Venezuela country Profile Final

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Carleton University

Civil Society and Development Civil Society Country Profile: Venezuela

Written by: Daniel, Carlos, Victor, and Justine Professor: Barbara Levine

Ottawa, Canada, February 5, 2009

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“There are two countries: one that loves the President of the Republic and one which hates him” (Briceño-León, 2005, p.21) Introduction This country profile of civil society intends to give a holistic and brief overview of the civil society arena in Venezuela. Civil society in Venezuela consists of a wide array of organizations, including non-governmental organizations, government supported organizations, trade unions, faith-based organizations, foundations, social movements, student groups and research centers, among others.

The paper aims to introduce the complex cultural, legislative, political, economic, and policy frameworks through which these civil society organizations exist. It will begin to facilitate an understanding of some of these frameworks through exploring the scope and size of the sector. It will then analyze the commonalities shared with the Latin American region and bring forth some of the divergences as well. To conclude some of the challenges facing certain aspects of civil society will be brought forth through reported experiences.

Scope and Context Venezuela’s civil society can best be described as a heterogeneous and polarized arena. In order to analyze the specific context, certain aspects of its political and economical life must be taken into consideration. The first major aspect is oil; since the 1920’s, this resource has been a primary source of revenue and has become the country’s principal asset. All previous Venezuelan governments, both civil and military, have relied on this resource to carry out their policies. It has given the State immense political and economic power. The second aspect is the party system. Until “El Pacto de Punto Fijo”1 Venezuela had a strong party system; however, after the economic crisis of 1980, this stability began to erode. The coup of 1992 was the last nail in the coffin; the citizens’ distrust in the parties became evident and they started to look to outsiders that were not associated with the previous system. Hugo Chávez then appeared on the scene, and was seen by many as “a savior”.

Since then, he has been able to gather huge amounts of support around him. This has polarized much of society between those who believe in Chávez and what he represents, and those who oppose him.

According to some, an important aspect of civil society in Venezeula emerged from the lack of a strong party system (Briceño-León 2005). One can trace its origin to the January 2000 mobilizations (“Con mis hijos no te metas”) against “Las Leyes Habilitantes” 2. The middle class, accustomed to a strong economy, social mobility and a certain degree of independence within the state, began to rally against the new regime opposed to ideals of this new system. Since then, this part of civil society has played the role of the government opposition (Encarnación, 2002). Much of this sector has been financed by the United States (Golinger 2007). This support became evident in the coup that put Chávez out of power for 48 hours in 20023. In response, the government has relied on two tactics: the disqualification, and even prosecution or harassment (Repela Caracas Críticas 2008; Gershman & Allen 2006), of anyone who opposes the “revolutionary movement”, and the creation of a from-thestate-civil-society.

Another important part of the civil society in Venezuela is those who support Chávez’s policies and receive support from him. However, this is not a homogenous sector, partly due to a lack of a clear action plan from the government. According to some, there are the Hardliners and the Softliners (Ellner, 2005). The Hardliners adopted a radical posture after the coup of 2002, and the generalized strike that paralyzed the country. They have worked to purge the institutions, and disconnect the public sphere, from those who are Anti-Chavistas. They believe in creating parallel institutions, 1 A pact signed by the two main political parties (AD and COPEI) in 1958 which main objective was to guarantee governability in the country.

2 Set of Laws that gave the Executive power to pass new Laws without the approval of the Legislative for a limited period of time.

3 The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the US quadrupled the amount of money it gave to Chávez’s opposition after he criticized the US Afghan bombings.

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which eventually will supplant the existing ones. This is done asserting that a radical break with the past is needed in order to accomplish the “revolutionary goals”. They hold that “The Revolution” needs a long period of time to consolidate its achievements, and they are certain that this will happen in a peaceful manner, as it is guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution (Ellner, 2005). On the other hand, the Softliners aim to consolidate the development that has already been achieved, and reduce the conflict levels in order to avoid a civil war. They assert that they have achieved a lot by institutionalizing their ideology (Movimiento V República, Circulos Bolivarianos, Plan Bolivar and Middle Class in Positive), thus institutionalizing a way to make decisions (1999 Constitution). They state that they have been changing the political culture of the Venezuelans for the better.

