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2011–2012

ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research Should we stay or should we go? Migration and its effects on demographic and economic development in Central Eastern Europe

Demographic Convergence: How the Demographic Shifts Are Transforming the Governments Islam Yusufi


RESEARCH REPORT

Demographic Convergence: How the demographic shifts are transforming the governments Islam YUSUFI* Prepared under: ERSTE Foundation Social Research Fellowship 2010-2011

2012

*

Views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of the organizations that he works for.


PREFACE This research report is a product of one year long research in the framework of the ERSTE Foundation Social Research Fellowship 2010-2011. It is a study of the demographic changes, tendencies and implications and how they have impacted upon governance structures in the countries of Southeast Europe, with particular focus on the case of Macedonia. The research report looks into the current situation with regards to the demography in the case of Macedonia, which is important case where different ethnic communities live next to each other and which has undergone importance demographic changes in the recent years. The report looks to the demographic changes seen recently and their policy implications. It also looks to the degree to which the demographic changes have affected the governance structures. The author’s deepest appreciation goes to ERSTE Stiftung and its staff members Alina Serban and Franz Karl Prueller and to Rainer Münz of Erste Group for his mentorship on this fellowship. Although they may not recognize their influence on the pages that follow, the author’s work on the issue in general owes much to the support and help given by other fellows who were part of the fellowship and to anonymous reviewers who provided very helpful comments and suggestions. The author expresses his gratitude to them for the support provided.

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CONTENTS Preface ........................................................................................................................................2 Contents ......................................................................................................................................3 Abstract .......................................................................................................................................4 Introduction.................................................................................................................................5 Methodology ...............................................................................................................................7 I. Broader Context.....................................................................................................................10 II. Actual situation with demographic change ..........................................................................15 III. Ethnic demographics...........................................................................................................33 IV. Demographic change and its effect on governance ............................................................40 Conclusions...............................................................................................................................49 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................51 Annex - Data .............................................................................................................................58

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ABSTRACT Of all the matters on the agenda of the government transformation none is more important than that of the transformation of the government as a result of the newly emerged nontraditional risks, such as demographic shifts. The way in which this issue is dealt with by the governments of Southeast Europe may well determine whether the governments are able to face the challenge of demographic shifts as a result of ageing and migration or due to other reasons. Against this background, this research report addresses the issues of demographic shifts and how they have transformed and continue to transform the governments in the region of Southeast Europe, with main focus on Macedonia. This report gives an overview of demographic trends and family policies in Macedonia during the period 1991-2011. The report presents an overview of demographic trends and family policies and analyses governance changes as a result of demographic changes. This research report, despite the existence of contrary views, reveals growing convergence in demographic patterns in all Macedonia's regions, where different ethnic communities live as minority or majority. In the new consociational democratic system, Macedonia is entitled to decisively break with the earlier excesses of its governance system and better reflect the new demographic structure of the country, at least at political level. The central government and local authorities are credited to deliver the public services with proper legitimacy. The change witnessed at the governance level as a response to new demographics has brought new optimism first to the local residents, and secondly, to the country as a whole. Changes seen in the country, in principle, have shown the demographics as a driver of the change. The new ethnic governance established has been a tool providing possibility for the rule by the minority over itself in the places where the minority is majority and for more rights where they stand as minority. The demographics have guided this process through building necessary factual justification for new changes. Macedonia has started to face all demographic challenges that Europe as a whole much earlier has started to undergo. Population dynamics have provided for significant changes in the Macedonian polity, including in the pension governance and in ethnic governance. These provided a context to population change and also a means for understanding the role of demography in Macedonia's polity and governance. The demographic change proved to be a mean necessary that encouraged the country to adopt real reforms towards new governance structures that will reflect the reality on the ground. Key words: Demography; Governance; Southeast Europe; Macedonia.

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INTRODUCTION The aim of this research report is to throw some light on the demographic changes in Southeast European country of Macedonia and elsewhere in the region. This research tries to show increasing demographic changes characterized by increasing ageing of population, lower birth rates, and increased net migration and other demographic changes observed recently in Macedonia and how these changes have led to adoption of new policies and what have been implications to the governance structures. The major work of this report has been to investigate population-government interactions. The goal here is to assess the complex interactions between demographic and governance change. A specific focus has been study of ethnic demographics and the demography of regions or municipalities of Macedonia, areas affected by the demographic changes. What are the demographic changes in Macedonia? What factors account for the demographic changes? What determines governance’s vulnerability to population change? What is the role of the governance in demographic changes and how the demographic changes in turn have affected governance? And finally, what were the consequences to the way governments function and what can governance analysis tell us that other studies on demographics have not? The underlying purpose of this research is to understand the determinants and consequences of the recent population trends. The main thrust of this report falls under these inter-related themes: sources of population change, features of population change, consequences of population change, ethnic demographics and the interaction of population change and governance. This research report, despite the existence of contrary views, reveals growing convergence in demographic patterns in all Macedonia's regions, where different ethnic communities live as minority or majority. The critical task becomes the identification of the problems that arise with the need of responding to the new demographic change that is likely to be destabilizing the governments. Analytical work to elucidate strategies for dealing with the new demographic results could provide with tools for combating the negative effects of demographic changes. Effort to demonstrate the potential impact of these forces on different localities could prove helpful in understanding changes and then in planning policy responses. The report concentrates on the governance implications of the changes now being put in place as a result of the demographic changes. These changes highlight the need to better understand the new structures of the governments. The changes’ consequences have gone well beyond the confines of government departments and offices. The aim is to examine the recent reforms in the organizational and institutional structure of the government. While the reform strategies differed, there is much to learn from these efforts. The goal of this report can be stated simply: to analyse the dynamics of population change and its interactions with changing political, social and economic conditions. This research tries to develop a way of thinking that does not imply that population changes are at the heart of all the other changes, although indeed population size and structure do matter for a broad array of political, social, economic and environmental changes seen in Macedonia. The report is structured along the following main sections: Section 1 describes broader context of demography of Southeast Europe, and specifically of Macedonia. This section is meant to provide context to the demographic changes and specifically in the case of Southeast 5


European country of Macedonia. The section sets the context of demographic trends and highlights the specific context of Macedonia, which is related to ethnic demographics and governance. Section 2 looks to actual situation on how Southeast Europe and specifically Macedonia stand with regard to population growth. Global benchmarking reveals that population growth in Macedonia slows down considerably. Macedonia and other countries of Southeast Europe, like EU countries, face large increase in old-age dependency ratios. The section looks to the sources of population change, features of population change, and consequences of population change. It also examines the variations in the main components of population change, ageing, fertility, and migration. It reveals that Macedonia faces population decline. It shows the influence of further factors in regional demographics, as well such as demographic patterns of ethnic groups. Section 3 explores the ethnic demographics of Macedonia. It shows how ethnic groups experience growing convergence in terms of population change. Section 4 looks to the impact of demographic changes to the governance in the country. Concluding section summarises the results of the research.

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METHODOLOGY The research technique of the research comprises institutional analysis and the observational research. Institutional analysis examined the situation in Macedonia as case study with particular focus on demographic changes and implications of the demographic shifts to the transformation of the government. The research also included fieldwork, which involved collection of the data for the aims of the research. In this part of the research the specific problems were sought to be identified in order to better understand the stages and processes of demographic changes and the transformation of the government. The first intervening variable between the demographic changes and the governance change is historical institutionalism or path dependency (Pierson, 1998). Because the governments usually do not have time to develop novel approaches to demands of people, instead they have been forced to look into existing toolkits. The second intervening variable in this research is the framing issue: how the demographic changes are framed by the governments in Southeast Europe. The outcome is influenced by the way the governments frame the issues. This supports Rein and Schon who argue that framing is an activity which “provides guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous ill-defined situation can be made sense of and acted upon (Rein et al., 1991). Moreover, it also confirms Baumgartner and Jones findings that success of a frame depends also on “emotive appeal� (Baumgarnter et al., 1993). This research in parts is organised around analytical model of historical institutionalism (HI), more particularly through path dependence (PD). HI refers to political institutions which claims that institutions influence both normative expectations and political strategies adopted by individuals, groups and governments, thereby affecting political behaviour and political outcomes (Pierson, 2000). The notion of PD is generally used to support a few key claims: specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is often punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life. Data used in this research comes from several sources. The main source of the research includes data collection exercise and observations conducted in Macedonia. Secondly, information obtained from books, journals, official documents, legislative materials, and strategy documents. Thirdly, it includes info obtained from news relevant to the issue. The data used in the framework of this research is both qualitative and quantitative in nature, and includes press accounts and documents, and various other secondary sources, including a close reading of numerous documents. Personal observations through practical work have been another major source of data used. The main case study is Macedonia as a case for analysis and with some indications for other Southeast European countries. The research explores various issues and takes care to explain differences between issues explored that can be judged as significant. The case study method differs from quasi-experimental approaches in its heavy reliance on within-case analysis as a way of evaluating claims about causal processes. The most distinctive feature of case study approach is the process-tracing procedure to analyzing the change. Even if the research looks into a single case (i.e. Macedonia), it is strategically selected and properly carried out. It promises to serve to implicate the case of demographic change phenomenon in Europe and 7


globally. Macedonia fits to global and European demographic approaches well and it is well suited to demonstrate the causal relevance of demographic processes. Among the countries of the region of Southeast Europe, Macedonia has been the most likely case of effective change as a result of demographic developments. I also selected sectoral cases of ethnic processes and pension reform in Macedonia because they are well suited to demonstrate causal relevance of the role of demography and the governance change. Among the sectors where it has been featured the role of demography in the case of Macedonia, the issue of ethnic relations and pension reform have been the most likely cases for effective change. In order to bring this research closer to what really goes on in Macedonia, this research report uses process tracing approach. This makes the report more policy relevant and increases the reliability of the findings. With process-tracing the aim is to know about the process generating change on the ground through demographic changes. The claim of this report is that demographic change has led to change in Macedonia. How this change has happened? What is the process that had led to transformation in Macedonia? The proposed solution of this research is to turn to process tracing methodology and to engage in process tracing (George, et al, 1985). Process tracing provides a good basis for causal inference. By using process tracing, you can take full advantage of the wealth of detail that research of a small number of cases offers and they secure powerful grounds for causal inference (Hall, 2006). The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal mechanism between an independent variable and the outcome of depended variable. It tells us to trace the process from the beginning (intervening variable) to the end (dependent variable). As process tracing is week in establishing structural context, in order to overcome this gap, case study analysis has complemented the role played by the process-tracing approach. In this context, the research analyzes the correlation between demography and changes seen in Macedonia and conducts a process-tracing analysis of the demography – governance relations. This research follows the line that demographic change is a process, not an outcome. In this light, in terms of research design, this has invited a choice for process-tracing and top-down research design. In this process-tracing and top-down model, empirical research starts from the presence of demographic changes, controls the level of fit/misfit of government policies with the demographic tendencies and then explains the presence or absence of change as a result of demographic developments. It allows for a wide range of intervening variables or mediating factors. Then it process-traces the situation over the years and identifies the turning points. For each turning point, the question becomes: was the cause of this major development result of demography related variables? In order to assess the contribution of the demographic variables, the research goes down controlling temporal causal sequences from above levels to domestic level, where the major change emerges empirically. In sum, the Methodology of this research consists of: • Qualitative case study research supported by quantitative data; • Desktop research and fieldwork with use of available quantitative data; • Case study: Macedonia (with some evaluation of other countries of the region of Southeast Europe), and sectoral case studies with focus on Macedonia; • Personal observations; • Process tracing the demographic developments through review of strategy, policy, programme and project documents, regulations, and laws; and 8


•

Rhetoric tracing or discourse analysis.

Considering the question of how exactly the demography has interacted with policy processes on the ground in Macedonia raises several methodological challenges: to identify relevant aspects and specify causal mechanisms that link them with demography; to specify and test the interaction between various causes; to control for impact of demography when asserting the causal relevance of demography; and to control for Macedonia's conditions when asserting the causal relevance of demography. How this research has addressed the question of causality? In this first instance relevant demographic impacts and effects have been clearly specified and linked to outcomes using qualitative methods. The qualitative study used in this research makes strong plausible assertions about the relationship between demography and conditionality using a variety of different methods. Demographic change has strong causal effects in the steering of policy and institutional change. This research does not wish to dispute the well-known claim that causation cannot be inferred from mere observation. However, if observation is somehow informed by a theory of pretheory, then it is logically possible for the observer to integrate observations with presuppositions in order to arrive as causal interferences. In this light, this research describes a number of cases in which the author was personally involved. He himself was part of the processes in negotiating and reforming some of governance structures.

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I. BROADER CONTEXT In order to analyze where we stand with the population change, we have to understand the past. To know where we are, we must know how we got here. The demographic change in Southeast Europe as a specific issue is a relatively new area in the study of demographic trends in Europe. The ongoing transformation of the Europe's demography, and specifically of that of Southeast Europe, calls for special review and evaluation. This section is meant to provide context to the demographic changes and specifically in the case of Southeast European country of Macedonia. The section sets the context of demographic trends and highlights the specific context of Macedonia, which is related to ethnic demographics and governance. I.1. Demographic trends When demographers try to make sense of the complexities of the world, they use one of social science’s great generalizing models: the demographic transition. In association with many other aspects of modernization, every population in the world has experienced or is still undergoing a set of inter-connected changes that is termed the demographic transition. As a description of long-run trends, the demographic transition can be seen to be a universally applicable generalization. At some point in the past, every population had high fertility and high mortality. With the spread of modern medicine and public health, mortality has improved; as family planning and contraceptive use became the norm, fertility has fallen. Usually mortality fell first, with a delay before fertility decline. This difference in timing leads to substantial population growth before the two processes come back into balance. Today, more than half the world’s people live in places where fertility is at or below the level needed for long-run inter-generational replacement (about 2.1 children per woman). Similarly, global life expectancy is approaching 70 years. Taken together, these changes amount to demographic transformation in human history. As a consequence of the demographic transition, the 20th and 21st centuries are centuries of unprecedented population growth – the global population grew almost fourfold, from 1.6 to 6.1 billion to 7 billion in October 2011. However, while significant future growth is certain, the end of the demographic transition is now in sight. As an article by some researchers in Nature in 2001 showed, it is likely that human population growth will come to an end over the course of the 21st century (Lutz et al., 2001). Projections envisage a maximum population of around 9 billion being reached around the middle of this century. In contrast with the growth of the 20th century, the 21st is a century of population aging. All populations that have long life expectancy and low long-run rates of population growth, now experience aging. This will soon apply to all parts of the globe, and has already become trend in Southeast Europe. There is growing convergence of demographic dynamics across Europe. Although until recently there has been great demographic diversity where some countries experienced steady population growth, whilst others faced severe population decline, increasingly there is similarity in demographic trends. Europe as a whole, in particular EU member states, is experiencing decline in its population growth. Demographic developments in Southeast Europe are in similar trend, although exceptions apply such as Kosovo, where despite current growth, it is also to face population decline in coming future. Southeast European region in general is one of the most rapidly ageing European regions.

