The European Security and Defence Union Issue 1

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence Volumn No 1/2008

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Dr.

THE NEW ROLE

TURKEYS ROLE

of European Parliament for Security and Defence

for European Security and Defence

RUSSIA

CLIMATE•CHANGE

and the European Security

and Security

GALILEO – The Way Ahead

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Editor Hartmut Bühl International Consulting for European Security & Defence Policy and NATO-Affairs, Head of the Brussels Office “ Der BehördenSpiegel” and Senior Editor European Affairs Born on February 25th, 1940 in Karlsruhe, Hartmut Bühl retired in 1998 from the German Armed Forces as a General Staff Colonel, Artillery (Führungsakademie Hamburg / Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, Paris) after a wide-ranging military career involving operational duties in combination with defence and security policy appointments. His responsibilities included among others: Defence and Security Policy Adviser to the German Chancellors (1982-1986); German Military Attaché in Paris (1986-1990); Territorial Brigade 54, Trier (1990-1991); German Head of the Euurocorps’ Mounting Headquarter in Strasbourg (1992-1993); Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS) of the Eurocorps (19931995); Commander of the Military Division 43 in Darmstadt(1996-1998).

On leaving the Bundeswehr, Bühl joined the French - German Company EUROMISSILE near Paris as Vice President and Marketing Director (1998 – 2001 ) before becoming the first EADS Vice President and Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO in Brussels (2001-2005). In parallel, he was the Team Lead Marketing of the transatlantic industrial consortium “TIPS” for the Atlantic Ground Surveillance Project/AGS (2002-2006) before he was appointed as Team Lead Communications of AGS Industries (2006-2007).

Impressum The European – Security and Defence Union is published by the ProPress Publishing Group Brussels/Berlin.

Headquarter Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557412-0 Fax: +49/30/557412-33 Advertisement Office: Daniel Bou-Fadel Headquarter Berlin Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B 1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135 Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970970 Fax: +49/228/97097-75

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Since 2007 he is Managing Director of an International Consulting Office EU and NATO in Brussels and Senior Editor European Affairs of the German’s Administration monthly “ Der BehördenSpiegel”, Bonn/ Berlin .

Hartmut Bühl has edited and co-edited (from 1982 to 1998) several books on Security & Defence Policy and Strategy, including a Dictionary. His last publication was a reader (with Dr. Klaus Achmann) about the German Military Resistance against Hitler (20th July 1944).

His decorations include: • The German Bundesverdienstkreuz 1. Klasse des Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1993) • The French National Order of Merit (Officer and Commander (1981/1993) • The French Knight of the Order of the Legion of Merit (Ordre de Mérit de la Legion d’Honneur/ 2004) • The United States Meritorious Medal (1998).

Hartmut Bühl is a member of the Advisory Board of the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) in Brussels. He is a founding member of the NGO “EuroDefence” where he is actually Vice President of the German and a member of the French section.

Since March 2008 he is a Municipal Councillor of Berchères-surVesgre, France

Publisher: R. Uwe Proll Editor-in-chief: Hartmut Bühl Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European – Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group, Organizer of the Congress on Security Defence (Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congress please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published quarterly in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 8 Euro, for one year 30 Euro. © 2008 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

EDITORIAL

Editorial Today’s Europe is a mighty union of free nations. Yet its structure is complicated and it must function in a complex world that requires decisions to be taken quickly, particularly where security and defence matters are concerned. The influence of the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy has grown with time and so too has its political effectiveness, notwithstanding the recent constitutional setback. However, Europe has yet to become an autonomous military power. The EU had intended the Lisbon treaty to serve as a basis from which to effectively exert its influence on global politics and so reinforce European security. In doing so it was fully aware of the consequences for Brussels, and the Member states share the belief that they should exercise that influence and, furthermore, prepare to manage difficult crises and conflicts.

Ensuring security – no slam dunk The citizens of Europe would not dispute the legitimacy of Europe’s common foreign and security policy under the leadership of the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, and its contribution to the management of international crises. A poll in 2007 showed 73 per cent of all Europeans to be in favour of a strong Europe able to guarantee their defence and security.

However, the fact that the EU’s peace missions have so far passed off smoothly cannot disguise the limitations on the provision of security whenever military resources are needed to implement it. Virtually all of Europe’s armed forces are plainly short of capabilities and Europe’s necessary reliance on the mutual support between the EU and NATO offered by the Berlin plus agreement should not be allowed to develop into a permanent state of dependency. An enhanced co-operaion with NATO and reliable transatlantic relations will be the base for Europe’s security and defence.

Countering threats together It is precisely because the European States, taken individually, are no longer able to cope with the risks and challenges to their security, that political, military and industrial leaders need to set a higher goal. Calls for the establishment of a Euro pean army are heard more and more frequently and the idea is finding increasing support in the European parliament. So far, cooperative projects like the Eurocorps Franco-German brigade, the Stettin corps, the Air Transport Command, Eurofor and Euromarfor have arisen separately outside of any organised system. They could however be “joined up” to form the pillars of a European security and defence identity. This could inclu-

de common procurement initiatives which would, in turn, drive industry’s core strengths beyond national boundaries to create European system builders.

Security and research Construction of Europe’s security and defence apparatus in the long Hartmut Bühl term calls for solid investment in research which, in the EU framework, should now also encompass civil defence measures.

After the efforts made towards setting up a European Defence market, attention now needs to focus on creating a single security market in Europe. In fact, these two markets increasingly intersect and the boundary between them is blurring.

Civil operations (disaster relief, counter-terrorism, police operations) are often only possible with upstream cooperation and support from the military. It will be increasingly difficult to maintain an artificial divide between military and civilian technology as the civilian marketplace multiplies its calls to apply technologies that used to be the military’s preserve – a neat reversal, in fact, of the past flow of technology from the civilian to the military sector. It is, nonetheless, ever more urgent to set up a single security market – the European security industry needs it, and it will give Europe a chance to hold its ground in a global context.

A European Army – beyond the vision And so we come full circle. The insistent demands for Europe to be a global player require a concerted effort from Europeans over many years and this can only be guaranteed durably if Europe’s citizens perceive their efforts as leading to successes.

Popular support for security and defence must therefore be fostered throughout the European Union. The overarching ambition to create a European security and defence union with a European Army – how the armed forces might ever be organized and composed – is the kind of motivation the citizens of Europe need.

This new publication shall strive to cover the full spectrum of European foreign and security policy issues, both individually and as a whole, and will keep you abreast of developments each quarter.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Content Russia and the Defence of Europe Manuel Medina Ortega MEP .......................... 25 Preface: Dr. Hans-Gert Pöttering

The Role of the European Parliament for Security and Defence Dr. Karl von Wogau MEP................................ 9 European Defence: Where do we go from here?

Jean-Pierre Masseret ...................................12

The Role of Turkey for European Security Tomur Bayer ............................................ 27

The European Organization for Security (EOS) – Strategy ahead Luigi Rebuffi ............................................ 31 A Natural Marriage – Conversation of the Civil and Military Security Market Interview with Hérvé Guillou ....................... 35 The Role of the EU Security Research Dr. Paul Weissenberg.................................. 37

European Security and Climat Change Javier Solana .............................................17 Is Energy a Factor of Instability for Europe ?

Interview with Angelika Beer MEP ................. 21 Russia and the European Security Vladimir Chizhov........................................ 23

Realistic Structured Cooperation Procedures in the Field of Security and Defence Robert Walter MP....................................... 39 Testing Times for European Crisis Management Alastaire Cameron ..................................... 41

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CONTENT

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence – a Capability for the Alliance and Protection for Europe Richard D. F. Froh ...................................... 57 EUFOR Chad/RCA – Progress and Ongoing Success Patrick Nash............................................. 59 Galileo – on Giant Leap for Europe Dr. Reinhold Lutz

What Legitimacy for the EUROCORPS? Pedro Pitarch ........................................... 61

European Industry is ready to close EU’s Capability Short falls - Example Transport Helicopters Oliver Bruzek ............................................51

A strong Base in Europe for Global Ambitions Interview with Jean-Paul Herteman .............. 54

The Politico- Military Organization of the European Union Christoph Raab ......................................... 64 The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) André Pirlet ............................................. 67

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PREFACE

Preface In the European Union, security and defence policy issues are a matter of increasing public interest. Today, many people are coming to recognise that the so-called peace dividend barely outlasted the 1990s. The fight against international terrorism, the threat to free maritime trade posed by pirates and Russia’s military action in Georgia are clear illustrations of the fact that in the future as well Europe will continue to face a series of very dangerous challenges.

Today, nobody seriously doubts the premise that the European nations can only meet the challenges of the 21st century together. This is already the European consensus view in many policy areas. In the area central to State sovereignty, security policy, however, joint action is only in its infancy, even though, in the first decade of the 21st century, Europe faces wideranging security policy challenges which we can only overcome by working together.

In the defence sphere, just as in many others, tight national budgets could act as the catalyst for faster progress towards the coordination of policies. Even the larger Member States of the European Union are increasingly acknowledging the limits to national projects. However, the answer to these problems does not simply lie in closer cooperation between autonomous national armies, but rather in quantum leaps in the areas of joint command structures, equipment and operations.

Like many other bodies, the European Parliament has been monitoring these developments for decades. As long ago as 1984, it introduced parliamentary scrutiny of this important policy sphere by setting up a Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament. As the first chairman of that subcommittee, I spent 10 years dealing with security and defence issues.

Some hostile reactions to the establishment of our subcommittee are still very fresh in my mind. ‘What, now you're taking on security and defence policy as well?’ was many people’s response at the time. Although under the Lisbon Treaty security and defence policy remains a Member State matter, for many years the European Parliament has been exerting a perceptible influence on security policy discussions and decisions in the European Union.

One thing is true for all the Member States: any attempt to overcome global challenges by means of purely national measures is doomed to failure. Further moves towards integrated European structures are now on the agenda. It is intended that these structures should combine civilian and military

capabilities and secure broad social acceptance in the Member States. The European Parliament is a key partner in this process and supports the efforts being made by the Member States and the European Council.

Dr. Hans- Gert Pöttering, In that connection, it is worth President of the pointing out that, as opinion polls have consistently confirmed European Parliament for years, there is public backing in the European Union for the call for closer coordination in the area of security and defence policy. A majority of Europeans support the aim of establishing a European army, although many people have still to be convinced of the value of such a step.

In the long term, joint action is impossible without joint institutions, efficiency and effectiveness are inconceivable without standardisation and cohesiveness. For that reason, the strengthening of the European Armaments Agency (EAA) is essential for efficient use of resources and to prevent unnecessary duplication of national projects and the application of internal market rules with as few derogations as possible is of vital importance to the armaments industry. In that connection, we are looking to two new directives to foster the development of a joint armaments market, as a result of which the current practice of protecting armaments markets against competition will become the exception, rather than the rule. At the same time, the European Parliament is calling for greater consideration to be given to joint European interests in the area of security and defence policy. I am convinced that there is already a consensus to the effect that, in addition to peace in Europe and in our neighbourhood, specifically European security interests also include secure energy supplies and the protection of global trade routes. This consensus is something we can build on.

This plethora of complex issues should not deter us from the task in hand. It is worth meeting these challenges in order to safeguard security in Europe and export security to other parts of the world. After all, consciously shaping the future is better than clinging obstinately to the past. In the future, the magazine ‘The European - Security and Defence Union’ will be our competent and informative companion on this journey.

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12Hth European Police Congress

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10. - 11. 02. 2009 Berlin

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12. Europäischer Polizeikongress

Meet the Politicians

Prevention: Principles, Strategies and Technology

st

European Security in the 21 Century

es e for Authoriti Free of charg

Jacques Barrot European Commission Vice President and Commissioner

Dr. Wolfgang Schäube

Jüri Pihl

German Ministry of the Interior Minister of the Interior

Estonian Ministry of the Interior Minister of the Interior

Dr. Maria Fekter

Dr. Ingo Wolf

Austrian Ministry of the Interior Minister of the Interior

Ministry of the Interior of NRW Minister of the Interior

Discuss with Experts

Ronald K. Noble Interpol Secretary General

Max-Peter Ratzel

Konrad Freiberg

Europol Executive Director

German Union of the Police (GdP) Chairman

Antonio Maria Costa

Dr. Wolfram Geier

UN Office for Drugs and Crime Executive Director

Federal Office on Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Head of Unit

Industry Key-Notes Dr. Jörg Kattein

Dr. Martin Schellenberg

rola Security CEO

German PPP-Union Chairman

Dr. Stefan Zoller EADS Head of Defence and Security

ation at r t s i g e R d n a Programme police.eu n a e p o r u e . w ww

POLITICAL ISSUES

The Role of the European Parliament for Security and Defence Dr. Karl von Wogau MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, Brussels

Since the end of the Cold War, the threats against Europe have fundamentally changed. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime are nowadays the most important threats posed to the Union and its citizens. In addition, there are the dependency of our energy supply, natural disasters, and the securing of our external borders. We are also concerned about the prospect of renewed arms races at global and regional levels, the ongoing proliferation of conventional arms and we have to develop a common strategy for the relationship with Russia.

The Europeans Unions interests

Dr. Karl von Wogau MEP Dr. Karl von Wogau MEP, born 18th July 1941 in Freiburg (Germany), Studies in Law and Economics in Freiburg, Munich and Bonn.

Member of the European Parliament since 1979. In 1984 author in the European Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee of the report launching the Internal Market Programme. From 1994-1999 Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy. Since 2004 chairman of the newly set up Subcommittee in the European Parliament on Security and Defence. Substitute Member in the Committee on Foreign Affairs; Substitute Member in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs; Member in the Delegation for relations with NATO. Cofounder and Chairman of the Kangaroo Group.

Most of the threats to security facing us today have one thing in common: no single state can meet these challenges effectively on its own. Many of the duties arising in the areas of security and defence can be tackled effectively only at European level, such as guarding Europe’s external borders, the fight terest”, by contrast, is politically still taboo. This taboo is no against international crime and smashing terrorist funding longer acceptable. Ever growing political, economic, social and networks. This would have been too tall an order for the cultural ties between Member States and the challenges of individual Member States on their own, and NATO does not globalisation make the concept of purely national security have the wherewithal to drain terrorists’ funding networks, for interests in Europe increaexample. Most citizens are singly out-dated. fully aware of this fact: AccorIt is therefore both possible ding to Eurobarometer surveys Up until now, Member States define and necessary to define the (June 2008), 81% of EU citizens their security interests on a purely national Union’s common security think that the fight against basis. The notion of “European security interests. Such interests could terrorism should be led at the be: security of our neighbourEuropean level. interest”, by contrast, is politically still hood, protection of external The European Union needs a taboo. borders and critical infrastrucstrong and effective Foreign, tures, secure energy supply Security and Defence Policy in and trade routes etc. Only if we have a clear idea of our comorder to defend its interests in the world, to protect the securimon interests, we can make our common policies more cohety of its citizens and to defend Human Rights. rent and effective. It is therefore high time to have an open This policy has to combine the use of both civil and military debate on what the Union’s common security interests are. assets and capabilities and necessitates close and seamless cooperation between all actors. At the same time, transparency and cost-efficiency are crucial to ensure public support for The European security strategy review European defence.

The European Security Strategy of 2003 analyses the post 9-11 To strengthen this comprehensive Foreign and Security Policy, threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destrucwe need to develop a clear idea of the Union’s security intetion, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime) and rests, the strategy to pursue these interests, the capabilities to identifies strategic objectives, which became the basis for subtake action and the best way to develop these capabilities. strategies (non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, etc.).

Up until now, Member States define their security interests on In December 2007, the European Council decided to review the a purely national basis. The notion of “European security in Security Strategy. I welcome this decision and encourage the

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

European Council to launch a broad and open debate on a possible revision of the Security Strategy.

Although many elements of the Strategy are still valid, others should probably be adapted. This is the case in particular for the EU’s relationship with Russia, its engagement in Africa, but also energy supply, climate change and cyber warfare.

I think that we should review the Security Strategy regularly every five years at the beginning of a new legislative period.

On this base the Union should therefore elaborate a White Book on European Security and Defence as a tool to ensure that the Security Strategy is implemented in a satisfactory way.

It is clear that the European Union needs the means to implement its policies. Hence, it needs both civil and military capabilities to strengthen the European Security and Defence Policy and to fulfil its responsibilities in the world.

In the military field, the development of the Battle Groups has been an important step for building European capabilities.

However, the Union needs armed forces which are available for a longer period of time. The European Parliament has therefore suggested placing the Eurocorps permanently at the disposal of the European Union.

At the same time, experience shows that the capability needs are often technologically very similar or even the same for operations of armed forces, border surveillance, protection of critical infrastructures and disaster management. This creates new opportunities to exploit synergies and enhance the interoperability between armed forces and security forces.

The capabilities The Union should therefore focus its efforts on common capabilities which can be used for both defence and security purposes. In this context, satellite based intelligence, unmanned air vehicles, helicopters and telecommunication equipment as well as air and sea transport are crucial. A common technical standard for protected telecommunications and means for the protection of critical infrastructures are equally important.

In order to develop the capabilities needed for a strong European Security and Defence Policy, Member States must coope rate more and better than in the past. This necessitates a stronger involvement of the Union and structural reforms to overcome in particular persisting barriers between defence and security.

More specifically, we should rapidly increase the Community funding for security research and foster joint research programmes between the Commission and the European Defence Agency, establish a European Defence and Security Market and Europeanise strategic assets by allowing the use of Galileo and GMES for security and defence purposes, and by developing common capabilities in the areas of strategic transport and logistics. We should also strengthen the European Defence College and transform it into a permanent structure

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On site experiences: Dr. Karl von Wogau discussing with Border Guard Officers in Moldavia..

which contributes to the development of a specifically European security culture.

However, the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy is not only a question of advancing our civilian and military capabilities to act. We must also ponder over the decision structures at European level.

The EU Military mission in eastern Chad and the Monitoring Mission in Georgia provide an opportunity to discuss important questions about the role of the European Parliament in the rapidly expanding policy area of European Security and Defence Policy. I am just back from a visit to Georgia and in the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) we will be scrutinising the further development of this mission.

The Subcommitte on Security and Defence has been very active in monitoring the European Security and Defence Policy since its inauguration at the beginning of the 2004 term. We began that legislature by focusing our attention on “catching up” with the Council which has had a 5 year head-start since the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy at the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Councils. The speed in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, with today 14 ongoing and 9 completed missions, and its undoubted impact on driving forward a new more visible Foreign Policy of the European Union raises important questions for both the European Parliament and the citizens of Europe.

Pushing for progress The European Security and Defence Policy has been criticised for its development “behind closed doors” which has had little (national or European) parliamentary scrutiny. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence aims at

POLITICAL ISSUES

bridging both a gap in parliamentary scrutiny as well as an important gap between European decision-making and Europe’s citizens.

The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence has been active in a number of areas as an integrator of ideas by elaborating concrete proposals for the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy.

One important recent example is a resolution, that I had the privilege of steering through parliament as rapporteur, on the importance of space-based infrastructure for the security of Europe. The report points to the importance of the space dimension to the security of the European Union. In the report, the European Parliament urges the EU Member States having access to the various types of radar, optical and weather observation satellites and reconnaissance systems to make them compatible and to make the imagery available to the EU Satellite Centre and for ESDP operations. The report also recommends that the MUSIS system be brought within a European framework and financed from the EU budget. The report emphasises the importance of GMES for foreign as well as security and defence policies of the European Union and underlines the necessity of Galileo for autonomous ESDP operations, for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and for Europe’s own security.

ported the adoption of a resolution calling for the deployment of an EU Monitoring mission in Georgia.

On this point I would stress that in the Subcommittee we have ambitions to achieve the highest standards of scrutiny before any European citizen’s live is put in danger by being sent on a civilian or military operation under the command of the European Union. The European Parliament’s objective is to ensure an effective parliamentary scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy in close cooperation with the parliaments of the member states.

We have discussed how to exercise our existing rights (article 21 Treaty of the European Union) to provide a recommendation to the Council on operations in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Ideally the European Parliament should express its recommendation before any operation is deployed such as achieved before the Congo mission. In adopting such a resolution the European Parliament would be showing its responsibility to Europe’s citizens (including its soldiers) as well as shedding the light of parliamentary scrutiny, and therefore democratic legitimacy, into the decision making.

Successful undertakings In elaborating such concrete proposals the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence benefits from the fact that we as Parliamentarians are not limited to the economic aspects of security and defence (as the Commission is) nor to political aspects (as the Council is). It is an important comparative advantage of the European Parliament that it is the right place to discuss the entire spectrum of European security and defence.

In our Subcommittee we have regular meetings with experts and officials from the Council, Commission, Member States, industry and think tanks that have focussed upon responding to some of the key issues in the field of European security and defence. This has included the sensitive issue of Missile Defence, questions related to opening up the internal market to defence equipment, the implementation of EU Export Controls on defence related goods and “the costs of non Europe” through the waste of tax payers money on inefficient and duplicative defence capability procurement.

Documentation European Security Strategy The European security strategy “A secure Europe in a better world”, drafted under the responsabilities of the Eu High Representative Javier Solana, was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 (...)

“No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. (...) As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union (...) should be ready to share in the responsability for global security and in building a better world. (...)

Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. (...)

We need to develop a strategic culture that foster early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention. (...)

Monitoring and influencing of EU mission Special attention has been given to monitoring and securitising ESDP military and civilian operations. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence has held in-depth meetings on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Chad as well as sup-

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities.” (...)

Source: Council of the European Union, 12-12-2003

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POLITICAL ISSUES

European Defence: Where do we go from here?

by Jean-Pierre Masseret, President of the European Security and Defence Assembly/WEU Assembly The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) allows Europeans to work together towards international peace through military or civil operations. Europe’s citizens are largely in favour of this policy. Yet the ESDP has reached its limits: farreaching political initiatives are required for it to flourish.

European security and defence policy: state of play Since 2003, the European Union has carried out some 15 operations in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. What the European countries have achieved together is undoubtedly worthwhile. EU action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Moldova in particular, as well as in the Palestinian Territories and Indonesia, has been useful and indeed in some cases decisive for promoting peace and development. The EU is also present in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Chad and Georgia.

Jean-Pierre Masseret Jean-Pierre Masseret (France, Socialist Group) was elected President of the European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western European Union on 7 December 2005 and re-elected for two successive years.

Mr Masseret is a Senator representing the Moselle region and President of the Regional Council for Lorraine. Born on 23 August 1944 in Cusset (Allier), Jean-Pierre Masseret studied public law before becoming a principal inspector at the Inland Revenue.

In 1997 he joined Lionel Jospin’s government as State Secretary for Defence, a post he occupied until 2001 when he was re-elected to the Senate.

The Lisbon Treaty: expected major innovations Crisis Management The crisis-management missions led today by the EU were originally defined in the framework of Western European Union (WEU). The WEU Council of Ministers, meeting in Petersberg (Germany) on 19 June 1992, drew up a list of crisis-management missions to which the member states wished to be able to bring a joint response. The definition of the so-called Petersberg tasks was included word for word in the Amsterdam Treaty (Article J.7), making the EU an important player in international security, and was fully incorporated in the Treaty of Nice (Article 17) in 2000. This treaty is currently the legal basis of the EU’s security and defence policy activities. The Lisbon Treaty (if ratified) provides for the extension of these missions.

Structural weaknesses While the ESDP can be described as satisfactory, there is no denying its recurrent structural weaknesses. It does not have means commensurate with the stated international ambitions of the EU member states or with the expectations of Europe’s international partners: it lacks financial resources. It is hampered by member states’ capability shortfalls and by the unwieldiness of decision-making procedures based on unanimity. The Lisbon Treaty includes a number of innovations that will help the ESDP to function more efficiently. However, this will not be enough to guarantee its optimum development in the long term. It was hard to get together the capabilities for the EU’s recent military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, and for the EU police mission in Afghanistan and the rule-of-law mission under preparation in Kosovo.

The Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (the Lisbon Treaty) was signed in Lisbon by the Heads of State and Government of the 27 EU member states on 13 December 2007. The aim was for it to be ratified before the elections to the European Parliament in June 2009.

On 12 June 2008 all eyes in Europe were on Ireland, the only country to have organised a referendum in order to ratify the Treaty. Irish voters rejected it by a clear majority (53.4% against, 46.6% in favour). Three years after the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in May and June 2005 (by a majority of 54.67% and 61.6% respectively) the EU is far from having resolved its institutional problems. On 20 August 2008, 24 out of 27 member states had ratified the Lisbon Treaty. Ratification procedures are under way in Sweden and the Czech Republic. The Polish Parliament has approved the Treaty but the Ratification Act remains to be signed by the Polish President. The question is what to do about the Irish “no” vote. The vote would probably have gone the same way in various other member states had they held a referendum. As stressed by the late Bronislaw GEREMEK (historian, MEP and Polish Foreign Affairs Minister from 2000 to 2007) in an interview with the French daily Le Monde in June 2008, “the three consecutive “no” votes in France, the Netherlands and Ireland signal a misunderstanding between the European institutions and citizens”.

Assuming that the Lisbon Treaty is one day fully ratified (with a second vote taking place in due time in Dublin, as was the case for the Nice Treaty), new possibilities for European cooperation

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Mutual Assistance Clause in case of an armed attack: Article V of the Brussels Treaty (WEU) and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO) Article V of the Brussels Treaty signed on 17 March 1948 and amended by the Paris Agreements signed on 23 October 1954: If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington DC on 4 April 1949: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

will be opened up in the field of security and defence.

• The European Council will have an elected President with a two-and-a-half-year mandate renewable once.

• The post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be created, merging the functions of the current High Representative for the CFSP/ Secretary-General of WEU (Javier Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (Benita Ferrero-Waldner).

• A European External Action Service will also be set up.

Mutual assistance The Lisbon Treaty contains a clause on mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression (Article 42.7). However, being non-binding, it is not comparable to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty or Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. There is no explicit mention of military means. Moreover, it is stipulated that this clause “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States” and that “for those States which are members of it, NATO remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”. It is true that this clause leaves the door open for achieving a common defence structure in the future as it establishes its political legitimacy. It is only natural that NATO should remain, for those countries which are members of it, the foundation of their collective defence. But the words

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“and the forum for its implementation” appear to rule out the possibility of establishing a collective defence mechanism within the EU framework.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) The Lisbon Treaty confirms the role of the European Defence Agency “in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments” and stipulates that it “shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities” (Article 42.3). However the Agency’s budget is still too small and the political will is still lacking on the part of some member states.

