European Forum for Urban Security
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release – Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This guidebook maps out and assesses the strategies and plans of several European countries to prevent radicalisation through prison, probation and release with a special focus on the role of local authorities in this process, and also by identifying promising practices of reintegration and rehabilitation. It presents the state of the art in seven European countries, showcases nine innovative local pilot projects conducted by municipalities across Europe, and outlines the way forward to better equip local authorities to re-socialise offenders and prevent radicalisation in probation and release. Published by the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus), this document is the result of the “Preventing radicalisation through probation and release” (PREPARE) project, carried out between 2017 and 2019. It was written by Moritz Konradi (programme manager) and Maria Lozano (external expert) under the supervision of Elizabeth Johnston (executive director) and Carla Napolano (deputy director), and with the contribution of the project partners. The use and reproduction are royalty free and for non-commercial ends, on condition that the source be specified. Revision: Nathalie Bourgeois Proofreading: Heather Sutton and David Wile Layout: Marie Aumont Printing: Technicom, Boulogne Billancourt ISBN: 978 -2-913181-75-9 Legal deposit: november 2019 European Forum for Urban Security 10, rue des Montiboeufs 75020 Paris - France Tel: + 33 (0)1 40 64 49 00 email@example.com - www.efus.eu
This publication was funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020). It represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.
European Forum for Urban Security
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release – Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The PREPARE project was carried out thanks to the commitment and contribution of the partners and associate partners, who contributed with their expertise to the different components of the project and to the drafting of this handbook. We thank them for their generosity in sharing their knowledge and experience towards the success of the project. Moreover, we would like to thank all those who contributed to the numerous events, local pilot projects, meetings and discussions organised in the framework of the project. Their tireless work to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism and support the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders across Europe is a true wealth and inspiration. We would particularly like to mention the colleagues and practitioners at the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), who have invited the PREPARE project to present and discuss insights and results at several events and working group meetings – the discussions held on these occasions have had an important impact on this publication. Additional thanks are due to the European Commission and its financial support, without which this project and publication would not have been possible.
Project partners European Forum for Restorative Justice – EFRJ (Tim Chapman, Edit Törzs, Laura Hein) – Belgium; Denkzeit – Gesellschaft zur Förderung wissenschaftlicher begründeter Methoden psychosozialer Arbeit mit jungen Menschen e.V. (Johann Schabert, Harald Weilnböck) – Germany; Violence Prevention Network – VPN (Ariane Wolf, Julia Reinelt, Anja Rockel) – Germany; Fondation Agir Contre l’Exclusion – FACE (Wided Halaoua, Clément Devillers) – France; Stiftelsen Fryshuset (Robert Örell, Sigrun Sigurdsson) – Sweden; Gemeente Den Haag (Rob Geerds, Erwin Rouwenhorst) – Netherlands; Ayuntamiento de Málaga (María Dolores Aguilar del Pino, María Dolores Aurioles
Florido) – Spain; Departament de Justicia de la Generalitat de Catalunya – DJGC (Clara Casado Coronas, Sara Pilar Valdivieso Muñoz, Raquel Robalo Piriz) – Spain; Stad Vilvoorde (Hanna Ouled Slaoui, Nadia Belkus, Jessika Soors) – Belgium; Gemeente Rotterdam (Esther Kipp, Ineke Nierstrasz) – Netherlands; Commune de Clichy-sous-Bois (Sarah Guettai) – France.
Associated partners Confederation for European Probation (Anna Esquerrà Willem van der Brugge) – Belgium; Commune d’Avignon Rage, Sébastien Ruel) – France; Commune de Sarcelles Mahboubi, Farid Bounouar) – France, Kriminalvården Laitinen) – Sweden.
Roqueta, (Johanna (Hichem (Michael
Other contributors Maarten van de Donk (RadarAdvies/RAN, Netherlands), Torben Adams (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Federal State of Bremen, Germany), Lluís Paradell i Fernàndez (Intelligence and Counterterrorism Service, Catalan Police, Spain), Catrin Trautmann and Erich Marks (German Congress on Crime Prevention, Germany), Anna Rau (Deutsch-Europäisches Forum für Urbane Sicherheit, Germany), Guelcin Durmus and Ingo Siebert (State Commission against Violence, Federal State of Berlin, Germany), Andreas Schönstrom and Jonas Hult (City of Malmö, Sweden), Julio Andrade (International Training Centre for Authorities and Leaders, Málaga, Spain), Mona Frank (Prison and Probation Service, Sweden), Pierre Berenguer Porcedo (Association Accueil et Culture, France), Bartolomeo Conti (Centre d’étude des mouvements sociaux, EHESS, France), Magid Nasri (Centre Éducatif Fermé de Montfavet, France).
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level
Table of contents
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Foreword.........................................................................p. 8 Introduction.................................................................p. 11 Part 1: Prevention of violent radicalisation in probation and release in Europe â&#x20AC;&#x201C; State of the art .............................................................p. 33 1.1 Belgium.................................................................................. p. 34 1.2 France..................................................................................... p. 39 1.3 Germany................................................................................. p. 43 1.4 Netherlands............................................................................ p. 47 1.5 Spain....................................................................................... p. 50 1.6 Sweden................................................................................... p. 55 1.7 The United Kingdom.............................................................. p. 59
Part 2: New municipal prevention strategies – PREPARE’s pilot projects ..........................................p. 64 1.1 Avignon.................................................................................. p. 65 1.2 Clichy-sous-Bois..................................................................... p. 68 1.3 Government of Catalonia........................................................ p. 70 1.4 Málaga.................................................................................... p. 75 1.5 Rotterdam............................................................................... p. 79 1.6 Sarcelles.................................................................................. p. 83 1.7 Sollentuna / Kriminalvården.................................................. p. 86 1.8 The Hague.............................................................................. p. 89 1.9 Vilvoorde................................................................................ p. 92
Part 3: Supporting local authorities in preventing violent radicalisation in release and probation – Political reflections and recommendations .............p. 96
Conclusion ................................................................. p. 116 Resource Guide ......................................................... p. 120 Glossary ..................................................................... p. 134
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release – Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Polarisation, radicalisation and violent extremism are key concerns for urban security strategies in Europe today. Over the last few years, European local authorities have had to deal with a variety of extremisms that increasingly consider violence as a justified means to reach their political or religious aims and are a real threat to security and social cohesion across Europe. This topic has been particularly pressing in the face of two trends: firstly, the fact that from 2014 onwards, quite a number of European citizens left their country for civil war zones, such as Syria and Afghanistan, with the aim of joining terrorist groups, receiving paramilitary training or participating in the planning, preparation or perpetration of violent extremist crimes. While this trend seems to have become marginal and the number of terrorist attacks is currently declining in Europe, many of those who have left are now coming back, so the threat level remains high. Secondly, it is becoming increasingly obvious that far right violence and terrorism have been widely underestimated. Extreme right hate groups are increasingly organised and inclined to adhere to violent methods. Indeed, the number of arrests of extreme right offenders by law enforcement agencies across Europe is growing. Extremist and terrorist acts of all kinds – whether motivated by political ideologies such as right wing extremism or religious fundamentalism such as Jihadism – have a severe impact on citizens’ perception of security. They generate fear and mistrust and threaten to divide and polarise us. In consequence, the question of how we treat those who adhere to such ideologies and perpetrate violent acts is particularly charged: How can we work with extremist offenders and help them to disengage or even de-radicalise? How can we prevent them from reoffending? How can we support the re-socialisation and reintegration of extremist offenders into local communities? How can we protect the public from the risk of renewed attacks as a result of recidivism?
These questions are particularly pressing as significant numbers of violent extremist offenders who have served their prison sentence and individuals who may have been radicalised in prison, will be released from penitentiary facilities across Europe in the coming years. This poses a real challenge to criminal justice and law enforcement at all levels of government. In the face of these challenges, European local authorities have over the past years been increasingly mobilised to reinforce their urban security policies, particularly regarding the prevention of violent radicalisation, recidivism and re-offending. Many activities and initiatives in this field have been rolled out by local authorities across Europe. They are firmly rooted in the belief that repressive policies are not sufficient or efficient on their own and that only well balanced approaches combining prevention, sanction and social cohesion can lead to appropriate and effective solutions. This conviction has led local authorities to broaden their thinking on how to respond to violent extremism well beyond law enforcement and criminal justice. They are exploring measures of prevention in the context of prison, probation and release; they are enacting programmes that support offenders in disengaging from violence and radicalism and in distancing themselves from extremist belief systems; and they interrogate the potential rehabilitation and re-socialisation programmes may have for this specific target group. The PREPARE project has allowed a group of local authorities and specialist NGOs to work together on these issues for two years. Based on their exchanges and cooperation, they designed a number of local pilot projects that specifically worked with extremist offenders in prison and during probation as well as the local communities they will eventually reintegrate into. The results of these efforts are presented in this publication. The main objective of this guidebook is to help local authorities operationalise current and available expertise in PREPAREâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s field of action in terms of policy making and research at European, national and local level. It explores the state of the art of prevention policies in the context of probation and release from prison in Europe, presents innovative
local practices to disengage and reintegrate violent extremist offenders, and builds on the insights gained through PREPARE to propose guidance and a series of recommendations tailored for local authorities. With this publication, Efus hopes to provide a practical and powerful tool that can help local authorities to improve their strategies to counter violent extremism and reoffending, thus making our cities and regions safer for all.
Elizabeth Johnston Efus Executive Director
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PREPARE: linking radicalisation and re-offending The PREPARE project makes the link between two key issues that have been at the forefront of urban security and crime prevention policies in Europe for many years: the prevention of re-offending and recidivism on the one hand, and the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism on the other. Regarding the prevention of re-offending, Efus has long advocated for it to be considered a priority in urban security policies. Early on in its work on connecting municipalities across Europe and promoting exchanges among them on crime prevention policies, Efus recognised that the repetition of offences contributes significantly to European crime statistics and that the human and economic consequences of these crimes are a heavy burden for many EU member states. In their 2000 Naples Manifesto1, Efus members thus called for:
Setting up effective responses and sanctions that favour inclusion and reintegration (“Local authorities must implement programmes to prevent recidivism; these must be based (...) on social development and on conflict resolution through mediation and restoration by offenders”).
Prison detention to be considered a measure of last resort to which minimal recourse must be made (“Prisons are a limited resource; their use must be strictly limited and always justified by clearly defined imperatives (...). It is important to facilitate access to prisons to social services and services providing training, education and employment”).
The concerted development of alternative community services (“Local authorities must be involved in developing alternative 1. Efus, Security, Democracy and Cities - The Naples Manifesto, 2000.
community service and other sanction which can reduce recourse to detention in prison”). Following this path, Efus consequently conducted two European cooperation projects on this topic: Innovative Strategies to Prevent ReOffending (SIPREV, 2008 – 2009) and Training Local Stakeholders on the Prevention of Re-Offending (FALPREV 2010 – 2012), which, among others, implemented local pilot activities and produced a handbook2 with a set of dedicated policy recommendations as well as a training toolkit for local stakeholders3. Regarding radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism, which is a more recent topic in European security policies at large, Efus equally has a long track record and helped to define the role local authorities play in responding to and notably preventing related crimes and other risks to urban security and social cohesion. A first landmark claim, included in Efus’ 2006 Saragossa Manifesto4, focuses on the need for balanced responses to terrorism, stating that “any response favouring discriminatory actions, designating scapegoats or encouraging aggressive, racist attitudes is to be banned,” as terrorism tries to exploit the social and cultural inequalities that such responses would reinforce. In 2006 to 2007, Efus coordinated a first European cooperation project on the topic: Cities Against Terrorism (CAT). The project handbook is the first practical guide for local authorities on this subject, delineating the role they can play in counter-terrorism policies, focusing on prevention and communication, crisis management, intercommunity dialogue and victim support5. Starting in 2014, when phenomena of radicalisation leading to violent extremism had become more present in European cities and the risk of terrorist attacks had intensified, Efus embarked on its Local Authorities Against Violent Extremism (LIAISE) projects. LIAISE 1 (20142016) and 2 (2017-2018) mobilised more than 30 partners – local authorities, NGOs and research institutions – who worked together to 2. Efus, Innovative Strategies for the Prevention of Re-offending. Practices and Recommendations for Local Players, 2009. 3. Efus, Prevention of re-offending. A training toolkit for local stakeholders, 2012. 4. Efus, Security, Democracy and Cities - The Saragossa Manifesto, 2006. 5. Efus, Cities Against Terrorism. Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism, 2007.
clarify and reinforce the potential of local prevention initiatives, identifying local multi-agency partnerships, family support, resilience-building, de-radicalisation and disengagement, and counter-narratives as key topics for cities to work on. They rolled out local pilot prevention projects across Europe, assembled a database of promising practice examples, and produced two handbooks with methodological guidance on how to design effective local prevention policies6. This practical work was accompanied by a series of political resolutions adopted by Efus’ executive committee, which further promoted the productive and much needed involvement of cities in European prevention policies and helped to put the topic at the heart of the European security agenda7. The manifestos published by Efus in the following years all include dedicated sections on these topics, providing further guidance and recommendations8. This pioneering work implemented by Efus’ members gave rise to a series of projects on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism, which further develop and promote the impact local authorities can have with regard to specialised prevention approaches, such as “Local Voices” (2018-2019) and Local Young Leaders for Inclusion (LouD, 2019-2020), which work with youngsters to promote alternative narratives and build resilience, or the project Building Resilience to Reduce Polarisation and Growing Extremism (BRIDGE, 2019-2020), which develops a methodology to monitor and mitigate polarisation at the local level. The project “Preventing Radicalisation Through Probation and Release” (PREPARE, 2017-2019) is equally part of this wave of follow-up projects. It supports cities in promoting prevention strategies in the judicial system and developing initiatives to support the disengagement and de-radicalisation of violent extremist offenders as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration into local communities. It thus raised a set of very timely and intensely debated questions: 6. Efus, Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level, 2016 and Efus, Prevention of Radicalisation leading to Violent Extremism - Methodological Guide for the Development of a Local Strategy, 2017. 7. See Aarhus declaration,2015, the Rotterdam declaration, 2016 and the Nice declaration, 2017. 8. Efus, Security, Democracy and Cities. The Manifesto of Aubervilliers and Saint-Denis, 2012, and Efus, Security, Democracy and Cities. Co-producing Urban Security Policies, 2017.
How can extremist offenders profit from alternative measures to imprisonment? How can they be accompanied towards their rehabilitation and reintegration into local communities? What kind of targeted probation programmes, disengagement and de-radicalisation measures or Exit schemes can support them in this regard?
How can prisons and probation programmes, rather than being “hotbeds” or “incubators” for radicalisation, develop their potentially positive impact on prevention, disengagement and de-radicalisation?
How can local authorities play out their potential as key prevention stakeholders in this subject area, given that the judicial system, detention facilities and probation schemes are often run by regional or national levels of government? Given the high public interest in radicalisation and terrorism, the high risk level and security needs of the Member States, and not least the fears of terrorist attacks among the European public, these questions needed to be tackled with particular caution.
Preventing radicalisation in probation and release and re-integrating violent extremist offenders – a priority within the EU security strategy The EU has clearly defined radicalisation and violent extremism leading to violence and terrorism as one of the key challenges for its internal security. In its internal security strategy, it is stated that “Terrorism, in any form, has an absolute disregard for human life and democratic values. Its global reach, its devastating consequences, its ability to recruit through radicalisation and dissemination of propaganda over the Internet and the different means by which it is financed make terrorism a significant and ever-evolving threat to our security.”9 When the EU revised this strategy for the period 2015-2020, this prioritisation became even more pressing. The first priority of the
9. European Union, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model, 2010, p. 13.
strategy is phrased as follows: “Tackling and preventing terrorism, radicalisation to terrorism and recruitment as well as financing related to terrorism, with special attention to the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, reinforced border security through systematic and coordinated checks against the relevant databases based on risk assessment as well as integrating the internal and external aspects of the fight against terrorism.”10 In its 2015 communication regarding the renewed security strategy, the European Commission once more was careful to point out this high risk level and resulting security priority: “Terrorist attacks in Europe – most recently in Paris, Copenhagen, Brussels – have highlighted the need for a strong EU response to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters. European citizens continue to join terrorist groups in conflict zones, acquiring training and posing a potential threat to European internal security on their return. While this issue is not new, the scale and the flow of fighters to ongoing conflicts, in particular in Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as the networked nature of these conflicts, are unprecedented.”11 Also in 2015, the Council of the European Union adopted a conclusions document aimed at enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. It urges all relevant stakeholders to implement the appropriate actions whenever and wherever possible and stresses the essential role of local actors. It outlines key actions in seven areas: (1) structure and organisation of detention regimes, (2) alternative or additional measures to prosecution and/or detention, (3) integration, rehabilitation and reintegration, (4) training, (5) learning from monitoring and exchange of practices, (6) funding, (7) external dimension. Moreover, and in the face of continuously growing challenges which resulted in a need for comprehensive prevention policies, the European Commission set up a High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radi10. Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020, 2015. 11. European Union, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region. The European Agenda on Security, 2015, p. 12.
calisation (HLCEG-R) in 2017. In its final report12, this group stated that challenges require multifaceted responses to which all relevant actors at local, regional, national, European and international levels should contribute “with policies aimed at preventing and countering radicalisation whilst complementing other measures as part of a more comprehensive approach to counter terrorism.” One of the key policy areas in which preventative measures must be further developed and cooperation intensified is Prison and probation, rehabilitation and reintegration. Regarding this field, the group developed a set of policy recommendations, among which:
“To map existing practices to prevent and counter radicalisation in the prison and probation context (...) as well as more broadly practices supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners into society.”
“To facilitate the sharing of existing, and encourage further research (including evaluations) into different prison regimes and pathways into and out of radicalisation in prison.”
“To further interrogate “the use of alternatives to prosecution and detention in particular by the improved provision of information and to explore ways of following up on findings.” Finally, these policy priorities led to the awarding of “action grants to support national or transnational projects regarding the criminal justice response to prevent radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism”13 for European cooperation projects on:
The preparation of release, and programmes during probation or post-release, to promote reintegration of individuals at risk of radicalisation or willing to disengage.
The development of a multi-agency approach for the efficient implementation and follow-up of de-radicalisation / disengagement / rehabilitation programmes. 12. European Union, High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report, 2018. 13. European Union funding & tender opportunities (the Single Electronic Data Interchange Area), 2016, Action grants to support national or transnational projects regarding the criminal justice response to prevent radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism.
This is where the PREPARE project links to the EU Security Strategy and introduces local authorities as a strong group of relevant stakeholders that can help promote targeted policies in the context of probation and release, involving strong local networks of actors promoting crime prevention and urban security.
Priorities of European PREVENT work for prison, probation and release – developing approaches and guidelines As shown, the phenomenon of radicalisation leading to violence and terrorism has taken up an increasingly prominent place in EU security policy documents. At the same time, numerous publications, guidelines and handbooks have been delivered by the European Union – in particular through the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) practitioners’ platform – as well as by other relevant international fora, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (CGTF)14. As the phenomenon of radicalisation and violent extremism in Europe evolves, these organisations are now dealing with issues that did not exist a few years ago. Indeed, whereas in the past they were focused on preventing European nationals from leaving their country to join war theatres in Syria and Iraq, now, with the defeat of Daesh, their priorities have switched15. There is now an increasing number of returnees, i.e. foreign fighters returning to their European country of origin, who will likely be prosecuted and imprisoned. Furthermore, there is also a rising number of homegrown terrorists serving a sentence in an EU Member State. In light of this, European countries are stepping up their efforts to deliver proper de-radicalisation and re-socialisation approaches in prison, during probation and upon release. Indeed, prisons appear as breeding grounds for radicalisation and recruitment processes, but they are also considered a suitable environ14. Refer to the Resource Guide included in this publication for further information. 15. See, for example, RAN, High-Level Conference on child returnees and released prisoners (Ex Post Paper), 2018.
ment to initiate programmes.