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The overall decline in the growth of Southeast Europe's population, emigration, aging population, decreasing fertility, and inter-city migrations are all reshaping the countries of the region, including Macedonia, affecting local politics, economies and priorities. The decline in population growth rates is radically altering the composition of the populations leading to increased urbanization and old-age dependency ratios, and to changes in the overall ethnic composition of population. Similar convergence is also to be witnessed among different regions of Macedonia that formerly tended to have huge demographic differences. The fertility trends in Macedonia have begun to converge among the regions of the country in recent years. The regions of the country have become to be characterized by low fertility. The low rates seem to have no parallels in the country's history. Pronatalist policies undertaken by the government have been unsuccessful in increasing fertility rates significantly. All parts of the country are bifurcating into lowering their fertility rates. As a result, Macedonia is shifting away from high fertility to low fertility, sharing the destiny of other parts of Europe. A second important trend is urbanization. Over half of Macedonia’s population now lives in urban areas, and urban concentrations in many cities are becoming disproportionately large. More villages have disappeared and there have been emergence of large cities, with the capital Skopje leading in this field. A third trend is also cause for concern: The number of migrants (moving across cities) continues to be problem. I.2. Ethnic demographics Demography is important as its use in Macedonia's and wider Southeast Europe’s regional context is in some sense political statement due to the complex ethnic structure of the societies in the region. The demography matters as the governance of Macedonia is based on number or share of a certain ethnic community in the whole country or at regional and local levels. Enjoying some rights (including language, education and public sector employment) is conditioned by the 20 percent requirement at the country or municipal level. Therefore, any census undertaken is not a technical matter; is a complex political procedure. As a legacy from former Yugoslavia, in Macedonia there is continuous strive to accommodate diversity and unity at the same time (Hammel et al, 2010). For example, the demographic data, particularly census data are tabulated in a fixed form reflecting the political importance of the major ethnic groups (Hammel et al, 2010). Rather than listing names of ethnic groups in an alphabetical order, the names are put in accordance to the share of particular groups in the whole population. Although the main focus of the demographic change is on how it relates to ethnic balance (how higher is Albanian fertility rate from that of Macedonian), there are demographic tendencies that have been lost in this overall demographic-ethnic relations debate. Although historical observations suggest that fertility increase in some ethnic groups may have shifted the ethnic balance in some regions, the most recent overall demographic tendencies show general population decline for all ethnicities with overall fertility rate of 1.44 children per women according to figures of 2009 (Gapminder World, gapminder.org) and 1.55 children per women according to figures of 2010 (State Statistical Office, 2011). Also, migration has received prominent place in the demographic trends of the country. Despite the great diversity of ethnicities in the country, monoethnicity, i.e. all inhabitants of a municipality to have the same ethnicity, is increasingly becoming mode in municipalities around the country. From 84 municipalities, around 85 percent are monoethnic according to the latest census of 2002; in 1994 there were around 60 percent monoethnic municipalities. There is increase in the number of monoethnic municipalities. The remainder contain from 2 11


to 5 ethnic groups. Having two ethnic groups in a municipality is a fact in various parts of the country, however, the inter-ethnic difficulties persists and interethnic antagonism has become higher in the municipalities where two ethnicities dominate. Actually, monoethnicity is the historical norm as an outcome of the traditional cycle of household formation in the country (Hammel et al, 2010). Increase in monoethnicity is also driven especially by internal migration from diverse locations of the country to urban centres such as Skopje, the capital, and Tetovo, a regional capital. This type of migration has been towards separate areas of these urban centres dominated by specific ethnicity leading to segregation in urban areas, such as Kisela Voda and Cair suburbs of Skopje attracting ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, respectively. Macedonians would settle in the south and southeast part of Skopje, while Albanians to the northern part. Internal migration is a point where it leads to disappearance of small villages as the young migrate to cities and the older generations die. As a result of internal migration, urban centres have become ethnically diverse however, they feature segregated areas. Skopje, the capital, attracts migrants from provincial cities from different ethnic groups, but predominantly becoming settlers in the suburbs of Skopje where particular ethnic groups dominates. Reporting of ethnic diversity in the municipalities has differed among the regions. While in Eastern Macedonia the major element of diversity has been the number of ethnic groups reported, the major element of diversity in Skopje and western Macedonia's regions (Polog and Southwestern regions) has been the near-equal balance between the major groups. While in former Yugoslav times, diversity in Macedonia increased steadily (Hammel et al, 2010), following 1991, it did just reverse. Overall trend toward increased segregation is striking. Thus, Macedonian ethnic diversity has increased becoming with following features: local mono-ethnicity, expanding to multi-ethnicity in ever larger geographical urban centres, however, with segregated areas. The decentralization path that has been chosen and drawing the municipal boundaries based on the ethnicity domination, has increased segregation tendencies on a regional basis. In the absence of the governance ideal that will unite all the ethnic groups, ethnicity as a political mobiliser remains the only convenient organizational alternative in the country. Map of regions of Macedonia

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I.3. Governance A lack of governance structures to ensure the adequate democratic governance of Macedonia has been a major feature of the country and of other transitioning countries of Southeast Europe. Governance will be understood to mean, as Caporaso (1996) and Rosenau (1992) note, a system of collective problem solving in the public realm, or the way in which relations are governed among the relevant actors that reside in constitutive units within a system of dispersed or fragmented political authority. A frequently neglected aspect is whether the governments are actually competent to decide on and implement a family policy and direct the course of relevant reforms. It has not been an easy task to determine the appropriate role of the demography in the political governance structures in the country. Also, through the early 2000s the country has been facing an increase in new demographic challenges, which require specific responses that traditional family policies are not able to perform. So the key question in the changed environment has been whether the governance structures reflect this change. Assessing the implications of the ineluctable transformation of the human age structure to governance is an important task. How can we have governance structures that are sustainable in the context of substantial aging, decreasing fertility and increasing migration? In carrying out this task it will be essential to consider not just quantity but also quality, i.e., not only how many people there will be, but how well endowed they are with public services. Moreover, where the population will live (urban or rural areas) will also play a key role in determining the governance structures. Population trends are crucial determinants of political, economic, social and environmental change. It is quite simply impossible to consider governance change in a serious manner without reference to demographic trends. However, because populations tend to change relatively slowly, demography is often taken for granted and its impact under-appreciated. Rather like some slow geological process that is imperceptible in the short-run, demographic change often has an ineluctable force, and ends up changing the whole landscape. As one historian put it: “Everything, both in the short term and at the level of local events as well as on the grand scale of world affairs, is bound up with the numbers and fluctuations of the mass of the people� (Braudel, 1972). Governance is important as it has been proven by collapse of Yugoslavia that governance is the responsible, not long standing ethnic hatreds as it has been argued (Hammel, et al 2010). The new demographic trends suggest three potential changes in the governance of Macedonia. Firstly, there have been changes in the nature of government. There is likely to be an increased prevalence of urban politics. Urban politics tends to be attractive to people, in part because it can equalize power between those who have and those who do not have. Ethnic suburbs are also likely to see their influence increase. Also, the number of people living in cities is growing dramatically. Rapid over-urbanization is putting an enormous strain on the governments. The influx of new arrivals is generating high unemployment rates and housing shortages, exacerbating the inadequacy of already limited education, sanitation, water supply and transportation systems, and contributing to congestion, environmental degradation and municipal budget shortfalls. As the population becomes increasingly urban, the nature of government work has started to change as well. Problems have become predominantly urban. To a certain extent, this has led to a dramatic shift in government planning, research and development, and strategies, from central to local government policies. 13


Secondly, there have been changes in sources of national power. Differential fertility rates also have implications for sources of government. Information technology, such as the Internet, is establishing more opportunities for people to influence politics very quickly. Egovernment has become major talk in the town. The government has increasingly been forced to substitute technology for manpower. There has been also increase in the demand for more good governance, particularly from minority ethnic groups. This led to adoption of series of family policies as a response to demographic changes. Aging of population, particularly, has increased government spending, has confronted the governments with the challenge to provide basic services for steadily changing demographics and has challenged the sustainability of the existing pension system. Thirdly, there have been changes in sources of governance. It does appear that demographic forces will change the balances of power among ethnic communities. Changes in population growth rates remain a factor in shifting this balance as they were 40 or 50 years ago. A major new demographic factor is inter-regional migratory flows. In addition, relatively young populations—”youth bulges” in the population pyramid—increase the tendency toward ethnic violence. This risk is present in many cities of Macedonia. For example, fears of Albanian growth in the capital Skopje encouraged the government to build monuments that refer solely to ethnic Macedonian culture in order to draw a line for Albanian expansion. As a reaction, Albanian side of Skopje started with a construction of a large square that serves the similar aim. However, converging population growth rates among ethnic groups can also lay the groundwork for prevention of ethnic conflict.

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II. ACTUAL SITUATION WITH DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE Demographic structure of Macedonia has come to undergo major transformation. This section gives evaluation of the challenges faced by the country in the area of demographics. The section consists of three parts. The first part gives a description of the sources of demographic change. The second part assesses and analyses the features of demographic shifts. The third part evaluates the consequence and challenges that Macedonia faces in the area of demographic change. II.1. Sources of demographic change Demographic changes seen in Macedonia, including migration, lower fertility, population aging, decreasing population growth and rapid urbanization are results of various sources that have influenced the demographic changes in the country. These sources include economic and social transition undergone since 1991 changes, specific features of political governance, gender composition of regions, demographic patterns of ethnic groups, and regional inequalities in accessing education and health care. II.1.a. Economic and social transition Macedonia has gone through radical socio-economic and political transformations since its independence in 1991. These have affected and still influence demographic processes, particularly aging and the net migration of the population. In September 1991, Macedonia achieved independence from the Yugoslav Federation. This historical change, however, did not immediately offer new prospects for progress and growth. Instead, a very difficult period followed, in both the economic and political arenas. Unemployment— at one-third of the workforce—remains perhaps the most critical economic problem. This unpromising macroeconomic scenario has been complemented by the unpromising demographic of an aging population, owing to a sharp decrease in the fertility rate and to an increase in life expectancy (Fornero et al., 2007). II.1.b. Political transition The post-communist politics in Macedonia is marked by two major events, which represent critical junctures. The first of these was secession from Yugoslavia and declaration of independence by plebiscite in September 1991 – marking the beginning of post-communist politics and sovereign statehood for Macedonia. Second, the ethnic conflict between Macedonian armed forces and ethnic Albanian armed groups in 2001, while brief, had a profound impact on the concepts of statehood and democracy in Macedonia as well as on the ethnic demographic context (Koneska, 2011). We can take a critical look back at this period and evaluate the impact that it had on the following periods and current developments in Macedonian politics in general, and on the demographics in particular. Establishing a sovereign state in 1991 was truly a groundbreaking event in Macedonian politics and history. Before 1991, Macedonian experience with statehood was confined within the limits of the Yugoslav federation as one of the six constituent federal units, but coming short of actual sovereignty and independence. Therefore, for the political elites, as well as for the entire population, establishing a sovereign state was a historical event. One should note that the independence referendum was boycotted by the ethnic communities of Albanians and Turks in Macedonia. Albanians were concerned about the status they would have in a new Macedonian state, fearing being relegated to a “minority” after decades of being a constituent nation in Yugoslavia. So failing to bring on-board all ethnic groups at the moment of 15


establishing statehood was a missed opportunity for placing Macedonian statehood on a foundation of initial consensus that did come to haunt the political elites in the years that followed (Koneska, 2011). The greatest ethnic risk in this period related to the inter-ethnic relations and the balance between the two largest ethnic communities in Macedonia: ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The relations between the two groups deteriorated significantly in the course of the first decade after independence. Despite the participation of Albanian political parties in coalition governments since 1991, the major demands of the Albanians that related to increased ethnic rights, restitution of property, constitutional recognition of Albanians as ‘constituent nation’ in the Macedonian state, were not met. The problems have begun with the character of the state and the different perceptions of the state. With respect to the history of the Macedonian people, ethnic Macedonians considered the Republic as their nation-state. This was clearly expressed in the preamble to the new 1991 constitution, which laid out a new way of dealing with minorities, particularly with Albanians. The 1974 constitution of the former Yugoslavia guaranteed Albanian and Turkish minorities' equal rights and status with the Macedonian population. After independence, the 1991 constitution changed this (Vetterlein, 2006). The preamble of 1991 had stated that: “Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.” (Constitution of Macedonia, 1991). The changed status was fundamentally controversial and caused much resentment among Albanians as it established a constitutional distinction and division between the majority and minority populations (Vetterlein, 2006). However, Albanians, who often described themselves as a non-majority instead of a minority, were not pleased with their own status in Macedonian society. This led to the boycott by Albanians of the referendum on sovereignty on 8 September 1991 (Vetterlein, 2006). As times passed, considerable discrepancy between constitutional rights and the experience of these rights in every-day-life developed. There were restrictions to the Albanians on the use of their own languages in higher education and political bodies, as well as discrimination in employment. Together these led to an underrepresentation of Albanians, Turks and others in state institutions. This, in turn, was linked with the low level of socio-economic development, as ethnic and religious segregation mostly went hand in hand with economic segregation. Albanians complained that they were discriminated against as second-class citizens (Vetterlein, 2006). A number of violent incidents during the 1990s indicated tensions between the two communities and between the Albanian population and the state institutions in particular. Not only were inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia poor but also that the state bodies had no capacity to deal with sensitive ethnic and religious situations and act preventively, on the contrary, the actions of the police and the special police and army units further aggravated the situation (Koneska, 2011). From a political perspective, independence coincided with the beginning of a period of institutional fragility and internal tensions, which culminated in the ethnic Albanian insurrection in 2001. Thanks to international intervention and surveillance, the 2001 conflict was kept under control, but the profound religious, ethnic, and social tensions that led to it are far from being solved.

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The ethnic conflict between Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels in the six months during spring and summer 2001 was a landmark event that opened a window for rethinking a lot of the ideas on which Macedonian statehood and politics was based during the 1990s (Koneska, 2011), including on the position of the ethnic communities. The precariousness of the ethnic balance was revealed as well as the need for deeper intervention and reforms in the institutional set-up. Forces on both sides of the civil conflict of 2001 targeted and in some cases destroyed ethnic and religious buildings. On 16 June 2001, during combat operations, police fired at the mosque at Stracini (US State Department, 2002). In June 2001, rioters vandalized the Bitola mosque, breaking windows, setting fire to the mosque interior, and breaking open several graves. Rioters also sprayed swastikas and anti-Albanian graffiti on the mosque (US State Department, 2001). Local police reportedly did not take any action to stop rioters from vandalizing a city mosque and its adjacent Muslim cemetery. Some witnesses claimed that a few police officers participated in the riots. On 21 May 2001, in Runica, in the Kumanovo area, government forces burned down the local mosque and a number of other buildings. During the spring of 2001, significant damage was caused to St. Bogorodica Orthodox Church and to Arabati Baba Teke Dervish sanctuary near Tetovo. On 3 June 2001, the Orthodox Christian monastery at Matejce, near Kumanovo was defaced. On 21 August 2001, the church within the Orthodox Christian monastery at Lesok was destroyed. On 8 December 2001, arsonists destroyed the Sveti Gjorgija (St. George) Church in the village of Golema Recica near Tetovo, the night before St. George's Day. The following night, on 9 December 2001, the mosque in Bitola caught fire. Police claimed that the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring; however, most observers believed that the fire was set intentionally in response to the St. George Church fire. On 7 August 2001, in Prilep, a group burned down the local mosque (US State Department, 2002). The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), brokered by the EU and US mediators for ending the conflict, which was signed on 13 August 2001 by the leaders of the four largest political parties in Macedonia provided for major reforms. While the conflict claimed some 150 lives and significant material damage was inflicted, the more long-term consequences were undoubtedly in the arena of mutual trust and relationships between communities. OFA set forth tangible benchmarks and measures to be implemented in order to rectify those conditions that led to hostilities, fighting, and general unrest leading to paralysation of parts of the country throughout much of 2001. The Ohrid Agreement included a number of key reform priorities. It aimed to meet mainly the grievances of ethnic communities in the country. Throughout the implementation of this agreement and the 2002 election campaign, ethnic issues increasingly were politicized. The Government increasingly politicized ethnic-religious issues and increased the role of religion in official events. For example, on 9 January 2002, the Minister of Interior organized a ceremony where police special forces were blessed by the Archbishop of Ohrid and each police officer was given a religious plaque. The Government also financed the placement of a 60-foot-tall Orthodox cross on Mt. Vodno near Skopje. These actions were seen as provocations by the country's non-Christian communities and contributed to strained relations between ethnic and religious groups (US State Department, 2002). OFA elevated the position of Albanians and other minorities in the country and the new preamble of the Constitution was changed to following: 17


"The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosnian people‌" (Constitution of Macedonia, 2002) Following the end of conflict of 2001, damage to the religious monuments and interethnic/inter-religious rivalry continued. In February 2004, an explosion occurred in Bitola at the Asan Baba mosque. In March 2004 during the period of unrest in Kosovo, unknown attackers threw several Molotov cocktails at a mosque in Kumanovo. None of the Molotov cocktails exploded, and there was only minor damage to the mosque (US State Department, 2004). The Bektashi compound in Tetovo was vandalized in July 2004 (US State Department, 2005). On 20 May 2007, unidentified perpetrators set fire to a mosque in Obednik, a small south-western village (US State Department, 2007). The Government, in a closed-door meeting on 22 January 2008, agreed to fund construction of an Orthodox church in the main city square of Skopje. A group of 38 civil associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) requested that the construction be complemented by the reconstruction of the Burmali mosque also in the city square that has been destroyed decades before by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in inter-war years (Krasniqi, 2010). One week after the decision to construct the church in the Skopje city square, the Government agreed to fund reconstruction of the Charsia mosque in the nearby city of Tetovo, rather than the Burmali mosque as initially requested (US State Department 2008). In January 2010 vandals twice broke windows of a mosque in Kocani. In the same month, unknown persons vandalized three tombs in a Muslim cemetery in Struga (US State Department, 2010). In February 2011 government initiated construction of church in Skopje (Kale) fortress, and aimed to be used as a museum, was seen by non-majority communities as disturbing for local population in the neighbourhood. The construction activities were temporarily put on hold until reaching an agreement between the coalition partners. On 10 February 2011, late at night around the Kale fortress in Skopje, ethnic Macedonian construction workers bussed in from Bitola resumed work on an archaeological museum in the shape of an Orthodox Church. The Kale fortress in Skopje stands at the highest point of the historic part of the city, and the surrounding population is of mixed ethnic composition, with many Muslim (Albanian and Turkish) inhabitants. Politicians belonging to Muslim community around midnight went to the site and tired down the construction. The following days, a Muslim NGO alerted police that it would march to the Kale fortress in Skopje on 13 February 2011 to protest about the construction of the Church-shaped museum, whilst some ethnic Macedonians mobilised through Facebook called for a march in defence of the construction. This culminated in an inter-ethnic clash on 13 February 2011 as police, were unable to keep the two groups apart. For 20 minutes protesters used slings, stones and clubs against each other, which resulted in eight people injured, including two police officers. Soccer fans from both ethnic communities are said to have been involved in the incident. The shape of the museum and the conspicuous way of proceeding with the construction added strain to inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations (Jahja et al., 2011). On 14 February 2011 morning, a fire was set to a mosque in Bitola as a response to the incidents in Kale fortress in Skopje. Above incidents have underlined the extreme sensitivity of cultural, ethnic and religious symbols in the present multi-cultural context of Macedonia. Placing as many landmarks as