Permanent structured cooperation (PSC) The treaty makes provision for permanent structured cooperation among member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, with a view to the most demanding missions (Articles 42.6 and 46). It also provides for the possibility of entrusting missions to a group of states that are willing and have the requisite capabilities (Article 44). However the protocols appended to the treaty make it clear that such “structured cooperation” undertakings would be confined in reality to the efforts made by all countries in order to attain the 2010 Headline Goal approved earlier by the EU member states.

Expanding the range of Petersberg missions Furthermore, in view of the new threats to European security, the Lisbon Treaty makes provision for expanding the range of Petersberg missions in order to include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories” (Article 43 of the Lisbon Treaty/Treaty on the EU).

Solidarity clause Finally, member states will be bound by a solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster: “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to (…) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in

POLITICAL ISSUES

Western European Union and European Defence: – some key dates – 17.3. 1948:

the event of a terrorist attack (…)”. (Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty/Treaty on European Union).

Common Union defence policy However, the question of a common defence seems to be put off indefinitely: “The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (Article 42.2).

The civil and military capabilities of the EU member states must match their political ambitions. It is therefore urgent for the European governments to develop mechanisms to better pool their resources (in particular in the area of combat helicopters, strategic transport and space capabilities) and make their capabilities more effective on the ground. It is also necessary to establish the principles of an effective and complementary relationship between NATO and the EU and to provide European defence with the resources it requires. It is pointless to dream up new ideas on paper such as the Helsinki Headline Goal or the EU battlegroups, which our military do their level best to implement, and then refuse to use these stand-by forces. It would also make sense for the EU to have a permanent operational headquarters in Brussels.

The challenges of democratic oversight of European defence European leaders promise “more democracy, more transparency!” It is time for them to deliver those promises at the European level, in particular as regards the common security and defence policy (CSDP), an “integral part of the common foreign and security policy” (CFSP) which remains intergovernmental.

The Lisbon Treaty does not give the Commission any new decision-making powers nor does it increase the role of the European Parliament which will continue to be “regularly consulted and informed” of the main aspects and fundamental decisions taken under the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy. MEPs have no right of scrutiny over matters relating to common defence and the ESDP. The Lisbon Treaty does however stipulate that twice a year the European Parliament will debate the progress achieved in the implementation of the CFSP, including the common security and defence policy, which de facto increases its powers of scrutiny over the CFSP. Nonetheless it is national parliamentarians who have the main responsibility for parliamentary scrutiny over the CSDP. Indeed it is national parliamentarians who vote defence budgets and decide whether to deploy troops for European or international missions. Within each country it is firstly at this level that political battles are waged to find solutions to common challenges and bolster defence efforts.

In the interests of democratic legitimacy, the European foreign,

The Brussels Treaty is signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

27.5. 1952: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands sign the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty in Paris. (The project was abandoned when the French National Assembly failed to ratify the Treaty on 30 August 1954).

23.10. 1954: Signature of the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty (creating WEU). Germany and Italy join the modified Brussels Treaty.

27.10. 1984: Rome Declaration – the first joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of the WEU member states.

27.10. 1987: The Hague Platform on European security interests is adopted by the WEU Council.

1987-1989: WEU mine-clearance operations and escort of merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war.

1990-1991: WEU coordinates the maritime embargo-monitoring operation in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. 7.2. 1992: Signature of the Maastricht Treaty – this Treaty confirmed the EU’s resolve to develop a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and made WEU an integral part of the development of the EU. 22.5. 1992: Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl signed the La Rochelle Agreement establishing a French-German Army Corps, later joined by Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, and renamed EUROCORPS 19.6. 1992: The Petersberg Declaration (Bonn) strengthens WEU action in the field of peacekeeping missions and draws up the criteria for the so-called Petersberg tasks.

16.7. 1992: Launch of WEU Operation Sharp Vigilance in the Adriatic (to monitor the UN embargo against the new Republic of Yugoslavia formed by Serbia and Montenegro).

1993-1996: WEU embargo-monitoring operation on the Danube.

1993-1996: Joint WEU-NATO Operation Sharp Guard in the Aliatic.

1994-1996: WEU contribution to the Mostar administration (police).

14.11. 1995: The Common European Security Concept of the 27 WEU countries is adopted by the WEU Council in Madrid.

2.10. 1997: Signature of the Amsterdam Treaty fostering closer institutional relations with WEU with a view to the possible integration of WEU into the Union should the European Council so decide.

3-4.6. 1999: Cologne European Council – decision to include “those functions of the WEU to be necessary to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks”.

13.11. 1999: Javier Solana is appointed Secretary-General of the EU Council/ High Representative for the CFSP, and WEU Secretary-General.

1999-2001: WEU Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia (WEUDAM) – at the request of the EU. 20-21.3. 2000: WEU Assembly Special Session (Lisbon) on “European security and defence: the parliamentary dimension” adopts the subtitle “Interim European Security and Defence Assembly (iESDA)”.

13.11. 2000: WEU Ministerial Council (Marseille): transfer of WEU operational functions to the EU. 7-8.12. 2000: The Nice European Council establishes on a permanent basis the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

26.2. 2001: Signature of the Treaty of Nice.

12.2. 2003: Following the entry into force of the Nice Treaty, the WEU Assembly decides to amend its subtitle to “Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly” (IESDA).

13.12. 2007: Signature of the Lisbon Treaty.

6.5. 2008: The European Security and Defence Assembly / WEU Assembly, adopts a new Charter and Rules of Procedure. The parliamentarians of the 27 EU member states have full member status within

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Hemicycle of the European Security Defence Assembly, Palais d'Iéna, Paris

security and defence policy must continue to be subject to democratic scrutiny exercised collectively by national parliamentarians meeting in a European interparliamentary assembly. This is essential for national parliamentarians to fulfil their constitutional obligations. It is not a question of setting up a second chamber alongside the European Parliament. Such interparliamentary cooperation is already embodied in the European Security and Defence Assembly/WEU Assembly. The Assembly admirably fulfils its mission of interparliamentary scrutiny over the CFSP, though as a European institution that came into being before the birth of the EU, like the Council of Europe, it does not bear the “EU” stamp. For as long as there is no common defence in the EU, the simplest solution is for the ESDA/WEU Assembly to continue to exercise democratic scrutiny over all matters relating to European security and defence in accordance with its remit under the modified Brussels Treaty [see insert 4] and for its role to be recognised by the European Union. This would enable the European Parliament and the ESDA/WEU Assembly to work together usefully.

In the body of the new Treaty on European Union, there is a new Article 12.f on the role of the national parliaments in the European Union which provides for interparliamentary cooperation “between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament”. This provision takes account of the resolve of member states to give national parliaments an increased role within the Union. In addition, the protocol (No 11) on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that “The European Union shall draw up, together with the Western European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them”. Our Assembly is the only WEU body that can cooperate with the EU. Parliamentarians, elected by the people, are responsible for exercising scrutiny over what concerns the lives of their fellow citizens. The Lisbon Treaty does not alter this responsibility in any way. Our Assembly is a forum for discussion and analysis

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where the national parliamentarians of European states, both members and nonmembers of the EU, which contribute to the European Security and Defence Policy, can express and debate their analyses and views. Our Assembly, through its political recommendations, is working towards greater European integration in the area of defence and security and enables the national parliamentarians of European countries to exercise interparliamentary scrutiny over the ESDP, which for the time being remains an intergovernmental policy.

Europe does not want enemies and can only see potential “partners” around the world. Yet Europe cannot be a global player in tomorrow’s world without a proper defence policy. Its existence and the survival of its member states are at stake. It is therefore important to explain these challenges to European citizens who are often less cautious and more clear-sighted about these vital issues than the political decision-makers.

Documentation Headline Goals Headline Goal 2003 (endorsed by the European Council, Helsinki, 11 and 12 December 1999): (...) “To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50.000-60.000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days (...). They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. (...) Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit.” (...)

Source: Presidency conclusions, Annex IV, Helsinki European Council 10/11-12-1999 Headline Goal 2010 (endorsed by the European Council, 17 and 18 June 2004) EU Rapid Response elements including high readiness joint force packages (“battlegroups”) of around 1 500 troops, as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases; relevant air and naval capabilities to be included. Decision to launch an operation within five days and deployment of troops within 10 days to an external theatre of operations; the EU should be able to undertake two battlegroup-size operations for a period of up to 120 days simultaneously.

The battlegroups, most of which are multinational, have been fully operational since 1 January 2007. Around 15 battlegroups have been set up and are scheduled to participate in the duty rota for the next three years.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Climate Change and Security

by Dr. Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Brussels The world is waking up to a new kind of conflict. Clashes over pastoral grazing rights in the Sahel; piracy off the coast of Somalia; melting glaciers in the Himalayas; Russian explorers planting their national flag on the seabed at the North Pole.

These are the potential flashpoints of the twenty-first century, where old sources of conflict are fanned by the new pressures from climate change generating additional tensions. How we respond, and how far we can manage these tensions, will decide in part whether we can preserve a peaceful international order through this century.

Over the last eighteen months, we have become more aware of these issues. In April 2007, following a British initiative, the UN Security Council held a first debate on the links between climate change and international conflict. In March of this year, along with the Commission, I presented a report to the European Council on Climate Change and International Security. At the same time, many seasoned commentators on foreign and security policy, including from the military establishment, have drawn attention to the issue.

What we know My report drew four main conclusions. The first is that climate change is already happening. The latest assessment by the International Panel on Climate Change estimates that over the last fifty years average global temperatures have increased every year by 0.13 degrees celsius. Sea levels rose by 3.1 mm over 1993 to 2003. Precipitation, drought and extreme weather events have also increased. It is very likely that these effects are linked to human activity. We must respond now.

Secondly, climate change acts as a threat multiplier. It increases the pressure on other drivers of conflict and instability, through reduced resources, desertification, migration, natural disasters and changes to coastlines, among others. Developed societies, which have the resources to handle these tensions, are better equipped to respond. However states that are already weak can be tipped over the edge, with consequences that are exported outside their borders.

Take Somalia, as a topical example. A cycle of drought and flood has reduced food production and bred instability, in a society already weakened by interethnic tensions, extremism and outside intervention. The consequences have included greater emigration and pirate attacks on international shipping. We face a challenge which combines humanitarian and security elements. In recent weeks, the EU has decided to deploy a naval mission to the region – our first under the

Javier Solana Born in Madrid on 14 July 1942 Married, two children.

Doctorate in physics - Fulbright scholar at several US universities.

• Professor of solid-state physics at Madrid Complutense University - author of over thirty publications in the field.

• Member of the Spanish Chapter of the Club of Rome.

• Joined the Spanish Socialist Party in 1964.

• Member of the Spanish Parliament as from 1977.

• Spanish Cabinet Minister from 1982 to 1995 without interruption: • 1982 / 1995: Minister for Culture, Minister for Education and Science, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

• 1995 / 1999: Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

• Since 18 October 1999: Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

• Since 25 November 1999: Secretary-General of the Western European Union (WEU).

• July 2004: appointed for a second 5-year mandate as Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and EU High Representative for the CFSP. www.consilium.europa.eu/solana

European Security and Defence Policy – as part of our response. It would, of course, be simplistic to see climate change as a primary cause behind this conflict. But nor is it absent. When placed alongside traditional causes of conflict, it aggravates the situation.

Thirdly, the report stressed that the European Union has already been alert to this problem. The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, stated that “competition for natural resources – notably water – will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades and is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.” We now know even more now than we did five years ago. The challenge is to translate these insights into concrete policy measures.

Lastly, our response must cover foreign and security as well as environmental policies. We are committed to mitigating

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

to talk seriously with those countries who will be most affected, and target our policies. The International Institute for Sustainable Development, with support from the Danish Government, has recently done a study on West Africa, which looks in particular at Ghana and Burkina Faso. The UK and French Governments are doing a joint study on the Sahel region. This is exactly what we need.

The European Council has asked me to come back at their meeting in December and What are we trying to achieve A changing planet creates serious new present further recommendatiin this process? For a start, we challenges for societies around the world. ons on what we should do want a successor to the Kyoto next. We are preparing these Protocol which has to be If we mishandle these changes, within the Council Secretariat agreed in Copenhagen next we risk increasing the threat that climate and Commission, in close year. Talking about security contact with EU Member appeals to national interests change will drive greater instability States, and the academic in a very direct way. The Stern in the future community. We have also Report, published in 2007, been discussing this issue with helped to create a more other countries, outside informed debate about the Europe, as part of our regular diplomatic exchanges and economic consequences of climate change. What we want to dialogue between policy planners. We intend to broaden this achieve is a similar effect for security issues. We know, for process over the next year, drawing in a wider cast in line with instance, that the melting of glaciers in the Himalayas and the Green Diplomacy Network which lead EU lobbying ahead of rising sea levels will pose very serious challenges for China, at the Bali meeting last year. We will also move this process on a time when the Chinese authorities are in any case seeking to from a general level, to discussing specific implications for manage the social consequences of rapid economic growth different parts of the world, and how we can work together on and population movements. That should be a powerful addiresponding to them. tional argument for China to work towards a new agreement on curbing emissions. climate change, through reductions in greenhouse gases, and by helping countries to adapt to what’s inevitable. The European Union’s ambition, agreed under the German Presidency of the EU in June 2007, is to reduce our emissions by 20% in 2020, or by 30% as part of an international agreement. But environmental action against climate change is not sufficient.

Climate change also means a new context for European foreign and security policy.

“

”

Regional studies What we need to do next At the same time, raising the linkage between climate change and security has encouraged us to take a new look at how we forge our foreign and security policy. Obviously, this is not about “securitising” the debate, or taking it out of the hands of environmental ministers or activists. But the military and security establishment has insights and a way of thinking that can bring real value: on mobilising large technological research projects, for instance; or planning against what might be low-risk but would be high-impact events. At the same time, environmentalists have an important contribution to make to the foreign policy establishment, in helping us to think about a wider range of causes behind conflict, and how we can use new kinds of data, including climatic, to improve our capacity to spot potential instability ahead of time.

For these reasons, it is important that this process stimulates more research. Much good work has already been done, including by the German Advisory Council on Global Change, which produced a comprehensive study last year. But we need to go further, and look at the issue region-by-region, if we are

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In support of that, we are preparing more detailed regional studies, on Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, as a basis for recommendations on what challenges these regions face, and what the EU can do. Experts predict, for instance, water flows down the Nile are likely to be affected, and sea level increases may reduce crop yields in the Delta region. How should Egypt, along with her neighbours, respond? In recent years, we have developed a good relationship between policy planners in Brussels and Cairo. We have also created a new EU Special Representative to the African Union, who is leading work through the new EU/Africa Strategy, which was launched in December last year, on addressing issues including peace and security, and climate change. As the European Union, we are well-placed to work with countries in responding to these challenges, though the full range of diplomatic, economic, development and security policies.

Security efforts in the future There is a broader context for this. I have already mentioned the European Security Strategy, which was adopted five years ago. At the December Council, I will present a report, together

POLITICAL ISSUES

with the Commission, on how implementation of that Security has fared since 2003, and where we might concentrate our efforts in the future. The idea is not to re-write the text, which remains highly relevant, but to identify what we can do better, in a changing world. The Strategy is based on a broad definition of security. In 2003, that was rather innovative. It identified certain key threats - terrorism and organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failing states - which remain relevant today. But it also highlighted other challenges arising out of globalisation and the changing relationship between governments and non-state actors: our dependence on energy and competition for natural resources; impact of poverty, new diseases and, as I have mentioned, climate change. Since 2003, these have grown in significance, and the issues are more interconnected.

To give a concrete example, think of Bangladesh. The population of that country, which already stands at 142 million, is predicted to rise by a further 100 million in coming decades.

India has already constructed a fence system along the border, to contain emigration. But, if sea levels rise, coupled with more monsoons, the pressures will increase. Add to that the consequences of poverty and radical Islam, and you have a foreign policy challenge which defies simple categorisation.

Strengthening global governance In response to that changing security environment, Europeans must continue to support an effective multilateral system.

Strengthening global governance, and working with a shifting global order, is essential. Pursuing agreement on a successor to Kyoto will be a critical part of that. But so will working with others to address the security consequences of climate change: more weak and failing states; environmental migration; disputes over resources; and natural disasters. It means, for instance, that Europeans must be ready to do more, using the unique mix of diplomatic, security, development and trade policies which the European Union can deploy. The review on implementation of the European Security Strategy is an opportunity to increase our capabilities and coherence.

We are all a product of our environment. A changing planet creates serious new challenges for societies around the world.

If we mishandle these changes, we risk increasing the threat that climate change will drive greater instability in the future.

When I presented my report in March, I said it was only the start of a process. So it was: it set out the problem. Since then, we have come closer to identifying solutions. The next task is to put them into practice. Ultimately, our goal is no less than to change the way that people think both about security, and about environmental policy. In a changing world, each has profound implications for the other. We cannot pursue either in isolation.

Documentation Climat Change and international security Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council (14 March 2008) (…)

Enhancing capacities at the EU level A first step to address the impact of climate change on international security should be to build up knowledge and assess the EU’s own capacities, followed by an improvement in the prevention of, and preparedness for early responses to, disasters and conflicts. Financial implications for such responses should be identified and also be considered in the EU’s budget review.

Possible actions that could be developed include: • Intensify EU capacities for research, analysis, monitoring and early warning and Watch Lists including the Institute for Security Studies, the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the EU Network of Energy Correspondents (NESCO), the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Joint Research Centres. Monitoring and early warning needs to include in particular situations of state fragility and political radicalisation, tensions over resources and energy supplies, environmental and socio-economic stresses, threats to critical infrastructures and economic assets, border disputes, impact on human rights and potential migratory movements.

• Further build up EU and Member State planning and capabilities including civil protection and the use of crisis management and disaster response instruments (civil and military) to contribute to the response to the security risks posed by climate change.

• Commission further work to look, region-by-region, in more detail at what the security implications are likely to be and how they will affect EU interests.

EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security Climate change is a key element of international relations and will be increasingly so in the coming years, including its security dimension. If recognised, it can even become a positive driver for improving and reforming global governance. As it is a global problem, the EU is advocating a multilateral response. Building on the successful Bali conference in Dec 2007 the EU needs to continue and strengthen its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement in 2009, including both mitigation and adaptation action by all countries as a key contribution to addressing climate security.

Possible actions that could be developed include: • Focus attention on the security risks related to climate change in the multilateral arena; in particular within the UN Security Council, the G8 as well as the UN specialised bodies (among others by addressing a possible need to strengthen certain rules of international law, including the Law of the Sea).

• Enhance international cooperation on the detection and monitoring of the security threatsrelated to climate change, and on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities. Promote the development of regional security scenarios for different levels of climate change and their implications for international security.

• Consider environmentally-triggered additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive European migration policy, in liaison with all relevant international bodies. (…)

Source: Council of the European Union, Document S113/08, 14-03-2008

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Is Energy a Factor of Instability for Europe?

Interview with Angelika Beer, MEP, Brussels The European – Security and Defence Union: In one of your interventions in the European Parliament in 2008 you mentioned that energy means security and that access to energy, as well as control over resources, could be the source of major conflicts in the future. Do you see energy as such as a factor of instability?

Angelika Beer MEP: Handled correctly energy is a factor of stability, not of instability, if we take all aspects into account.

Overall stability needs security. Without security there can be no trust in any field in politics. Security policy is a crosscutting issue and energy is just one of the elements. We have to see politics and policies as a whole and should not try to look at single points of interest or one issue alone.

It is important to stress this context, because that has been neglected for a long time. Economic, environmental or development decisions had been made on different levels and independent from foreign policy decisions. The result is, that we now have a complete uncoordinated situation and don’t have the anticipated results or benefits. Insecurity is one of these outcomes. To acknowledge how interwoven and global the topic is will be a first positive step and we see that this is happening finally. This is the basis for my permanent interventions not just in the field of energy policies.

The European – Security and Defence Union: If I understand correctly, you feel that the Russian leaders were mistaken in intervening in the Caucasus and have weakened Russia’s position because of the consequences in Europe where there is now greater awareness of the need and for a policy geared to reducing the EU’s energy dependency to reinforce the security and defence of central European member states. Would you agree that energy security will play a very central and essential part in a European Security Architecture?

Angelika Beer MEP: Let us get one thing right from the start: I am working together with my colleagues from the Greens/EFA on a new approach to security aspects. This includes a complete analysis of potential threats in all fields and develops answers to increase the European security. If you expect military answers for the defence of central European member states or even military actions to secure the routes of supply or the lines of communications I have to disappoint you. It was not the Georgian crisis that made us aware of how dependent we are in terms of energy supply. That happened already years ago. What the Georgian crisis proved is that we don’t have a strategic approach within the EU how to deal with our Eastern neighbours, Russia in particular. Here we have a strategic lack which hinders us to find a clear position and common ap-

Angelika Beer MEP Angelika Beer was born in Kiel, Germany in 1957 and trained as physician’s assistant and paralegal.

She has been Member of the European Parliament since 2004 serving amongst other responsibilities as spokesperson on security policy of the Greens/ European Free Alliance group, and as Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Assembly.

Ms. Beer is charter member of the German Green party, established in 1979. From 1987 to 1990, she was Member of the German Parliament and Member of the Parliamentary Assemblies of NATO and the European Council. After leaving the German Parliament in 2002, she was National Chairperson of the German Green party.

proach of all 27 EU member states. There are different points of view, Russia seems to be everything between enemy and trade partner. Even without a common strategic approach the upcoming negations with Russia including the need to diminish the energy dependence of the EU should start.

The European – Security and Defence Union: : The notion of energy today still conjures up first and foremost the idea of oil and gas and it will take Europe decades to reach a substantial degree of independence through alternative energies. How can Europe break the current stranglehold and ensure diversified energy supplies? Rather than a European law to ensure energy supplies, do we not need something with global reach all factors contributing to our security i.e. human rights, economics, environment etc Angelika Beer MEP: I agree that the approach should be global. The Bali conference last year stressed the justified interest of everybody to get access to resources once more and articulated the shared interest of all states for a clean environment and equal access to resources. This could be the starting point for a global architecture. There are plenty of possibilities like the green idea of an International Renewable Energy Agency, technology transfer on renewable resources, an upgrade of the UN Environmental Program to a full organisation and so on and so forth. Kyoto was an important step in the past, but only the first. We need a new international protocol with more ambitious aims and objectives for 2020 and beyond. The new package of the EU commission on climate protection and energy shows the direction and should as soon as possible come into force as the next step inside the EU. For me renewable energies are the best way in the energy sector

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

into a safe future by giving every country the chance to minimise dependence and CO2 emissions at the same time. Secure energy is just a small part of our security concept and you are right: Human Rights, Economy, Preservation of Nature, Ocean Policy and Traffic are among these subjects.

The European – Security and Defence Union: Your idea of comprehensive security is far-reaching. However, in the catalogue of issues you describe for inclusion in a European security policy able to hold its own in the global framework there must be priorities. Is energy at the top of the list? Without secure energy supplies, surely the broader goal of „human security“ would be unachievable?

Angelika Beer MEP: Human Security is the top priority and defines and influences all other policy areas. First you have to ask: what is in the human interest? If you take energy as an example you can develop a strategy how everybody can benefit most of the limited resources. High consumption demands a higher responsibility to give back to and to take care of others. This is a moral demand but a necessity at the same time, as injust use of resources can lead to wars, at least to insecurity. The protection of our climate should follow the same principles.

Only the Human Security aspect will help us to define worldwide common approaches that will be of benefit for all.

The European – Security and Defence Union: In the short term the notion of “abandoning oil and gas” is surely just not viable.

I understand that catchphrase to indicate a step towards conflict prevention, which is something to which you give high priority. And yet I find it revealing that you only mention oil and gas. In avoiding any mention of nuclear power at all, I take it that you are completely ruling out the possibility of atomic energy.

Angelika Beer MEP: All fossil energies are not endless. This includes oil, coal, gas and nuclear energy. Conflict prevention in these fields is best reached if the use is limited and all other means further developed, these are the renewable resources.

Nuclear energy can never be the future of energy supply.

Imminent to it is always the risk of nuclear proliferation. The civilian technology is inseparable from a military use of nuclear energy. Is there a better example as the Iran conflict or the double standards with India? What will be indefinite last is the waste disposal. We would overboard our environment with nuclear waste and it will be a problem for generations to come. In Germany alone we have until now 5.500 tons of highly radio active waste. This technology is out of the question, life-risking, stupid and dangerous. The pronounced energy gap makes me wonder. In Germany some dangerous

22

nuclear powerplants are switched off for a while already but Germany has never exported as much energy as last year. This is living proof that we do not need more nuclear power plants.

A Security Policy as we see it should prevent potential conflicts before they even can arise and the risk of the use of nuclear energy and the fights for the endless resources like in Nigeria and elsewhere can be avoided, at least minimised.

The European – Security and Defence Union: Energy and climate policy are the two sides of the same coin. And our security depends on both. Where should we be prepared to make concessions, particularly in the medium term? Energy savings can only be a part of the solution..

Angelika Beer MEP: For years economists have told us that we have to make a choice between economic and environmental politics. The Greens were the only party who stressed all the time that environmental politics are economically beneficial.

The international development proofed us right.

There are good and efficient innovations in the area of energy politics. They should be taken serious and get the necessary support. However, people like to stick to what they know. If governments support this attitude then energy and climate politics really can become a problem. Again let me take the package of the EU Commission as an example. It is not perfect, but a big step forward. Climate- and energy policies are combined and secure our planet as well as they meet the energy needs of the people. This is what we want. Our Security strategy combines fields like these and is a political approach to a common policy. Security as a whole is more than just the addition of the single elements.

The European – Security and Defence Union: What do you see as the role of the European Parliament in preparing a new security blueprint to supersede the strategy decided in 2003 and also take into account the issues you consider to be important?

Angelika Beer MEP: The European Parliament starts to take an active part in this evaluation. The whole process of a reformulation or adaptation of the security strategy takes place behind closed doors. This is something we criticise. The Green Party in Germany started a long process to come up with lessons-learned and with possibilities for the way ahead.