Similarly, such programmes can also be rolled out in probation, as recommended by European institutions and other international platforms such as the Confederation of European Probation (CEP) and the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)16, but further development and research in some Member States is required for that approach to be generalised. Furthermore, it seems crucial to identify how to properly ensure these former violent extremist offenders (VEOs) reintegrate into society and are rehabilitated; how to deliver effective measures to prevent recidivism, and how to prevent the radicalisation of other individuals and/or family members. All these policies will require Member States to deliver a properly balanced approach between repressive and preventative measures. We can identify several guiding principles and action lines generally accepted by European institutions and international fora, others that require further debate and development within the national strategies of Member States and yet others that are specific to European local authorities, depending on their needs and the trends at play locally. Primarily, the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Dynamic Securityâ&#x20AC;?17 concept put forward by the Council of Europe in their topical guidelines18 and accepted by other European and international fora is based on a new conception of the relationship between prison and probation staff and VEOs, which should be based on ethics and aimed at the VEOs complete rehabilitation and reintegration. 16. See, for example, RAN, RAN P&P and CEP (Confederation of European Probation) (Ex Post Paper), 2017. 17. Dynamic security is a concept and a working method whereby staff prioritise the creation and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release. This concept should be understood within a broader notion of security, which also comprises structural, organisational and static security (walls, barriers, locks, lighting and equipment used to restrain prisoners when necessary). Council of Europe, Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, 2016. 18. Council of Europe, Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, 2016.
This approach is also included in several documents and handbooks published by a number of organisations such as RAN and UNODC. It entails the adoption of several lines of action.
Alternative measures to imprisonment The use of alternative measures to imprisonment for VEOs or suspects charged with terrorist crimes is uncommon in a majority of Member States because of the social alarm these would cause. In any case, this trend is gradually evolving into a more comprehensive approach in line with national and regional strategies to prevent and fight violent extremism and radicalisation, including â&#x20AC;&#x153;softâ&#x20AC;? measures and approaches that could directly contribute to the success of any disengagement or de-radicalisation programme conducive to final rehabilitation. The widespread view among the vast majority of international fora is that there needs to be a balance between hard and soft measures in order to deal with the phenomenon. Recalling the principle that prison shall be used as a last resort and sentences be as short as possible to reduce costs and increase chances for rehabilitation19, it seems necessary to identify the proper measures and sanctions to impose, and to avoid imprisonment whenever possible because it may be conducive to further radicalisation processes. The use of alternative measures should involve cooperation with other agencies and be based on experience gained in other, adjacent fields. This is particularly important when dealing with young VEOs.
Rehabilitation must begin in prison All measures, programmes and actions aimed at reintegrating and rehabilitating radicalised individuals must begin in prison. Although prisons can be a breeding ground for radicalising other inmates, they can also provide an opportunity to work on disengage19. See, for example, EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Criminal detention and alternatives: fundamental rights aspects in EU cross-border transfers, 2016.
ment and de-radicalisation as a first step to be continued upon the offender’s release, with proper support and after-care measures.
Good management and good prison conditions It is widely agreed that good prison management and proper prison conditions will effectively contribute to the success of these rehabilitation programmes, notably because they prevent inmates from feeling discriminated against or like victims of inequality, which could reinforce the “us against them” thinking that feeds into radical narratives.
Strategy: defining measurable objectives The design of the strategies must include a concrete definition of the objectives in the short and long term. These, in turn, should be identified in a realistic way and linked to specific and different steps along the disengagement (behavioural change) and de-radicalisation (cognitive shift) processes.
Risk assessment and needs assessment The “risk assessment” concept has inspired widespread discussions and research because of the multiple consequences it entails for security and social arenas, and of its role as a determining factor in the design and implementation of comprehensive treatments for VEOs in prison, during probation and upon release. Multiple instruments and tools have been developed recently by different governments and organisations, most of them focused on assessing the threats that these inmates can pose, the risk of seeing other inmates radicalising, the risk of recidivism, etc. The need to develop a special individual needs assessment is generally accepted as key for rehabilitation and reintegration processes. It is generally considered that this contributes to the success of rehabilitation programmes and is instrumental when designing individual support and after-care measures during probation or upon release,
while also taking into account an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s specific radicalisation drivers.
Monitoring and evaluation It is essential to monitor and evaluate these processes, in particular when dealing with short-term evaluations and expected results. The Radicalisation Awareness Network and the Council of Europe recommend the use of voluntary peer reviews of exit, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, and there is increased investment in research into these tools as well as on the mapping of good practices. In general terms, this remains a pending subject for most Member States.
Re-socialisation and rehabilitation It is generally accepted that re-socialisation processes must begin in prison or during probation. For this to happen, the prison conditions, management and environment must be adequate so that both inmates and probationers feel they are in a â&#x20AC;&#x153;safe spaceâ&#x20AC;?. The design of ad hoc re-socialisation programmes must be based on the results obtained through risk assessment tools as well as on the research on needs and resilience. This will ensure a well-balanced approach combining security and social measures can be provided. The transition process to the outside is equally sensitive and crucial and all the practitioners involved at the start of this process should remain so once the offender is outside. A relationship of trust among all stakeholders involved with the former VEO and their family and community is a prerequisite to achieving the desired results.
Multi-agency approach Reintegration requires a holistic approach and therefore multi-agency cooperation is key throughout the process, in prison, during probation and upon release.
Meeting the different needs and challenges arising during the process requires coordination and cooperation amongst the various professionals and stakeholders involved, whether local communities, education and welfare, police, social and healthcare systems, religious authorities, etc. Prison and probation authorities should therefore envisage involving other actors when necessary and possible. For such cooperation to work, it is necessary to set up arrangements and protocols with shared objectives, concepts and tools and clearly distribute responsibilities and roles among the relevant practitioners.
Training Specialised trainers need to be involved throughout the process and the consensus is that they should be provided with adequate training and capacity-building programmes in order to perform their daily tasks. Training programmes for prison and probation staff should cover radicalisation processes, indicators of violent extremism and dealing with VEOs. Other practitioners involved in the process in prison, during probation or upon release â&#x20AC;&#x201C; social workers, psychologists, educators or religious leaders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; must also receive specialised training. Furthermore, the sharing of good practices, handbooks and tools can inspire other institutions and agencies when designing their own training modules.
These general lines of action, retrieved from key policy documents at European and international levels, were key in inspiring the activities of the PREPARE project. During the project, they were reworked to meet the needs of local authorities, and finally transformed and elaborated into the recommendations presented in part 3 of this publication.
Defining the role of local authorities in preventing radicalisation during probation and release and rehabilitating extremist offenders It is generally agreed that local authorities have an important role to play in preventing and countering violent extremism because they are the level of governance closest to citizens and are capable of delivering local prevention policies and strategies20. The continuous work on defining and sketching out the details of this role implemented by Efus and other networks â&#x20AC;&#x201C; such as RAN, the Alliance of European Cities against Extremism, the Strong Cities Network and Nordic Safe Cities â&#x20AC;&#x201C; has identified priority areas in which local authorities can be particularly impactful. Among these are: identifying local multi-agency partnerships, family support, resilience-building, de-radicalisation and disengagement, and counter- or alternative narratives21. There are guidebooks with methodological advice on how to establish multiagency cooperation at the local level, stressing the need to integrate this work in the larger violence and crime prevention strategy of the city or region, and laying out concrete steps that can help in forming and consolidating a strong local prevention network22. A local authorityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s approach to prevention work in the context of probation and release, and with regards to the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders has not been systematically sketched out yet. Whether focused on de-radicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation or resettlement, such programmes require multiagency coordination in order to maximise the chances for radicalised individuals to reintegrate into society and to minimise the risk of re-offending. Some EU countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, have recognised the key role of cities as
20. See, among others, European Union, High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report, 2018 and European Union, Fact Sheet. A Europe that Protects. EU Cities against Radicalisation, 2019. 21. See Efus, Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level, 2016. 22. See Efus, Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism - Methodological Guide for the Development of a Local Strategy, 2017, which identifies political mobilisation, the securing of a partnership, trainings for local stakeholders, shared local diagnostics, communication, design and evaluation of local projects as key steps. See also RAN, Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles (Policy Paper), 2016.
coordinators of all relevant stakeholders within such multi-agency programmes23. However, although multi-agency cooperation around radicalised offenders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; whether in release or in probation â&#x20AC;&#x201C; has already been highlighted as a key policy principle to be taken into account when designing tertiary prevention initiatives, it is also often identified as one of the main challenges to overcome24. Indeed, these concerns are heightened now with the ever more pressing issue of how to deal with radicalised offenders who are now about to be released, both in prison to prepare their resettlement and outside once released. To a great extent, this concern presents clear local components given that ultimately, released inmates will return to their home city or town. This makes the need for a multi-agency approach, in which local authorities must be involved, even more pressing. Regarding their role in the prevention of radicalisation in prison and through probation and release, several lines of action can be identified:
Supporting the establishment of local multi-agency strategies As mentioned above, a multi-agency approach requires local safety partnerships. Local authorities are well placed to identify and encourage such partnerships and provide adequate training to the different agencies and professionals involved, whether first-line practitioners, prison and probation staff, educators, social workers, etc. Such training should be aimed at strengthening their capacity to identify and manage violent extremism processes and the available resources and tools to deal with them. In the same way, multi-agency strategies and their structures must be set up according to local needs and the specific types and processes of violent extremism at play locally, as well as the local target audiences. These can be prevention programmes focused on the wider public,
23. RAN, Prison and Probation Working Group Meeting - Multi-agency cooperation (Ex Post Paper), 2016. 24. RAN, EXIT Working Group, Minimum methodological requirements for exit interventions (Ex Post Paper), 2016; Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Member States meeting within the Council on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism, 2015.
specific actions with radicalised individuals to counter violent extremism, or collaboration in re-socialisation programmes during probation or upon release. In some cases, the actors involved in these processes ignore the existence of these structures and their benefits. Additional efforts must thus be made to raise awareness among these stakeholders on the availability of such resources. It is also sometimes appropriate to raise awareness among local authorities themselves about existing structures and good practices.
Community-based organisations There are numerous benefits to be gained from involving different stakeholders during the exit processes, notably community and local actors. Indeed, it is necessary to establish a relationship of trust with the families in order to assess their needs and gather relevant information about radicalisation processes. Civil society organisations and community-based organisations (including religious leaders) are well placed to consolidate such bonds and identify proper “credible voices” to support some of these actions. This involvement should always be led by the local authority and should be included in the local strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism, taking into account the local authority’s needs, the existing structures from adjacent fields, the local organisations’ experience and expertise, relationships with the local communities, etc. The collaboration between local civil society organisations and actors and the local authority should encompass the whole process from the assessment of local needs to the design of the local strategy and its implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The objective is that civil society organisations be involved throughout and present at all stages. Furthermore, support from the local authority to these local organisations and their prevent or exit programmes should also be envisaged, in particular by facilitating their access to funding or by setting aside a specific budget. In the same way, these local actors should be provided
with tailored training modules so as to encourage their collaboration with local and security services.
Re-socialisation programmes Specific protocols for sharing sensible and relevant information must be set up by local authorities to stimulate the collaboration of all involved actors when monitoring former VEOs upon their release and during probation, always with due respect to privacy and data protection. The role of community services in dealing with the material needs of former inmatesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; families (employment, housing, schooling) must also be taken into account during these processes. Reintegration programmes that involve community services, local actors and NGOs must be designed, monitored and constantly evaluated depending on how the beneficiaries (i.e. the former VEOs) evolve and what their needs are. It is in this area that local authorities can play a particularly relevant role due to existing local structures from adjacent fields that could benefit from and improve rehabilitation programmes.
Communication The presence of former VEOs can create or exacerbate social and political tensions in local communities and lead to polarisation. When this happens, the local authority should reassure the local population through targeted communication and specific policies to address their concerns. They should also challenge possible stigmatisation processes.
Based on these basic action lines, the PREPARE project has further explored the opportunities of local authoritiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; involvement in targeted prevention approaches. A set of recommendations has been developed, which include the following sub-topics: 1. The need to adopt a cross-extremisms approach and learn from adjacent fields
2. Setting up a local multi-agency strategy to deal with VEOs 3. Ensure continuity between prison, probation and release 4. Fostering risk assessment capacities 5. Training, and again training 6. Providing exit work 7. Focusing on reintegration 8. Strengthening cooperation with civil society 9. Cooperating on local, national, European and international levels 10. Dealing locally with returnee foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) 11. Local communication strategies around VEOs 12. Strengthening alternative measures to imprisonment All these sub-fields have been identified by the PREPARE partners, local authorities and NGOs who work at the local level and have developed innovative prevention practices in the framework of the project. Topical recommendations regarding these subtopics are further developed in part 3 of this guidebook.
PREPARE’s aims, methods and actions The PREPARE project has sought to respond to these challenges and needs and has evolved around the following four specific objectives:
To bring together European local authorities willing to address radicalisation through release and probation.
To develop state-of-the-art multi-agency disengagement and rehabilitation programmes in release and probation that involve local authorities.
To identify the needs in this field in order to draw up tailored recommendations on the development of multi-agency initiatives in release and probation.
To strengthen local authorities’ capacities on multi-agency tertiary prevention of radicalisation in release and probation.
PREPARE’s methodology and activities have proceeded in four stages:
Establishing the state of the art An initial research stage was undertaken by Efus and the partner organisations on the policies and strategies different EU Member States apply to prevent radicalisation in the context of probation and release and with regard to disengagement and rehabilitation of extremist offenders. This first phase has allowed for the identification of the different forms in which local authorities are involved in strategies to work with released inmates or individuals on probation throughout Europe, as well as the identification of the main challenges and topics to be addressed during the project meetings that will follow. A specific questionnaire was designed and filled in by the PREPARE partner local authorities, which interrogated the existing practices and initiatives related to the project topic, as well as the needs and resources available for future activities. PREPARE’s NGO and expert partners conducted research into the national strategies to prevent radicalisation in the context or probation and release in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The articles on the state of the art resulting from this research are available online via Efus website www.efus.eu, and short versions have been included in section 2 of this handbook.
European exchange via project meetings Based on the results of the research into the state of the art and the common thematic areas of interest identified with local authorities and experts, four project meetings were organised throughout the project.
1st coordination meeting: Paris (FR), 22 November 2017 2nd coordination meeting: Malmö (SE), 15-16 March 2018 3rd coordination meeting: Málaga (ES), 29-30 November 2018 4th coordination meeting: Avignon (FR), 27-28 June 2019 28
These events were an opportunity for discussions among partners, lectures from external experts and field visits. They allowed partner cities and experts to exchange and learn from concrete experiences related to PREPARE’s thematic field. The partner local authorities updated the rest of the consortium on the development of their local activities, benefitted from direct face-to-face inputs from experts and learned from other local experiences through study visits on the ground organised in partnership with host local authorities.
Technical assistance and local activities In parallel with the project meetings, local authorities were able to mobilise experts who have assisted them in the development of activities in the field of disengagement and rehabilitation in release and probation scenarios. Assistance consisted of face-to-face meetings, field visits or online contact. Efus acted as an intermediary between partner organisations or external experts and the recipient local authorities. For this third phase of the project, the following teams were built between local authorities and NGO / expert partners, which have worked on the below mentioned topics:
Avignon – FACE: Risk-assessment for extremist offenders Catalonia – Violence Prevention Network: Multi-agency partnership in case management
Clichy-sous-Bois – Efus: Training on disengagement and de-radicalisation for frontline practitioners
Málaga – Denkzeit: Training municipal front-line workers in exit strategies
Rotterdam – Fryshuset / Exit Sweden: Case management in probation and release
Sarcelles – Efus: Reintegration of young offenders Sollentuna/Kriminalvården – Fryshuset / Exit Sweden: Case management in probation and exit work
The Hague – European Forum for Restorative Justice: Learning from the Northern Irish probation regime
Vilvoorde – Fryshuset / Exit Sweden: Case management and working with “formers” Like the rest of the activities, this third phase of the project was a tailored one, meaning that the content of the technical assistance and subsequently developed local activities were defined according to the specific context of each partner regarding issues of radicalisation and violent extremism, their specific needs and the activities and partnerships they had already developed to prevent radicalisation or de-radicalise. Regular contact between Efus and partner local authorities guaranteed a bespoke needs assessment before mobilising the required expertise and resources.
Dissemination While key results of the project were disseminated throughout the project cycle, such as the state of the art articles that were made available through Efus’ website, a final project phase was specifically dedicated to disseminating and communicating the project’s results. This project handbook, one of its key deliverables, was presented during a dissemination event held in Berlin on 26 and 27 November 2019. Further project deliverables, such as the long version of the articles and pilot project presentation sheets, are available via www.efus.eu.
The aims of this guidebook This guidebook is meant to share such promising practices as well as guidance and recommendations with local authorities involved in managing recently released VEOs, or those who are about to be in the short to medium term. It is also meant for local civil society and non-governmental organisations, including faith communities.
The PREPARE project has enabled a group of local authorities and NGOs with different profiles, experiences, needs and resources to participate in intense exchanges on the subject matter and develop innovative approaches together, with the support and feedback from their peers. This cooperation process was firmly rooted in Europe’s response to radicalisation and violent extremism, and contributes to further developing this strategy. In particular, it responds to the need identified by the European Commission to map out existing practices of preventing and countering radicalisation in prison and probation (including exit programmes and risk assessment tools/methodologies) as well as practices for the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners upon their release, taking into account their gender and age. This was precisely the purpose of the Efus-led PREPARE project: to map out and assess the strategies and plans of several European countries to prevent radicalisation through prison, probation and release with a special focus on the role of local authorities in this process and also by identifying promising practices of reintegration and rehabilitation. This guidebook assembles the results and insights gained in this intense cooperation process and makes them available to local authorities as well as policy makers, prevention practitioners and researchers across Europe. It proceeds in three parts, which present this knowledge in accessible form: Part 1, “Prevention of violent radicalisation in probation and release in Europe – State of the art”, presents concise summaries of the research conducted by PREPARE’s partners regarding the state of play of targeted prevention measures in probation and release and towards the rehabilitation and reintegration of VEOs. Such research has been conducted in all the partners’ countries of origin: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The strategies and measures implemented differ widely, depending on the needs and institutional and political cultures of the Member States, as does the involvement of local authorities in them.
Part 2, “New municipal prevention strategies – PREPARE’s pilot projects”, showcases the local activities implemented by the project partners. They are the results of intense exchange and cooperation among pairs or small groups of partners, including the partner local authorities and the project’s partner NGOs and experts, who engaged in the co-production of these innovative strategies. The projects range from training programmes to multi-agency roundtables and the development of case management protocols. The short but concise presentations in this part include descriptions of the actions as well as information on lessons learnt and future prospects. Part 3, “Supporting local authorities in preventing violent radicalisation in release and probation – Political reflections and recommendations”, sketches out a set of recommendations for local authorities willing to engage in prevention strategies for probation and release and rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Organised around 12 sub-topics ranging from a cross-extremisms approach to risk assessment and communication strategies, they put together a set of propositions and ideas that can inspire local authorities in finding their own approach. They are neither exhaustive nor could they apply equally to all local contexts. Rather, they are designed to inspire reflection and offer food for thought.
An Annex includes a Glossary of important terms and concepts used in this publication as well as a Resource Guide to key policy documents that are shaping the debate at European and international levels.
Prevention of violent radicalisation in probation and release in Europe â&#x20AC;&#x201C; State of the art
1.1 Belgium: an integrated approach implemented at each of the three levels of government
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As a federal state, Belgiumâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s integrated approach for dealing with violent extremism offenders is implemented at each of the three levels of government25.