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possible to prove particular ethnic or religious character of the cities, particularly of the capital Skopje, will continue to haunt the inter-ethnic relations in the country. This precarious political transition has come to be an important cause, feature and consequence of Macedonia's demographic change. A number of cities have faced outgoing migration as people have moved from the cities where they are minority to cities where their ethnic kinship is majority. This phenomenon has exacerbated the low fertility trend leading to slow in the growth of the population. II.1.c. Demographic patterns of ethnic groups A further factor influencing the demographic composition of Macedonia has been the location and demographic patterns of ethnic groups. Some regions of Macedonia have experienced rapid alteration in the composition of their population according to ethnic origin. The socioeconomic integration of minorities constitutes an important challenge for Macedonia, especially in metropolitan cities, which are primary targets for interregional migration flows. Macedonia’s largest minority population, Albanians, live mainly in North-Western parts of the country (Skopje and Polog regions), but also increasingly in south parts of the country (Southwestern and Pelagonia regions). The proportion of Albanians is estimated to range around 25 percent, in accordance to the census held in 2002. Education statistics put Albanian pupils at around 30 percent, which is expected to increase the rate of the Albanians in the whole population, but not much as most recently primary school enrolment in Albanian schools has seen drops (Lajm, 2010). While fertility rates are projected to remain below the natural replacement rate of 2.1 children per women across the country (1.55 children per women according to figures of 2010), the Albanians until recently have had high replacement fertility rate. At the same time, mortality rates among the Albanians remained high due to regional inequality in health conditions. A large segment of the Albanians are concentrated in rural and in socially and economically backward regions, has low educational attainment, poor health and is economically inactive. The socio-economic integration of the Albanians is a precondition for long-term sustainable growth in many Macedonia's regions. Although until recently Albanians have had different demographic trends, currently there is increasing converging demographic patterns compared to the majority population: decreasing fertility rate, ageing of population and migration has come to dominate the ethnic Albanian demographics in the country. II.1.d. Gender composition and access to education and health care Gender composition has been another determinant in Macedonia's demographics. A number of regions have faced a strong rural-urban migration of high skilled females in the economically active age groups. This phenomenon has exacerbated the low fertility trend and in many cases has resulted in a high degree of 'masculinisation' of rural areas as seen in villages of Bitola, in the Pelagonija region of Macedonia. Another important factor is access to education and health care. Although life expectancy is projected to increase, health outcomes have differed considerably among regions and cities. Health inequalities have been large, leading to change in demographic circumstances. Although overall access to education has increased, access to education outcomes have differed considerably between regions. Education inequalities have been large among cities and regions, in turn leading to demographic changes. Resources allocated to education remain low. There are high regional disparities in accessing education, particularly at the pre-school education level. Substantial funds have been invested on renovation and construction of 19


school buildings and sports halls, however, the investment has not been equitably applied to all municipalities in the country (EC, 2011). II.2. Features of demographic change Demographic change happening around Macedonia has possessed the features of population aging, lower fertility, increasing mortality, slowing rate of natural population growth, regional demographics and migration. II.2.a. Population aging Low fertility and increasing life expectancy (based on declining mortality at higher ages) in Europe, have reversed the age pyramid, leading to a shrinking number of younger people, an ageing work force, and an increasing number and share of older people (Muenz, 2007). Population aging is tendency happening with continuous increase in the elderly population and a simultaneous decrease in the young population. The demographic effect of population aging is a reduced reproductive capacity of the population and ever increasing number of young people reach reproductive age. The economic effects are adverse, since the labour force declines and the number of senior citizens who depend on the rest of the population, goes up (Hristov, 2004). The aging population of Macedonia and of other Southeast European countries, needs to be examined against the background of the population ageing in EU, where dependency ratio is set to reach 51 percent by 2050 and where working age population (15-64 years) will decrease by 48 million by 2050 (EC, 2006:4). Most parts of the world, including Europe, witness demographic aging – defined as a rise in median age of populations and a growing share of people above age 65. As a result, prospects and consequences of demographic ageing are widely discussed in Europe. Today, pay-as-you-go systems based public pension regimes as well as funded private pension plans and their sustainability are at the centre of the debate. The impact of longevity on health care expenditure has drawn some attention. Possible effects of aging on future innovation and productivity have been also an issue. Other discussions have focused on replacement migration as a means of coping with of ageing and shrinking populations (Muenz, 2007). Macedonia and other Southeast European countries do not diverge from the rest of Europe in terms of natural population dynamics. Southeast European countries have undergone aging of their population and this trend continues and will continue in future as estimated (see Tables 1a, 1b in Annex). With population aging, their age profile will be similar to that observed in EU member states. Southeast European countries experienced civil war or lived through ethnic tension and conflicts. However, population structure of these countries still prevents some of them from aging quickly and profoundly as seen in EU countries. However, this is also partly due to the low life expectancy in some of these countries. In Macedonia, increasing percentage of the male population die before they reach age 60 (Mamolo et al., 2006). One interesting characteristic of Macedonia is difference in the mean ages between men and women. Reviewing population aging by looking at the aging at different ages (the age cohort 0-14 – the base of age pyramid); the mean ages in the interval 15-64; and the high ages of 65 and over – the top of the age pyramid), shows greater aging. The main reason for such an aging would be a trend for a continuous decline in the birth rate.

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The proportion of the working-age population is decreasing constantly in Macedonia, suggesting that, in the long run, the ageing process might become a significant social burden. However, the country can exploit the window of opportunity characterized by a prominent proportion of the population at working age and a shrinking share of people below 15. Such a situation, combined with a rather slowly growing proportion of elderly people, later fertility declines and persisting low life expectancy lowers the total dependency rate, which might favour socio-economic development. It is clear that such a favourable situation will merely persist for a short period, because the window of opportunity closes as soon as process of population ageing once more inflates the dependency rate. As a response to these situations, the government has undertaken to introduce socio-economic policies and to invest into the health and education systems (read path dependency) in order to exploit the opportunities offered by such as demographic window and to counter negative demographic trends. The ageing of population is the result of following demographic trends. In summary: • The average number of children per woman is low at 1.55 children (2010), well below the replacement rate of 2.1, required to stabilize the population size in the absence of immigration or emigration. • There is gradual progress of working age population towards retirement age. • Life expectancy at birth continues to rise. • The country is exporter of major outflows of net migration to EU. As a result of these trends, the total population remains around same, but has become older and the size of the working age population decreases. The dependency ratio has increased. In the period 1948-2006, the representation of the population between the age of 0 and 14 in Macedonia has declined by 38.4 percent, whereas the representation of the population aged 60 and over has increased by 58.6 percent (UNECE, 2009). Changes demonstrated in the representation of age groups in Macedonia indicate to the fact that the aging population process has commenced. Namely, it is considered that, according to the indicator, the population commenced its ageing, if the representation of the population aged 60 and over has reached 12 percent. Namely, in the period 1953-2006 it is perceived that the average age of the population of Macedonia increased from 25.9 percent in 1953 to 33.5 percent in 1997 (Miladinov, 2009). According to the most probable option of the study on “Projection of the Population of the Republic of Macedonia to 2020”, by the end of the projected period it is expected that the population aged between 0 and 14 will represent 17.2 percent in the total population, having a decline of 28 percent compared to 1997. The population aged 15-59 will represent 60.9 percent of the total population, a slight decline of 2 percent compared to 1997 (UNECE, 2009). Finally, the population aged 60 and over will represent 21.9 percent of the total population by 2020, with an increase of 57 percent compared to 1997. It means that the process of demographic population ageing will intensify by 2020 simultaneously increasing needs for social and health protection of older persons. The proportion between these two groups of population shows growth from the current 25.5 percent to 60.6 percent in 2060 and decline to 51.2 percent in 2100. That means that in future about one third of the population over 18 years will be old population (Miladinov, 2009). The available data from the population censuses until 2002, then population estimations in the period 2002-2008, as well as the population projections for the period 2007-2055, show that the volume and the structure of older population (aged 60 or over) in Macedonia developed with variable dynamics and that in the following decades an intensification of the process of 21


demographic ageing can be expected. In Macedonia, the number of person aged 60 or over, has increased for more than thrice in the period 1921-2002. According to the data from the population censuses, from around 90.000 persons in 1921 and 1931, respectively 100.000 after the Second World War (1948 and 1953), in 2002 it has reached 300.000 person. Thus, the population aged 60 or over has grown significantly since the 1970’s. Unlike the continuous absolute growth, the participation of the older population in the total population decreases until the 1960’s, and afterwards it continuously increases and in 2002 reaches 15 percent (Janeska, 2010). The available data of the population estimations and of the population projections, confirm that after 2002 in comparison with the 1990’s, the process of demographic aging of the older population has had a significant intensification. Namely, in the period between the last two censuses (1994-2002), the older population (aged 60 or over) has increased for 19.7 percent, and old age contingent (aged 80 or over) for 6,1 percent. In the period 2002-2008 these indicators respectively count 9.2 percent and 32.4 percent (population estimations), and between 2002-2010 13.4 percent and 43.0 percent (population projections). In the period 2010-2020, according to the middle scenario of population projections, it is expected the older population (aged 60 or over) to increase for almost a quarter (24.3 percent), and the old age contingent (aged 80 or over), for more than two fifths (41.4 percent). Because of these dynamics, in the first two decades of the 21st century, in Macedonia, the population aged 80 or over will duplicate. After 2020, a continuous decline of the old age population growth is expected (15.2 percent from 2020-2030; 8.3 percent from 2030-2040; 6.7 percent 2040-2050). The increase of the population aged 80 or over in the same intervals will be higher 25 percent. Women make up a significant majority of the older population in Macedonia and the female share increases with age. Because their life expectancy is greater than men's, women comprise a significant majority of older population. In the 1994 and 2002 the sex ratio of population aged 60 or over was 87 and 85 males per hundred females. Thus there were approximately 18.000 (1994) and 24.000 persons (2002) more women aged 60 years or older than there were man of the same age (Janeska, 2010). The ranking of demographic ageing shows that the population in the level of the country from the threshold of demographic ageing (1994) has passed to stage of demographic aging (2002). In the threshold of demographic ageing are the populations in Southeast and Southwestern regions of Macedonia. With higher intensity process of aging are Vardar, Skopje, Southeast and Eastern regions, whose population from the threshold of demographic aging have moved to the stage of demographic aging (Parliament, 2009). In the same stage have remained Pelagonia regions. While Polog region has moved from the stage of demographic maturity to the threshold of demographic ageing. That means that more than 3/5 of the country is covered with very intensive process of demographic ageing (Parliament, 2009). The highest percentage of old people is located in the Pelagonija region with 20.8 percent. Followed by Vardar, East and Southeast regions where their percentage is 18.1 percent. The smallest percentage of old population has Polog region, and is 12.2 percent. However, even Polog’s percentage exceeds critical limit of demographic aging, which confirms that all regions of Macedonia have penetrated deep into old age demographics (Government, 2010). (See Table 19 in Annex). Considering only the natural demographic developments, the aging is unavoidable in the decades to come. An analysis of the age pyramids would show that the structure of the Macedonian population is expected to change, according to these natural projections, from a (roughly) diamond-like shape to a vase shape, where the younger cohorts are proportionally smaller and smaller (Lanzieri, 2010). 22


According to the latest census, households and dwellings in 2002, Macedonia has 2,022,547 inhabitants, which is 3.9 percent more than in previous census (1994), or 43.0 percent more than in 1948. According population estimates from the State Statistical Office (as of 31.12.2010) population in Macedonia amounted to 2,057,284 inhabitants. According to projections (medium variant) of the United Nations in the next period is expected to reduce the number of population in Macedonia in 2015 to amount to 2,045,000 inhabitants, in 2025 to 2,037,000 residents, and in 2050 to 1,857,000 inhabitants. Measured by average population growth from 2010-2015, it is expected a negative growth of 0.02 percent. The negative growth is expected to continue in following decades, with -0.01 percent growth in the period of 2015-2020, -0:09 percent from 2020 to 2025, and -0.49 percent from 2025 to 2050, according to UN World Population Prospects (Government, 2010). II.2.b. Lower fertility, increasing mortality and lower rate of natural population growth Today, demographic change is a global phenomenon resulting from two almost universal trends: declining fertility and increasing life expectancy. Most countries in the world experience declining fertility or have stagnating fertility. In most developed countries fertility is below replacement level. And the majority of Southeast European countries, including Macedonia, reports decreasing fertility. In Macedonia, after the period 1948-1952 when the average birth rate was 39.3 live births goals per thousand inhabitants, in the following years rates show downward trend and in 2006 it amounted to 11.1 births per thousand population. Compared to other countries in Europe, Macedonia is among the last countries to start demographic transition and it is characteristic that it begins with very high rates. According to the values of total fertility rate (TFR) which is considered hypothetically or possible fertility and represents the number of live births that a woman is expected to have during her reproductive period, in 1971, TFR amounted to 2.98 children per woman, and in 1981 was 2.45 live births per woman, which was significantly higher than other countries of Europe for the same period. The trend of steadily reducing fertility is characteristic of the last decade of the twentieth century, when the fertility rate in 1994 was still at the level of simple reproduction of the population (2.1 live births to one woman), but from this time the values of the TFR started downward trend, for today Macedonia to be in the borders very low fertility (TFR under 1.5) and so-called safe zone (TFR over 1.5). The latest available figures show that Macedonia possesses TFR of 1.55 children per woman (2010). Expectation is the values of the TFR to continue to decline (See Tables 4, 10, 23 in Annex). Ethnicity has shown substantial variations in fertility. The big variation has been between the two main ethnicities in Macedonia: Completed fertility among Albanian women has been much higher than among Macedonian women (Dragovic, 2000). The reasons for such a situation are complex - cultural, demographic, economic and health-related factors. At the same time it is not possible to ignore current transitional position of Macedonia: transit to the market economy and pluralistic political system. Other reasons include the aging of the fertile contingent, the insufficient financial security, the small homes etc. Essential factors are the rate of unemployment of women and their position in the family and society. At the same time, the subsequent decline in the birth rate has been also due to diminishment in the effectiveness of the state's demographic pro-natalistic policy in the country (Dragovic, 2000).

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In terms of eight regions that exist in Macedonia, higher TFR from that of national level has only Skopje region, while other regions have TFR values the same or below. Specifically, in Eastern and Pelagonia regions, there are more deaths than live births. The reduction in birth rate is due to the so-called tempo effect or delay in the births and marriage in adult years. For example, the average age of mothers at birth of first child increased from 23.5 years in 1994, to 25.3 in 2006 to 26 in 2010, and the average age of all births increased from 25.8 years in 1994 to 26.8 in 2004 to 27.8 in 2010 (Government, 2008). Taking into account that the greatest number of live births (87.8 percent) in 2010 were born in marriage, it can be said that the reduction of fertility is due to postponement of marriage to older years than the reduction in the number of marriages. In fact, in 2010 were registered 14,155 marriages, a 5.1 percent decrease over the previous year, and the average age of the bride has increased (from 23.5 in 1994 to 25.2 in 2010). There are indications that the delay of entry in marriage is due to worsening economic and social conditions in the country and the increasing number of women who give priority to their education and career (Government, 2008). Until 1998, relatively more children (more than two thirds) gave birth the women with younger age: 2024 and 25-29 years than in older years. In 2000 births are still most dominant in both age groups, but already in 2006 the highest number of births (36.2 percent) occurred among women who belonged to the age group 25-29 years, 27.0 percent at age 20 -24 years and aged 30-34 was 21 percent and this percentage has increased to 23.6 in 2010. The specifics of the Macedonian fertility are the difference in birth of children by ethnicity of the mother. The rate of ethnic Macedonian mother is lower (52.1 percent in 2010) than overall share of the community in total population (63 percent according to census of 2002). While the rate of ethnic Albanian mother is higher (32.5 percent in 2010) than overall share of the community in total population (25 percent according to census of 2002). The highest difference is seen in Roma women whose rate in delivering live births is 7.4 percent (2010), which is the double of the share of Roma in the composition of the total population of the country (around 3 percent according to census of 2002). In Macedonia, from the 1980s of the twentieth century, there is increased number of deaths. The overall mortality rate for the period from 1994 to 2010 increased and it ranges from 8.0 to 9.3 deaths per thousand inhabitants. Mortality is higher in men than women. Highest mortality rate is in Pelagonia, Vardar, East and Southeast regions where the proportion of old population is highest. The Polog region, where parallel to the low percentage of old population, in terms of other regions, has the lowest mortality. This trend in mortality is due to the increasing share of the old-age population in the total population, provided the largest number of deaths belongs to older ages. Also, as possible reasons are the standard of living and status of the health sector (Government, 2008; Statistical Yearbook of Macedonia, 2008). Hence there is a need for establishing conditions for increasing the expected duration of life, which should be achieved by reforms in health, but also improvement of living conditions. The United Nations forecasts that the average length of life in Macedonia will continuously increase that for the period 2010-2015, the average expected lifespan to be 74.9 years and in 2050 to reach 79.5 years (Government, 2010). As a result of reduction in the birth rate and increasing the rate of general mortality in the last 10 years, the rate of natural population growth has dropped by 8,1 percent in 1994 to 2.5 percent in 2010. Lowest rate achieved so far has been in 2007 with 1.5 percent. The rate has increased to 2.5 percent as a result of subsidies offered temporarily to mothers giving birth to more than 2 children.

