European Elections in Central Europe: Information Operations and Disinformation Campaigns

Strategic Communication Programme

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS www.globsec.org

AUTHORS Miroslava Sawiris, Research Fellow, StratCom Programme, GLOBSEC, Slovakia Lenka Dušková, Project Assistant, PSSI, Czech Republic Jonáš Syrovátka, Program Manager, PSSI, Czech Republic Lóránt Győri, Geopolitical Analyst, Political Capital, Hungary GLOBSEC and National Endowment for Democracy assume no responsibility for the facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their subsequent use. The sole responsibility lies with the authors of this report.

METHODOLOGY Data were collected between 10. 4. 2019 and 10. 5. 2019 from 45 relevant Facebook pages in each country based on the following process. Local experts and publicly available sources (such as blbec.online) identified 30 Facebook channels that often publish content classified as disinformation or a pro-Kremlin narrative. In the selection of Facebook pages, those openly affiliated with a specific political party were omitted, including the Facebook pages of individual candidates. These were subsequently narrowed down to 15 of the most influential pages based on the following metrics: number of fans, number of page storytellers, and the average number of interactions per fan.

In the Czech Republic, these pages were: AC 24, Časopis Šifra, České národní listy, Česko aktuálně, Český Zpravodaj, Organizace proti multikulturnímu fanatismu, Parlamentní listy, Pravý prostor, Proč Proto, Protiproud, Sputnik CZ, Středoevropan, Svobodné noviny, Zastavme zloděje, and Zpravodajství bez cenzury.

In Hungary, these were: 888.hu, Drábik János, Felháborító Hírek, hirado.hu, Hírturi, HUN-News, KárpátHír, Leleplező Friss Hírek, Mindenegyben blog, ORIGO, Orosz Hírek, Patrióta Európa Mozgalom, PestiSracok.hu, TV2, and Vilaghelyzete.com.

In Slovakia, these were: Česi a Slováci podporujú Ruský Krym, Chemtrails Slovensko, Hlavné Správy, Hrica Lubos, IdemVolit.sk, InfoVojna, Konzervatívny výber, Necenzurované informácie, Otec Marián “Maroš” Kuffa, Policajti objektívne, Sila pravdy, Slobodný vysielač, Sloveni, Zdrojj, and ZEM A VEK. The data were filtered using different forms of the term “election” in local languages and the term “euro”, and then labelled based on the sentiment toward the relevant political parties, and the most prevalent narratives identified. © GLOBSEC GLOBSEC, Bratislava, Slovakia April 2019

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

(3

TABLE OF CONTENTS METHODOLOGY

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 KEY HIGHLIGHTS

4

CZECH REPUBLIC

5

PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES 5

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES 6

HUNGARY

7

ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES 7

PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES 7

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES 9

SLOVAKIA

11

PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES 11

ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES 12

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES 12

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES BY SOURCE 13

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 14

4)

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

KEY HIGHLIGHTS The purpose of this research was to identify how different political parties were being portrayed prior to the EP elections on channels that publish disinformation, as well as to assess the extent to which these channels have been active throughout the Central European region. Another goal was to discover the narratives most often promoted by the monitored channels in the context of the upcoming elections and whether these promoted narratives and myths overlap across the region.

The monitored channels that regularly publish disinformation were not equally active in each Central European country. For example, in Hungary the number of posts relevant to the EP elections in the monitoring period amounted to 2,189 posts, whereas in the Czech Republic, the number was much lower— only 104 related posts. As the chapter on Hungary explains, this difference can be attributed to the fact that in that country, disinformation narratives are actively promoted by pro-government media outlets, whereas in the Czech Republic, the disinformation campaigns are still predominantly spread by fringe “alternative” channels.

While in Hungary the monitored channels portrayed the ruling party Fidesz very positively, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the “anti-system” far-right parties were actively promoted by these channels.