1. Background Competences with regard to radicalisation are spread over the different levels of government: the federal level is responsible for repression; the French, Flemish and German communities are entrusted with prevention, social care and education; and the Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) cover the cities and municipalities. Cities and municipalities play an important role and have worked for many years now on the topic of radicalisation, notably because they were confronted with the issue of local residents going to fight in Syria. A federal plan (Plan M for Mosques) was developed in 2002, later renamed Plan R (radicalisation), and has been updated over the years. It forms the general framework for an integrated and integral approach, together with the more general National Security Plan.
Federal Plan R The federal Plan R states that radicalism and extremism require a global approach by all levels of government and should not be limited to intelligence and security services. The plan aims to detect individuals and groups with a radicalising effect on their environment and to
25. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project: Inge Vanfraechem (European Forum for Restorative Justice), Belgium: An integrated approach implemented at each of the three levels of government, 2019.
reduce the impact of radicalisation. The coordination of Plan R lies with the National Task Force (NTF), under the presidency of the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA). At the local level, Local Task Forces (LTF) have a strategic and operational component and are connected with the local administrative authorities and socio-preventive services. Concrete topics are furthermore discussed in the Local Integral Security Cell (LISC) at the level of the cities and municipalities.
Flemish Action Plan The Flemish Action Plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and polarisation describes the integrated approach through five policy-lines: 1. Coordination and cooperation 2. Support for the local approach 3. Organisation of a personal approach 4. Strengthening knowledge and expertise 5. Mobilising civil society The Flemish Radicalisation Platform, a network of contact points of the different policy areas, oversees coordination. At the European level, cooperation with the Network of Prevent Coordinators and participation in the Radicalisation Awareness Network’s (RAN) working groups is envisaged.
Wallonian Plan for the prevention of violent radicalism Three lines are developed: 1) Coordination between the different actors by:
Naming a reference person who will preside the network. Putting in place a network. Taking part in the Inter-Federation Platform and National Task Force. 35
Benchmarking via Wallonia-Brussels International to learn from experiences elsewhere.
Cooperation with federal services and working groups. Collaboration with the French community.
Radicalisation as a topic is integrated in the Social Cohesion Plans. 24 projects are subsidised. Social integration of foreigners is strengthened, including in the labour market.
Recognition of religions. Extra subsidies for prevention in bigger cities.
500 first-line workers are trained on the topic Their questions are collected
Plan of the French community Three transverse strands are developed: 1. The creation of the anti-radicalisation network RAR (réseau anti-radicalisme) in order to coordinate all efforts, raise awareness among first-line workers, develop prevention tools, strengthen expertise and cooperate with other similar structures. 2. Participation in the national prevention strategy. 3. Strengthened action against racism, discrimination, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.
Plan of the German community The German community Plan tackles both Islamist and extreme-right radicalism and focuses on prevention, awareness, training, early detection and social guidance. It is based on four pillars: 1) prevention, notably in schools; 2) individual de-radicalisation pathways; 3) cooperation with other Belgian regions as well as cross-border cooperation within the Maas-Rhine Euregio; and 4) communication.
2. Prevention of radicalisation in prison, release and probation The federal Ministry of Justice issued an “Action Plan against radicalisation in prison” in 2015. The central objectives of the policy are (1) to prevent the radicalisation of detainees and (2) to develop a specialised follow-up of radicalised people during their detention. Ten points of action are included, with a focus on information gathering and sharing. One of the most important is the “reinforced cooperation with the local level, the federated states and Europe.” In Flemish prisons, Islamist radicalisation became a priority in 2015 through a “reactive policy” foreseeing a specialised framework for radicalised detainees as well as a preventive policy. The Belgian government opted for a dual approach: in first instance, detainees are integrated in general prison departments, after which a transferral to “satellite prisons” or a specialised department (called D-Rad, as for example in Hasselt and Ittre) is possible in case of further radicalisation or recruitment.
3. Role of local authorities Through the Local Task Forces (LTF) and Local Integral Security Cell (LISC), local authorities are involved in the exchange of information and coordination between the different actors. Local governments have a directing role in prevention, as they are responsible for preventing radicalisation and strengthening social cohesion. In particular, they can intervene through the local Integral Security Cell. They can also be involved in signalling and handling
cases of radicalisation, as well as in providing support to and monitoring returnees.
4. Other initiatives A number of initiatives have been taken in Belgium independently from governmental plans. To name a few:
At the federal level Mobile teams A mobile team has been set up at the Ministry of the Interior to support and guide local governments. It entails four experts and offers a tailormade answer to the questions and challenges the city/municipality is confronted with. CoPPRa – Within the European project “Community policing and prevention of radicalisation & terrorism” (CoPPRa), the Belgian federal police provided training on radicalisation. BOUNCE contains three training and awareness-raising tools for young people and their social environment. It is a positive answer to the challenge of preventing violent radicalisation at an early stage.
Flemish level At the Flemish level, various initiatives are undertaken in the different policy domains in order to offer training and expertise on radicalisation. The Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities supports governments in developing a local policy with concrete tools, bespoke coaching and training on the “Local approach to radicalisation”
Radix tool The Radix Tool Antwerp was developed by the City of Antwerp to guide debates between different partners. The instrument allows the listing of an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s vulnerabilities and strengths as well as the structural factors that can lead to (violent) radicalisation.
CoPPRa â&#x20AC;&#x153;lightâ&#x20AC;? Based on the expertise that police services have built within the CoPPRa programme for frontline local police officers, a package has been developed for all staff, especially local governments.
1.2 France: a global plan against violent radicalisation in which local authorities are increasingly involved
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since 2014, France has adopted a series of global policies to counter violent radicalisation, in particular for offenders in custody or probation. The role of local authorities has been strengthened over the years as far as the prevention of radicalisation is concerned, but much less when it comes to managing individuals who are radicalised or in a process of radicalisation26.
The policy for the prevention of and fight against radicalism and terrorism A first Anti-Terrorist Plan (Plan de lutte anti-terroriste, PLAT) was adopted in April 2014 and comprises two aspects: strengthening the legislative framework against terrorism and Jihadist networks, and setting up a system for detecting radicalised individuals and facilitating their reintegration into society. 26. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project. Fondation FACE, France: A comprehensive plan against violent radicalisation in which local authorities are increasingly involved, 2019 https://efus.eu/files/2019/04/2019_PREPARE_-article-France-ENG.pdf
This plan also established the National Centre for Support and Prevention of Radicalisation (Centre national d’assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation, CNAPR), which receives the reports about individuals showing signs of radicalisation and supports families. A second Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme, PART) was adopted in May 2016 with the objective of better detecting the signs of radicalisation and better preventing and countering radicalism. Both these plans (PLAT and PART) advance a prevention policy based on detection, training, the management of individuals in open and secure custody, and developing research. Two additional plans were published in 2018 (the Prevent to Protect Plan and the Action Plan Against Terrorism) that strengthen prevention measures and establish a national Anti-Terrorism Public Prosecutor.
The judicial policy, in particular with regard to prison, for individuals who are radicalised or in the process of being so In 2018, there were 511 prisoners in France serving a sentence for crimes linked with Jihadist terrorism, and 1,110 common law prisoners at high risk of violent radicalisation. Offenders condemned for terrorism must remain four months in the prison’s “Section for the evaluation of radicalisation” (Quartier d’évaluation de la radicalisation, QER), where they are managed by a multidisciplinary team (educators, psychologists, penitentiary service for reintegration and probation, faith representatives, etc.). At the time of release, the authorities’ objective is to avoid “dry” release. Therefore, the Enforcement Judges Specialised in Anti-terrorism (juges d’application des peines spécialisés dans l’antiterrorisme, JAPAT) are in charge of monitoring the individual and can place them under “judicial surveillance”, which implies a series of restrictions, or in the case of less dangerous ex-inmates, under the “programme for individual handling and social reintegration” through which the individual is accompanied by specialised educators, cultural and religious mediators, social inclusion counsellors and psychologists.
In France, the challenge for the penitentiary administration in the coming years will be to monitor the terrorists that are released from prison. It is planned that 81 individuals condemned for terrorism will be freed between 2019 and 2022.
Local authorities: initiatives on the ground and a more important role A number of French local authorities have developed three types of initiatives to prevent radicalisation: 1) raising awareness and training local staff and their partners in the volunteer sector; 2) detecting weak signals and identifying the concerned individuals; and 3) managing these individuals. Furthermore, cooperation between the central government and local authorities has been strengthened since 2016, in particular concerning prevention.
Stakeholders involved in the “Listening and Support Units” (cellules d’écoute et d’accompagnement) According to a survey carried out in 2016 in all of France’s 95 départements (counties) by the central government’s general secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation, CIPDR), the following administrations monitor individuals who are radicalised or in the process of being radicalised:
Decentralised departments of the State: representatives from the National Education system, the national police, the national gendarmerie, and the Regional Health Agencies, among others.
Services of the Ministry of Justice: representatives from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Judicial Protection of Young People (Protection judiciaire de la jeunesse), and the Penitentiary Services for Reintegration and Probation (Services pénitentiaires d’insertion et de probation).
Local authorities: the departmental councils and communes are also part of these units (in a third of the cases that were examined).
Professional and volunteer networks: these are diverse stakeholders operating in various fields, such as psychology, social, professional and educational help in parenting, and support to victims (health insurance and family services agencies; job-seekers agencies; specialised prevention; local job centres; victim support associations; youth clubs; parenting support networks; associations against sectarianism, etc.). They intervene either to accompany families or to provide individuals reported as being radicalised with psychological, social and professional support.
Faith leaders: they are rarely part of the monitoring units (only in 17 départements) but authorities hope to bring more on board.
Governance and evaluation The Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR) is in charge of leading at national level the policy for the prevention of radicalisation. With some 30 staff members, it is responsible for organising trainings for the people in charge of radicalisation within the government and administration, but also within associations, local authorities and other services dealing with this issue. CIPDR is additionally entrusted with allocating funds from the Interministerial Fund for the Prevention of Crime (Fonds interministériel de prévention de la délinquance, FIPD) to the various relevant associations. Lastly, it is also charged with evaluating whether the support given to radicalised individuals by public entities and associations gives results as well as with disseminating good practices. The evaluation of the schemes and initiatives already carried out nationwide remains largely empirical. Two recent parliamentary reports highlight the need to link French experiences with others carried out abroad and advocate the establishment of a national evaluation protocol that would be applied to some local experiences, as well as a reflection on how to mainstream the most promising practices.
1.3 Germany: a hybrid model with an overall security-focused approach
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Because of Germany’s complex federal system, neither a purely state-led nor a civil society-focused approach has prevailed so far. The country remains a hybrid model in which emphases and successes depend on the Länder27.
1. The federal government’s strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy Besides measures applied by security agencies, Germany’s national strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy comprises approaches that “range from promoting participation in civil society and strengthening democratic counterforces through preventive educational work with children, young people and young adults, their parents and other reference persons, through political education work, the conveying of knowledge and strengthening of the capacity to act amongst specialists and multipliers, to the provision of counselling services”28. The federal government provides different funding streams. The most important is the federal programme “Live Democracy! Active Against Right Wing Extremism, Violence and Hate,” whose funding more than doubled to reach €120.5 million in 2018. The “Cohesion through participation” federal programme focuses on empowering regional and local actors, especially in structurally weak parts of Germany. A third relevant institution is the German Federal Agency for Civic Education. 27. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project: Till Baaken and Maximilian Ruf (Violence Prevention Network), Germany: A hybrid model with an overall security-focused approach, 2019. 28. Bundesregierung, Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung, 2018, p. 10.
2. Roles of and relationship between the State and civil society Germany is often portrayed as having exceptionally high civil society involvement. Yet, while NGOs and civil society initiatives do play a significant role, they are far from being predominant. A quick comparison with France or the UK highlights the significance of the “softer” German approach including a large share of civil responsibility. This current state of affairs, which is still actively supported by the official federal government strategy, as well as the diverging paths of Britain and France, stem from a particular historical understanding of state and society and has developed organically within the context of German society.
3. Fields of action and settings 3.1 Family counselling and counselling the social environment The central and nationwide contact point for counselling the social environment in the context of Islamist extremism is the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees’ (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge – BAMF) “Advice Centre on Radicalisation”. Regarding the counselling of the social environment in the context of right-wing extremism, “Mobile Counselling Teams” (Mobile Beratungsteams) have proven their worthiness in practice for many years. They do not work directly with (potentially) radicalised individuals. A second purpose of counselling the social environment is educational and sensitisation work with the private and professional social environment of persons at risk of becoming radicalised.
3.2 Counselling of persons at risk of becoming radicalised and (partly) radicalised individuals Working with the social environment of the individuals in question can be a first step towards working directly with (partly) radicalised individuals. Multipliers in the sense of the social environment are not only teachers, but also people working in institutions such as child and family help centres, police officers and others who may be in direct
professional contact with individuals at risk of becoming radicalised. Training multipliers in single or group settings is a fundamental part of prevention and de-radicalisation. Another option to initiate first contact with the target group is the “classic” street work of social workers.
3.3 Support for leaving extremist groups and subsequent stabilisation The support structures to help individuals exit an extremist group are part of the tertiary prevention string and their main aim is either a cognitive or a habitual distancing process. In Germany, so-called “exit” programmes are the most prominent and are based on the work of Norway’s Dr Tore Bjørgo29, who started a pilot project in 1997 called “Project Exit – Leaving Violent Groups”. Other such support programmes are HAYAT, the Violence Prevention Network and NGOs that are part of a joint working group called Ausstieg zum Einstieg (roughly translated as “Exit to entry”).
3.4 De-radicalisation within the penitentiary system One of the new funding priorities in the “Innovative pilot projects” section of the “Live Democracy!” programme is dedicated to “Prevention and de-radicalisation in prison and probation”. The projects funded in this context seek to provide preventive-pedagogical offers for detained juvenile offenders and support during and after the prison sentence. Additionally, they provide exit interventions and distancing work for detainees who are already radicalised. This part of the programme also primes projects that aim at qualifying and training prison staff to deal with both inmates who are vulnerable to radicalisation and those already radicalised.
29. Dr Tore Bjørgo is Professor and researcher at the University of Oslo. He is the Director of the university’s Centre for Extremism Research: Right-Wing Extremism, Hate Crime and Political Violence.
The most complete study on extremism in German prisons was published in June 2017 by “Kriminologische Zentralstelle e.V.”30. According to the study, intervention offers can include but are not limited to educational options, faith-based interventions, psychological or cognitive interventions, creative or cultural activities, sport, or inclusion of family, mentors and so-called “Listeners”.
4. On evaluation While evaluation is now part of almost every programme in Germany, it rarely means impact evaluation but rather a process-based, formative evaluation aimed at better understanding certain prevention and de-radicalisation processes and hereby continuously improving the work of the respective projects. While no scientifically valid and useful method for impact measurement in this field of work has been found, this strategy is likely to be pursued in the foreseeable future.
5. Conclusion This diversity of approaches certainly sets Germany apart from other European countries. In light of the need for professional diversity when facing a threat such as extremist ideologies, this strategy is worthy and will probably continue to be so. Indeed, the diversity of experiences and approaches should be understood as an opportunity rather than a lack of fixed standards. Some major challenges remain, the main one being the lack and insecurity of funding that makes it difficult for NGOs to recruit and retain qualified staff.
30. Kriminologische Zentralstelle, Extremismus im Justizvollzug. Literaturauswertung und empirische Erhebungen, 2017.
1.4 Netherlands: a strong local emphasis on de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation programmes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Dutch approach can be summarised as multi-agency, integrated and comprehensive with a local implementation. Both prison and probation contribute to de-radicalisation, disengagement and re-integration and do so in cooperation with local municipalities. The local approach has national support.31
The Dutch National Strategy on countering violent extremism The Dutch government is implementing the 2016-2020 National Counterterrorism Strategy32, which is risk-based — i.e. focusing on the Jihadist threat — although it also includes all other forms of extremism. Two principles of the strategy are particularly important:
The approach is comprehensive and includes preventive, repressive and curative measures to be implemented collaboratively with relevant organisations and agencies.
This comprehensive approach is replicated locally, in particular through multidisciplinary case management and active community engagement.
31. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project: Steven Lenos (RadarAdvies) and Harald Weilnböck (Denkzeit), The Netherlands: A strong local emphasis in de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation programmes, 2019. 32. National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020, 2016.
Furthermore, the government published in 2017 a policy paper on terrorism in which it pledges to invest in de-radicalisation, re-integration and “the judicial approach”33. The approach for returnees requires on the one hand further development of methods for de-radicalisation in and outside prisons, and on the other, further development of methods of re-integration.
Local authorities: key in prevention, exit and re-socialisation Local authorities are responsible for individual case management and tailor-made personalised approaches. In particular, they are responsible for setting up ‘case conferences’ where all relevant parties discuss cases of individuals who are radicalised or in the process of being so, as well as of returnees. The local authority is responsible for a ‘person-specific approach’ and for setting up ‘case conferences’. An essential element of the ‘person-specific approach’ is the need for the parties involved to share relevant information about a given individual as soon as possible. This is vital if they are to make a comprehensive and effective assessment of the risks posed by the individual in question. A national model agreement for a person-specific approach has been drawn up with a view to further clarifying the legal framework within which the parties involved in the case conferences can share information about individuals who are or may be radicalising. The case management is normally done in the multi-agency Safety Houses. There, local or regional partners for security and care cooperate under the supervision of the local authority. Furthermore, case conferences discuss the risks posed by returnees or prisoners being released into society, and measures are taken to minimise risks and optimise re-socialisation. Tailor-made is the code word. Potential interventions are prosecution, area banning orders, care programme or a de-radicalisation programme.
33. National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), Integrale aanpak terrorisme, 2017.
Prisons For each prisoner, including those who fall under the terrorist regime, a so-called Detention and Re-integration Plan (D&R plan) is drawn up. It describes how the cooperation between the prison, the ex-inmate and network partners, such as local authorities, can function. Probation is advising on this D&R plan, and for terrorism-related prisoners this will be done by the specialised TER team Dutch Probation. There are three dimensions to any D&R plan: safety and security; care and re-socialisation; and re-integration. Part of the D&R plan can be a personal de-radicalisation programme, to which the prisoner must apply voluntarily. The personal programme is not one-size fits all but tailor made. Local authorities can offer extra support in housing, debt management and welfare applications but under the condition that the ex-prisoner duly cooperate in his de-radicalisation process. Prisons have the obligation to inform the municipality where the offender last resided of the date of release so that the local authority can prepare re-integration.
Probation: TER team The Dutch Probation board supports the Dutch comprehensive approach. They developed their own approach in 2012, titled the TER approach for Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation. There is a specialised TER team that gathers around 15 experienced staff members who receive training in conversation techniques for people with extremist ideas. The target audience of the TER team are not only prisoners convicted for terrorism, but also other prisoners who have raised concern over their possible radicalisation. The TER team can even be hired by municipalities to advise and support in prevention cases where there is no conviction. TERâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s activities consist in home visits, contact with the family, critical conversations and cognitive behavioural interventions during which the TER team guides the individual and checks whether they respect the measures applied to them, such as banning orders, use of social media, or contact restrictions. The TER team cooperates with all the relevant professional partners, i.e. local authorities, youth care, the
National Coordinator for Counter terrorism and Safety (NCTV), police and public prosecution. To date, the TER team has handled about 60 individuals and given advice in some 150 instances.
National support for the local approach by the NCTV and the National Expertise Centre on Extremism The local approach is supported by the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism and Safety (NCTV), which develops tools and facilitates the exchange of knowledge between local actors in different municipalities. The NCTV is also connected or sometimes even attends the local case conferences. Furthermore, the NCTV has set up a National Expertise Centre on Extremism, which provides family support, individual counselling and group contact with people who are or have been dealing with radicalisation issues. The multidisciplinary team consists of 30 competent professionals with ample experience in the field of radicalisation, honour-related and domestic violence, youth care, crisis care and intercultural social work. The support centre is located in the region of Utrecht and offers help throughout the country.