Worldwide a network of parliamentarians for human security and conflict prevention was lately founded, inspired by Maarti Ahtisaari. The tragic that has to be changed is, that in the area of security people feel something is going on but they are not properly informed. Soldiers were send abroad, some got killed and nobody explains why and wherefore. We need the opposite: a wide public debate. The Green group in the European Parliament think it should belong in the public space.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Russia and European Security

by Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities , Brussels This article will be published at a critical period for Europe.

The «moment of truth» has come for a whole range of fundamental problems related to European security. This became more evident during the recent crisis in the Caucasus, which was in fact imposed on Russia, United States, Europe and the entire world by the reckless Georgian president. There is no doubt that this crisis will have a multitude of consequences for the European security system as well as for the system of international relations in general.

Unfortunately what we are witnessing is a process of fragmentation of a single European security space, something that is not in the interest of Europe, the nations inhabiting the Euroatlantic area and the world as a whole. The European security architecture, originally designed to serve as an example for the rest of the world, happens to lose its ability to handle a mountain of risks and challenges piling up in front of us - in a sober, systematic manner, with due respect to the interests of all states. This trend needs to be reversed, otherwise the entire European architecture will come crashing down.

What needs to be done for security Responsibility burdens. This is simply a factual statement. The purpose of this article is not to offer a ready-made answer to one of the two famous eternal questions of Russian literature – “Who is to blame?”. I would rather focus on the other one – “What needs to be done?”

Russia is committed to a cooperative and comprehensive approach to security. We believe that true progress can be achieved only through joint efforts and close cooperation on a basis of full equality and mutual benefit. Under no circumstances shall we allow ourselves to be drawn into confrontation. Equally, isolation is not our choice.

On the other hand, we cannot avoid addressing serious questions in connection with the current agenda of one of the institutions working in European security space, namely NATO. Let me enumerate the points that are causing us particular concern.

Three major issues for Russian security • the further eastward expansion of NATO, in no way strengthens the security of old and new members, neither that of nations with no interest to become parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. We also see Western refusal to listen to Russia’s concerns regarding the course taken by Georgia and Ukraine towards speedy entry into NATO. A culture of searching for mutually acceptable solutions has been lost. In fact, for its aggression against South Ossetia Georgia received a bonus in

Vladimir Chizhov Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Born Dec.3, 1953.

Graduated with honours from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1976.

Joined diplomatic service in 1976.

1996 Deputy High Representative for Bosnia Peace Implementation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 Director, 3rd European Dept., MFA, Moscow 1999 Director, European Multilateral Cooperation Dept., MFA, Moscow 2002 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moscow 2005 Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities, Brussels Conducted analytical research work on European security, OSCE, Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, Mediterranean, Balkans, problems of Cyprus and Northern Ireland, UN peace-keeping.

Russian Special Representative for Cyprus (1997-2000), for the Balkans (2000-2002).

the form of the Georgia-NATO commission. As for Ukraine, the Russian leadership has stated it bluntly – Ukraine’s entry into NATO would entail a deep crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations.

This crisis will most adversely affect pan-European security as well because NATO is imposing on Ukraine the role of a buffer between Europe and Russia against the will of the Ukrainian population - - thereby infringing on its rights. So the West must make a strategic choice at that.

• the deployment of elements of a US global missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic. We remember what happened when the former Soviet Union deployed missiles in Cuba in 1962. The Caribbean crisis with a real threat of outbreak of a global war is now part of history. This time there will be nothing similar. Russia and US, Russia and NATO are not enemies, and the Cold War is over. But military planning is not about intentions. It is all about potentials and capabilities. We have been constantly told by the Americans that their socalled third ABM deployment site in Central Europe is of no threat to Russia. OK, taken. But then they should not consider our additional measures to diminish vulnerability of Russian strategic forces as running counter to their strategic interests.

• the system based on NATO-centrism claims to replace panEuro-Atlantic structures like the OSCE - based on the principles agreed by all its participating states. And by and large, it is not the fault of the OSCE that it is loosing its relevance today and has become an Organization where unilateral and group interests are placed above pan-European ones. The responsibility lies with individual OSCE participating states.

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It is very indicative that a huge amount of heavy weaponry which was sent to Georgia, all these shipments of arms have been done in clear violation of the Code of conduct existing in OSCE since 1993 and a relevant 1998 Code of conduct of the European Union.

The same sad thing can be said about the European arms control regime as a whole. If the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) is a corner stone of European security, why couldn’t our partners walk an extra mile to save it? Instead there has been no willingness to listen to Russia when we warned that the CFE regime was losing touch with reality.

What Russia needs for its security These very indicative concerns are mentioned to demonstrate that Europe, unfortunately, still does not have a collective security system which would be open to all and provide all with equal security. It actually represents a structure consisting of diverse organizations comprising different memberships. We need a comprehensive framework structure, one that would not harm any of the existing organizations in the region.

That is why President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev presented in Berlin on June 5, 2008 the initiative to develop a new Agreement on European Security, which was further evolved in his speech at the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, on October 8, 2008.

This proposal could provide a platform for launching a joint overview of the European system and searching for ways to reform it.

For a start it would be wise to look at the principles on which the current European security architecture is based. Those principles are: sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual respect, non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs of states and indivisibility of security. If all these principles agreed back in 1975 and enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act are still valid, then let us discuss why they fail to be applied in practice. Maybe the implementation mechanism are not adequate? Maybe we need to enlarge some of the mechanisms or create new ones?

The Euro-Atlantic Security Structure We think all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area as well as all organizations active in the security area within this particular space - NATO, OSCE, EU, CIS, CSTO – should take part in this work with the aim to strengthen the present security architecture on the basis of clearly defined rules to ensure universal application of norms of international law. It is obvious that after the crisis in the Caucasus it will no longer be possible to conduct affairs in Euro-Atlantic politics as if nothing has happened. We are looking forward to hearing the response, hopefully positive, to this initiative from our European Union

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and American partners. It is obvious that we can achieve real results in establishing effective Euro-Atlantic security structures only through joint efforts by Russia, the EU and US. There is a need for collective leadership, something that Russia has been consistently supporting. We need to develop a common vision of the contemporary historical epoch. That is what Vladimir Putin meant as he spoke in Munich in February 2007.

Unfortunately, in the US his suggestion to hold a real discussion of real problems was left unanswered. The reaction in Europe was different.

From my extensive contacts here in Brussels I know that it is conventional wisdom in Europe for many politicians, thinktankers and media-people to speak of the need to think constructively about how to answer today’s security challenges, including untraditional ones like climate change, food security, lack of financial stability, etc. There is also a growing awareness of the fact that Russia and the EU really need each other if they want to strengthen their respective positions internationally. I fully agree that Europe needs a positive agenda, not a negative one. That is why I would like to invite all our partners to be conscious of their responsibility for preserving unity of the Euro-Atlantic space. We should act as truly equal partners in all situations. Otherwise it will never work.

Russia has made its choice, reaffirming it in its Foreign Policy Concept. Now it is up to the rest of the members of the European and Euro-Atlantic family.

Documentation Speech by Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, Berlin 5 June 2008 (...) “I am certain that we cannot resolve Europe’s problems until we achieve a sense of identity and an organic unity between all of its integral components, including the Russian Federation. (...)

I think that only by openly and honestly sharing all our concerns with each other can we make progress in building a genuine greater Europe. Our predecessors during the Cold War years managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (which, as the legal foundation for the European system, has withstood the test of time despite all the difficulties encountered), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organisations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties. (...)

We could look at a regional pact based, naturally, on the principles of the UN Charter and clearly defining the role of force as factor in relations within the Euro-Atlantic community. This pact could achieve a comprehensive resolution of the security indivisibility and arms control issues in Europe that are of such concern to us all. (...)

POLITICAL ISSUES

Russia and the Defence of Europe

by Manuel Medina Ortega, Member of the European Parliament, Spain, Party of the European Socialists, Brussels The recent events in the Caucasus have reopened old wounds. It looks as if we were back in the cold war era.

Countries in the eastern border of the Union see in these events the return of the old Russian expansionism. These countries are also concerned by our heavy dependence on the supply of fuel coming to Europe across the Russian territory, which gives Russia a high hand on the Union’s energy policy. The Georgian crisis ties in with the crisis arising from the U.S. decision to deploy on anti-ballistic missiles defence system in order to protect Europe and North America from a possible attack coming from Iran.

The US Antiballistic Missel Defence – apolitical issue The Russians objected to such a deployment claiming that it put in danger their own security. If the aim of the anti-ballistic system war to protect Europe from an Iranian attack, it should be deployed closer to Iran. In fact, Russia offered the U.S the possibility of using their military facilities in the Caucasus to build an advanced common defence system facing Iran. The Americans rejected that offer and went ahead with their plan to deploy antiballistic missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland.

The only two governments that then supported the American proposals were the strongly anti-European governments of the Kaczynsky brothers in Poland and of Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic. After the loss of the parliamentary elections by the Kaczynsky government questions may be raised about the continued support to this program in Poland. What will happen in the Czech Republic after the new elections there?

Manuel Medina Ortega MEP Born on 15 December 1935, Arrecife (Las Palmas) Group of the Party of European Socialists, Member European Parliament, Member Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, Member; Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Substitute; Delegation for relations with the countries of South America and MERCOSUR, Member Spain Partido Socialista Obrero Español • Degree in law (University of La Laguna, 1957); doctorate in law (University of Madrid, 1961); master’s degree in Comparative Law (Columbia University, New York, 1962).

• Professor of International Law and International Relations (Complutense University, Madrid, 1959-1975).

• Titular professor of International Law (Universidad de La Laguna, 1975-1978).

• Titular professor of International Relations (Complutense University, Madrid, since 1978).

• Deputy in the Cortes (1982-1987).

• Vice-President of the European Parliament (1986).

• Chairman of the Spanish Socialist delegation in the European Parliament (1994-1999).

• Coordinator for the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market (1999-2004) • Coordinator for the Committee on Legal Affairs in the current Parliament.

In the European political structure as it now exists, diplomatic and military movements require a carefully designed strategy that takes into account the concerns of all the actors present in the East-West political chess-board. The strengthening of the European institutions and the further developEurope and his neighbours’ security – ment of economic and political cooperation with the US a sensitive system within NATO should enhance As the German military theothe defence capabilities of the retician von Clausewitz said West instead of undertaking some 200 years ago, war is The lack of a European defence system injudicious military moves the continuation of politics by makes us vulnerable to Russian that create insecurity and other means. The US missile cause a lack of confidence in defence approach followed diplomatic threats the intra-European relations. the opposite line. It attempThis is how Putin’s Russia has ted to influence politics perceived the missile deployment against Europe. The politithrough a military deployment. This ploy may have backfired. cal manoeuvring and implicit threats that the Russian goverThe Russians got new cards in their hands in the European nment has later undertaken vis-à-vis, Europe is perceived as political game. The European resolution to confront the justified by a part of the European public opinion. Thus Iranian nuclear threat with military means has consequently political support for the common foreign and security policy been watered down by the unilateral U.S. action seconded by has been weakened. two anti-European governments.

“

”

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The European Union is vulnerable to the existing Russian military and economic capabilities. Europe depends heavily on Russia’s energy supplies. The lack of a European defence system makes us vulnerable to Russian diplomatic threats.

The exposure of the Union to Russian political blackmail was made patent during the Estonian crisis, when the Union was unable to counter the Russian electronic warfare. Temporary cuts of gas supplies to Belarus and Ukraine sent cold shivers through the European Union. The Europeans are not inclined to tickle the Russian bear’s belly with defence projects of doubtful usefulness to our defence.

To begin with, both NATO and the European Communities were set up to counter Soviet expansionism in the Old Continent after the Second World War. The enlargement of both organizations to countries that were till 1990 within the Soviet sphere of influence reassured the Europeans about their political resilience, but it also made the Russians wary of the American presence in their western frontiers. The Russians appear now less concerned about the Iranian

nuclear threat than by the American military deployment near their frontiers. The result of the US missile defence approach has been a further loss of support by the European public opinion for a joint defence system with the US. On the other hand, it has strengthened the Russian hand in eastern European Affairs.

Europe’s strength is diplomacy A further blow to the security of the European Union has been dealt by the surprise attack of Mr. Saakashvili, the president of Georgia to the Russian troops stationed there under a previous international agreement.

Europe is not prepared to defend itself militarily in an armed conflict with our powerful neighbour, and it doesn’t appear that we are preparing ourselves for such an armed conflict.

European power is above all “soft power”. The appropriate playing field for soft power is diplomacy, not military confrontation. We need a more coherent and sophisticated foreign policy. For the time being military confrontation is not in the books.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Turkey’s Role in European Security and Defence Ambassador Tomur BAYER, Director General of International Security Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara Turkey has been and will continue to be an essential actor of the European security and defence. This has been in a way, a dictation of its geostrategic location as well as its multifaceted relations in its neighbourhood. Currently, its membership in NATO, OSCE, associate membership status in the Western European Union (WEU), being an accession country to the European Union (EU) and the role it played over the years through both its geographic location as well as its military and civilian capabilities are well known. In fact, these are all natural consequences of a well-established Turkish security policy. It is this national policy that looks for more security and stability through membership in international organisations or other formations both at global and regional level. It is the same policy that leads Turkey to become a net security and stability provider both in its region as well as in the world at large. This very fact explains its belief in and effective contributions to a strong transatlantic relationship and an institutionalized global security system. It is also the underlying factor of Turkey’s active participation in peacekeeping operations and missions under the mandate of the UN, NATO, EU and the OSCE in different theatres throughout the globe, since early 1950’s.

In this comprehensive security policy, one element of Turkey’s vocation seems to be frequently ignored: its place in the European Union’s security and defence policy (ESDP).

ESDP as a security policy choice Turkey’s search for more security in a very complicated region and its willingness to be a net security provider have been the driving factors in its quest to become a contributor to the ESDP. Its belief in the transatlantic relationship made Turkey a supporter of a strong European security and defence. Its accession process to the EU shapes its look to an evolving ESDP not only as “another security formation”, but as a nascent European security and defence policy which will shape its own policy in this important area in the medium to long term. Based on the basic assumption that the ESDP would provide an added value to international security and stability, Turkey has lent its support to this new development even before it was properly referred to as a policy, back in 1991. ESDP therefore remains a conscious security policy choice by Turkey based on its own security interests.

Turkey in the evolution process from the ESDI to the ESDP It would be misleading if one describes the evolvement of the ESDP without mentioning the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). This new approach to European security had

Tomur Bayer Ambassador, Director General of International Security Affairs, MFA, since 01.12.2004 Tomur Bayer born in 949 Graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University, 1972 • Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to NATO from 25.09.1991 to 01.09.1995 • Head of Department for Maritime Affairs from 01.09.1995 to 30.09.1996 • Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Director General for NATO and WEU Affairs from 30.09.1996 to 16.11.2000 • Ambassador of Turkey to the Republic of Korea from 2000 to 2003 • Ambassador of Turkey to Sweden from 15.01.2003 to 17.11.2004

foreseen the establishment of a European pillar within the Alliance as a way of increasing Europe’s role in providing security and stability in the continent and further afield, an aim strongly supported by Turkey. It was concretized through the NATO-WEU relationship whereby the Alliance accepted to make NATO’s assets and capabilities available for the WEU-led operations.

Through its associate membership status in the WEU, Turkey enjoyed almost the same rights as those of the full members of the WEU, and thus contributed to the foundation of an ESDI. Turkey’s expectations from the ESDP are directly influenced by these early days of a European security and defence policy and the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996 (thus the appellation “Berlin plus”), establishing a NATO-WEU relationship.

The 1998 St. Malo Summit between France and the UK was a turning point for European security and defence whereby the main stakeholders in the EU decided to launch the establishment of a separate “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) within the EU, through acquisition of the WEU’s institutional heritage. While the Alliance adopted the key decisions for supporting this new institutional development within the EU, Turkey saw its status degrading within the evolving European security and defence formation. Its associate membership status at the WEU, thus its acquired rights for participating in the European security and defence affairs, were not transferred to the new born ESDP. When the EU Council adopted arrangements regarding involvement of non-EU European Allies and candidates for accession to the EU at Nice in 2000, this had been perceived by Turkey as a rejection of the already existing arrangements, and thus its exclusion from European security and defence. Following the turn-over of the responsibilities of

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the Western European Armaments Group /Organization (WEAG/WEAO) to the newly established European Defence Agency, its exclusion turned out to be complete: Turkey was prevented from signing Administrative Arrangements for establishing “some kind of a relationship” with the Agency.1

The “agreed framework” established a very delicate balance between, on the one hand, involvement of non-EU European Allies and, on the other, the support that the Alliance was supposed to provide to the EU, in support of the ESDP activities. From the Turkish point of view, the fact that the EU had not implemented the “Nice implementation document” disturbed the delicate balance established by the decisions of both Turkey’s involvement in the ESDP and its links organisations in 2002 and 2003 and thus, sowed the seeds of a with the NATO-EU relationship “malaise” in NATO-EU relations.

Turkey’s efforts for correcting these mistakes at the birth of the Finally, the complications experienced during Turkey’s accessiESDP yielded some results by October 2002. Following intense on process caused further damage in what could have been a negotiations between UK, US, Turkey and Greece as well as the very positive Turkey-ESDP relationship. Turkey’s signing of a NATO and the EU Secretaries General, the EU Council adopted bilateral Agreement for security of information (which was on 24-25 October 2002 in Brussels, what is called the “ESDP: necessary for the exchange of classified Implementation of the Nice provisions on information) was blocked within the EU at the involvement of the non-EU European the final stage of approval in the EU’s Allies” or more succinctly referred to as institutional structure. The administrative “the Nice implementation document”. arrangements to be signed by the EuropeThe document was a turning point from an Defence Agency and Turkey were the Turkish point of view as it was seen as similarly vetoed within the EU. The a tool enabling Turkey to contribute to treatment Turkey received within the EU European security as part of the ESDP on ESDP issues therefore seems to be in project. While the document was not Turkey in the center of controversial geoplitical contradiction with this country’s status of specifically addressing Turkey, it had and geostrategic interests. an acceding country as well as a non-EU taken into account important consideratiEuropean Ally. ons from the Turkish perspective, as Turkey was the only non-EU European Ally who contributed to its negotiation.2 Turkey’s contributions to the ESDP activities This decision of the EU Council on the involvement of non-EU Despite all these setbacks, Turkey’s support to the ESDP per se European Allies in the ESDP activities became one of the key continues to be strong. Once again, its geostrategic location, its elements of a package that enabled the finalisation of a stratedemocratic and secular regime, its status as an acceding coungic partnership between NATO and the EU. The decisions of the try, a European Ally and a UN and OSCE member as well as its Alliance and the EU of December 2002 became the other two important military capability all confer upon Turkey a deterrent elements of the same package. All these culminated in an and a security provider role. Although its role is not limited to exchange of letters that formed the “agreed framework” of its own region, lying at the Eastern edge of Europe, its involveNATO-EU relations. One point needs clarification from the very ment in European security affairs is unavoidable. start: The “agreed framework” of NATO-EU relations was foreThe recent crisis in Georgia provides a good example of the role seen to cover all issues of common interest to both organizatiTurkey can play in providing added value to a European security ons related to security, defence and crisis management. It was and defence policy. Being a neighbouring country, Turkey has therefore an all-encompassing framework for the NATO-EU played a balanced role between the two sides from the very relations. This holistic nature of the “agreed framework” was beginning of the crisis. Its proposal to launch a regional platlater on questioned: The EU argued that these arrangements form (the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP)) cover only cases where the EU would request military support covering the two sides as well as other regional actors demonfrom NATO (“Berlin plus” type operations). strates that it has the will and the capacity to act as an honest This “word-by-word” EU reading of the agreed framework broker between conflicting parties in the region.4 Its role in practically meant that the provisions of the Nice implementation initiating indirect peace negotiations between Syria and Israel document are confined to the military domain, thus limiting shows that it does not hesitate to get involved in the resolution Turkey’s rights concerning its involvement in the ESDP. This of long-lasting conflicts with the aim of bringing stability to a continues to be interpreted as an extremely legalistic approach region in need. Turkey is equally engaged in the Balkans by the Turkish authorities and adds to their frustration. Turkey through regional initiatives as well as its contributions to continues to assert that the agreed framework has a broader ongoing peacekeeping operations in the region.5 scope.3 As part of its overall contributions to international and especial-

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POLITICAL ISSUES

ly European security, Turkey has also participated in all ESDP operations and missions to which it has been invited. This approach made Turkey the biggest non-EU contributor to the ESDP missions and operations, a bigger contributor than even some EU members. For example, Turkey’s contribution to Operation “Althea” in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes the country the second biggest contributor among all participants including the EU members and the biggest contributor among the non-EU participants. It is equally important to note that the majority of the ESDP missions and operations have been conducted in close proximity of Turkey. Finally, in addition to initially supporting both the civilian and the military EU Headline Goals, Turkey still intends to take part in a battle group.

It should be clear that all the ESDP operations and missions that Turkey participates in are totally under the political control of the EU. Turkey, therefore, contributes to these missions without being given a say as to how a particular mission or operation will be conducted in the future. Turkey’s continuing political will to stay engaged in the ESDP activities can thus only be explained by its belief that being involved in the ESDP is in its own security interest and that it has the military means and capabilities to contribute to it. It is noteworthy to underline that the EU has left Turkey’s requests for consultations unanswered, even in cases where the EU considers launching a mission or an operation in the vicinity of Turkey. This was the case in Iraq: The EU decided to launch EUJUST LEX and the EU’s response to Turkey’s request to take part in the mission was that the mission was not open to “third states”.

Turkey’s will for cooperation is not honoured by the European Union A further example concerns the EU mission which was officially launched in Georgia (EUMM) as of 1 October 2008. During the Turkey – EU Troika meeting on 15 September 2008, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan informed the EU High Representative Dr. Javier Solana of Turkey’s readiness to take part in the EUMM. Turkey’s offer still awaits an answer. The EU Joint Action adopted on 17 September 2008 states that the ESDP Monitoring Mission in Georgia is to contribute to long term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region. The Mission in question has been launched immediately beyond Turkey’s border and Turkey was actively involved in efforts to bring stability back to the region. However, Turkish demands for advance consultations in accordance with the provisions of the Nice Implementation Document on a possible mission in Georgia remain “kindly” ignored.

It can be thus concluded that the perceptions of the EU/ESDP and those of Turkey on the added value of working together on European security affairs do not match each other: While Turkey remains a staunch supporter of the ESDP and is ready to make greater contributions; the EU does not feel the same urgency in

Turkish KFOR Contingent welcomed in KOSOVO by the population.

making Turkey a close partner of the ESDP. Whatever the reason might be, one fact cannot be ignored: the current security environment requires all actors to work together in an open, transparent and integrated manner. The EU/ESDP is no exception to this. The objectives of an evolving ESDP can only be reached if the EU proves its capability to work hand in glove with all involved actors, including a non-EU European Ally who aims to be a security provider in its own complicated geostrategic environment and beyond.

NATO-EU relations at present The lack of openness and transparency as well as a reluctance to implement agreed decisions on the part of the EU have, from the Turkish point of view, a negative impact on the efforts to actually establish a strong NATO-EU relationship. Such a perception is also detrimental to the health and future of the transatlantic relationship as well as the adoption of a common and comprehensive approach by all the relevant actors in operational theatres, including Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The willingness to work with non-NATO contributors and other international organisations and the inclusive approach displayed by NATO towards non-NATO EU partners are not duly reciprocated by the EU. Despite this fact, NATO is persistently asked to be more “open” while the EU retains from doing the same. This can be a non-issue for countries that are members of both organisations. However, for Turkey, it is of utmost importance that the decisions that established an “agreed framework” for strategic partnership between the two organizations are duly respected as it is the same “framework” that provides a special status to non-EU European Allies (like Turkey) within the ESDP. Unfortunately, the EU, through a strictly legalistic approach, insists that NATO-EU cooperation in areas like Afghanistan and Kosovo remain outside the agreed framework. The EU’s argumentation goes on to say that the NATO-EU cooperation in these areas cannot be categorized as Berlin plus operations:

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Instead of NATO providing military assistance to the EU in an operational area in which the Alliance has decided not to take part, the two organizations are present in the same terrain at the same time with each playing different roles. This differing EU interpretation on the scope of NATO-EU strategic cooperation has two natural consequences: First, Turkey cannot enjoy the rights as provided by the Nice implementation document and second, tested modalities of NATO-EU cooperation are of no use in such operational theatres. In an environment where Turkey is refused to sign a Security Agreement with the EU and hampered from establishing institutional contacts with the European Defence Agency, the EU’s attitude only increases the frustration long experienced by the Turkish authorities on the ESDP.

Challenges for the Future The ESDP has surely taken huge steps forward. However, one must accept that it still lacks forces, capabilities, financial resources and institutional experience in this domain where nations remain the main actors. Looking at the ESDP missions and operations launched until now, one can also conclude that the EU still lacks a culture of consultation and information sharing on the existing and upcoming operations and missions, in contradiction to its legal obligations. Its efforts continue to be focused on achieving coherent action within the EU, rather than contributing to a comprehensive approach among all relevant actors of the international community.

On the other hand, despite knowing very well that without membership status, it would never enjoy a status similar to that of associate membership in the WEU, Turkey has still chosen to support the EU in this new venture, since the very early days.

Turkey maintains the same willingness to contribute in every possible manner to the development of the ESDP, however remains deeply frustrated. Does the Turkey-ESDP relationship present an insurmountable challenge? In view of the fact that Turkey’s inclusion in the ESDP activities by the EU side remains very limited, it is very difficult to talk about a robust “TurkeyESDP relationship”, as one of the sides in this equation remains extremely frustrated. In that sense, there is a challenge to be overcome: this relationship must be turned into a real one the satisfaction of both sides. There is certainly a great potential in terms of the evolving security partnership between the EU and Turkey. The EU has chosen to establish special relations with non-EU, non-European Allies (US and Canada) across the Atlantic. With a country like Turkey, which stands in the midst of areas vital to European security considerations, activating an already existing arrangement for partnership should not therefore prove difficult for the EU which aims to become a security actor on the global scale.

From the Turkish perspective, it can easily be said that Turkey has done its utmost in overcoming the challenge. Of the eleven

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ongoing ESDP missions and operations, seven are within Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. This was also the case for four of the nine ESDP missions and operations that are now completed. This fact alone underlines the importance of the region in which Turkey is located for the European security and stability. It would then be only logical to expect the EU to be more forthcoming in its relations with Turkey in this domain and to create the necessary conditions for Turkey’s participation in ESDP missions and operations. Such a move on the part of the EU will also be in line with its own Council decisions.

