. At present, many NATO members approach discussions on such security issues only hesitantly, worrying that NATO’s image as a solely military, operations-driven alliance may create the impression among partner countries or the wider public that any such debate was only the precursor to military engagement. However, the true risk for NATO lies in the opposite direction: by refusing to look ahead Allies would condemn themselves to an entirely reactive approach. They would simply miss the opportunity to address the issues in time, to put greater emphasis on prevention and on a pro-active rather than a reactive approach.

Connection between NATO and other security stakeholders Third, NATO needs to be better connected with other security stakeholders of the international community. The nature of today’s security challenges makes NATO’s success increasingly dependent on how well it cooperates with others, whether

Ambassador Gábor Iklódy Ambassador Gábor Iklódy is NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. He joined the Hungarian Foreign Service in 1983 and has devoted a large part of his diplomatic career to Euro-Atlantic integration.

Before taking up his new position at NATO, he worked as Political Director and State Secretary in charge of multilateral issues (2009), with the main focus being on Hungary’s upcoming EU Presidency in the first half of 2011. In the period between 1999 and 2009 he served two four-year terms in Scandinavia as Ambassador, first in Norway (accredited also in Iceland) and later in Sweden. In between the two (2003-2005) he filled the position of Director General for European Political Cooperation in Budapest. In 1996 he headed the Foreign Ministry’s Security Policy and Arms Control Department and later, from 1997 through 1999 its NATO and WEU Department.

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NATO needs to bolster its analytical capabilities Fifth and finally, if NATO wants to become a more effective platform for forward-looking political debate it needs to bolster its own analytical capabilities. Improving NATO’s intelligence sharing mechanisms is one part of such an effort, but it will be equally important to produce analyses that dig deeper into how certain developments affect NATO, and what the Alliance could do to prevent or at least mitigate such developments or their adverse effects. NATO has taken several bold steps in this direction, including by establishing a unique civil-military team that performs such complex strategic assessments. Ultimately, however, this analytical effort will only pay off if Allies muster the political will to use it to improve their collective strategic awareness.

NATO needs a new business model Coping with asymmetric threats requires NATO to adopt a new “business model”. Rather than relying on military power alone, NATO will need to develop a holistic approach to security with a greater emphasis on strategic awareness, prevention, enhanced resilience, cooperation with other countries and organisations, and forward-looking political debate. This is a tall order. However, in the years ahead NATO’s relevance will be ever more closely tied to its success in tackling asymmetric challenges. If NATO wants to remain an effective crisis manager, it must continue to adapt.

NATO

Documentation Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan Issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Declaration (excerpts) “We, the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew our firm commitment to a sovereign, secure and democratic Afghanistan.

In line with the strategy which we agreed at the Lisbon Summit, ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafter Afghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period.

In Lisbon, in November 2010, we decided on the phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibility for their own security. (…)

The third wave of provinces to enter the transition process was announced by President Karzai on 13 May 2012. This means that 75% of Afghanistan’s population will soon be living in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid-2013, all parts of Afghanistan will have begun transition and the Afghan forces will be

in the lead for security nationwide. This will mark an important milestone in the Lisbon roadmap. ISAF is gradually and responsibly drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014. (…)

The completion of transition, however, will not mean the end of the International Community’s commitment to Afghanistan’s stability and development. Afghanistan and NATO reaffirm their commitment to further develop the NATOAfghanistan Enduring Partnership signed at Lisbon in 2010 in all its dimensions, up to 2014 and beyond, including through joint programmes to build capacity such as the Building Integrity Initiative. (…)

NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a different nature to the current ISAF mission. We agree to work towards establishing such a new NATO-led mission. We will ensure that the new mission has a sound legal basis, such as a United Nations Security Council Resolution. (…)”

NATO

NATO finds itself in the precarious situation of having to justify the firm withdrawal date

The credibility of NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan’s future

by General (ret) Harald Kujat*, Berlin

At the summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government on 20 and 21 May in Chicago, Afghanistan was at the top of the agenda. It was important to show unity. The end 2014 date for the withdrawal of the ISAF contingent was confirmed, although some Alliance partners have already started drawing down their troops and newly-elected French President François Hollande was not willing to forgo his election promise and to stick it out together with his allies until the joint withdrawal.

Indeed it is questionable whether the security situation at the end of 2014 will look very different from that which prevails today. In military terms, thanks to its regional successes and the wait-and-see attitude adopted by the Taliban, NATO has achieved an uneasy stalemate. This is why it is necessary to keep training the Afghan security forces beyond 2014. And this is also why the NATO Secretary General made every effort at the Chicago summit to secure the necessary funding – an annual sum of US$ 4.1 billion – from NATO member states and other sponsors. At the same time the member states were asked to undertake to supply the staff for the NATO training mission. But whether the provision of training and funding for the Afghan security forces will be enough in order to lead Afghanistan towards a secure future is doubtful, especially when one considers that it is not the numbers of security forces that are decisive, but rather their professionalism and reliability.

NATO finds itself in the precarious situation of having to justify the firm withdrawal date by pointing to constant improvements in the security situation. Yet it is a sign of the Taliban’s strength that it is they who decide whether, when and with whom to negotiate. The spectacular action with which they draw attention to themselves from time to time is first and foremost a signal to the Afghan population, among which they evidently still find support for their attacks. The negotiations with the Taliban, notwithstanding their importance, also show that NATO is now going to have to allow the Taliban to play an influential part in shaping the country’s future.

What the future holds in store for Afghanistan will depend above all on progress in the civilian sector. So far the efforts to establish a stable and democratic system of government, a viable economy freed from drugs production and rampant corruption, a countrywide legal and judicial system and a reliable and law-abiding police have not succeeded. Thus for

the moment one cannot rule out the possibility that the Taliban will again seize power once NATO has left.

But after spending 10 years in Afghanistan engaged in what has been its most difficult operation, one that has cost dearly in civilian and soldiers’ lives, NATO cannot simply buy its way out of its responsibility for the country by offering a training mission and funding for the Afghan security forces. What is needed is a transition strategy that defines the means and objectives for ensuring that the country can enjoy a secure future in a region of lasting stability. Should it really prove to be possible to negotiate a modus vivendi with the Taliban, such a transition strategy would also be a confidence-building tool. Unfortunately the Heads of State and Government were unable to come up with even the beginnings of such a strategy.

The United States will in any case, if only in order to protect its geostrategic interests, continue to show a strong military presence in Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan is at the heart of a key geostrategic region in which the regional and global powers have overlapping security and economic interests. Therefore lasting sovereignty and stability for Afghanistan would only be possible if the neighbouring states and regional powers, including Iran and India, were to come together within a system of regional security and stability, for Afghanistan’s stability is threatened not only from within, but also from without. This should form the core of a transition strategy that must also be supported by Russia, for it is in the security interests of both: Russia is worried that after NATO’s withdrawal the Taliban could infiltrate the central Asian countries and might even threaten Russia’s security. This is why it also important from the Russian point of view that NATO should avoid making the same mistake as in 1989, when the US withdrew from the region following the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.

The Heads of State and Government would therefore have been well advised to leave the haggling about staff and funding for the training mission to their ministers and to concentrate on the more fitting task for a summit of demonstrating their far-sightedness in the field of security policy and their geostrategic skills by adopting a forward-looking and realistic transition strategy for Afghanistan.

*Harald Kujat, is a former Chief of Defence (CHOD), Federal Armed Forces, Berlin and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Brussels

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European Defence Conference 9 and 10 October 2012, Dorint Hotel Don Giovanni, Prague (CZ)

Tuesday 9 October 2012 Plenary sessions / 10:30 Coffee break / 13:00 Luncheon

08:30 – 10:30

Welcome and opening Mr. Jiri Sedivy, First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic (invited) NATO Smart Defence: Options for industrial cooperation Mr. Ernest J. Herold, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment Europe’s role in NATO Smart Defence – cooperation between NATO and EU Mr. Krzysztof Lisek, European Parliament – Vice chairman subcommittee on Defence & Security (SEDE) Security and Defence Industry: Meeting Future Challenges Dr. Paul Weissenberg, Deputy Director General – EU Directorate General Enterprise and Industry 11:00 – 13:00 Track 1: Strategies for Cooperation Panel discussion: Long-term defence cooperation Benefits and challenges of interdependency: Weimar Triangle, Visegrad 4, Smart R&T cooperation, Strategic Airlift Command, Major OCCAR projects Chairman: Mr. Hartmut Bühl, editor in chief of “The European“ Speakers: Mr. Ivan Dvoř ák, MoD CZ, Visegrad 4 Ir. Jelle Keuning - NL MoD, Smart R&T cooperation Maj.Gen Jochen Both, EATC (inv.), Strategic Airlift Mr. Eric Huybrechts, OCCAR-EA, Major projects 14:00 – 14:45

Track 2: technologies for the future Snap-shot and poster session: R&T project results Multiple projects in 10 minute presentations followed by poster presentations and discussion at exhibition Chairman: Mr. Pavel Černý, CZ MoD Deputy NAD Several speakers: Register your abstract on-line at www.defenceconference.eu

Plenary sessions

Dependencies in Europe on technology and capabilities Mr. Christian Bréant, Director R&T of the European Defence Agency (EDA) 15:00 – 17:00 Track 1: Strategies for Cooperation Debate session: Regional cooperation Regional cooperation could help solve European challenges.

Industries and governments to foster regional initiatives.

Examples Benelux, NORDIC, Bulgarian

Track 2: technologies for the future Panel discussion: Major technological challenges Capability shortfalls in the Military (EDA), Space (ESA) and Security (EC) domain that need technological breakthroughs or advanced research

Conference reception, Posters at exhibition

Wednesday 10 October 2012 Plenary sessions / 10:30 Coffee break / 12:45 Luncheon

09:00 – 10:30

Economic aspects and financing of defence technology and capability development Mr. Rudolf Sharping (invited) Challenges of SMART Defence and P&S to industry and industry policy Industry speakers 10:45 – 12:45

Track 1: Strategies for Cooperation

Track 2: technologies for the future

Debate session: Human aspects of cooperation Human behaviour, friendships, mutual trust, inter cultural recognition and other informal elements are critical to the success of cooperation.

Introduction: Dr. Peter Essens, TNO-NL Debate coordination: Dr. Sadhbh McCarthy and moderator team

Snap-shot and poster session: Cooperative project proposals Multiple projects in short presentations followed by poster presentations and discussion at exhibition. Promoting ideas for R&D in the style of Eurofinder.

Chairman: Mr. Jelle Keuning, NL MoD Director R&T Several speakers: Register your abstract on-line at www.defenceconference.eu

13:45 – 15:45 Track 1: Strategies for Cooperation Debate session: PPP options for SMART defence Alternate financing options to resolve capability shortfalls. Based on concrete list derived from the Continued Capability Watch Study Introduction: Mr. Maarten Stikkelorum and SWP Debate coordination: Dr. Sadhbh McCarthy and moderator team

Track 2: technologies for the future

16:00 – 16:30:

Lecture session: Cooperation in action EDA – JIP programmes; EC demonstration programmes NATO capability challenges

Plenary session

Closing session and Wrap-Up For up-to-date information on speakers, registration and exhibition please visit www.defenceconference.eu.

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NATO

It is the lack of political will that consignes long-term strategic cooperation attempts to failure

Long-term strategic partnerships in defence

by Dr Merle Missoweit, Fraunhofer Institute for Technological Trend Analysis (INT), Euskirchen The European defence community has witnessed a number of attempts to share the financial burden through cooperative development and use of military capabilities. Recent initiatives, namely NATO Smart Defence and its EU counterpart Pooling & Sharing (P&S), were born in light of shrinking national defence budgets within the last decade and gained further importance through the ongoing financial crisis.

Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing – a necessity The lack of political will to accept mutual dependencies often consigned previous long-term strategic cooperation attempts to failure. This time, restriction of Smart Defence and P&S to “political window dressing” or failure, may not be an option.

Without the appropriate commitment to the aforementioned co-operation, Europe’s defence industries could shift their focus to markets abroad thus replacing national European defence investments. Such a development would not only lead to an EU technological dependence on foreign suppliers, but furthermore, eventually to an EU which is lacking a defence based strategic significance on a global scale. Moreover, a loss of technological superiority, caused by the growing gap between Europe’s, on the one side, and emerging economies’ R&D investments, on the other side, can be anticipated1. Thus, as already stated by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, it has to be concluded that “our choice is between Smart Defence and Less Defence. […] if you think that security is money, remember that it is cheaper than insecurity”.

The difficulty to implement those approaches Besides the underwhelming political will to understand that national industry protectionism and putative maintenance of national sovereignty and freedom of decision (that potentially prevents Smart Defence and P&S from becoming effective) will lead to the contrary, i.e. to a loss of both, there is a further constraint to a successful implementation of the two approaches. This is namely a reasonable definition of promising military capability areas for long-term cooperation (acknowledging national and industrial interests and capacities) combined with the development and implementation of an organisational evaluation process of lessons learned in long-term cooperation within, and between, NATO, and the EU/CSDP.

