International Piracy Shifts Geography and Tactics

S&SI Analytic Investigation

J OSH UA T. C O H E N

International piracy shifts geography and tactics T he United Nation’s Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability reports armed piracy-related attacks in the Strait of Malacca are on rise the since 2013. At least eight failed hijackings in early 2014 have led the United Nations agency to label the whole of Southeast Asia a ‘piracy hotspot’. For the time being, coordinated international naval patrols have largely subdued the primary threat to international commerce off Africa’s East coast. Attention is refocusing on a less publicised offshore crime trend known as ‘petrol-piracy’, the hijack of slow moving barges, tankers, and supply vessels carrying petroleum products. Regions seeing this phenomenon include South East Asia, in particular the Straits of Malacca.

Current trends “The downward trend in piracy incidents in South East Asia until 2009 was largely the result of the adoption of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia [ReCAAP] by 16 Asian countries in 2005”, said Lydelle Joubert, Senior Analyst and Maritime Piracy Specialist with Suritec (Pty) Ltd. “Information sharing and combined patrols between these countries also helped. Cur-

rently, the area again has the highest reported incidents of piracy and robbery of ships worldwide. The largest number of incidents occurred in Indonesian waters, the country presently has inadequate resources to monitor their large maritime domain”, Joubert told in early June 2014.

Expected to improve capabilities, the Indonesian Navy is scheduled to take delivery of three BAE Systems Marine F2000 corvettes originally build for the Royal Brunei Navy. Purchased

by Indonesia after contract disputes ended the deal with Brunei, these vessels should be in service within months. In addition, Indonesia’s PT Palindo Marine Industry and PT Citra Shipyard produce the CLURIT class (KCR-40) fast missile craft, with the most recent delivery of the KRI ALAMANG (644) in December 2013.

Piracy analysis periodicals Under Joubert’s direction, the South Africanbased company publishes a specialised Piracy Report analysing global piracy, ship robbery, and maritime terrorism incidents worldwide.

Political and security issues affecting maritime security, potentially leading to an increase in

piracy, robbery of ships or maritime terrorism incidents are further investigated in their reporting. An incident database spanning the past 20 years facilitating trend and statistical analysis models has been developed to assist in Suritec’s research.

“The [Piracy] report started as a once off for a client in June, 2013 which made us aware the analysis could be of value to a wider general audience, we don’t provide 24 hour maritime piracy monitoring as there are several already performing this service. We focus on maritime risk assessment and analysis for shipping and the maritime environment in general as well as risk assessments for a specific vessel or company’s fleet”, Joubert noted.

East Africa: Not one successful attack off the horn of Africa has been reported over the past 24 months, however, costs associated with counter-piracy activities remain high. A 2013 World Bank report estimated costs from threat responses range from on-board security teams, re-routing, and otherwise ‘hardening’ vessels against boarding attempts. The combined bill to the global economy: somewhere between US$15-18Bn. Estimates place the cost of armed anti-piracy teams at approximately US$1Bn. The approximately 200-page report “The Somali Pirates: Ending the Threat, Re-

Photo coverage showing the oil tanker MV SIRIUS STAR after she was hijacked by Somali pirates (allegedly under the orders of piracy kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan) about 830 km (450 nm) southeast of the coast of Kenya on 15 November 2008, becoming the largest ship ever captured by pirates. The vessel was released on 9 January 2009 after payment of a US$3M ransom via a parachuted container (shown). (Photo: US Navy)

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building a Nation” notes, while primarily responsible for the dramatic drop in piracy attacks off the Africa’s east coast and Gulf of Aden, international naval forces and ship-based private security teams are impractical as a long-term solution for issues originating on land.

Echos of Al-Shabbab: Interestingly, the World Bank dismisses any substantial, high-level connection between pirates and Al-Shabbab.

World Bank researchers have found no indications or plans for joint maritime terrorism although local Al-Shabbab members may unofficially cooperate with pirates in small ad-hock cells. Calling for a paradigm shift, the report suggests integrating law enforcement and development assistance policies with political and business interests as an effective counterpiracy practice.

moment, piracy and hijacking are expected to continue until Somalia’s economic and civil circumstances, ultimately the root issues can be mitigated.

At any given moment, these task forces maintain up to 20 naval ships on station, patrolling in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast. Coordinated from shore bases, long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) use surface search radar and forward looking infrared (FLIR) equipment to detect suspicious activity and targets.