1.5 Spain: 15 years of work on radicalisation in prison
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In Spain, the first measures aiming at preventing, detecting, following up on and neutralising possible radicalisation processes in prison were taken in the wake of the 2004 Madrid train bombings.34 34. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project: Maria Lozano-Alia, Spain: 15 years of work on radicalisation in prison, 2019.
National strategy Spain adopted in 2015 the National Strategic Plan Against Violent Radicalisation35, which replicates at the national level the European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy as well as the subsequent and more concrete EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism36. In a schematic way, we can say that the National Plan defines three clear spheres of action: prevention (before); surveillance (during); and action (after). The plan includes a “special reference to the treatment in penitentiary centres of cases of individuals imprisoned for their involvement in acts of violence or, in any case, for links with terrorism.” The Spanish policy against violent radicalisation in prison dates back to 1972, when the first member of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA was incarcerated. In more recent times, measures were taken following the 2004 Madrid bomb attacks, as well as in 2008 and 2011. The current Radicalisation Prevention Programme in Prison was launched in 2014.
Current Spanish penitentiary policy The general objective of the penitentiary policy is to prevent the recruitment and indoctrination of new terrorists in prison by detecting, neutralising, disengaging and de-radicalising inmates who show signs of adhering to an extremist ideology. Two programmes are currently being implemented:
1. Programme for the prevention of radicalisation in penitentiary centres (2014) This programme is focused on measures for the detection and prevention of recruitment processes and radicalisation of Muslim inmates. Its 35. Gobierno de España, Ministerio del Interior, Plan estratégico nacional de lucha contra la radicalización violenta (PEN-LCRV), 2015. 36. Council of the European Union, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2015.
objective is to collect, analyse and systematise a set of data and relevant variables to detect and limit incipient or consolidated processes of radicalisation.
Control and monitoring groups Established in 2009, the “control and monitoring groups” gather officials within the prison who are specifically trained to analyse data and relevant variables in order to detect and limit incipient or consolidated processes of radicalisation. Specific coordination and cooperation is established with the security forces to manage this information.
2. Framework Programme for intervention in cases of violent radicalisation of Islamist inmates (2016) This programme complements and furthers the previous prevention programme. It is based on the guiding principles and objectives of the Spanish penitentiary policy, whereby the prison administration, in addition to ensuring custody during the sentence, will offer re-educational activities in order to prepare inmates for their social reintegration and ensure they return to society with the ability and willingness to abide by the law. As its name implies, the Specific Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation in Penitentiary Centres is designed for inmates classified as violent radicals. It seeks to lead radical inmates to reject violence and disengage from their criminal / extremist organisation and refrain from recruiting others. Several types of techniques and training/awareness modules are used to encourage radical prisoners to change their beliefs and behaviours. Furthermore, concerning Muslim offenders, Spanish authorities are contemplating involving in these programmes the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (Federación española de entidades religiosas islámicas).
Probation As per the Spanish legal system, there is no provision of de-radicalisation / disengagement programmes linked to probation. In any case, all decisions concerning measures to be applied during probation are taken by a judge and not automatically granted.
Role of Local Authorities The National Plan Against Radicalisation includes the figure of the local cross-sectoral coordinator as contact point within the local security forces in charge of centralising all the information concerning any radicalisation process in the area. Furthermore, the Plan stipulates that every municipality must have a multi-agency Local Group Against Violent Radicalisation, whose modus operandi will be replicated from the National Groups Against Violent Radicalisation. As mentioned in the National Plan Against Radicalisation, whenever an offender for terrorism / extremism is released at the end of his sentence, his prison will exchange all relevant information with the local multi-sectoral coordinator (of the territory where the prison is situated).
Involved Practitioners The practitioners involved in preventing or countering radicalisation in prison and probation have different backgrounds and work for different agencies. Authorities seek to promote a moderate interpretation of Islam with the help of moderate Imams. An agreement has been signed between the General Secretary of Penitentiary Institutions and the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities.
Multi-agency approach The programmeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s complex development requires coordination between the treatment teams (legal practitioners, psychologists, social workers and educators) and the control and monitoring groups. In the same way, information will be shared between the prison and the local cross-sectoral coordinator each time a prisoner having served a sentence for extremism or terrorism is released.
Governance of these initiatives The coordination of these measures is carried out by the prisonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Deputy Director of Security, who is responsible for sharing information about the relevant prisoners with the management team.
Evaluation Lessons learned from the Intervention Programme: 1. It is necessary to keep working on and updating the programme, notably in the follow-up phase, and to include some after-care activities. Furthermore, it would be interesting to involve more practitioners, probably with the support of local authorities. 2. Changing the name of the programme and of some activities would be helpful to enrol more prisoners, as some are deterred by the current denomination. 3. It is necessary to work on strengthening the therapeutic alliance between inmates and therapists. 4. It is crucial to improve the description of the dynamics used in the prevention programme, providing details and know-how. 5. There should be a system rewarding programme participants according to their involvement and efforts. 6. Collaboration with Muslim Imams should be strengthened and fostered at all stages.
7. More investigation and research on the ground is needed to analyse more in depth the push and pull radicalisation factors in prison, and thus improve the design and implementation of these programmes.
1.6 Sweden: a programme originally designed for the disengagement of gang members
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are only about 90 prisoners in custody for violent radicalism in Sweden. Authorities are using with them a programme originally developed to encourage gang members to disengage37
National strategy There are approximately 90 individuals in custody in Sweden for violent extremism, the majority of whom are from an Islamist background and the rest from a neo-Nazi environment. The national strategy adopted by the Swedish authorities to deal with these offenders is based on four key principles:
The correctional work seeks to encourage them to change their life, while at the same time maintaining a high security level and constantly assessing risks.
Detainees are monitored so as to identify any change in both individuals and groups.
Apart from this permanent control, efforts are made to build trust with the prisoners in order to encourage them to change.
37. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project: Robert Örell (Fryshuset / Exit Sweden), Sweden: A programme originally designed for the disengagement of gang members, 2019.
The Entré programme, which was originally developed for gang members wishing to disengage, is also used for extremist offenders who are motivated to change their life and leave their extremist environment. Based on multi-agency cooperation, the programme works on values and shows there are alternatives to violence and crime. Sweden has a ‘dispersal strategy’ regarding prisoners in custody for violent extremism whereby they are spread out throughout the system in order to prevent the formation of cliques and curb ‘recruitment’ among detainees. Furthermore, as part of the regular correctional work, efforts are made to build dialogue and trust between detainees and prison staff in order to bring about change in beliefs and behaviours (for example through the STICS programme, see below), and to focus on and prepare for post-release situations and challenges. An important part of this work thus consists in identifying among the general prison population individuals who are involved or at risk of becoming involved in violent extremist groups. Another key aspect concerns prison staff, who are encouraged to work on their own values and to act as role models in terms of their behaviour, attitudes and values. Notably, this involves making sure they always treat prisoners fairly and well, while at the same time being alert for possible threats to security and changes in behaviour and attitudes.
Entré – a Swedish programme to support desistance from gangs Entré is a probation-based programme involving a tailor-made approach to support offenders during the post-release phase of their sentence. Based on the building of trust and alliance with the clients, it focuses on solutions to move forward in life and change values from violent, extremist beliefs towards more moderate and non-violent norms and values. Interventions are geared towards building new experiences that will encourage the offender to change their values, attitude and norms. Introduced a few years ago, the Entré programme has been successful in supporting people willing to leave organised criminal gangs. It is
currently (2019) being tested by the Swedish Prison and Probation service for inmates involved in violent extremism and, so far, it looks promising. In addition, EntrĂŠ provides support through multi-agency cooperation to help the individual find accommodation and a job and to study or work with a non-governmental organisation (NGO). The objectives are to support the client in building a new life and to create a sustainable environment where the risk of reoffending and re-connecting with violent extremist groups is reduced.
The STICS programme on changing values and behavioural patterns Another programme that is often used is STICS (Strategic Training in Community Supervision), which was originally developed in Canada. Used as part of ordinary probation work, it focuses on working with the offenderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s values and thought patterns through cognitive behavioural therapy, with the objective of bringing about a change in lifestyle.
Training of staff and multi-agency cooperation An important part of prison and probation work with extremist offenders relies on providing adequate training to prison staff, particularly in terms of violent extremist environments and ideas, radicalisation processes, methods of intervention and working within a multi-agency partnership. Indeed, one of the challenges of working with violent extremists, whether in prison or outside, is the fear they inspire among the personnel. Sharing information on how the process of radicalisation takes place and explaining the approach to be followed with extremist individuals helps alleviate such fears. Another challenge is multi-agency cooperation. Prison and probation authorities must sometimes motivate local authorities and services, social or other, in supporting their client. Indeed, close cooperation with local partners is essential in order to deliver a proper service for
offenders when they are released from prison. It must be noted that approval from the clients is required in order to mobilise local authorities and other partners.
Target audience The EntrĂŠ programme targets individuals who are motivated to leave criminal gangs and violent extremist groups. As mentioned above, the population of violent extremists in Swedish prisons is relatively low, with approximately 90 individuals.
Multi-agency approach The multi-agency approach is central in Swedish Prison and Probation work and permeates the work with inmates and clients.
Role of local authorities The probation service works according to the specific needs of each client and situation. Probation is mandatory and doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t require the consent of the client except when there is multi-agency work, in which case their consent is required.
Involved practitioners Many practitioners are involved in this approach. Obviously, prison and probation services are first in line but depending on the needs of each, other services also intervene.
Governance of these initiatives The governance of these initiatives varies depending on each individual case. For example, the case of someone involved in terrorism will be under the supervision of the national security service, whereas that of someone involved in a less serious crime will be followed by the local probation authority.
Guidance on governance is provided by the central Prison and Probation Service.
Evaluation A scientific evaluation of the EntrĂŠ programme is yet to be released, in particular because there have not been enough cases so far to properly assess the programme. Nevertheless, the programme has been closely followed by national and international professionals and is seen as promising.
1.7 The United Kingdom
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The United Kingdom: a strategy for the early prevention of radicalisation including in prison and probation The United Kingdom has a four-pronged anti-terrorist strategy that includes a strand, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Preventâ&#x20AC;?, aimed at preventing at the earliest possible stage individuals from being drawn to radicalism. This strategy was updated in 2015 to include the role of prison and probation in prevention and disengagement38.
1. Preparation of national strategy against radicalisation The United Kingdom comprises three jurisdictions: England and Wales; Scotland; and Northern Ireland. Each is distinctive and has responded to the threat of violent extremism in different ways.
38. The following section is based on a research article written in the framework of the PREPARE project: Tim Chapman (European Forum for Restorative Justice), United Kingdom: A strategy for the early prevention of radicalisation including in prison and probation, 2019.
The British government’s approach to addressing terrorism was set out in its Counter-Extremism Strategy in 201539. It defines extremism as “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of armed forces as extremist.” In June 2018, the government published CONTEST, a revised strategy for countering terrorism that updated the four work strands of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare*. Prevent aims to safeguard people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are given appropriate advice and support. This aspect of the British government’s strategy is the most relevant to Efus’ PREPARE project as it directly seeks to respond rapidly and to support those who may be at risk of radicalisation. The aim of Prevent is to intervene at the earliest possible stage and proactively support individuals or groups to prevent them from becoming or supporting terrorists. To do so, it focuses activity and resources on locations where the threat from terrorism and radicalisation is highest; seeks to enrol individuals deemed at risk in disengagement programmes; fosters multi-agency work; focuses online activity on preventing dissemination of terrorism material; and builds strong partnerships with communities, civil society and public institutions. However, it is important to note that Prevent has been criticised in the UK for fostering an Islamophobic culture.
2. Prevention of radicalisation in prison, release and probation The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) has overall responsibility for both the Probation Service and the Prison Service in the UK. All convicted extremist offenders both in custody and community who are assessed as suitable can follow the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) programme, which is designed to disengage participants from 39. UK Home Office, Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015.
extremist groups or ideologies and focuses on the concept of identity. Through this process they are encouraged to dissociate themselves from negative influences and to move on with their lives in a positive direction. Individuals are assessed through the Extremism Risk Guidelines 22+ (ERG 22+), and a programme is then tailored to each participantâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s risk, needs and circumstances. Through the modules participants have the opportunity to: 1. Meet their personal needs without needing to be committed to an extremist group, cause or ideology. 2. Strengthen their own sense of personal agency in making decisions about their current and future commitments. 3. Address their offence-supportive attitudes, beliefs and thinking. 4. Express their values and pursue their goals without needing to offend. 5. Increase their tolerance and acceptance of challenging emotions. Upon release, Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) should be used to manage risk, and consideration should be given to referral to Channel. Probation in the UK comprises two organisational structures: the National Probation Service, a public agency that supervises high-risk cases, and the Community Rehabilitation Companies, which are private organisations supervising lower risk offenders. Probation has a key role in reducing risk of terrorism in the community. Each National Probation Service division is expected to have a designated Probation Counter-Terrorism Lead (PCTL) and to work through Community Safety Partnerships. In particular, the PCTLs are in charge of coordinating the sharing of intelligence with all the relevant agencies, including police and prisons, and of providing a single point of contact for updates on the progress of individual offenders. A range of intensive tailored interventions and practical support have been designed to address the causes of radicalisation, needs for identity, self-esteem, meaning and purpose, and to address personal
grievances that the extremist narrative has exacerbated. Support can include mentoring, psychological support and theological and ideological advice.
3. Role of local authorities within the above mentioned initiatives in release and probation In 2015, the law was strengthened to place an obligation on specified public organisations to prevent people from being “drawn into terrorism”. This included local authorities. The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales (2015)40 specifies government’s expectations of local authorities. They should work through a multi-agency partnership and use the counter-terrorism local profiles produced by the police to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism. They should also engage Prevent coordinators, schools, registered child care providers, universities, local prisons, probation services, health, immigration enforcement and youth offending teams. Local Prevent action plans should be produced to identify, prioritise and deliver projects, interventions and other activities to address the risk of involvement in terrorism. Records should be kept on these activities and these, in turn, will be subject to reporting mechanisms to government. Staff should be trained appropriately and local authority resources, including the Internet, should not be used to provide a platform or to disseminate extremist views.
3.1 Channel Channel is part of the Prevent strategy. Through this programme the police work with local councils, social workers, National Health Service staff, schools and the justice system to identify those at risk of being drawn into terrorism, assess the risk and determine how to intervene to reduce the risk. Interventions may include mentoring or structured programmes to address the risk.
40. UK Home Office, Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales, 2015.
4. Other relevant initiatives Quilliam is a London-based organisation that focuses on counter-extremism. It campaigns specifically against Islamism and lobbies government. It works to take on radicalisation through challenging its arguments. Quilliam publishes reports, engages with the media and delivers through its “Outreach and Training” unit a “radicalisation awareness programme.” However, this is a controversial organisation that is criticised by other Muslim organisations, which see it as not typical of the general Muslim population in the UK.
New municipal prevention strategies – PREPARE’s pilot projects
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: aapprox. 217,500 Location: Department of Vaucluse, Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur Region (south of France) Official website: http://www.avignon.fr/ Website or page of the service or office in charge of radicalisation: http://www.avignon.fr/ma-ville/securite/
Summary As part of PREPARE, the municipality of Avignon worked jointly with the Act Against Exclusion Foundation (Fondation Agir Contre l’Exclusion, FACE) to seek ways to better accompany offenders who are being released from prison and are deemed at risk of radicalisation. The focus of this local project was to foster closer cooperation between the municipality and different relevant stakeholders, such as the Penitentiary Service for Integration and Probation (Service pénitentiaire d'insertion et de probation, SPIP), the Juvenile Judicial Protection Authority (Protection judiciaire de la jeunesse, PJJ), the police and local associations working in the field of reintegration and rehabilitation.
Background According to the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration (Direction de l’administration pénitentiaire, DAP), in 2018 there were 511 prisoners in custody in France for offences linked to Islamic-Jihadist terrorism. Furthermore, 1,110 common criminals in custody were deemed particularly at risk of drifting into violent radicalisation. Given these numbers, the issue of the capacities of public institutions,
including local authorities, to respond to this challenge is high on the political agenda. Official French policy documents, notably the Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (Plan d'Action contre la Radicalisation et le Terrorisme, PART 2) recognise that local authorities have an important role to play, notably by detecting and signalling “situations of radicalisation” and by contributing to handling individuals who are radicalised or in a process of radicalisation, as well as their family, in particular concerning social welfare. Avignon’s local project was designed in light of this context.
Objectives The objective was to improve the municipality’s capacity to support the reintegration and re-socialisation of offenders condemned for terrorism-related acts or at risk of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Particularly, the project aimed to:
Foster cooperation between the municipality and relevant local and regional services and organisations that can contribute to preventing radicalisation and violent extremism.
Reinforce the municipality’s capacity to identify offenders that are radicalised or at risk of radicalisation.
Establish working partnerships to support at-risk individuals, including case management and monitoring.
Strategy and Activities The municipality invited the partner institutions to participate in joint working sessions and they established close working relations with them. The project’s first phase was focused on the need to improve risk assessment capacities, with a plan to develop a set of criteria to evaluate whether soon-to-be-released prisoners are at risk of radicalisation, taking into account the specificities of this target group in the
department of Vaucluse and the Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur region. Preliminary work on an assessment scheme was conducted and different service providers were contacted that could support the development of the scheme. The second phase of the project would be to train probation officers (conseillers pénitentiaires d'insertion et de probation, CPIPs) so they could monitor offenders together with a psychologist. However, it was decided that this project would not be followed through in the framework of PREPARE due to various constraints, but could hopefully resume in a different context. Following this decision, the project was reoriented towards young offenders at risk of radicalisation. Different activities were discussed and planned in cooperation with the PJJ and other services in charge of youth protection and reintegration. At the time of writing, these activities had not yet been completed.
Department of Public Tranquillity (Département de la Tranquillité Publique), city of Avignon.
Local Security and Crime Prevention Council (Conseil local de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance, CLSPD), city of Avignon.
Act Against Exclusion Foundation (Fondation Agir Contre l’Exclusion, FACE).
Penitentiary Service for Integration and Probation (Service pénitentiaire d'insertion et de probation, SPIP).
Juvenile Judicial Protection Authority (Protection judiciaire de la jeunesse, PJJ).
Montfavet’s Closed Educational Centre (Centre Éducatif Fermé de Montfavet).
Results and Lessons Learnt The project has highlighted the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation when seeking to reinforce prevention in the context of probation and release. Local authorities can really make a difference in this respect when they collaborate with a range of relevant services at local, regional and national level. Exchanges with European partners on exit programmes and multiagency cooperation between public institutions and NGOs with the aim of fostering the re-integration of extremist offenders were experienced as particularly fruitful.
Next Steps The municipality will further cooperate with the involved stakeholders in order to step up the work with youngsters deemed at risk. They are also looking for new resources (both in funding and staff) to keep working on risk assessment and case management.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 30,000 inhabitants Location: France, Ă&#x17D;le de France Region Official website: https://www.clichy-sous-bois.fr/ Website or page of the service or office in charge of radicalisation: https://www.clichy-sous-bois.fr/mon-quotidien/preventionet-securite/
Summary The municipality of Clichy-sous-Boisâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s PREPARE pilot project consisted in designing and implementing a training programme for municipal officers on radicalisation.
Background The municipality has no record of any local resident having joined war zones in the Middle East and no known issue of radicalisation. Nevertheless, as part of its overall crime prevention strategy the municipality thought its personnel should be more informed about this phenomenon and how to prevent it.
Objectives The overall objective of the training was to strengthen the capacities of municipal staff intervening in social and educational prevention, either collectively or individually. The specific objectives were to provide them with general knowledge on the context of radicalisation and violence as well as concrete tools to prevent them.