Dr Merle Missoweit Senior researcher fellow at the Fraunhofer INT since 2007. She graduated with a PhD in Biology at the Faculty of Science of Bonn University (Germany). In her current work she focuses on analyses and scientific support regarding strategic aspects of long-term oriented defence research planning, especially in the field of international cooperation projects for the German Federal Ministry of Defence. At EU level she was, in cooperation with the German Government, involved in a number of recent EDA initiatives (Capability Development Plan, European Defence R&T Strategy, and European R&T Quality Impact Assessment) and, on the security side, she is active in the field of research planning for EU level crisis management.

ships in order to derive best and less successful practices as well as lessons identified from those. There are a couple of existing use cases to be analysed: including the Weimar Triangle between France, Germany and Poland, and its ambition to set up a common Battle Group2; the Visegrad 4 Group consisting of Hungary, Check Republic, Slovakia and Poland; but also the joint efforts in the transport aircraft case, the A400M, or in multinational logistics. This analysis should be further complemented by studying some of the unsuccessful long-term cooperation attempts that took place in the R&D area. Analysis of the latter will lead to a better understanding of national industry policy constraints that prevent the implementation of more cost-effective long-term partnerships.

By initiating and supporting the evaluation process outlined above, NATO and the EU (in this case the European Defence Agency, EDA, being best positioned to coordinate the P&S activities), ideally in coordination with OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matiére d`Armement), could contribute to national ambitions to develop long-term partnerships and at the same time bridge the traditional gap between the three organisations, national armaments policies and armaments production.

Following a good start in Warsaw 2011 the EDC 2012 in Prague will continue to foster this coordination and cooperation process among the various national and multinational organisations to achieve smarter cooperation in Europe.

Lessons to learn To that end, it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at: 1. military capability areas that are promising with regard to the formulation of common requirements and to the degree of national protectionism; 2. existing long-term defence partner-

1 Cf. Europe without Defence (November 2011), Chrisian Mölling, German Institute for International and Security Affairs 2 Cf. Weimar Defence Cooperation – Projects to Respond to the European Imperative (November 2011), Marcel Dickow et al., German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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Transatlantic Dimensions of Cyber Security, Washington (Edit/nc) On 1 and 2 May the ESRT organised jointly with the CSIS a major Transatlantic Cyber Security Conference in WashESRT Chairman ington. Keynote speakers were Commissioner Cecilia MalmChristoph Raab with ström, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute and German InteriCommissioner or Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich. Malmström and Lute underCecilia Malmström lined the increasingly intens nature of transatlantic cooperation at the Washington in cyber security. Lute described the difference in the approach cyber security to privacy between Europe and the US as: “Americans want to conference.

Photo: ESRT limit the access of government to their data. Europeans want to control what happens to their data in general once it is out there.” A topic that was intensively discussed was the new focusing on different aspects of cyber security and cyber crime.

European Cyber Crime Centre at Europol, its functioning, the Speakers from the EU and US underlined the importance of interaction with the FBI and perceived and real differences public private partnership for developing a sound protection of between Europe and the US with regard to privacy and data individuals but also nations against cyber attacks. The panelprotection. In addition, there were many comments and queslists expressed clear ideas of what needs to be done and tions on the obstacles and necessary agreements for developagreed on regarding cyber security. The conference was very ing an internationally common understanding of cyber security. successful in hightlighting the commonalities and differences Friedrich proposed for Germany and the US to develop internabetween the US and EU approaches to tional cyber soft law including the right cyber security. The ESRT will continue for states to find out who attacked its Cyber Security series with a Global them. Transatlantic cooperation is Cyber Security Conference in Brussels achieved by a multitude of TransatConferences Reports in early 2013. lantic Working Groups, which are

Conferences Reports

Special aspects of cyber defence, Prague (Edit/hb) On 30 and 31 May, the AFCEA TechNet Europe 2012 was held in conjunction with the AFCEA Czech Chapter’s ITTE 2012 in Prague. Conference Chairman Major General (ret) Klaus-Peter Treche welcomed cyber and ITT professionals from 18 countries all over the world, including representatives of the major European and NATO institutions, think tanks and industries.

Under the Cyber Defence Umbrella, four major topics were discussed: Cyber Active Defence, Cyber Defence in Mobile Computing, Recovering from Cyber Attack and SMART procurement. Addressing an audience of more than 200 persons, the keynote speakers agreed on the growing importance for civil society of the cyber issue and the resulting asymmetric threats.

Jiri Sedivy, the Czech 1st Deputy Minister of Defence, underlined national responsibilities but also the need for well-coordinated cooperation with the EU and NATO. Ioan Pascu, MEP and Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, stressed that the EP supported the efforts to respond effectively to needs, but that procedures within the EU were fragmented. The new EU Cyber Centre at Europol might be conducive to the development of a more centralised EU concept.

1st Deputy Minister J. Sedivy and K.P. Treche, General Manager AFCEA Europe at TechNet 2012 in Prague.

Photo: Pavel Pelikan, Prague

Lt General Kurt Herrmann of NATO CIS Services Agency (NCSA) addressed the need for secured information sharing during NATO- led coalition operations. To meet threats, NATO aimed for the highest level of security in network-enabled operations, an approach that had very successfully proven itself during the ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

General Vlastimil Picek, Head of the Czech Armed Forces, speaking in the presence of AFCEA President Kent Schneider, Fairfax/Virginia, underlined the importance attached by the Czech Government to cyber defence and the formidable work done by the Czech AFCEA Chapter.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

To protect Information and Intellectual Properties a business oriented approach is needed

IT-Security is more than technology Interview with Michael Eberhardt, Vice President and General Manager, Enterprise Services Germany, HP, Böblingen

The European: What is Hewlett Packard’s assessment of ITsecurity over the last 12 months?

Michael Eberhardt: Based on the observations and analysis of our own Labs and research departments 2011 saw a slight decrease of detected vulnerabilities, but also an ongoing increase of attacks.

The European: Does this mean that existing and known vulnerabilities are still offering enough opportunities for cyber based attacks?

Michael Eberhardt: Yes indeed. The Internet is the easiest way to do business, but this opportunity also brings risks with it. In the UK, for example, cybercrime is the third in the top ten list of economic crimes. Cyber threats are non-discriminatory; they affect all businesses from Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to large multinational organizations.

The European: Do you see the rising number risks as related to business and Internet commerce?

Michael Eberhardt: Not only, the public sector, defense and military organizations and industries that form part of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) are all high-profile targets of cyber attack. The motivation and goals of the intruders might be different, but we see a lot of similarities in the strategies and tactics in targeting both private and public sector organizations.

The European: Can you give us an example?

Michael Eberhardt: In April last year the SONY PlayStationTM Network was infiltrated, compromising millions of users, it was one of the largest attacks last year. Similarly, a public water utility in Illinois was hacked stealing customer usernames and passwords, but the attack also caused substantial damage to a water pump as it was powered on and off, burning it out.

The European: How can organizations prevent and stop these attacks?

Michael Eberhardt: Organisations need to change the way they approach vulnerabilities and how they view and manage security on a day-to-day basis. As we all know, there is no 100 per cent security, so we cannot avoid all these attacks, but can transform how we tackle them. Security should not be seen solely as a technology issue; it can have an impact right across the mission of the organization affecting everything from productivity to brand reputation. It’s crucial organiza-

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Global footsteps of HP Enterprise Security Services

tions balance risk migitation with responding to cyber attacks in a multi-layered approach.

The European: How has HP enhanced its portfolio by acquiring security companies such as ArcSight, Fortify and TippingPoint?

Michael Eberhardt: Cyber threats have become more sophisticated, persistent and unpredictable. Organizations can no longer just rely on building and defending security perimeters, they need to apply security to all layers of their infrastructure and applications’ environments. By combining market-leading capabilities from ArcSight, Fortify and TippingPoint, HP has established a foundation for the unified approach to security and continues to invest in security innovation In addition, we offer security experts across the globe in HP Enterprise Security Services (HP ESS). HP has vast experience in counselling businesses from varying industry sectors and geographies with innovative methods and procedures to manage current and future business challenges. To be a global security leader you need to be global also in daily operations. Nearly all of our clients operate in a multinational, 24/7 environment. We have built one of the most comprehensive information security operations in the world today. Our 3,000 staff and 5 GSOCs (Global Operation Centres) are integrated onto a common threat and intelligence platform giving us unparalleled insight into the global security landscape. Last but not least we are continuing to invest and expand our SOCs and specific regional Cyber-Centres to offer greater span and control for our clients (government, finance, insurance) with the need for dedicated and regional delivered managed security services.

The European: What exactly is the new approach of your security teams?

NATO

Michael Eberhardt: Globalization, cloud, hacktivism — all add to the changing landscape of modern business, but the opportunities, threats and associated risks are personal to individual organizations. Our approach is holistic, active, and business-ready. We’ve developed a far more efficient way to reduce risk. We take a consistent and strategic approach, based on our Information Assurance Platform – a methodology and integration platform that not only identifies present security challenges, but proactively works to avoid security issues that might keep organizations from achieving their objectives.

For example, it’s important to determine the real risks to your organization and the costs associated in reducing the risk are reasonable in proportion to the potential loss. Also it shouldn’t be about restricting access to information, but make it securely available. Information security is about making the correct information available to authenticated and authorized people and not as a barrier to getting on with business.

The European: So risk management is the solution for cyber threats.

Michael Eberhardt: Risk is part of life. Every time we make a decision, however mundane, we make a risk assessment whether consciously or not. Risk and business cannot be separated. Where a CEO may take calculated risks on market conditions and sales predictions, the risk decisions a CISO or CIO make can lead to an unnecessary impact on the whole business. IT or technology is often central to the whole operation of a business.

You have to take a holistic approach to security and consider the whole business. Security cannot operate in a silo running box ticking exercises, with no real understanding or evidence of the risks and potential vulnerabilities. You only have to look at media headlines from last year to see the consequences of failing to do so.

The European: So how do technology and the human factor fit in this business risk related approach?

Michael Eberhardt: Good point, human error can and should never be ignored. Technology is vital in helping business comply with many regulations and legal requirements, and critical in tackling the huge number of threats posed. For example AntiVirus software vendors are receiving about 30.000 potential malware probes each day. The data captured from every attempted attack is important in helping us improve the effectiveness of countermeasures, but educating employees about cyber threats is essential as a first line of defence.

EMC’s well known security division RSA was the subject of a social engineering attack in 2011. Social engineering cyber attacks deceive people into revealing information by unknowingly giving access to a computer system. The attack started with two different spear phishing emails with the subject

“2011 Recruitment Plan” sent to two small groups of employees. One employees clicked on the spreadsheet attached to the email, which contained a zero-day exploit; attackers then were able to infiltrate RSA and steal information related to its SecurID products, which had an impact related to the protection level of RSA´s customers, including military, government and others with a higher need of secure access to their sensitive information . Experts were stating the network disruption of defense contractor Lockheed was a result of “RSA’s SecurID Hack”.

The European: How could individuals be integrated into an overall cyber scenario concept?

Michael Eberhardt: With the internet and social networks it is much easier today to research and access information needed to prepare and start a dedicated attack against organizations via individuals. Organisations need to evaluate all social networks and communication channels. Users need to be careful about the level of detail they publish in a private life and business environment, and aware of the sensitivity of information in communications such as emails from colleagues and friends. Educating and making employees aware of their role and responsibility in security is a key success factor.

But also new ways to find and educate young talents are important. HP is partner of the so called Cyber Security Challenge (www.cybersecuritychallenge.or.uk) a series of online games and competitions, e.g. the Digital Forensic Challenge of the US Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) designed to test the cyber security abilities of individuals and young teams from every walk of life. The Master class grand final was held in Bristol and HP labs staff were on hand to design and run the competition. HP supports this initiative to continually develop our capability and understanding of cyber threats.

Another important approach is the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) by our mentioned security research organizations DVLabs.

Micheal Eberhardt Michael Eberhardt has been Managing Director of Hewlett-Packard GmbH and Vice President General Manager Enterprise Services Germany since November 2009. He was born in 1963 in Germany. Mr Eberhardt studied mechanical engineering at the University of Applied Sciences in Konstanz, and started his professional career in 1989 at IMB Germany. He became later Business Executive, integrated Technology Services IBM USA, Somers, NY (1999-2000). From 2000-2005 he worked for TDS Informationstechnologie GmbH where has been Head of Sales TDS IT-Outsourcing and Chief Executive Officer (2001-2007). Before his current position he was Director Outsourcing Germany at Hewlett Pachard GmbH (2007-2008) and Vice President CEE EDS (2008-2009).

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Michael Eberhardt during the interview with Hartmut Bühl at the HP-Germany Headquarter in Böblingen.

The European: What does it mean and how does it work ?