The ruling parties were not mentioned very much at all and pro-European parties in the opposition were heavily criticised on the monitored channels. This suggests a regional trend in which the monitored channels that frequently publish disinformation are actively promoting the interests of parties on the extreme of the political spectrum in the upcoming EP election.

The most recurring narratives in the Czech Republic were related to a generally negative perception of the EU, an alleged “EU dictate”, suggestions of election interference, and “migration as a threat”. The Czech researchers have concluded that these narratives coincide with the far-right party SPD’s agenda and hence, may positively influence SPD’s election bid.

The most recurring disinformation narratives in Hungary combined “migration as a threat”, a negative portrayal of the EU, and the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe into one conspiracy theory in which nationalist parties are the only ones protecting the national interests against European elites who are trying to establish a “United States of Europe”.

In Slovakia, the narratives most often promoted by the monitored channels in relation to the EP elections were “migration as a threat” and “nationalism as the only solution”. Although the migration crisis in Europe that peaked in 2015 impacted Slovakia only to a very limited extent and subsided a long time ago, ambitious far-right parties resurrected “migration as a threat” to justify their nationalist agendas.

The decision to use migration as a dominant narrative in relation to the EP elections is all the more surprising since this narrative also played a very limited role in the recent Slovak presidential election.

Across Central Europe, the monitored Facebook channels that often publish disinformation and pro-Kremlin content, actively promoted populist parties with a strong anti-migration and Eurosceptic agenda in an effort to further the social and political polarisation on the European level.

The research has identified a general negative portrayal of the EU in combination with “migration as a threat” as the two most recurring narratives across Central Europe in relation to the European Parliament elections, followed by stories about a “European populist bloc”. This shows that the narratives dominating the monitored channels in relation to the upcoming EP elections are very similar across the region, with the only difference in the number of posts that disseminated these messages. It remains to be seen what results this will yield.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

(5

CZECH REPUBLIC When it comes to the Czech Republic and its relationship with the European Union (EU), it is possible to witness a sort of paradox. While it is one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the whole Union, the hardcore anti-EU parties did not significantly succeed in previous elections to the European Parliament. This may be caused by low voter turnout (less than 20% in the 2013 EP elections) and the fact that EU opponents expressed their opinion by not participating in the vote.

This paradox also plays a significant role in our research related to disinformation and the 2019 EP elections. While the EU remains a frequent target of disinformation and conspiracy theories, there was no evidence of any significant change in its coverage

all. Whether the situation will change as the elections approach remains to be seen.

PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES Since only a few posts were related to the elections, the number of mentions of individual parties was low. For example, the right-wing ODS—the thirdstrongest party in pre-election opinion polls—was not mentioned even once, and so it would be premature to draw some more general conclusions from the gathered data.

Figure 1: Mentions and perceptions of Czech political parties

on Czech platforms spreading disinformation between April 10 and May 10, 2019: only 104 posts related to the EP elections were published. So far, the elections were most frequently mentioned by the Russian state information agency, Sputnik CZ (22 posts), the right-wing website Pravý prostor (20 posts), and the political tabloid Parlamentní listy (17 posts). Surprisingly, some of the notorious conspiracy websites did not mention the elections at

However, so far, one can see a more positive attitude towards the hardcore Eurosceptic and anti-systemic parties, such as the far-right SPD in particular (which was mentioned in 8 posts, of which 3 were positively spun while the remaining 5 had a neutral connotation). This party was not only praised but was also provided with reporting from its election rallies.

In contrast, the liberal and EU-sympathetic parties, namely the coalition TOP 09/STAN (mentioned in 8

6)

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

posts, of which 5 were negative) and the Pirate Party (mentioned in 5 posts, of which 4 were negative) were portrayed negatively. Not only was the ideology or programme of these parties criticized but also older scandals and other problems involving them received new reporting.

The populist party ANO, clearly leading in the election’s opinion polls, was mentioned in 3 posts without any particular sentiment attached.

