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The  Department  in  Review   Cincinna2  Police  Department     January  2012    

  Strategic  Policy  Partnership   Box  577   West  Tisbury,  MassachuseGs  02575  

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Table  of  Contents  (1  out  of  2)   •  • 

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Execu2ve  Summary     Introduc2on  and  Overview   •  –  The  Audit  Team  and  Introductory   Remarks  (7-­‐8)   –  The  Cincinna<  Police  Department  (9)   –  Linder  Report  Ac<on   Recommenda<ons  (10-­‐15)   –  The  Historical  Environment  (16)   –  The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna<   (17-­‐23)   Community  Policing   –  Current  Ini<a<ves  (25-­‐26)   –  Recommenda<ons  (26-­‐30)   •  Patrol  Services   –  Organiza<on  (32-­‐34)   –  District-­‐by-­‐District  Recommenda<ons   (35-­‐46)   –  Administra<on  (47-­‐48)   –  Special  Services  (49-­‐53)   –  Resource  Alloca<on  (54-­‐56)   –  Demand  Management  (57-­‐58)  

The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on   –  Organiza<on  (60)   –  Case  Management  (61-­‐64)   –  Integra<on  with  Patrol  (65-­‐66)   –  Specializa<on  (67-­‐68)   –  Homicide  (69-­‐70)   –  Officer-­‐involved  Shoo<ngs  (71)   –  Felonious  Assaults  (72-­‐74)   –  Criminalis<cs  (75)   –  Records  Management  (76-­‐77)   –  Task  Forces  (78)   The  Intelligence  Func2on   –  Structure  (80)   –  Informa<on  Dissemina<on    (81)   –  U<liza<on  (82)   –  Special  Events  (83)   –  Departmental  Coordina<on  (84)   –  Phone  Surveillance  (85)  

  Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Table  of  Contents  (2  out  of  2)   • 

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   •  –  Internal  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on  (87)   –  Planning  Sec<on  (87)   –  Inspec<ons  Sec<on  (88)   –  Court  Control  Unit  (88)     –  Detail  Coordina<on  Unit  (88)     •  –  Training  Sec<on  (89)   –  Organiza<on  (91)   –  Technology  (92-­‐97)   –  Financial  Management  and  Personnel   •  (97-­‐98)   –  Over<me  and  Court  Time  (99-­‐102)   Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   –  The  History  (104-­‐105)   –  Strategy/Implementa<on  (106-­‐107)   –  Law  Enforcement  Team  (108)   –  Services  Team  (109)   –  Community  Team  (109)   –  Systems  Team  (109)   –  Team  Recommenda<ons  (111)  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

Managing  Performance   –  General  Background  (113)   –  General  Recommenda<ons  (114-­‐115)     –  Accredita<on  (116-­‐117)   –  Personnel  Evalua<on  (118-­‐119)   Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the   Department   –  Staffing  Levels  (121-­‐128)   –  Departmental  Organiza<on  (129-­‐133)   Summary  of  Recommenda2ons  