Michael Eberhardt: While there clearly are skilled malicious hackers out there, this remains a very small minority of the total number of people who actually discover new software flaws. In reality, the number of benevolent researchers with the expertise required to discover a software vulnerability is a sizeable, and fast growing group. The dissemination of publicly available vulnerability analysis and discovery tools has helped foster this group of security enthusiasts. It made perfect sense however to augment DVLabs with the additional zero day research of this growing network of “extended researchers”. Interested researchers provide DVLabs with exclusive information about previously un-patched vulnerabilities they have discovered. DVLabs collects background information in order to validate the identity of the researcher for ethical and financial oversight. DVLabs validates the issue in its security labs and makes a monetary offer to the researcher.

If the researcher accepts the offer, he/she will be paid promptly. As a researcher discovers and provides additional vulnerability research, bonuses and rewards can increase through a loyalty program similar to a frequent flier miles program.

After an agreement has been reached for the acquisition of a researcher’s vulnerability, DVLabs simultaneously develops IPS protection filters for HP Tippingpoint software and notifies the affected vendor so the they can develop a vulnerability patch before it will be published and misused by the “bad guys”.

The European: What are your predications for cyber security in 2012?

Michael Eberhardt: We continue to witness unpredictable economic and political events across the economies of US,

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Source: Tobias Bahlinger, Bad Nauheim

Europe and Asia. This might result in sustained high levels of unemployment, further social unrest and as in the past recessions have increased crime, which of course includes cyber based attacks. We may witness more cyber attacks against the CNI, either as “probes” against defence procedures or fullscale attacks as part of geopolitical disputes. But, with the mentioned methods, tools and well trained and aware people we are able to fight these cyber battles. For our own organisation and also for our clients.

The European: Mr. Eberhardt, yesterday evening I received a phone call from a friend of mine who informed me, that HP is cutting up to 40.000 jobs in Europe. Could you comment?

Michael Eberhardt: As you know, when published its quarterly results on 23 May, it announced a restructuring programme aimed at optimising its cost structure, simplifying business processes and reducing complexity. The restructuring process is to take place over several years and comprises structural measures concerning its supply chain and portfolio. It also entails a reduction of 27 000 jobs worldwide by the end of financial year 2014.

The European: Ok this is a little less but which are the countries in Europe the most affected?

Michael Eberhardt: For the moment there are no concrete plans regarding the detailed implementation of those cuts in the different countries and regions.

However, we attach great importance to cooperation and coordination with the responsible bodies and to transparent communications with our staff.

The European: Mr. Eberhardt, thank you for the interview.

NATO

An innovative step forward – less dependence on fossil fuels is needed

Serco goes green and mobile

by Stefan Dopp, Ralf Otten und Christina Janzen-Wolf*, Bonn It is a MUST that the strategic dependency of fossil fuel needs to be reduced in order to guarantee energy security. Thus, today’s energy production requires a high degree of technological innovation – as per linear technology. At the same time when Europe demands that European Forces go green, Serco is fielding first products.

EDA pilots the B-Project GO GREEN The European Defence Agencys (EDA) just recently launched the “GO GREEN” category B project. This initiative is aiming at meeting the energy requirements of European armed forces by evaluating new ways of deploying alternative energy sources faster, cheaper, cleaner and environmentally sound. This innovative and cost-effective cooperation initiative will be implemented by six EDA members: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg.

One example for the renewable energy potential of the European armed forces are the collectively managed numerous buildings and structures with a total surface of about 200 million square meters. There solar panels could be installed to

LinearMirror Technology

form additional investment for CSDP capabilities and to release national defence budgets from pressure.

Serco is ahead Serco delivers an efficient solution in the field of renewable energy supply by innovative solar thermal energy technology – designed for military deployments, exercises and in facilities ideal for WATER HEATING in accommodations as well as for the production of process heat.

Since February 2012, the first LinearMirror System has been in operation for a long-term field test, on site at the Habtoor Staff Village near Dubai. Although the field test will end by June 2012, the expectations concerning the energy efficiency are already today highly exceeded. As a result of this field test, this product with its high energy efficiency proofs to be the convincing solution for an autarkic hot water supply.

Innovative approach on field camps At the Eurosatory 2012, Serco will present a solution for a mobile military camp that is autarkic with respect to communications and energy. The Mobile Field Camp solution provides

Source: Serco Gmbh

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

DP – Deployable Network Solution

Source: Serco Gmbh

MUP Mobile Unified Platform

MOTS and COTS standards. Live demonstrations of Serco’s LinearMirror as well as of Serco’s mobile communication systems MUP (Mobile Unified Platform) and DN (Deployable Network) will convince users about Serco´s innovative approach for mobile solutions.

Deployable Network Solution The Deployable Network Solution is a robust system for voice and data communication. It fully complies with the requirements for extreme environmental conditions. Thus, it can be utilized for a rapid generation of communication networks of various standards as required by FOBs (Forward Operation Bases) and UORs (Urgent Operational Requirements).

Source: Serco Gmbh

hoc information system carrier. The system has been designed for an open field operation. Up to 20 wireless network devices in an obstacle-free zone can be connected for voice and data communications. Additional applications can be customized on request.

The highly mobile network is mounted in a robust backpack, which is both suitable for one-handed transport or for the back supported by a backpack device. It can also be mounted into vehicles. Together with a high rate of availability, this product is the appropriate solution for autarkic communications.

Mobile Unified Platform (MUP) The MUP Solution is a highly mobile system providing a data communication infrastructure based on IP within a very short time slot. The basis of MUP is the consequent development of the idea of a mobile Ad hoc Networking towards the mobile Ad

*Stefan Dopp, Serco Sales and Product Manager LinearMirror *Ralf Otten, Serco Sales and Product Manager *Christina Janzen-Wolf, Serco Sales and Marketing Manager

Serco GmbH Serco GmbH is an independent manufacturing service company, which is among one of the largest technical service providers in Germany, with more than 800 employees.

Headquarter is located in Bonn.

We offer clients premium quality, low-cost, innovative and requirement-oriented solutions in the sector for products and services, and provide the services in close cooperation with our clients from the

industry, science, public and military sector.

As a long-term partner of NATO, of national and international armed forces around the world, we support our clients working across land, sea, air, nuclear and space. Our services and products comprise technical support, engineering, facilities management, training and IT support.

Our mission is to deliver affordable solutions that are “mobile – modular – ruggedized -

innovative and green”!

Serco solutions are aimed at providing Effectivity, Reactivity, Flexibility. through - Minimizing dependency - Securing availability - Controlling cost - Reducing risks

Eurosatory 2012, (11th – 15th JUNE, 2012) in Paris, Serco Stand No. B230 - Outside Area

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NATO

European Armed Forces should conribute to the EU’s energy objectives

Renewable energy and the military

by Martin Stoussavljewitsch, Principal Officer, European Defence Agency, Brussels

Renewable energy production and armed forces are not necessarily an obvious combination. Yet no one doubts that energy is essential to military operations. Without energy, the Armed Forces stand still and silent. Over the past decades, energy dependency has steadily increased, and although operations consume the greatest share of fuel, electric energy use at home is also an important factor. Multiple national initiatives currently encourage energy efficiency in the military to reduce dependency and cost.

But do armed forces have other options to reduce energy dependency and, more broadly, to contribute to Europe’s 2020 Energy Policy targets? The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been looking for innovative solutions.

A simple idea In defence, there are few “Eureka!” moments. Progress is made step-by-step, one incremental innovation at a time. Those advances usually require extensive military-industrial research and development, at a considerable cost. Energy is an important exception; the ultimate dual-use technology, nearly all the work has already been done by the civilian sector. Combining these already extant technologies with the unique needs and advantages of the military, we were able to create a win-win situation. GO GREEN is a simple idea allowing substantial progress by producing renewable energy.

The basic idea within the GO GREEN demonstration project is to install solar panels on buildings and free land of armed forces in Europe, enabling them to produce the electricity they need from renewable sources and even to generate additional revenues for defence budgets by feeding surplus electricity into the general electricity network. The GO GREEN initiative was officially launched at the EDA Steering Board in March 2012, with the participation of six EDA Member States: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany (Lead Nation), Greece and Luxembourg.

Martin Stoussavljewitsch Mr Martin Stoussavljewitsch is a Principal Officer in the Armaments Directorate of the European Defence Agency (EDA). His main task is the promotion and enhancement of European armaments cooperation, in particular by promoting and proposing new multilateral cooperative projects. Among his current activities are the EDA support measures in the field of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and the European Armed Forces GO GREEN initiative.

Mr Stoussavljewitsch received his MSc in Mechanical Engineering from the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich and his MBA in International Sales- and Marketing- Management from the University of Applied Science in Deggendorf. He served in the German Air force as commissioned officer for the TORNADO and PHANTOM Jet Engine Maintenance facility and as System Engineer in the In-Service Support Centre of the EUROFIGHTER Typhoon Weapon System. He joined the European Defence Agency as Seconded National Expert in 2006 and was subsequently contracted in 2008 as Principal Armaments Officer.

Why Armed Forces and renewable energy?

A single European armed force consumes the electric energy of a large city, while the militaries of the EDA Member States1 combined need energy equivalent to a small EU country.

Besides making the Armed Forces dependent on fossil fuels (with their carbon emissions and uncertain supply), this accounts for a substantial chunk of the defence budget. It is estimated that the 26 EDA pMS spend roughly 1 billion € on electric energy for their military every year. At the same time, EU Armed Forces own huge amounts of land, with a total estimated infrastructure surface of about 200 million square metres and an estimated total land surface of 1% of Europe.

This combination means they are ideal contributors to renewable energy efforts; they need to reduce energy dependence, and they have the means to do so.

The broader context The Energy Policy for Europe, agreed by the European Council in March 2007, establishes the Union’s core energy policy objectives of competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply. By 2020, renewable sources have to contribute 20% to Europe’s total energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions have to fall to 20% below 1990 levels and energy efficiency gains have to deliver 20% savings in energy consumption. The military are not exempt, and GO GREEN is one effort towards this goal.

Finance At a time of increased pressure on budgets and defence spending, this project’s innovative approach will not cost any taxpayers’ money. The project funding shall be generated as privately organized investment.

The strategy of GO GREEN is to collect infrastructure and free land user rights, pool them and bring them to the market as an attractive package for energy development. The payoff of the land and free roofs used by industry to generate electricity is

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investment from public budgets. They can thereby contribute directly to Europe’s future economic competitiveness and energy efficiency targets and at the same time reinforce Europe’s security with new investments in capabilities for CSDP.

European cooperation, not national fragmentation Several EDA Member States are already investing in renewable energy production and reduced energy consumption. However, a purely national business base in the solar energy domain has significant disadvantages resulting in limited financial return. In some EU countries, a good solar exposure with many sunshine hours per day allows a high level production of energy. However, more often than not, investment conditions of the government and/or private industry in those countries do not allow a project to be realized that can exploit that potential. Some EU countries have greater financial resources, larger armed forces and the investment level, technological know-how and government incentives in place to set-up solar projects, but lack the intense sun exposure, so can only produce limited electrical power output. Scaling factors, knowledge transfer and best practice solutions are additional factors which are generated by multinational approaches.

EDA GO GREEN leaflets

Source: EDA

the spread between the financial value of the energy production of the completed projects and the cost of pre-financing, constructing and implementing the project.

Growth and jobs There is consensus that low carbon policies can bolster the EU economy, as stressed in the Commission’s 2012 Annual Growth Survey. Studies have shown that the public sector, including defence, can create new markets for energy efficient technologies, services and business models. Incentives like that set out in GO GREEN, allowing Armed Forces to reach their targets costeffectively and safeguard financial benefits when producing renewable energy, are one measure to facilitate growth and job creation.

Financing for renewable energy in the defence sector should be recognised as a growth-enhancing incentive that will provide greater returns in the future, for defence budgets by saving energy and gaining independence from fossil fuels, but also for the society at large in supporting the 2020 targets.

Because of their size, the considerable amount of energy they consume and their extensive experience in technological innovation, the Armed Forces are uniquely positioned to stimulate renewable energy innovation. The GO GREEN initiative will address the opportunities that will result from the transition to renewable energy-supported armed forces and the key role that they can play to advance innovation and commercialization of clean, low carbon energy without additional

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A necessary combination In a recent speech of José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, energy was identified as a strategic enabler for Europe, shaping the environment of the future. His argument is worth quoting at length.

“With our European 20-20-20 commitment we have launched a highly ambitious European energy policy. And we are delivering on it! These actions are cornerstones of our Europe 2020 agenda for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth: Because you simply cannot have sustainable growth without sustainable energy production and use. But unleashing the potential of this new energy revolution is also creating huge job opportunities. … The EU is thus leading what some call the third industrial revolution; we are showing not only that our 2020 objectives can and will be met, but can positively benefit our citizens and provide answers to the issue of climate change, and support our drive for long term sustainable growth.”