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES The narratives related to the EP elections and the EU in general were overwhelmingly negative. However, it was not possible to discern which narrative will prevail in the upcoming elections. The most prominent narratives were general criticisms of the EU, an alleged “EU dictate”, election interference, migration, and media manipulation. It is worth noting that these exact narratives represent notable points of the SPD’s campaign and so their spread might indirectly support the party’s bid.

The EU was portrayed as a non-democratic monster that just treads on national identities and which dictates inter alia how citizens should vote. For instance, Sputnik CZ quoted SPD representative Radim Fiala, who drew a parallel between the EU’s behaviour and the invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies of Czechoslovakia in 1968.1 Such a presentation of the EU is further “embellished” by narratives that the mainstream media cannot be trusted because they intentionally omit the Eurosceptic parties, manipulate public opinion polls, and put forward pro-European propaganda.

The efforts of the EU to counter disinformation prior to the EP elections was presented conversely by the observed websites as an attempt to manipulate the electoral process. Migration as a theme is then used in various ways—as a demonstration of the Brussels’ “dictate” and as an imminent threat that should unite patriotic political forces across Europe.

Figure 2: The most prominent narratives in the Czech Republic

1 https://cz.sputniknews.com/ceskarepublika/201905049798445-fiala-si-nebere-servitky-breznevovy-tanky-nas-prijely-ucit-co-je-demokracie-nyni-nas-chceeu-ucit/.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

(7

HUNGARY ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES The Hungarian specialists identified 15 of the most relevant pro-Kremlin disinformation channels in Hungary on Facebook. Among these, mainstream pro-government sources are listed, such as the main state channel, hirado.hu, and the leading commercial online news site, origo.hu. This is because the public and private media conglomerate comprised of more than 500 outlets and under the Hungarian government’s control has made conspiracy theories about George Soros, the EU supporting illegal immigration, etc., and pro-Russian disinformation a daily staple of media consumption in Hungary.2 The data show that the activity of pro-government media is on par with other far-right and pro-Russian fringe/disinformation media in the campaign leading up to the European Parliament election, as shown in the graph below.

and echoes the official messaging of the Hungarian government, so the ruling Fidesz-KDNP party coalition significantly benefits from disinformation activities in the Hungarian media space, either owing to these fringe accounts’ supportive role or to the disinformation disseminated by pro-government media. Overall, Hungarian disinformation outlets significantly contribute to the political campaign.

We could observe 2,189 relevant posts (out of 2,796 occurrences), or 78.3%, of the messages discussing the European elections in the period between April 10 and May 10, 2019.

PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES Hungarian political parties were featured heavily on the Hungarian disinformation outlets, with 43.4% of the Facebook posts addressing them in one way

Figure 3: Activity of Hungarian sources in relation to EP election

The top five media include the fringe, anti-immigration Patriotic Europe Movement (Patrióta Európa Mozgalom), the main pro-government mouthpiece PestiSracok.hu, the far-right, xenophobic HUN-News, finally the pro-government hirado.hu and origo.hu (ORIGO). It is important to note that the activity of farright and/or pro-Russian fringe pages closely follows

or another. Given the Hungarian disinformation scene’s positive bias towards Fidesz-KDNP, it is no wonder that 26.7% of posts dealing with parties expressed positive sentiments towards the ruling coalition while only 0.1-0.8% of the messages

2 ‘Larger than life - Who is afraid of the Big Bad Russia?’, accessed 15 May 2019, https://politicalcapital.hu/russian_sharp_power_in_cee/research_results. php?article_id=2391.

8)

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

Figure 4: Mentions and perceptions of Hungarian political parties

mentioned opposition parties in a positive context at all.

In contrast, the outlets disproportionally attacked opposition parties, mostly the leftist MSZP-P (14% of the negative messages), the leftist-liberal Democratic Coalition (DK) led by former PM Ferenc Gyurcsány (13.7%) and the rightist, populist Jobbik (8.7%).