The EU needs to accept that “it takes two to tango”! TurkeyESDP relationship can only be established through a strong political will to be shown and translated into action by both sides. In what we call “European security and defence”, Turkey remains a solid and capable actor. The challenge therefore lies with the EU’s capacity to act as a reliable European security and defence actor, able to work with other actors of the same environment and cognizant of its obligations.

Turkey – the reliable partner Working with other actors of the international environment in creating synergy to advance common goals and objectives remains essential in achieving results in the name of security and stability. Some call it “comprehensive approach”; others name it as “integrated approach” or “integrated planning”.

Whatever designation it is given, Turkey fully supports such an approach and stands ready to play its part in that sense.

Whether the subject is the NATO-EU cooperation, or TurkeyESDP relationship, the challenge remains the same: To become a solid actor, the EU must be able to put into action its own decisions and develop mechanisms for cooperation with other actors. The coming months and years will show whether the EU/ESDP is up to this challenge.

* The author thanks Mrs. Esra Doan Grajower for her contributions.

1 Turkey was a full member of the WEAG/WEAO, as their roots go back to the European Group and the IEPG, two former NATO bodies, transferred to the WEU through an agreement signed between the two organisations.

2 Paragraph 12 of the Nice implementation document is a case in point. Paragraph 12 provides for the possibility of a non-EU European Ally to request consultations in the case of a crisis in the geographic proximity of the non-EU European Ally. It also requires the EU to take into account the security considerations of such a non-EU European Ally while taking the decision on the participation of non-EU countries.

3 It covers namely: (a) Berlin plus arrangements, (b) Strategic cooperation as underlined by the North Atlantic Council on 13 December 2002 and (c) Nice implementation document and its full implementation.

4 Further information on this latest Turkish initiative can be found in the article “Calming the Caucasus” of His Excellency Ali Babacan, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, as published in the International Herald Tribune on 23 September 2008.

5 Her contributions to ongoing operations can be found through the official website of the Turkish General Staff. 46% of its forces declared to NATO remains deployable, while 10% of its forces are sustainable, thus providing a huge pool of forces able to be used for international operations and missions.

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The European Organization for Security (EOS) – the Way Ahead

by Luigi Rebuffi, CEO of the European Organization for Security, Brussels

The Origin The European Organisation for Security, EOS, has not been created in one night. EOS, named as the Greek goddess of dawn, has taken almost four years of discussions to rise between the major European security companies among companies that usually are fierce competitors.

It was in 2003, following the Group of Personalities (GOP), called by the European Commission to provide advice for the creation of a programme on security research, that European companies recognized that research was yes important to develop new technologies for evolving security threats, but first of all there was the need to develop the still highly fragmented European security market and start cooperation for European interoperable solutions. To reach this convergence, the role of the European Association for Aerospace and Defence (ASD), has been instrumental. EOS has effectively born by the impulse of major dual technology companies, but it has rapidly been extended to stakeholders of other domains, to fully realize its multi-sectoral approach.

EOS is now a cooperative company with limited liability under Belgian law, run non-for profit and equal shareholding among members.

The initial discussions for the creation of EOS were extremely interesting, as all these major European actors from Industry and Research, providing solutions and services in different civil security sectors, have recognized that the EU market was highly fragmented.

In Europe we are missing critical mass market and a comprehensive industrial security policy coordination as we find it in the US. Furthermore, EU security is historically driven mainly by national political issues. Economic and social concerns have been of secondary importance and for long time, the application of security measures and regulations will remain largely a national concern / prerogative.

European Security Research and Market Development European Institutions have progressively taken into consideration the development of European security policies at the Laken, Tampere, and Hague Councils. The European Parliament has been more sensitive to security issues linked to society and protection of the citizen’s rights. The European Commission has, in particular, focussed its activity on precompetitive research on security to support market development, leveraging on its competence of management of R&D

Luigi Rebuffi Luigi REBUFFI graduated in Nuclear Engineering at the “Politecnico di Milano” (1984). Holds a PhD in Engineering at the Paris – Orsay University (1987).

From 1988 to 1999 responsibilities , within the frame of the EURATOM support to ITER, Thomson CSF European Affaires (R&D) .

From 2000 to 2007 Thales : Head of Sales Unit at Thales Microwave, Director for European Affairs for Division Services and Division Security. Since April 2007 Deputy Director for Security of Aerospace and Defence Industry Association of Europe (ASD).

He is the founder and since July 2007, the CEO, of the European Organisation for Security (EOS).

programmes in other domains as well in policy definition. But the security market is a new one, with rules that still have to be clearly defined and understood: it is quite different from other markets. We could say that the security market takes the most challenging elements from the consumer market – quick and competitive response to evolving needs – and from the professional / defence market with its sensitiveness, confidentiality, extreme technology solutions and limited market size.

Tackling these challenges with traditional approaches (projects, platforms, …) could lead to undesired results. We need innovative solutions and approaches as, for instance, those proposed by EOS: the specific security market needs specific (“non traditional”) measures.

Objectives for technology developments are usually slow paced, targeting the medium / long term, while users and operators need solutions for present threats and that could be different tomorrow. Furthermore, like in other domains, research results are difficult to be implemented. This is also partially due to the fact that users and critical infrastructure operators are not sufficiently cooperating to provide their input on needs for long term threats as their objectives are at shorter term.

EOS is focussing its initial activity in better understanding pre sent operational market needs in a close and constructive dialogue with end users and operators. EOS should be considered as a tool for European security stakeholders to support a comprehensive implementation of existing (and future) security strategies and solutions at National, European and International level.

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The present EOS Members are: EOS has strongly supported the creation of ESRIF (the European Security Research and Innovation Forum) and its Members are directly participating and its working groups. But EOS would like to see the work of ESRIF leveraging more on shorter term concerns and market needs, together with establishing a long term research agenda. The market definition studies and activities of the EOS Working Groups could provide valuable support to the analysis of ESRIF to properly identify future technology developments, filling the gaps and creating a sound dialogue and cooperation between research / technical specialists and the operational / business experts (a weak point in almost all Organisations).

EOS Objectives and Activities The main objective of EOS is the development of a consistent European Security Market supporting the interests of its Members and satisfying political, social and economic needs with efficient use of budgets and implementation of available solutions in priority areas with the creation of main EU Security Programmes.

To develop the security market we will support the development of civil security & resilience systems and related services with innovative European approaches that can be used in the global security market. We will support also the effective implementation of existing and future solutions (developing interoperable and consistent architectures, interfaces, innovative methodologies and / or common procedures, best practices, pilot projects, etc) focussing resources on market priorities.

In this period, when the EU is going to strengthen its position with the adoption of a new Treaty and is envisaging new security priorities for its future budgetary exercise, we are promoting the emergence of relevant (politically and economically) structuring European Security Programmes in Public – Private cooperation on main security issues, for protection of citizens and assets based on users / operators centric needs, focussing / federating resources and budgets in close link and to support implementation of EU security policies. We are currently working to identify the main priorities, but it is clear that areas like the integrated Border Management, the Cyber Protection, the Civilian Protection and the Protection of Critical Infrastructures should become a priority for the future European Commission and Parliament, as they already are for the Members of EOS. Our actions would facilitate networking and cooperation between European supply & demand / public & private Security Stakeholders. EOS would act as a major interlocutor between its Members, EU Institutions and EC Advisory Bodies, providing link between the major actors and supporting acti vities that encompass all stages of the process, from supporting civil decision makers defining security policies to fostering favourable conditions for the development and implementati-

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ASD, CORTE, ERTICO, Alcatel-Lucent, Altran, ATOS ORIGIN, Avio, BAE Systems, Bumar, CEA, Cotecna Inspection, Dassault Aviation, Diehl, EADS, Edisoft, Engineering Ingegneria Informatica, Fincantieri, G4S, Hellenic Aerospace Industry, Kemea, Indra, Iveco, Saab, Sagem Sécurité, Selex Sistemi Integrati/Finmeccanica, Siemens, Smiths Detection, TELETRON, Telvent, Thales, TNO.

on of solutions and processes.

We would in particular support the definition of consistent requirements for future call for tenders on security (EU with impact at MS level) as well as the development and application of suitable regulations and procedures (and standards when needed). Our action would be complementary and in support of initiatives like ESRIF and possible follow-on bodies.

Membership and Representativeness EOS is constantly growing to provide an adequate representativeness of the different economic sectors. We have today 31 Members (representing more than 1,5 million employees), from 12 European countries and different sectors as ICT, defence, civil security, energy, transport, finance, services, research, …

EOS will provide to its Members synergetic added value across different sectors, where single Members, for different reasons, cannot provide alone a European impact. These Members are operational all over Europe and world-wide. They are originating from the following countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.

The EOS added value for Security providers: • Creation of new business opportunities • Optimisation of development costs, in a common approach • Better identification of user’s needs • Development of common risk assessment methodologies • Effective deployment of existing and innovative solutions • Increase of visibility for Member’s positions and activities • Easier link and cooperation with international Institutions and across borders.

• Common support to the development of international regulations, standards and procedures

EOS should not be seen only as the Organisation of security suppliers. Our Membership is open also to end-users and operators (some are already member). For Security End Users & Operators, EOS added value can be summarised as follows: • Reliable solutions, fit to user’s needs, with high performance to cost ratio

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EOS Working Groups: The work of the Members has been structured into Working Groups around some major priority areas: • Border Surveillance & Security Domain : Blue and Land borders; Border Management (Entry / Exit) • Civil / Citizen Protection Domain: EU Civil Protection • Crisis Management: Urban - Event – Site Security (including CBRNE) • Natural and man-made disasters • Critical Infrastructure Protection Domain - Energy Infrastructures Security & Resilience - Supply Chain Security - Surface Transport Security - Air Transport Security - ICT Networks (including Data Protection, Cyber crime and Information Society Security)

• Steering of supply, better knowledge of existing capabilities • Contribute to the definition, development and implementation of solutions allowing higher levels of interoperability, efficiency and business continuity • Limitation of risks and trade-off with insurance costs • Increased visibility towards end-users

Other Envisaged Support Activities A Working Group (WG) has also recently been created to tackle transversal issues like interoperability (systems), process, standards, regulations …

Further to the activities of the WGs, EOS is supporting or will soon support other issues that are “transversal” to all the previous priorities.

A particular attention is given to supporting security SMEs. Their role in proposing innovating solutions is fundamental to sustain the comprehensive approach of major system integrators. To allow a better and easier implementation of the development activities of the sector, we are also encouraging the creation of a EU “Test / Validation / Certification” Platform to verify and validate interoperability of technologies / legacy systems, identifying gaps, needed links and future evolutions of architectures, standards and procedures across EU countries also in connexion with international regulations. This reflexion is done in cooperation with the European Commission and with ESRIF, including the present debate on the EU Security Label for security solutions and services. We estimate that this Label should be more than a simple “marketing tool”. A clear link should be established with legal issues concerning suppliers’ and users’ liability and an economic impact analysis should be done for its use in the different sectors. Only after these measures, the test and certification of solutions could validly give an EU Security Label to promote the use of compliant technologies and procedures.

Human Factors are too often weakly considered in security.

Often they are consider either as a constrain in the develop-

ment of new technologies or with a too generic academic approach. Therefore, we would support in the future, the creation of an EU Platform for a comprehensive approach of Human Factors in security solutions, services and in crisis management (internal and external security).

The Way Forward: Detailing the Roadmap EOS Working Groups on the different priorities are now fully operational. All Working Groups are presently inviting at their meetings, representatives from end-users, operators, regulators and National Administrations to better understand short / medium term needs and establish a direct cooperation when possible (or needed), in a win-win approach.

This work will lead to the production by each WG of a White Paper to describe the common “Vision and Framework for an EU approach, targeting the creation of a major European Programme” including an operational vision of users’ needs and the possible integration of security solutions and services in the business of operators. The White Paper will describe for each WG, its objectives, envisaged activities and roadmap for the development of the specific security market.

These White Papers will be discussed during specific workshops with key National and European stakeholders beginning 2009. They will be updated in the future according to needs.

The first version of the White Papers would be used as common starting position for future activities of EOS Members and as a communication tool. They will be proposed as suggestions for priority activities to the future European Commission and European Parliament.

EOS WGs are also preparing proposals to the E.C. for studies and support actions to support the activities of common interest envisaged in the White Papers. Priority will be given to the development of European risk assessment methodologies (to link operators and national approaches), market studies on needs, dissemination and networking, linking demand and supply, interoperability issues, also considering cross sectoral issues and interdependencies of applications. Special emphasis has been given to support the development (and implementation) of well defined European regulations, standards and procedures in the different sectors.

An example is the project EURACOM (ESRP – DG ENTR) that under EOS coordination aims to develop an EU methodology for risk management of different energy infrastructures.

A European Industrial Security Policy The definition and support of a Security related Single Market is complex in an EU context. Nevertheless, it is urgent and mandatory to develop appropriate security capabilities adapted to European specificities. This requires a strong and competitive industrial base. Security is a relatively new market sector that would need a stronger support to define and

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Iniatiatives by the EU-Commission 1. Link Supply and Demand (public & private) Communities.

Support to Public Private Partnership and Dialogue.

2. Focus resources into main structuring and federating Programmes (also in Public – Private cooperation), that help structuring the supply and the demand side, supporting the implementation of European and National Security Policies (use of EU funding, e.g. structural funds , according to EU approaches for interoperability, procedures, standards …)

3. Support and coordinate national and European Security R&T Programmes and Innovation (ESRIF and its “follow on,…) in close relationship and coherence with market needs, national / EU / international policies, regulations and legislations.

4. Support the definition of Standards, Procedures and Regulations for Interoperability (improving the way systems operate together and interconnect) also in the frame of an international co-operation strategy.

5. Conformity of solutions to Legislation and Social / Human Issues 6. Test, Validate and Certify security technologies / solutions according to criteria agreed at European level satisfying appropriate security levels and business models, leveraging upon demonstration activities and training laboratories for exchange of best practices and validation of interoperability of available products and services.

7. Coordinate sustainable development of the supply chain and the involvement of SMEs at national / European / international level (improving link with large integrator companies as well as with users / operators) 8. Develop consistent transfer, procurement and trade rules across (and outside) Europe for security products.

9. Link with financial institutions: access to venture capital, sustained funding (public and private) and taxation issues.

10. Liability vs insurance issues (also risk assessment issues).

In particular, the liability issue should be considered and developed, together with the other stakeholders (administrations and financial institutions) to support deployment in the EU market of innovative solutions.

develop a comprehensive and sustainable European Industry Security Policy to foster its development. The European Institutions have launched many initiatives to develop and support an European (internal and external) Security Policy, where Member States’ sovereignty issues are considered in a wider European context for common growth and security.

Having considered all these initiatives, we would suggest embracing them in a unique view, identifying their connections, finding possible gaps and further detailing their objectives and actions. EOS is hence suggesting the development of a comprehensive and sustainable European Industrial Security Policy. We have collected the ten most important issues of this proposed Industrial Policy (the majority of these initiatives have already been started by the European Commission in different times and modes). EOS Supporting the Creation of a European Network of National Security Organisations for an Increased Cooperation between End Users / Operators and

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Suppliers. The security market is global. But, particularly in Europe, national specificities play an important role. For this reason particular attention should be paid to the development of consistent national security market in EU Countries as the major (public and private) customers of security solutions and services are today at Country level.

For all these reasons, we think that it is of paramount importance to encourage the creation of National Security Organisations, federating all national security stakeholders. These Organisations can have different structure, as legacies and national associations are different in the different countries.

These Organisations would support the establishment of appropriate Security Policies considering national requirements and specificities; allow exchange information and agree on the appropriate content of future regional, national and EU programmes; exploit synergies in current regional, national and EU projects; act as a channel for local SME participation in EU programmes; collaborate on security training and awareness programmes; exchange best practices across National Security Organisations / Associations; take up of security research results at National level in EU coordination; support test / validation & implementation. The national point of view provided by these Organisations would hence be complementary to the work done at European level by EOS and other European Bodies connecting the demand and the supply side.

Many security issues are at local / regional / national level.

They are very similar in the different EU countries and require very similar solutions. The mandate of the European Commission is covering mainly trans-border security issues. There is hence a need to federate these “similar” local / regional security needs at European level and close this gap. To develop a coherent European security market is also fundamental to establish, trust, dialogue and cooperation on operational issues between the supply and the demand sectors present in all European Countries.

For these reasons, EOS is contributing to the creation of a “European Network of National Security Organisations” led by National Organisations. We participate actively in advanced discussions with existing national organisations of 12 different EU Countries to establish this EU Network.

In this Network, it is envisaged the creation of a End-Users / Operators Forum to support dialogue among these actors of the Demand side within a sector, across countries and across sectors, thus facilitating cooperation with the Supply side (in close cooperation with EOS and its WGs) to develop a consistent Security Market as well as international relations and cooperations.

By developing these activities and establishing a close relationships with the main public and private actors, EOS is aiming at positioning itself as the THE recognized VOICE of European Security Stakeholders.

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A Natural Marriage – Conversion of the Civil and Military Security Market Interview with Hervé Guillou, CEO of the Defence and Communications Systems Business Unit (DCS) of EADS Defence & Security (DS), Munich/Paris

Referring to the convergence of the two markets due to customer requirements and the digitisation of technology, Guillou calles on politicians to provide the necessary impetus for conversion of the markets in Europe. This was more likely to be feasible at a European level; on national terrain a swift process could in many cases be hindered by strong fragmentation and traditional structures. However, this development was also essential to give local industry a global chance in the – on a world scale relatively small European market.

The European – Security and Defence Union: What do the markets for national security and defence have in common and what are the critical differences?

Hervé Guillou: In my opinion, the most striking aspect of both markets is that customer needs are progressively converging, and the interface between the markets – those we refer to as civil and military – is becoming increasingly diffuse, the demarcation between them indistinct. With reference to the differences you mentioned I should, of course, point out that we will not see any intervention of military forces in an urban conflict between civilians or in purely peace-keeping operations.

Interventions by civil forces in civil conflicts will remain strictly civil operations. But, on the other hand, take a look at the report of the French Navy. It states that 50% of all current operations concern the detection and prevention of terrorists and the control of illegal migration flows. This example shows us that intervention by the armed forces is in turn a prerequisite for successful work of the country’s security forces. It’s the same with technology. An example of this: a telecommunications system we supplied to the German Bundeswehr last year ensured that it was equipped for, amongst other things, its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. We originally developed this telecommunications system – Tetrapol – for the French police.

That is only one of a number of examples. Conversely, we are becoming increasingly aware of a demand for products in the civil security market which we strictly speaking developed for the defence market. For example, interoperability between various national relief units. It was almost catastrophic that the French and German fire fighters sent to tackle the natural di saster in New Orleans or the fires in Greece were hindered in their operations because they were unable to communicate with their colleagues by radio. This reflects a radical change in the requirements that the civil market places on the technolo-

Hervé Guillou Hervé Guillou has been Chairman and CEO of EADS Defence & Security France and CEO of the EADS Defence and Communications Systems Business Unit since 2005. The previous positions of the certified engineer, born in 1955, include Head of the Nuclear Department of DCN Indret and Chief of Staff at the French Defence Procurement Agency DGA.

gy used – requirement changes that we have hitherto witnessed in this form only in the military sector.

The European – Security and Defence Union: But does this change in requirements not necessitate the digitisation of information and communications technology?

Hervé Guillou: Just look at the European nations’ emergency forces in the Balkans: they consist of diverse organisations from the civil, police and military sectors of a large number of European countries. A prerequisite for functioning is a common network to guarantee effective cooperation. The establishment of the necessary interoperability, i.e. the mere ability to communicate with each other, must be achieved by strict integration based on the digitisation of telecommunications and of communications and information systems. The latter will not be electronically, but software-driven. That is the common basis for applications and solutions developed in both the defence and security markets. This development has in fact already begun and is moving forward at a fast rate.

The European – Security and Defence Union: A major European electronics group which is actually from the armaments sector, although it also operates in the civil market, has announced that it now generates only 50% of its revenues in traditional military business and already 25% in the security market. What is the situation with EADS? Hervé Guillou: In the area of systems technology we achieved a ratio of 50 to 50 at the end of 2007. That applies to the Defence and Communications Systems Business Unit of EADS Defence & Security. It reflects a solid market position and we are convin-

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ced that competitors from the military sector will have difficulty achieving this.

The European – Security and Defence Union: The subdivision into defence and civil markets is a given fact. There is currently no common European market in the overall security sector, i.e. including defence, civil security and between the nations. Does this require political action?

Hervé Guillou: It is absolutely a political – and necessary task!

If we take a look at the USA, we see clear structures in the security sector, characterised by central authorities. In Europe, we observe that particularly the old EU member states are “captives” in antiquated structures: border police, police forces for a variety of assignments, fire brigades and disaster relief units. The task of the politicians is on the one hand to enable a high degree of interoperability between these national forces and then between the nations, and on the other hand to create an image or goal for joint operations for all involved. Some initiatives can be seen in France and I want to mention an example from our own company. We have set up the “Local Security Battle Lab” and with this security laboratory for local crisis scenarios we want representatives from industry, the police, private security companies, fire brigades and rescue services to work together on operational concepts.

Currently, no joint development work is being carried out for integrated operations as will be required in real life at a future date. Incidentally, the resistance is limited; the difficulties confronting us derive from what are from today’s perspective traditional organisational structures. In my opinion, European politicians in particular are called on to quickly take the initiative. They are in a better position than the national governments to spur on not only the conversion of the markets, but also cooperation between the emergency forces. This must, of course, be accompanied by the creation of a common European security market. The latter does not merely present an opportunity, but is an absolute must for European industry if, operating from the relatively small European market, it is to have a chance in the global arena.

The European – Security and Defence Union: A glance at the large security market USA with its Homeland Security Ministry shows us that a large amount of money and personnel can also present big problems. But in the Katrina disaster in New Orleans the Homeland Security concept proved to be inadequate. There still seems to be a fragmentation of the US markets between the civil and military sectors?

Hervé Guillou: Quite right. But in considering the organisations under the umbrella of the Homeland Security Ministry we must also take into account that there was a need to catch up in

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terms of civil defence in the USA. As far as an analysis of the security markets, in particular the civil security market, is concerned, a high degree of fragmentation is recognisable, because every sheriff is finally responsible for procurement at a local level. Nevertheless, there still remains the advantage of a nationwide authority that combines all civil protection and disaster control issues under one roof. That’s just what we’re lacking in Europe.

Documentation ESRIF: European Security and Innovation Forum ESRIF is a European strategy group in the civil security research domain that was established in September 2007. ESRIF was set up and is supported by the EU Member States and the European Commission together.

Objectives: The main objective of ESRIF is the development of a mid and long term Joint Security Research and Innovation Agenda that will link security research with security policy making and its implementation. It should • create opportunities for more coherent research programming and funding that should lead to better innovation; • trigger the investment of funds by the private sector in research strategic priorities, thereby complementing public investments.

ESRIF corresponds to the general aim of building a true European Research Area, notably by promoting greater coherence between investments in research and development allocated at European, national and regional levels. This should ultimately strengthen the EU security market and the competitiveness of industry and other providers of technologies and solutions.

Members: Its members represent three different interest groups (“stakeholders”): • Those on the “demand side” that will use and apply the achievements of security research – knowledge, technologies and products (often large systems): European, national and regional authorities, police, fire brigades, all kinds of emergency organisations and first responders, private and public operators of critical infrastructure etc. ; • Those from the “supply side” that perform security research and turn its outcome into technologies and products: universities, research establishments, industry, including SMEs ; • And representatives of the “Civil society”, often non governmental organisations or special think tanks, that are affected by both potential security incidents as well as the efforts to ensure their security.

Source: ESRIF, www.esrif.eu

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The role of the EU Security Research

by Dr. Paul Weissenberg, Director DG Enterprise & Industry, European Commission, Brussels An article on ‘what role EU security research can have’ in Europe’s security and defence, need to start with the EU’s ambitions, thus by explaining the need for a progressive framing of the Union’s policies relevant to the area of security and defence. Subsequently EU research should be set to contribute in advancing this process.

After the failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950-ies, defence has disappeared from being a common European integration goal for several decades; instead, the path of ‘Common Market’ and ‘Economic Community’ was chosen. The NATO became the main actor and guarantor for security and defence while the WEU played only a marginal role. The importance of ‘transatlantic’ ties was easy to explain in front of a monolithic threat imposed by the Soviet Union to our ‘free’ society.

Even immediately after the end of the cold war, Member States are still rather divided in their views on what the EU’s role in security and defence should be. While some claim that ‘defence is exclusively NATO business’, many stated that there is room for a ‘European common approach’. In the past few years, we have seen stronger push towards more European co-operation, as security and defence are key factors to be embedded in the European ‘political union’ project.

The change of scenario With the end of the cold war and more specifically since the early years of this millennium, we have seen a change of the treat scenario. The roles that non-state based actors are taking, lead to a paradigm shift. We have witnessed a shift from ‘Territorial Defence’ towards ‘Security of Society’. We have observed that ‘internal’ security measures and ‘external’ defence actions are highly related.

The EU must bring into coherence all means available to it, to maintain its security. As the security threats we are facing are more and more complex, our responses must evolve accordingly. Individual ‘spot-actions’ can show short term results but only a package of coherent measures will yield the long term effect. If uncoordinated, today’s solution, risks becoming part of tomorrow’s problem. Furthermore, ‘the fight’ our society is having against the security threats is extremely asymmetrical (it requires relatively few determined people with a relatively small budget to plan and execute a specific terrorist’s attack and always our response is thousands –if not millions– times more elaborate) so we can not engage in this fight with the usual strategies.

The December 2007 European Council has launched a revision of the European Security Strategy (ESS), for adoption by the European Council in December 2008

Dr. Paul Weissenberg Dr. Paul Weissenberg studied law at the Universities of Würzburg, Freiburg (Germany) and Geneva .PhD in European law . Dr. Weissenberg started working for the European Commission in 1989 as Member of Cabinet of Dr Martin Bangemann, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Industrial Policy. 1996 Head of Bangemans Cabinet. 2000 to 2005 Head of the Single Market Directorate. Since 2005 in charge of the Directorate for Aerospace, GMES, Security and Defence. Mr Weissenberg is the Coordinator for these areas within the DG Enterprise and Industry.