The European Defence Agency’s innovative GO GREEN project will demonstrate the deployment of new alternative energy sources for faster, cleaner, more sustainable and cheaper ways to meet Armed Forces’ growing energy needs. It will demonstrate that Armed Forces and renewable energy are a necessary combination. Through the GO GREEN project, participating European Armed Forces will develop and demonstrate a generic renewable energy exploitation model that could be used later on for European-wide implementation, moving Europe forward in the renewable energy revolution.

1 27 EU Member States participate in EDA - all EU members except Denmark.

Photo: US Army Africa/flickr.com/cc by 2.0

Crisis management forces The New Strategic Concept of NATO recognises that an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area, sharing common values and geostrategic interests.

The EU and NATO can play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles for peace and security

Forces Development – EU/NATO Synergy Interview with Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann, DG IMS, and Lieutenant General Ton Van Osch, DG EUMS, Brussels

The European: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) cooperate on issues of common interest and are working shoulder-to-shoulder in crisis management. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010 the Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

General Bornemann in which fields are these objectives these to be realised?

General Bornemann: First of all, let me thank you for the possibility to engage with you together with my EU counterpart, General Van Osch.

You’re absolutely right. The New Strategic Concept recognizes that an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. We share common values and strategic interests, therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO and we reaffirmed this at the Chicago Summit in May. I strongly believe that we can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. Having said that, these objectives can be realised through practical cooperation in operations. Of course, all this requires broad political commitment so that we may share assessments and perspectives, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field. Operations-wise, there is a lot we are already doing. In Kosovo for example, we experience very good cooperation between KFOR and EULEX in support of the Kosovo authorities. In Afghanistan, the NATO training mission works closely with the EU police mission to build a safe and secure environment. And off the coast of Somalia, NATO and the EU forces deploy side-by-side to prevent and combat piracy.

These are all concrete examples of military synergy between our two organisations, and where it matters most – in operations. But we cannot rest on our laurels. NATO nations are determined to continue the strategic partnership with the EU, in a spirit of mutual transparency and openness.

The European: General Van Osch, among these objectives, which is the most important for the European Union Military Staff? Is it more the practical cooperation throughout the crises spectrum from coordinated planning to mutual support on the ground or is it capability development?

General Van Osch: The aim is to further improve our cooperation in both crisis management and capability development.

Though there are still some political difficulties to overcome, we military will try to find the most pragmatic solutions within the political framework which is given to us. We have limitations with regard to formal exchange of information, but we are permitted to have informal staff-to-staff coordination. In this way, we can avoid duplication in both planning and capability development. We make use of each other’s strengths and look for complementary solutions.

General Bornemann: If I may, let me add one additional remark to what General Van Osch just said. I fully share his view that the staff-to-staff cooperation is the most important tool we have at the moment to coordinate between NATO and EU. We are doing this on a permanent basis at all levels between our two staffs. There is still room for improvement but at the same time there are also limitations, taking into account the political difficulties with regard to the participation of Cyprus in NATOEU business. Only a political solution to this problem will allow us to develop a real strategic partnership between NATO and EU. The European: As I understand you both well, you are convinced that NATO and EU should play complimentary and reinforcing roles. In the field of operations there is a certain understanding and mutual assistance, e.g. in the Balkans or in Afghanistan.

General Bornemann, let me ask you on the topic of Afghanistan, how does cooperation work there. Is NATO’s role is a more

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military one? How does the contribution of the EU fit in your strategy?

General Bornemann: Indeed, both the Balkans and Afghanistan are good examples to explain how cooperation between NATO and EU works within the current political framework. In Kosovo, KFOR and EULEX liaise closely every day in the execution of their respective mandates to ensure a safe and secure environment. And during the election weeks, this dialogue proved to be very effective, intervening when needed, avoiding incidents and escalation of violence. KFOR and EULEX have their respective mandate and it is vital that both sides have the necessary means and capabilities to execute their missions as a prerequisite for common success.

“The strength of the partnership lies in its complementarity”.

Jürgen Bornemann

In Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helps create a secure environment in which the Afghan government, as well as other international actors, can work to reconstruct the country. At the same time, the EU Rule of Law mission strengthens civilian policing, focusing on security sector and justice reforms. Needless to say, we all recognize the importance of the EU’s strong contribution to Afghan security, as well as sustainable economic development. And I can tell you that at the Chicago Summit, the Allies welcomed the EU’s affirmation of its continuing long-term commitment in support of Afghanistan.

I believe NATO and the EU jointly play key roles in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, within the international community’s broader efforts, to implement a comprehensive approach. But the strength of the partnership lies in its complementarity.

Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann has been Director General of the NATO International Military Staff since 2010. He was born in 1950 in Bad Wildungen, Germany. He joined the German Federal Armed Forces in 1968, and studied economics from 1976-1980. Before taking up his current post, he was German Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committees (2008-2010). Previous posts include that of: Assistant Director Plans and Policy Division, NATO International Military Staff (2005-2008), Deputy Head of Politico-Military Affairs and Arms Control Division, Federal Ministry of Defence Berlin (2000-2005), and Head of Politico-Military Affairs, Federal Ministry of Defence, Bonn (1996-2000).

The European: General Van Osch, the EU will remain in Afghanistan after the redeployment of NATO forces in 2014. Are you giving already thought to real strategic coordination with NATO as is apparently the case in the field of the naval mission EU NAVFOR Atalanta?

General Van Osch: Firstly, I’d like to stress that the EU currently does not have a military involvement in Afghanistan, though most EU Member States contribute to NATO’s Operation ISAF. Secondly, the EU as an organisation does give high priority to the stabilization and development of Afghanistan. Since 2002, the European Commission (EC) has contributed some 1.8 billion EUR to Afghanistan. The thrust of EC assistance has gradually shifted from humanitarian assistance and support for reconstruction towards development cooperation aimed at supporting priorities set out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Furthermore, the civilian EU police training mission in Afghanistan was launched in 2007 and supports the Afghanistan government to move towards a civilian police system grounded on the rule of law.

The European: And after 2014 where the focus will shift to?

General van Osch: Diplomacy, security, defence and development are clearly common efforts of both organisations together with many other partners. After 2014, the focus of what is necessary will shift, but to what extent, will depend on the concrete development of the security situation. I expect that the further development of Afghanistan will remain a common effort for all who are part of this endeavour from the beginning.

The European: Let me turn to other areas of cooperation. NATO and EU have created in 2003 the NATO-EU capability group to ensure mutual reinforcement, and in 2004 the EU has built up the European Defence Agency (EDA) whose aim. This organisation is to coordinate work on development of defence capabilities and arms cooperation among others things. Is there any real progress and are there any upcoming “products”?

General Van Osch: The NATO-EU capability group is a good tool for coordinating our efforts to improve the military capabilities of our Member States. The informal staff-to-staff coordination between the EU and NATO is also very useful. On the EU side you can see that the work of the EU Military Staff and the European Defence Agency (EDA) mirrors the work of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in NATO. An additional benefit for EU Member States is that EDA also has a responsibility for Research and Technology and the improvement of the European Industrial Base. I agree that for some specific projects it can also be very beneficial for Member States to have ACT take these forward. Both NATO and EU have their specific strengths and Member States can choose which suits them best.

The European: It seems that there is a master plan?

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Crisis management forces

General Van Osch: The positive aspect is, that EU and NATO are well coordinated. We have a good overview of who does what. I would also like to stress that we facilitate Member States in their creation of better capabilities. Member States continue to own these capabilities and can decide themselves how to use them. This can be done under EU, NATO or other coalitions. So, if we strengthen the capabilities of Member States within the EU, we directly also strengthen the capabilities of NATO, since most are members of both organisations.

The European: General Bornemann, you would certainly like to comment on that.

General Bornemann: General van Osch hits the point when he says that strengthening European capabilities directly reinforces NATO. And the Chicago Summit Declaration recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence in underlining NATO-EU cooperation. Concretely, NATO’s Smart Defence approach and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are two faces of the same coin. Smart Defence means spending wisely on essential requirements, while avoiding duplication. That is why we welcome the EU’s efforts to address the European shortfalls in air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance, and training.

“Reality is that no Member State can take care of its security in isolation” Ton Van Osch

The European: Is this the right track or only a trend?

General Bornemann: I believe we are on the right track. This requires working step-by-step to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation, specifically in the important area of military capabilities development.

However, there is always room for improvement. I am convinced that the NATO-EU Capability Group has not yet made full use of the potential of coordination in the area of capability building. We can and we should do more in this area.

The European: General Bornemann, could the financial crisis have “positive” effects on this cooperation or are national cuts in defence budgets to work not yet so deep that nations are forced to cooperate further and in a more coordinated fashion?

Until now, as Secretary Rasmussen stated some weeks ago at the Folketing in Copenhagen, “not much progress has been made”. Is NATO´s new mind-set of the Smart Defence initiative a remedy?

General Bornemann: Of course the financial crisis has accelerated the need for greater cooperation between NATO and the EU. I mean, we share the majority of member nations, so the benefit is clear in terms of saving money and better utilisation

Lieutenant General Ton Van Osch Lieutenant General Ton Van Osch has been Director General of the EU Military Staff since May 2010. He was born in 1955. In 1974, he joined the Royal Netherlands Military Academy.

After various appointments, he attended the US Army Command and General Staff College, and studied at Leiden University for a Masters degree in Public Administration. In 1999, during the Kosovo conflict, Van Osch became Chief Ops (Land) at HQ SFOR. Directly after 9/11 he was sent to US Central Command, Tampa, as an operational planner for the conflict in Afghanistan.

In June 2002 Van Osch was promoted to Brigadier General and took over the post of Director of Operations in the Netherlands. Before taking up his current post, he was Military Representative of The Netherlands to the EU and NATO in Brussels.

of resources. At NATO, we have already made progress in this regard. Our Smart Defence initiative is a new mindset that seeks to better align our collective requirements with national priorities. It means deciding on selective cuts and specialised areas. So Smart Defence is a vital principle for us. And in Chicago we approved a robust package of more than 20 multinational projects, to provide the capabilities we need, at a price we can afford.

But let’s be clear, Smart Defence is not the only answer to the current security challenges. Making progress requires the political will of all nations and in this regard, the EU plays a key role. Certainly at the staffing level contacts are increasing, and we shall continue to work towards regular discussions at all levels across the widest spectrum of common security threats.

The European: General Van Osch, in parallel to that Smart Defence initiative the EU has developed the concept of Pooling and Sharing. Are my doubts justified that an outcome will not be achieved easily since nations are not yet forced by budgetary constraints to follow this concept or should I rather believe in the CEO of EDA, Ms Claude-France Arnould, when she underlined at a Foreign Affairs committee meeting in the European Parliament that the EDA is successfully preparing the ground for a long-term Pooling and Sharing initiative on “save and reinvest”?

General Van Osch: I am quite clear on the coordination between NATO and EU on who does what. Both facilitate Member States to identify and then take forward new initiatives. It is in the interests of both organisations that we do not duplicate. I also believe that there is the political will to become more efficient by pooling and sharing capabilities. That said, we also have to acknowledge, that it is not easy. Let me mention two key issues. Firstly, the question of sovereignty: In the field of defence, most Member States do not like to be dependent on others. But the reality is that no Member State can take care of

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its security in isolation. Therefore, there is no choice. Sovereignty is not only the freedom to decide, but also the ability to act. If for your security ambition you need certain capabilities and you cannot afford to have those by yourself, it is better to create those capabilities with others than not having them at all. Secondly, the question of reinvestments: Here, I fully agree with Claude-France Arnould, the Chief Executive of EDA. If we want to stimulate Chiefs of Defence ( CHODs) to come with initiatives for pooling and sharing, it is important that they have a certain guarantee that they can reinvest the money they save. If, as a matter of principle, the Minister of Finance with each initiative cuts the budget with the level of expected savings, the Chiefs of Defence will only have the disadvantages and not the benefits. In the domain of military capabilities, Europe is clearly below the level of the formal political ambition. This is another reason we should reinvest the money we save.

The European: General Bornemann, one of the issues General Van Osch mentioned is air-to-air refuelling. EU defence ministers declared that this initiative should serve the EU but also NATO and other nations. What is about the NATO Prague summit capability package in which air to air refuelling was stated to be essential for NATO? Are you working in parallel and can the EU’s albei restricted volume of air-to-air refuelling capabilities bring an added value for NATO? General Bornemann: The Prague Capabilities Commitment was part of a three-pronged approach to improving defence capabilities. The other two were the creation of the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of NATO’s military command structure. With this package, Allies made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in 76 specific areas, one of which is air-to-air refuelling. Last year, NATO’s operation in Libya demonstrated significant shortfalls in a range of European capabilities – including precision-guided munitions, airto-air refuelling, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.

The European: That shows that Europe alone is not yet powerful enough to master these forms of conflict?

General Bornemann: Although European nations clearly showed their willingness to lead a NATO operation, it is also true to say that, without significant American contributions, the operation in Libya would have been more difficult to conduct. For Europeans to provide these assets requires political commitment just as much as financial resources.