The real points of contention between these two visions are the parallel institutions: the Hardliners see them as the seed of a new society, and they believe they are essential because the old institutions are corrupt or inefficient. On the other hand, the Softliners see them as complementary to the old ones or even temporary (Ellner, 2005). They believe that a Gramsci´s war of position is possible.

Venezuelan Civil Society Sector in Comparative Terms (Latin America) Venezuela does not appear in any of the major Civil Society Indexes. Neither Civicus nor the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies have included this country in their research, thus making a comparison is somewhat difficult due to the lack of statistical information. However, it is possible to analyze the Venezuelan case contrasting it with the main trends of civil society in Latin America.

The Johns Hopkins report (Salamon et al 2003) is useful in exploring the structural aspect of civil society. The research explains that civil society in the region is not very developed, with the exception of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, due to their European traditions. In comparison with other countries analyzed, one can draw a hypothesis that Venezuela shows the prominent Latin American characteristics: a) Small volunteer sector; b) The role that civil society plays in the region is fundamentally oriented to provide services (Education is the most important field); c) Fees and charges constitute the most important funding source; and, d) Government support to the sector is very low.

Although there is no statistical evidence that could verify these elements in the Venezuelan case, we could infer that structure is similar because of shared experiences within Latin American. First, because in Venezuela the Catholic Church has played a big role in development activities; second, Venezuela suffered a right wing military rule; and finally, because they also embarked on the process of structural economic adjustment in the eighties, which included large cuts to civil society and public funding. With cultural and historical exceptions of the Cono Sur countries, the Hopkins analysis applies to the majority of Latin American countries. An important distinction could be the recent political trends in Venezuela (and Bolivia) that could present a different result in the structure of civil society. The Civicus report (2006a: 18) also gives insight to the Venezuelan case. It is noted in their analysis that civil society participation in Latin America “tends to peak in times of social conflict or socioeconomic crises and lower rapidly during phases of political normalization”. This is found to be true in the Venezuelan case as well. During the last years, political participation of different social groups; civic organizations and a wide array of associations have increased dramatically both in support and against Chávez government.

In regards to the space, values and concept of civil society, we can argue that the different interpretations of what is happening in the country vary. Some argue that civil society is being restricted and is living a period of darkness (Civicus 2006b, Encarnacion 2002). These groups allege that laws and some actions of the government are going against some essential freedoms necessary for a healthy civil society. Chávez has responded that certain laws and actions are just against some groups that are trying to generate political instability in Venezuela. This type of argument is not new

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in the region as President Uribe’s fight against terrorism in Colombia is one example. The other view states that currently there are a lot of organizations, which are part of the Chávez movement. They claim that no government in Venezuela has invested equal amounts of money in development (Rebelion.org 2009). According to them, an important part of these resources are being transferred to civil society organizations, a trend that is contrary to the regional norm in terms of government investment in civil society. Although, for the other side, this new trend could be labeled a new chapter of populism or a clientelist system to control collective action.

The two contrasting opinions above hinder the applicability of Venezuela to some of the regional trends. Whatever the truth may be, it is certain that civil society space, structure, values, concept and interpretation is particularly a “contested territory – both in theory and reality-” in Venezuela (Edwards 2004: vii).

Policy and Operational Challenges Over the past nine years Venezuela has experienced many broad changes within the standpoint of civil society. To understand these changes, one has to look at examples and identify reasons behind the transformations of power that have taken place.

According to the Human Rights Watch there is a vibrant public debate within Venezuela between pro and anti-Chávez supporters. Recently however, to get a foothold in this debate the government has expanded their controls on the limiting of free speech while at the same time strengthening incentives for self-censorship. These actions are justified by the Chávez supporters as a way to moderate the excessive coverage of partisan media. In effect, although debates occur still between the two camps in Venezuela, some believe that the public sphere is endangered of being annexed by the state.