Their main line of criticism was mostly based on Fidesz’s political campaign centred on immigration, claiming that MSZP wants to abolish European borders to “flood the continent with (illegal) migrants”

in line with the “pro-immigration bureaucrats of Brussels and all the other pro-immigration parties”.3 The disinformation tried to lump together all the opposition parties with the same charges: they go against the very interests of the Hungarian nation or Europe by supporting the alleged “pro-immigration policy of the Soros network.”4 As a consequence, Fidesz claimed the “moral” high ground against the opposition by praising the government’s effective anti-immigration policies, such as the construction of the southern border fence,5 defending Hungarian tradition, sovereignty, and European Christian

Figure 5: The number of positive messages about Hungarian parties between April 10 and May 10, 2019.

3 ‘Fidesz: Európát a Bevándorláspártiak Veszélyeztetik’, PestiSracok.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/pestisracok.hu/ posts/2197203273701348.

4 ‘Az Ellenzék Összetartóelemei: A Gyűlölet És a Nemzetrombolás!’, Patrióta Európa Mozgalom, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/ patriotaeuropa/posts/2050710995047709.

5 ‘A Migráción Múlhat Az EP-Választás’, PestiSracok.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/pestisracok.hu/posts/2212436638844678.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

civilisation.6 The biased reporting on the ruling coalition and the opposition remained unchanged throughout our monitoring period.

According to the party sentiment trend figure, Fidesz-KDNP was featured increasingly positively on the disinformation outlets over time while opposition parties, on the other hand, did not significantly change in their constant low share of positive messages.

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES The most prevalent narratives pushed by the analysed disinformation Facebook pages concerning the upcoming European elections detailed a simple, yet dangerous conspiracy theory. According to this disinformation storyline, anti-immigration and prosovereignty parties are battling pro-immigration forces and the current EU’s elite, who are hell-bent on creating a federalist “United States of Europe”.

The stakes of the current European elections are, thus, the future of European civilisation and that of the nation-states, so a new “European populist bloc” of Eurosceptic, far-right parties needs to be established to replace the incumbent European political elites. Therefore, Eurosceptic and nativist narratives dominated the disinformation discourse in Hungary, amounting to more than two-thirds, or 77%, of the posts under examination, as seen in the word cloud below.

(9

In this interpretation, the EU is responsible for the (irregular) migration crisis by not defending its borders effectively, handing out so-called “migrant bank cards” to further fuel the inflow,7 and finally, by forcing or “dictating” European member states to accept the European migration quotas.8 The new alliance of “the defenders of Europe”,9 namely between PM Viktor Orbán and the Italian Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini or the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, Heinz-Christian Strache, legitimise their European populist bloc through a set of narratives based on such values as the defence of Christianity, European traditions, or homogenous societies and strong nation-states in the face of “illegal” immigration.10 Issues such as Brexit or the East/West divide are redefined along these lines.

So, while PM Orbán declares that the “European Union is torn apart” over views on migration,11 a disinformation article expresses support for Brexit because it represents the cause of “the sovereigntist-national independence” movements in the European Union.12 The “conspiracy and hidden interests” narrative about Soros, elites, or oligarchs ruling the world is intended to accuse the EU or Brussels of enacting the most heinous plots. One of the far-right HUN-News’ posts detailed how the EU is supposedly trying to secretly upend European Christianity to “refresh” the European population through Muslim mass migration.13 Another article even cited the tragic Notre Dame fire as a sign for the need for political change in the EU.14

Figure 6: The most prominent narratives in Hungary.

6 Menczer: A Határvédelem a Józan Ésszel Függ Össze’, hirado.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/hirado.hu/posts/2487852537913809.

7 ‘Egyre Kevésbé Áttekinthetőek a Migránskártyák’, ORIGO, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/OrigoHirek/posts/2338433256207586.

8 ‘Orbán Viktor: Most Meg Kell Védeni Európát!’, 888.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/888ponthu/posts/2068978516563480.

9 ‘Alakul Végre Európa Megmentőinek Szövetsége!’, Patrióta Európa Mozgalom, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/patriotaeuropa/ posts/2187471878038286.