Target About 30 municipal staff in total: all the management teams as well as all municipal officers specialised in welfare and social work, civil registrars, and all other interested officers.
Strategy and Activities The three-day training programme was delivered in October 2019. It encompassed general information about the history of political and religious extremism; the mechanisms at play in radicalisation processes; the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;recruitmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; process; stereotypes about radicalism; the psychological mindset of radicals; how to detect a process of radicalisation; and how to deal with families and returnees. The training
combined theoretical information and practical exercises, and was delivered by municipal officers and external experts.
Results and Lessons Learnt Trainees were given questionnaires to evaluate their session (organisation, content, speakers...) Their feedback was not yet available at the time of writing. The municipality expects that the programme will have given attendees tools to better detect signs of radicalisation, more knowledge on radicalism, and tools to improve coordination among the different municipal services in order to better improve prevention.
Next Steps The municipality now plans to develop tools to evaluate and monitor the targeted actions that will have been carried out following the training and to set up a system for the exchange of interdisciplinary practices.
2.3 Government of Catalonia â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Department of Justice
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 7,600,000 Location: Barcelona/Catalonia Official website: https://web.gencat.cat/en/inici/index.html Website or page of the service or office in charge of radicalisation: http://justicia.gencat.cat/ca/ambits/reinsercio_i_serveis_penitenciaris/
Summary The Government of Catalonia’s PREPARE pilot project was focused on multi-agency cooperation and working methods. A multi-agency structure was set up to manage the case of two offenders serving sentences in Catalonia for crimes related to radicalisation leading to violent extremism, and who were close to conditional or final release. This multi-agency structure, managed by the regional government’s Department of Justice (Secretariat of Criminal Sanctions, Rehabilitation and Victim Support), gathered the regional police of Catalonia (called Mossos d’Esquadra) and the City Councils of Terrassa and L’Hospitalet de Llobregat. These parties were organised into a scientific board and two local boards working jointly to take decisions on the common approach to the cases and the form of communication that was to be maintained among the members of the multi-agency organisation.
Background It was decided to conduct the local pilot project in Terrassa and L’Hospitalet de Llobregat for various reasons. In the case of Terrassa, anti-terrorist operations in the past led to the dismantling of a local terrorist cell and a significant number of convictions for crimes related to terrorism. In the case of L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, a number of offenders serving a sentence in Catalan prisons have declared being residents of this municipality. In addition, L’Hospitalet already had multi-agency work experience through the Efus-led LIAISE I & II (Local Institutions Against Extremism) projects. The objective of the PREPARE local pilot project was to build a structure that could be replicated and transferred to other municipalities.
Objectives The main objective was to guarantee comprehensive intervention in the process of transition from prison to community for those who have
served a prison sentence for offences related to violent radicalisation and/or have shown signs of having been radicalised in prison. The specific objectives were to:
Strengthen the multi-agency work (hereinafter MAW) to implement tertiary prevention strategies specifically adapted to radicalisation.
Develop a common language regarding the phenomena of violent radicalisation.
Contribute to reducing the risk factors at individual and community level.
Improve the knowledge and skills of the different participating professionals.
Improve coordination through training and work sessions in order to share the different views and work methodologies of each agency.
Target The profile of inmates in Catalonia’s prisons who could be included in the project was either:
Spanish or EU citizens who started serving a sentence for terrorist offences in a spanish prison, and according to a previous coordination agreement between the spanish and the Catalonian administration, have been transferred to a prison in Catalonia to continue serving their sentences*. Non-EU citizens convicted of terrorism offences (with or without a residence permit) were excluded because they are as per the Spanish law deported at the end of their sentence.
Serving a sentence for offences not related to terrorism but showing risky behaviours in which evidence of radicalisation is observed.
Serving a sentence for offences not related to terrorism and being vulnerable to violent radicalisation. It was also necessary to consider the prisoners’ families and their community since they are factors of protection and prevention and play an important role in the life of offenders.
* See Royal Decree 1436/1984 of 20 June on provisional rules for the coordination of penitentiary administrations
Strategy and Activities The activity was carried out on three levels: 1. Scientific and Local Boards Based on the analysis of the issues raised by the local boards working on the cases, the scientific board evaluated the situations at hand to give the local boards new guidelines for action. This evaluation was carried out following a bottom-up approach according to the action-research-action methodology. 2. Kick-off Meeting A kick-off session was organised in May 2019 on key aspects of the MAW. All members of the scientific and local boards attended. Participants were divided into four groups that discussed four issues: the multi-agency work model, the figure of the case manager, the figure of the mentor, and the confidential handling of data. 3. Transfer of Knowledge to Professionals The work of the scientific and local boards was supplemented by the training organised through PREPARE. It was delivered in June 2019 by the Violence Prevention Network (VPN) to a group of 15 local and scientific board professionals on the subject of MAW and mentoring models. Further training sessions were organised in September 2019 by the Mossos d’Esquadra on the theoretical and conceptual framework of violent radicalisation and radicalisation processes, and in October 2019 by a Dutch Safety House representative about their experience with MAW.
The Government of Catalonia: Department of Justice (Secretariat of Criminal Sanctions, Rehabilitation and Victim Support); central services; Department of Information.
The Mossos d’Esquadra. The Terrassa City Council: social services; the municipal police; the Department of Citizenship-Migration and Interculturality.
The L’Hospitalet de Llobregat City Council: Community Mediation Service; Department for Crime Prevention, Coexistence and Citizenship; social services; Department for Equity, Social Rights and Human Resources.
Results and Lessons Learnt The main results were more fluid relationships and better coordination and communication between the institutions and professionals involved in supporting ex-offenders when they return to the community. They adopted a common language as well as common guidelines for action. All the professionals involved also gained knowledge on radicalisation and violent extremism, in particular through the training provided through the project. The City Councils of Terrassa and L’Hospitalet de Llobregat now want to maintain the multi-agency structure, although it remains unclear (at the time of writing) who will be responsible for doing so.
Next Steps The Catalonia government wants to develop guidelines for future interventions and carry out continuous assessment with the lessons learnt from the two pilot cases. It will also ensure these guidelines can be shared with and adapted by other municipalities. Another objective is to better define the position and responsibilities of the case manager.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 570,000 Location: Andalucía, southern Spain Official website: http://www.malaga.eu/
Summary A cosmopolitan city host to 150 different nationalities and whose city council has been actively promoting coexistence and a multicultural environment for the past 20 years, Málaga is one of the largest cities in the southern Spanish region of Andalucía. It was chosen by the government as a pilot city for the 2015 National Strategic Plan Against Violent Radicalisation (Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta, PEN). The municipality has also drawn a plan for strengthening social cohesion and countering marginalisation and violent radicalism. Málaga has used the PREPARE project to reinforce this plan and improve institutional coordination, in particular with prisons, in order to prevent radicalisation among the local prison population. It has also used the project to train local frontline staff in accompanying at the time of release and during probation offenders who are radicalised or at risk of being so. A partnership was established with the German NGO Denkzeit to deliver to local stakeholders a bespoke training programme so they can better support young offenders on their path towards social reintegration.
Background Málaga was chosen by the government as a pilot city for the National Strategic Plan Against Violent Radicalisation (Plan Estratégico
Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta), which was approved in 2015. The city was deemed a good example of social inclusion and coexistence because it has been pursuing for two decades an inclusive policy and is known for its tolerance and the good coexistence between its various communities. Working for a year and a half with the Centre of Intelligence Against Terrorism and Organised Crime (Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado, CITCO), a group of experts of the University of Málaga and the volunteer sector, the municipality’s Office for the Promotion of Coexistence and Religious Pluralism drafted a plan with the objectives of raising awareness and building an active, resilient citizenry that favours social cohesion, improves coexistence, respects faith and religious freedom, and avoids marginalisation and violent radicalism.
Objectives The general objectives pursued by Málaga through PREPARE were to better understand the radicalisation process; build the capacities of first-line practitioners in detecting signs of radicalisation among vulnerable individuals; increase the capacities of practitioners and municipal staff to promote social cohesion; and foster better institutional coordination.
To raise awareness among the relevant professionals on the importance of violent radicalisation so they can detect it early.
To acquire basic tools for detecting people at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised and for managing such cases.
To better equip local frontline practitioners to work with youngsters that have committed extremism-related offences or are at risk of radicalisation.
Strategy and Activities Meetings were organised to form a partnership and collaborative exchange between the following institutions involved in the local PREPARE project: Málaga City Hall; the national Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, CIS); the Group for Peaceful Coexistence and the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation (Agrupación de Desarrollo por la Convivencia y la Prevención de la Radicalización Violenta); University of Málaga; and NGO Denkzeit. In September 2018 and November 2019, training sessions were delivered to practitioners, focusing on various methods and exercises for dealing with difficult-to-reach, multi-challenged or radicalised young people. Work was carried out to facilitate the ex-prisoners’ social integration together with the participating entities (the team involved in the National Strategic Plan Against Violent Radicalisation, members of the Group for Peaceful Coexistence, and local social welfare agencies).
Partnership The PREPARE local project was conducted jointly by the Málaga City Hall (Departments of Security and of Social Rights) and the Berlinbased NGO Denkzeit. For the local training sessions and to identify who among the frontline staff should take part in them, they worked with a number of local NGOs and social enterprises, such as Asociación Arrabal – Aid and Proyecto Hogar. Furthermore, there were exchanges about the project with the organisations and entities involved in the above-mentioned National Plan, in particular the Group for the Promotion of Coexistence and Prevention of Violent Radicalisation, the technical platform for the prevention of violent radicalisation, the Evaluation Council, which gathers experts and staff from the Forum for Peace in the Mediterranean, and the University of Málaga (UMA).
Results The municipality’s Department of Social Rights, Good Governance and Transparency designed a Plan for Coexistence and the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation following intense collaborative work over a period of a year and a half. This plan is groundbreaking in Spain and represents Málaga’s contribution to the National Strategic Plan Against Violent Radicalisation.
Challenges and Lessons Learnt Some of the challenges encountered by the staff of Málaga’s City Hall during the project were: not having enough staff to carry out both their daily duties and the additional work entailed by the project; the administrative follow-up; and language barriers. However, these challenges were overcome thanks to the close cooperation and communication with the project’s European partners and the support from and leadership of the locally elected officials.
Next Steps Participating in the PREPARE project has reinforced the city of Málaga’s capacity to design a protocol for monitoring and managing individual cases and fostering their social integration. Moreover, Málaga will continue to play an active role in the National Strategic Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation, notably coordination, networking, training and awareness activities.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 623,000 Location: Province of South Holland, Netherlands Official website: http://www.rotterdam.nl Website or page of the service or office in charge of radicalisation: http://www.rotterdam.nl/radicalisering
Summary Our project consisted of an interactive training session on exit work: what kind of training is suitable for working with violent extremist offenders? The aim was to learn more about the training programme in Sweden so we could implement suitable elements in our own approach. Colleagues from the Rotterdam municipalityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Radicalisation Contact and Advisory Point (MAR according to the Dutch acronym) and the Municipal Radicalisation Expert Pool (GER according to the Dutch acronym) were invited to the training. We also discussed an existing case from Rotterdam and got advice on what to do in that specific case.
Background The Rotterdam approach to radicalisation, extremism and polarisation consists of four courses of action: 1. De-polarisation and tension reduction. 2. Strengthening resilience against radicalisation, extremism and polarisation. 3. Promoting expertise. 4. Disengagement and de-radicalisation.
Depending on the severity and the phase of the radicalisation process, a person-oriented approach is initiated either solely by the municipality or in consultation with relevant partners from the Rotterdam Rijnmond Safety House. Part of our case-by-case approach is an action plan created by the MAR to prevent further radicalisation or to end the radical behaviour and set up interventions. Implementation, which is on a case-by-case basis, is contingent to an assessment of the concerns and risks. The MAR can also support cases of individuals in detention in an effort to put a stop to radical behaviour. We work closely with the professionals in our penitentiary facility De Schie and the national probation team that is involved in these cases. Our responsibility is to deliver care to individuals when they are still incarcerated, rather than after their release. The MAR also offers support to offendersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; families.
Objectives 1. Learning from existing exit programmes dealing with other forms of extremism and sectarianism, especially regarding the shift between probation and release. 2. Learning from methods used in exit programmes/interventions in other countries, such as conversation techniques, creating a point of entry for contact, etc. We wanted to learn about the practices carried out in other countries.
Strategy and Activities 1. Half a day training/workshop on training and methods for exit workers in Rotterdam (in total 15 pers.) What type of training did Exit Sweden workers receive? Is their training more based on gaining a better understanding of ideology and being able to provide one-on-one counter narratives and/or is it focused on different types of conversation techniques (e.g. motivational interviewing, life history intervention, Socratic conversation)? How do Exit Sweden case workers implement the trainingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s insights in their daily
work? What methods, approaches and practices do they apply in their casework?
2. Half a day sharing experiences by exchanging case studies (in total 15 pers.) We wanted to discuss one existing case from Rotterdam and another from Exit Sweden, including the background of the case, how a point of entry was created, what conversation techniques were used, what type of interventions were provided and what the challenges were in bringing about the disengagement of the individual. The purpose was to reflect together on lessons learnt and dos and don’ts in those specific cases.
Partnership Colleagues from the municipality’s Radicalisation Contact and Advisory Point (MAR) and the Municipal Radicalisation Expert Pool (GER) were invited to the training. The GER can be deployed by the MAR in cases of violent extremism or (possible) radicalisation. This team consists of eight professionals with different backgrounds (social worker, etc.) — this diversity means there is always someone available who fits the needs and background of the case at hand. In the PREPARE project, we cooperated with Fryshuset–Exit Sweden (Robert Örell). They explained their approach and gave training in conversation techniques, such as motivational interviewing, building rapport and the principles of influence.
Results and Lessons Learnt We gained insight into the approach and content of the Exit training programme in Sweden, notably on a number of points related to understanding radicalisation:
Knowledge about the environments:
- Group dynamics (what does it mean to be part of a specific group?)
- How do these environments shape people?
- Different modus operandi, but also understanding similarities.
Some basic elements/knowledge in a training session:
- Social pedagogy.
- Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT).
- Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
- Criminality as a lifestyle (behavioural and cognitive programme).
- Motivational interviewing (MI).
Focus on the relational aspect of this work (how do you create changes and work with these people?) And less on hard knowledge of the extremist movement: what are the required qualities to work with this group and lead them to change their behaviour?
- Being able to adapt the strategy to different people and situations.
- Being aware of your own strengths and weaknesses.
- Creating a non-judgmental setting and being curious about the person you are sitting across. We also have established close contact with Robert Örell, a director at Exit Sweden, and will contact him in the future should any question arise.
Next Steps We use the insights gained at the training to further shape our training programme for the MAR and GER.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General information Population: approx. 57,000 Country and region: France, Ile de France Official website: http://www.sarcelles.fr/
Summary In the framework of PREPARE, the municipality of Sarcelles organised a one-week citizenship training for young petty criminals, on 1-5 April 2019. This type of training is a provision of a March 2004 law and concerns young people sentenced to community work who are being monitored by the Penitentiary Service for Integration and Probation (Service pénitentiaire d’insertion et de probation, SPIP) and/or the Juvenile Judicial Protection Authority (Protection judiciaire de la jeunesse, PJJ). The project targeted some 15 people aged between 16 and 25 who had been sentenced to a minimum of 35 hours of community work. By providing them with knowledge of citizens’ rights and duties, the importance of culture in daily life and the concept of solidarity, which can for example inspire someone to do volunteering, the project aimed at helping them reintegrate into society.
Background The project was implemented quite smoothly because the contributing partners are already used to working together: the Local Mission for the Social and Professional Inclusion of Young People (Mission locale pour l’insertion sociale et professionnelle des jeunes), the employment agency (Espace Emploi) and several local associations. They drafted together the content of the training.
Objectives The overall objective of the citizenship training is to provide young people with knowledge of citizenship so they can be part of society as fully-fledged citizens. The training includes personal aspects, such as self-confidence, and educational aspects, such as the principles behind all laws and how citizens have both rights and duties. The specific objectives were to:
Teach young people the basic principles of the law and notion of citizenship.
Introduce them to artistic practices. Strengthen their self-confidence and capacity for pursuing projects.
Strategy and Activities The Local Mission delivered a presentation on the rights and duties of youngsters and the type of support they can get to find a job. The local police station, represented by the Head of Police-Population Relations, talked about the criminal record and its consequences (on employment, the ability to find accommodation, etc.) A local association (called Jeune et Engagé) presented a series of theatrical sketches where young people are dealing with the justice system. The employment agency (Espace Emploi) helped youngsters identify their skills and capacities. The association Action Résilience presented the trajectory of its founder, the French journalist Nicolas Hénin, who was held hostage in Syria from June 2013 and April 2014. Two local associations (IMAJ and Maison des Solidarités) talked about support networks and organised a visit to a charity shop in Sarcelles where people can buy and exchange second-hand items.
Partnership The projects partners were:
The Local Mission for the Social and Professional Inclusion of Young People (Mission locale pour l’insertion sociale et professionnelle des jeunes).
The local police station. The association Jeune et Engagé. The employment agency (Espace Emploi) and the House of Solidarity (Maison des Solidarités).
The Accueil et Culture, Action Résilience and IMAJ associations. The Juvenile Judicial Protection Authority (Protection judiciaire de la jeunesse, PJJ).
The probation service (Service pénitentiaire d’insertion et de probation, SPIP).
Results and Lessons Learnt The training was an innovative, multi-agency project that enabled professionals from various sectors to work together and, more importantly, reached out to young people who are not usually in contact with local support structures. However, only six among the 15 youngsters targeted actually attended the training, which is partly due to a lack of information. The training gave the young attendees an opportunity to meet professionals they might contact later when looking for a job. It also dispelled whatever prejudice they might have had about professions such as journalism and law enforcement. In the future, the content of the training will be developed collaboratively and there will be one single coordinator to facilitate the smooth running of the week. The partners are considering changing the training into a residency, for a shorter period of time, in order to make sure everyone attends all the sessions.
Next Steps The partners want to renew this training because they have clearly identified a need among young petty criminals. They also want to propose the training be considered as community work by judges for young petty criminals aged 18 to 22.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 72,000 Location: North Stockholm, Sweden Official websites: https://www.Kriminalvården.se/swedish-prison-and-probationservice/ https://www.fryshuset.se/verksamhet/exit
Summary The Swedish Prison and Probation Service (SPPS) Sollentuna joined up with the non-governmental organisation Fryshuset–Exit Sweden to organise a workshop for their respective teams. It gathered some 20 probation and prison staff from different regions of Sweden, two representatives from Exit Sweden, an international expert from Belgium, and the Efus staff. The objective was to present the two organisations and their work, and to meet in person in order to strengthen mutual cooperation. The workshop combined formal presentations, discussion and in-depth case work.
Background Sollentuna Probation manages some 450 probationers any given day, including about 5-10 clients with a violent extremist background. Added to these are pre-sentence investigations as well as clients serving prison sentences. These numbers fluctuate as court sentences are handed down. Exit Sweden approached Sollentuna Probation for a partnership in the project in order to strengthen cooperation, given that the two organisations can complement each other and work in synergy. Given the time limitation, they decided to focus on getting to know each other better. The workshop allowed for the respective teams to meet in person and better understand their mutual work and organisations.
Objectives The main objective of the project of organising a joint workshop was to get to know each other better, strengthen cooperation and build a platform for further cooperation and knowledge of our different mandates, functions and available resources.
Strategy and Activities The project consisted in organising a joint workshop between Sollentuna Probation and Fryshusetâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;Exit Sweden through the PREPARE project, which enabled us to also include an external expert as well as the Efus team. The workshop allowed us to discuss our work, our experience and our needs regarding the reintegration into society of violent extremists. We also examined how to complement each other and further cooperate in the future.