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II.2.c. Regional demographics According the EU's NUTS classification (Nomenclature of Units of Territory for Statistics) today in Macedonia there are eight regions (NUTS 3), and 85 municipalities (NUTS 4) from the territorial organization of 2004. Macedonia as a whole constitutes the NUTS 1 and 2 levels of classification. The demographic dynamics of Macedonia until recently has been characterized with regional differences (Dimitrieva et al., 2010). However, there is increasing convergence in demographic trends. In such sense, very indicative are the recent converging trends in the eight regions of the country, including Eastern, Northeastern, Pelagonia, Polog, Skopje, Southeast, Southwestern, and Vardar. Before converging trends to begin, one clear mark has been regional differences. For example, in the period between the Censuses of the population of 1994 and of 2002 in the Polog region (mainly Albanian populated region) the population increased for 8.5 percent and in the Pelagonia region decreased for 1.8 percent. However, the changes in the age structure contributed the Pelagonia region which used to be in stadium of demographic old age to remain in the same. The Polog region although has had a high natality, yet under the influence of the emigration, has become caught in a process of demographic aging. Although regional differences are expected to continue in the future, they are expected to be exceptional and convergence trends are to dominate the prospects for population dynamics of Macedonia for the coming period until 2055. The total population is expected to decrease but with different intensity. In the Pelagonia region the decrease is for 30,5 percent, in the Polog region for 19,8 percent and in the country for 22,8 percent (Dimitrieva et al., 2010). It can be concluded that Macedonia and both observed regions will face seriously the problem of demographic aging although in different time intervals. Therefore, Macedonia is increasingly facing regional convergence in population growth, as expressed by growing similarities between urban and rural areas. The changes in the demographics in Macedonia have been historically characterized by regional differences. The development of the population in Macedonia has been characterized with drastic decreased natural growth and strong growth of the emigration abroad. These changes have caused significant decrease in the growth of the population and shift in its demographic structure. From 67 municipalities (out of total 84), decrease in population growth is characteristic for more than half of municipalities (35) (Parliament, 2009). According to the latest census of population, dwellings and households (2002), Macedonia has 2,022,547 inhabitants, which is 3.9 percent more than in the previous census (1994) and is 43.0 percent higher than in of 1948. According to population estimates from the State Statistical Office, the total population in 2010 was 2.057.284 inhabitants. According to projections (medium variant) of the United Nations (UN) the population is expected to decrease and in 2015 to amount to 2.037 million, to 2.001 million in 2025 and in 2050 to 1.746 million residents. In the period of 1994-2010 rates of natality in Macedonia decreased from 16.1 to 11.8 live births of 1000 residents. There is decrease in all regions, and the largest decrease is seen in Polog, Southwestern and Southeast regions. This kind of tendency in the higher natality regions contributed for significant decrease of regional differences in the size of rates of natality. Rates of mortality in the country increased from 8.0 (1994) to 9.3 deaths in 1000 residents (2010). Big changes in natality, caused enormous decrease of the natural growth in the country. That in the period of 1994-2010 decreased for four times (from 17,716 to 5,183 25


people), and the rate of natural growth decreased from 9.1 to 2.5 promiles in the same period. Big changes in absolute size of natural growth have experienced all regions. The same decrease came also in the highest natality regions, such as Polog, primarily under the influence of emigration (Parliament, 2009). Above indicators shows the fact that all regions have been in different demographic transitions, however, increasingly converging in the demographic results. Relatively high rise of the population in Skopje, Polog and Southeast regions are still under the influence of the higher natural increase, although part of them are emigration oriented regions. Nevertheless, total fertility rate shows that according to the situation in 2010 simple reproduction of the population in the meaning of recovery of generations is in none of regions. II.2.d. Migration Migration has been a major determinant of demographic change in Macedonia, featuring inter-regional (within country) migration and emigration. Migration is influenced by various economic, social and political factors acting as 'push' factors in the country or city of origin and 'pull' factors in the destination city or country. High unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, decreasing standards of living and obsolete infrastructure are among the push factors for migrants. Economic possibilities and growing demand of citizens or of EU countries for labour represent a considerable pull factor for migration. Macedonia has the character of migration area distinctively characterized both by intense internal movements of population, and a continuous process of eviction of the population to other countries, mainly to EU area. Internal migration flows have had different intensities in different time periods and in principle between town and village to the city of Skopje or to other major cities. The most intense wave of this type of migration occurred during the industrialization of the state (the sixties and seventies of last century). It is believed that during this period, more than 175,000 people have left rural areas to seek their livelihoods in urban neighbourhoods. Due to the dynamic process of industrialization is estimated that from 1948 to the present, villages have left 700.000 people and they have sought their existence in urban areas. Such a kind of migratory flow caused rural exodus, re-planning of the city settlements (especially the City of Skopje) and important consequences in the process of demographic aging. With the Census of 2002 is registered a total of 694,032 persons (around 35 percent from the total population) who do not have the character of indigenous population. For Macedonia in recent years, of particular characteristic is internal migration. In 2010, 5,961 persons have conducted internal migration, most of which are to Skopje region. This confirms the concentration of overall population in the capital, analogous to the depopulation of the population that occurs in other regions. As consequence of this rural exodus, it is registered a high number of abandoned villages, i.e. 85 villages without a single resident, and even 450 villages with 1 to 50 residents (Government, 2010). According to the age structure of population in these villages the old population dominates and it leads to the conclusion that in very short time many of them will become villages without a single resident. Participation of the urban population in the total population is 56.7 percent (2002). Around half of municipalities (41 out of total 84) have only rural population. City of Skopje remains the only urban place with more than 100.000 residents. More than a third of the population (36.2 percent) of the urban population lives in Skopje. In this context, it is witnessed continuous depopulation of the small rural and increased number of population in the greater rural municipalities. 26


There are significant tendency in terms of inter-regional or rural-urban migration flows. The majority of inter-regional migration goes to large regional urban centres such as Skopje, Tetovo (Polog region) or Bitola (Pelagonia region). Regions have faced a significant outward migration of young people. Young educated people tend to seek jobs in the capital Skopje or regional centres where they were educated, in view of the increased job opportunities offered. Outward migration of young people has left elderly people isolated in sub-urban, peripheral or rural areas. Indications show that in the last decade in the greater number of municipalities, emigration abroad has continued with very high intensity (Parliament, 2009). Many, if not all, Macedonia’s regions experience significant emigration, in particular to EU member states. Annual net migration outflows reached 620 people in 2010. Macedonia as a matter of fact is emigration area. By some estimates the total number Macedonian citizens residing abroad is very large and it is estimated that more than 300,000 people migrated from Macedonia in the last 50 years, representing 18 percent of the total population of Macedonia (Government, 2010). Recent economic emigration has also included flows of working age population to destinations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where they are employed in services providing logistics to international forces. One of the important factors that cause these migratory movements is the current state of the labour market and the high percentage of youth participation in the overall rate of unemployed. The problem of long-term unemployment exists in all categories of unemployed persons, regardless of age. Hence, the employment of young people, enabling those with higher levels of education, remains a serious problem to reduce youth emigration. Emigration has a strong negative impact on the reproduction of the population, because "export" of women in fertile period leads to the next low birth rate that is expected not only in the next 10-15 years, but for a long time coming, probably 40-50 years. Making effort to reduce emigration will significantly mitigate the effects that cause the process of demographic aging of the population. Prevention of future emigration requires joint efforts of many institutions and approach aimed at improving the life quality of young people from all aspects (education and qualification, employment and professional training, family and children, etc.). II.3. Consequences of demographic change Above-mentioned demographic tendencies, including aging, lower fertility and higher mortality, and migrations of populations have had their implications. II.3.a. Policy implications The implications of migration particularly that of inter-regional nature, are double. On the one hand it directly affects the numbers, territorial layout and population structures, and on the other, determines the natality and mortality due to the effects of gender and age structure of the population. The consequences to the parts from which people are moving are lack of working age population and untapped natural capital (land, etc.) and in the parts to which migrate, there is a surplus of labour, unemployment, poverty, increased population density and decrease in the quality of life. For sending towns, large-scale migration has deprived the local economies from needed human capital and has disrupted community and family structures. The benefits for sending towns are near zero as the inter-regional migration does not lead to flow of funds from urban to rural towns which is opposite to emigration where the

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remittances play an important role. For receiving cities, it has put a strain on social services and has established social friction. Internal and external migrations directly and indirectly have influenced the growth of the population. They have had important impact on the size of the whole population of the country, its reproductive basis and the process of demographic aging. Implications of migrations are more pronounced in the regions where migrations, particularly emigration, have seen large intensity. Emigration to EU countries is partly beneficial to the country in terms of economic terms, specifically through reduction of pressure on the labour market and transfer of remittances (i.e. funds). However, emigration of young population has had negative impact on social-economic development prospects. Emigration flows towards the EU will continue in view of differences in living standards. The projected population profiles depend very much on the migratory flows which will take place in the future, especially after the (assumed) membership to the EU. If, as it is likely, the membership will increase the emigration (at least on a first stage), both population size and aging will be affected, as the migrants have usually an age profile with a peak around young ages (which are also the childbearing ages). Therefore, continued net emigration flows would increase the speed and level of aging. Although restrictions on the labour markets of the other Member States can be set for the first years following the accession to the EU, as it has been the case for the latest enlargements, this may only partially be effective against the risk of further demographic decline (Lanzieri, 2010). The aging of population or the migration has not improved the conditions of the ethnic and religious minorities in the country. In the light of the challenges that Macedonia has faced, the socio-economic integration of minority ethnic groups of society has become precondition to mitigate the complex effects of an aging population. Growing regional convergence in demographic patterns generates a substantial socio-economic impact on Macedonian regions with implications to the inter-ethnic relations. Macedonia until recently has shown a heterogeneous picture comprising of regions with high population growth (Polog region or western Macedonia) and regions with declining populations (eastern and southern Macedonia). However, all of the regions currently face similar demographic challenges. They face slow population growth, as a consequence of low fertility rates and high net outward migration. Rural regions in general show a worse demographic situation, as a consequence of high outward migration of working-age population (both inter-regional and international), imposing a challenge for regional planning. The most obvious strategy coping with demographic aging is higher labour force participation rates. This strategy primarily applies to regions where participation rates of women are below average. This, however, would require better child care facilities and schools that take care of children all day. Another strategy is to impose higher retirement age. This strategy particularly applies to situations where actual retirement age is well below legal retirement age. In Macedonia, actual male retirement age has fallen to or even below age 60 whereas female retirement age already is below age 60. The social and local implications of population ageing are also worth noting. Municipalities with declining populations face difficulties in supplying essential public goods and services, such as health care, housing, urban planning, transport. In the field of economics, aging has affected economic growth, savings, investment, production, labour, pensions, taxes and

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generation transfers. In social terms, aging has affected the structure and arrangement of family life, household demand, migration trends, and health care (Government, 2008). As a response to declining fertility, government, among other policies, undertook a policy through amendments to the Law on Health Insurance that aimed at increasing the country’s population growth by giving state subsidies to mothers with two or more children. The new policy granted state subventions to mothers only in municipalities with a low birth rate. The programme provided for mothers to receive financial benefits for children born after 1 January 2009. The programme was restricted to the municipalities where the birth rate was below 2.1 per 1000 inhabitants. Of the municipalities that met the requirement, only two had an ethnic Albanian majority; the rest were populated mainly by ethnic Macedonians. Under the programme mothers would be eligible for a monthly cash benefit of around 90 euro for their second child during the first nine months of the baby's life. Mothers with three children would be eligible for 120 euro a month for ten years, and those with four children would receive about 190 euro a month for 15 years. As the new programme was discriminatory because it did not apply to the whole country (it mainly applied to municipalities with ethnic Macedonian majority), the Constitutional Court on 18 March 2009 overruled programme and annulled the provisions in the health insurance law that granted state subventions to mothers only in municipalities with a low birth rate. II.3.b. Implications to pension system The ageing of population has put ever greater pressure on public spending, particularly as it relates to pensions. Overall public finances has become unsustainable, thereby compromising the future equilibrium of pension and social security systems in general. Allowing public spending linked to ageing to lead to budget deficits has led to an intolerable spiral of debt. Such consequences have undermined the potential for economic growth, thereby requiring pensions and health benefits to be seriously called into question. Solidarity between generations has been jeopardized as the burden of ageing has fallen on the shoulders of the younger population. Remedying this situation has become priority of the government and of the interactions between the generations (EC, 2006). However, the government has, in general, not remained inactive and reforms have been undertaken especially in the fields of public pensions, family policies, education, decentralization and employment. These reforms have started to transfer responsibilities from governments and companies to individuals with citizens starting to play more active role as regards pensions and when to retire. Until recently, Macedonian pension system was based on so called Intergenerational Solidarity or Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system. In PAYG systems pension benefits are paid from the current contributions made by each employed individual. This is by no means a bad model especially having in mind the socio-economic and demographic circumstances (Miladinov, 2009). Just when the Macedonia‘s pension system begun to mature, the conditions conducive to a successful PAYG scheme, started to disappear. Population growth started to stagnate, fertility rates began to fall and life expectancy continued to increase. The crucial issue for the stability of any PAYG system is the ratio between the current number of employees and the people receiving pension benefits. This is because the system itself is currently financed. In the case of Macedonia, the growth of the population was stagnating. This aging of population resulted in increased number of individuals entitled to receive pension benefits. In addition, life expectancy has been constantly rising thus leading to big gap in the future pension fund liabilities. Like in many other transition countries, the process 29


of privatization resulted in harsh consequences. As the global market was putting pressure on Macedonian economy, unemployment was constantly growing and the country was lagging in economic development. This process led to increasingly severe market conditions. In Macedonia an increase of the number in pensioners and the replacement rate were most important factors in explaining an increase in pension costs. The number of contributors declined slightly and did not contribute greatly to the growth in pension expenditures. The ratio between current number of employees and people receiving pension benefits was decreasing dramatically. The financial situation in the Macedonia‘s pension system worsened dramatically during the 1990s, due primarily to: a significant decline in the contribution base, caused by high unemployment and a large non-taxed informal economy; a large number of beneficiaries, due to rapidly aging demographics, low real retirement age and early retirement policies widely used in the first years of transition; and a generous benefit level (Miladinov, 2009). Simulations conducted by the authorities indicated that the aging population would lead to a future destabilization in the finances of the Pension Fund of Macedonia unless the structure of benefits is changed further. The ratio between the contributors and retirees is very important for a PAYG system, because the benefits for the current retirees are paid with the contributions from the current contributors. Macedonia spent significant economic output on pensions. Pensions also represented a large share of total government outlays. The new situation influenced the debate about the urgent need of reform of the pension system. Prominent feature of these reforms was the introduction of mandatory individual retirement saving accounts. Macedonia, as a response to the unsustainability of PAYG system, initiated pension reform in 1997, and in 2000 the Pension and Disability Insurance Law was adopted. Reformed pension system included the introduction of the mandatory fully funded pension insurance to supplement the existing PAYG pension system. The new reform allowed for the introduction of a mandatory second pillar pension system to supplement the first pillar pension. The second pillar has only recently become operational i.e. in 2007. The first and second pillars are strongly integrated. Under the previous pension system, the employer paid 21.2 percent of each employee‘s salary to the Pension Fund of Macedonia. In the reformed system the same contribution is paid and the total of 21,2 percent contribution is divided into two parts: 13,78 percent remains in the Pension Fund and 7,42 percent is transferred to an individual account in the chosen private pension fund. The total rate of contribution is divided into two parts: 65 percent is kept in the Pension Fund, and the rest of 35 percent are transferred to the individual account in the selected compulsory pension fund. The new system was introduced under the heading of ―three-pillar pension system and is consisted of: The first pillar, compulsory and financed on PAYG basis; the second pillar, compulsory and fully funded; the third pillar, voluntary and fully funded. According to this scheme eligible for a retirement benefit are contributors with 65 years of age (for man), i.e. 62 years of age (for woman) and minimum 15 years of pension service (Miladinov, 2009). Every individual has her/his own personal investment account operated by private pension companies and audited by the MAPAS Agency (MAPAS - Agency for Supervision of Fully Funded Pension Insurance) responsible for providing security for the funds in the second pillar. The third pillar is designed to provide additional protection for people who want more income and insurance in their old age. It is consisted of personal savings plans managed by a private company and fully funded by the ones who will decide to become contributors in this 30