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Execu2ve  Summary   • 

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This  report  presents  the  results  of  a  review  or  “audit”  of  the  Cincinna<  Police  Department,   undertaken  at  the  request  of  Chief  James  Craig.    The  objec<ve  of  this  review  was  to  assess   current  structure,  opera<ons,  and  systems  within  the  Cincinna<  Police  Department  against   na<onal  standards,  iden<fying  strategies  that  were  notable  for  their  effec<veness  and   needed  to  be  protected,  areas  that  needed  strengthening  and  areas  that  needed  major   reform.   Overall,  the  department  is  a  police  agency  that  has  made  significant  strides  toward   excellence  in  a  number  of  areas  over  the  last  five  years.    A  number  of  notable  ini<a<ves  have   been  undertaken,  such  as  the  Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  to  Reduce  Violence  (CIRV),  which  has  won   several  na<onal  awards.   The  quality  of  the  police  officers  with  whom  the  review  staff  interacted  was  notable,  having  a   strong  commitment  to  Cincinna<  and  its  future.    Since  the  riots  that  occurred  some  years   ago,  the  department  has  worked  hard  to  build  trust  with  the  Cincinna<  community   experiencing  substan<al  success.   Key  recommenda<ons  resul<ng  from  the  review  are  the  following:   –  The  organiza<on  is  somewhat  top  heavy,  overly  specialized  and  in  need  of  more  robust   performance  management  processes.     –   A  greater  percentage  of  police  officers  need  to  be  assigned  to  the  Police  Districts  as   opposed  to  specialized  assignments,  with  District  Commanders  held  accountable  for   how  those  officers  are  used  to  address  the  major  concerns  of  District  neighborhoods  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Execu2ve  Summary   –  The  rela<onship  between  inves<ga<ons  of  felonious  assault  cases  and  homicides  needs   to  be  strengthened.    Presently,  Districts  inves<gate  the  assaults  and  Inves<ga<ons   inves<gate  homicides.    They  are  in  reality  ogen  the  same  event  –    except  that  in  a   homicide  the  vic<m  has  died.   –  The  department  needs  to  strengthen  its  commitment  to  vic<ms  of  crime,  who  ogen  are   trauma<zed  from  the  crime  event  and  need  regular  informa<on  from  the  inves<ga<ng   officer.   –  The  successful  CIRV  strategy  against  violent  crime  needs  to  be  re-­‐vitalized  and  focused.     Having  had  excellent  success  in  its  ini<al  years,  it  has  become  a  bit  disorganized  in  the   last  year  but  has  the  poten<al  to  drama<cally  further  reduce  violent  crime  in  the   community.   –  The  department  needs  to  be  restructured,  merging  related  units  and  ac<vi<es,  reducing   staffing  in  some  so  that  addi<onal  personnel  can  be  moved  to  patrol  assignments.   –  There  is  a  strong  need  for  the  department  to  move  forward  at  a  fast  pace  with  its   technology  ini<a<ves,  since  they  can  drama<cally  increase  the  informa<on  flow  in  the   department  and  that  made  available  to  field  personnel.     –  Performance  management  through  the  CompStat  process  and  the  related  Problem-­‐ Oriented  Policing  process  needs  to  become  a  cornerstone  of  strategic  thinking  about   how  crime  preven<on  should  occur.   –  The  community  must  be  brought  into  the  department  processes  of  policy  development,   strategy  and  tac<cs.   Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Introduc2on  and  Overview   The  Audit  Team  and  Introductory  Remarks  ―  The   Cincinna<  Police  Department  ―  The  Linder  Ac<on   Report  ―  Vision  for  Cincinna<  Policing  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Introduc2on  and  Overview   • 

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This  report  presents  the  findings  of  an  audit  of  the  Cincinna<  Police  Department  aimed  at   providing  the  Chief  of  Police  with  a  picture  of  how  current  prac<ces  in  the  department  match   what  are  considered  best  prac<ces  across  the  country.   The  audit,  conducted  by  staff  of  the  Strategic  Policy  Partnership  (SPP),  was  headed  by  Robert   Wasserman.    Team  members  were  Robert  Stewart,  Louis  K.  Dekmar  and  Patrick  Oliver.    Each   team  member  reviewed  specific  aspects  of  the  department,  joining  together  for  discussions   regarding  observa<ons  and  findings.    Zachary  Ginsburg  provided  research  on  various   comparable  agencies  across  the  country.   This  audit  review  period  was  between  October  and  December,  2011.  SPP  staff  conducted   numerous  visits,  interviewing  command  staff  and  unit  heads,  riding  with  officers  in  various   districts,  and  reviewing  departmental  data.   SPP  held  extensive  discussions  with  James  Craig,  Police  Chief,  regarding  his  vision  for  policing   Cincinna<.  We  informed  the  Chief  of  our  recommenda<ons  as  they  began  to  crystalize,  and   in  many  cases  he  acted  to  begin  implementa<on  when  they  fit  with  his  overall  vision  for  the   department.   We  were  impressed  with  the  willingness  of  employees  of  the  department  –  at  all  levels  –  to   share  informa<on,  insights  and  sugges<ons  for  ways  the  department  could  improve  its   effec<veness.    The  police  union  President  shared  her  observa<ons  and  sugges<ons,  as  did   the  City  Manager.    However,  the  content  of  this  work  is  en<rely  that  of  the  Strategic  Policy   Partnership  and  its  staff,  reflec<ng  our  opinion  of  how  the  department  can  improve.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Introduc2on  and  Overview   • 