In a first approach in 2003, the EU identified a number of main threats which remain valid today: - Terrorism and the Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; -Regional conflicts and State Failure; Organised crime.

More recently, other threats have been added to the list, e.g.: - Global climate change and Security of energy sources; - Violent Radicalisation The main political challenge remains the implementation of that strategy with the required degree of coherence, or simply said: with more European ‘togetherness’.

The European Union has become a global player. While – without any doubt, the EU is a global player in the economic sense, it must also become a global player on Security matters.

Indeed, we will not be able to sustain being an economical giant while remaining a security dwarf. In today’s global economy, interests have become too intertwined. The fight against terrorism and organised crime, the protection of the European infrastructures and borders, and civil crisis management, they represent the security missions we have to tackle.

Future threat relations However, we also need to look further at threat relations that are as complex as: • climate change and its impact on food supply and on human health, • the vulnerability of energy infrastructures and the accessibility of energy sources, • demography shift in Europe and the need to maintain our industrial force, • violent radicalisation and the need to advance cultural pluralism in Europe.

These are just some examples, pointing towards the extreme complexity and inter-dependence of challenges posed to European society and of the complexity of the new required se-

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curity solutions. If the EU is to provide an effective response, it must be capable of delivering a ‘comprehensive’ response to its security threats. EU security research has to be framed accordingly. The EU research programme offers the possibilities for funding work in relevant technological fields as well as in the society related matters. Security relevant activity is done under several themes of the current FP7, such as ICT, Transport, Health, Science & Society. The Security theme of FP7 provides a ‘home base’ with a budget of 1.4 Billion Euro for 2007 – 2013. We can not ignore the relation between security and society. It is certainly not ‘insecurity’ that we want to use as arguments to build-up an industrial sector that makes money from producing and selling equipment such as: sensors, surveillance cameras, luggage-scanners and police radios.

We need all of that. But beyond that, we need the capability to create ‘societal security’; and for that, we need more than individual equipment and technologies. We must never enter the race between insecurity and the technological measures we develop and implement against it. This is not good medicine. It is like treating the symptoms only. Since the fight is extremely asymmetrical, we should be warned against letting action and reaction to escalate out of control. It is therefore equally important for us to understand the root-causes of violence, terrorism, suicide-bomber, etc.

The security – economy relations Furthermore, we can not ignore the relation between security and economy. Security is a prerequisite for prosperity; it is the availability of ‘peace and security’ that will drive the economy.

Never the less, as part of the whole European security architecture, we must have a credible and efficient industry.

• An industry base that can follow the demand in the most cost efficient way.

• An industry base that is part of a larger ‘Public–Private Security Partnership’.

• To be efficient, this sector needs a solid technology base and a transparent market.

Technologies useful for the security and the defence sector are becoming more and more common. Also the providers of technologies are now serving all sectors: consumer, civil, commercial, security as well as defence. While this leads to access restrictions (non-proliferation and control of ‘dual-use’ technology) of technologies to now become more and more difficult to enforce, this also requires a synergetic approach to be taken in research planning. We also need to keep an eye on the availability of technologies to our industry to maintain its ‘nondependence’.

• Certain biometric techniques such as the algorithm for person identification using retina scanners are under heavy non-EU patents.

• Some sensor technology to protect civil aircraft against man

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portable, shoulder launched missiles is under high military classification. Our ability to act depends on accessibility of such critical technologies in solutions that can be deployed world wide. For a transparent market to function, standards, including industrial standards, would need to be agreed.

This is essential for inter-operability reasons while at the same time this should also enable product competition through multiple sourcing. The Commissions’ preference for ‘openstandards’ is well known.

With FP7 we are committing EU money to security research. We should however also look beyond the scope this FP7. The job is not done by just having EU security research; it merely starts here. In some cases, we need European security infrastructure.

Kopernikus Kopernikus is the new name for Europe’s solution on Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, formerly known as GMES. Initially it is limited to Research and Pre-operational work. But soon thereafter EU funds will be needed for Kopernikus’ operational use. And with the strong support from The European Parliament and the EU Member States, a ‘Preparatory Action’ to fund such operations is now started. The budget is small at this beginning, but most important of all, it is a beginning. It is widely accepted that we need to couple research planning with operational needs, but beyond that, in some cases we need EU operational budget. We may wish to consider other security relevant operational costs to receive EU funding too. There are also areas –so far– not fully addressed in FP7-security such as Civil Protection and Conflict prevention and post crisis stabilisation which deserve having a European dimension; also in an operational sense.

Conclusion There are two key factors to bench-mark European security research. The first is the efficiency we plan security research work to be responsive to the future need; needs that are ‘mission orientated’. Such missions are e.g. Border control, Protection of critical infrastructure, Counter terrorism, Civil protection, Crisis management. A security research portfolio that is planned, executed and validated against ‘user’ and ‘mission’ needs is needed. Standardisation, interoperability, interconnectivity are among the key drivers. The second relates to the effectiveness of EU’s security and defence measures. The early part of this article discussed the complexity of the threats we are facing and the need to have our response tailored accordingly, in a holistic manner. In support of the wide spectrum of measures the EU is to undertake, security research need to also take a ‘comprehensive’ attitude. Good governance of the multitude of actions is a factor to be taken into account. FP7 security research should only just be the beginning. It has a ‘spear-head’ function, but it is for us, to define where the spear is to go.

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Realistic Structured Cooperation Procedures in the Field of Security and Defence

by Robert Walter MP, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly/WEU Assembly, London/Paris Whatever the fortunes of the Lisbon Treaty it is clear that ratification of the text is not essential to the future development of defence cooperation within the European Union. The concept of permanent structured cooperation highlighted in the treaty already has a considerable legacy of achievement and many such projects are already underway. The attempt in the Treaty to codify this form of flexible cooperation might even be a hindrance to the effective evolution of European defence projects.

Mechanisms of variable geometry Any steps directed towards enhancing the capabilities of EU Member States are welcome. The mechanisms of variable geometry of necessity initially differentiate between states well able to fulfil higher criteria and those less able to do so. If structured cooperation remains an open form, it will help bring new entrants up to the level of the best, thus ultimately avoiding the creation of a two-speed Europe. It is therefore essential that these mechanisms are seen to be adding value and that cooperation should be flexible, developmental and motivating: flexible in that participation can be selective, based on a country’s specific capabilities; developmental in that participants can add new fields of activity within the general cooperative framework and motivating in as much as their involvement gives them a higher status and more say in ESDP decision-making.

It is regrettable that there is no clear formal framework to encompass the significant legacy of the various forms of multilateral European cooperation such as the European Corps, Euromarfor, Eurofor, the Air Transport Cell and the European Gendarmerie Force, possibly because these involve fewer than the nine participant EU members specified in the treaty. This is, I believe, an unnecessary restriction and we should proceed on a flexible basis if we are to achieve our goal of credible European defence capability.

“European Defence aspirations” In order to promote enhanced European defence capabilities, member states have to work with the reality of their national budget constraints. This has to be a “bottom-up” process, starting with and building on what we already have and resolving national defence aspirations. The United Kingdom and France spend 60% of Europe’s military budget. Both nations have defence aspirations based on projecting their own foreign policies, which may or not always coincide with EU

Robert Walter MP Robert Walter MP has been a British Conservative Member of Parliament since 1997. He serves as Chairman of the Defence Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly. He has been a member of the Assembly since 2001 and is President of the largest political group, the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats. He also serves as on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where he is Vice-Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee. Since 1997, he has been a member of the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly, and is Chairman of its European Affairs Committee.

policy objectives. The two also have aspirations for defence capability that are now beyond their own budgetary capacity, and that situation will not improve in the current economic climate.

There is clear self interest for both in creating cooperative structures to spread the burden of their own capacity aspirations, whilst at the same time enhancing Europe’s overall capacity. This is the clearest case for enhanced structured cooperation. Everyone agrees that there is a need for greater flexibility in the way the institutions of the European Union of 27 members operate. The Lisbon Treaty, irrespective of whether or not it is ratified, puts forward new ideas for European cooperation in the field of security and defence, which will have a decisive impact on Europe’s future and its ability to take effective action.

Permanent structured cooperation Permanent structured cooperation is described in a specific protocol to the Lisbon Treaty as being “open to any Member State which undertakes to proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and to have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group.”

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To drive this forward, and to support EU military capability development, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in July 2004. The EDA has four directorates responsible for: capability development; armaments cooperation; the European defence technological and industrial base and equipment market; and research and technology. The realistic vision is for the EDA to be capability driven – a “dating agency” forum helping participating Member States (Denmark does not participate) to collaborate in identifying common solutions to identified capability shortfalls, commissioning relevant research and technology studies and working together on joint projects. What the EDA cannot do is act as an intermediary in the big multi-billion euro projects of the larger EU states.

These will for the time being continue to be based on partnerships between governments and the defence industry.

In the area of deployment, to avoid the need for lengthy force generation processes in emergency situations, the ESDP has also created the Battlegroup (BG) concept. Battlegroups are small, highly mobile self-sustaining stand-by forces (of approximately 1,500 troops) designed for rapid intervention to nip a crisis in the bud, typically in response to a UN request. The final stage of implementation (Full Operating Capability) was reached on 1st January 2007, the aim being to have the ability to run two concurrent BG operations in any six-month period.

Although as yet untested in any conflict, this form of structured cooperation has so far been a success.

National versus European Interests I believe we must be realistic and build on our success to date in these areas. We must also reconcile the objectives of member states’ procurement programmes with realistic opportunities for cooperation. To a large degree, the language of the Lisbon Treaty is about process rather than outcome. Defence expenditure is determined ultimately by member states and their parliaments and must be sustainable in terms of national criteria. Europe has a common interest in more effective allocation of defence resources and structured cooperation gives us the opportunity to meet that goal. If it is really to go beyond peripheral cooperation in procurement and small-scale rapid response forces it must engage the large nations and their defence aspirations. If we get the formula right it is a winwin situation.

Whatever the fate of the Lisbon Treaty, and irrespective of the use made of these mechanisms, the various forms of enhanced cooperation must basically be advantageous to the European Union as a whole and to the countries involved, bearing in mind that at the current level of political integration within the Union, national interests are still the overriding consideration.

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Documentation Capability Development Plan (CDP) On 8 July 2008 the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA) endorsed a Capability Development Plan (CDP) defining the future military needs and priorities of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The CDP builds on the EDA’s Long-Term Vision report, published in 2006. Among its principal conclusions are the importance of intelligence and information-sharing during operations in complex environments; the need for flexible and agile responses to unpredictable threats; the requirement to coordinate military and civilian activities in crisis management operations; and the challenge of recruiting talented and well-qualified personnel for the armed forces.

The Steering Board agreed on 12 topics for specific action: 1. Counter Man Portable Air Defence Systems 2. Computer Network Operations 3. Mine Counter-Measures in littoral sea areas 4. Comprehensive Approach - military implications 5. Military Human Intelligence and Cultural / Language Training 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Architecture 7. Medical Support 8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence 9. Third Party Logistic Support 10. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) 11. Increased availability of helicopters 12. Network Enabled Capability “The CDP provides the picture all Member States need to take into account when planning future capability development agendas and finding the right balance between ambition and resources. Linking theory to practice is a job for everyone.”

Javier Solana, Head of the European Defence Agency.

Source: EDA Press Release, 08-07-2008 www;eda.europa.eu

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Testing Times for European Crisis Management

by Alastaire Cameron, Head, European Security Programme, Royal United Services Institute for Security and Defence Studies, London The conflict that flared-up in the Caucasus between Georgia and Russia was initially greeted with disbelief by European observers. While fighting has ceased for now, the conflict endures and its implications remain far-reaching. Battlelines are drawn both in the field - with Russian troops remaining in Georgia’s South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions - as well as within the political sphere, heralding uneasy times ahead for Russia and the EU. Cautious to avoid escalating the Georgia crisis into an international conflict, the course of diplomatic engagement taken by the European Union was certainly a necessary and crucial process. Whether it be calling for an immediate end to hostilities, sending delegations to Moscow and Tbilisi, or simply tempering some of the more immediate knee-jerk reactions, the EU could in theory have done little more than it has already; attempt to broker a ceasefire, express concern and make strong condemnations.

Success is mitigated by failings Yet, its limited success offers precisely the measure of its own failings: Europe’s response to events in the Caucasus should have been stronger and made more immediately.

Collective expressions of concern in the face of Russia’s disproportionate use of force will have done very little to trouble officials in Moscow. Instead, Russia has been left to act with relative impunity for its actions. Not only in the heat of the battle itself, but also with regards to destroying Georgian military equipment and facilities after signing the ceasefire agreement, compromising a sovereign state’s territorial integrity, maintaining scores of troops on the ground and unilaterally recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Provided Russia strikes enough of a conciliatory tone, that European leaders can then parade in front of their concerned political peers, business will at some stage ‘return to usual’ and the EU no doubt tempted to count this episode amongst its diplomatic victories: Stop the bloodshed, assist the refugees and rebuild the infrastructure. Yet for all the EU’s proclaimed soft power and political agitation, Russia has been undeterred by European actions and fairly uncompromising towards their demands. The EU-brokered ceasefire itself came more as a result of fortunate timing; Russian President Dmitry Medvedev having declared an end to Russian manoeuvres even before acting EU French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s plane had hit the tarmac.

While a ceasefire in itself is certainly a success on the road

Alastaire Cameron As Head of the European Security Programme, Camerons main research interests relate to the development of European military capabilities, the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy, NATO transformation and NATO-EU relations, as well as international defence partnerships and military operations.

Prior to joining RUSI, Defence Consultant within Frost & Sullivan’s Aerospace and Defence Practice.

Between 2004 and 2006, Armed Forces Editor for Jane’s, 2002-2004 Project Leader within the EU/NATO office of ‘Directorate for Strategic Affairs’ of the French Ministry of Defence. In 2001, Research Assistant at the Assembly of the Western European Union in Paris.

towards more meaningful negotiations, it is the substance behind the agreement that validates a diplomatic achievement. Evidence that the document was symbolic at best comes from crucial elements of the ceasefire remaining unfulfilled to this day, namely point 5 an 6, which call for an international monitoring team to be given access to the entire region (including least we forget, Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions) and international talks concerning the security and stability arrangements in the breakaway regions. If the standard of discussions in Geneva on 15 October is anything to go by, then these open-ended negotiations will indeed be drawn out affairs to say the least.

Using some of the old cold war rhetoric at times (albeit not alone in doing so), Russia also declared itself unperturbed by the postponement of negotiations concerning the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, its relations with NATO, and said it would be unruffled by exclusion from the G8, etc.

Europe’s response: Unwilling or unable?

The EU’s response reflected both its limited options and some of the divisions within Europeans and with the US on how to cope with Russian actions. Certainly, dealing with Russia isn’t anything like dealing with African rebel groups or tin pot dictators, one must be more attentive in our negotiations, but while adopting a diplomatic discourse, the EU also precluded itself from taking a more robust stance. Most officials would pale at the suggestion that deployment of the EU Battlegroups may have been on put on stand-by, yet these are specifically the kind of operations that these tactical groupings are earmarked for: Peace-making and Peace monitoring at the high end of the Petersburg scale!

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Instead the EU declared itself in favour of a 200-strong civilian observer mission to support the OSCE in view of developing in time its own ESDP mission. On the ground since the beginning of October, but lacking the credible peacekeeping support it needs from military assets, EU observers have already found themselves wanting in terms of fulfilling their mandate. Originally turned away by Russian troops when they tried to enter the so-called ‘buffer regions’ and unable to operate within the break-away regions themselves, Russia’s disposition towards EU observers reveals a great deal regarding their intensions to abide by international scrutiny. With the EU’s Kosovo EULEX operation still struggling to get off the ground as Russia opposes the official mandate handover from UNMIK, while effectively unable to operate in Northern Kosovo which Serbia runs as an administered region, it is hard to believe that EU could have expected anything but in Georgia, with Russia now squarely calling the shots. Russia’s unilateral recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, contested by the EU, will certainly not help matters either.

Even had the European Union been willing or able to muster enough consensus to use the Battlegroups capability, this always remained an unlikely scenario. British troops who are at the helm of the current six month tour of duty are overdrawn as it is with operations elsewhere. Yet with the appropriate conditions for the use of Battlegroups nether seeming to materialise either, the expression “use them or lose them” repeatedly comes to mind. Unwilling to send a mere 1,500 troops, albeit to such a politically sensitive region, what in practice would the EU suggest it should do with a 60,000 strong European Army?

What relations with Russia?

In the end, Europe and the United States must make up their mind in regard of Russia. Is Russia an emerging partner to whom we should show adequate consideration and stop dismissing their concerns with regard to the Balkans, its near abroad and NATO / EU expansion or are they a strategic competitor, demonstrating signs of aggression and should the West be doing more to deter and constrain their ambitions? In the event, Russia’s own actions have proven the most binding element for a closer European position and may yet prove a significant building block towards a more significant European Security and Defence Policy. It’s own worst enemy, Russia’s disregard for Georgia’s territorial integrity, its protracted withdrawal from Georgia proper, let alone ‘withdrawal to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities’, has already help contribute towards a stronger stand against Russia within Europe. While always the better form of engagement towards opposing factions, diplomacy and dialogue

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are more consequential when backed-up by credible deterrence. Caught napping at the wheel, the dramatic episode demonstrates some of the inherent limitations of the European conflict management approach, and the EU remains today ill prepared to fulfil the mandate it covets in terms of providing security to the entire continent. Found wanting in terms of any kind of meaningful riposte, the Caucasus crisis also raises important questions regarding Europe’s collective security agreements, such as NATO’s Article Five or the Solidarity Clause enclosed within the Lisbon Treaty.

Gambling with high stakes, there is little doubt that the Georgians will have been emboldened by the notion that an escalating crisis would inevitably draw in the United States, as well as other Europeans, eager to back-up a prospective ally. This was a very risky strategy, attempting as it were to call Russia’s bluff. Nonetheless, the immediacy and execution of the Russian response should leave observers in no doubt that this was a contingency their forces were well prepared for and a turn in which they ultimately held a much better hand. However, in launching the attack and subsequently losing its military campaign, Georgia has in the same breadth called the Western countries’ bluff as well. The Western bluff - much like deterrence - was namely that they would step-in early and defend the status quo A major power confrontation being conducted on the borders of Europe brings back clear memories of the Cold War era.

Unless both the EU and NATO now take a concerted measure of what needs to be done to respond to Russia, these security architectures will face serious concerns coming from within.

While most European diplomats expressed their ‘grave concerns’ regarding the escalation of violence, political leaders from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland issued a joint statement on the second day of the conflict saying that “the EU and NATO must take the initiative and stand up against the spread of imperialist and revisionist policy in the east of Europe,” thereby strongly taking a stand against Russia’s military incursions within Georgia. Officials from those same four countries, plus Ukraine, then went to Tbilisi to support Mikhail Saakashvili in a further expression of solidarity.

As former Warsaw Pact countries themselves, these countries have faced similar confrontations and the sight of Russia baring its claws once more in the Caucasus will only confirm lingering anxieties since the demise of the Soviet Union. The constitutional prerogative which Russia used in order to justify the use of force in view of protecting Russian citizens abroad will have sent chilling signals not only to these countries, but to all those sharing a border or having delicate

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relations with Russia.

Current times are “a litmus-test for the credibility of the EU and NATO to solve the conflict in its immediate neighbourhood and to prove for all EU and NATO members, aspirant countries and democratic partners that it is worth being members and partners of these organisations” the declaration continues.

At present, the wider picture of Europe’s relations with Russia looks pretty grim and security and defence directorates all over Europe will have now begun looking more gravely towards Europe’s eastern periphery. While Western countries have worked hard to maintain the status quo arrested at the end of the Cold War, Russia has never accepted it. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty is now in taters and the relationship between all parties further strained. As much as diplomacy is pictured to prevail after the sound of canons recedes, Russia has demonstrated itself to be at best an unreliable partner, as worst an impending concern.

The moment for European Defence?

Russian intentions towards the West have taken a new, if not unexpected turn. Europeans must therefore renew with some of the harder-edged defence strategic planning and invest in defence structures in Eastern Europe, establishing bases to help reinforce Europe’s commitment to the security of all allies. Egged on by Eastern European countries, along with the support of Northern Member states, the EU and NATO alike have no other choice than address their concerns regarding issues of mutual defence or expose the weakness of their resolve. Failure to do so could otherwise result in these countries turning once more towards the United States for protection, rather than the EU or NATO, and the moment for European Defence will have passed.

In military planning terms, aggressive moves should be matched by defensive mechanisms. Although careful as to how they should structure their response, Europeans must again get serious about their own defence. Adapting the expeditionary focus of European armed forces and understanding how such capabilities might be employed closer to home is of chief importance in today’s strategic environment.

Concentrating military efforts where they matter, engaging politically in the Balkans and towards the wider security of the continent, are indeed more pressing challenges than creating what can sometimes appear as vacuous or foreignaimed capability concepts.

The question as to how Europe’s sense of security will be affected by this in the long run is one which will take time to assess. A conservative guess however is that it is currently more than Europeans will care to face up to.

Documentation EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (“Berlin Plus” Agreement), 16 December 2002 “THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, • Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges of the new Century; • Welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members; • Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union’s disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged; • Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management; • Reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities; Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be founded on the following principles: • Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature; • Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency; • Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO; • Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO; • Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable EuroAtlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions; • Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations; To this end: • The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of nonEU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002; • NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002; • Both organisations have recognised the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness.”

Source: NATO Press Release (2002) 142,16-12-2002

www.nato.int

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The Galileo System Galileo will be composed of a space and a ground segment. The space segment comprises a constellation of 30 satellites orbiting at an altitude of more than 23 000 kilometers above the earth.

The ground segment is composed of the ground control segment on the one hand, which maintains satellite operations, and the ground mission segment on the other hand, which processes signal and integrated data provided by the satellites and can be complemented with regional and local elements to augment performance for specific applications. Currently, two Galileo Control Centres – one in Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany) and one in Fucino (Italy) are being equipped and getting ready to start operations of the first four satellites in 2010. A third centre, dedicated to safety of life services, shall be established in Spain in the future.

The satellites in the constellation are fitted with highly precise atomic clocks. The time signal sent from the satellite is captured by the user receiver, incorporated, for example, into a mobile phone, which indicates the precise time and position the signal leaves the satellite. By reading the incoming signals it can thus recognize the particular satellite, determine the time taken by the signal to arrive and calculate the distance from the satellite. Once the ground receiver receives the signals from at least four satellites simultaneously, it can calculate the exact 3D position at the exact time.

The complete GALILEO system is scheduled to be fully operational by 2013 and will enable any user to calculate his position anywhere and anytime on Earth to within a few meters.

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Galileo – One Giant Leap for Europe

by Reinhold Lutz, Managing Director of Astrium GmbH, Munich

Since the beginning of civilisation, man has looked to the sky to determine his whereabouts, taking the sun and the fixed patterns of stars as his guides. Now, at the dawn of the third millennium, constellations of man-made satellites have taken over as beacons to guide the way.

When launching the Galileo programme in the late 90s, the European Union took a strategic decision to set up its own satellite infrastructure independent from the existing US GPS and Russian GLONASS system which are both under military control and were initially designed for military use. Satellite navigation and positioning services based in particular on GPS have become an indispensable element of civil, institutional and military activities in Europe. Galileo shall release Europe’s dependence on a single foreign infrastructure. However, while providing autonomous navigation services under civil European control, Galileo has been planned right from the start to be interoperable with GPS and in general also with GLONASS so that users can benefit from being able to receive the signals of all systems in one receiver.

Apart from sovereignty, the intention of Galileo was to involve Europe in the new generation of satellite navigation technologies, services and associated markets. As Europe’s largest high-technology project, it will not only put Europe’s space industry into a internationally competitive position of mastering state-of the art technology, but it will also trigger economic growth in Europe and related employment effects in the numerous existing and evolving markets for satellite navigation applications, related technologies (e.g. receivers) and services. Last but not least, Europe has embarked on Galileo as it has identified that space assets for navigation, earth observation and telecommunication are powerful tools helping to implement major objectives of the European Union, e.g. the European Single market, the Single European Sky as well as for the developing European Security and Defence Policy. We at EADS Astrium strongly welcome that the European Union now gives an increased significance to space on a European level.

The Benefits of Galileo for Europe In contrast to the US American “GPS” and the Russian “Glonass” system, GALILEO will be designed around the needs of civilian users: • GALILEO will be a civil-controlled system • The availability of the GALILEO signal will be guaranteed allowing for reliable and sound business cases based on satellite navigation technology • The GALILEO system will offer an integrity signal

Dr. Reinhold Lutz Dr. Reinhold Lutz, born in 1951, studied Communications Engineering at Technical University Munich and holds a Doctorate in Electronics of the University of German Armed Forces in Munich. He joined the space industry in 1983, taking leading positions in various divisions of EADS Space and EADS Headquarters. Since 2007, he is Head of the Navigation Division of Astrium Satellites, Managing Director of Astrium GmbH and Head of Astrium Strategy and Business Development.

GALILEO is one of the biggest and most ambitious projects undertaken in European space industry. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, GALILEO shows a benefit/cost ratio of 4.6, the highest of all infrastructure projects in Europe.

GALILEO, GPS and GLONASS are planned to be compatible and interoperable systems, as the combination of these systems will offer better availability and higher levels of accuracy. The European Commission and ESA attach great importance to the complementary and interoperable relationship between GALILEO and GPS in order to provide improved and safer services to the users worldwide.

GALILEO will offer considerable advantages in many sectors of the economy. In road and rail transport, for example, it will make it possible to predict and manage journey times, or, thanks to automated vehicle guidance systems, help reduce traffic jams and cut the number of road accidents. However, although transport by road, rail, air and sea is the example most frequently quoted, satellite based radio navigation is also increasingly of benefit to fisheries and agriculture, oil prospecting, defence and civil protection activities, building and public works, etc. In the field of telecommunications, allied with other new technologies such as GSM or UMTS, GALILEO will increase the potential to provide positioning information as well as to provide combined services at a very high level.

By developing the GALILEO system, European industry acquires and widens important know-how in satellite based radio navigation, one of the identified key technologies of the twenty-first century. Moreover, European industry will have the opportunity to develop countless applications evolving from this technology and hence, position itself as a worldwide market leader. Controlling and operating an independent satellite based radio navigation system, which allows for the development of applications vital to the running of the society

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of tomorrow is crucial for the European Union.