financial and administrative arrangement. This third pillar became operational in July 2009, completing the pension reform (Miladinov, 2009). The positive effects of reform are expected on two levels: In terms of individual, new pension system provides greater security for the financing of pensions through two or three sources. This way an individual achieves diversification of risks that each system carries itself. Namely, the demographic shock that affects all currently funded systems, fully funded pension systems are resistant, while the economic and stock market have influence only on fully funded systems. Therefore, the existence of a combined pension system provides two pillars with one another to promote through their complementarities and easier cushioning the risks, which achieves a higher degree of certainty. In terms of the pension system as a whole, multi-pillar or multi-column helps ensure solvent pension system, and that in the long run, that is the goal of every state in the conduct of social policy. By reducing the size of the state pension system at the expense of introducing a fully funded system, the obligations of the state system in the long run will decrease, which will be simultaneously achieved and reduce the public spending in the area of pensions. Unlike the earlier funded pension system, which did not encourage savings in the population due to generational solidarity, system funded under the capital base is expected to contribute to increasing national savings in the long term, and this in turn will be a tool for developing and strengthening financial market capacity (MTSP, 2011). Before the reforms, although the level of benefits was very low in fact, in principle, they were overly generous because the benefit was computed according to the best 10 consecutive years of work. The full-service replacement rate, corresponding to 35 years of seniority for women and 40 for men, was 85 percent, and the official retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men. Early retirement was quite common. Various privileges were provided for police and military personnel. Consequently, the total number of pensioners grew very rapidly. This solution was generally effective, in the short term, preventing many elderly people from falling into extreme poverty and, indeed, even improving their relative position compared to current workers; but it came at a high fiscal cost (Fornero et al., 2007). The premature entrance of workers into the pension system was not, however, the only problem. Many young workers became unemployed and many new entrants into the labour force could not find jobs, which caused the number of contributors to shrink. Within a few years, the ratio of workers to pensioners went from 3.19 in 1990 to 1.53 in 1996. This resulted in a great erosion of taxable revenues leading to conclusion that the system had to be reformed (Fornero et al., 2007). After 2030, the number of insured people will start to decrease due to demographical movement. The number of retired people will be continuously growing in the next years. The proportion between insured people and retired people, from current level of 1.3 insured people to 1 retired person will be decreased in long term to a level of 1 insured person to 1 retired person. This trend of ratio means that there will be smaller and smaller number of insured people and they will pay for more and more retired people. The ratio between the employees and the pensioners in 2007 was 1,6 (Miladinov, 2009). In future it is expected that the number of pensioners will equalize with the number of insured population, which can lead to difficulties in the payment of the pensions. This causes insolvency of the pension system in the long run. Demographic changes, specifically ageing of population, combined with the increasing life expectancy, are increasing the duration of the use of pension. At the same time, average size of families is decreasing, as people decide to have fewer children. These two trends together lead to increasing number of old-age population in comparison with the 31


number of employable citizens. In Macedonia, the ratio of people in the age older than 60 years with the people in the age from 18 to 59 years is projected to increase to 24 percent (current rate) to 34 percent in 2020, 42 percent until 2030, and to 55 percent in 2050. The PAYG scheme of financing is very sensitive for the ratio of pensioners to insured population. The ratio is expected to increase from the current rate of 60 percent to around 100 percent in the long run. Pension expenses expressed through a percentage of GDP are an indicator for that how much expensive is the pension system in a country. In 2004 pension expenses were 9.7 percent from GDP. The expenses have been decreasing gradually. This is due of two factors: First, decreasing of the obligations of the Pension Fund because of the ongoing parametric reforms, i.e. step by step decreasing of the substitute rate of the pensions from 80 percent to 72 percent for the insured people who will stay in the first pension pillar and second, decreasing of the range of pensions for the insured people who will make transfer into the second pension pillar because the replacement rate from the first pension pillar is only 30 percent, and these insured people will be receiving their leftover of the pension pay-offs from the second pillar (Miladinov, 2009). Considering the ratio of pensioners with the insured population which gradually is increasing with the demographic changes, non-implementation of a reform of pension system would have brought to increase of the contribution of the current rate of 19 percent of gross salary (which is equal to 35 percent of a net salary) to near 40 percent of gross salary (which is equal to 70 percent of a net salary). This kind of increase of the rate of contribution, would have decreased the net incomes of the employees, the potential of economic development of the country, and possibly would have caused further increase of the unemployment rate. Demographic changes and their consequences, the reforms undertaken, including in the pension field, have led to change in pension governance, including in the establishment of new institutions. Among new institutions established include the Agency for Supervision of Fully Funded Pension Insurance (MAPAS), pension companies, the custodian of the assets of pension funds (a commercial bank licensed by the National Bank of the Republic) and enhancing the role of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, and of the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund. MAPAS was established in July 2002 to supervise the operation of management companies and pension funds with the ultimate goal to protect the interests of pension funds (insurers). MAPAS is responsible for granting, withdrawing and revoking licenses for establishment of pension funds. It supervises the operations of pension companies, mandatory and voluntary pension funds. Also, MAPAS promotes, organizes and encourages the development of fully funded pension insurance in Macedonia, in cooperation with MoLSP and develops public awareness of the purposes and principles of pension companies and the mandatory and voluntary pension funds (MAPAS, 2011).

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III. ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHICS The question of population size is never absent from politics and can take a particularly acute form when different national, ethnic or religious groups are brought together in the same state. Numerical strength is the basis on which each group lays claim to political and administrative representation. III.1. The numbers democracy Numbers matter in the context of Macedonia’s demographics. The question of number has disproportionate importance because access to political and state resources is linked to the number of a certain ethnicity in the whole population. Macedonia is heterogeneous in its demographics. Ethnic groups that are present in the country include Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, Vlachs, Bosniacs and Torbeshi. What matters in Macedonian context is the ethnic demography rather than religious demography. It is not uncommon to equate ethnic Macedonians with Orthodox Christianity or Albanians with Islam however religious category is more artificial and it is not a sociological or political reality, but a simple statistical aggregate. Ethnic interests have priority over religious affiliation (Courbage, 2003). Almost all Macedonians, Serbs and Vlachs are Orthodox Christians and almost all Albanians, Turks, Roma and Bosniacs are Muslims. The most recent official census (2002) recorded 2,022,547 population. Of these, 64 percent were Macedonians, 25 percent ethnic Albanians, 4 percent Turks, and others. But, two ethnic groups, the Macedonians and Albanians, alone account for some 80 percent of the population and demographic balance between these two groups is an issue that affects the political stability in the country. Both groups have strong ethnic consciousness and they bolster this by underlying the high or low fertility of one group or another (Courbage, 2003). III.2. Ethnic fertility Ethnicity is the most distinctive feature of fertility in Macedonia and discussion of fertility would be incomplete without a brief examination between ethnicity and fertility. The initial assumption is that number of children ever born is bigger among the Albanian women. The fertility rates of ethnic groups have long been a subject of comment. In Macedonia as a whole, with 1.55 children per women in 2010, fertility remains relatively higher than western European average. Fertility rates among the ethnic groups differ. Perceived high fertility rate on the part of Albanians and other minorities and low fertility rate on the part of Macedonians has long been a subject of discussions. How the high or low fertility rates have affected the political governance of the country? Difference in fertility rates among ethnic groups has received attention from media and has been traditionally widely politicized (Dragovic, 2000; Daskalovski, 2000). Macedonian language newspapers have reported on high fertility rates among Albanians. While the Albanian language press has reported on high emigration of Albanians out of the country (Courbage, 2003), on the government policies for promoting of fertility of Macedonians only and on decreasing number of Albanian pupils in the schools. Albanians, Turks and Roma living in Macedonia until recently possessed a set of socioeconomic characteristics which in synergy almost invariably induced high fertility (see Tables 30, 4, 10, 23 in Annex). Illiteracy, until recently, relatively low among Macedonian women (12 percent), remained high among Albanian women, with one in four were unable to read or write. Gender inequalities remained large among Albanians: the gap between men and women 33


was 17 percentage points (8 points among Macedonians). The different treatment of Albanian women emerged more clearly still from the short length of time they spent in school and university (Courbage, 2003). Whereas one Macedonian in three lived in the countryside, the figure for Albanians has been two in three. The way of life has been intensely rural, affecting even the Albanian districts of the towns. Many Albanians have lived in rural areas. In addition to these easily quantifiable phenomena, the hypothesis has been made that the persistently high fertility of the Albanians has been related to the particular nature of their economic system, depending on remittances from emigrants. Albanian position has also derived from Macedonia's exceptional geographical situation in the middle of the Balkans, which fuels various networks involving Albania and Kosovo, where Albanians are majority (Courbage, 2003). For Macedonia’s Albanians, earlier it was not just agricultural activity that was marginal; economic activity in general — in the conventional sense of the term — was a rarity (9 percent of women in the labour force, 40 percent among Macedonian women). Female labour force participation has been historically low in Macedonia. Albanian men, themselves, are little involved in production and of those in the labour force, more were unemployed (51 percent) than employed. Overall, only one Albanian in twelve was economically active (one in three of Macedonians) (Courbage, 2003). However, all these differences recently have started to disappear and similar trends have started to be witnessed in the country. Fertility and mortality differences between the various ethnic groups have narrowed greatly and there is growing convergence in all demographic tendencies, including in fertility. III.3. Census politics Two censuses have been held in Macedonia since its separation and independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. The first took place in 1994 and the second in 2002. The third was conducted in October 2011 however, later it was cancelled. Censuses are not a neutral factor in Macedonia, but a crucial layer for the conquest of power. Distrust between ethnic groups who suspect each other of manipulating with numbers (Courbage, 2003), has politicized the conduct of censuses. The 2002 census was held a few months after the end of the ethnic conflict between Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels that occurred in the six months during spring and summer of 2001. Censuses in Macedonia are not mere mechanical statistical exercise, but highly charged political issues. One of the ways that conflict has been expressed is through rival census claims. One expression of the instability in Macedonia is the persistence of conflicting population figures (Friedman). Macedonia has historically been the object of conflicting claims supported in part by conflicting census figures (see Table 13 in Annex) (Friedman). Today population figures are again being used to bolster conflicting claims. Yugoslavia had a long tradition of censuses (1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991) and produced statistics covering ethnic group, language, and some times religion. Up to the death of Tito (1980), relations between the ethnic groups were far less tense. The federal statistical offices did their work satisfactorily and the data, in particular those from censuses, while perhaps not perfect, were adequate to perform estimation (Courbage, 2003). In Macedonia, the Albanian and Macedonian groups were both minorities in a larger whole and did not really see themselves as rivals, which is, after all, a condition for reliability in a census. After the death of Tito in 1980, inter-ethnic relations deteriorated throughout Yugoslavia, including in 34


Macedonia, leading even to a boycott of the census by the Albanian community in 1994. The last census organised in the territory of Macedonia and not contested by the ethnic communities of the country is the last one held in 2002. III.3.a. 1991 census From 1-15 April 1991, under conditions of impending political disintegration, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conducted its last census. Before the end of that year, while the census data were still being processed, war had broken out in Former Yugoslavia and Macedonia had subsequently declared independence. The census itself was carried out in an atmosphere of distrust and animosity. Albanians in Macedonia boycotted the 1991 census, claiming that they would be purposefully undercounted (Friedman). The State Statistical Office estimated the data for Albanians in the boycotted cities by means of statistical projections utilizing the data from the 1981 census, natural growth of the population during the inter-census period, migration, and other statistical data. The preliminary results were published in November 1991. Table 14 in Annex gives comparative statistics for all the postWar censuses conducted on the territory of Macedonia. Before the preliminary figures for the 1991 census were published, there appeared wide perception that Albanians have been miscounted in this census (Friedman). Establishment of independent Macedonia and the absence of a non-contested source for the characteristics of its population, particularly on its ethnic composition, necessitated holding a new census that will not be contested by the ethnic communities (Sardon, 2000). This led to organisation of extraordinary census in 1994. III.3.b. 1994 census In 1994 (from 21 June - mid-July), subject to intense external political pressure, an extraordinary census took place in Macedonia. Holding of 1994 consensus came as a result of dissatisfaction with the 1991 census. The extraordinary census of 1994 provided an opportunity to view more broadly the complexity of the Macedonian scene. Questions of ethnic identity, citizenship, language rights, and the interrelationships of the concepts of language, religion, and "nationality" have been hotly contested in Macedonia. The 1994 census was therefore a clearly political event rather than the statistical exercise it was officially claimed to be. And this was not the first time that Macedonian census figures were subject of conflicting claims. The 1994 census announcement was followed by nineteen months of uninterrupted dispute. There was an intense debate over the wording of the census law, which was eventually passed with the support of the Albanian members of parliament. One of the chief issues was language use in the census, and the new census law provided for bilingual forms in Albanian, Turkish, Roma, Vlach, and Serbian in addition to Macedonian (Friedman). The chief problem was that the Ministry of Interior had not succeeded in distributing all citizenship documents by the time the census began particularly to Albanians. Although the problems of document distribution occurred throughout Macedonia, Albanians maintained that a disproportionately high number of qualified Albanians were without citizenship documents. Albanian politicians were expressing particular misgiving over the issue of citizenship and they claimed that the question about citizenship was designed to demonstrate that the majority of Albanians in Macedonia were 'immigrants' (Friedman).

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The 1994 census highlighted, among other things, the ambiguity of the term Macedonia. Politically or culturally the term Macedonia often has the meaning of 'Slav Macedonian' or 'ethnic Macedonians'. Thus, for example, the most powerful political unit on the country calls itself the Macedonian, although only ethnic Slavs are included in it. It is no coincidence that ethnic Macedonians have embarked on campaign stressing its sole membership in this term. The exclusion of the other ethnicities from what can be called political Macedonia is well known in the country. The 1994 census was in sum a statistical success but a political failure. Although it legitimated the basic statistics of the 1991 census, it did nothing to resolve the issues of political hegemony and access to resources that continued to plague Macedonia (Friedman). III.3.c. 2002 census The Ohrid Framework Agreement ending the conflict of 2001, set forth measures to be implemented in order to rectify those conditions that led to general unrest leading to paralysation of parts of Macedonia throughout much of 2001. Among the measures proposed included conduct of a new census that will better reflect the demographic structure and ethnic composition of the country. Holding the census just after the signature of the Ohrid Agreement was important as the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement giving more rights to minorities set ratio thresholds that needed to be fulfilled in order to enjoy the rights. The Ohrid Agreement brought qualitative changes to the Census Law, in the parts that relate to the definition of census units, the use of the languages during the conduct of the Census, as well as the articles which determined the documents needed to be presented for the enumeration. With these changes, the final date for conduct of the Census was set for 1-15 November 2002. Because of limited budget, the State Statistical Office organized a donor meeting, to access additional sources for successful conduct of the Census (Gerasimovski et al., 2003). To avoid any possibility for mistrusting of the census results, the competent international monitoring was provided, which was led by the High-level Expert Group and Steering Committee. The Census Law excluded from the census units the citizens who were working or staying abroad more than one year. This provision was among the most contested aspect of the Census, due to large number of emigrants living outside the country and the largest share of emigrants belonging to ethnic Albanian community. The 2002 census resulted that Macedonia had 2,022,547 residents, a slight increase from 1,945,932 residents counted in 1994 census. The 2002 Census showed following ethnic composition of the country: 64.2 percent Macedonians, 25.2 percent Albanians, 3.9 percent Turks, 2.7 percent Roma, 1.8 percent Serbs, 0.8 percent Bosniaks, 0.5 percent Vlachs and 1.0 percent belonging to other ethnic communities (State Statistical Office, 2005). III.3.d. 2011 census: failed census The most recent census was planned for and conducted in October 2011. However, few days before the end of the process, it was cancelled because of different interpretation of the legislation and methodology by the government partners (Albanian and Macedonian). The Census was terminated after the Parliament upheld the Law on cessation of the validity of the Law on Census. In tense debate that followed, the government and opposition levelled accusations for the falsification of the census. The ruling parties’ MPs claimed that the cessation was in the interest of the state and the inter-ethnic relations, while the opposition continually asked for responsibility to be established for the spent funds which, according to them, amounted to nearly 10 million euro. The government said that reasons for the cessation 36