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It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Cincinna<  Police  Department  –  when  compared  with  other   police  agencies  its  size  and  service  popula<on  –  is  a  good  police  agency.    Over  the  years,  it   has  improved  how  it  addresses  the  policing  challenges  of  Cincinna<,  and  has  learned  from  its   mistakes.    Since  the  riots  of  some  years  ago  and  the  Collabora<ve  Agreement,  the   Department  seems  to  have  adopted  a  posi<ve  stance  in  its  rela<onship  with  the  minority   community  that  is  reflected  in  how  many  officers  address  their  work.   Over  the  last  few  years,  the  Department  has  adopted  a  number  of  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art  ini<a<ves   –  most  notably  the  Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  for  Reduc<on  of  Violence  (CIRV),  the  an<-­‐violence   ini<a<ve  that  in  its  early  stages  has  produced  very  posi<ve  results.    While  there  have  been   substan<al  issues  surrounding  management  styles  in  the  department,  there  appears  to  be  a   serious  commitment  to  addressing  those  issues  under  the  new  Chief,  James  Craig.   The  amtude  expressed  by  numerous  officers  with  whom  we  interacted  regarding  Cincinna<’s   quality  as  a  city  is  most  impressive.    Officers  like  policing  in  this  city;  they  like  the  city  and   desire  that  the  Department  be  noted  as  a  place  where  excellence  prevails.   The  recommenda<ons  contained  in  this  audit  report  provide  a  framework  from  which  that   commitment  and  desire  can  be  achieved.  

 

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The  Cincinna2  Police  Department   •  • 

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The  City  of  Cincinna<  Police  Department  currently  employs  approximately  1027  sworn  law   enforcement  officers  and  119  civilian  employees.  It  is  a  full-­‐service  law  enforcement  agency,   providing  a  wide  range  of  services  to  the  residents  and  visitors  to  the  city.     Under  the  Police  Chief,  the  department  has  been  divided  into  five  Bureaus,  each  headed  by   an  Assistant  Chief  of  Police.    Recently,  with  the  arrival  of  Chief  James  Craig,  the  department   has  begun  a  process  of  restructuring,  and  currently  the  five  Bureaus  have  been  collapsed  into   four:  Patrol  Services,  Inves<ga<ons,  Administra<on  and  Resources.     The  department  has  five  Districts,  each  of  which  provides  police  services  to  a  group  of   neighborhoods  throughout  the  city.    Cincinna<  has  a  wide  variety  of  neighborhoods,  each   with  its  own  characteris<cs  and  iden<ty.       The  city  is  a  financial  center  for  Southern  Ohio  and  has  several  na<onal  corpora<ons   headquartered  there.    It  is  also  a  substan<al  conven<on  center,  has  several  major  sports   teams  and  draws  many  visitors  daily.   While  the  popula<on  of  the  city  is  about  300,000,  the  metropolitan  area  has  a  popula<on  of   approximately  2,600,000  and  there  is  a  substan<al  increase  in  popula<on  within  the  city   boundaries  daily  as  people  come  into  the  city  to  work,  shop  or  visit  entertainment  and  ea<ng   establishments.   A ��large  number  of  police  employees  grew  up  in  Cincinna<  and  have  a  par<cular  affinity  for   the  community.       Over  the  years,  the  department  has  undertaken  a  number  of  notable  ini<a<ves,  including  an   innova<ve  violent  crime  reduc<on  ini<a<ve  (CIRV)  and  an  evolving  commitment  to   community  policing,  among  many  others.  

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Linder  Report  Ac2on  Recommenda2ons   A  major  review  of  the  Cincinna<  Police  Department  was  conducted  by  an  outside  consultant  in  2005.     The  review  was  funded  by  the  private  sector  for  the  Mayor.    A  number  of  specific  recommenda<ons   were  made;  many  of  which  have  been  implemented  and  some  which  have  not.    The  status  of  those   recommenda<ons  and  our  comment  on  each  is  listed  below.   Ac2on  1  –  Launch  STORM  (Strategic  and  Tac4cal  Opera4ons  and  Risk  Management).   •  This  recommenda<on  suggested  a  model  of  CompStat  as  the  basis  of  crime  reduc<on  efforts.    The   CompStat  process  has  now  been  implemented  and  the  CIRV  process  has  approached  the  issue  of   violence  in  a  different,  and  more  effec<ve  way,  than  had  been  recommended.   Ac2on  2  –  Hold  commanders  accountable  for  outcomes,  not  ac4vi4es.   •  The  implementa<on  of  CompStat  has  been  a  move  in  this  direc<on  but  the  performance  measures   are  s<ll  too  focused  on  ac<vi<es.    Beper  outcome  measures  will  need  to  be  iden<fied.   Ac2on  3  –  Invest  in  sophis4cated  crime-­‐mapping  analysis.   •  The  department  has  obtained  crime  analysis  sogware  and  each  District  has  a  crime  analyst  (a   police  officer  assigned  to  that  func<on).   •  The  sogware  in  use  does  geographical  profiling  and  spa<al  analysis  for  density  crime  mapping.   •  Numerous  other  sogware    products  also  available  to  the  crime  analysts.   Ac2on  4  –  Ini4ate  Quality  Assurance  Unit  audit  systems  for  repor4ng  and  coding  crime  incidents  and   police  responses.     •  The  department  has  not  assigned  personnel  the  specific  task  of  audi<ng  crime  report  coding.   •  Processes  for  ensuring  the  accuracy  of  such  repor<ng  are  under  considera<on.   •  The  process  for  repor<ng  and  entering  crime  report  data  will  move  to  field  repor<ng  rather  than   having  data  clerks  entering  data  from  handwripen  reports.    