According to Joubert, several initiatives in Somalia are currently underway to build a Coast Guard capability and to disrupt piracy networks. EUCAP NESTOR, an EU civil/military mission to help enhance maritime security around the Horn of Africa, completed basic training for the Galmudug Coast Guard and the Bosasso Port Police in May 2014.

Destabilising threats

The EU Naval Force seeks a legal procedure with prosecution of suspected pirates, however, if evidence is deemed insufficient, suspects are returned to their boats and allowed to depart after being finger printed, photographed and profiled for database entry, building precedent for High Risk Zone in Declipotential future attacks. Issues of jurisdicne: Piracy off the coast of tion and prosecution can become very Somalia and the High Risk A member of the Pacific Area Tactical Law Enforcement Team (PACTAcomplicated. Many apprehended pirates Zone (HRZ) reached its CLET) conducts a vertical insertion drill from a US Coast Guard HH-60 highest point in 2011. The JAYHAWK helicopter. By July 2007, PACTACLET, like the other three Tac- suspects are between 12-15 years of age International Maritime tical Law Enforcement Teams (TACELTs), formed part of the Coast Guard’s and cannot, under international norms, Bureau (IMU) reported Deployable Operations Group (DOG); but, then returned to the control of be tried as adults.

Without an overarching strategic plan Somali pirates attacked ap- the area commanders in April 2013. (Photo: US Coast Guard) addressing all contributing factors, the proximately 237 vessels and attacks […] the odds of success have dropped, willingness of nations to commit naval assets boats. “In the HRZ and Arabian Sea, Dhow and it’s become an increasingly hazardous long-term is questionable. Many experts agree hijackings have been highlighted in recent business to be in […] chances of getting killed societal and economic factors leading to pimonths. It is not a new trend, only highly or captured is pretty high now”, stated Alan racy, if not addressed, will continue enticing underreported, not unlike the hijacking of fisCole, Regional Coordinator of the Maritime individuals to the high seas with grappling hing boats in Nigeria, Suriname, and BanglaCrime Programme for the United Nations hook, boarding ladder and Kalashnikov. A new desh where groups of up to 30 fishermen at a Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) during report entitled “The Protector’s Choice: An time are often kidnapped for ransom or killed a July 2014 press statement. Three naval forces Application of Protection Theory to Somali for boats, nets or their catch”, Joubert said. specifically tasked with anti-piracy duties off Piracy” suggests just such a counter-piracy Warning against complacency, Joubert noted, Somalia include Combined Task Force 151, a model be enabled, arguing that “changing “as ship owners began employing on-board US-led flotilla made up of ships and aircraft economic incentives ultimately must induce private security companies, attacks have defrom six nations. local stakeholders to move from protecting clined, not a single ship with a security team Mandated to protect international aid shippirates to more lucrative, legal alternatives […] has been successfully boarded. Although the ments into Somalia, the European Union long-term development initiatives are likely to number of attacks off Somalia has lessened, it deploys assets to participate in Operation undermine the key input to the Somali piracy is not an indication of a reduction in the overATALANTA. Also, in early July 2014, the business, namely land side support for ranall threat of piracy in these waters.”

NATO Operation OCEAN SHIELD mission soming hijacked ships.” The report findings, Task group success? was extended until 2016 to provide the Somali released by Oxford University Press on 9 July “With a few very small exceptions, we’ve had government time to build an indigenous capa2014, appeared in the British Journal of Critwo years now without any successful piracy bility to begin addressing the problem. For the minology.

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East African piracy: motivation and means The “Global Report on Maritime Piracy – A Geospatial Analysis Report”, published in April 2014 by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, points out piracy in the Gulf of Guinea differs from attacks in the western Indian Ocean. Although fewer overall attempts are reported, these show no signs of decreasing as opposed to situation on Africa’s East coast. The United Nations study observed, “attacks on the high seas have increased, while attacks in ports are on the decrease, the types of attacks have gone from low-intensity towards more violent acts.” The document adds: “Financial losses to the national economies for countries with ports in the Gulf of Guinea are considerable, this has forced certain countries to take military action that has proven successful.”

The West African difference Joubert said Nigeria’s illicit oil trade is the root cause of piracy and ship robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, and tends to be cyclical. “Hijackings are mostly linked to tankers or vessels used to hijack tankers. As the resource challenged Nigerian Navy imposes security measures, piracy often moves to other areas in the Gulf.” Kidnappings from commercial vessels in the West African theatre are not new occurrences nor limited to the maritime domain, as recent events illustrate.