However, if we go for multinational solutions, then we can afford the capabilities we need in order to face new security challenges. This is the essence of our Smart Defence initiative.

And, as I said before, a crucial part of Smart Defence involves closer coordination between NATO and the EU. This is the reason why we welcome the EU pooling and sharing initiative, and in particular the current project on air-to-air refuelling. We

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all have much to gain from a more capable European defence.

The European: Generals, which are the fields of cooperation that will bring tangible success in the near future, when you intend to bring together Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing?

General Bornemann: I won’t single out any one field. What is important is that we ensure that these two initiatives are mutually reinforcing. We cannot deny that we are facing a difficult time of financial restrictions in a scenario which continues to present complex security challenges. The economical crisis is putting tremendous pressure on our populations and our public finances. At the same time, there remains great uncertainty in the world, and we are facing new threats like cyber attacks and global terrorism. It is plain that no single nation can address these challenges on its own. This is a time when, more than ever, we depend on each other to ensure our shared security and preserve our shared values. So we need to keep investing in the security relationships that matter, and face these new threats from a global perspective.

General Van Osch: Because for political reasons sharing of classified information is still difficult, it is easier to coordinate “who does what” based on each other’s strengths, rather than doing projects together. But this kind of coordination is already very beneficial to both organisations. It avoids duplication, and most Member States benefit from the projects on both sides. It helps us to use our defence budgets as efficiently as possible.

The European: Thank you, Generals, for your attitude to bring those initiatives forward. How do you think that the NATO-EU cooperation will develop in the future?

General Van Osch: Political problems should be solved by politicians, therefore we welcome the political will in both NATO and EU to further improve our cooperation. Within the political framework given, we military will try pragmatically to find the most optimal solutions.

General Bornemann: I agree with General Van Osch. Of course, NATO and the EU can work together to facilitate solving any political impasse. In this regard, the “two-way street” approach suggested by the Secretary General could really make the difference. All EU members should be able to participate in NATO-EU cooperation. At the same time, it would certainly be beneficial for the EU to reinforce its political and military relations with those NATO Allies who are not members of the EU. We know what we need to do. If we work together, then both our institutions can emerge stronger from these times of economic difficulty, supporting international peace and security.

The European: Generals, thank you for this joint interview that illustrates so well the potential synergy of NATO and EU cooperation.

Crisis management forces

The need to save lives and ensure battle supremacy is influencing helicopter’s mode of operation

Helicopters in Crisis Management

by Janusz Zakrecki, CEO, PZL Mielec, Warsaw In 1938, when Igor Sikorsky was perfecting the design of a vertical lift aircraft, a design that would launch the rotorcraft industry, he said: “The helicopter will prove to be a unique instrument for the saving of human lives.”

His words have proved to be prophetic and since the first recorded helicopter rescue in 1944 in a Sikorsky R4, helicopters of all types and makes have rescued an estimated three million people.

Manage the flight The need to save lives and ensure battle supremacy is profoundly influencing how the military operates helicopters.

The U.S. Marine Corps is experimenting in Afghanistan with a version of the K-MAX aerial truck that resupplies troops without a pilot. Adapted for the unmanned mission by Lockheed Martin and Kaman, the aircraft is freeing more valuable manned helicopters for troop transport roles, and keeping trucks away from roadside bombs.

Similarly, with an eye on making BLACK HAWK helicopters useful when their crews are resting, Sikorsky is developing flight control technology that will enable the same aircraft to be flown in an optionally piloted mode.

Sikorsky’s vision will enable an operator, who may not be a pilot, to manage the helicopter, not fly it. A medic, for example, could summon an aircraft to extract wounded troops, relying solely on the aircraft to return to base with minimal human oversight.

S-70i Black Hawk – a Polish Product of PZL, Mielec

Janusz Zakrecki Since 2005 Janusz Zakrecki has been General Manager of PZL Mielec, a position established in 2005, when Sikorsky Aircraft acquired the Polish aviation company. In 1992 Mr. Zakrecki graduated from Cracow University of Technology and joined Zaklad Lotniczy “PZL Mielec” Sp. z o. o. In 1999, he transferred to Pinacle Consulting’s economic department and in 2002 he became department manager at WSK “PZL-Rzeszów” S.A. Mr Zakrecki is a member of the boards of the Aviation Valley Association in Rzeszow and of the Polish Industry Association (SPPL).

Eventually, remotely piloted or autonomous helicopters will migrate to civil search and rescue and other humanitarian aid (HA)/disaster relief (DR) missions, demonstrating again the connection between military and civil technology and how both sides still maintain Igor Sikorsky’s initial vision.

Transatlantic cooperation Across the European Union, fiscal belt tightening is forcing Member States to think “smart” about their defence expenditures by pooling and sharing resources.

Cooperative national defence planning could compel the EU to look to the United States for heavy lift transport helicopters, even as the European Defence Agency (EDA) proposes forma-

Source: Mielec

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

tion of a Multinational Helicopter Wing with separate squadrons for heavy lift, utility and attack. Today, Sikorsky and the U.S. Navy are well into a $3 billion system development and demonstration contract to design and build the CH53K heavy lift helicopter for the U.S. Marine Corps.

A breakthrough in technology While the CH-53K aircraft will have an identical footprint to its D and E predecessors, the aircraft is all-new in every other way. Titanium rotor components, 7,500 shaft horsepower engines (twice the power of the CH-53E), fourth generation blades, composite structures and fly-by-wire controls will render the K aircraft more survivable, more maintainable and easier to fly — while tripling external payload to 27,000 pounds (12,247 kilograms) over 110 nautical miles in “high hot” ambient conditions. First flight of the K aircraft is expected in 2014, with initial operational capability in 2019. The program of record is for 200 aircraft.

Given the maturity of the CH-53K program, and the longstanding transatlantic relationship, the EU could explore cooperative opportunities in the areas of production, sustainment and spiral development to meet mutual capabilities enhancements and country-specific modifications.

This approach has precedence. In the early 1970s, Sikorsky teamed with German industry to bring production of 112 CH53G aircraft to Germany. Forty years later, those heavy lift aircraft are still operational.

Go smart To keep costs low, customers can order airframes with optional equipment, including sensors and armament, while keeping an eye on harmonization, standardization and interoperability.

Both the new CH-53K and the Polish manufactured S-70i BLACK HAWK helicopters can give the European Multinational Helicopter Wing an important edge in military and HR/DR crisis response situations.

Attachment of a “Battle Hawk” module to the utility BLACK HAWK helicopter will thereby fulfill the attack mission, and thus drastically reducing logistic footprint and increasing responsiveness and flexibility.

These airframes can offer a solution along the lines of the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) and the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) in Hungary, where the longstanding stable and cultivated transatlantic relationship guarantees the required security of supply.

Staying competitive While governments are devising new ways to affordably acquire and operate military helicopter fleets, Eurocopter and Sikorsky are each developing rotorcraft designs that could achieve high speed flight in the 200 to 300 knot range — twice the speed of conventional helicopters.

The speed advantage can be crucial for the “Golden Hour” in Helicopter Emergency Management Services (HEMS) operations, or can extend the reach of helicopters in HEMS and HA/DR missions.

Low risk acquisition A truism of today’s acquisition process is that mature, proven aircraft — often defined as “military off the shelf” — provide governments the lowest risk procurement choice.

Sweden is taking the low risk path with the purchase of 15 UH60M BLACK HAWK helicopters for deployment to Afghanistan in 2013. The Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV) cited its desire to buy a proven aircraft and support system rather than update their existing aircraft for the ISAF mission.

To answer an immediate crisis response requirement, Sikorsky is accelerating production and delivery of all 15 aircraft via the U.S. Army in just 18 months and Sweden will deploy its BLACK HAWK helicopters with trained personnel, logistics services, spares and the knowhow to ensure operational success.

Likewise, because of an aversion to high risk, Australia last year selected 24 MH-60R SEAHAWK aircraft for the Royal Australian Nav and this summer, the U.S. Army is expected to sign a five-year contract with Sikorsky for 500 more BLACK HAWK helicopters. Alternatively, governments can now buy Polish-built S-70i™ BLACK HAWK helicopters direct from Sikorsky. Built at PZL Mielec, Sikorsky’s $100 million facility in Poland. S-70i aircraft are identical in power and performance handling to U.S. Army UH-60M helicopters.

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Eurocopter’s X3 design features two turbo shaft engines to power a main rotor and two propellers installed on short-span fixed wings. Sikorsky’s X2 design uses co-axial counter-rotating blades and a pusher propeller. Both companies have proved the effectiveness of their designs to deliver efficient high speed flight and vertical lift performance with the potential for low operating and ownership costs.

Design innovation Design innovation is the approach Igor Sikorsky took more than 70 years ago with his VS-300 helicopter. Dismissing a claim he had invented the helicopter, he said he and his team of engineers had “merely” kept abreast of existing technologies, which they had combined with the successful design and construction of an aircraft capable of controlled vertical flight.

Igor Sikorsky would applaud today’s efforts to build better helicopters, which often make the difference in the success or failure of crisis management missions.

Being the humanitarian that he was, he would urge industry and governments to collaborate fully to establish a strong EU defence equipment market and technological and industrial base.

Crisis management forces

Protection is a system bringing together the human factor and state of art technology

Integrative Protection for and in operations Interview with General Fulgencio Coll Bucher, Madrid

The European: General, you are the head of the Spanish land forces and to reach that position you have participated as Force Commander in all the Spanish forces’ out-of-area missions of the last 20 years: Mozambique, Iraq, Afghanistan are just three examples. What was the biggest problem you faced in preparing your servicemen and women for those operations?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: The key element in my view is the preparation of the squads, fire teams, team leaders and even drivers. Each soldier must realise the importance of his/her individual contribution for the success of the mission. Soldiers must learn to respond automatically to the different incidents with which they are likely to be confronted in any operation, in a way that is consistent with the commander´s intent and, of course, with the rules of engagement and all other applicable procedures. In this way, soldiers are trained to be self-confident and to understand the culture of the people around them and the history of the place they are working in. This enables them to use their initiative and common sense, to avoid taking unnecessary risks and to help keep the local population in their AO safe.

The European: I can understand that there is nothing worse for the troops’ morale than not being able to have confidence in the safety and functionality of the equipment – personal protection gear in particular – on which their survival and sustainability often depend. How do you see the issue of protecting your forces today, and what avenues are you exploring for the future?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: Our soldiers know that there is no such thing as zero risk and that force protection is achieved by means of thorough training as well as by equipping the deployed contingents with the best available materiel and weapons in accordance with the risk level of each operation.

Also, UAVs are used to locate any insurgent presence in the areas of operation of our patrols in advance. The soldiers’ personal equipment is being improved, as are night vision devices, camp security and all other means that can contribute to minimising the risk.

The European: What you are saying, General, is that yours is an integrated approach that takes account not only of direct threats but also the risks associated with a highly technological environment. What does this mean in terms of the technical requirements of soldiers’ personal protection equipment, on the one hand, and the compatibility of that equipment with their environment – in other words the transport and combat vehicles made available to them – on the other?

General Fulgencio Coll Bucher General Fulgencio Coll Bucher has been head of the Spanish Landforces since 2008. He was born 1948 in Palma de Mallorce and received his education there and in Menorca.

He graduated as an infantry lieutenant in 1970 and was promoted to brigadear general in 2001.

Fulgencio Coll was the first Spanish liaison officer to the Eurocorps in Strasbourg and commanded then a brigade in Spain. After his command of a mechanized division he created the most modern Military Emergency Unit in Europe to be engaged in natural or man made desasters.

During his career he has become a specialist in special forces operations experienced in UN missions in Angola and Mozambique and under Nato command in Bosnia-Herzogewina and he commanded the 2nd Multintional Brigade in Iraq.

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: One must not forget that this comprehensive approach also encompasses the welfare of the servicemen and women deployed on operations as well as that of their families back home. That is an integral part of protection.

But now to come to your question: we can state that the quality of the equipment carried by our deployed soldiers meets our allies’ standards. Our uniforms, personal protection elements, weapons and radio sets are completely reliable even in the harsh conditions of modern operations and can be employed in any feasible theatre, regardless of the specific environmental conditions. Furthermore, before any materiel is fielded a complete procedure is followed to determine the requirements that the materiel must cover and what its specifications must be. During reception the equipment specifica-

Spanish infantry platoon with the Spanish transport vehicle RG-31 MK 5E. Source: MOD, Spain, Madrid

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European: Allow me to ask you a few questions on the issue of CBRNE threats and protection. Where do you see the biggest threat for armed forces coming from?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: Despite the efforts made in weapons control and CBRNE technology, we cannot disregard the risk posed by failed states and terrorist elements interested in using weapons of mass destruction in the form of limited-effect artifacts and devices.

This threat assessment has led to a change in the CBRNE protection perspective, making it more proactive, with the focus on improvements in the field of intelligence rather than relying mainly on protection as has been the case up until now.