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Linder  Report  Ac2on  Recommenda2ons   Ac2on  5  –  Ini4ate  task  force  to  explore  prospect  of  criminal  intelligence  sharing  with  other   jurisdic4ons.   •  Some  informa<on  sharing  was  in  place  during  supervisors’  mee<ngs  but  generally   informa<on  sharing  remains  an  issue  within  the  Department.   •  One  of  the  most  important  issues  remains  sharing  intelligence  informa<on  with  officers  in   the  field.    The  existence  of  perceived  silos  in  the  Department  restricts  such  informa<on   sharing.   •  The  Fusion  Center  (intelligence)  now  provides  a  base  for  informa<on  sharing  with  other   jurisdic<ons.   Ac2on  6  –  Count  arrests  by  “bodies”  instead  of  charges  for  each  arrested  person.   •  This  has  been  implemented   Ac2on  7  –  Combine  SCU  and  VICE  to  more  effec4vely  target  mid-­‐level    narco4c  dealers.   •  These  two  func<ons  have  been  integrated  into  a  single  vice  unit  .  It  has  been  doing   inves<ga<ons  at  all  levels.   •  There  is  some  duplica<on  of  effort  by  the  Vice  Squad  and  regional  task  forces  focusing  on   narco<cs  enforcement.   Ac2on  8  –  Seek  stronger  inspec4on  ini4a4ves  by  City  agencies  working  with  police  targe4ng  vice   loca4ons.  Also  seek  more  civil  penal4es  for  viola4ons.   •  The  Vice  Unit  and  police  districts  now  iden<fy  loca<ons  requiring  such  ac<on  and  both   criminal  and  civil  penal<es  are  now  issued.   •  Nuisance  abatement  viola<ons  are  now  issued  under  the  quality  of  life  code.   •  CERT  team  ac<vi<es  now  address  these  issues  as  well.     11   Strategic  Policy  Partnership    


Linder  Report  Ac2on  Recommenda2ons   Ac2on  9  –  Priori4ze  on  arres4ng  “worst  of  the  worst”  felons.   •  The  Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  to  Reduce  Violence  (CIRV)  has  focused  enforcement  and  preven<on   ac<vi<es  on  gang  and  group  members  who  engage  in  the  most  violent  ac<vi<es.   •  District  personnel  and  the  Vice  Unit  target  repeat  violent  offenders  as  well.   •  There  is  a  need  for  the  Department  to  be  involved  in  decisions  concerning  the  release  of   prisoners  who  have  had  a  serious  propensity  to  reoffend.   Ac2on  10  –  Assign  one  VCS  officer  to  Major  Offenders  Unit  for  60-­‐day  rota4ons.   •  This  has  not  been  implemented.    The  reason  is  not  clear.   •  There  appears  to  be  agreement  that  a  rota<on  plan  for  the  department  would  be  beneficial   for  officer  development.   Ac2on  11  –  Track  warrants  and  document  inves4ga4ve  ac4ons  to  record  progress.   •  This  has  been  completed  and  is  done  by  SOFAST  and  District  inves<ga<ve  units.   Ac2on  12  –  Implement  program  to  have  inves4gators  interview  and  debrief  subjects  arrested  for   guns,  drugs,  and  violent  crime  charges.   •  This  prac<ce  is  rou<nely  done  by  the  arres<ng  officers  and  inves<gators  on  significant   arrests.   •  The  na<onal  best  prac<ce  –  an  inves<gator  separate  from  the  arres<ng  or  case  inves<gator   interviewing  arrestees  –  will  be  considered  in  the  future.   •  The  prac<ce  can  be  greatly  increased  in  the  future.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