Maritime piracy off Nigeria’s coast constitutes one minor piece of a much larger disintegrating security situation authorities are attempting to mitigate. Reminiscent of the Somalian scenario pre-2009, the Nigerian problem is exacerbated by the nation’s many poor, while encouraged by the low perceived risk, Joubert noted. Worsening matters, incidents of misidentification

have led to shoot-outs between private ship security and Nigerian authorities, leading the Navy to ban all private security contractors not duly registered in Lagos.

Equipment and weapons The sophistication of pirate operations ranges from very basic to operations using intelligence gained from shipping companies, crew postings such as Facebook and LinkedIn, radio communications, online schedules, and AIS (Automatic Ship Identification). Security companies’ reports suggest that pirates may also be using jamming devices, although no solid evidence proof has been uncovered.

Court cases are often a good indication of what equipment is used. On the Somalia side, satellite and mobile phones, compasses, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) devices, GPS navigational equipment, and short-wave radios have been reported. Weapons and equipment listed are AK47, RPG7, Tokarev pistols, SAR 80 rifles, knives, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IED), maps of shipping routes, grappling hooks, ladders, and outboard engines.

In other areas such as Bangladesh, hordes of robbers armed with only knives have attacked and kidnapped groups of fishermen.

Predictive models Joubert explained predictive analysis models have been developed based on ship and attack

data. The Piracy Attack Risk Surface (PARS) database is one example. Certain attributes to include maximum speed, free board, construction, schedule, time of day, and area of operations render vessels more likely to be attacked.

In certain areas ships may be targeted based on cargo value. Sea state and the distance from shore also affect the likelihood an attack will succeed. Effectiveness of military intervention is often determined by the surveillance capability of the vessel. In most cases, the early detection of small boats is essential in mitigating an attack, sensors with a long range capability are preferable. Often basic measures such as those mapped out in Best Management Practices (BMP), such drifting-to-delay time at anchor and the instalment of Citadels are enough to manage these risks, Joubert explained.

“In essence, ships need to go where their cargo needs to go, in most cases dangerous areas cannot be circumvented, situations must be managed. Attacks on commercial shipping cannot be prevented by any single means, naval and Coast Guard forces across regions with high piracy levels are often unable to quickly reach vessel in distress within an actionable time frame. It remains the responsibility of the individual shipping company owner to ensure proper anti-piracy/boarding training and procedures at the appropriate levels, dependent upon route risk”, Joubert elaborated.

These procedures are outlined in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) endorsed “Best Management Practices for Protection against Somali Based Piracy” (BMP4), a guide developed in 2009 by a number of maritime

Members of the US Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment and Combined Task Force 151’s board search and seizure team specialised in counter-piracy operations board a suspicious dhow in the Gulf of Aden. (Photo: US Navy)

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organisations. Updated in 2011, the guide suggests passive and active defensive measures as: “increasing the speed of the ship; learning escape-and-avoidance manoeuvres; elevation of freeboard; use of barbed and electric wire over hanging on the outboard of the ships and water cannons or projected nets; use of debilitating loudspeakers and flares; development of strongholds; use of radars and cameras, maintaining constantly watch alert; and reporting vessels entries and exit from risk areas and sending daily reports to authorities.”

Vessels need professional security teams while transiting high risk areas. As military forces are required to cover huge areas of open ocean, the law of probability suggests should the need be urgent assets may not be positioned to arrive on scene quickly. Helicopters possess better speed, yet require appreciable time to cover long distances.

Untried methods Experimenting with land-based, fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Embraer SUPER TUCANO

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turboprop, positioned on alert status at specific airstrips, would reach a hijacking target area much sooner, providing reconnaissance, verification and, if needed, firepower from mounted machine guns, cannon, free flight rockets, and bombs. These measures could reduce the need to maintain far more expensive fleet assets.

Increasing the use of MPA, those systems particularly equipped with radar capable of discriminating among targets at long-range, such as the Raytheon SeaVue XMC expanded mission capability family, or the Telephonics APS-143 OceanEye radar, selected for the aft radar positon on Indian P-8I MPA supplied by Boeing. As sensor miniaturisation technology advances, these tasks may be automated with autonomous or controlled unmanned aircraft.

Use of flying boat patrol aircraft, exemplified by the ShinMaywa Industries Ltd. US-2i large STOL amphibious search and rescue aircraft, is another untried potentially cost-cutting option. Following lead of a pirate tactic, allies may consider use of a well-deck equipped ‘mother ship’ deploying smaller craft on independent patrols.

Joshua T. Cohen … is Lead Research Analyst at Champlain Analytical Partners, LLC, Shelburne, Vermont, USA.

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