Partnership The core partners of this project were Fryshusetâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Exit Sweden and Sollentuna Probation, the regional branch of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service located in the north of Stockholm. Key contributors
to the activity were the Entré project, a one-to-one cognitive-behavioural programme developed within the SPPS, originally designed to support clients to leave organised criminal groups or environments. Moreover, Jonathon Péromet, representing the Belgian probation services (Administration Générale des Maisons de Justice), partnered up and contributed to the workshop.
Results The project gave us better knowledge about our different organisations, our methods and approaches, and the areas where we can — and should — cooperate more closely. In particular, we gained knowledge about Swedish and international practices and approaches regarding pre- and post-release from prison, as well as about promising and good practices for motivating, facilitating and cooperating on cases of offenders involved in and disengaging from violent extremist groups. During the workshop we also got deeper insights into the Belgian approach to clients from violent extremist groups and environments, and the interventions and work carried through there, such as home visits, which is not done in Sweden.
Challenges and Lessons Learnt The main challenge is, as always, the short-term nature of the project. However, the project gave us an invaluable opportunity to cooperate, exchange and work together in the future. Without the project, we wouldn’t have had this opportunity. The main lesson learnt is precisely the need to work closely together on individual cases, as well as on a more organisational level to exchange and share promising and best practices, learn more and constantly develop and bring in new, national and international perspectives and experiences.
Next Steps We will now continue our contact and cooperation, further relations between the Swedish probation service EntrĂŠ programme and Fryshusetâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;Exit Sweden, and disseminate our work and insights through the PREPARE project final publication.
2.8 The Hague
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 539,000 Location: Province of South Holland, Netherlands Official website: https://www.denhaag.nl/en.htm Website or page of the service or office in charge of radicalisation: https://www.denhaag.nl/nl/in-de-stad/veiligheid/tegengaan-vanradicalisering-en-polarisatie.htm
Summary In May 2019 the municipality of The Hague organised a meeting to explore the eventual adaptation of a project used with Northern Irish Unionist/Loyalist combatants41 to the context of returning Dutch Islamist foreign terrorist fighters. The original Northern Irish project employed restorative practice training as a means for promoting non-violence and reintegrating ex-combatants into their communities. The main similarity between the two groups lies in the fact that both have engaged in the use of violence for ideological motives. The project seemed particularly interesting because it sought solutions beyond punitive and securitisation measures. 41. The mostly Protestant Northern Irish who fought to remain part of the UK.
Background The Dutch approach towards radicalisation and extremism is internationally known for being multidisciplinary and inclusive. The system of safety houses — where the various agencies and local NGOs involved in preventing crime discuss individual cases in order to prevent reoffending or, as is the case here, radicalisation — first piloted by the municipality of The Hague has been adopted throughout the Netherlands for some years now. The creation of a legal basis is ensured through the implementation of an agreement referred to as the ‘model covenant’. This approach is based on a combination of penal and security measures on the one hand and care and welfare on the other. While there are good working relations with the Probation Service and Custodial Institutions Agency, there is clearly a separation between the two domains: detention and probation on the one hand, and release and reintegration on the other.
Objectives The pilot project aimed to explore and potentially translate an existing project that was previously conducted using an arguably similar target audience. The main requirement was that it had to provide tools for reintegration and re-socialisation, moving beyond punitive and securitisation measures. Ideally the project would help inmates reflect upon their past actions and their future role in society. Because they might face negative responses and further marginalisation in light of their past, there is also a need to build up their resilience. Ultimately, the project would offer them tools for dealing with their frustrations and urge for activism in a non-violent way.
Strategy and Activities A meeting was organised in May 2019 to gauge the interest of The Hague’s existing partners for a project aimed at reintegration and re-socialisation that would move beyond punitive measures and the exclusive use of criminal law. The primary goal was to garner all the relevant partners’ support for a pilot project aimed at offenders
sentenced for violent radicalism that would be inspired by the restorative justice course offered to inmates in Northern Ireland. The secondary goal was to determine the roles and responsibilities of all participants in implementing the pilot project in the Netherlands. Some cooperative partners were approached before the meeting in order to gauge interest and create support and active commitment towards the project.
Partnership A number of relevant partners were invited to take part in an exploratory meeting prior to designing The Hagueâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pilot project. These were: the Terrorist Wing of the Vught prison; the Dutch Probation Office; the National Coordinator on Terrorism and Security (NCTV according to the Dutch acronym); the Public Prosecutor; Restorative Justice Netherlands; and Leiden University. Other important partners were the police, representatives of the four main Dutch municipalities, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of the Interior and the Confederation of European Probation.
Results Participants in the meeting became more aware of the need to promote initiatives that go beyond the strict framework of security measures and criminal law and they expressed keen interest in developing a pilot project. While we had already gauged their reaction beforehand, we were actually surprised by the enthusiasm shown by all the meeting attendees and even those who had been invited but could not attend.
Challenges and Lessons Learnt In the beginning, the project had an entirely different direction. It took some time to frame it as adapting the restorative justice approach used for Northern Irish Unionist offenders to offenders condemned for violent radicalism in the Netherlands.
Another challenge was engaging with all the appropriate partners and ensuring their timely inclusion into the project in order to make it sustainable after the meeting. The biggest challenge, however, turned out to be the question of ownership and responsibility. The municipality of The Hague was responsible for arranging the meeting, its concept, speakers and attendees, but it was deemed important to avoid placing too much emphasis on its local dimension since the issue of radicalised offenders is a national concern.
Next Steps In the months following implementation, there was a follow-up through a working group that gathered a few, selected partners. The Terrorist Wing of the Vught prison, the Dutch Probation Office, the National Coordinator on Terrorism and Security (NCTV), the Public Prosecutor, Restorative Justice Netherlands and Leiden University will be asked to form a small committee that can work towards an assignment to be taken up by Leiden University in collaboration with Restorative Justice Netherlands to prepare a pilot that could be applied to some inmates of the Vught prison Terrorist Wing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> General Information Population: approx. 45,000 Location: City of Vilvoorde, near Brussels, Belgium Official website: https://www.vilvoorde.be/ Website or page of the service or office in charge of radicalisation: https://www.vilvoorde.be/dienst-deradicalisering
Summary Since 2014, Vilvoorde has been actively investing in a de-radicalisation approach following the high number of youngsters leaving the city to join the fight in Syria. Within the PREPARE project we were offered the opportunity to look at our current working methods and assess what is needed to strengthen our expertise in working with target groups in the context of probation and release. We partnered with Fryshuset Sweden in order to explore alternative methods and adopt a more effective and efficient approach.
Background The outline of the project happened in a phase in which we had seven returnees in prison who were eligible for early release. We decided to be more present in the preliminary trajectories preparing for release, when the individuals are still incarcerated. But a key question remained: what should be the concrete content of accompaniment? On a second level we realised we didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t know much about these individuals, as no information was shared with us on their situation (ideology, behaviour, health) in prison. We thus reached out to all the prisons in order to set cooperation in motion regarding the prisoners from Vilvoorde that were eligible for release. To this day, our approach remains very ad hoc, given the fact that there are no structural, supra-local measures providing such trajectories from within local authorities.
Objectives Our main objective was to explore different strategies to strengthen our existing, multidisciplinary network in working with individuals in probation or release. We opted to have a strong focus on exit work following the example of Exit Sweden. As a first stage, we wanted to offer the opportunity to one of our returnees of exploring the personal process one needs to face before being able to engage as a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;formerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. As a second strategy, we aimed at looking
at different methods of working with individuals in the context of release and probation. We looked for meaningful training that would offer new insights to our current approach.
Strategy and Activities In an initial stage, we organised a working session with Exit Sweden, one of our returnees who was now a former (i.e. had moved away from radicalism), a local law enforcement officer and our head of service. Scientific research has shown that engaging formers in a programme with radicalised offenders can have positive outcomes for both the offender and the former. At the same time, a study visit to the Swedish organisation gave some useful perspectives to the local police officer and our head of service on how to position ourselves towards the individual. Secondly, we implemented training for the larger network of partners (social, repressive and health) to come to a shared methodology in assessing different needs in cases and to overcome difficult questions during decision processes.
Partnership We partnered with Fryshuset, and more specifically with Exit Sweden. Their main role for us was to deliver inspiration and share good practices in working with formers and violent extremists. It has also been very useful to integrate into our approach their insights on trust-building whilst shaping an intervention (theory of motivational interview techniques). Concerning the training for our network of partners, we cooperated with a philosopher who works for an international organisation named Governance and Integrity. His expertise lies in assessing moral dilemmas and how to judge a decision on the grounds of morality.
Results and Lessons Learnt The working session in Stockholm with the returnee offered some interesting perspectives on aspects that are crucial for success when setting up programmes for individuals in release or probation. It was particularly useful to synthesise the experiences of the returnee, the local law enforcement officer and the local coordinator in order to formulate more general recommendations for practitioners. When looking at our broader network, the moral dilemma training appeared to be a strong tool in decision-making whilst working with partners from different sectors (safety, health, wellbeing) that all have different interests and goals in mind. It is our ambition to implement this method in our multidisciplinary platform when confronted with difficult cases and different points of view. At least now we have a guiding principle in these kinds of situations, whereas before we didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t always come to group-supported decisions. While designing the activity we envisioned a very ambitious goal by wanting to develop an exit strategy in Vilvoorde supported by all relevant stakeholders. Not only was this unfeasible within the limitations of the project, but we also acknowledged there were other priorities to overcome at the local level before considering the development of an all-inclusive strategy. Therefore, we downgraded our ambitions and thought of actions that could be of direct benefit to our target group (returnees) and our social and safety partners. The training programmes we offered to our partners do not provide solid answers in all situations and it will always remain a challenge to make the right decisions. However, if you operate from within a clear framework, your chances of success get much higher.
Next Steps In the next phase we will continue to actively monitor the prisoners and the individuals in probation or release. Next to that a strong investment in structural measures with regard to this target group is advised. Therefore, we need support from supra-local levels in order to put this into practice. Until then we will hold on to our current structures.
Part 3 Supporting local authorities in preventing violent radicalisation in release and probation â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Political reflections and recommendations >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 96
This chapter identifies recommendations for local and regional authorities on how to prevent radicalisation through release and during probation in order to facilitate the reintegration of extremist offenders into local communities. Local authorities are in a privileged position to contribute to and even lead such efforts: not only are they the level of governance closest to citizens, having the most direct impact on the lives of people as well as first-hand information about local life, but they also have in-depth expertise and experience in delivering effective local crime and violence prevention policies. Moreover, most local authorities rely on a wide network of external partners, such as civil society organisations, researchers and private-sector initiatives, and as such they can mobilise the necessary resources to implement impactful strategies and measures. Based on the experience gathered through the PREPARE project â&#x20AC;&#x201D; as well as on a strong body of previous work in European cooperation projects on the prevention of radicalisation, violent extremism and reoffending and reintegration â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Efus provides local and regional authorities with the following recommendations. We aim to offer concrete advice, suggestions and reflections to support municipalities in their endeavours in this field. These recommendations should neither be considered as an exhaustive list for all possible cases, nor should they be understood as a one-size-fits-all recipe that could be adapted across Europe. The challenges around extremist offenders, the risk of radicalisation in prison and the concrete needs and opportunities regarding the reintegration of radicalised individuals differ widely across Europe. So do justice systems at national and regional levels. As for all public and social policies and strategies, one model does not fit all. Efus therefore encourages all related stakeholders to deeply scrutinise and discuss these recommendations according to their specific local needs, circumstances, available resources and legal and administrative frameworks, and to modify and adapt them accordingly.
3.1 The need to adopt a cross-extremisms approach and learn from adjacent fields
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Violent extremism can take many different forms, including political extremisms of far-right or far-left movements and different forms of religious extremism. Though the underlying ideologies and strategies may differ, what unites violent extremists is the deployment of means and methods that ignore the lives, rights and fundamental freedoms of others42. Not all forms of violent extremism are present in all territories and local authorities typically conduct an extensive analysis of risks, threats and resources that feeds into the design of their local prevention strategies. While Efus welcomes the design of adapted and tailored strategies, there is a risk of overemphasising or hyper-targeting certain forms of violent extremism. This may come with a certain terminology constrained to religious or political groups as unique targets, and can entail the stigmatisation and securitisation of these social groups. Such stigmatisation must be avoided as it may give rise to further polarisation and further cases of radicalisation. Moreover, the labelling of particular social groups may lead practitioners to lose the opportunity of engaging with adjacent fields, which may have developed effective measures, methodologies and strategies for prevention. Therefore, Efus encourages local and regional authorities to:
ď&#x20AC;´ Adopt a cross-extremisms approach tackling all forms of violent extremism and political violence, whenever suitable to your local needs. Avoid an exclusive focus or biased view on one form of extremism, e.g. Jihadism or Salafism, if this does not strictly correspond to your local situation.
42. For a further discussion of this line of reasoning, see Efus, Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism. Methodological Guide for the Development of a Local Strategy, Paris 2017.
Avoid the use of discriminatory or “branding” terms to address local or regional extremism as they may lead to the stigmatisation of wider religious, political or social groups and are conducive to further polarisation and radicalisation.
Be aware that different forms of extremism interact and tend to reinforce and amplify each other, creating a vicious circle of anti-democratic sentiment and violence. In order to break this dynamic, prevention strategies should target all forms of violent extremism.
Learn from adjacent fields, building on the work already done by other local agencies and practitioners in terms of socio-therapeutic approaches and methodologies and adapting them to local needs. For example, there are in many countries well developed exit and de-radicalisation programmes that target members of gangs or right-wing or left-wing terrorist groups. Build on these experiences rather than reinvent the wheel.
3.2 Setting up a local multi-agency strategy to deal with violent extremist offenders (VEOs)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prevention and reintegration require a holistic approach and therefore multi-agency cooperation is key to facilitate these processes during a prison sentence, in probation time and upon release. To meet the different needs and challenges that may arise along the way, effective cooperation and coordination among a range of stakeholders from different professional fields is necessary. This includes actors from the justice system and probation services, the police and other law enforcement agencies, public education institutions, social and healthcare services, youth organisations, local faith communities, associations and the private sector.
Local and regional authorities are well placed to lead local prevention and reintegration strategies, including during probation and release time, as they have a solid knowledge of the local needs, the specific cases they need to manage and the available resources. When such a local strategy is not in place and cooperation with relevant stakeholders is not established, considerable opportunities may be missed and valuable resources and efforts may be wasted. In order to avoid such losses, we encourage local and regional authorities to:
Support and lead the setting up of local multi-agency partnerships considering your current and future target group (VEOs) and their needs in line with the larger local or regional violence and crime prevention policies, and encouraging safety partnerships among the different local stakeholders.
Start working in “peace times”, previous to periods of high demand, in order to be ready for particular challenges, e.g. around the release of single or groups of VEOs at the end of a prison sentence.
Define your goals and strategy and identify the stakeholders you’ll need to enrol based on the VEOs’ needs and the expertise (individual needs and risk assessments) and support to be provided by these agencies and other private or public organisations (local NGOs, local businesses, etc.)
Bear in mind the legal constraints and your legal competences when defining the multi-agency strategy and also on a case-by-case basis.
Raise awareness among the involved stakeholders and your own staff about the benefits of collaborating and working within a multiagency, trans-disciplinary and pluri-professional partnership.
Establish protocols and Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) among the involved agencies, NGOs and other practitioners. Settle the aspects you need agreements on, e.g. clarify the roles and tasks of the different involved services, establish rules or procedures regarding information sharing, and clarify procedures for case management or referrals.
Include all the actors involved in the process in focus group sessions where the needs, concerns and resources of the different actors could be inventoried to define a common and inclusive strategy.
Consider adopting other related models linked to the restorative justice approach, building upon your strengths and social cohesion level, addressing exclusion, conflict or potential conflict between groups that could result in radicalisation or violence, such as the Restorative City43 model.
3.3 Ensuring continuity between prison, probation and release
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prisons appear as breeding grounds for radicalisation, but they must also be considered as an opportunity to start working on disengagement and de-radicalisation processes. Rehabilitation and reintegration therefore must begin in prison, but there is a need to ensure continuity during probation time and upon release, which requires stability among the agencies and practitioners involved in the process. Unfortunately, local and regional authorities — even when they take the lead in setting up local platforms to boost collaboration and cooperation among the different stakeholders — can sometimes struggle to ensure such continuity due to legal, structural and bureaucratic limitations, as well as sometimes inflexible institutional cultures.
43. On this concept, see for example An Invitation to RJ City(SM) by Daniel Van Ness – presented in a plenary session at “The Next Step: Developing Restorative Communities, Part 2,” the IIRP’s 8th International Conference on Conferencing, Circles and other Restorative Practices, October 18-20, 2006 http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/beth06_vanness.pdf.
In order to ensure stable and continuous casework and avoid the loss of information and expertise when transitioning between different stages of the prevention and reintegration process, Efus recommends that local and regional authorities:
Pay special attention to the “transition management”, ensuring (where possible) the continuity of the same practitioners along the whole process, strengthening the trust relationship, with a clear reflection of this issue in the relevant protocols and MoUs.
Enable practitioners from local NGOs or community-based organisations to establish a stable and long-lasting working relationship with clients, as they can work across institutional boundaries and continue the working relationship with clients over different transitional stages of the process.
Foresee the close collaboration between these local stakeholders and prison services in your protocols or MoUs in order to strengthen the relationship of trust with the clients and their families and ensure the continuity of the process. Even when relationships are personal, try to create a wider structure that goes beyond individual employees. The PREPARE project is a possible model to stimulate such collaboration in other regions, fostering collaborative work and learning experiences.
Pay special attention to the societal, organisational, family and personal factors that could facilitate or hinder desistance or disengagement.
Work on removing barriers to reintegration such as the lack of legal economic opportunities, negative stereotypes and legislation that restricts economic activity and ability to fully contribute to society.
3.4 Fostering risk assessment capacities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The “risk assessment” concept has inspired widespread discussions and research because of the multiple consequences it entails for the security and social arenas and of its role as a determining factor in the design and implementation of comprehensive treatments for VEOs in prison, probation and upon release44. Multiple instruments and tools have been developed recently by different governments and organisations, most of them focused on assessing the threats that these inmates can pose, the risk of seeing other inmates radicalising, of recidivism, etc. The need to develop a specific individual needs assessment is generally accepted as key for rehabilitation and reintegration processes and is instrumental when designing individual support and after-care measures during probation or upon release, while also taking into account an individual’s specific radicalisation drivers. In order to best use such instruments, Efus recommends that local and regional authorities:
Rely on existing assessment tools and further develop and adapt them to ensure they respond to local needs and correspond to existing frameworks at the local or regional level.
Ensure proper access and coordination with intelligence agencies where relevant in accordance with the protocols established to share sensitive information, and avoid creating conflicts of interest by respecting the different roles and responsibilities of the involved actors while keeping the client informed of this approach.
44. For an overview of this topic and an introduction to different risk-assessment tools and their strengths and weaknesses see RAN Ex Post Paper: Developing, implementing and using risk assessment for violent extremist and terrorist offenders June 2018.
Keep a clear delineation between risk assessment and mentoring, assigning different actors to each task. The mentor must never be the risk assessment person, who can be commissioned by third parties, e.g. security agencies, and serve different functions.
Encourage regular use of these instruments, as the results of rehabilitation programmes could be regularly improved on the basis of the knowledge gained by prison or probation staff in their interactions with inmates or probationers and therefore the intervention measures could be adapted ad hoc according to these updated results.
Avoid a purely risk-centred approach and analysis, which may lead to an overly security-focused perspective on preventive measures. Make sure to include competencies and resources as well as potential for change on behalf of the client as well as the local community, which may enable you to map out positive paths for development and reintegration.