The European: How do you assess the development of protection against IEDs, including Source: Luiz Rico, Madrid with regard to the situation post-Afghanistan?

Will they continue to represent a threat for future operations? tions and requirements are conscientiously verified for compliFulgencio Coll Bucher: Great advances have been made in ance with army standards, so that the equipment can be implementing TTPs to face and minimise the C-IED war risks deployed from that very moment. that are so relevant in what we call asymmetric warfare. I think The European: You are conducting the COMFUT programme that these kinds of attacks can be expected to continue in the near future and we must therefore persevere in our protection with Spanish industry using the technologies developed by that efforts in this area. The preparation of our personnel and the industry, or those developed elsewhere in Europe. Are there any excellence of our materiel will be of great help, although we common approaches in the EU that you are following? know that there is no such thing as total security. Spain has Fulgencio Coll Bucher: I’m happy to answer that, but then I taken a huge qualitative step forward in that direction by would also like to address the question of compatibility including, among other things, MRAP vehicles and the use of between personal protection equipment and vehicles. jammers in its range of protection measures. We also have the C-IED Centre of Excellence where experts work to update and The Future Warrior programme has two components: one is standardise the procedures for facing this threat within NATO. national in scope, with all the industrial developments made

by Spanish companies, while the other – known as Combat The European: Could I ask you to come back to the issue of the Equipment for Dismounted Soldiers – is multinational. The latter is supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), “human system” and the social integration of the men and which strives for convergence among the projects of several women that make up your forces: do you have a strategy here?

European countries – up to 9 projects – including the Spanish Fulgencio Coll Bucher: The human element is our main asset.

Army one.

Our personnel – men and women – work conscientiously day General Coll and the Editor in Chief during the interview at the Army Headquarter in Madrid.

News: Spain is hosting European Air Transport Training event From 4 to 15 June 2012, the Spanish Air Force is hosting a European Air Transport Training event (EATT2012) involving six European Defence Agency (EDA) member states in Zaragoza. Member States involved are: Belgium (one C-130 with two crews); the Czech Republic (one CASA-295 with two

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crews); France (one C-130 with two crews); Germany (two C-160s with two crews); the Netherlands (one C-130 with two crews); and Spain (one C-130 and one CASA-295 with four crews). The course has been organized by the EDA with the support of European Air Transport Command and is

part of the EDA’s ongoing pooling and sharing initiative. A second EEAT will be organised in 2013 with the perspective to establish a permanent European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course (EAATTC) in 2014, modeled on the U.S. course that has operated with success since 1984.

Crisis management forces

by day to enhance the Army’s capabilities, giving their best to the task. In that regard we are making a big effort as regards further training courses for both commissioned and non-commissioned officers in our military academies. Regarding enlisted personnel and junior NCOs, we have consolidated the professionalisation process a little more than ten years after the abandonment of conscription. Satisfactory results are being achieved at all levels; indeed I am very proud to command this extraordinary group of people.

The European: General, you founded the Military Emergency Unit in 2006. What is the MEU? Fulgencio Coll Bucher: The Military Emergency Unit (MEU) is an Armed Forces unit that is especially constituted, organised, trained and equipped to preserve the security and welfare of citizens in the event of grave risks, catastrophes, calamities or other cases of public necessity. It is composed of 4 000 staff from the Army, Air Force and Navy and is deployed all over Spanish territory for the purpose of providing a faster intervention capability. It is the medium provided by the State to assist in cases of emergency.

The European: How does it fit into the Civil Protection System?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: In Spain civil protection responsibilities are structured into different levels of assistance according to the seriousness of the emergency. The most elemental level is the responsibility of the municipality. The second level is the

Spanish Forces training Afghan soldiers in patrolling

responsibility of the Autonomous Community. The third level is the responsibility of the State through the Ministry of the Interior. In the case of an emergency that exceeds the capabilities of the Autonomous Community, the Autonomous Community requests the help of the State through the Ministry of Interior (Civil Protection and Emergency Directorate). In this case the Ministry of Interior asks the Ministry of Defence to authorise the intervention of the Military Emergency Unit. Once authorised, the MEU is at the disposal of the Autonomous Community.

In the event of a level-three emergency the MEU General Commander assumes the sole operational command, taking his orders directly from the Minister of the Interior.

The European: Is this the only unit of this kind in Europe?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: No. The MEU is based on other models, in particular the French and Swiss ones, but clearly, being more recent it has been able to take advantage of the knowhow of its French and Swiss predecessors which were very generous in providing assistance for its creation. This Unit improves upon certain aspects of the French and Swiss models, principally in that it is bigger in size and has a more powerful communication systems.

The European: General, thank you for the discussion. I wish you all the best in bringing your troops safely home from Afghanistan in 2014.

Source: MOD, Spain, Madrid

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

There is a need in multinational police operations for common standards and equipment components

Police forces: personal protection during crisis-management operations

by Gerd Hexels, CEO Blücher Systems, Erkrath

The European: Herr Hexels, you are the CEO of Blücher Systems GmbH, whose name is associated with the SARATOGA brand name, known in more than 40 countries, including the US and Germany, as the synonym for CBRN protective clothing for the armed forces. Your company was also the development partner for the clothing system for the Infantryman of the Future Enhanced System (IdZ-2) of Germany’s armed forces.

Gerd Hexels: After some initial research and development work for Germany’s civil protection forces Blücher evolved into a company concerned predominantly with developing protection technologies for military forces. But time has moved on, our systems have proven their worth, and just as the 2009 Lisbon Treaty calls for a comprehensive approach to threats, deployment scenarios and operational concepts, so do we too now perceive the need to make the technologies initially developed for military operations available to civilian forces as well.

The European: That is indeed an interesting development, but before we discuss police forces in more detail, could I ask you to briefly explain all the things that the brand name SARATOGA stands for?

Gerd Hexels: With pleasure. In the 1990s the SARATOGA® brand name was still synonymous with an adsorptive air permeable fabric liner for protective suits, designed to keep the soldier safe from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. But as the company grew, it extended its area of expertise to the whole supply chain, which for some product areas now ranges from the raw material through to the complete integrated protection system. Over the last ten years the company has developed into a systems supplier.

The European: With the development of the IdZ-2 for the Bundeswehr you have extended your technological leadership to areas other than CBRN protection.

Gerd Hexels: Yes indeed, through successful partnerships we are now also particularly active in such areas as ballistic protection, human factors, camouflage technologies and the integration of electronic components.

The European: Then it comes as no surprise that you are now also applying those technologies to the protection of police forces but – let me try to phrase this carefully – is this something that the police actually want? And if there is a real need, how do you intend to set about satisfying it?

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Gerd Hexels Gerd Hexels has been CEO of Blücher Systems, formerly Texplorer since 1998.

1960 born in Lobberich he joined after graduation the German Armed Forces for a two-year service in 1980. Then he started working in the textile industry in the fields of R&D, production and sales. From 1982 to 1990 he has been technical director and later production manager at Thomassen GmbH, a small business unit in Nettetal. From 1990 to 1995 he has been technical director at Voss Biermann Lawaczeck Krefeld. From 1995 to 1998 he has been Managing Director at Rawe Nordhorn. In 1998 he founded Texplorer® GmbH, a company specialized in the development of high quality functional systems for civilian as well as for military forces. In 2010 Blücher GmbH, Erkrath, became the main shareholder of Texplorer® GmbH and the company was renamed Blücher Systems GmbH. In the last couple of years Gerd Hexels main focus laid on human factors in textile systems to improving the soldier’s survivability and sustainability.

Gerd Hexels: There can be no doubt that the need exists: we see this not only for our German and European forces, but in our activities all over the world. However one must be clear about the fact that police and military forces often do not have exactly the same approach, which means that the requirements of the protection systems will be different, although for the user the physiological burden is much the same.

The European: What is your approach?

Gerd Hexels: As a general rule the first step is to try and understand the threat and operational scenarios. On that basis we can then define the equipment requirements, before finally developing solutions that also take on board the specific needs and wishes of the users.

The European: Herr Hexels, to get down to the business at hand: on what kind of scenarios are your development activities in the area of protection systems for police based?

Gerd Hexels: Given the multinational nature of operations there is a need for interoperability, common standards and equipment components that are at least mutually compatible, if not, even, totally interchangeable. And the European Union considers itself a global player.

Crisis management forces

The European: What do you mean by that?

Gerd Hexels: That police operations these days are not necessarily confined to peaceful areas with temperate climates.

During international police missions, special forces and training staff may face asymmetric threats such as terrorism and at the same time have to operate in climatic zones for which their normal equipment was not originally designed. The challenges for police forces and hence for every single police officer are therefore becoming greater. On top of that there is the problem of the unpredictability of events, both in terms of the location and timing.

The European: And what are the requirements that you deduce from that?

Gerd Hexels: The diversity of threats leads to increasingly complex protection systems, both for law enforcement personnel and for the special and police units engaged in international missions. We fully agree with the police authorities on the need to attach equal importance to protection and to operational effectiveness. This is why we have developed systems that, thanks to the integration of ballistic protection, human factors and load-carrying systems make for weight savings and an ergonomic weight distribution, thereby enhancing the operating efficiency of the wearer.

The European: So far so good. However, I see another issue, namely that of the need to adapt the protection to actual operational requirements in a given situation. In other words, some situations require less protection, but others, more. How do you tackle that problem?

Gerd Hexels: In our discussions with our clients we see time and again, after a careful analysis of the current scenarios and operating concepts, the need to develop modular protective clothing to allow the equipment to be adapted to specific situations in the way you just suggested. Among other things, for example, we propose a modular design for ballistic protection systems as well as components adapted to specific climatic conditions that enhance the operational efficiency of forces, in that, for example, they allow the weight of the equipment to be reduced without increasing the risk for the wearer. This has become a recognised principle that we adhere to.

The European: A moment ago you mentioned the Lisbon Treaty.

I note that political circles deliberately no longer make a clear distinction between civilian and military scenarios. In your

Example of a new clothing system including load bearing vest.

Source: Blücher Systems

discussions with your customers do you find that they too are working on the basis of converging scenarios for military and civilian crisis-management operations?

Gerd Hexels: Civil-military cooperation is getting closer.

The fact that military and civilian forces find themselves confronted, increasingly, with similar scenarios is reflected in the growing convergence between the requirements that the two types of forces put forward for their protection equipment. In my view, however, it is not a matter of treating the two cases without distinction.

The European: What then?

Gerd Hexels: We need a clear analysis of where and under what circumstances joint action is called for. And this is precisely why our system components and products incorporate technologies and research findings that were originally developed for use in the military area and can now be used for civilian purposes.

The European: Allow me, finally, to ask once again about the role of human beings in your development activities: just now you referred to “human factors”. What does this mean exactly?

Gerd Hexels: “Human factors” generally speaking is a very wide-ranging concept. It is of special importance for the field of personal protection equipment, where it refers in particular to ergonomic and physiological considerations as well as to issues of compatibility with weapons systems and transport platforms/vehicle systems. Since all these criteria have an equally important influence on the effectiveness and success of missions, human factors now carry as much weight with users and in our development work as the protection performance of each system itself.

News: CBRNE conference From 14 to 16 May 2012, experts from 32 countries met in Copenhagen for a conference on Explosives & CBRN. The conference was held under the umbrella of the EU-based network EEODN (European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network), which was created by Europol in 2008 with the aim to strengthen knowledge sharing and exchange of best practices between the countries of the European Union on CBRNE issues.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Reduce the budget burden of the life-cycle cost through standardisation

The future of versatile platforms

by Arnaud de Pechy, Regional Sales Director GDELS, Kreuzlingen

Recent conflicts have created a growing demand for highly protected vehicles. This could easily be realised with the range of strongly armed Infantry Fighting Vehicles, but it was more challenging to improve the protection of medium wheeled platforms. The last decade has seen the creation of a new type of system able to resist the highest level of mine or IED (Improvised Explosive Device) threats, but which has the drawback of increasing weight, with the negative consequences that this entails for operational and strategic mobility. The by now well-known Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) category of vehicle was a natural and fast response to the need to carry soldiers whilst providing satisfactory protection against the worst threats. It has been the golden age of the “Vshape hull”, reputedly the best technological compromise for saving lives, but at the cost of downgrading other operational assets, such as internal volume, low centre of gravity, payload capability. These drawbacks have finally created additional hazards in the battlefield, cancelling out the gain in protection originally expected from the V-hull.

The need to reconcile requirements In actual fact this technological choice simply contradicts basic military tactical principles according to which the best protection stems from mobility, the capacity to take initiatives, reversibility and quick manoeuvres. On top of that, the limitations of MRAPs have led to a hyper-specialisation of mediumsized platforms, leading to a deep lack of versatility. This has resulted in the multiplication of intermediate categories of vehicles, several different medium-sized platforms now being required to cover the full range of missions in the operational spectrum, from low to medium intensity. Consequently, the bulk of today’s medium wheeled vehicle fleets are afflicted both by a loss of operational capability and by the increasing organisational complexity of logistic support. Hence today, in order to reconcile protection, operational needs and logistic efficiency, versatility appears to be the key, by giving more room for manoeuvre and streamlining fleet management.