Galileo will improve the quality of life.

Positioning, local information and route guidance increase personal safety and improve the quality of everyday life. For example, with a hand-set the size of a matchbox, no one on an overland trip or journey into unfamiliar surroundings needs ever get lost again. Emergency services will no GNSS Applications longer waste precious time, on which the difference between life and death can depend, searching for the right spot.

Galileo will contribute to the preservation of a healthy environment when coupled with other data.

The condition of vegetation can be continuously tracked on large areas of terrain, as well as at specific sites. Global mapping can determine potential sites for legitimate human intervention in existing biotopes. Navigation technology is especially useful for oil and gas exploration, mining and deep-sea fishing. It thus not only optimizes yields but, in combination with other data, also provides vital information about how much exploitation the ecology of a particular region can withstand and where ecological balance is endangered by human activity. Via intelligent traffic routing (land, air & sea) it can drastically reduce congestions as well as noise and exhaust emissions.

The Galileo Services Galileo is designed to satisfy various user requirements, which can be described through the following five service groups: • The Galileo Open Service is defined for mass-market applications and provides free signals for direct user charge. The Open Service will be accessible to any user equipped with a receiver.

• The Safety-of-Life Service will be provided to critical transport applications where human lives could be endangered if the performance of the navigation system is degraded without real-time notice. This service includes service guarantee to its users and provides global integrity, which will inform users within seconds of any satellite signal or system performance failure.

• The Commercial Service is aimed at professional market applications requiring higher performance than offered by the Open Service. It provides added value services like e.g. service guarantee and precise timing services on payment of a fee.

• The Public Regulated Service (PRS) will be dedicated to European and national governmental security groups such as police, coastguard and customs. Civil institutions will

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•

control access to the encrypted Public Regulated Service whose robustness of signals protects against jamming and spoofing.

The Search and Rescue Service is Europe’s contribution to the international cooperative effort on humanitarian search and rescue. It will allow important improvements of the international COSPAR-SARSAT search and rescue system by detecting emergency beacons from users in distress and forwarding a return link message to inform the sender that their message has been received.

The Galileo Applications Satellite navigation positioning and timing services are becoming an indispensable element in many sectors of activity.

Management and control of all modes of transport, communications networks and many other utilities are expected to benefit greatly from satellite navigation.

Personal Navigation: Galileo will open the door to new location-based services by integrating positioning capability with communications, typically in handheld terminals. A person with such a handset providing exact details of his or her position will be able to receive on demand information on nearby restaurants, hotels, petrol stations, and so on. This technology is particularly important for emergency and rescue services to locate callers who cannot give their precise position.

Transport and Logistics: Galileo has been designed to satisfy all transport domains: air, road, maritime and rail. Applications include route planning, traffic and fleet management, in-car navigation, driver assistance, congestion and collision warning, and management of emergency situations in the air, on land and at sea. Galileo thus will contribute to increase efficiency, safety and security. By reducing traffic congestion and travelling time, Galileo will help to protect the environment from pollution.

Precise Timing: Galileo’s global timing system based on atomic clocks will facilitate interconnection and synchronisati-

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on of telecommunications, electricity supply and banking networks and systems. It will also improve data encryption and electronic signatures for ecommerce.

Agriculture and Fisheries: In addition to day-to-day navigation and positioning of vessels, Galileo can help to monitor fish resources and enable authorities to confirm that Galileo Architecture vessels operate in their designated areas. Galileo can also contribute to crop yield monitoring and precision farming, enabling effective resource management and assist in safeguarding the agri-environment.

Public Protection and Security: Various applications are currently being implemented to combat vehicle theft, to monitor offenders on bail and to patrol maritime borders against illegal surveillance or smuggling. Satellite navigation can also help track registered cargo to its destination.

Galileo will also be a valuable tool for forecasting natural disasters, contributing to the organisation and optimisation of relief operations, guiding emergency services to their target and accelerating repair of damaged infrastructure, such as roads, bridges or power lines.

In encouraging entrepreneurs, investors and governments to create and implement innovative products and services across Europe and worldwide, Galileo will bring far-reaching economic and social benefits.

The Galileo System After intense consultations with the various user communities, the Galileo system and its services have been defined on the basis of mission requirements. These reflect the identified user needs to the largest possible extent. To describe it very simply, Galileo will be composed of a space and a ground segment.

The space segment comprises a constellation of 30 satellites orbiting at an altitude of more than 23 000 kilometers above the earth. The ground segment is composed of the ground control segment on the one hand, which maintains satellite operations, and the ground mission segment on the other hand, which processes signal and integrated data provided by the satellites and can be complemented with regional and local elements to augment performance for specific applications. Currently, two Galileo Control Centres – one in Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany) and one in Fucino (Italy) are being equipped and getting ready to start operations of the first four satellites in 2010. A third centre, dedicated to safety of life services, shall be established in Spain in the future.

The satellites in the constellation are fitted with highly precise atomic clocks. The time signal sent from the satellite is captured by the user receiver, incorporated, for example, into a mobile phone, which indicates the precise time and position the signal leaves the satellite. By reading the incoming signals it can thus recognize the particular satellite, determine the time taken by the signal to arrive and calculate the distance from the satellite. Once the ground receiver receives the signals from at least four satellites simultaneously, it can calculate the exact 3D position at the exact time.

The complete GALILEO system is scheduled to be fully operational by 2013 and will enable any user to calculate his position anywhere and anytime on Earth to within a few meters.

The Programme Setup and Status The Galileo programme consists of the following phases: • a definition phase during which the structure of the system was designed and its elements determined, which ended in 2001; • a development and validation phase, comprising the construction and launch of the first satellites, the establishment of the first ground-based infrastructures and all the work and operations necessary to validate the system in orbit.

The aim is that this phase shall end in 2010 with 4 operational Galileo satellites; • a deployment phase consisting of the establishment of all the space and ground-based infrastructures as well as related operations. The aim is that this phase shall run from 2008 to 2013. It shall include preparations for the exploitation phase; • an exploitation phase comprising infrastructure management and operations, the maintenance, constant improvement and renewal of the system, certification and standardisation operations relating to the programme, the marketing of the system and all other activities needed to develop the system and ensure that the programme runs smoothly. The exploitation phase is set to begin at the latest upon conclusion of the deployment phase currently foreseen in 2013.

Two experimental satellites, GIOVE-A and GIOVE-B, are currently operating in orbit, the first one mainly to secure the Galileo frequency filings, the second one which was delivered by Astrium GmbH additionally to demonstrate key technologies

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such as the Hydrogen Maser Atomic Clock in orbit and to transmit the latest Galileo signals. Currently, the development and validation phase is well under way with the aim to verify the space and ground elements and their interaction until 2010 with four Galileo satellites in orbit. The corresponding space and ground control segment are under the responsibility of Astrium GmbH and Ltd., respectively.

At the same time the procurement process for the deployment phase has started in the frame of a socalled “competitive dialogue” proPersonal Navigation cess according to EU procurement rules ensuring a fair and open tendering with balanced participation of various industries. ESA is acting as the procurement agent and system responsible under a delegation agreement from the European Commission who is the overall programme owner. Six main work packages shall be procured and under contract by 2009: • System Support • Ground Control Segment • Ground Mission Segment • Satellites • Operations • Launchers Except for launchers, where there is only one European prime candidate, all other segments are now competed by two industrial groups each.

The Role of Astrium Astrium as the leader in European Space industry has been involved in the Galileo programme since the beginning and has significantly contributed to the programme with its comprehensive set of competencies in the field of Satellite Navigation and large Space programmes. These competencies range from overall navigation system understanding, over design and delivery of the navigations satellites and ground infrastructure to launchers and operations segment. .

System engineering: In the Galileo system and architecture, Astrium is one of the main industrial partners supporting ESA in the design of the overall space and ground infrastructure with specific key expertise in signal design and performance engineering.

Space segment: In the most prominent segment which comprises the 30 satellites constellation, Astrium has been responsible for the development and delivery of the Giove-B test satellite as well as for the first four Galileo satellites of the development phase including the lead for the highly complex navigation payload. For the completion of the full constellation

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in the deployment phase, Astrium is one of the two down-selected prime candidates.

Ground Segment: In the on-going phase, Astrium is leading the design and delivery of the Ground Control Segment which is currently being installed in the Galileo Control Centre in Oberpfaffenhofen. Furthermore, the company contributes to the engineering of the Ground Mission Segment. For the deployment phase, Astrium has been downselected as one of two Ground Control prime candidates.

Through its branches Services and Space Transportation, Astrium also contributes with valuable work shares to the activities of Galileo operations and Ariane launchers, respectively. With regard to application technologies, Astrium also has built up a remarkable know-how. The company has developed promising navigation products such as ground based Galileo test beds or technologies and solutions for precision landing and indoor applications. As a firmly established player in the system, a leader in the space, payload and ground control segments, and as an innovator in the areas of high-end applications, Astrium is therefore well positioned for Galileo.

The Political Dimension A self standing European navigation system owned by the European Community will strengthen political and economic unity in Europe and fortify European independence. For Europe’s citizens’ benefits, Galileo therefore is highly supported by the European public as shown in different surveys. Europeans understand that navigation is a key technology and thereby of strategic importance for Europe.

The future-oriented navigation technology offers Europe a very strong product for the global marketplace. Navigation, providing positioning, local information and guidance, fulfils political goals by guaranteeing mobility, innovation and environmental quality. Mobility is a precondition for successful commerce and an independent Europe. Fostering innovation secures the future - an important political goal. Galileo opens the potential for almost unlimited innovation. European navigation technology and the range of services it provides, strengthen EU independence in the face of global competition.

In their resolution of 10 July 2008, the European Parliament underlined the necessity of Galileo for autonomous European Security and Defence Policy operations, for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, for Europe’s own security and for

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Galileo Programme Phases

the Union’s strategic autonomy. The parliament notes that, in particular, its public-regulated service (PRS) will be vital in the field of navigation, positioning and timing, not least in order to avoid unnecessary risks. The European parliament additionally draws attention to the fact that the EGNOS and Galileo programmes should be considered as one of the major pillars of the future European Space Programme and the development of a European Space Policy.

Conclusion Innovation is the key to foster Europe’s economic success.

Satellite based radio navigation has been identified as one of the key drivers for innovation of the twenty-first century. In few years time, so called “Location Based Services” will be offered via a small Galileo chip integrated in mobile phones allowing for local service providers to help clients with dedicated solutions or information related to their situation and position.

Aircraft will be equipped with Galileo receivers making air travel safer, faster, cheaper and also more environmentally friendly. Galileo will also help to make the world safer by complementing and reinforcing existing systems i.e. predicting floods and earthquakes or contributing to successful relief operations. Galileo is a key project and at the same time a great challenge for European space industry and, moreover, a perfect example for the benefits, space technology offers to the people on Earth. Galileo serves also as an important signal to the next generations of engineers interested in working in the space or other high-tech industry. Different to GPS or GLONASS, Galileo will offer dedicated services based on user needs, and by providing service level guarantees and integrity functions enable professional and safety critical applications beyond the variety of applications already existing and developing today.

The potential for public safety and security will be tremendous, be it for personal safety such as children tracking or location based emergency calls, for supporting the rescue and protection activities of fire brigades or police, or for guiding and

coordinating complex anti-terror, peace keeping and defence missions based on a dedicated and protected service.

Galileo is undoubtedly one of today’s most exciting high-tech projects worldwide and one giant leap for Europe.

Documentation Joint Statement on GPS and Galileo Cooperation, October 23, 2008, Washington, D.C. “Representatives of the Government of the United States, the European Community (EC) and its Member States met in their first plenary session to review and discuss matters of mutual importance regarding cooperation in the use of global navigation satellite systems. Such consultations are held pursuant to the 2004 Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications between the United States of America and the EC and its Member States. (...)

The Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the Agreement and presented the current status of their respective systems. The U.S. intends to continue to operate GPS, a dual use system that provides precision timing, navigation and position location for civil and military purposes, and to provide the Standard Positioning Service for peaceful civil, commercial and scientific use on a continuous, worldwide basis, free of direct user fees. The European Community has launched the procurement of the Galileo system and revised the governance of the European global navigation satellite systems (Galileo and European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS)) which will provide services including open, safety-of-life, commercial, and public regulated services. The Parties believe that compatibility and civil interoperability not only between GPS and Galileo, but also with other global navigation satellite systems, will promote global economic growth and strengthen transatlantic cooperation. (...)

The participants expressed strong support for continued close cooperation, which has the potential to significantly improve services related to spacebased positioning, navigation and timing.”

Source: US Department of State, Media note, 24 -10-2008

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Europe’s Position in Security and Defence Issues – a Capacity to Act is Desperately Needed

by Oliver Bruzek, Director International Markets, CAE, Stolberg (Rheinland) Europe’s days of comfort are now certainly a thing of the past.

For many decades the European Union in the fold or - depending on one’s view - the shadow of the super powers had plenty of time to attend to its own organisational development, the expansion of the economic performance of its member states and the shaping of a sustainable civil society.

After the upheavals in the late 1980s it was again Europe that was able to benefit most from the changed political situation.

The borders of the European Union have extended and the scope of economic prosperity and democratic social order has almost doubled, while the USA, as the only remaining super power, became a victim of hegemonic politics under the cloak of global democratisation and Russia was busy with the stabilisation of its own country and trying to find its future self-conception.

The new geopolitical facts The situation today is quite different. With the partly failed military mission in Iraq, which has driven the country to its economic limitations, and one of the greatest financial crises in recent history, the USA will – at least in the next ten years – have to focus all its energy on consolidating its national finances. After the bitter experience in Iraq most of the American people are war-weary and want their Administration to concentrate on the domestic affairs that concern them. On a global level the United States operations will be clearly more reserved than in the past. There is a growing understanding for the necessity of closer cooperation and coordination with the European partners. The previous latent mindset as to the European states - if necessary – “divide et impera” is changing towards a desire for strong allies and a single reliable partner on this continent.

Thanks to its sheer geographical size, its energy-political resources and the economic performance that goes with that, Russia, on the other hand, is gaining in self-assurance and is in this self-concept calling for a reinstatement of status of a global power. Russia’s position should not be underestimated.

Against the background of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, which was not so long ago, some people, going by the winner’s rules, still tend to assume the natural subjugation of the loser of the Cold War as something quite normal. And it is in the end this characteristic style that has led to - and will always lead to - an inappropriate fierceness in any discussions. However, all this does not mean a return to a bipolar world order, alone for the reason that with China there is a third power with global importance also playing a part. In fact

Oliver Bruzek born in 1968 since 2008: Director International Markets, CAE (Stolberg) 2007 - 2008: Director General, Brain-World (Ulm) 2002 - 2007: Director Government Relations, EADS Defense and Security (Ulm) 1999-2002: Consultant Marketing, Euromissile (Paris) 1997-1999: Advisor on Defense- and Security Politics, German Parliament (Bonn) 1992-1997: Eurocorps, (Strasbourg) Author of various published articles and books, i.e. “Wörterbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik” with Bühl and Kujat (Hamburg, 2001)

in future it will be a case of defending regional interests on the one hand, and at the same time – with everyone cooperating – dealing with the challenges of globalisation, be it the ecological and economical challenges or the dangers of international terrorism.

Europe has to create new capabilities in Security and Defence Europe will have to learn that the possibilities of exercising influence on the developments in Russia or in China are limited. This will certainly be the case if Europe itself is in principle not capable of acting to its full extent. An effective European diplomacy – and this was and is without doubt one of the most effective weapons of ensuring the interests of our civil societies – can in the long run only be based on a plausible ability of assertiveness on Europe’s part. What is more important, however, is the fact that there is now a much slimmer probability of others extinguishing the fires on Europe’s forecourt, as was previously the case in various African states and during the Balkan conflict. When it comes to finding a common security and defence strategy the European Union will no longer be in position for delaying things, or indeed as in the Iraq conflict not reaching a common agreement at all.

Special paths for individual states to gain a national advantage in the one or other case will have to be a thing of the past, if in the long run the Union does not want to lose both its strength and its credibility. It remains to be seen to what extent in future it will be possible to transfer national sovereignty to the EU from areas where, if we are to be honest, there has been no national independence for a long time, and

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The most modern training center for simulation in Bückeberg (Germany) would be an example for EU-Simulation Centers.

certain scepticism is not out of place here. In the constellation we have today it would in any case be unforgivable if it were not possible to mobilise the right means to provide the capacity to act for such a vital interest. There are three essential criteria here: • All available resources must be mobilised.

• Synergies must be created, as regards both systems and personnel.

• The procurement and expansion of unavailable resources must not be directly focused opposed to Russia or another power, they have to present a potential for a securitypolitical and economic network.

How to close the helicopter EU/NATO gap?

Any amount of examples could be specified here. The latest and perhaps the most severe example is the lack of transport helicopters within the European Union and NATO. Nowadays injured soldiers might die because they have to be transported out of operational areas by jeep instead of being flown out and receiving prompt medical service. The capacity foundation for future deployments necessary is completely jeopardised.

There is no budget for new helicopters and the order situation with the manufacturers means that if at all possible they would not be available before 2015. And it is not just a question of a lack of material, the existing military commitment means that there are not enough pilots and other crew members.

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Various attempts to eliminate this lack of helicopters as soon as possible – or at least bridge the gap – have to date failed.

The main reason for this is that up until now only the western helicopter industry has been taken into consideration, and we are still waiting for answers from that address.

So, how can we find a way out of this calamity that will meet the demands of the armed forces, accommodate the rightful interests of the helicopter industry and, at the same time, take the basic political framework into consideration.

A large number of Russian-design transport helicopters, mostly Mi-8 and Mi-17, are available in the newer member states of the European Union and NATO. However, some of them are grounded due to a lack of repair work and maintenance, and also their equipment does not meet with today’s standards as far as safety and operational capacity are concerned. At the same time they are the only aircraft available in these states. That these helicopters are not serviceable is really negligible in two respects. First, the gap could be closed with a refurbishment and upgrade to NATO and EU standards, which could be carried out relatively quickly. Second, after an appropriate training of pilots and other crew members, personnel would be ready for action.

The European Parliament has recognised this situation and has in the meantime not only taken note of the fundamental availability of these resources, but also called for the utilisation of these resources. No way was it only the economic dimension that the Parliament had in mind. In fact, if Europe were to do without these platforms it would also have to do without the willingness of the new Eastern European partners to take on the appropriate operations in the future and existing deployments and do without these well-trained pilots.

Such a solution is of interest for both sides. While the European institutions and NATO see a prompt and cost-effective way of filling the gap within the planning of the corresponding missions, the countries, which only have Russian platforms at their disposal, see a possibility of achieving an integration of their own military operational capacities. Win-win situation for all involved certainly be possible.

Industrial cooperation with Russia in EU-Projects The global market leader for the simulation of civil and military aircraft CAE, has therefore proposed setting up a joint training and simulation centre for these helicopters not far from Prague, and together with other partners ensuring an appropriate upgrade to a NATO standard still to be defined. In this venture CAE will be supported not only by the Czech government but also by other EU member states which also have Mi-17 helicopters and also by countries which have recognised that it is time to take action. The biggest worry for the sceptics is the regular availability of the necessary spare parts and the fear that

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Russia could freeze the deliveries or licenses at short notice in the event of ‘special’ political developments. However, looking at it more closely this reservation is not sustainable since on the one hand it misappropriates not only the industrial intents of the Russian government but also on the other hand the political significance of such a cooperation.

Just a short time ago President Putin declared the aerospace industry as a strategically important commercial sector for Russia, making it clear that on a long-term basis the Russian Federation wants to face up to the competition of the existing global players. To this end every effort necessary will be made from an industrial, technical and technological point of view, as well as on a commercial level. The Russians too are well aware that this cannot be achieved without technology transfer, a division of labour with regional and local partners and certainly not without cooperation. If we were to assume so, this would be tantamount to a negligent underestimation of the free-market capacities of that country. In the long run the Russian aerospace industry simply cannot work off its capacities in its domestic market, it will on a long-term basis have to rely on successful exports.

A second aspect is just as important: in a phase in which the political relations between the West and the Russian Federation may develop one way or the other, both sides are aware that there is no alternative other than a continuing cooperation. The challenges of today are simply too global and can no longer be divided by national borders. The latest events in the Georgian conflict happened in the middle of the US presidential election campaign and this not only impacted the communication between the USA and Russia but also caused NATO to discontinue discussions in the NATO-Russia Council – a paradox insofar as such a council is virtually created for just such a situation, to continue discussions in such critical times. The apparent dead-end the two sides are stuck in can only be solved in two respects. On the one hand discussions on a political level: here the Europeans have found the right way in expressing their disapproval of the Russians’ course of action without ceasing communications. On the other hand, it will be the medium-term and long-term measures that for instance are anchored in a closer networking of industry and – even better – in the defence-industrial basis.

European Industries is willing to proceed The project of the Centre for Training, Simulation and Upgrade of Mi-17 helicopters accommodates these concerns. Of course the above mentioned reservations will also be fuelled by some western helicopter manufacturers who fear the competition from the Russian manufacturers. But again here the focus is on a very short-term observation that cannot be sustained on a long-term basis. In the first place this competition will in any case come sooner or later, and second, the enormous chances

Russian sourced Mi17 Transport helicopter – Reforbishment and Training/ Simulation could help to close EU/NATO helicopter gap at relatively short notice.

that will automatically arise when Russia does open up more for foreign products than is now the case will be suppressed.

Having said that, there are western manufacturers who have recognised the chance such a cooperation can bring and who, alone for economic reasons, are willing to support the Czech centre. At the end of the day it is not just a case of which helicopter is flying, but also which technology has been used.

In the past Europe has realised key projects of strategic importance: Galileo or the A-400M to name only two. A joint training centre for Mi-17 helicopters would be a further step in the right direction with similar strategic, economic and political significance, even if with another, namely a short-term objective. As to the European Union’s actual capacity to act in this respect there is no other alternative, and the soldier severely wounded in action will hardly be asking what make the helicopter is that is transporting him swiftly to the military hospital and saving his life. However, the loved ones of servicemen may well ask why not all resources were used to save the life of their son or husband.

Documentation Report EP from 6 May 2008 on the development of the ESDP in 2007 Paragraph 24 “Welcomes the Franco-German heavy transport helicopter project, but is also aware of the complex reasons for the shortage of available and operational helicopters, mostly related to the high costs of flight hours and maintenance; invites the Council to explore possibilities designed to bridge the gap for the near future, either by a joint action or by supporting Member States in the refurbishing and upgrading of Russian-built helicopters as well as establishing a helicopter training centre; urges the Member States to envisage an increase in defence expenditure for the purpose of being able to make efficient use of acquired helicopters;”

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A Strong Base in Europe for Global Ambitions Jean-Paul Herteman, President of the Committee of Directors, SAFRAN, Paris The European-Security and Defence Union: SAFRAN is a global player in civil aviation, in defense and in the security sector. The company is also a major manufacturer of rocket engines for space applications and is a leader in biometric identification systems. On the military market, SAFRAN is found in almost all airborne systems. What does your overall strategy look like and on what is it focused?

J.-P. Herteman: By the end of 2008, SAFRAN will be one of the major equipment suppliers in aerospace, defense and security, and we will be concentrating on these three sectors in future.

So we will shortly be spinning off our telecommunications activities. To place SAFRAN in the right context, I would add that we are number five in the world on the basis of sales and our strategic goal is to raise ourselves a few rungs higher.

The European-Security and Defence Union: And how do you see the space sector in your group?

J.-P. Herteman: Those companies operating solely in the aerospace segment, such as Goodrich, are few and far between.

As a rule, companies operate in several major areas, such as aerospace and defense or aerospace and security, or are at home in all three such as SAFRAN, namely aerospace, defense and security.

Even if the technologies involved may sometimes be very different, it is vital to retain the confidence of the major customers in order to be considered for large and complex high-tech programs with a long-term orientation. This is a very specific sector.

Jean-Paul Hertemann Safran Group Chief Executive Officer (September 3, 2007, onwards) President, Defense Security Branch Jean-Paul Herteman is a graduate of Ecole Polytechnique and of Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l'Aéronautique et de l'Espace. In 1984, he joined Snecma and assumed until 1995 among others the positions of Quality Director (1989 - 92), Mechanical Division Manager and Deputy Technical Director (1993 - 95). In 1995 CFM56 Program Manager at Snecma and Executive Vice President of CFM International; 1996 Vice President Engineering of Snecma . In 1999 Executive Vice President and General Manager of Snecma Rocket-Engine Division and was then appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Snecma Moteurs in 2002.

From 2004 till 2006: President, Defense Security Branch and Chairman & CEO of Sagem Défense Sécurité.

The European-Security and Defence Union: You have just stressed that you aim to become even bigger. How do you aim to achieve this?

J.-P. Herteman: There are two ways to grow: organically by making intensive efforts in technological R&D, and by acquiring companies. As an example of the first way I would mention our great advances in the security sector, and specifically in identification. In fact, our biometric algorithms have left our competitors behind in terms of performance, precision and speed. As regards the second path to growth opportunities, namely acquisitions, we stick to the basic principle of buying companies only when we are convinced that they will make a vital strategic contribution, either in terms of technology or by complementing our market coverage.

The European-Security and Defence Union: This is a complementary strategy that appears to be successful.

J.-P. Herteman: That is precisely a specific feature of SAFRAN. We try to develop by means of investments and technological breakthroughs.

Jean-Paul Herteman, head of the world’s fifth largest aerospace and defense group, talks to Hartmut Bühl, Correspondent of the Behörden Spiegel and Editor of “The European –Security and Defence Union”. photo: Jean-Marie Ramès/SAFRAN.

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The European-Security and Defence Union: Globalization in conjunction with the weak dollar has surely had an impact on your strategy and business development. Are you planning to outsource facilities on a larger scale?

J.-P. Herteman: Like all companies in our sector, SAFRAN must also become increasingly international, as our industry has an unequivocally global character. We are continuing to place our supply chain on an increasingly international basis. There are two reasons for this: the dollar and competitive pressure. We

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J.-P. Herteman: Space really is a very special sector. What is happening there is one of the most brilliant successes in the construction of Europe. We can be proud of having given Europe free access to space and also of developing the capabilities of using it not only for civilian but also for strategic purposes. But our past success can be improved further in the future. Indeed, we have no choice but to do so. Take the example of China: the Chinese have announced a rocket with a larger payload capacity than Ariane 5, and believe me, that’s absolutely enormous. They are talking about 14 tons while we are currently at 10 tons.

try to manage our costs on a dollar basis and to reduce them.