12  


Linder  Report  Ac2on  Recommenda2ons   Ac2on  13  –  Ini4ate  pawn  shop  database  input  by  district  inves4gators.   •  This  ac<on  has  not  been  implemented.   •  District  inves<gators  have  been  using  Leads  on-­‐Line  to  complete  these  ac<ons.   Ac2on  14  –  Transfer  district  inves4gators  from  Patrol  Bureau  to  Inves4ga4ons  Bureau.   •  This  recommenda<on  has  been  widely  discussed  in  the  Department  over  the  years.   •  There  are  both  poten<al  benefits  and  complica<ons  rela<ng  to  such  a  merger  and   centraliza<on  of  inves<ga<ons,  par<cularly  rela<ng  to  informa<on  sharing  between   inves<gators  and  districts.   •  Current  best-­‐prac<ce  is  decentraliza<on  of  inves<gators  except  for  Homicide  and  Aggravated   Assault  Firearm  as  well  as  some  special  crimes,  such  as  sex  crimes.   Ac2on  15  –  Review  case  clearances  at  STORM  mee4ngs  -­‐-­‐  especially  ones  cleared  by  excep4on  -­‐-­‐   to  increase  cases  cleared  by  arrest.   •  Some  of  this  has  occurred  at  the  weekly  CompStat  mee<ng  but  overall  it  has  not  been   implemented.   Ac2on  16  –  Assign  local  inves4gators  and  proba4on/parole  officers  to  ini4al  office  interviews   when  violent  or  career  property  criminals  are  released  to  parole  or  proba4on.   •  There  has  been  no  procedure  developed  for  this  ac<on,  although  District  Neighborhood   Liaison  Officers  rou<nely  visit  career  criminals  with  Parole  and  Proba<on  Officers.   •  CIRV  has  taken  some  ac<ons  with  regard  to  this  recommenda<on.   •  Current  best-­‐prac<ce  has  evolved  into  a  far  more  targeted  and  comprehensive  interview   with  released  offenders,  aimed  at  preven<ng  reoffending.       Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

13  


Linder  Report  Ac2on  Recommenda2ons   Ac2on  17  –  Work  with  Coroner  to  establish  electronic  no4fica4on  system  for  CODIS  and  NIBIN   hits.   •  Inves<gators  now  receive  facsimile  transmissions  from  the  Coroner’s  Office.   Ac2on  18  –  Code  and  track  CODIS  and  NIBIN  hits.   •  This  ac<on  is  completed  by  the  Criminalis<cs  and  the  Coroner’s  Office.   Ac2on  19  –  Chief  and  Coroner  to  arrange  for  in-­‐service  training  for  supervisors  on  subjects  of   importance  to  both  agencies.   •  Not  implemented  for  unknown  reasons.   Ac2on  20  –  Clarify  policy  to  dictate  when  li\ing  a  fingerprint  is  required.   •  The  ac<on  is  now  standardized  in  the  Department’s  Inves<ga<ons  Manual,  but  there  is  s<ll   some  degree  of  interpreta<on  in  its  implementa<on.   •  The  process  starts  with  the  ini<al  inves<ga<on  by  the  patrol  officer;  a  beper  standardized   criteria  needs  to  be  iden<fied  and  implemented  to  make  the  process  work  as  recommended.   Ac2on  21  –  Secure  funds  to  purchase  palm  -­‐-­‐print  reader.   •  The  CIS  has  made  such  a  purchase.   Ac2on  22  –  Develop  tracking  system  for  processed  crime  scenes  to  track  fingerprint  and  palm   print  outcomes.   •  This  ac<on  has  been  completed.    CIS  tracks  all  crime  scenes  they  process.    Finger  and  palm   prints  are  tracked  through  the  Automated  Fingerprint  Iden<fica<on  System  (AFIS)     Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

14  


Linder  Report  Ac2on  Recommenda2ons   Ac2on  23  –  “Full  Court  Press  Ini4a4ve:”  “Every  non-­‐patrol  officer,  with  few  excep4ons,  both  in   districts  and  at  headquarters,  will  be  required  to  spend  one  tour  each  week  on  patrol  under   district  supervision.”     •  This  has  not  been  implemented  as  it  was  considered  more  “show”  and  “go.”   •  As  the  department  moves  to  reduce  specialized  units  by  moving  officers  to  patrol,  it  becomes   more  difficult  to  implement  this  recommenda<on  as  the  remaining  units  would  have  less   staffing  and  thus  poten<ally  greater  workload.  