Multi-role chassis platform General Dynamics European Land Systems, with its long tradition of the well-known PIRANHA family of vehicles, has now developed the EAGLE family of vehicles based on a common versatile and multi-role chassis platform, available either in 4x4 or 6x6, and offering as much protection as the heavier MRAP vehicles. High and secure mobility on and off the road is achieved by means of De Dion axles using a patent-

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Arnaud de Péchy Regional Sales Director, General Dynamics European Land Systems Born in 1973 in France. He spent 14 years in the French Army and had the opportunity to serve as an infantry officer within the French Foreign Legion. He is graduated with Master degrees in operational management and in Internationl Business. Formerly Key Account Manager in a French Defence company, he has been working for GDELS since 2010, as Regional Sales Director working mainly in Europe. He is currently one of the participant of the SERA24-IHEDN European course.

ed roll stabilizer system. The De Dion suspension system combines the advantages of independent wheel suspension with those of rigid axles. By means of the patented roll stabilizer, maximum off-road traction and thrust are achieved even in the toughest conditions and body roll in curves is eliminated. This state-of-the-art chassis technology can be combined with an innovative double V floor.

The versatile EAGLE-Platform Thanks to the combination of the two technologies, and contrary to the majority of MRAPs, the EAGLE vehicle does not need to give up any of its mobility or payload capabilities in order to achieve the highest protection. This innovative versatile platform ranges from a 10 tonne two-men cab support vehicle to a 15 tonne armoured personal carrier suitable for a crew of up to 12 soldiers. Hence, whereas in the past more than five different types of vehicle were sometimes required, today a single family of vehicles can cover the full range of missions while allowing the use of all four tactical methods: offensive and defensive action, security and assistance.

The EAGLE family of vehicles has been developed in order to offer customers the possibility of standardising their entire fleet of light tactical vehicles. By using a single platform to cover all requirements, the EAGLE family reduces the through-life support cost of the entire customer fleet. Indeed, each variant within the EAGLE family has more than 85% of parts in common with the other members. This high degree of commonality is an important factor that is highly in demand for the mobility chain of a military vehicle. Moreover, it facilitates the potential outsourcing of maintenance support at home or on operations abroad, thereby reducing logistic

Crisis management forces

EAGLE FoV within the Spectrum of Operations

support management costs. More than 5 000 EAGLE vehicles are already in service worldwide. We offer our customers various pooling and sharing opportunities in the field of common training or common logistic support during operations.

With all defence budgets facing drastic cuts, it is urgently necessary to implement new fleet management methods and rationalisation concepts. This can be achieved with the help of this off-the-shelf military product. Fleet standardisation also makes for optimised human resources management. Indeed, the rationalisation of spare parts implies the rationalisation of training for maintenance staff. Training can now focus on a single type of vehicle, using one kind of documentation and repair kit, in similar workshops set up in every regiment or maintenance unit. On the user side, the driver can be trained on the same real driver post or simulator. The driver of a recce platoon equipped with a 4x4 vehicle will, for instance, be able to drive a 6x6 APC. Thus he can reinforce another unit for specific missions or replace the driver of another vehicle who may be injured or sick, not to mention the ease with which he can switch from driving a training fleet vehicle to an alert fleet vehicle.

Meeting operational requirements‌ The EAGLE family of vehicles has been designed to improve the allocation of budgetary resources to operational require-

Chart: GDELS, Kreutzlingen

ments. By providing the opportunity to progressively move from a heterogeneous to a homogeneous fleet, it reduces the budget burden of the fleet, to the benefit of the soldier on the ground. In addition, by offering soldiers the highest level of protection and mobility, EAGLE helps increase the margin for manoeuvre of the tactical chief on the battlefield.

‌ and reducing the financial burden over the life-cycle The trend towards modern military equipment with the increasing integration of various cutting-edge technologies will require the allocation of more and more budget resources to the maintenance and use of equipment. Meanwhile, procurement batches are being dramatically reduced, leading to increased procurement costs. The EAGLE family of vehicles is the solution proposed by GDELS for tackling these constraints.

This platform covers the broadest range of needs and hence enables optimised procurement and a better operational use of the vehicle fleets. This ideal solution that now exists is the key to achieving budget savings by simplifying procurement management, rationalising maintenance and optimising training. All these savings can be converted into potential new budget allocations to operational training, urgent procurements and/or other direct investments for meeting operational requirements.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Anticipating needs following the release of toxic chemicals

CBRN – The stockpiling of antidotes

by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels CBRN response is a cornerstone of the European Union’s internal security strategy. In June 2009 the European Commission issued its Communication on an EU CBRN Action Plan, which was adopted by the EU Council in November 2009. The aim of this Communication was to ensure efficient interaction between EU and national initiatives in addressing CBRN risks and preparing appropriate responses. This represents a veritable challenge for the EU and the member states and the efforts thus far have fallen short of those objectives.

The EP - one of the main players in security During the vote in the European Parliament (EP) in December 2011 on MEP Ana Gomes’ report on the EU CBRN Action Plan, the EP recognised that “the current CBRN Action Plan is weak, lacks coherence and is not being implemented by all Member States” and that “the changes introduced by the European Council to this action plan dilute the binding level of the measures foreseen and weaken the monitoring and control of their implementation”.1 The EP finally voted for the establishment of a special European Crisis Reaction Mechanism for helping nations to cope with CBRN disasters.

An important aspect of Ana Gomes’ report is that the EP calls for regional or EU-wide stockpiles of response sources. In its its opinion on the EU CBRN Action Plan, the Committee on Foreign Affairs called for a special focus on defining the EU’s needs in terms of CBRN preparedness and response capability, including medical counter-measures.

Hans H. Kühl, one of the world’s recognised authorities on CBRN, suggests that the European Union could “provide nations and interested parties [with] the platform for identifying threats and risks, coordinating research and development, harmonizing capabilities, and increasing civil-military cooperation”,2 given that the responsibility for such primary operational-level domains as protection, response and recovery lies with the member states.

Regional conflicts – accidents – disasters The European Security Strategy of December 2003 identifies the most probable threat scenarios and concludes that the most likely scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction, but CBRN threats to Europe do not stem only from international terrorism. Natural accidents or industrial disasters can also create mass casualties. The “EU Threat Programme” has shown that, generally speaking, neither hospitals nor medical staff are prepared to deal with mass casualties.

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Chemical hazards and threats In general, chemical hazards or threats stem from the deliberate release of substances (e.g. by terrorists) or from their production, storage and transport. Chemical disasters such as the accidental leakage of methyl isocyanate gas at Bhopal in India in 1984 or the deliberate release of sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995, which killed 12 people and poisoned and more than 5.000, prove that a real danger exists all over the world. So far the European Union has been spared such a major chemical catastrophe, but the deliberate or accidental release of chemical substances remains a realistic possibility, notwithstanding the EU’s higher security standards. In such incidents as the Toulouse disaster in 2001, when 300 tonnes of stored nitrate ammonium exploded,3 or the spill of toxic red chemical sludge in Hungary in 2010, the population narrowly escaped a major catastrophe.

Nations strive for EU-wide cooperation in the field of “C” EU MASH WP 5 (2007–2009),4 which was set up to gather information from nations with a view to the management of mass chemical casualties, clearly identified deficiencies in the management of chemical disasters. It noted that only a minority of member states were capable of a quick and timely response to chemical incidents involving mass casualties and that less than half of nations had hospital facilities specialised in the treatment of chemical casualties. One reason for those shortcomings in the provision of emergency care would seem to be that some chemical agents are persistent and require decontamination measures, while others are not. Depending on the mechanism of their impact on the human body, the effect of some toxic chemicals can be mitigated by administering antidotes to the victims.

According to the MASH Report, more than half of member states made provision for early life-support care in the event of chemical incidents, but only half of the nations had an emergency plan for the administration of antidotes. One positive finding, however, was that there is unanimous interest in an EU cooperation programme for chemical casualty management as recommended by the report. One aspect of this programme is the stockpiling of chemical antidotes.5 The way ahead Apparently there is no shortage of ideas and good will within the European Union in order to master the problem of response to chemical incidents.

Regarding stockpiling, it seems that among the EU countries France at least has a consolidated and implemented national

Crisis management forces

response strategy; indeed, France recently set up an official organisation for that purpose called EPRUS, to which the legislature has given two main tasks: to ensure the acquisition and inventory management of public health stockpiles to deal with emergency situations and to organise the mobilisation of health workers in the event of a massive medical emergency.

The EU needs a stockpiling strategy The European Union needs a stockpiling strategy that must lead to the creation of a central European stockpile as well as decentralised stockpiles of antidotes. This strategy must provide an answer to the question of how strategic and local stockpiling with cross-border effect could create added value.

The strategic work should therefore start with common guidelines about what, how much and how to stockpile for each specific risk.

The stockpiling of antidotes is an integral part of overall protection. For the moment is not obvious that everyone will rally behind this proposal, but it is vital to launch a process of reflection within the EU and at national level.

1 Ana Gomes MEP: “Member States must enact an enhanced EU CBRN Action Plan” in The European – Security and Defence Union Berlin/Brussels ed. 1-2011, pp. 21ff.

Documentation MASH EU Project 2007-2009 WP 9-Final Report (…) A large scale incident, although rare, may stretch the resources of a single country so that expert help may be requested from neighbouring nations, or if it may affect several countries. If there is at least some procedures in common between nations, an international response can be carried out more easily and will be more effective. The ultimat goal for mass casualty management in Europe is the ability to respond effectively and efficiently to a major incident in a variety of situations, providing a coordinated compatible response (…).

Source: Heath Protection Agency, HPA: Mash-Work-Package 9, Oxfordshire 2011, page V

2 Hans H.Kühl, “The CBRN threat and resulting challenges for the European Union in The European-Security and Defence Union, Berlin/Brussels ed. 2/2011 p. 44.

3 Xavier Montauban: “Les risques NRBC-E, savoir pour agir”, Paris, 2010, 2nd edition, pp. 135 ff.

4 MASH = Mass Casualties and Health care following the release of toxic chemicals or radioactive material.

5 The results of MASH WP 5 are resumed in: MASH WP 9 by David Baker and others under the Health Protection Agency, Oxfordshire, UK.

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Leaving aside maritime terrorism for the moment, pirates’s degree of organisation can greatly vary.

Depending on the latitude, a different modus operandi is used and the attack radius and objectives diverge.

Actions to be implemented with caution

“Yes” to a robust EU counter-piracy strategy

by Maria Eleni Koppa MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels* A major development field has been the first offensive action of EU naval force EU NAVFOR Somalia-Operation Atalanta in Somali territorial waters and on Somali soil on 15 May 2012.

Extension of the mission This action was mandated by a European Union Council (EUC) decision adopted on 23 March 2012 authorising an extension of the force’s range of operations to include Somali coastal territory (up to 2000 metres from the shore), as well as its territorial and internal waters. The European Parliament (EP), in a resolution adopted on 10 May, welcomed – albeit with some scepticism – this decision of the EUC, realising that without more resolute action it is not possible to ensure safe navigation off the coast of Somalia and to protect humanitarian aid shipments to Somalia. Indeed, pirates have extended their area of operations to encompass over a quarter of the Indian Ocean.

As a consequence, effective policing and escorting has become almost a mission impossible.

Scepticism This scepticism has to do with the Parliament’s conviction that piracy cannot be eliminated through military means alone, as its root causes are related to the conditions of extreme poverty in which the Somalis live and to the region’s persistent instability. But there are also fears that the intervention could exacerbate violence, increasing the risk of unintentionally targeting civilians and fishing equipment. Clearly, piracy in Somalia is a multifaceted problem that requires a comprehensive response by the international community. As a matter of fact, the EU is now adopting a more comprehensive approach. Early this year a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn of Africa was appointed, with a special focus on Somalia, and a strategic framework was elaborated with the emphasis on the root causes and drivers of conflict, the rule of law and socio-

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economic development in the region. In other words, the EU has upgraded its political presence in the Horn of Africa, viewing Somalia and its problems from a broader perspective.

It would therefore be erroneous to claim that there has been a militarisation of the EU engagement. The new robust action by Operation Atalanta on the Somali coast is in line with UNSC resolution 1851 and is being conducted with the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. It is a response to the situation when it comes to piracy at sea, as is the planned CSDP mission EUCAP NESTOR, a regional training mission for strengthening the maritime capacities of eight countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean.

The EU has to avoid entering a circle of violence It is precisely such “militarisation fears”, however, which are being echoed by certain Members of the European Parliament.