10 ‘Egy Új, Biztonságos És Hagyományos Értékeken Alapuló Európát Építene Magyarország És Olaszország’, Vilaghelyzete.com AWAKENING THE WORLD. EVERY HEART MAKES A DIFFERENCE, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/AWAKENINGtheWORLD/posts/2174770689274036.

11 ‘Orbán Viktor Szerint Kettészakad Az Európai Unió - Magyar Expressz’, HUN-News, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/hungaryannews/ posts/2196023573807778.

12 ‘Brexit: A Szuverenisták Esélye’, 888.hu, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/888ponthu/posts/2062397300554935.

13 ‘Az EU Vezetőinek Asszistálásával, Titokban Zajlik a Kereszténység Fölszámolása?’, HUN-News, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/ hungaryannews/posts/2159479664128836.

14 ‘Notre-Dame-Tűz: Nincsenek Véletlenek’, ORIGO, accessed 16 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/OrigoHirek/posts/2342192315831680.

10)

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

The trend line of Eurosceptic narratives shows, as seen below, that the number of generally negative posts about the EU (negative) moves strongly together with the “EU is responsible” for issues

and the “migration” narratives, backed by the constant presence of the “conspiracy and hidden interests” narrative, which makes the EU look like it is responsible for “illegal” immigration.

Figure 7: Dominant Eurosceptic narratives on the monitored Hungarian pages over time.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

(11

SLOVAKIA PERCEPTION AND PORTRAYAL OF POLITICAL PARTIES

as often, perhaps because the party’s campaign in the EP elections has been very low key and not generated much attention. SMER-SD was never portrayed in a positive light.

Three political parties were mentioned on the monitored Facebook pages the most often: KotlebaĽSNS, an extreme right-wing party,15 the PS–SPOLU coalition,16 and the Sme rodina17 party. None of them are in the current ruling coalition. Even though the number of mentions dedicated to both Kotleba’s party and the PS–SPOLU coalition is almost the same, they were portrayed very differently. While Kotleba’s party was portrayed in the most positive light of all the parties in the context of the upcoming EP elections, PS and SPOLU were often portrayed negatively. Kollár’s Sme rodina party was portrayed almost as often in a positive light as Kotleba’s ĽSNS, particularly ever since Boris Kollár announced his party’s alliance with Salvini and France’s Marine Le Pen in the far-right bloc Europe of Nations and Freedom, should his party win seats to the EP. The current ruling party, SMER-SD, was not mentioned

The monitored disinformation pages actively promoted the Kotleba-ĽSNS party by sharing their campaign materials, for example, the page Necenzurované informácie (Uncensored information) re-posted a promotional video with strong racist and homophobic overtones from Milah Uhrík’s official Facebook page, in which members of Kotleba-ĽSNS invite viewers to vote for them in the EP elections in order to stop “Brussel’s politics which destroys the EU as well as Slovakia”.18 The quantitative analysis has demonstrated that the monitored Facebook pages that often publish disinformation are actively promoting parties on the extreme end of the political spectrum, thus contributing to the further polarisation of Slovak society.

Figure 8: Mentions & perceptions of Slovak political parties 15 Exists since 2010 as a continuation of the ultranationalist Slovenská pospolitosť party, which was dissolved in 2006 by the Slovak Supreme Court because its political activities were in breach of the Slovak constitution.

16 The two relatively new pro-European liberal parties announced they would run jointly in the EP elections. The popularity of Progresívne Slovensko grew rapidly in the wake of its former Deputy Chairwoman Zuzana Čaputová’s success in the presidential election.

17 Active on the Slovak political scene since 2015, this populist party defends a strong anti-immigration agenda and conservative values.

18 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2774530579229126 & id=1441545275861003.

12)

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED FACEBOOK PAGES

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES

Figure 9: Activity of Slovak sources in relation to the EP elections.