3.5 Training, and again training
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Skilled and knowledgeable practitioners are key assets for all aspects of urban security and crime prevention policies. Over the past decades, there has been a growing consensus that proper, specific training and capacity-building programmes are key to developing practitioners’ skills and equipping them to master their complex, daily tasks. When working on radicalisation and violent extremism, and particularly when in direct contact with violent extremist offenders, a solid base of knowledge and capacities is particularly important as these are contested issues, which are frequently treated with a certain sense of alarmism and “scandalism”.
When working with VEOs, sensitivity and understanding other cultural and religious norms, values and expressions are considered to be of paramount importance for creating professional relationships. Prejudices and fear among professionals when VEOs are in prison, probation or upon their release can undermine these relations and hinder de-radicalisation and disengagement efforts. Direct work with VEOs requires a specific skill set, which needs to be fostered through targeted and continuous training efforts45. In order to facilitate suitable training for all actors involved, Efus recommends that local and regional authorities:
Provide prison and probation staff with training sessions focused on radicalisation processes and indicators of violent extremism.
Extend targeted training programmes to other practitioners involved in the process in prison, during probation time or upon release, whether social workers, psychologists, educators or religious leaders.
Share good practices, handbooks and tools that could inspire other institutions and agencies’ own training modules.
Deliver common training sessions for different groups of professionals with the same training needs and expectations to enable exchange across professions.
Focus training modules on practical skills for interaction with clients – especially first responder skills in situations in which expressions of group hatred or violent extremism occur or in which stakeholders may assume that such is the case. First responder skills are needed to avoid escalation and mutual alienation between offender/potential client and potential mentor/representative of mainstream, liberal society.
Pay special attention to long-term training. Most questions do not arise until professionals are implementing what they have learned in 45. Information on a large number of training programmes for prison and probation staff as well as other front line staff can be found in the RAN Collection on Training for First-Line Practitioners: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ ran-best-practices/ran-training_en.
training. Generally, one-day workshops without follow-up are unsustainable and ineffective.
Deliver training sessions for local authority staff involved in the local multi-agency platform/strategy, and consider raising awareness among these practitioners on the methodology and benefits of adopting these approaches.
Consider exploring other training approaches, including methodologies and related skills developed in the field of restorative justice.
3.6 Providing exit work
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Exit work is focused on providing support to those VEOs who wish to leave a radical and violent group and/or quit a violent mindset or behaviour. The process is also referred to as de-radicalisation (leaving radical ideology), disengagement (leaving a radical environment and violent behaviour), re-socialisation or reintegration (reintegrating into a local community). Leaving extremist mindsets and environments and rebuilding links with mainstream society can be a lengthy and complicated process. Exit work is typically piloted by specialised associations with highly skilled and equipped staff, which includes former extremists who can speak from personal experience, social workers and psychologists. However, it also requires the involvement of multiple actors, including prison and probation staff, community representatives, mental health services, NGOs and local authorities in order to properly meet the clients’ needs across the whole process. In order to play a productive role in this process and enable effective exit work, Efus recommends that local and regional authorities:
Provide support for those who are ready to disengage and/or de-radicalise by meeting their needs and those of their families along the
process and ensuring the involvement of a specialised and professional exit organisation.
Learn from established programmes, identifying good practices, experiences and lessons learnt, e.g. from those assembled in the topical RAN collection on exit strategies46.
Train all involved stakeholders on key methodologies and strategies that can foster and nourish VEOs’ motivation to leave extremist groups and mindsets, such as motivational interviewing.
Learn from good practice literature on distancing and exit work. There are several good examples available, such as the EU’s Exit Europe project 2019-20, which provides good practice guidelines and training for exit work.
Secure maximal confidentiality for exit workers. They need to be able to provide confidentiality and therefore, in the long run, to be granted by law the right to refuse to testify in court about their clients. However, they also must be aware of the limits of this confidentiality.
3.7 Focusing on reintegration
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The overwhelming majority of VEOs who are condemned and imprisoned will eventually be released. A prison sentence itself is not a prevention strategy but only and exclusively a punishment for a criminal act. To prevent reoffending, a holistic strategy is needed that does not only aim to disengage and de-radicalise the VEO, but eventually seeks to foster their reintegration into society. It is generally accepted that re-socialisation and reintegration processes must begin in prison and continue in probation time. Therefore, the 46. See RAN, Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Exit Strategies, 2018.
prison conditions, management and environment must be adapted, ensuring a “safe-space” feeling among inmates so that a sentence can be an appropriate starting point for an effective rehabilitation programme culminating in the offender’s reintegration into the local community. Local and regional authorities have a relevant role to play in creating or ensuring that conditions are met to facilitate the success of this reintegration process. In order to better involve them and achieve the expected results, we recommend that:
The design of ad hoc re-socialisation programmes be based on the results obtained through risk-and-needs assessment tools as well as on the research on needs and resilience. This will ensure a balanced approach combining security and social measures.
The transition process to the outside is equally delicate and crucial; all the practitioners involved at the beginning of the process should stay on board outside prison. The relationship of trust among all the actors involved with the former VEO and their family and community is a prerequisite in order to achieve the expected results.
Identify small and short-term goals or milestones to prevent feelings of frustration and the abandonment of the programmes.
Ensure families and local communities are involved in order to facilitate the re-socialisation processes and identify and prevent the risk of recidivism, alongside the support of grassroots and community-based organisations and religious communities.
Support these families to meet their psychological, material or health needs resulting from the return of the former VEO.
Work with local communities beforehand to address existing biases and therefore prevent the possible stigmatisation of the former VEO.
Take into consideration restorative justice approaches, including family group conferences and restorative community circles, identifying and meeting the VEO and the community’s expectations.
3.8 Strengthening cooperation with civil society
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Civil society organisations can make crucial contributions to the prevention of violence and crime in general and more specifically have a key role to play in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in prison, probation and release. Indeed, NGOs can be in charge of large parts of the prevention and re-socialisation programmes and provide key services and offers in the process, depending on their specific expertise, profiles and skills. Importantly, when working with VEOs, NGOs can assume a key intermediary role that representatives from local authorities and other forms of government are not always able to play given their status and identification as representatives of the state. Typically, NGOs can be in very close contact with local communities, credibly represent their culture and values, and may thus have better access to clients. Importantly with regard to disengagement, de-radicalisation and reintegration work, NGOs have also been able to work with formers who can be particularly credible and convincing voices for exit programmes. Local and regional authorities should thus contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for such cooperation. We recommend that they:
ď&#x20AC;´ Map out all relevant local and regional NGOs and civil society organisations with experience in the field in order to prioritise their involvement according to the local needs and the interaction with other agencies and stakeholders. It is advisable to take into consideration the work already done by NGOs from adjacent fields that have existing and efficient structures.
ď&#x20AC;´ Identify the real involvement of the selected organisations in each step of the prevention or re-integration plan (when defining the local goals, drafting the plan, during the implementation phase or when monitoring and evaluating the actions).
Support the organisations involved in the process by providing them with specific and tailored training, funding local initiatives and involving them when necessary in the platforms and multi-agency approaches, setting information-sharing protocols and identifying the roles of all involved actors.
3.9 Cooperating at local, national, European and international level
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Preventing violent extremism in prison, probation and upon release is a shared commitment of both local and regional authorities around the European Union. Even when there are clear guidelines of action and recommendations from European institutions and other international fora, the process of putting into practice these proposals can be challenging. The exchange of knowledge and good practices on a European level can strengthen the link and continuity between European and national and regional strategies. Moreover, the different stages of implementation of these policies in different regions in Europe help less experienced local and regional authorities learn from other municipalities and regions that have already implemented more advanced strategies. In order to foster this collaboration and cooperation, Efus recommends that local and regional authorities:
Invest the necessary resources in meaningful translation of content into local context, so that identified good practices can be adapted and transferred to other regions.
Organise study visits and peer-to-peer meetings between local and regional authorities to boost cooperation and set up professional networks on the ground.
Create local, national and international networks in which knowledge is shared between policymakers, researchers and practitioners to offer added value in terms of capacity building.
Step up the exchange of knowledge and good practices between local authorities, and focus on identifying and clarifying the role of local authorities in preventing radicalisation during probation and release in other regions, and the best ways to strengthen it.
3.10 Dealing with returnee FTFs locally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The acronym FTF has come to stand for Foreign Terrorist Fighters, i.e. individuals who have left their homeland for global war zones to receive terrorist training or engage in civil war. While this is not a new phenomenon, it reached a peak between 2011 and 2015, when approximately 5,000 people left Europe for Iraq and Syria to fight for Daesh. A number of these fighters have already returned to Europe or are expected to do so in the near future47. The “returnees” trend in the European Union entails some specific challenges for local and regional authorities as they have to deal with the returnees’ unique background and meet their needs according to the different return pathways they can be involved in within the criminal process. To facilitate this task and adapt the local and regional structures to meet returnees’ needs, Efus that recommends local and regional authorities:
Learn from other, more experienced local and regional authorities’ strategies and approaches to identify possible gaps and good practices. 47. See RAN Manual Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their Families, July 2017 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf.
Provide local authorities’ staff with specific training to deal with these cases.
Design the re-socialisation and reintegration process on the basis of an individual needs-and-risk assessment, attending to the specific needs and circumstances surrounding each situation.
Start the re-socialisation process as soon as possible to minimise the threat returnees can pose to society, their families and themselves.
Strengthen, when necessary, the role of local community services to deal with the families’ material needs (employment, housing and schooling).
Involve local, community-based organisations to strengthen the relationship of trust with the returnees and their families.
Pay special attention to information-sharing policies considering the sensitive nature of the data related to the returnees’ background and links with terrorist organisations, and the increased level of information sharing that is required among the contributing departments and agencies in order to strengthen cooperation and take evidencebased measures.
3.11 Local communication strategies around VEOs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The presence of VEOs in a locality or neighbourhood can generate or exacerbate social and political tensions and lead to social polarisation. In particular, the release of VEOs who are linked to groups that have committed terrorist attacks or have played a role in preparing or executing such acts may give rise to public debates around questions of political responsibility, which pose challenges for elected officials.
In such cases, local authorities need to reflect and decide on how to communicate with the local population. While communication strategies may differ with regard to a particular situation and local context, it seems reasonable that active measures be taken to reassure the local population through local communication campaigns and specific policies addressing their concerns. Moreover, local communication should also challenge tendencies in public debate that may lead to “labelling”, discrimination or stigmatisation of related communities. To support local and regional communities in addressing this challenge, Efus recommends that they:
Work beforehand with the media, raising awareness on the proper terms to use and possible approaches to avoid exacerbating social tensions and polarisation.
Ensure maximum anonymity and actively disguise case stories when providing information to media.
Work on the institutional communication strategy to identify the different targets and therefore design and prioritise the messages.
Provide specific training on communication strategies on this issue to local authority staff.
Deliver specific awareness-raising campaigns highlighting the benefits of exit programmes and probation, and release after-care measures targeting local authorities (both staff and higher ranks), communities and other local stakeholders. The campaigns should also identify the role played by local communities and civil society in such programmes.
Highlight the broader context of violence prevention strategies and general measures to prevent recidivism to show that work on VEO cases follow a well-established and evidence-based strategy, which is adapted to the particular challenges of specific cases.
3.12 Strengthening alternative measures to imprisonment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use of alternative measures to imprisonment for VEOs charged for crimes related to terrorism remains uncommon in the majority of Member States due to the social alert this sort of action entails. This trend is slowly evolving into a more comprehensive approach in line with national and regional strategies to prevent and fight violent extremism and radicalisation, including soft measures and approaches that could directly contribute to the success of any disengagement or de-radicalisation programme conducive to re-socialisation. Recalling the principle that prison shall be used as a last resort, it seems necessary to identify the proper measures and sanctions to be imposed and avoid imprisonment when possible, as it can sometimes actually lead to further radicalisation processes. It is particularly important to keep this in mind when dealing with young violent extremist offenders. Indeed, using prosecution and imprisonment as the only path to the exclusion of rehabilitation and re-socialisation measures will only delay the threat posed to society by these individuals. In order to strengthen the use of alternative measures to imprisonment and facilitate their acceptance by society, Efus recommends that local and regional authorities:
Define a balanced distribution between repressive and preventive measures when drafting their action plan to deal with the phenomenon.
Bear in mind the cooperation with other agencies and learn from the experience gained in other adjacent fields.
Design and deliver a proper communication campaign to clearly explain to the public how these measures can benefit society and contribute to general safety and wellbeing.
ď&#x20AC;´ Seriously consider probation as an efficient tool to facilitate the VEOsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; reintegration and resettlement, although it does not necessarily lead to their de-radicalisation. However, it is clear that probation can create proper conditions for the success of de-radicalisation programmes.
ď&#x20AC;´ Consider setting up a reward and incentive system linked to the commitment of the probationers and inmates to the programmes during probation time, when serving their sentence and upon release.
Conclusion >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At its outset in 2017, the PREPARE project was a particularly challenging and daring endeavour for the involved partners for a number of reasons:
The topic of the prevention of radicalisation in probation and release was novel for local authorities and particularly challenging given the rising number of violent extremist offenders who were serving prison sentences and the prospect of significant numbers of returnees facing trials and detention in Europe.
Local authorities were motivated to get involved and bring in their skills and resources, in particular regarding prevention. However, criminal justice services are typically beyond their scope of responsibility and they thus heavily relied on the cooperation and involvement of agencies at regional and national levels of government.
While the European Union had clearly identified rehabilitation and reintegration in prison and during probation as a priority policy area of their counter terrorism strategy, there was a lack of exchange of experiences and identification of good practices in this field – very few programme evaluations were available and there was no reliable databank of good or experimented practices. In the two years during which PREPARE received funding, the project partners took on these challenges and put in place a range of activities to respond to them: they worked together to establish a state of the art of prevention practices in seven EU member states; they fostered an intense European exchange with coordination meetings and seminars; they teamed up internationally to implement nine local pilot projects; they developed a set of recommendations to inspire their future work and that of their peers; and they contributed to the writing and dissemination of this handbook.
In this work, a few key insights that apply to PREPARE’s subject matter but also urban security policies at large were of key importance and should be reiterated:
In our work to prevent radicalisation and reoffending, we need to privilege long-term strategies and seek to create the conditions for our projects and initiatives to be sustainable and evolve over time. Processes of disengagement, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation are particularly lengthy and this requires stable conditions and partnerships, hence stable frameworks and funding schemes.
Holistic prevention strategies rely on a broad and varied network of dedicated partners. A list of services and institutions that can contribute should include at least: the state public security force, judicial services, prison services, a state representative (national or federal), local police, social workers, the community youth and sport service, stakeholders from the world of culture, health services, professional integration, housing services, local associations, victim support associations, families and associations representing families, university research and representatives of religious communities.
In the complex field of the prevention of radicalisation in probation and release, it is necessary to work simultaneously on many different levels: dedicated prevention programmes in prison should not only target offenders charged with crimes relating to extremism and terrorism but also the general prison population; risk assessment schemes should be developed taking into account the specific local contexts and individual assessments carried out for individual violent extremist offenders; exit programmes should be provided to accompany those willing and motivated to leave extremist groups and disengage from violence; case management procedures should be put in place to ensure a continuous accompaniment and monitoring of VEOs; multi-agency platforms gathering all relevant stakeholders should be established and meet regularly to assess risk situations and ensure a swift reaction if needed; and training offers should be developed and made available to a wide variety of stakeholders in order to continuously increase skills and abilities.
As investments in extremist offenders in particular and persons convicted of crime in general is a controversial topic, political support is needed to communicate with and convince the public that prevention schemes in prison and probation — as well as exit and rehabilitation programmes — are important components of a democratic and human rights-based urban security policy. Mayors and other elected officials are particularly well placed to promote such a view and organise public acceptance of and support for dedicated projects. What the PREPARE project has made particularly clear is that neither preventing radicalisation in probation and release nor disengagement and de-radicalisation are the tasks of criminal justice services alone. A holistic approach to these matters that takes into account the different forms of extremism, the specific needs of individual offenders, the various contexts of local communities and the vast differences among prevention strategies and partnerships at municipal and regional levels must rely on a much broader network of stakeholders. One of the particular strengths of a European cooperation project on this topic is that it draws our attention to the shared challenges we face, even if local contexts and working conditions differ widely. PREPARE has thus shown that any programme addressing the risk of violent extremism and supporting disengagement from violence should be designed to tackle the key drivers of violent extremism in the specific political and social contexts in which they occur. Furthermore, their content and style should be adapted to the degree in which an individual is in a process leading to committing serious violent acts. Programmes to prevent those at risk of escalating towards violence will thus be different from those who are serving sentences for actual violence, and these in turn will be different from programmes designed to support those who wish to disengage from violence. While these categories may overlap, prevention, risk management and exit programmes must be distinguished and also adapted to the local contexts in which they will be implemented. Local authorities are best placed to steer such adaptation processes, as they are the level of governance that is the closest to citizens and communities on the ground.
Finally, a key takeaway from PREPARE is that local authorities and specialised NGOs across Europe already have a wealth of knowledge and expertise at their disposal. Across Europe, many initiatives, projects and strategies have been designed and implemented to encourage extremist offenders to disengage and de-radicalise and to prevent further radicalisation in prison, probation and release. The experience gathered in these local practices is a key resource for the future development of prevention policies and will play a key role in informing such efforts at national, European and international levels. Investments in such strategies pay off, as they make a decisive contribution to the pacification of our societies. This guidebook belongs to its users. It reflects the insights and outcomes of a short but intense project implementation process. The participating local authorities and NGOs have made the choice of taking a positive approach to a complex and challenging but timely and pressing topic, generously sharing their first-hand experience and know-how, and making it available to their peers. Together, we hope that it can contribute to and strengthen our future efforts to overcome extremist violence and help those who have embarked on the path of violent radicalisation to disengage and reintegrate into their local community.
Resource Guide >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This section presents a set of relevant documents with regard to the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism in the context of prison, probation and release at the local level, as well as the rehabilitation and re-socialisation of violent extremist offenders. It provides concise descriptions of the main aims and contents of the presented sources, aiming to facilitate access to these key policy documents which can be helpful to provide context, guidance, advice and practical recommendations. The selection of sources is by no means comprehensive; it focuses on sources that may be relevant for security practitioners and prevention workers at local and regional levels.
Council of Europe Prison: A Breeding Ground for Radicalisation and Violent Extremism? Council of Europe, 2018 This publication assembles handbooks, guidelines, good practice examples, meeting reports and declarations from the Council of Europe targeting prison and probation staff, aiming to support them in preventing and countering violent extremism in their professional contexts. It proposes guiding principles, tools and advice based on an approach that emphasises a balance between human rights, security and effective criminal justice.
Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Council of Europe, 2016 These guidelines, adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2016, recommend measures to be taken by prison and probation services in order to prevent persons under their responsibility from being radical-
ised and accepting violent extremist views which may lead to terrorist acts, as well as to detect, manage and resettle radicalised persons. They explain the basic principles of PVE (prevention of violent extremism) work; sketch out the contribution prison and probation services can make in this regard; give advice on detection, prevention, and dealing with radicalisation and in prison; and outline measures of post release work, as well as research, evaluation and communication.
Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Council of Europe, 2016 Designed for use by prison and probation staff, this handbook offers practical advice to prison and probation services, and provides examples of methods and tools already used. Covering a range of techniques, procedures and programmes that can be used to detect, prevent and manage complex cases of radicalisation and violent extremism, it can support the establishment of improvement procedures. They include risk assessment and intervention programmes; issues related to classification, allocation, regime and treatment; and inter-agency co-operation between prison and probation, intelligence services, law enforcement and other stakeholders.
Organising Intercultural and Interreligious Activities â&#x20AC;&#x201C; A Toolkit for Local Authorities Council of Europe, 2015 As part of its Strategy to Combat Radicalisation at Grassroots Level adopted in 2015, the Council of Europe has published this toolkit aimed at informing and raising awareness among European local authorities. It assembles legal and literature resources, a database of education and training offers, and best practice examples, along with guidelines and recommendations underlining the need for local and regional authorities to support de-radicalisation programmes and involve civil society. A dedicated section presents best practices in the field of exit work.