The European-Security and Defence Union: So you have to reduce your costs. How do you go about that?

J.-P. Herteman: Ambitious countries already offer excellent production capabilities in aerospace, and do so at attractive prices. SAFRAN exports 95 percent of its products, on the basis of their final status. For example, 15 percent go to China.

The European-Security and Defence Union: What about the presence of SAFRAN in other countries?

The launching of an Ariane V at Kouron – driven by motors from SAFRAN. Photo :

J.-P. Herteman: We are not far from Safran having exactly the same number of employees in our production plants in Europe and outside Europe.

The European-Security and Defence Union: And what is the picture like as regards investments?

J.-P. Herteman: We naturally try to keep on top of this globalization process, and that means that we simultaneously invest strongly in our industrial capacities in Europe. Along with strengthening our international supply chain, we invest twice as much in Europe as in the rest of the world combined.

The European-Security and Defence Union: So you feel that you have managed to avoid delocalization?

J.-P. Herteman: Absolutely! We have so far managed to avoid closing any large industrial plants. Let me give you an example: we have hired 2,000 employees in France each year over the last three years. Half of them are engineers and the other half are production staff. We really are expanding SAFRAN internationally, but we are doing this in a very balanced way, even if a large part of our growth takes place abroad.

The European-Security and Defence Union: Let’s go back to your space activities. You have partners in the subcontractor segment for rocket engines worldwide, including China. In Europe you cooperate very closely with a number of engine manufacturers.

You are the leader in this sector. Can you imagine assuming leadership of a large European group on the pattern of EADS one day?

The European-Security and Defence Union: Does this mean that Europe needs to reorganize in the space sector?

J.-P. Herteman: We are willing to work together with an even more rational organization that focuses above all on achieving greater specialization and optimization of the individual components. An obvious first step would be to find a basis for a rapprochement between the two giants in space engines, namely Astrium GmbH and ourselves.

The European-Security and Defence Union: But what is the real challenge here?

J.-P. Herteman: The space industry cannot be compared to any other. Space is a delicate sector. We are willing to share, but it’s simply impossible to share everything. We could, as you have indicated, take over the leadership. But in order to bring Europe forwards, leadership must be shared. I am convinced that this is possible. You know, space is just a very tiny domain comprising several hundred persons.

The European-Security and Defence Union: Let me turn to quite a different market that concerns specific German interests. SAFRAN has entered the field as a bidder for the Bundesdruckerei (Germany’s supplier of secure documentation). Is SAFRAN still interested in this over the long term in view of the latest developments?

J.-P. Herteman: We did not make an offer. We keep an eye on everything that is of strategic importance. We ask ourselves questions and gather information. You must realize that SA-

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FRAN is a company with Supervisory and Executive Boards. And any offers must be approved by my Supervisory Board. Any offers that the Executive Board submits to the Supervisory Board have previously been discussed in depth by them. Even if such an idea did arise, it would still need to be presented at this higher level. But SAFRAN is also a public stock corporation.

If I make an offer, then I have to inform the market. To repeat clearly what I have said: we made no offer in this case.

The European-Security and Defence Union: To what extent do you differ from your competitors?

J.-P. Herteman: SAFRAN concentrates on a specific part of the security business, namely on identity checks. Our strategy here is simple – we want to have the better technology. Our position is not to provide large systems.

One of our core capabilities is biometrics. We are worldwide first among equals in this sector in terms of both the sales and performance that we achieve with our technology.

We have a strong position in smart cards, especially in Germany – where we have 500 employees. Incidentally, smart cards are increasingly also being used as data carriers for secure information. In this sector, we have an important technological component for encrypting and designing these cards.

The European-Security and Defence Union: A few months ago you acquired the Dutch company Sdu-I. J.-P. Herteman: That’s right. We recently acquired Dutch secure document printer Sdu-Identification BV, which we assume to be without any global rivals as holder of a technology for document security (ID cards). We have already worked together with them in manufacturing biometric ID cards for Albania and our people on the team were very impressed by them. When Sdu-I was up for sale, we acted immediately.

The European-Security and Defence Union: Finally, what is the current situation as regards the Germans?

J.-P. Herteman: The sector of identity checks is a market with many local and national peculiarities, but always of global interest. So it’s clear that our people are also interested in the capabilities of the Bundesdruckerei. But let’s be pragmatic: the acquisition of a foreign company in such a sensitive sector as security or defense can only be successful with the full political approval of the state concerned. Such a business would otherwise be completely unfeasible. It’s not a question of nationality and no-one suggested to us that we should go for the Netherlands rather than Germany. I can assure you of that.

The European-Security and Defence Union: What about SAFRAN and the French government?

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J.-P. Herteman: The French government owns thirty percent of SAFRAN’s capital. Only ten years ago the figure was 100 percent. Naturally, very specific rules apply to our activities concerning the country’s nuclear deterrent force. I would add that next to the government as the largest shareholder of SAFRAN we have the employees, who hold 2? percent of the capital.

This is also part of management’s strategy.

The European-Security and Defence Union: Let me return to Europe. Efforts are being made in Brussels to realize a common defense products market. Other efforts are moving toward creating a security market. Why does the industry need two markets?

J.-P. Herteman: Well, there are distinctions between the two.

The equipment for high-intensity conflicts cannot be compared with that needed for border checks. But you are right that there is no way of assigning these technologies to specific sectors.

Seen from outside, a Eurofighter or Rafale engine has nothing in common with that of an Airbus. But inside they have the same materials, the same mechanical operations. They are merely adapted to their specific functions.

The European-Security and Defence Union: Do you regard European policies in the sectors of security and defense as coherent?

J.-P. Herteman: I very much hope that those who will be responsible for Europe in the future will have a broad-based vision and will talk about strategic technologies rather than a segmentation of activities. But specific characteristics must be respected. The USA has identified 27 critical technologies in which America is defined as being “dominant”. They simply make no attempt to think in categories such as aerospace, security and defense.

The European-Security and Defence Union: What would be your definition?

J.-P. Herteman: When people talk to me about “industrial basis and defense technologies” and some then add “and security”, then I take this to mean the “industrial basis and technology strategy”. Just look at the surveys: 74 percent of Europeans want Europe to be able to assure its own defense and security.

The European-Security and Defence Union: Shouldn’t the EU Commission talk about strategic research within the scope of their research program?

J.-P. Herteman: I have held discussions on this issue with the Commissioners and their Directorates-General. Perhaps their ideas will change. We must be patient and keep on the ball.

EUROPEAN•DEFENCE

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence – a Capability for the Alliance and Protection for Europe

by Richard D.F. Froh, NATO – Deputy Secretary General for Armaments, Brussels In April 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, the Heads of State and Government addressed the need for defences to protect Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. In their technical report, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) proposed five Architecture Options built around elements of the US Ballistic Missile Defence System in Europe. Today, that report forms a solid basis both for further technical analysis by the Committee of National Armament Directors (CNAD) and for the essential political-military discussions on missile defence ongoing in the Executive Working Group (EWG) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The contribution of Europe At Bucharest, NATO Heads of State and Government drew four essential conclusions regarding missile defences for the Alliance: • the significant contribution of the elements deployed in Europe of the US Ballistic Missile Defence Systems; • the increased threat of the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; • the Architecture Options based on the US deployed elements in Europe capable of providing a comprehensive coverage to NATO population centres and territory; and • the need to maintain dialog with Russia.

But discussions on a possible territorial missile defence for the Alliance did not just start this year in Bucharest. In the 2002 Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government agreed the need to examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to the Alliance in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence means, including deterrence. Consistent with the indivisibility of Alliance security, NATO’s Heads of State and Government initiated the NATO Missile Defence Feasibility Study (MD FS) to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. The CNAD, one of NATO’s senior committees, was given the job of conducting the MD FS and told to report back in 2006.

The architecture The Study was conducted in parallel with other NATO activities to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery means. To provide a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) capability to Alliance’s deployed forces, in 2005 the North Atlantic Council created the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile

Richard D. F. Froh NATO’s Deputy Secretary General since 2007.

Born in Toronto, Canada, àn 10 August 1949, Richard (Rick) Froh graduated from the Royal College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario in 1972 with a Bachelors Degree in Civil Engineering.

Over the next 25 years, Rick Froh served in various command and staff appointments in Combat and Construction Engineering units in Canada and in Lahr, Germany. His last appointment was a Military Assistant to the Chairman of the NATO Military Council (1992 -1996).

On retiring from the Canadian Forces, Rick Froh assumed the position of Head, Land Armament section at NATO’s Brussels HQ, and on the creation of the Joint Armaments Section in July 2004, he became its head (until 2007), among others responsible for the Active layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Steering Committee and the Missile Defence Project Group

Defence (ALTBMD) Programme Organization. It was tasked to execute a Programme Plan to deliver an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010 and a Full Operational Capability (FOC) in the 2015-2016 timeframe. The objective of the ALTBMD Organization is to develop and field to the war fighters a verified ALTBMD Architecture composed of a NATO-owned Battlefield Management Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (BMC3I) system which, along with national sensors and lower-layer and upper-layer weapons systems, will form a fully integrated theatre missile defence system of systems. That Architecture will be able to protect deployed NATO forces against ballistic missiles with a range up to 3,000 km. The BMC3I will provide TMD functions at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels through NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information System (Bi-SC AIS), the Alliance’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS) and NATO’s General Communications System (NGCS).

NATO Russia council is involved At the same time, under the auspices of the NATO Russia Council, work to improve both operational and technical interoperability of theatre ballistic missile defense systems was launched. The objective of this work is to ensure that NATO and Russian TMD forces which might be deployed in adjacent Areas of Responsibility during Crisis Response Operations could operate in a coordinated manner. Operational concepts and procedures were developed and assessed during three Command Post Exercises and one Computer Assisted

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Exercise. A technical Interoperability Study was undertaken and successfully completed, which proposed options to improve Situational Awareness, operational planning and engagement de-confliction. In light of the current political situation regarding missile defense, this work is progressing slowly.

The study results

That brings us back to where we started, at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. The results of that Summit were very positive, as regards missile defence. As the next step, Heads of State and Government asked for the refinement of the presented options to provide a comprehensive missile defence architecture which would extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the U.S. system. A report is expected at NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit next year. Additional technical analysis on debris or Command and Control was also requested.

Returning to the MD FS, you will remember the report to NATO Heads of State and Government was due to the Riga Summit in November 2006. The MD FS was the first detailed study ever undertaken by the Alliance to examine options for protecting The situation today is that work is ongoing within NATO to Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the examine the political, technical, financial and military aspects full range of ballistic missile threats. It concluded that missile of missile defence with the aim defence was technically to provide the comprehensive feasible within the assumptiinformation needed to support ons and limitations of the Consistent with the indivisibility of Allianany decision on NATO missile study. The study report propoce security, NATO’s Heads of State and defence at the Strasbourg/Based several Architecture den-Baden Summit in April Options that could meet Government initiated the NATO Missile 2009. The current global NATO’s requirements.

Defence Feasibility Study (MD FS) to exfinancial crisis, and continuing Appreciating the good work political debate in member done in the MD FS, Heads of amine options for protecting Alliance terrinations, makes it difficult to State and Government in Riga tory, forces and population centres against predict the outcome with recognised that further inforregard to missile defence at mation was needed before the full range of missile threats. the next Summit. As was nations would be ready to agreed in Bucharest, the take any political decision on ballistic missile threat is real and it is growing. When and how a possible missile defence capability for NATO. They wished to the Alliance will deal with that threat remains an open questiknow the political and military implications of missile defence on, but there are steps which can be taken in the short term for the Alliance and to receive an update on missile threat which will better prepare the Alliance and its member states to developments by the time of the 2008 NATO Summit. be ready should someone decide to test us with the threat of or an actual ballistic missile attack. These are being develoSignificant Change in 2007 ped and discussed now and should be included in the reports Shortly after work started on these Riga tasks, there was a on missile defence going to Strasbourg/Baden Baden. significant change in the situation. In January 2007, the USA announced plans to deploy long-range interceptors and an Xband radar in Europe. As a result, the NATO Defence Ministers, Strasbourg-Kehl Summit: The way ahead when they met in June 2007, asked for an assessment of the We have come a long way since the need for missile defences possible political and military implications of the proposed US was first discussed in NATO in the early 90s, following the first missile defence system, including its effect on the work tasked Gulf War. Today, missile defence concepts and technologies at the Riga Summit. Again CNAD was tasked to conduct a are much better understood, enabling informed debate in technical analysis, this time on the implications of the US political, diplomatic, military, financial, and technical forums plans to a possible, future NATO missile defence system. within NATO, its member states and more widely. It is not simple, in fact it is “rocket science”, but the good news is that Throughout 2007, NATO supported transparent dialogue with we have some of the best experts available working on the Russia on missile defence. During several meetings of the issue. I am confident that in April 2009, at the Strasbourg/BaNATO Russia Council, reinforced with missile defence experts den Baden Summit, our leaders will have the information they from nations, Russia, USA, the Czech Republic and Poland need to make a decision on the political desirability of a NATO exchanged information on their ongoing activities, expressing missile defence system to protect the territory and population their views and concerns in a frank and open manner. centres of all Allies, most of whom are in Europe.

“

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EUROPEAN DEFENCE

EUFOR Tchad/RCA – Progress and On-going Success

by Lt Gen Patrick Nash, Operational Commander EUFOR Tchad/RCA, N’Djanena In keeping with the European Union’s tradition of helping people in need and, together with the wider international community, in responding to the impact of the crisis in Darfur, a decision was taken by the UN Security Council to seek the improvement of security for the people of Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic by the establishment of a multidimensional international presence which includes Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

A highly complex military operation From the outset EUFOR Tchad/RCA was considered, and remains, a complex military operation in a challenging part of the world. The prospects of success were uncertain. Such were the requirements of the operation that during late 2007 a number of commentators indicated that “mission impossible” was a term best appropriate to describe EUFOR Tchad/RCA. These demands were and still are considerable. The Chad/CAR/Sudan region is volatile, unpredictable and extremely hard to assess primarily arising from a complicated longlasting crisis in the Darfur region. To-date, EUFOR has faced no small amount of difficulties achieving ambitious objectives.

There is no doubt there will be other difficulties in the future.

How to translate political will into military action As it’s operational commander it was, and is, my task to translate diplomatic and political policy into military action, this has involved: • Creating EUFOR’s visibility and presence on the ground which required an unprecedented logistical deployment into a remote, vast and inhospitable area of operations in the

Daily contact to the population.

Lieutenant General Patrick Nash Operation Commander EUFOR CHAD/RCA Graduate of the Irish Defence Forces Command and Staff.

Home Service Experience: Lieutenant General Pat Nash was commissioned into the Cavalry Corps in Sept 1966. On promotion to Colonel in June 2000 he was appointed Director of Defence Forces Administration. Brigadier General in Jan. In 2005 Patrick Nash took up the appointment as Deputy Chief Operations.

Overseas Service Experience: Wide range in oversea with United Nations Forces, and EU Monitoring Mission in the Western Balkans. Cyprus in 1967. Company Commander (UNIFIL) in Lebanon in 1983 and Operations Officer UNIFIL in 1992. In 1996 Headquarters of the EU Monitoring Mission in the Western Balkans. In 1999 Battalion Commander in UNIFIL.

heart of Africa. At the operations launch nine months ago, I spoke of having to climb a “Logistical Everest”, well, it has been climbed. This involved 9 sea moves, 1,500 containers, 540 strategic flights, 150 vehicle convoys (distance of over 2,00 kms), 365 aviation transport flights.

• The construction of infrastructure from “brown-field” sites to finished camps involved a huge programme of building.

Overall EUFOR has to-date completed 6 camps including 4 with a capacity for 600 personnel and one with a capacity for 2,000 personnel.

• The deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA as the largest, most multinational EU operation in Africa to-date, has had to overcome difficulties in order to become operational while still deploying. Despite delays caused by the rebel attack on the Chadian capital N’Djamena in late January/early February 08, EUFOR Tchad/RCA successfully reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on the 15 March 2008.

• Getting a force and getting that force on the ground only has relevance if you get results from it. EUFOR’s performance of its key military tasks in achieving on-ground effects to provide a safe and secure environment in its area of operations has continued to improve as forces and assets arrived and as it built on our knowledge of the area of operations.

EUFOR has established its legitimacy and efficiency in peoples’ minds by its work rate, particularly the every day patrolling and liaison work and by its responsiveness and capability. Any act of violence against the humanitarian community is an indication of the breakdown of the rule of

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EUFOR: Promotion of a soldier in a camp in Chad.

law and order. Occasionaly it has been necessary for EUFOR to step in to give the local authorities confidence to reassert themselves as was the case in May during EUFOR’s operation “Forchana Response”. The rebel attack at Goz Beida in midJune evidenced a firm response from EUFOR in protecting internally displaced persons and evacuating NGO personnel to a safe location. This illustrated and confirmed EUFOR’s effectiveness and thus raison d’être. It has further displayed its Military Capability by the conduct of a number of combined joint operations – where periodically forces were consolidated saturating a particular area for a given timeframe to gain a specific effect. Moreover it’s apparent random pattern of night patrolling in remote areas is having a significant deterrent effect. EUFOR is out there, EUFOR is active. Bandits and criminals know this as they learnt to their cost in AM NABAK in mid-August when a EUFOR patrol encountered an unidentified armed group, and having received fire responded in kind. All this demonstrates the EU’s military response to major security issues in the region and illustrates EUFOR’s role as necessary and relevant. EUFOR has contributed to the stabilization of Eastern Chad and Northeastern Central African Republic, helping to calm tensions and encouraging a trend towards returns of internally displaced persons.

The mandate and the organization In accordance with it’s mandate, EUFOR continues to conduct its actions in an impartial way, an important condition for the success of it’s deployment. Through the ongoing development of it’s situational awareness and through the experience gathered on the ground, EUFOR has created a significant deterrence to the major groupings who were creating instability heretofore in it’s area of operations.

The Operational Headquarters of EUFOR in Paris has begun to progress comprehensive military planning for post 15 March 2009. In last September, the UN passed a Resolution stating their intention to take over from EUFOR on the 15 March 2009.

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EUFOR is now planning for Force Recovery and the handover to a follow on force on the 15 March. It’s aim, together with the UN, is to achieve avoidance of any security gaps developing. In this regard, the newly adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1834 (2008) has authorised planning to proceed and has set out the relevant timelines providing for: the extension of MINURCAT1 until 15 March 09, the extending of a Multidimensional presence beyond 15 March 09 and the transfer of authority on 15 March 09. A clear picture from a military perspective on how to proceed is now apparent.

Less than five months remain to the end of our mandate in mid-March and far from focusing SOLELY on the end date EUFOR will be concentrating hard on the pursuit of it’s military tasks between now and then. The situation on the ground demands it of us and EUFOR responds to that situation by the maintainance of its operational tempo; by patrolling; by liaisoning; by welcoming the MINURCAT deployment; by assisting where necessary MINURCAT in its police tasks to fight banditry and criminality; by anticipating and by being ready to react. We know we are facing into a difficult period. The coming months are crucial.

The Commanders conclusion EUFOR Tchad/RCA deployed despite the difficulties and continued despite the challenges. The task has been, and remains, considerable … but much work has been done, much progress has been made. It’s becoming evident that this work is yielding success. The operation has gained a much sought after momentum. This gain is not to be underestimated because it signifies that EUFOR has met, and is meeting, the expectation on the ground. Because of EUFOR’s presence, regular patrolling, and planned targetted operations • There now exists a greater “sense of security” • IDPs and refugees have expressed the view that they feel safer, more secure • The humanitarian associations know they can rely on EUFOR in a crisis This Military Bridging Operation has succeeded in gaining an initiative towards positive development. The UN follow-on Force/arrangement can maintain this progress. EUFOR’s solid foundation has prepared the way to build future successes contributing to the long-term beneficial impact of a safe and secure environment for those most vulnerable in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic.

1 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Which Legtimacy for the Eurocorps?

Interview with Lieutenant General Pedro Pitarch, Commanding General of Eurocorps, Strasbourg The European – Security and Defence Union: General Pitarch, the Eurocorps celebrated 15 years of existence on 4th October 2008. Is there reason to celebrate?

General Pitarch: Of course, there is reason to celebrate: Eurocorps is a success story, not only in terms of military capabilities, but also in terms of political-military relevance. More than ever, and may be due to the continuous development of ESDP, Eurocorps is considered one of the main military units in Europe.

The European – Security and Defence Union: But has the pioneering spirit of the first years been kept up? After all, the name "Eurocorps" was deliberately chosen in order to overcome borders and harmonize national demands.

General Pitarch: Since its foundation Eurocorps has never given up progressing and developing its capabilities. It has never been in a static configuration. If one compares Eurocorps then and now, the transformation is huge: at that time it was designed as a heavy army corps, for high intensity conflicts. Yet Eurocorps has permanently adapted its structure and equipment to become now a very versatile and agile headquarters, able to deploy anywhere, at any moment on order of our nations. Indeed Eurocorps has already been selected three times for missions in theatres of the most demanding type such as Afghanistan, and Eurocorps was the land headquarters that allowed the Alliance to pronounce the full operational capability of the NATO Response Force in 2006.

The European – Security and Defence Union: The founder nations developed common regulations, procedures and methods designed to allow creating maximum interoperability and being open for new partners. In which form these new partners have indeed come into existence?. How does Eurocorps function after all?

General Pitarch: Since the mid-90s, three other countries have joined Germany and France as Eurocorps core nations: Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. These five countries form the Eurocorps Framework Nations, which means they are the ones that own this major unit. Moreover, I can read from time to time that Eurocorps includes some liaison officers. This definitely belongs to the past: Eurocorps is today reinforced by staff personnel from Austria, Greece, Turkey and Poland. The latter has recently even reinforced its contribution and has applied to become Eurocorps sixth Framework Nation. Regarding the reality of Eurocorps, I would say that I am pretty impressed. In

General Pedro Pitarch Commanding General of the Eurocorps, Strasbourg,France.

Lieutenant General Pedro Pitarch gratuated from the Military Academy of Zaragoza as a first Lieutenant.

From 1990 to 1994 advisor to the Prime Minister for international defence and security issues.

In 1998 advisor to the PM for planning and implementation of the professionalisation of Spanish Forces. Brigadier General in 1999 resonsible in MOD Madrid for NATO, WEU, EU and OSCE .

2002 ACOS Logistics in Shape, Mons as a Major General before returning 2004 to Madrid as the Policy Director of MOD Madrid.

He became head of the Spanish land forces in 2006 and was then nominated Commanding General of the Eurocorps on 21.September 2007.

fact, in contrast to most other headquarters of that level, no single nation can claim to run Eurocorps by itself. Everything is based on a common will, which consists in sharing the responsibilities while sharing the burdens as well. In concrete terms, Eurocorps headquarters comprises approximately 1000 persons and all the necessary assets to command and control a force of up to 65,000 soldiers.

The European – Security and Defence Union: Thus, the core elements of the Eurocorps are your Staff, a Headquarters Support Battalion and the French-German Brigade in Müllheim on the other side of the river Rhine. But what structures does Eurocorps form part of?

General Pitarch: In fact, Eurocorps does not have only the French-German Brigade under its operational command.

Eurocorps commands a multinational command support brigade as well. This unit is one of our masterpieces as its mission is to get our command posts up and running. The great strength of Eurocorps is the fact that it is the shared property of five Framework Nations. Eurocorps can be put at the disposal of the EU, the NATO or the UN, whenever our nations decide to. In terms of military command and control, Eurocorps is under the command of the Chiefs of Defence of our Framework Nations, while simultaneously maintaining close links with the NATO command structure and the EU, too.

The European – Security and Defence Union: Certainly, lacking military command and control structures of the European Union are one reason why there are only "light" links to the EU. And, of

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single week passes in which the Chairman of the Sub-Committee for Security and Defence picks up the Eurocorps topic in speeches or in written form in Brussels. Mr. Karl von Wogau, Member of the European Parliament, the Chairman, wants to create a close affiliation of Eurocorps to the EU and, thus, rights of fast access in the event of forthcoming military operations. How could that work, and what pre-requisites would have to be created in terms of organisation?

The Editor in Chief of The European - Security and Defence Union, Hartmut Bühl, interviewing the Commanding General of the Eurocorps, Lieutenant General Pedro Pitarch, at the Headquaters in Strasbourg.

course, the EU is no alliance. Are there any agreements with the EU? To what extent do you cooperate with the EU Military Staff?

General Pitarch: The links with the EU are developing in parallel with the development of the military side of ESDP. A closer cooperation has started in 2008 and I hope it will be further intensified: Eurocorps is already contributing to EUMS exercises with staff personnel, and Eurocorps members are attending courses organized by the EU in order to deepen their knowledge in this field.

The European – Security and Defence Union: As an operational headquarters, Eurocorps is available at any time for employment in operations. Are the agreements signed in the early 90s with NATO and WEU as defence alliances still relevant? Does Eurocorps feel "integrated" in any way as a result of these agreements?

General Pitarch: HQ Eurocorps has been certified by NATO both as High Readiness Force Headquarters and as Response Force Land Headquarters. Three times we have been committed in NATO operations so far. So, cooperation between Eurocorps and NATO is working perfectly. With regard to the WEU, I would like remind you of the fact that the WEU has transferred its capabilities to the EU a few years ago. Eurocorps is already included in the EU Force Catalogue as an Army Corps. Our nations are currently considering assigning a greater role to Eurocorps with regard to the EU. The European – Security and Defence Union: Now the EU Parliament is after you, if I may express this in this way. Not a

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General Pitarch: On the 5th of June this year, the European Parliament passed a resolution (by a vast majority) that proposed placing Eurocorps as a standing force under EU command and invited all member states to contribute to it.

This is an event of major importance for Eurocorps members.

No other military unit of its level can claim to have such backing and legitimacy. With regard to closer links between the EU and Eurocorps, I do not see it as a technical issue.

Considering our corporate culture, we are used to consensus, and considering our military capabilities, I do not know any other headquarters that has such a lot of command and control equipment at hand. All the more, Eurocorps is currently adapting its structure in order to make it more efficient when deployed. Frankly, the implementation of the European Parliament resolution would not constitute a big challenge for us, but it is up to our Framework Nations to decide what to do, when the time has come.