of census were the inconsistencies and flaws in the application of provisions from the Law on Census as a result of the short preparation period. Ruling ethnic Macedonian parties argued that with the cessation of census it has been intended to prevent forgery in the enumeration of the people (alluding to higher number of Albanians enumerated then expected) and arguing that they have stopped the operation for the sake of national interests. Already before the start of census, there were calls from various political circles for ceasing of the Census due to manipulation with the data and unclear lawful formulations. Before the start of census operation, governing coalition consisted of Macedonian and Albanian parties (VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, respectively) ironed out their differences over the composition of census teams in exclusively ethnic Albanian municipalities. The agreement was reached as DUI gave up the request for mono-ethnic teams of census takers in ethnic Albanian municipalities and agreed that the teams consist of representatives from the two biggest ethnic communities in those municipalities. The agreement halted the boycott of the work of the State Census Commission by its ethnic Albanian and Turkish members. However, number of members of the Commission resigned, including its president and deputy, latter arguing that the census cannot be successful without mono-ethnic teams. Ahead and after the census operation, numerous concerns and doubts were raised on the future shape of the ethnic composition of the country. While Macedonians argued that Albanians cancelled the census due to the fact that Albanians could have resulted to have less than 20 percent in overall population and Albanians arguing that Macedonians would have come less than earlier rate gained as a result of 2002 census. Albanians suspected that around 465 thousand Albanian migrants will not be covered by the census which will significantly affect the statistic overview of Albanian population in the country (Fakti). Albanian media argued that ruling Macedonian coalition partner (VMRO-DPMNE) has systematically worked on decreasing the number of Albanians. One aspect argued has been the issuance of biometric passports and the deliberately caused tumult as to make Albanian immigrants quit on their place of residence in Macedonia. Only in 2011 above 7 thousand of Albanians from Skopje were argued to have been forced to quit on this right to have passport. The long queues in front of the passport windows impeded citizens of Albanian origin living abroad to obtain their passports in a regular procedure. For obtaining passport, the Ministry of Interior required that this category of citizens, sign a statement in which they say that their place of residence is in one of the West European countries and for this reason they cannot wait for more than one month to obtain a passport. Accordingly, it has been argued that only in Skopje not less than 7000 Albanians have signed this statement. Another aspect has been requirement that every individual who wants to enter Macedonia by his car with foreign car plates cannot do that with a passport of Macedonia instead he/she should possess foreign documentation. If the immigrant wanted to enter Macedonia with a Macedonian passport he had to leave his car on the other side of the border. All of them have entered with foreign documents and they have been enlisted as foreigners. This means that their factual return home has not been registered because they didn't present Macedonian personal documents. In that way, all of them will be regarded as citizens of this country which for 12 months have officially not visited their homes. For this fact, they were automatically deprived from the right to be counted in the overall number of population in the census, have argued Albanian media (Dullovi, 2011). Demographers from both ethnical spectrum argued that migrations and the low birth-rate amongst communities would have negatively affected the final results. The economic migration remains to be a big concern for Albanians in Macedonia, which causes decrease in 37


the number of pupils in schools. In some Tetovo villages, many classrooms have phased out as a result of migration of entire families. Struga is the first one on the list, followed by Kumanovo. The problem of the 2011 census centred to the pending differences between the government partners over the registration of citizens who live abroad and the use of copies of IDs and passports. EUROSTAT advised that only the persons living in their usual place continuously for 12 months prior to the day of census or arrived at their place of domicile less than 12 months before the day of census in order to stay for at least one year should be registered as citizens of that area. The lack of complete teams operating on the ground as well as the confusion in context of the methodology of the process led to a chaotic situation which was keeping the conduct of the census operation in danger. These differences were reflected in the work of ethnically mixed teams of enumerators. The State Consensus Commission’s President (ethnic Macedonian) explained that the members of the body had jointly established that different interpretation and application of the Law on Census (which stipulated that the census should include all citizens whose place of residence is in the country, but at the time of the census have been working/living abroad for up to 12 months) might affect the results. Her deputy (ethnic Albanian) said the clash resulted from different interpretation of the Census Law 'everywhere'. Newspapers reported that over 18,000 census forms for citizens from the western and northern part in the country (i.e. Albanian parts of the country) were questionable; this raised the suspicion of a census counterfeit (Dnevnik). One day before the start of the census, then State Census Commission president resigned suspecting that a 'great census forgery' was being prepared. Albanian media argued that the Census operation was forged by the Macedonians and openly expressed their distrust in the State Statistical Office which run the census operation as the Office lacks equitable ethnic representation in its structures. Albanians are represented with less than 10 percent in the Statistical Office (Fakti). Albanian media has also accused that the Macedonians living abroad were enumerated; which was not case for Albanian diaspora (Lajm). They have also argued that one of the reasons for cancellation of the census may be the low number of enumerated Macedonians and number of them declaring themselves as Bulgarian. The failed census made headlines without any hints about possible new timings of the statistical operation. It may take a long time and it may lead to avoiding to hold census for a long time due to fear of change in the ethnic composition of the population. The country will be faced with the challenge to carry out a census that will produce a precise picture on the country's population in compliance with international standards. It will take time until the country establishes a right climate allowing census activities to be conducted in an adequate and safe mode. III.4. Elections: Do the 2011 parliamentary elections in the absence of 2011 census confirm the population figures? Although it is impossible to derive an irrefutable figure from electoral data, the results of Macedonia’s parliamentary elections of June 2011 can be used to confirm or invalidate the broad estimates that would have been obtained from the failed Census of October 2011.

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The new electoral system adopted in 2002, based on proportional representation in the six electoral districts covering the whole territory, brought the electoral representation of the Albanian parties more into line with those of the Macedonians. Early parliamentary elections were held on 5 June 2011. The elections resulted in 25 Albanian MPs, which is 20.3 percent out of total 123 MPs. The Albanian share in overall vote was 21.1 percent. In the elections, population votes ethnically to elect their own ethnical party. The Albanians parties took 21.1 percent of the votes cast in June 2011, and considering large absenteeism among Albanian voters, a result was very close to the Albanian share of the total population in 2002 census (25 percent). There were 1.821.122 voters on the electoral registers according to the State Election Commission. Table 16 in Annex shows the share of the main ethnic groups in the electorate and the share of the votes cast obtained by the political parties according to their explicit or implicit ethnic affiliation. The implicit affiliation is inferred from the fact that the candidates of any given party all belong to the same ethnic group. Exceptions apply. Macedonian ruling and oppositional parties (VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, respectively) presented several candidates from Turkish and Torbesh origin. Albanian parties presented mainly Albanians only (a bosniac representative was elected from DUI, the Albanian ruling party). The percentage of votes obtained by the Albanian parties (21.1 percent) is very close to the proportion of Albanians in the population aged 18 and over in 2011 (aged 10 and over in the 2002 Census), adding the fact of low turnout among Albanians. In district six, which corresponds broadly speaking to the Albanian regions of Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar and Kicevo, the level of turnout was low (49.3 percent), way below the national average (63.4 percent). The relative shortfall in the electoral turnout of the Albanians has been in the region of 20 percent. This is the difference between the turnout in district six (49.3 percent), where Albanians number seven in ten, and that in a uniformly Macedonian district, district four (72.5 percent), where Macedonians account for 93 percent. Returning to the demographic issue, the lower electoral turnout of the Albanians suggests the proportion of Albanians in the population aged 18 or over and in the total population is higher than according to the results carried forward from the 2002 Census. By applying the differential turnout rate of 30 percent, the Albanian population would represent slightly more than 25 percent (probably around 27 percent) of the total population, instead of 21 percent. This paper attempts to provide a population estimate by ethnic groups as of October 2011, based on 2002 census and based on 2011 elections (see Table 16 in Annex). On these assumptions, in a total population of nearly 2 million inhabitants (2010), Albanians would number between 520,000 and 560,000 persons, i.e. between 26 percent and 28 percent of the population. The 2 or 3 extra percentage points compared with the 2002 Census result partly from a slight under enumeration in that census but mostly from recent natural increase, which is much higher than for the Macedonians. Between 2002 and 2010, the crude birth rate of Albanians was higher than that of Macedonians while their mortality rate was smaller, leading to a rate of natural increase higher. Around 30 percent of live births of 2010 are of Albanian origin. These figures partly explain the current size of Albanian population, in the absence of official census figures. Around half of the natural increase in the country is due to the Albanians, who represent some quarter of its population. However, this high growth has been weakened by constant migration of the population and falling fertility rates among ethnic Albanians as well. Plus, improvements in the educational system and increasing access to the employment market have led to convergence in the demographic trends. 39


IV. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS EFFECT ON GOVERNANCE An issue that until recently has escaped much of the attention is the implications of the demographic change to the governance and governance of the demographic and family policies. This is significant as it is the governance that plays an essential role in the democratic functioning of the states. This section specifically intends to investigate the degree to which the demographic change that occurred in Macedonia has affected the governance structures in the country. This section also intends to investigate the particular governance of ethnicities in Macedonia and how is the governance of the demographic and of the family policies in the country. IV.1. Demography and governance Institutions that shape public policies on health care, insurance, education, and economics have long been producers and consumers of demographic information (Murawiec et al., 2000). By contrast, the wealth of empirical observation, analysis, and prediction generated by demographers has not found its proper place in the thinking of some of its important potential consumers: governance communities. Governance studies, which could usefully integrate demographic considerations, have only sporadically paid attention. Demographic shifts are a cause, an effect, and a forerunner of government transformations. Their study should be one of the first steps in any form of governance reform. Providing venues for intersections of academic and professional tracks of the demographic and the governance communities is therefore important. We have to set general framework for understanding the governance relevance of particular demographic trends. Negligible population growth has increased reliance on technological solutions to problems. Increased urbanization throughout the region of Southeast Europe, including in Macedonia, makes urban issues more likely to dominate the public policy agenda; and ever-larger flows of migrants lead to potentially destabilizing forces in many cities of Macedonia. Low fertility has resulted in the slowing down of population growth and population aging in Macedonia. Economic and social change and failing health care system are key culprits. Economic turmoil has played a part, but the dire trends have been building for decades. The main governance concern for Macedonia is the declining size of the population and its effects on economic growth and management of the local economies. Coupled with economic problems that are likely to severely limit government modernization, population decline is weakening the Macedonian governance. Urbanization and a burgeoning youth population have contributed to resource shortages, unemployment, and unrest. Population size and composition are still an important consideration in national policy planning. The potentially disruptive urbanization is a governance issue that is yet to fully confront. Migration has had stabilizing effect by establishing a “safety valve” to defuse problems tied to urbanization. Also, change of ethnic composition in “sending” cities has in turn played the role of policy to contain ethnic conflict. IV.2. Ethnic governance: governance based on numbers The logic of numbers of the population underlies the Ohrid Agreement. Because the results of the 1994 Census had been rejected by the ethnic Albanians, the second largest ethnic group of the country after ethnic Macedonians, holding a new census became a condition for ending the conflict in the country. Initially set to be held in October 2001, later it was delayed for 40


November 2002. Political and administrative representation had to be closely modelled on demographic representation (Courbage, 2003). The Ohrid Framework Agreement established a hierarchy of ethnic groups according to their demographic importance, with the 20 percent threshold having force of law (Courbage, 2003). The Agreement on the use of minority languages as the country’s official languages, included provisions for altering the official languages of the country, with any language spoken by over 20 percent of the population becoming co-official with the Macedonian language at the state level (Ohrid Agreement 2001). Only Albanian language with an approximate use by 25 percent of the population fulfils this criterion. At the state level, this mainly applies to the use of Albanian language at the Parliament, in communication with the state level public administration and with courts, and in printing official gazette. With regards to courts, in criminal and civil judicial proceedings at any level, an accused person or any party has the right to translation at State expense of all proceedings as well as documents. With regards to official gazette, only laws published at Official Gazette are also published in Albanian language. Ethnic demographics were also taken into account, to sanction decentralization of the state. The Ohrid Agreement included provisions to devolve more powers to local jurisdictions such as management of schools, social and cultural institutions, collection of taxes. The development of local self-government when negotiating the Agreement was seen as essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities. A revised Law on Local Self-Government was adopted in 2002 that reinforced the powers of elected local officials and enlarged substantially their competencies. At the local level, any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population at a municipality became also an official language in the respective municipality. Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian may use any official language to communicate with the regional office of the central government with responsibility for that municipality; such an office replies in that language in addition to Macedonian. Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language other than Macedonian are also issued in that language, in addition to the Macedonian language. With respect to local selfgovernment, in municipalities where a community comprises at least 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the language of that community is used as an official language in addition to Macedonian. Currently, Albanian, Turkish, Serbian and Roma are used as coofficial languages at the municipal level besides the Macedonian. With respect to languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the local authorities decide on their use in public bodies. An important new provision of the ethnic governance of Macedonia is increased representation of minority representatives in the state administration. The new system includes laws that regulate employment in public administration to assure equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within such bodies. The new governance system requires from authorities to take action to correct imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities. Another important provision is the special parliamentary procedure or so called Badinter Majority, as it was proposed by the French Senator Robert Badinter during his visit to the country in 2001 on the request of the country’s authorities. The principle of Badinter majority, specific to Macedonia, is a decision-making mechanism institutionalised through the 41


“Badinter majority� or "double majority" voting. On the central level (Parliament), the double majority voting on matters concerning rights of minorities means that a proposal can be accepted only if a majority of all members of the Parliament votes for it, as well as a majority of the representatives of the ethnic minorities in the Parliament. This voting pattern has also been adopted as a rule in new municipal councils. This principle pertained that on the central level, certain Constitutional amendments and Laws cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. A further aspect of the new governance is education. With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction will continue to be provided in the students' native languages, and state funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia. To meet the growing demand for higher education of minority citizens, the University of Southeast Europe and State University of Tetovo were established in the town of Tetovo, an Albanian majority town, in the north-western part of the country. With above changes, demographic change has moved from being merely a political discussion to be main source of the new governance of the state and nation of Macedonia. IV.2.a. Ethnic democracy The new ethnic governance system of Macedonia addresses a number of the underlying reasons for the 2001 conflict. One of the more sensitive issues is the unequal representation of the different ethnic groups in public administration. Equitable representation is an important provision and this principle is applied in particular with respect to employment in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing for business development. In practice, however it mainly deals with the employment in state administration. The figures of 2001 showed that the representation level of Albanians in the state administration stood at 4 percent level. By 2010, following the affirmative actions taken for increasing the minority representation, the overall number of civil servants from the nonmajority ethnic communities reached 30 percent (EC, 2011), tripling the rate, however, falling short of required 36 percent, which is the percentage of minority communities living in the country. Although the 2001 conflict largely is being perceived as a conflict between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, the figures of minorities represented in overall number of population of the country show that unequal representation in public service is relevant for all ethnic minorities. Further inter-ethnic reconciliation through equitable representation, thus aiming to build a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, was further elaborated in strategy documents of the country that came to be adopted following the adoption of the Ohrid Accord. For example, the national security strategy of Macedonia titled as National Conception of Security and Defence and approved in June 2003, is an overarching document of the country’s strategic policies, 42


defines the development of multiculturalism as a vital interest of the country (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003). In the document, it is assumed that the development of multiculturalism is to contribute to the country’s security and stability, and to contribute to the establishment of necessary conditions for economic prosperity and individual well being. The same or similar sentences and provisions can be found in other strategic documents of the country. Macedonia has entered into the process of building and expanding the systemic mechanisms for the protection of the multicultural identity of the state itself, of its society and of its citizens. In that way, the multicultural identity of the country, reflected with the growing number of minority representatives being employed in the state administration, increasingly became to be known as the factor and source of the planning of state policies and began to influence the overall policies of the country. The multiculturalism and multiethnicity of Macedonia became more important particularly with the start of the perspective for Macedonia’s membership in the EU structures. The process of integration to EU, transformed the relationship of the political elite of Macedonia to multiculturalism as it became an important aspect for reaffirming the Macedonia’s prospects in EU. Without the EU this would not have happened. For instance, the Thessaloniki Summit declaration of June 2003 called for ensuring ethnic and religious coexistence, and conditioned the European perspective with the ethnic reconciliation and multiculturalism (Thessaloniki European Council, 2003). The European Council of December 2005, which decided on awarding a candidate status to Macedonia, highlighted that the decision to grant candidate country status to Macedonia is due to the 'substantial progress made in completing the legislative framework related to the Ohrid Framework Agreement' (European Council, 2005), which referred to the building of a multi-ethnic state. With this the EU underlined that the treatment of minorities or building a multiethnic character of the state is a key condition for the country’s entry into EU. Diversity and multiculturalism has always been there in Macedonia, but with the turn of the century, it has become a major characteristic of the country taking various dimensions at the state, society and at the citizens’ level. It has grown in depth and breadth and has gained strength as a characteristic in the country. Particularly, multiculturalism has been absent at the governance level, a gap that has been partially recovered with the equitable representation of minorities in the state administration. The equitable representation has emerged as a tool with regard to the involvement of minorities in decision-making. The right to participate fully, in accordance with the democratic decision-making procedures of each state, in political, economic, social, and cultural life, requires participation in decision-making at the national, regional, and local level. The essence of participation is involvement, both in terms of the opportunity to make substantive contributions to decision-making processes and in terms of the effect of those contributions. The efforts and changes undertaken in addressing the issue of inequitable representation of citizens from minority ethnic groups in public administration, the military, the police, judiciary and public enterprises, has served to the most direct and obvious political and security interest: providing legitimacy to state institutions which has been seen as major source of discrimination applied to the minorities in the country (Yusufi, 2007). Earlier examples of equitable representation occurred among others in Finland for Swedish speaking minorities; in Italy's autonomous region of South Tyrol of Italy for German speaking minority; then in Northern Ireland for both Protestants and Catholics. In these cases, these countries have ensured that opportunities exist for minorities to have an effective voice at 43


both central and local level of government. The related arrangements have included such as special representation of national minorities, for example, through a reserved number of seats in one or both chambers of parliament or in parliamentary committees; and other forms of guaranteed participation in the legislative process; formal or informal understandings for allocating to members of national minorities cabinet positions, seats on the supreme or constitutional court or lower courts, and positions on nominated advisory bodies or other high-level organs; mechanisms to ensure that minority interests are considered within relevant ministries, through, e.g., personnel addressing minority concerns; and special measures for minority participation in the civil service. Lijphart considers equitable representation as important part of decision making process (Lijphart, 1977). Steiner defines the ethnic representation as one in which "all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength" (Steiner, 1971). Ethnic equitable representation not only requires representation in decision-making process, but that there should also be proportional representation. Macedonian governments took action in the direction aiming to increase the rate of representation of minorities in the state administration by launching training programs that aimed to include minority representatives in the state administration. The recruitment and training of hundreds of police cadets belonging to minority groups was a key target. The country committed to ensure that police services would by 2004 generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia. As initial steps toward this end, 500 new police officers from communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia were hired and trained by July 2002, and these officers were deployed to the areas where such communities live. Additional 500 such officers were hired and trained by July 2003 and these officers were also deployed on a priority basis to the areas throughout Macedonia where such communities live. Despite the fact that recent figures of minority representation in the state administration are not yet equitably representing the overall composition of the country’s multiethnic structure, clear commitment of the governments in this regard has become critical ingredient of success as it has served as an overall driver of ethnic reconciliation and democratic consolidation. Special vacancy calls applying only to ethnic Albanians as well as to other minorities, established incentives that have compelled all ethnic communities to make policy choices that will put them on the road to overcoming hostile relations between ethnic minorities and majorities. Their employment in the public service has increased the confidence of minority populations toward the state institutions as their representatives have started to be seen in the driving seat in adopting and promoting state policies. This fact has reflected the smooth political transition of the country from conflict-ridden weak state, to functioning democratic polity. This has been most evident in the case of minority police cadets that ensured the return of the police to former crisis areas. The process of equitable representation illustrates how inclusion of ethnic minorities in the state administration has become an impetus for the interethnic harmony. This is a noteworthy example, where affirmative action was taken in including ethnic minorities in state apparatus. The uniqueness of Macedonia’s case is that its constitution and national laws provide opportunity for minority representation in the civil service at all levels, central and local, and it is not just limited to areas where the minority groups tend to be dominant, it applies to all the territory of the country.