European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism – Methodological Guide for the Development of a Local Strategy European Forum for Urban Security, 2017 This methodological guide, produced during the second phase of Efus’ LIAISE project, offers step-by-step guidance to support local authorities in designing, implementing and evaluating a local radicalisation prevention strategy as part of their overall crime prevention policy. It defines guiding principles for such strategies and presents concrete steps towards their successful implementation, including political mobilisation, forming a partnership, training local stakeholders, conducting a shared diagnostic, communication, design and evaluating local pilot projects.
Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level European Forum for Urban Security, 2016 This guidebook results from the Efus-led European cooperation project Local Authorities Against Violent Extremism (LIAISE) 1. It sketches out key concepts and definitions local practitioners need to know with regard to radicalisation and violent extremism. The publication identifies key fields for prevention activities at the local level, including local multi-agency cooperation, family support, resilience building, de-radicalisation and disengagement, and counter-narratives. Each topical section includes practices and tools experimented by local authorities across Europe and can inspire future actions implemented by cities and regions across Europe.
Prevention of Re-offending. A Training Toolkit for Local Stakeholders European Forum for Urban Security, 2012 This publication highlights the importance of a local policy to prevent re-offending and aims to support local authorities in preparing and
training local stakeholders to successfully implement prevention programmes at the local level. It contains a guide on how to build such training programmes in five steps: assessment, design, development, implementation and evaluation (ADDIE model). This training tool kit was conceived to be read together with the E-learning platform http:// efus.eu/stop-reoffending_module/ which contains videos and further tools to support local prevention practitioners.
Innovative Strategies for the Prevention of Re-offending. Practices and Recommendations for Local Players European Forum for Urban Security, 2009 Resulting from a European cooperation project involving partners from the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Romania and Spain, this guidebook looks into the place of the prevention of re-offending in local security policies in Europe. It proposes a common methodology for prevention projects in this field, presents innovative practices in the fields of housing, employment, education, healthcare, family relations and debt management, and features 14 recommendations to inspire local stakeholders in designing more effective strategies to prevent recidivism.
Cities Against Terrorism. Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism European Forum for Urban Security, 2007 This publication, resulting from a European cooperation project involving local authorities and researchers from across Europe, aims to support cities and regions in defining targeted prevention strategies against terrorism. It features insights from British, German, Polish and Portuguese case studies. Recognising that fighting terrorism is a local issue and that cities have a role to play in international counterterrorism policies, it sets out guiding principles for local prevention strategies, including sections on communication, crisis management, intercommunity dialogue and victim support.
European Union High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), Final Report European Commission, 2018 This report, produced by the HLCEG-R, aims to offer advice to the EU on how to improve cooperation and collaboration among the different stakeholders involved in PVE policies, on the further development of EU prevent policies, and on future, more structured cooperation mechanisms at the EU level. It includes a set of principles and recommendations for the implementation of targeted and effective measures to prevent and counter radicalisation at both the EU and national levels. It aims to maximise the added value of EU cooperation in the area of radicalisation and avoid duplication with existing mandates and roles of other groups. A section of these recommendations is dedicated to the field of “prison and probation, rehabilitation and reintegration” and includes advice on exchange of experiences and good practices, research, funding, training, guidance and further policy development.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism European Commission, 2016 This communication addresses the EU’s contribution to support Member States in preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism. It details this contribution with regard to seven key topical areas: (1) supporting research, evidence building, monitoring and networking; (2) countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online; (3) addressing radicalisation in prisons; (4) promoting inclusive education and EU common values; (5) promoting an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young people; (6) the security dimension of addressing radicalisation; (7) the international dimension. Regarding radicalisation in prison, it details five key actions,
among which are supporting the development of rehabilitation programmes for prisoners by Member States and the exchange of best practices and policies in the field of the execution of penal sanctions.
Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Combatting Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Prevention Mechanisms at Local and Regional Level EU Committee of the Regions, 2016 In this opinion document published in 2016, the European Committee of the Regions aims to identify the specific role of local and regional authorities in preventing and countering radicalisation and violent extremism. Defining human rights and diversity as a starting point, it develops a set of 70 targeted recommendations for local and regional authorities that stress, among others, the importance of combining individual de-radicalisation programmes with measures such as establishing partnerships with community representatives, investing in social and neighbourhood projects to break down economic and geographical marginalisation, and running mentoring schemes for disaffected and excluded young people who are at risk of violent radicalisation.
Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Member States Meeting Within the Council on Enhancing the Criminal Justice Response to Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism and Violent Extremism Council of the European Union, 2015 These conclusions adopted by the council in 2015 seek to contribute to the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. They urge all relevant stakeholders to implement the appropriate actions whenever and wherever possible and stress the essential role of local actors. The conclusions outline key actions in seven areas: (1) structure and organisation of detention regimes; (2) alternative or additional measures to prosecution and/or detention; (3) integration, rehabilitation and reintegration; (4) training; (5) learning from monitoring and exchange of practices; (6) funding; (7) external dimension.
Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalisation to Violence. Recommendations on the Effective Use of Appropriate Alternative Measures for Terrorism-Related Offenses Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2016 Resulting from expert meetings conducted by the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, this document develops a set of recommendations regarding the range of measures that might be employed at the national or local level as alternatives to pre-trial detention or post-conviction incarceration for individuals charged with, or convicted of, terrorism-related offences. The recommendations aim to frame this complex and novel issue, encouraging states to consider broadening already existing alternative measures to include violent extremist offenders.
Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012 In this memorandum, the GCTF presents a list of 25 recommended principles and good practices to strengthen existing or develop new programmes or policies to rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremist offenders and address more general issues in the context of prison radicalisation. The outlined principles relate to, among others, programme development, standards for prison facilities, intake and risk assessment, the role of different services and related stakeholders, reintegration components and training courses.
Addendum to the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012 This complement to the Rome Memorandum offers an analysis of the various internal and external challenges and obstacles authorities face
in the management and reintegration of extremist and terrorist offenders, as well as a number of suggested strategies to overcome these impediments. It formulates a set of good practices concerning the legal frameworks national governments should put in place in order to enable and support comprehensive and effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders.
International Centre for CounterTerrorism Background Paper: Roundtable Expert Meeting & Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Core Principles & Good Practices International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012 This background paper offers key definitions, sketches out goals and objectives, and delineates the roles of the involved stakeholders regarding programmes to rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremist offenders. It advocates a holistic and culture-specific approach that must be tailored to the relevant local contexts and individuals. It also outlines general principles and good practices that are preconditions for the effectiveness and success of such initiatives.
International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalisation The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, 2015 This policy document sets out basic principles along with a set of 16 practical recommendations regarding prison and prisoner management as it relates to preventing and addressing radicalisation leading to violent extremism among prisoners and prison staff. Focusing on prison setting and the risks and opportunities they offer with regard to violent extremist offenders, the recommendations take a preventative
approach. They do not specifically address questions of re-socialisation, however do include a section on aftercare and transition management.
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) The Challenge of Resocialisation: Dealing with Radicalised Individuals During and After Imprisonment (Ex Post Paper) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2018 Resulting from a RAN Policy and Practice event held in September 2018, this paper aims to provide policymakers, practitioners and prison and probation staff with information on how to deal with radicalised individuals. It identifies key issues affecting the reintegration of former violent extremist offenders, among which are challenges and barriers to reintegration, transition management and post release planning, risk and resilience assessment, multi-agency cooperation and staff training. It addresses both re-socialisation and reintegration of extremist offenders and the prevention of recidivism.
Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their Families (RAN Manual) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2018 This manual gathers extensive knowledge and expertise on responses to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their families upon their return to Europe from global war zones. It contains sections on facts, figures and profiles of FTFs, investigation and risk assessment, multi-agency cooperation, prosecution, alternatives to prison, re-socialisation, and the specific topic of child returnees. A dedicated section assembles recommendations that practitioners from the RAN network forward to EU Member States with regard to risk assessment, multi-agency cooperation, prosecution and imprisonment, re-socialisation, and cross-cutting issues such as gender.
Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Exit Strategies Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2018 This paper gives an introduction to exit strategies, i.e. the setting up and management of de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes aimed at changing extremist worldviews away from embracing violence (de-radicalisation), making them end their involvement in violent activism (disengagement), and facilitating their reintegration into society. It sketches out key aims and methods of such programmes, presents almost 20 practical examples of such programmes from across Europe, and draws some conclusions and lessons learnt from these experiences.
High-Level Conference on Child Returnees and Released Prisoners (Ex Post Paper) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2018 Paper resulting from the RAN High-Level Conference on Child Returnees and Released Prisoners held in October 2018. It summarises results from the discussions held between policymakers and practitioners from across Europe on, on the one hand, dealing with child returnees from Iraq and Syria and child refugees fleeing from conflict zones to the EU, and, on the other, measures to take to accompany and monitor radicalised detainees released from prison and prevent recidivism. Regarding the latter, the paper makes a range of suggestions on how to improve existing measures, arguing for a systematisation and standardisation of the procedures to follow, and sketches out recommendations for the future focus and further development of such interventions.
Tabletop Exercises: Practicing Multi-Agency Cooperation (Ex Post Paper) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2018 This paper, resulting from a RAN Local Working Group meeting held in November 2018, assembles key insights and takeaways on how to foster multi-agency cooperation and build a consistent and reliable network to safeguard individuals at risk and prevent radicalisation at the local level. It contains practical recommendations and exercises on the role of local authorities and the added value of cooperating with partners on different levels. A part of the paper is dedicated to an exercise on the topic of dealing with a returning FTF at the municipal level.
The Role of Family and Social Networks in the Rehabilitation of (Violent) Extremist and Terrorist Offenders (Ex Post Paper) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2018 Sketching out the results of an experts meeting held in 2018, this paper focuses on the particular role of family and social networks in rehabilitation and re-socialisation programmes. It focuses on the needs and resources families and social networks have regarding such initiatives and seeks to define the role of family care service in working with violent extremist offenders.
Prison and Probation Working Group Meeting on Multi-Agency Cooperation (Ex Post Paper) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2016 This paper documents a meeting of RANâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Prison and Probation Working Group held in 2016 on the topic of multi-agency cooperation to deal with radicalised offenders. It identifies a number of problems and challenges related to multi-agency cooperation that prison and probation staff face in their daily work, and provides a better insight into how effective cooperation in a network of stakeholders can be organised. Among others, it gives advice on how to define common
goals and aims, build trust among the partners and establish information sharing procedures. An annex details examples of multi-agency cooperation in prison and probation from Sweden, Belgium and France.
Approaches to Violent Extremist Offenders and Countering Radicalisation in Prisons and Probation (Working Paper) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2016 This working paper aims to provide policymakers, prison governors and prison and probation staff with information on current practices and challenges relevant to managing violent extremist offenders (VEOs) and individuals considered at risk of engaging in violent extremism in a prison and probation context. It addresses topics such as prison conditions and reintegration strategies, risk assessment, prison regime choices, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, and staff training, while providing concise overviews, concepts, definitions and recommendations for policy implementation.
Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Prison and Probation Interventions Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 2015 This handbook offers a set of prison and probation interventions implemented across Europe that are presented in the form of concise info sheets. All interventions are based on the principles of promoting offendersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; wellbeing and rehabilitation; individual risk assessment; capability of positive change when support to disengage from extremism is provided; respect for universal human rights; positive staff-prisoner relationships and healthy prison settings; and multi-agency cooperation. The presented practices are part of the RAN collection on prison and probation interventions.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2017 This handbook was developed with a view to providing coherent and consistent guidance to national authorities on the treatment of children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups, with emphasis on the role of the justice system. Dedicated chapters outline prevention strategies, the treatment of child victims in the justice system, and the management of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. The handbook promotes rehabilitation and reintegration as key purposes of the justice system and advocates for comprehensive, tailor-made programmes for child victims. It includes case studies, checklists for practitioners and an extensive annex on relevant legal international frameworks.
Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2016 This handbook, designed for the use of prison managers and prison staff and other actors involved in the criminal justice system, provides technical guidance on the management of prisoners who have embraced violent extremism. It looks at preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons, as well as interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and facilitating their social reintegration upon release. Eight topical chapters cover aspects such as training for prison staff, risk assessment, good management of disengagement interventions and preparing prisoners for release and reintegration into a local community. A final chapter provides concise policy recommendations on all subtopics.
Handbook on the Management of High-Risk Prisoners United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2016 This handbook provides advice and recommendations on the management of high-risk prisoners. It contains, among others, chapters on assessment, classification and allocation, requirements for prison staff, managing contacts with the outside world, operating security and constructive regimes. Dedicated advice is given on the management of violent extremist offenders and case studies present programmes aimed at this specific target group.
Handbook on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2015 This handbook is aimed at supporting countries in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. Its main focus is on the contribution made by dynamic security and highlights one particular element of dynamic security â&#x20AC;&#x201C; prison intelligence â&#x20AC;&#x201C; which provides important intelligence for use within the prison to prevent escapes and maintain order and control.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2015 The Nelson Mandela Rules are a revision of the 1955 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR), which were adopted by UNODC in 2015. This key international document on justice systems assembles a set of recommendations generally accepted as being good principles and practice in the treatment of prisoners and prison management. It includes sections on prison healthcare; restrictions, discipline and sanctions; restraints; cell searches; contact with the outside world; prisoner complaints; and investigations and inspections.
Glossary >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> De-radicalisation De-radicalisation is a psychological and social process that can take place with or without the help of specific programmes or interventions/ actions aimed at reversing a radicalisation process in a person or group of individuals. De-radicalisation measures focus on the ideological or cognitive level, on beliefs and values, and aim to lead a person to question, revise and abandon their violent extremist views and stance. The concept of de-radicalisation is contested as it implies changing a personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s way of thinking and is thus seen by some as a form of mental manipulation.
Disengagement Intended as the reverse process to violent radicalisation that leads an individual to abandon the use of violence to achieve their goals, which stem from the radical ideology they adopted. Disengagement measures thus emphasise the behavioural aspects of extremism, aiming at the renunciation of the use of violence as a means to reach political or religious aims or leaving the group that embraces such tactics.
Exit Work The terms exit and exit work are often used to describe measures and offers addressed to radicalised individuals and extremists with the aim of supporting them in distancing themselves from extremist environments and disengaging from violent groups and behaviour. Exit work, which is usually provided by specialised NGOs, addresses a clientâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s identity, personal and family-related needs, attitudes, behaviour, and social and community ties. While the primary focus of exit programmes tends to be disengagement (behavioural aspects, refuting violence), they may also include measures of de-radicalisation (cognitive aspects,
revising ideology). The aim of exit work is typically the client’s rehabilitation, re-socialisation and re-integration into society.
Extremism The term extremism describes ideas, worldviews or ideologies that are diametrically opposed to a society’s core values and may include various forms of racial, political or religious supremacy based on perceived grievances, or any ideology that systematically denies basic human rights. An important distinction must be made between cognitive and behavioural/violent extremism: cognitive extremism refers to conceptual or ideological opposition to the fundamental values of a society and attempts to impose the supremacy of a certain ideology or belief, refusing to recognise human rights and democratic procedures. Behavioural/violent extremism refers to the violent means and methods used by extremist individuals and groups to achieve their goals by ignoring the lives, rights and fundamental freedoms of others.
Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) FTFs are defined as “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.”48 In the European context, this phenomenon is of particular importance with regards to Europeans leaving for Iraq or Syria to join ISIL/Daesh, Al-Qaida or other terrorist groups. Given their implication in terrorist activities and acts of war, FTFs are often considered as a particular risk, especially when returning to their home countries as “returnees” (see below).
48.United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29
Former violent extremist or “former” This term refers to individuals who have formerly been part of radicalised extremist or terrorist groups but have disengaged from a path to violence and abandoned their violent extremist views. Some formers are now involved in PVE programmes or exit work and can have a productive role in raising awareness and promoting credible counter-narratives. Their first-hand experience with radicalisation and violent extremism can be an asset for prevention measures provided that specific issues are taken into consideration such as their necessary training, follow-up and monitoring. Individuals can only be considered as formers when both the de-radicalisation and disengagement processes have been successfully achieved.
Probation In criminal law the term probation describes a period of parole or suspension during which an offender is under court-ordered supervision instead of serving time in prison. Typically, an offender on probation is accompanied by a probation officer. They have to abide by a number of obligations and will be re-incarcerated if found breaking these rules. Probation includes a range of activities and interventions, which involve supervision, guidance and assistance, aimed at the offender’s social inclusion and at ensuring community safety. In some European Union Member States, the law specifically bars violent extremist offenders and perpetrators of terrorist crimes from probation schemes.
Radicalisation Although its definition remains controversial, radicalisation is generally considered as the process by which an individual or a group of people adhere to extremism or radicalism. This phenomenon can therefore be considered as a progression into various forms of extremism (right or left, anarchist or religious, or even ecologist). Such processes are generally understood as complex, comprising a number of potential stages and driven by a mix of factors including grievances, needs, ideology, contact with recruiters and violence.
Radicalism The term radical implies a return to the roots, to the essence of something. Radicalisation and being radical can lead to radicalism but not necessarily to extremism. Radicalism implies the idea of a fundamental change in the status quo within society, an attitude by which individuals refuse any compromise and go all the way to the logical end of their convictions. But radicalism can also lead to changes deemed as progressive. For example, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King are considered advocates of a kind of radicalism that brought about freedoms and rights that we now consider part of our core values.
Rehabilitation Rehabilitation is generally understood as the process of re-educating and retraining criminal offenders. It generally involves social and psychological approaches that target the cognitive distortions associated with specific kinds of crime committed by particular offenders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; but may also involve more general education such as literacy skills and professional training. The aim of rehabilitation programmes is to re-socialise and reintegrate offenders into society or a community.
Re-socialisation The term re-socialisation describes the ability of a prisoner to lead in the future a life without criminal offences in a socially responsible manner. In addition to protecting the general public from further criminal offences, it represents an important enforcement objective. The idea of re-socialisation is intended to serve this purpose in accordance with the re-integration of a criminal into society. In order to work towards the re-socialisation of offenders, prisons must be equipped to provide appropriate measures, typically by professional social workers within the prison services or from external providers such as NGOs.
Resilience The term resilience is derived from psychology and describes a personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to cope with a crisis situation and bounce back from adversity. Adapted to criminology, it describes a set of factors or schemes that render an individual less vulnerable to delinquent and criminal behaviour or recidivism. In the context of the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism, the notion is becoming increasingly important. Measures will seek to strengthen protective factors, rendering individuals more resilient to extremist ideologies and environments, and reducing the risk of recidivism.
Returnees A returnee is an FTF who returns to his home country. Returnees have a wide variety of profiles. They may be men, women or children who are often severely traumatised, may return willingly or unwillingly if captured, may be sent or plan to carry out attacks in their home country, may be disillusioned/remorseful or simply in search of better living conditions. Depending on their profile and the degree of monitoring and follow-up carried out by the home state, they may face prosecution and/or be subject to re-socialisation measures.
PREPARE Preventing Radicalisation in Probation and Release â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Perspectives and Practices at the Local Level The moment a convicted offender leaves prison is particularly important because this is when they can either successfully reintegrate back into society or on the contrary, be drawn into reoffending. This is true for all types of offenders and particularly so for those sentenced for offences related to violent extremism or terrorism. For them, the time of release and probation offers a precious window of opportunity to ensure they have indeed abandoned the radical ideologies that inspired their crime and are supported in re-integrating into society. Local authorities have a key role to play in coordinating multi-agency cooperation to this end. Their experience in conducting local prevention policies against radicalisation that leads to violent extremism and in minimising the risk of reoffending make them important players when it comes to supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of extremist offenders.