Another notable challenge is that since 2004 the administration has completely controlled the filling of court judges within the judicial system of Venezuela Human Rights Watch Report, September 2008). This came about largely as an act to clean up a judiciary system that was disaccredited, dysfunctional, and corrupt. Thus, Chávez signed legislation allowing his supporters to both administer and purge the Supreme Court of Venezuela, therefore allowing their allies now in the seats of the Supreme Court to have legitimized power within the court systems from the top-down.

This type of power gives a large amount of access and capacity to change or create laws that may be harmful to Civil Society.

A controversial act that exemplifies the dangers in top-down legislative procedures in Venezuela is the reform of the Criminal Code in 2004. Article 10 of said code, states that anyone who supplies or receives funds from abroad to “conspire against the . . . integrity of the republic, against the institutions of the state or to destabilize the social order” may be punished by 20 to 30 years in jail.

The purpose of removing access to this funding is to curb the influence of foreign states within Venezuela, as most funding comes from democratic nations that do not agree with the current government. This reform is being used to prosecute an organization engaged in election monitoring and education that received a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy, an arms-length institution of the United States.

The Human Rights Watch Report of September 2008 outlines how the Venezuelan Prison Watch (Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones, OVP) uniquely provides statistics and qualitative insight on the prison system in Venezuela alongside bringing to the attention of the public the safeguarding or lack thereof of human rights within the prison system. A very much needed insight on a government

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service, where official Venezuelan documents or reports cease to exist and are said to be controlled the inmates themselves. In March 2008 populations in 15 prisons began a hunger strike in response to the repeal of reforms of 2005 which exempted criminals convicted of violent crimes from sentencing benefits such as probation and conditional release. The government pointed fingers at NGOs that work with prisoners as masterminds behind the hunger strike, as the Interior and Justice Minister accused these same NGOs as receiving their plans from the United States and had only but “dubious” and “political intentions”.

Some argue that Unions are also throttled under the Chávez administration. Representatives of unions are only legitimate unless they are overseen by the state and have state certification of the elected persons. Without this certification, a union cannot bargain collectively to champion for workers’ rights. The Human Rights Watch report of September, 2008 on Venezuela recommended that the government cease intervening in union affairs.

Allowing Civil Society to operate free from harassment, intimidation, discrimination, or unnecessary legal obstacles has been accepted by many governments. However, many argue that at this moment Venezuela does not.

Conclusion The civil society arena in Venezuela is a complex and contested territory. The wide array of nongovernmental organizations and government supported organizations currently exist in unique cultural, legislative, political, economic, and policy frameworks.

Reference List Briceño-León, R. (2005). Petroleum and Democracy in Venezuela. Social Forces, 1-23.

CIVICUS (2006a), CIVICUS Civil Society Index: Preliminary Findings Phase 2003-2005, CIVICUS, at http://www.civicus.org/new/media/ICSI%20paper.pdf.

CIVICUS (2006b), CIVICUS urges Venezuelan government to reconsider proposed law, CIVICUS, at http://www.civicus.org/csw_files/Venezuela_Appeal_07.08.06.htm.

Edwards, Michael (2004), Civil Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 138 pp.

Encarnación, O. (2002). Venezuela’s “Civil Society Coup”. World Policy Journal, 19(2), 38-48.

Ellner, S. (2005). Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Paths of Radical Populism: Directios of the Chavista Movement in Venezuela. Science & Society, 69(2), 160-190 Gershman, C. & Allen, M. (2006). New Threats to Freedom. The Assault on Democracy Assiatance.

Journal of Democracy, 17(2), 36-51.

Golinger, E. (2007). The Chávez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela. London: Pluto Press.

Human Rights Watch (September 18, 2008). A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela McCoy, J. & Neuman, L. (2001). Defining the “Bolivarian Revolution” Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela.

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Current History, February, 80-85.

Rebelion.org (2009), “Venezuela invertirá $225 mil millones de dólares en los próximos 4 años”, Rebelion.org, en http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=79136&titular=venezuela-invertirá-$225mil-millones-de-dólares-en-los-próximos-4-años-.

Repela Caracas Críticas; Echa a Director de HRW. (2008, September 20). El Periódico Reforma, p.

Internacional 1 Salamon (2003), Global Civil Society: An Overview, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies at http://www.jhu.edu/~ccss/publications/pdf/globalciv.pdf.