Of all the monitored pages that publish disinformation content, Zdrojj has been the most active in relation to the EP elections (this channel was also the most active in the Slovak presidential election campaign19), as over 30% of the related posts were published on this channel, followed by Hlavné správy (21%), and Slobodný vysielač (12%). However, the frequency with which a particular channel publishes content does not necessarily mean it has influence. For example, Zdrojj’s posts are often shared only a few times, whereas a video published on Hrica Lubos’s page promoting extreme right-wing politics in relation to the EP elections was shared more than 1,700 times.20 Although his posts are not as frequent as those of the other monitored channels, they have much wider reach. However, in comparison to the Slovak presidential election, the monitored Facebook channels are generally much less active—in the period between 10. 4. 2019 to 10. 5. 2019, only 175 posts were actually related to the European parliament election.

This is because traditionally, in Slovakia, voter turnout and public interest in the EP elections are very low and, hence, spending too much time and effort on this topic may be considered inefficient. Also, Slovakia held municipal elections in November 2018, a tworound presidential election in March and April 2019, and is expecting parliamentary elections in March 2020. All three command considerable attention and coverage in the country, which might come at the expense of the EP elections.

In the context of the EP elections, “nationalism as the only solution” and “migration as a threat” were the two most dominant narratives promoted on the monitored channels. They are complementary in that migration is often being portrayed as an imminent existential and cultural threat (even though in Slovakia irregular migration has been a negligible issue) to which extreme nationalism, as promoted by the KotlebaĽSNS and Sme rodina parties, is the only suitable answer. Other frequently recurring narratives equally work in tandem: “liberalism” (a term so largely void of any specific meaning now that it can mean almost anything to anyone) is portrayed as a force somehow undermining the stability of Slovak society in particular and European societies generally. Against this supposed destruction, the European populist bloc, as represented by the rise of the populist Eurosceptic leaders, will take a strong stance and save their populations from the “EU dictate”. Without much elaboration on what the “EU dictate” and “liberalism” actually mean, these terms serve as vague symbols of “what is wrong” and something against which the populations can unite. These narratives together thus create one overarching metanarrative, a modern myth that imbues complex political realities with a simple explanation.

19 https://www.globsec.org/publications/slovak-presidential-election-followed-through-facebook-disinformation-channels/ 20 https://www.facebook.com/hricalubos1/posts/869965620015073.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

(13

Figure 10: The most recurring narratives

THE MOST PREVALENT NARRATIVES BY SOURCE Hlavné správy and Zdrojj were the most active channels in the promotion of the top 5 most recurring narratives, followed by the page Necenzurované informácie. The remaining sources promoted only some of them, for example, Konzervatívny výber did not push the “EU dictate” narrative throughout the monitoring period at all. However, “migration as

a threat” was pushed by almost all of the monitored sources. This suggests that the monitored pages that often publish disinformation and manipulative content are trying to keep this theme relevant to steer potential voters in the EP elections to vote for radical populist candidates by exploiting existing fears.

Figure 11: 5 most recurring narratives in Slovakia by source.

14)

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ČSSD

Česká strana sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)

DK

Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition)

EP

European Parliament

EU

European Union

KDH

Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement)

KDNP

Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party)

Kotleba-ĽSNS Kotleba-Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia) KSČM

Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

LMP

Lehet Más a Politika (Another Politics Is Possible)

MKKP

Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party)

MSZP-P

Magyar Szocialista Párt (The Hungarian Socialist Party)

ODS

Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party)

OĽaNO

OBYČAJNÍ ĽUDIA a nezávislé osobnosti (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities)

PM

Prime Minister

PS

Progresívne Slovensko (Progressive Slovakia)

SaS

Sloboda a Solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity)

SMER SD

SMER Sociálna demokracia (SMER Social Democracy)

SNS

Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)

SPD

Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and Direct Democracy)

STAN

Starostové a nezávislí (Mayors and Independents)

olus Tower II P Vajnorská 100/B 831 04 Bratislava Slovak Republic

+421 2 321 378 00 info@globsec.org www.globsec.org