Summary   • 

•  • 

Many  managers  in  the  Department  felt  they  were  not  consulted  when  the  Linder  Report  was   being  prepared.    It  appears  that  this  lack  of  involvement  made  many  in  the  Department   unwilling  to  take  the  recommenda<ons  seriously.    Addi<onally,  the  report  was  apparently   never  released  publically,  although  some  in  the  Department  had  access  to  the   recommenda<ons.   It  is  important  that  the  Department  ensure  that  the  results  of  departmental  analyses  be   publically  available.  This  is  par<cularly  important  because  of  the  Chief’s  commitment  to  full   transparency  of  Department  ac<ons  and  opera<ons.   The  Department  must  also  analyze  recommenda<ons  that  may  improve  performance  and,   for  those  that  are  accepted,  track  progress  toward  implementa<on  with  regular  reviews  and   assignment  of  responsibility  to  accountable  managers.    Use  of  the  CompStat  forum  is  one   good  way  of  monitoring  progress.    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

15  


The  Historical  Environment   • 

•  • 

•  •  • 

The  Cincinna<  Police  Department  has  long  been  viewed  as  a  model  for  the  professional   police  agency,  an  organiza<onal  strategy  that  developed  following  the  work  of  O.W.  Wilson   and  other  reformers  in  the  mid-­‐part  of  the  last  century.    That  model  focused  on  policing   ac<vi<es  for  a  new  era,  moving  police  officers  into  vehicles,  providing  them  with  radios,  and   making  response  to  ci<zen  calls  for  service  the  primary  priority.   There  was  a  high  priority  on  ensuring  that  new  officers  met  basic  qualifica<ons,  were   adequately  trained  and  followed  rules  and  regula<ons.    These  were  the  cornerstones  of  the   new  professionalism.   Management  styles  during  this  period  were  absolute  and  fairly  authoritarian.    Higher  ranks  in   police  agencies  ogen  managed  by  fear  and  in<mida<on.    There  was  liple  communica<on   between  management  and  lower-­‐level  officers;  these  officers  were  expected  to  do  what  they   were  told.   The  result  of  this  managerial  style  was  the  forma<on  of  police  associa<ons  and  unions  to   protect  officer  rights.    But  even  with  the  forma<on  of  employee  organiza<ons,  the  core   management  style  that  developed  over  the  years  remained  in  place.   In  Cincinna<,  the  Chief  of  Police  was  viewed  as  a  powerful  leader  of  a  complex  organiza<on.     Internally,  over  the  years,  the  authoritarian  management  style  became  somewhat  less   aggressive  but  remained  as  the  model  that  each  chief  embodied.     In  many  ways,  the  mantra  was  “do  what  I  say”  with  limited  collabora<on  in  decision-­‐making   from  the  top  down.    This  style  produced  results,  some  na<onally  notable.    But  over  many   years,  it  created  a  sense  within  the  department  that  cri<cism  and  collabora<on  were  not   postures  that  were  accepted.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

16  


The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2   • 

• 

The  Cincinna<  Police  Department  is  well-­‐placed  to  achieve  a  level  of  excellence,  community   engagement  and  effec<veness  built  upon  the  many  posi<ve  ini<a<ves  undertaken  over  the   last  ten  years.    The  Collabora<ve  Agreement,  while  distasteful  to  many  in  the  Department,   put  in  place  new  systems  that  raised  ci<zen  confidence  in  the  organiza<on.    Police  outreach   to  community  leadership  flowing  from  the  Collabora<ve  Agreement  has  resulted  in   drama<cally  improved  legi<macy  of  the  Department  in  the  eyes  of  the  community.   The  current  Chief  of  Police,  James  Craig,  is  commiped  to  reinforcing  the  strengths  of  the   department  and  moving  the  agency  to  new  levels  of  excellence.    The  key  characteris<cs  of   the  Department  that  will  develop  in  the  coming  years  are  the  following:   –  Strong  community  collabora<on  with  the  Department  in  areas  of  policy  development,   strategic  and  tac<cal  development,  transparency  and  the  sharing  of  responsibility   between  police  and  community  for  effec<ve  crime  reduc<on  and  safety  throughout  the   city.   –  A  strengthened  commitment  to  problem-­‐solving  as  a  key  means  for  reducing  repeat   situa<ons  of  concern  for  the  community  and  situa<ons  requiring  police  apen<on.   –  Internal  police  management  prac<ces  that  show  respect  for  employees  and  value  the   work  they  do,  pushing  down  authority  within  the  organiza<on  to  be  crea<ve  problem-­‐ solvers  within  policy  guidelines.   –  A  leaner  police  organiza<on  that  provides  value  for  money  spent  by  the  ci<zens  of   Cincinna<  for  policing  services.  

 Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

17  


The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2   –  Strong  performance  management  ini<a<ves  –  including  a  problem-­‐solving  CompStat  –   that  will  ensure  all  employees  are  accountable  for  outcomes  resul<ng  from  their   ac<vi<es.   –  A  community  that  truly  shares  responsibility  for  semng  the  standard  for  safety  and   security  in  every  neighborhood;  community  members  are  vocal  that  they  will  not   tolerate  aberrant  criminal  and  deviant  behavior  that  damages  their  neighborhoods’   quality  of  life.   –  An  effec<ve  crime  preven<on  strategy  with  robust  implementa<on  of  the  Community   Ini<a<ve  to  Reduce  Violence  (CIRV)  process  that  has  been  so  successful  in  years  past.   –  Stronger  integra<on  between  police  and  other  city  agencies  in  providing  services  to   those  who  have  problems  that  may  result  in  violent  or  destruc<ve  behavior.     –  High  levels  of  sa<sfac<on  with  police  performance  in  mee<ng  community  needs,   resul<ng  in  higher  levels  of  police  legi<macy  in  the  community  and  increased  confidence   that  the  police  are  trea<ng  everyone  with  respect,  regardless  of  the  circumstances.   –  Maximizing  police  officers  assigned  to  neighborhood  policing  through  reducing   specializa<on  of  certain  func<ons.   –  Widespread  acknowledgement  in  the  community  that  “cops  count”  in  maintaining   Cincinna<  as  a  great  place  to  live  and  work.    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

18  


The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2   –  A  strong  commitment  to  assis<ng  vic<ms  of  crime,  to  lessen  the  impact  of  criminal   events  on  their  lives  and  well-­‐being.   –  Powerful  ethics  within  the  police  organiza<on  focused  on  truthfulness  at  all  <mes  and  a   commitment  to  excellence  in  community  service  through  the  organiza<on’s  ac<vi<es.    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

19  


The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2   Accountabili2es   • 

  • 

The  members  of  the  department  should  have  a  clearly  defined  set  of  accountabili<es;   quali<es  of  performance  by  which  they  are  judged.    Drawn  from  the  Strategic  Policy   Partnership’s  work  with  the  Cambridge  Police  Department,  the  Cincinna<  Police   Department’s  accountabili<es  ought  to  include  the  following:   All  police  officers  are  accountable  for…     –  Addressing  with  skill  and  competency  a  wide  range  of  public  safety  situa<ons  affec<ng   the  quality  of  life  within  the  community.   –  The  quality  of  their  problem-­‐solving,  decision-­‐making  and  judicial  use  of  discre<onary   authority.   –  The  quality  and  professionalism  of  their  communica<on  and  interac<ons  with  the   community.   –  Exercising  judgment  in  a  manner  that  is  reassuring  and  responsive  to  the  community.   –  The  treatment  of  vic<ms  and  those  in  need  of  assistance  in  a  manner  that  reflects  the   Department’s  values.   –  The  type  of  rela<onship  the  department  has  with  the  community.   –  The  level  of  communica<on,  coopera<on,  and  coordina<on  with  their  fellow  officers.   –  Conduc<ng  themselves  in  a  way  that  leads  ci<zens  to  perceive  their  ac<ons  as   legi<mate.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