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The processes of equitable representation have also given a stronger role to new social actors in the country consisted of civil society organisations and businesses, mainly run by minorities. They have had influence on the government, institutions and society in the formulation and operationalisation of the public policies that in turn have provided suitable environment for developing and promoting the multiculturalism in the country. These new social actors, with the changes undertaken, and with the knowledge and techniques that have been made available to them, have acquired greater access to the higher levels of public policy processes, which then has contributed to the diversity. In consequence, these new social actors have started to become unique multicultural elite of the country, capable of formulating, promoting and promulgating projects and policies that serve to the multicultural identity. The emergence and resurfacing of this new elite and its growing importance in recent years in the country have had powerful effects on the management of governance and social life and their transformation. Witness the example of Analytica, a minority think tank, which has grown to have influence over wide ranging policies in the country. These measures towards the development of multiculturalism, which have been also requirements of the EU in its conditionalities to Macedonia, have served to contain eventual opposing trends to the multiculturalism. In this context comes the significance of the state itself in defining and embedding the multiculturalism in the state and societal structures of the country as that is of great importance for the genesis of a new multicultural identity of the country. This situation underscores the importance of the framework of agent and principals, where the structure has an influence on the agents. In this context, the state as agent of principles (citizens) has to a great extent an influence in defining and shaping the framework of multiculturalism in Macedonia as a state and as a society. Public goods produced by the actions of the state administration that has the multicultural and multiethnic character and that reflect the multicultural realities of the society, have had decisive effect on the genesis of the multiculturalism in Macedonia. Integrating non-majority cadets into the police structures of Macedonia, as a multicultural process, has served for increasing confidence of the communities to the state structures that in turn enhanced the security and stability in different parts of the country. The same applies for the recruitment of members of the non-majority groups into the general public and state administration structures, in the army, and in other state organs, all of which serve the very purpose of increasing the stakes for the importance of protecting the multicultural identity of Macedonia. IV.2.b. The decentralization law An important provision of the new Macedonia's governance is decentralisation of the powers from central to local jurisdictions, a process which has become of major importance in the constitution of the country. Decentralisation is widely believed to reduce ethnic conflict in the world today (Brancati, 2006). Decentralisation is a system of government in which there is a vertical division of power among multiple levels of government that have independent decision-making power over at least one issue area. In most cases, decentralised systems of government have three different levels of government – a national level, a regional level, and a local level. In the case of Macedonia, there is two levels of government, that of national and local level. An independent decision-making power refers to a fact that these different levels of government can legislate on certain matters. The issues that local governments have control over mainly are related to areas that can be tailored to the specific needs of different geographic locales, such as education, social security, health, transportation, or police. Decentralisation is supposed to 45


meet the demands of various ethnic groups by giving them a majority stake in running local governments and in managing policy issues that are of major importance to the local population. This is one of the means to overcome what can be perceived as unfair treatment of minorities by the majority groups. A number of scholars have suggested that decentralisation increases ethnic conflict and that it is not a means for preventing conflicts. They suggest that decentralisation reinforces ethnic identities and that it discriminates against other regional minorities (Leff, 1999; Snyder et al., 1996). However, alternative explanation has been that decentralisation if managed well can diminish potential of ethnic conflict (Brancati, 2006). According to this view, the countries prone to experience ethnic conflict, are more likely to adopt decentralised system of government. Macedonia, which is a country with strong regional cleavages and ethnic communities in the country speak distinct languages and practice different religions, has decided to establish a decentralised system of government, albeit with reluctance due to fear that this process may lead to federalisation of the country or secessionism tendencies in part of the country. However, ethnicity issues have not been the only reasons for moving away from centralised government to decentralised forms of government. Regional development, local economic development, and better local planning have been other major reasons that have been source of Macedonia's decision for decentralised government. The development of local self-government is seen as essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting the role of minority communities in running of municipalities. A revised Law on Local Self-Government was adopted in 2002 that reinforced the powers of elected local officials and enlarged substantially their competencies. Enhanced competencies in the area relate principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care. A separate law on financing of local self-government was also adopted in 2004 to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local governments to fulfil all of their new responsibilities. The boundaries of municipalities were revised as well with the Law on Territorial Organisation of 2004. The decentralisation reform provides a variable to better understand its impact and the role of demographic change on it. Macedonia's different ethnic groups are concentrated in different parts of the country with number of towns being populated mainly by the ethnic groups that in the overall country's context represent minorities. In this context, decentralisation has been a tool providing possibility for the rule by the minority over itself in the places where the minority is majority. Macedonia has had a lengthy experience with decentralisation. During the existence of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the period of 1945-1991, there was a high level of decentralisation in the country. Following the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991, Macedonia started building its own decentralisation system, where the relationship between the central authorities and local governments were changed and competencies of the municipalities were limited. This post-communist transitional regime of local self-government was unsustainable due to serious deficiencies: namely, it did not provide democratically transparent and effective, economically sound and financially sustainable functioning of the municipalities. A large discrepancy existed between the assigned sources of financing of local 46


self-government units and their actual revenues. Secondly, there was a lack of competencies of the units of local self-government, especially in the sphere of local financing, economic development, and urban planning. Thirdly, there were also no conditions for part of the funding for units of local self-government originated from local taxes and fees and compensations, the rates of which would be determined by units of local self-government. With the adoption of the new reforms, local self-government units acquired new competencies, including significant economic and social sector responsibilities such as economic development, urban planning, communal activities, management and financing of primary and secondary education, social welfare facilities such as old-age homes and orphanages, and primary healthcare. With the new reforms, local units are authorised to award construction permits and they prepare their own economic development plans. Mayors and members of municipal councils acquired the right to administer thousands of elementary schools, hundreds of secondary schools, fifty or more kindergartens, and one hundred fifty or more primary healthcare facilities. Streets, parks, markets, and cemeteries have all become under the competencies of mayors. In the new system, the general competencies of local governments include, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the central principle of the European Charter of Local Self-government, the right to perform activities of local importance on their territory that are not excluded from their competency or are not under the competency of the organs of the state administration. The new competencies of the local jurisdictions were transferred to 85 “new� municipalities not more than 90 days after the local elections, held in March 2005 and the actual start of the first phase of decentralisation process was given on 1 July 2005. Previously (i.e., between 1991–2004), there were 123 municipalities, plus the City of Skopje as a special unit of local self-government. In total there were 124 units of local selfgovernment. This number was unsustainable. With the adoption of the new Law on Territorial Organisation of the Local Self-government on 11 August 2004, this number was decreased to 85 units of local self-government. In Macedonia, local self-governments are divided into three groups: city-municipalities; village-municipalities; municipalities in the City of Skopje, and the City of Skopje itself as a special unit of local self-government regulated by a special Law on the City of Skopje. In total, there are 85 units of local government (including the City of Skopje). The new system of decentralisation contains large sectoral and financial devolvement from the central government to local government units that is set to transform the system of local and central government relationships in the country. Besides above mentioned competences, municipalities receive a 3 percent share of the VAT and of the personal income tax. They have also been receivers of ear-marked and block grants to fund education, welfare, fire protection and cultural institutions and have been given responsibility for the collection of municipal taxes, including property taxes. Moreover, tens of thousands of posts have been transferred to the local level, including in the educational services, cultural institutions, kindergartens, fire fighting and protection units, public revenue offices and the regional offices of the Ministry of Transport and Communication responsible for the urban planning function. The salaries of the transferred posts are paid from the block grants given to municipal budgets. The transfer has also consisted of transfer of buildings, equipment, vehicles, debts, documentation and assets in the sectors that have undergone decentralisation.

47


The process has been driven by numerous political logics. It is expected that polarising tensions in some areas between citizens and the central government will decrease, if policymaking is moved to the community level, closer to the citizen. It is valuable not the least in cases where minority communities on the national level are in majority on the local level. Decentralisation increases contact and communication between policy makers and service users, and is intended to strengthen the accountability of elected local officials. Some policy is more effectively formulated on the local level as conditions vary across the country. All groups and parties have an interest in stronger local government, as it also strengthens the system of checks and balances in the country. But, what has been the centrality of demographic change logic in this reform process? How the demographic change has guided this reform at policy level? The commitment to decentralisation is backed by recent demographic changes. Decentralisation is all about supporting locally driven processes of societal change at various levels (political, institutional, social and economic). It touches on norms, values and rules for exercising power, on state-civil society relations and on vested interests, as well as institutions and the way those institutions operate. In this context, the demography has provided ground for new demands and policy proposals in order to reflect the new changes on the ground. Not all political interests in Macedonia were convinced of the value of the decentralisation process as set within the Ohrid document. Clear expression of the dissatisfaction was witnessed with the organisation of the referendum in November 2004 to prevent the continuation of the decentralisation project. The threat was overcome as the majority of voters accepted the government’s policy of decentralising power, including with the reorganisation of the municipal boundaries. Overcoming the challenge of the referendum was possible by strong domestic political support and international assistance complemented by the vision provided to the country in terms of its perspective for EU membership. Following this, the project of the decentralisation started to be realised through putting in place necessary constitutional and legal changes. Provided leadership and ownership by the Government to the process and EU policy and financial support, has proven to be sufficient in holding the momentum of reform and change.

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CONCLUSIONS Based on above analysis, in the new consociational democratic system, Macedonia is entitled to decisively break with the earlier excesses of its governance system and better reflect the new demographic structure of the country, at least at political level. The central government and local authorities are credited to deliver the public services with proper legitimacy. With the start of big demographic changes, the country entered into the process of serious change. The change witnessed at the governance level as a response to new demographics has brought new optimism first to the local residents, and secondly, to the country as a whole. Changes seen in the country, in principle, have shown the demographics as a driver of the change. Macedonia's different ethnic groups are concentrated in different parts of the country with number of towns being populated mainly by the ethnic groups that in the overall country's context represent minorities. In this context, the new ethnic governance established has been a tool providing possibility for the rule by the minority over itself in the places where the minority is majority and for more rights where they stand as minority. The demographics has guided this process through building necessary factual justification for new changes. This research report examined the demographic changes happening in Macedonia, their features, sources and implications, with a focus on the Southeast European country of Macedonia. The report devoted attention also to the ethnic demographics in the light of the country's multi-ethnic composition. Each section of the research report devoted separate study by focusing on new demography of Macedonia. The core argument of this research is that despite contrary expectations, there is convergence in Macedonia's demographics with other European countries where low fertility and ageing is among two major demographic tendencies. The report also argues that there is convergence in demographic features among different ethnicities in Macedonia and that more and more share the same destiny. In addition, the research argues that the demographic change has been major reference point for changes seen in Macedonia's governance. This concluding section provides summary of findings of this research report in light of the framework (see the Introduction) and brings out some of the general findings of this report. The stories in this research report highlight processes of the demographic change in the case of Macedonia, including ageing, low fertility, and migration. Macedonia has started to face all demographic challenges that Europe as a whole much earlier has started to undergo. Sources, features and consequences of the population change are three-dimensional framework that defines the Macedonia-demography relations and specifically the role of ethnic demographics in it. Population dynamics have provided for significant changes in the Macedonian polity, including in the pension governance and in ethnic governance. These provided a context to population change and also a means for understanding the role of demography in Macedonia's polity and governance. Cases examined had their different influence, but all of them formed part of the demographic change of Macedonia. The population tendencies have led to a new era in the country’s transition processes that are linked with the preparation of the country for converging with the overall demographic tendencies of the European continent. The demographic change proved

49


to be a mean necessary that encouraged the country to adopt real reforms towards new governance structures that will reflect the reality on the ground. The reform package that has been associated with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, has had cumulative effect in loosening the grip of the capital Skopje in the policy processes and balancing the power of the central and national institutions on the one hand, and the local jurisdictions on the other. In unitary, over-centralised state like that of Macedonia, the territorial transformation in the balance of political power, resources and relationships represents an important move towards good governance processes. The new reforms, including in the pension and ethnic governance, reinforced the capacities of the state to cope with the new challenges and demands. As the country started to experience new significant demographic tendencies, it was crucial the decision to set a stage for a shift in the country’s policy processes by undertaking governance reforms. With this agility of the country, a cycle of dependency was avoided and the risk of being unnecessarily protracted was alleviated. In the light of questions outlined at the beginning of this research report it is clear that Macedonia undergoes significant demographic change and that change in turn has had significant impact on Macedonian governance. Demographic concepts were important elements in understanding the changes, although they do not explain all the changes seen in Macedonia. In the country, the demographic changes triggered processes of transformation of the state and had substantial impact on policies of the country.

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ANNEX - NATA Table 1a - Mean age of the population in Macedonia, in some of countries and in EU27 (1960s, 1990s, 2000s) (ages measures in years). Countries 1960s 1990s 2002 2004 Albania 25.78 27.51 29.06 28.0 Bosnia 25.00 32.54 37.53 37.6 Macedonia 26.43 31.80 34.88 33.9 EU27 35 40 Sources: Hristov, 2004; Mamolo et al: 20; Eurostat. Table 1b - Mean age of the population in Macedonia (recent years). 2007 2008 2009 Macedonia 36.5 36.7 37.0 Sources: Statistical Yearbook of State Statistical Office, 2011.

Southeast European 2030 34.7 46.5 42.1 -

2050 36.6 51.6 44.3 -

2010 37.2

Table 2a – Total population in Macedonia, in some of Southeast European countries and in EU 27 (millions); years 2004, 2020, 2030, 2050. Countries 2004 2010 2020 2030 2050 Albania 3.1 3.8 4.1 4.9 Bosnia 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.3 Croatia 4.4 4.4 Macedonia 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2. 2.2 Montenegro 0.6 0.6 EU27 488 501 513 519 Sources: Mamolo et al: 20; EC, 2008:5; Eurostat. Table 2b – Total population in Macedonia; years 1921, 1931, 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994, 2002, 2010 1921 808,724 1931 949,958 1948 1,152,986 1953 1,304,514 1961 1,406,003 1971 1 647 308 1981 1,909,136 1991 2,033,964 1994 1,945,932 2002 2,022,547 2010 2,057,284 Sources: State Statistical Office; Statistical Yearbook of State Statistical Office, 2011. Table 3 – Old-age dependency ratio in Macedonia, in some of Southeast European countries and in EU27. Countries 2005 2009 Croatia 24.9 25.7 Macedonia 15.8 16.3 EU27 24.7 25.6 58


Sources: EC, 2008:5; Eurostat. Table 4 – Total fertility rate in Macedonia – children per woman. 1988 2.2 1989 2.1 1990 2.3 1991 2.1 1992 2.2 1994 2.2 1995 2.2 1996 2.1 1997 1.9 1998 1.9 2005 1.46 2006 1.46 2007 1.46 2008 1.47 2009 1.52 2010 1.55 Sources: Gapminder.org; CIA world factbook; Eurostat; Statistical Yearbook of State Statistical Office, 2011; Dragovic 2000. Table 5 – Life expectancy in Macedonia Countries 2006-2008 2007-2009 2008-2010 Macedonia 74.00 74.17 74.58 Sources: Gapminder.org; CIA world factbook; Statistical Yearbook of State Statistical Office, 2011. Table 6 – Absolute growth of population of Macedonia in the level of the regions in the period of 1994-2002 Regions 2002 Pelagonia -4.478 Vardar 2.056 Northeastern 8.946 Southwestern 8.690 Skopje 32.916 Southeast 2.935 Polog 23.773 Eastern 1.777 Sources: Parliament 2009; State Statistical Office - Censuses of 1994 and 2002 Table 7 - Density of population – 30 June 2008 Statistical regions Population Republic of Macedonia 2 046 898 Vardar 153 902 Eastern 180 260 Southwestern 222 142 Southeast 172 362

Density 79.6 38.1 51.0 66.5 62.9 59


Pelagonia 234 902 Polog 312 607 Northeastern 174 276 Skopje 596 447 Sources: Government 2010; SSO.