Are these fears groundless? Certainly not. The EU should be very careful to avoid getting involved in a vicious circle of violence that could endanger the lives of civilians on the ground. Any action beyond the authorised 2 000 metres should be excluded from rules of engagement (ROEs) and the scope of European action should be defensive in nature and thoroughly planned. It is important that the EU mission should be provided with adequate intelligence, analysis, early warning capabilities and clear ROEs. The EU mission, finally, has to be seen and to act as a sincere ally of the Somali people. The EU needs to communicate more clearly the contribution it makes to protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to take more pronounced action against illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic and radioactive waste off the coast of Somalia. These illegal activities, affecting the livelihoods of thousands of Somalis, are also the root causes of piracy. * Maria Eleni Koppa MEP, Advocat, Athens, has been MEP since 2007

Photo: Matthias Dörendahl/Presse- und Informationszentrum Marine/na Presseportal

Maritime security

Maritime security

Pirates are still active in the first half of 2012 – with a major economic impact

Piracy off the Horn of Africa in 2012

by Dr Michael Stehr, German Maritime Institute, Bonn About 60 incidents resulting in 12 hijacks were reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in the period until the end of May 2012. The numbers show a decline in comparison to 2011 as an effect of naval operations and of civil shipping relying more and more on private armed security teams (PAST). The heavy weather season contributed to this result.

Pirates: tactical developments In February pirate gangs began to extend their sweeps for booty to the “Malacca-Cape Route” – with three attempted attacks south of 5° South and east of 60° East. Pirates continue their mother ship operations preferring to use captured dhows. To counter the navy’s effective sea surveillance and information-sharing pirates have begun a new game: dhowhopping – which means using a dhow for a limited time or number of strikes and then capturing a new one in exchange, without sailing back to their home beaches. Pirates also continue their business with “low cost-high profit”, but sometimes escalation is indicated by the heavy use of weapons or by “mass attacks” involving up to eight attack-craft. Unconfirmed reports since 2011 have accused some pirate gangs of intentionally killing hostages in order to push the ransom negotiations.

Civil shipping: BMP4, PAST and insurance More ship-owners than before are relying on Private Armed Security Teams (PAST). Up until now no ship with armed guards has been hijacked. In recognition of that fact, a London-based insurance company is offering a piracy policy for transiting the high-risk area off the Horn of Africa with reduced rates (up to a 75% reduction). The MT SMIRNY (Aframax crude oil tanker) hijacking incident illustrated the importance of effective self-protection. Technical protection measures in accordance with the Best Management Practices (BMP4) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) may help in the Gulf of Aden with warships in the vicinity, but are not likely to succeed in the vast ocean areas if there is no naval ship to assist.

EU NAVFOR Atalanta – mandates and tactics The European Union has prolonged the mandate of EU NAVFOR Atalanta until the end of 2014 and extended the naval forces’ operational area from the sea to a land corridor stretching from Somalia’s coastline to 2 000 metres further inland.

The EU’s naval forces are now allowed to destroy boats and equipment while gangs are preparing their raids. This does not constitute a major change of mandate but closes a practical

gap. In May, nine naval vessels and five Maritime Patrol Aircraft were operating under the EU mandate and flag. They conducted a first raid on pirates’ land-based assets in May.

Yemen: next failing state in at the Gulf of Aden In Yemen developments resemble the Somali agony that began 25 years ago. In southern parts around Aden and in northern regions, clans, militias and Islamic terror organisations are taking control. The election of Al-Hadi as the successor of President Salih in February 2012 has not changed anything.

The economy is in dire straits, oil revenues are declining and there is a dramatic water shortage in parts of the country due to the intensified cultivation of quat. There has been no complete collapse of law and order in the period up until mid2012 thanks to the tribal structures that have provided a degree of stability for some 3 000 years. Will the elder clansmen be able to maintain stability in the 21st century, and in particular to counter the Islamists’ dream of a new safe haven after Afghanistan and southern parts of Somalia? Islamists are trying to establish a maritime link with Somalia and to build up maritime assets and abilities in order to gain a kind of “control” over the sea lanes around the Arabian Peninsula enabling them to carry out terrorist attacks in the maritime environment and perhaps also to engage in piracy in order to fund their war. Regarding the objective of conducting a new closein/blockade along the Yemeni coastline like that put in place to keep Somali pirates ashore, new mandates and more naval assets would be required.

Economic burden of Somali piracy The One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) has published a detailed study in which it estimates the economic costs of Somali piracy at some US$ 7 billion in 2011. Military operations (about 20 nations operating some 30 ships to fight piracy) account for a share of only 19% (US$ 1.4 billion); it is the shipping industry that carries the main burden. Ransoms account for a tiny share (2%) of that sum, insurance 10%, security equipment 17%, additional labour costs 3%, increased speed and fuel consumption in high-risk areas 40% and re-routing 9%. Increased fuel consumption alone amounts to nearly US$ 3.5 billion. To this sum of US$ 7 billion one must add the economic drawbacks for Somalia, Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania, which all suffer from higher prices for imported commodities.

Study and Executive Summary: www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

News: from Industry New EADS Top Management On 31 May 2012, EADS confirmed changes in its top management. The Annual General Meeting appointed a new Board of Directors with Arnaud Lagardère as Chairman and Dr Thomas Enders as Chief Executive Officer of EADS. At their meeting, the Board of Directors also appointed Harald Wilhelm as Chief Financial Officer of EADS N.V. and of Airbus S.A.S, succeeding Hans Peter Ring. Thierry Baril was appointed Chief Human Resources Dr Thomas Enders, Officer of EADS N.V. and of Airbus S.A.S. He new CEO of EADS replaces Jussi Itävuori. The Airbus ShareSource: EADS holder Committee has appointed Fabrice Brégier as new Chief Executive Officer Airbus taking over the post from Tom Enders. Based on a proposal by Fabrice Brégier, approved by the Board of Directors of EADS, the Airbus Shareholder Committee has also appointed Günter Butschek as Chief Operating Officer of Airbus. The CEO of EADS will announce the composition of the EADS Executive Committee in September, following the conclusions of his review of the state and strategy of the company.

NATO AGS takes off in Chicago NATO nations took an important step towards the delivery of a NATOowned and operated ground surveillance and reconnaissance capabil-

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ity. A procurement contract for the AGS system was signed with the US industrial group Northrop Grumman on 20 May 2012 in the margins of the NATO Summit in Chicago, paving the way for the delivery of a vital capability that will be made available to all NATO member nations. Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) will be a NATOowned and operated system and will be fully operational in 2017.

Dassault 2011 Results End of March, Charles Edelstenne, CEO of Dassault Aviation, presented the Results of is Group for 2011. Net sales (3,305 million) went down by 21% in 2011. This decrease results from a noticeably lower number of business jets deliveries compared to 2010, which was the Falcon historical delivery record.

The CEO commented: “However, 2011 net income is improving, thanks to Thales contribution. Thales 2011 good results are in line with their forecast. Regarding the prospects, the Group is pleased with the Indian Government decision to select the RAFALE in the frame of the MMRCA program, in order to equip the Indian Air Force with 126 aircraft. Our teams keep mobilized into obtaining the signature of the contract.” > An interactive version of the Annual results report is available here: http://tinyurl.com/ck62d6j

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS) 16 February 2012 SG 5 Strategic Communication Mann

Source: EEAS/Graphic: The European

F Audit, Inspection & ex-post control O’Sullivan f.f.

F.1 Internal Audit Lopparelli f.f.

Mediator.

Allegra

F.3.

Ex-post control

CIVCOM Leinonen, PMG Versmessen

Cavendish

MDR Administration & Finance

MD I ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MD II AFRICA

MD III EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Child ff

Isticioaia-Budura

Westcott

Lajcák

MDR A Finance and Corporate Support Guerend

MDR B Security Officer

MDR C Human Resources

I.A South and South East Asia

I.B North East Asia and the Pacific

Potuyt

Child

Serrano

Sabathil

II.A Horn of Africa, East Africa, Indian Ocean Vervaeke

MDR.A.1 Budget O’Neill

MDR .B.1 Field Security Croll

MDR.C.1 Human resources HQ Ruiz Serrano

I.A.1 India, Nepal, Bhutan Remond

MDR.A.2 Contracts Perez Jimenez

MDR.B.2 HQ Security Lajos

I.B.1 China, HK, Macao, Taiwan, Mongolia Cunningham f.f.

II.A.1 Horn of Africa, East Africa & Indian Ocean Lester

MDR.A.3 IT Ruys

MDR.B.3 Secure Communications Keymolen

MDR.C.2 Staff in Delegations Mandler

I.A.2 Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives Tirr

I.B.2 Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand Hatwell

II.A.2 Southern Africa Wiedey-Nippold

MDR.A.4 Infrastructure Christiane

MDR.C.3 Rights & Allowances Demassieux MDR.C.4 Local Agents in Delegation Notarangelo MDR.C.5 Partnerships with MS (ENDs) TheodorouKalogirou MDR.C.6 Resources & planning Klaar MDR.C.7 Training Ruiz Serrano f.f.

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F.2.

Inspection of delegations Graham

G PSC CHAIR Skoog Direct link to WG chairs

I.A.3 South East Asia Gillespie

I.B.3 Pacific Sabatucci I. 1 Horizontal affairs Molnar

COASI Majewski

II.B West & Central Africa Lopez Blanco

III.A Western Europe, Western Balkans and Turkey Gentilini

III.B Russia, E. Partnership; C. Asia R. Coop. & OSCE Wiegand

II.B.1 West Africa Doyle

III.A.1 Western Europe Grippa

II.B.2 Central Africa Tison

III.A.2 Western Balkans Jonsson

III.B.1 E. Partnership, reg. coop. & OSCE Tibbels

II.1 Pan-African affairs Costa Pereira

Turkey Advisor Portman

III.B.2 Eastern Partnership bilateral Kjaer III.B.3 Russia Pulch III.B.4 Central Asia Andres Maldonado

COAFR Lunny

COEST Vuorimaki, COWEB Everard, COSCE Bechet

Organisation chart

HRVP Ashton Chief Operating Officer O’Sullivan

DSG 1 DEPUTY SECRETARY General Popowski

Chair EUMC Syren

Executive Secretary General Vimont

SG.2 Strategic planning Conte

MD VII CRISIS RESPONSE & OPERATIONAL COORDINATION A. Miozzo

DSG 2 DEPUTY SECRETARY General Schmid

MD IV NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST, ARABIAN PENINSULA, IRAN AND IRAQ Mingarelli

IV.A N. Africa, Middle East, Ar. Peninsula, Iran and Iraq Berger

IV. 1. ENP Strategy and Instruments O’Rourke III.1. ENP Sector Coordination Majorenko

IV.A.1 Middle East I – Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan Uusitalo IV.A.2 Middle East II – Israel, occupied territories and MEPP Gabrici IV.A.3 Regional policies for the Southern Mediterranean Bergamini IV.A.4 Maghreb Fanti IV.A.5 Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq Llombart Cussac MAMA Bozovic, MOG Kisling COMEP Di Michele

CPCC Haber

Crisis management structures EU Satellite Centre

EDA

EU ISS

EUSRs

SG.3 CB secretariat Onestini

CMPD Stevens

Counsellor Cooper

Corporate board

SG.1 Policy coordination Campbell

EUMS Van Osch

H EP and national parliaments Matthiessen

SG.4 Legal affairs

SITCEN Salmi

Van Hegelsom

MD V AMERICAS

MD VI GLOBAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES

Leffler

Marinaki

V.A Americas

Dupla del Moral V.A.1 US, Canada Andresen Guimaraes V.A.2 Mexico and Central America Mavromichalis V.A.3 Andean Countries Martinez Carbonell V.A.4 Mercosur Countries Carro Castrillo V.A.5 Caribbean Kalogirou

V.1 Regional affairs Gelabert Rotger

COTRA Zajc Freudenstein, COLAT Gelabert

VI.A. Multilateral relations & global governance Grela ff

VI.B Human Rights and Democracy

Principal advisor Grela

VI.B.1 Human Rights policy guidelines Kionka

VI.A.1 Multilateral relations De Peyron VI.A.2 Global issues Guyader VI.A.3 Dev Coop coordination Fernandez Shaw

CONUN De Peyron

Arnault

VI.B.2 Human Rights policy instruments Timans

VI.C Conflict prevention, & security policy Marinaki f.f.

VI.D Non-Proliferation & Disarmament

VI.C.1 Peacebuilding, conflict prevention, mediation Jenny

VI.D.1 WMDs, conventional weapons, space Ganslandt

Marinaki ff

Budget, finance, interinstitutional relations Miller Stability instrument operations Ruiz-Calavera

VI.C.2 Security policy Roy

VI.B.3 Democracy, Electoral observation Wasilewska

Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI – Commission service) Margue

COARM Della Piazza, CONOP Rudischhauser, CODUN Ganslandt

COHOM Theuermann

CFSP operations Auvinen Public diplomacy; election observation Nette f.f.

KEY: reporting directly to the HRVP ASHTON Corporate and Policy Boards Working Group Chairs CFSP Agencies Crisis management structures Commission Service reporting directly to HRVP ASHTON

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