The European – Security and Defence Union: What attitude do the nations have towards this issue?

General Pitarch: As the resolution of the European Parliament is a recommendation to all EU member states, this has to be discussed among the Eurocorps Framework Nations and any other nations that show an interest.

The European – Security and Defence Union: Are there deliberations and discussions going on at the national levels, particularly under the aspect that the existing EU Battle Groups yet to be created do not meet all the demands placed on rapid reaction forces with modern equipment?

General Pitarch: The Eurocorps is not directly involved, at least for the time being, in this process. Nevertheless everybody can see that European Defence is generating a dynamic process of creation or transformation of units all over Europe, in order to give them capabilities usable by the EU. This interest is very positive and encourages those who promote the idea of a stronger European Defence. Nevertheless, sooner or later those defence tools will have to be organized and rationalized, in order to give to the European Union a good overview of its effective military capabilities.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE

regarding interoperability within the Brigade itself and with other combat units?

General Pitarch: Eurocorps has already deployed together with the French-German Brigade at the time of the Afghanistan mission.

The results are obvious. The current level of equipment of the French-German brigade is absolutely impressive, mainly when looking at its new command and control information system, or at its artillery battalion. In my view, Briefing for the Commanding General of the Eurocorps about the situation during a manouver. interoperability is currently not a concern, as our nations are making large efforts to maintain a good interoperability between Eurocorps The European – Security and Defence Union: It seems that and its subordinate units. Every year, we organize a specific exereverything is still open in this field. Let me therefore come down cise for the sole purpose of checking the interoperability betto the military level and ask you about the experience the Euroween the respective communication assets of our Framework corps has in operational deployments. Up to now, the Eurocorps Nations. In that field, Eurocorps has developed an invaluable has only been "on the road" for NATO, being integrated into the experience. But this is a constant effort. I would like to add that, operational structures of the Alliance. Where has the Corps as for multinational cooperation and integration, the Frenchtaken part in operations, and what experience have you gained German Brigade is a jewel that should be preserved and looked in the field of command and control? after.

General Pitarch: Eurocorps has been committed three times: in The European – Security and Defence Union: Let me come back to Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. Both in Kosovo and the starting point. Fifteen years of Eurocorps. It has stood the test, Afghanistan, Eurocorps took over the command in the theatre. and still it has become a little bit forgotten? If you had the chance When deployed in Afghanistan, Eurocorps supported the UN in to express a wish for your corps, what would that be? the organisation of the first democratic presidential election in the history of this country. The NATO Response Force certificaGeneral Pitarch: The recent developments of European defence tion exercise in 2006 was very challenging: Eurocorps had to perfectly show that Eurocorps is in the vanguard of military capadeploy all its command and control assets to Cape Verde, off bilities in Europe. While most countries are considering possibilithe African coast. Eurocorps personnel are rather discreet; ties of making savings and are withdrawing some of their personthey do not make a fuss of their achievements. But I do not nel from other headquarters, Eurocorps is, on the contrary, in an know if there are so many headquarters of our level that have expansion phase: Italy, Romania and the USA will join the Eurodeployed all their command and control assets to a place so corps staff within the next few months. Furthermore, Poland has far from their home base. Therefore, the real strength of officially applied to become Eurocorps 6th Framework Nation, Eurocorps is not its communication policy. It is its experience, which, if endorsed by our Framework Nations, would constitute background and capability. an event of major importance: the territorial base of Eurocorps would then cover an area expanding from the Canary Islands to The European – Security and Defence Union: And what about the Russian western border. I wish that Eurocorps would contithe experience made by the French-German Brigade itself – after nue progressing on its path of increasing multinational potential all it is a high-readiness unit. Is it equipped the way you as the and increasing relevance in the framework of European Defence. superior commander would like to? And what is the situation

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The Political-Military Structures of the EU

by Christoph Raab, Managing Director, COPURA GmbH ments in Europe. But by the end of the war in June 1999, it was clear to all European leaders that there was no alternative to the creation of an ESDP. Major decisions were prepared at the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 and taken in Helsinki half a year later: The EU copied to a large extent NATO’s military structures and adjusted them to its own specific needs by creating the Political and Security Committee The very beginnings: The (PSC), a military committee, a UK’s strategic turn around military staff, a Joint Situation It was in fact, a revolution in the Centre and other support and British approach to Europe, where advise structures. In those days, for over four decades it was a “lightspeed” was a term often cornerstone of British politics to used to describe the stunning ease limit defence exclusively to NATO. and swiftness with which the EU During the Cold War, Europe was set up structures in ESDP. The to a large degree free-riding on the Helsinki summit also saw the United States guaranteeing WeEUFOR – Soldier with EU-Flag in Chad adoption of the so-called “Helsinki stern Europe’s security. But there Headline Goal”, the EU’s commitwas also an element of free-riding ment to have a deployment capaciby Western Europe on the Soviet ty by 2003 of 60000 soldiers within 2 months for up to one Union to contain US power: The last few years have given a year outside of Europe. glimpse of what can happen if there is only one superpower For the next few years, the EU had a new policy area which was left. buzzing with task forces and people building structures and There is a whole mix of motivations why the EU created first procedures, often from scratch. However, trust is a hardthe Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and subseearned value and critiques kept on wandering if ESDP wasn’t quently the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), more about symbols than about substance. At the European NATO searching for a raison d’etre, EU Member States that Council in Laeken 2001, the EU declared its provisional operawant to keep on relying on the US for their security and other tional readiness in ESDP. 16 months after, the EU would start Member States searching for the right institutions to promote its first, if not so military, ESDP police mission in Bosniatheir goals. It all led to an unlikely and somewhat awkward Herzegovina – the EU’s first steps in security and defence alliance of those who wanted to answer the American call for deployment were very careful. more defence contribution by Europe and those, uneasy with the US dominating global affairs after 1989, who saw an opportunity for the hour of Europe. The blueprint for European How ESDP works integration also in security and defence was there and by late Over the years, the EU has built up an elaborated decision1998, the UK saw an interest in going down that road or else, making system in ESDP. The heads of State and government, the United States would loose interest in NATO. coming together in the European Council twice per year, decide about the principles and political guidelines for ESDP. The foreign ministers, meeting in the General Affairs and First steps in ESDP External Relations Council (GAERC) decide about the actual However, it took another major event to really kick-start Europolicy-making in this area. These decisions are based on pean Security and Defence Policy, the Kosovo war. It was argudeliberations going on very regularly in the PSC and are ably Tony Blair who in the days and weeks before the war had prepared by the Committe of Permanent Reprensatives the clearest idea of how much was at stake for many governWhen Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac met in December 1998 in St. Malo and formulated that “the [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”, it was an idea whose time had simply come.

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Christoph Raab, (COREPER). The PSC is composed of Member States’ representatives at ambassador level who take political responsibility for any ESDP mission once the GAERC has mandated the mission. The PSC gets military and strategic advice from the EU Military Committee, the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) and further working groups.

Closely connected to that, but almost with a parallel structure, the High Representative of the CFSP and Secretary General of the Council Secretariat, Javier Solana is the face of ESDP. For all practical purposes, the High Representative has, in his 9 years of office, become a foreign minister of the EU, but not the foreign minister. If the EU has a united position, he brings a lot of weight to the negotiation table, but he has to work alongside other, national foreign ministers that jealously watch his actions.

By 2004, stemming from the deliberations within the European Convention, the EU had also set up the European Defence Agency (EDA) in which most, but not all EU Member States participate. The political consensus behind the creation of this institution was that more coherent proceedings in technology development and defence procurement are necessary. However, the EDA’s record is scratched by the fact that national defence procurement is not only about getting the highest value for money and that many other considerations play a role which prevent a more efficient Europe-wide organised defence research and procurement scheme. The “Code of Conduct” on defence procurement constitutes really the smallest common denominator between the EU Member States.

The EU defence ministers do not meet in a formal minister council, but meet twice per year as the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency and also informally under the GAERC.

The role of European Parliament Even if ESDP is a Council competence, the European Commission and the European Parliament play a role in it, too. The Commission sends a representative from DG Relex into the PSC. It seems that this has led to rather well functioning coor dination of Council and Commission action around ESDP policies and missions.

The European Parliament’s main role consists in its budgetary power as the CFSP budget is part of the overall EU budget which is decided by the Council and the European Parliament.

The Parliament’s power is however limited by two facts. One, CFSP expenditures are considered “non-mandatory” which at the end of the day means that the Council really has the last word and the parliament decides about the global sum but not about the individual line items of the CFSP budget. Still, the threat not to pass the global budget during the overall budget negotiations, has granted Parliament a number of additional rights over the last ten years. The budget has been increased

Mr. Raab has received his degree in Economics at the University of Trier. He holds a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (Natolin) and is a trained journalist. He has worked on behalf of the German government on several media projects in Poland. From 2002 to 2005, Mr. Raab was Personal Assistant to Dr. Karl von Wogau MEP, in the European Parliament. In this period, he was closely involved with the growing number of EU activities in the field of security and defence. In November 2005, he founded the company COPURA, and has since been its Managing Director.

Mr. Raab was born on 18 March 1974 in Karlsruhe. He is married and has a daughter.

substantially under the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 from around 100 Mio. Euro per year to around 250 Mio. Euro per year. The cost of specific ESDP mission are not part of the CFSP budget. They follow the principle “cost lie where they fall” and Member States contribute on the basis of the Athena mechanism, established in 2004.

2003: The EU embarking on a first mission The feelings about ESDP were often very mixed, with things evolving very fast from one point of view and very slowly from another. It took almost four and a half years from St. Malo before troops were sent out for the first time under the EU flag.

And then it wasn’t so much troops as policemen. Overall, developments, actions and speeches between 1999 and 2003 fostered the impression that ESDP was more a project to create political will rather than military capacity.

On January 1, 2003, the EU undertook its first official mission, the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since then, more then 20 missions have followed. Their purely military relevance was for the most part minor. The importance was to show that the EU was ready to take on the responsibility to stabilise its neighbourhood. The idea was to build up credibility and trust in ESDP step by step abroad and at home. Also, to avoid at any point an “overstretch” of the political consensus standing behind ESDP. By all practical purposes that meant avoiding failure and casualties.

In 2003, the EU undertook another mission to protect refugee camps in the Kongo. Most of the missions to date have focused on the Balkans, the European neighbourhood and Africa.

For its ESDP missions, the EU has set up with NATO the socalled “Berlin Plus”2 agreement which consisted in an exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the High Representative in 2003. It allows the EU to use NATO’s planning and command capacities for its missions. Since then, there is also an agreed mode how to choose under which flag and through which headquarter a specific operation is conducted: The first frame of reference would be NATO. If NATO, i.e.,

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the United States, would not be interested in a mission, the EU can use the capacities in SHAPE. The EU can also use one of several national headquarters able to handle an ESDP mission.

Only after eliminating all of those options could the EU use the so-called operation centre in Brussels as the headquarter of a mission. During the Iraq crisis in 2003, the idea of a “European headquarter” was a key divider between the EU Member States and created heated debates. The atmosphere at the time was arguably best caught in the noise surrounding the so-called “Praliné summit” of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg in April 2003 which called for the creation of such a European headquarter.

5. Behind the scenes of ESDP In the early days of ESDP, the discussion about its setup was much inspired by the Maastricht debate on the Euro. The question was whether the EU would need a similar catalogue of criteria to create a credible ESDP. Meanwhile, time has shown that ESDP turns out to be a much too sensitive policy area for that and that Member States prefer discretion over rules and keep the reins safely in their hands. The big question in those early and dynamic days was, is it just institutionbuilding and creating new interesting positions? Was it just much ado about nothing or would Europe get serious as it did with the Euro and make another leap forward in European integration? It was against this background that Javier Solana started a tough job when he lent his face to CFSP and therefore also to ESDP in 1999. Since then, he hasn’t only lent his face, but also his own credibility and trustworthiness to ESDP. At the end of the day, Javier Solana is “Mister ESDP” and the EU’s interface to the world. Another important aspect of ESDP is this – new policies need symbols: So, each carefully planned mission that the EU started since 2003 was accompanied by a lot of political noise to get the maximum political benefit and create, step by step, a credible ESDP. For any mission to be mandated success was a must, failure not even an option.

Legitimacy: EP versus WELL-Assembly Lately, with the Chad mission and the observer mission in Georgia, the EU is taking on significantly higher risks in its missions. Since ESDP is for the most part a Council competence, oversight of its policies and actions should be handled by national parliaments. However, all too often, national parliamentarians lack the background and the specific information to effectively oversee what their government decides in Brussels at the Council table. So, it needs in addition supranational institutions to guarantee the democratic control and the accountability of ESDP. Here is a competition between the European Parliament on the one hand and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) on the other.

The advantage of the WEU Assembly is that it is composed of

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on average better known, national parliamentarians and it has a strong secretariat with a high capacity of research and analysis. On the other hand, ever since the integration of major parts of the WEU into the EU in the 1990s, the WEU is all but politically dead. The European Parliament on the other side is steadily growing in importance, however its legitimacy is limited by the low turnout of European elections and its members tend to be less known in the Member States which also means that their judgment is not introduced into the public sphere as effectively as the opinions of national parliamentarians.

The EU and the global geopolitical situation have significantly changed since the EU decided to endow itself with an ESDP. Has it been a success? There are short-term and longer-term aspects to that question. The EU has created significant decision-making and military and civil deployment capabilities within 10 years. More importantly, it has created a political consensus, almost like an ESDP acquis.

Documentation In December 2002 the European Council decided in Nice to establish permanent political and military structures: The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. The PSC is keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It is the highest military body set up within the Council.

The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The PSC is also advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) that provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of military and civilian experts seconded to the Council Secretariat by the Member States.

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is part of the Council Secretariat, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian ESDP operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian ESDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.

INSTITUTIONS

The European Committee for Standardization(CEN) André Pirlet, Specialist for Standardization and Research, CEN CEN is the European Committee for Standardization. It is contributing to the objectives of the European Union and European Economic Area with voluntary technical standards which promote free trade, the safety of workers and consumers, interoperability of networks, environmental protection, exploitation of research and development programmes, and public procurement. Standards are formal high quality documents, containing requirements and frequently also testing methods, for checking the compliance with these requirements. CEN is a non-profit making technical organization set up under Belgian law (www.cen.eu ). CENELEC and ETSI deal respectively with electro-technical and telecommunications standardization. CEN is basically in charge of standardization in all other sectors, including security and defence.

In 2000, the European Commission organized a large Conference on ‘European Defence Procurement in the 21st Century: Improving Efficiency and Enhancing Competitiveness; the Role of Standardization’, recognizing that standardization is one of the facets to improve the competitiveness of the European Defence Industry. CEN was invited to support the creation of a European Handbook containing reference to the best standards to be used for defence procurements .

CEN set up first a specific Forum (CEN/BT/WG 125) to ensure a continued dialogue amongst interested parties.

André Pirlet André PIRLET is Engineer from Liège University (Belgium) and MSc from Oregon State University (USA). He is handling in CEN Special Projects (new developments, including defence) but is mainly involved in reinforcing the links and cooperation between Standardisation and Research. Since 2002 he is a CEN representative in several research projects.

handling systems, Life cycle management (Service life management, integrated logistic support), Life cycle technical documentation, Quality of electric power supply – Portable electric power generators, and Terminology. It is foreseen to update and further expand this Handbook. The European Defence Agency has shown interest for taking the responsibility for the “maintenance” of that Hanbook. The EDA is indeed interested by the enhanced interoperability and efficiency which will be gained by the expanding reliance on the Handbook, in particular for joint operations within or outside the EU.

Defence Handbook For the drafting of the European Handbook, BT/WG 125 decided to use a CEN Workshop structure for its openness and flexibility. That CEN Workshop (CW 10) issued a CEN Workshop Agreement, CWA 15517:2006, the ‘European Standard Handbook’ for Defence Procurement (www.defense-handbook.org ). It contains references to standards and standard-like documents commonly used to support Defence Procurement contracts as well as guidelines on the optimum selection of standards and standard-like specifications in order to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and interoperability.

The covered subfields are the following: NRBC detectors, Energetic materials, Fuels and lubricants, Batteries, Packaging, Electrical interfaces, Electromagnetic environment, Environmental testing, Armoured land vehicle technology, Ammunition, Paints and coatings, Fluid

The CEN-System

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+++ DEFENCE AND SECURITY NEWS +++ Council of the European Union New resolution to take forward European Space Policy On 26 September the Competitiveness Council (Internal Market, Industry and Research) adopted the resolution “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, which was also approved by the 5th Space Council (European Space Agency Council of Ministers). The resolution highlights the significant advances in the two flagship space programmes of the European Space Policy, Galileo and Kopernikus (GMES). Recently took place the successful launch and in-orbit validation of GIOVE-B, allowing demonstrating critical new technology needed for the performance of the Galileo system and the demonstration at the Lille GMES Forum of pre-operational GMES services.

The Council resolution underlined the need to further promote international cooperation e.g. solar system exploration, earth environment and sustainable development. Existing mechanisms for coordinating European expertise and investments in space have to be strengthened, and mechanisms to improve synergies between civil and defence space programmes have to be set up, respecting the specific requirements of both sectors, including their decision-making competences and finance schemes.

Climate change, Contribution of Space to the Lisbon Strategy, Space and security, and Space exploration are the four new priority areas for space as defined by the Council, which called for the scientific community (EC, ESA, EUMETSAT) to pool European space observation data relating to climate change more effectively. Furthermore the Council highlighted the “important contribution of space to CFSP/ESDP including the Petersberg tasks, and thus to the security of European citizens.”

European Defence Agency (EDA) 1. EU governments agreed Code of Conduct on Offsets On 24 October the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA) agreed a voluntary Code of Conduct on Offsets with the aim to evolve towards more transparent use of offsets. This should help shape the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, whilst reducing reliance on them.

The Code will take effect from 1 July 2009 and applies to all compensation practices required as a condition of purchase or resulting from a purchase of defence goods or defence servi-

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ces. As today’s defence market is not perfect and is strongly influenced by political considerations, offsets are a global phenomenon that is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future. Those global practices have effects on European industry’s global competitiveness. Member States subscribing to the code will neither require nor accept offsets exceeding the value of the procurement contract and are recognising the need to adjust national policies to this provision. National Armament Directors agreed to defer the application of the 100% ceiling until 15 October 2010.

EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis called the new Code of Conduct on Offsets, which addresses the problem on EU level, a "breakthrough decision". He said that "it is a first step in dealing with a very complex issue, knowing that offset is not the only market distortion. We are therefore in parallel working towards the creation of market conditions and a European industry in which offsets may no longer be needed. But, considering the present structure of the European industry and that our market opening efforts are still in their beginning, we need for the short term to focus on evolving offsets, whilst starting to mitigate the adverse impact they have on cross-border competition.” He added that “offset often represents significant additional cost to the customer, which constrains already heavilycommitted defence budgets. We simply cannot afford it. By limiting offset to 100% we want to see defence acquisition budgets focused on what they should be focused on, that is equipping our Armed Forces with the military capabilities they need and not the ones with the highest offset offer.”

The Code of Conduct on Offsets sets out a framework for increased transparency on national offset practices and underpinning policies and for using offset to help develop industrial capabilities that are capability driven, world class competent and globally competitive. This should help shape the aspired European Defence Technological and Industrial Base by facilitating the development of globally competitive Centres of Excellence, developing depth and diversity including Smalland Medium-sized companies and avoiding unnecessary duplication.

2. EDA receives the unsolicited industrial proposed solution “HELIBRIDGE” for closing the EU/NATO transport helicopter gap On 29 September an industrial consortium – CAE Elektronik GmbH (GE), Lom Praha s.p.(CZR) and Selex-Galileo (IT/UK)

DEFENCE AND SECURITY NEWS

+++ DEFENCE AND SECURITY NEWS +++ handed over to EDA an unsolicited industrial proposed solution to fill at short notice the EU/NATO transport helicopter gap.

This interim proposal which will bridge the shortfall until nations are able to buy new helicopters and European industry is able to deliver them, has at its base the refurbishing of Russian sourced helicopters Mi-17 to NATO standards and the provision of standardized training and simulation.

The Czech Defence Minister declared at the Defence Ministers meeting in Deauville, France, beginning of October that the Czech government will support this industrial proposal.

The simulation centre – as the eastern cluster of EDA trainings centre concept – will be established in Prague. The refurbishment of helicopters will be directed from Prague allowing participating countries to have direct work-share in their countries.

European Parliament 1. Commission's defence package adopted

by Internal Market Committee On 7 October the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) adopted two reports on the proposed directives included in the so called "Defence Package" that had been proposed by the European Commission in December 2007. The aim of the Commission's proposal is to help the European Union to create a genuine single market for defence equipment. Intra-Community trade in defence related equipment should be facilitated and defence procurement made more transparent and European. Two amended reports, one on public procurement drafted by Alexander Graf Lambsdorff (ALDE, DE), the other on transfers of defence related products drafted by Heide Rühle (Greens, DE) were adopted by a large majority in the Internal Market Committee. They will be put to a plenary vote in November.

Background: In the field of defence and security, in principle, Community procurement rules apply. But Member States are allowed to exempt contracts in this field, in particular through Article 296 EC Treaty when their "essential security interests" are concerned. As Member States make extended use of this article, in practice nearly all military procurement is excluded from the scope of Community law. The extended use stands in contrast to the case of law of the Court of Justice limiting the use of these exemptions to exceptional cases. Rapporteur Graff

Lambsdorf, whose report clarifies and widens the scope of the proposed directive on public procurement, underlined that the aim of the new directive is to establish "a uniform European legal framework which enables the Member states to apply Community law without jeopardising their security interests."

The directive on transfers of defence-related products focuses on simplifying and harmonising the rules for granting licences to transfer military equipment from one country to another.

The currently 27 different European regimes prevent the free movement for equipment within the EU. The new directive will create a European system of licences which will be uniform and applicable throughout the EU. The amended text strengthens provisions to guarantee the security of transfers to ensure that arms and other defence-related products do not reach conflict zones. Heide Rühle's report introduce an entire heading of legal remedies aimed to promote transparency and non-discrimination in the award of contracts without prejudice to Member State's need to protect secret information.

Crisis in Congo 2. Karl von Wogau proposes deployment of EU-Battlegroups After the successful Military Operation of the European Union in Kinshasa 2006, securing Congo’s presidential and parliamentary elections, new fighting has broken out in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s North Kivu region. It is estimated that more than 200.000 people have fled their homes.

Karl von Wogau, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defense in the European Parliament, fears that the new outbreak of violence in DR Congo risks destabilizing the entire Great Lakes region: “Such a situation is unacceptable. The fighting could destroy the progress we have made in DR Congo in the recent years.

The European Union should therefore discuss whether the deployment of the “EU battle groups”, of which two are on stand-by, would be an adequate measure to stop the fighting until an enhanced MONUC operation of the United Nations will be able to fulfil this task.”

The European Union is still present in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo, since 8 June 2005) provides advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition to this there is a Police Mission (since 2007). The European Union is also very active in the field of development cooperation.

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EU missions 3. EUMP Bosnia and Herzegovina On 24 October EU High Representative Javier Solana congratulated Brigadier-General Stefan Feller on his appointment as the new Head of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He succeeds Brigadier-General Vincenzo Coppola at EUMP on 1st November 2008. Brigadier-General Feller was until recently the Head of the “Conduct of Operations” Unit in the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) at the Council. Javier Solana highlighted Mr Feller’s excellent policing background, his international experience as Police Commissioner in the United Nations Mission in the Kosovo (UNMIK) and his responsibilities as Head of the Conduct of Operations” Unit. “He can count on my full support and that of the European Union as a whole in carrying out his new duties” said the High Representative.

EULEX Kosovo: 4. The USA will participate in the EULEX mission in Kosovo The United States of America and the European Union published a joint press statement on US participation in the EULEX mission in Kosovo. On 22 October 2008 the “Agreement on the Participation of the United States of America in the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo” entered into force, a distinctive case of the US participating in a civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission.

The joint statement put emphasis on the common desire to work together to support the development of Kosovo’s democratic standards, in particular the strengthening of an independent and multi-ethnic rule of law system. The negotiations were led by EU High Representative Javier Solana for the EU delegation and Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, for the US delegation.

Forces – Future Soldier System International Journalist price for the EADS „Warrior 21“ The Prague industry show “Future Soldiers” of mid-October 2008 proved that the different concepts obviously have made progress with the tendency for practical use and component solutions. The over-sophistication which was observed in the

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last years seems to be overcome. The future soldiers have to be the capability to be warriors.

An international team of journalists from nine countries was invited by the organizer to choose the most innovative among the exposed programmes in connection with the Future Soldier. Nine prices had been allocated, one of them was dedicated to the EADS Defence & Security concept “Warrior 21”.

The EADS Soldier modernized Programme (SMP) Solution was selected for its unique and innovative character. Based on open and modular system architecture the SMP sets up a base to fulfil individual requirements by customers. Thereby new technologies, sub-systems preferred by customers or existing legacy equipment can be easily integrated into the whole system. This opens the SMP solution for direct work share in local industries partners.

The journalists nearly unanimous saw in the EADS Concept a real chance to equip European soldiers with a unique solution having the advantage that the armed forces of the different nations can individually bring in components of their own choice.

French EU Presidency Informal Defence ministers meeting in Deauville On 1st and 2nd October, the French Defence minister Hervé Morin invited his 26 EU counterparts to a two-day working meeting in Deauville. Subjects discussed and agreed on were the overhaul of European helicopters and training for the pilots to be deployed to the most demanding theatres of operations, on the basis of the French British initiative from March 2008 (France raised its contribution from •5 million to •8 million) as same as the establishment of a multinational air transport fleet, initially revolving around the A400M aircraft, to increase the EU’s air transport resources.

A further point was the set up of a European air and sea group, in case of need, for military naval interventions. This would consist of an aircraft carrier and all the escort and support vehicles, which would be interoperable. The new generation of MUSIS reconnaissance satellites should be developed cooperatively and imagery from current space systems be pooled at the EU satellite center at Torrejon. Furthermore the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) should be reinforced notably with regard to conducting European armaments and research programmes. The EU meeting on 10 November is expected to formalize the commitments from Deauville.