49.8 129.4 75.4 329.0

Table 8: Structure of population by age group (Status: 06.30.2008) Age groups in% Statistical regions 0-14 15-59 Republic of 17.5 65.8 Macedonia Vardar 15.8 66.0 Eastern 15.8 66.0 Southwest 18.0 67.2 Southeast 15.1 66.8 Pelagonia 15.4 63.8 Polog 20.0 67.8 Northeastern Region 19.0 65.3 Skopje 17.9 64.8 Sources: Government 2010; SSO

60+ 16.6 18.1 18.1 14.8 18.1 20.8 12.2 15.7 17.3

Table 9 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Socio-economic indicators by ethnic group, 1994 Macedonians Albanians Turks Urbanisation rate (%) 62.0 35.0 33.8 Labour force in the 9.0 11.8 13.8 primary sector (%) Women in labour 40.4 9.0 27.4 force (%) Unemployment rate 27.7 51.8 16.2 (%) Employed members 31.0 8.1 12.3 of labour force in total population of the group (%) Non-qualified and 28.7 47.8 54.1 semi-qualified persons in labour force (%) Illiteracy rate (%) Women 12.2 26.7 30.0 Men 4.0 10.1 12.5 Average duration of studies among persons attending school (years) Women 7.8 5.0 4.8 Men 9.2 7.2 6.8 Sources: Courbage 2003: 435; The 1994 Census of Population, Households, Dwellings and Agricultural Holdings in the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 1996; the Labour Force Survey, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2000.

60


Table 10 - Total fertility rates by ethnic group, simulation 1971-1996 (number of children per woman) 1971 1976 1981 1986 Macedonians 2.38 2.21 2.11 1.94 Albanians 5.12 4.28 3.61 3.25 Turks 4.08 3.71 3.33 3.25 Whole of 2.92 2.66 2.45 2.27 Macedonia Source: Courbage 2003: 439

1991 1.73 3.17 3.02 2.07

1996 1.73 3.09 3.01 2.06

Table 11 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Population size, 1971-1994, by ethnic group, from the censuses and estimates 1971 1981 1991 1994 Macedonians 1.142.375 1.279.323 1.328.187 1.401.389 Albanians 279.871 377.208 441.987 484.228 Turks 108.552 86.591 77.080 82.976 Roma 24.505 43.125 52.103 47.363 Others 92.005 122.889 134.107 90.708 Total 1.647.308 1.909.136 2.033.464 2.106.664 Source: Courbage 2003: 441. Table 12 - Women's Ethnicity and Number of Children Ever Born Age of Ethnicity mother MaceAlbanian Turkish Roma Vlach donian 15-19 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.05 20-24 0.55 0.51 0.82 1.33 0.28 25-29 1.33 1.62 1.75 2.24 1.06 30-34 1.75 2.52 2.40 2.63 1.42 35-39 1.92 3.15 2.74 3.15 1.70 40-44 1.98 3.63 3.12 3.55 1.80 45-49 2.07 4.10 3.55 4.01 1.88

Serbian

Other

0.04 0.59 1.24 1.70 1.92 2.03 2.07

0.09 0.6 1.42 1.81 2.03 2.46 3.05

Source: Dragovic 2000 Table 13 - Conflicting Census Figures for Macedonia: 1889-1905 ethnic group

Bulgarian

%

Serbian

%

Bulgarians

1,181,336 52.31

57,600

2.01

Serbians

700

0.03

2,048,320 71.35

Greek

%

332,162 19.26 0

0

Turkish

%

896,497 30.8 100,000

3.4

Greeks

228,702 10.13

201,140

7.01

652,795 37.85

307,000 10.6

Albanians

128,711

5.70

165,620

5.77

0

0

Turks

499,204 22.11

231,400

8.06

634,017 36.76

Other

219,571

9.72

166,540 13.86

Total

2,258,224

100

2,870,620

100

0

105,844

6.13

1,724,818

100

0

1,508,507 51.8 99,000

3.4

2,911,004 100

61


Source: Friedman Table 14 - Figures and percentages for declared nationality (narodnost) in all post-World War Two Censuses conducted in the Republic of Macedonia Census total by year, number, and percentage (rounded upward where necessary)

Source: Friedman. Table 15 - Difference between declared nationality and declared mother tongue for the six main languages of the Republic of Macedonia: 1953 and 1981 Declared Nationality Macedonians Albanians

Macedonian

Albanian Turkish

Serbo-Croat Romani

Vlah

853,971

1,986

281

934

277

2,565

2,152

153,502

6,569

181

70

1

27,087 143,615

534

70

10

Turks

32,392

Roms

1,040

860

2,066

25

16,456

1

Vlahs

137

4

2

14

0

8,130

Serbs

3,945

0

8

31,070

41

9

2,152

25

50

563

2

4

Other

322

341

569

5,258

173

31

Total

896,651

183,805 153,160

38,579

Muslim Yugoslav

Macedonians

17,089 10,751

1,276,878

190

160

547

316

1,218

374,181

3

440

1,697

Turks

16,608

8,592

60,768

366

94

Roms

4,160

1,697

808

24

36,399

Vlahs

1,111

1

0

3

2

Serbs

8,521

10

3

35,867

14

15,075

4,968

2,038

16,325

308

7,645

1,943

274

2,746

530

Albanians

Muslim Yugoslav

5,257 30

62


Other

13,282

4,247

2,853

17,031

1,280

Total

1,334,498

391,829

64,907

63,349

37,780

5,931

Source: Friedman. Table 16 - Comparison of the population of electoral age in 2011 and voting by ethnic group in the parliamentary elections of June 2011 Population of electoral age Votes cast – valid votes Number % Number % Macedonians 887.439 78.9 Albanians 236625 21.1 Total 1.821.122 100.0 1.124.064 100.0 Source: Courbage model applied to the elections of 2011. Table 17 – Scope and dynamics of the population in Macedonia as a whole and specifically in some of regions, year 1994 and 2002 Region Total population Change (growth) Growth Concentration fo of the population rates of the population (1994-2002) the (RM=100,0) population 1994 2002 Number % 19941994 2002 2002 Macedonia 1.945.932 2.022.547 76615 3.9 0.48 100.0 100.0 Pelagonia 242.614 238.136 -4478 -1.8 -0.23 12.5 11.8 Polog 281.982 304125 22143 7.9 0.95 14.5 15.0 Sources: Dimitrieva et al, 2010: 2; State Statistical Office, Census of the population, households, dwellings and agricultural holdings in the Republic of Macedonia, 1994, Book VI, Skopje, March 1997; Census of the population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002, Book IX, Skopje, May 2004. Tables 18 – Indicators about the natural movement and net migration in Macedonia as a whole and specifically in some of regions, 1994 and 2002 Macedonia Pelagonia Polog 1994 2002 1994 2002 1994 2002 Natural 15611 6288 721 -557 4160 1545 increase Natural 8.0 3.1 3.0 -2.3 14.8 5.1 increase on 1000 citizens Total 2.08 1.59 1.98 1.49 2.43 1.55 fertility rate (TFR) Natural 86647 126 23089 increase 1994-2002 Net -10063 -4604 -946 migration 63


1994-2002 Note: Without born and death persons from abroad Sources: Dimitrieva et al, 2010; State Statistical Offce of the Republic of Macedonia Table 19 - Changes in the functional age and gender contingents Region

Total population

Macedonia 1994 1.945.932 2002 2.022.547 Pelagonia 1994 242.614 2002 238.136 Polog 1994 281.982 2002 304.125 Pelagonia 1994 12.5 2002 11.8 Polog 1994 14.5 2002 15.0

Children on preschool age (0-6)

Children on school age (714)

Working Female population Old age On In optimal population population fertile reproductive 60 and (male: 15- age period (20- more 64 and (15years 34) female: 49) 15-59) Participation in the total population (in %)

Old population 65 and more years

Old population 80 and more years

11.2 8.8

13.7 12.3

64.2 66.0

25.7 25.9

11.5 11.2

13.1 15.0

8.5 10.6

1.3 1.3

8.5 7.3

12.0 10.6

63.7 64.4

23.9 24.3

10.2 10.0

18.8 20.2

12.7 15.1

2.2 2.0

13.4 10.5

16.2 61.0 26.4 13.1 10.6 15.6 64.4 27.0 12.1 11.3 Structure in % (Republic of Macedonia = 100.0)

6.9 7.8

1.1 0.9

9.5 9.8

10.9 10.1

12.4 11.5

11.6 11.1

11.1 10.5

17.9 15.8

18.6 16.8

21.0 17.7

17.4 18.0

17.1 19.0

13.7 14.7

14.9 15.7

16.5 16.3

11.8 11.3

11.8 11.1

12.7 10.3

Sources: Dimitrieva et al, 2010; State Statistical Offce of the Republic of Macedonia Table 20 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Aging of population in Macedonia Young up to Younger than 20 years of 40 years of age (%) age (%) Macedonia 2010 24.9 55.6 2020 21.4 50.3 2030 19.6 44.3 2040 18.0 40.4 2050 17.5 39.0 Source: (Dimitrieva et al, 2010: 7)

Old from 60 Ageing index and more years (%)

Rang

16.9 21.3 25.6 29.6 34.3

5 6 7 7 7

0.678 0.996 1.304 1.650 1.961

Table 21: Total population and population density by regions, Macedonia: 1994-2006 1994

2006

State/Regions

Total population

Density

Total population Density

Republic of Macedonia

1945932

75,7

2040228

79,3

64


Pelagonia

242614

51,4

236088

50,0

Vardar

131035

38,6

133184

39,3

Northeastern

163841

71,0

173982

75,3

Southwestern

212856

63,7

222385

66,6

Skopje

545228

301,1

590455

326,0

Southeast

168481

61,5

171972

62,8

Polog

280352

116,0

310178

128,4

Eastern

201525

48,1

201984

48,3

Sources: State Statistical Office; Government 2008 Table 22: Average age, the aging index and the stages of demographic aging, Macedonia: 1948-2006 Index of old Year Average age Stage of aging aging 1948 26,1 17,0 Demographic maturity 1953 25,9 17,0 Demographic maturity 1961 26,6 17,0 Demographic maturity 1971 27,8 20,0 Demographic maturity 1981 29,6 24,0 Demographic maturity 1994 32,8 39,0 Threshold of demographic aging 2000 34,2 46,0 Threshold of demographic aging 2006 36,2 58,1 Demographic aging Sources: State Statistical Office; Government 2008 Таble 23 – Total fertility rates according to regions, Macedonia: 1994-2006

State / Regions

1994 1996 2000

2006*

20102015* *

20152020* *

20202025* *

20452050* *

Republic of Macedonia 2,1 1,9 1,7 1,5 1,38 1,43 1,48 1,73 Pelagonia 2,0 1,7 1,6 1,5 Vardar 1,8 1,9 1,6 1,4 Northeastern 2,3 2,2 2,0 1,5 Southwestern 2,3 2,0 1,5 1,3 Skopje 2.0 1,9 1,7 1,6 Southeast 2,0 1,7 1,7 1,4 Polog 2,5 2,2 1,7 1,4 Eastern 1,8 1,6 1,5 1,3 Sources: Government 2008; SSO, Demographic statistics according to regions 1994-2004; SSO, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Macedonia, 2006; UN. 2006. World Population Prospects. the 2006 Revision.

65


Таble 24: Basic structure of population of Macedonia according to age brackets: 1971-2002 1971 1981 1994 2002 Total Total Total Total 0 - 14 years 32.5 29.1 24.9 21.1 15 - 64 years 58.4 61.4 61.9 63.9 65 – more years 5.8 6.7 8.5 10.6 Source: Statistical Yearbook 2011 Table 25: overview of natural change in population in Macedonia 1994 2002 Live births – total 33,487 27,761 Deaths – total 15,771 17 962 Natural increase – 17,716 9,799 total Live births per 1000 17.2 13.7 inhabitants Deaths per 1000 8.1 8.9 inhabitants Natural increase per 9.1 4.8 1000 inhabitants Source: Statistical Yearbook 2011

2010 24,296 19,113 5,183 11.8 9.3 2.5

Таble 26: Natural growth and rate of national growth of the population in Macedonia: 19942002 Region Republic of Macedonia Pelagonia Vardar Northeastern Southwestern Skopje Southeast

Indicator Natural growth Rate Natural growth Rate Natural growth Rate Natural growth Rate Natural growth Rate Natural growth Rate Natural growth Rate

1994

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

15772 8.1

6288 3.1

5783 2.9

5417 2.7

4076 2.0

3609 1.8

721 3.0

-557 -2.3

-480 -2.0

-553 -2.3

-557 -2.4

-512 -2.2

599 4.6

226 1.7

201 1.5

195 1.5

-12 -0.1

41 0.3

1376 8.4

752 4.4

722 4.2

693 4.0

410 2.4

365 2.1

2130 10.0

511 2.3

525 2.4

385 1.7

283 1.3

283 1.3

4600 8.4

3059 5.3

2634 4.5

2571 4.4

2576 4.4

2271 3.8

1289 7.7

532 3.1

532 3.1

484 2.8

221 1.3

179 1.0

66


Natural growth Rate Natural growth Eastern Rate Sources: Government 2008; SSO. Polog

4160 14.8

1544 5.1

1626 5.3

1594 5.2

1392 4.5

1191 3.8

897 4.5

221 1.1

23 0.1

48 0.2

-237 -1.2

-209 -1.0

Table 27 – Ratio between insured and pensioners in 2004-2007 in Macedonia Year Insured Pensioners Insured/Pensioners ratio 2004 348.212 260.075 1.3 2005 348.500 265.152 1.3 2006 377.763 269.681 1.4 2007 424.338 272.386 1.6 Source: Miladinov 2009 Table 28 – Educational attainment Macedonia Primary 53.2 Secondary 36.9 Higher 10.0 Source: Parliament 2009

Pelagonia 49.7 39.0 11.3

Skopje 39.8 45.5 14.8

Polog 73.8 21.2 5.0

Eastern 51.4 39.4 9.2

Table 29 – Regional GDP per capita from the average around the country (MK = 100) Pelagonia Vardar Northeastern Southwestern Skopje Southeast Polog Eastern GDP 97.2 103.6 49.9 63.9 167.0 91.9 46.4 73.3 per capita Source: Parliament 2009 Table 30 – Some indicators for total and natural movement characteristics in Macedonia and in the level of regions (NUTS 3) Macedonia Eastern Pelagonia 1994 1.945.932 180.081 242.614 2002 2.022.547 181.858 238.136 Average annual rates of growth of the population (1994/2002) 0.48 0.10 -0.23 Estimate of population 2006 2.041.941 180.791 235.861 Rate of natural increase (natural growth in 1000 people) 1994 8.1 4.7 3.0 2006 1.9 0.8 -2.0 Death of infants of 1000 people 1994 23.9 17.0 21.8 2006 11.5 8.9 8.2 Total fertility rate

of population and its Polog 280.352 304.125

Skopje 545.228 578.144

1.02

0.73

310.853

591.991

14.8 4.2

8.4 3.9

27.1 11.4

28.9 15.3

67


1994 2.1 1.8 2.0 2006 1.42 1.27 1.48 Expected living years in birth 1995 72.1 72.3 72.3 2005 73.4 73.7 73.7 Participation in % in total population (2006) Children (0- 18.9 16.2 16.3 14) Employable 67.6 69.2 66.0 contingent (15-64 men and 15-59 women) Old age 65 11.2 12.0 15.2 and more Old age dependency rate of the population (2006) Total 44.6 40.7 47.7 Youth 28.0 23.4 24.7 Old 16.6 17.3 23.0 Houeseholds Number 564.237 64.490 72.531 (2002) Rise (%) 12.4 7.8 3.5 2002/1994 Educational level of the population 15 years old and more (2002) Primary 53.2 51.4 49.7 Secondary 36.9 39.4 39.0 High 10.0 9.2 11.3 Sources: Parliament 2009; State Statistical Office

2.5 1.35

2.0 1.63

72.3 73.7

72.2 74.2

22.3

18.9

67.7

67.4

8.2

11.1

45.0 32.9 12.1

44.7 28.1 16.5

69.089

163.612

32.3

12.7

73.8 21.2 5.0

39.8 45.5 14.8

Model 1 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Aging of Population

Source: MAPAS Model 2 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Number of insured pensioners 68


Source: MAPAS. Model 3 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Aging of population in Macedonia

Source: MAPAS.

69

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