20  


The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2   • 

• 

• 

Sergeants  are  also  accountable  for…   –  Consistency  in  officers’  delivery  of  services.   –  The  quality  of  work  of  their  subordinates,  and  communica<ng  their  strengths  and   weaknesses  to  them.   –  The  level  of  communica<on  between  officers  and  their  colleagues,  clients  and  the   community.   –  Officers’  understanding  of  and  adherence  to  the  Department’s  mission  and  values.   –  Ensuring  their  subordinates  are  informed  about  situa<ons  or  circumstances  that  may   impact  their  assignments.   Lieutenants  are  also  accountable  for…   –  General  overall  oversight  and  management  of  the  units  for  which  they  have  opera<onal   control.   –  Ensure  the  effec<ve  coordina<on  effec<veness  among  the  various  opera<onal   components  of  the  department.   –  Ensuring  clear  and  open  lines  of  communica<on  between  the  units  that  report  to  them.   –  The  accuracy  and  <meliness  of  informa<on  provided  to  others  in  the  department.   –  The  management  of  accurate,  <mely,  and  important  informa<on  that  is  brought  to  the   apen<on  of  the  Police  Chief.   –  The  iden<fica<on  of  crime  paperns  and  trends,  and  the  development  of  interven<on   strategies  to  be  carried  out  by  their  subordinates.   –  Thinking  strategically  in  the  development  of  problem  solving  strategies  that  meet   certain  criteria.   Captains  are  also  accountable  for…   –  Providing  construc<ve  guidance  to  unit  commanders.   –  Consistency  in  the  delivery  of  services  of  the  shig  commanders,  unit  commanders  and   sector  lieutenants  (everyone  playing  on  the  same  team).  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

21  


The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2  

• 

–  Ensuring  vic<ms  and  persons  in  of  assistance  are  treated  in  accordance  with  the  values   of  the  Department.   –  Maintenance  of  staffing  levels  (Ensure  the  proper  staffing  levels  in  order  to  maintain  a   safety  and  adequate  delivery  of  police  services).   –  Defining  and  distribu<ng  informa<ve  and  ac<onable  intelligence  and  analysis.   –  Balancing  the  expenditures  associated  with  the  areas  of  responsibili<es  are  consistent   with  the  overall  mission  and  needs  of  the  department     Assistant  Chiefs  are  also  accountable  for…   –  Ins<lling  a  sense  of  overall  public  trust,  con<nually  building  upon  the  professional   reputa<on  of  the  Department.   –  Ins<lling  and  building  upon  the  overall  sense  of  professionalism  among  all  members  of   the  department,  as  well  as  establishing  and  maintaining  a  desired  level  of  professional   services.   –  Build  upon  and  facilitate  the  collabora<on  and  partnerships  that  exist  among  city   departments,  service  providers,  other  external  agencies,  as  well  as  the  various  boards   and  commissions.   –  Maintaining  a  high  level  of  coordina<on  of  services  with  other  agencies.   –  Addressing  percep<ons  of  fear  and  other  concerns  in  the  community.   –  Transparency  of  opera<ons  and  decisions  in  the  eyes  of  the  public.   –  Con<nually  assessing  alloca<on  of  resources  and  making  adjustments  to  always  strike  at   maintaining  an  adequate  level  of  police  services.   –  Mee<ng  officers’  need  for  guidance,  training,  professional  development,  and  resources.   –  Keeping  the  Chief  informed  of  pending  problems  or  issues,  and  managing  other   informa<on  (ensuring  its  importance  and  accuracy)  that  is  brought  to  his  apen<on.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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The  Vision  for  Policing  Cincinna2   • 

The  Chief  of  Police  is  also  responsible  for…   –  Maintaining  trust  between  the  Department  and  the  community  and  among  the   Department.   –  Craging  and  implemen<ng  effec<ve  strategies  for  maintaining  order  and  deterring   crime.   –  Overseeing  policy  implementa<on  in  all  opera<ons  and  divisions.   –  Responding  to  community  concerns  and  ensuring  compliance  with  all  governmental  and   legal  direc<ves.     –  Promo<ng  a  culture  of  proper  and  judicious  resource  expenditure  through  the  financial   management  process.   –  Op<mizing  managerial  efficiency  in  all  Departmental  branches.   –  Communica<ng  Departmental  needs  to  proper  city,  county,  state,  and  federal   authori<es.   –  Managing  rela<ons  between  the  Department  and  all  external  cons<tuencies.    

Recommenda2ons   • 

•  • 

The  Chief  should  ensure  that  each  person  holding  these  ranks  understand  these   accountabili<es  and  how  their  performance  will  be  judged.    When  issues  arise  related  to   mee<ng  these  accountabili<es,  discussions  should  be  held  with  the  impacted  employee  to   develop  a  strategy  for  improving  performance.   A  crucial  benefit  of  clearly  defined  accountabili<es  is  that  every  officer  knows  how  their   performance  will  be  judged.    These  accountabili<es  in  no  way  impact  the  contract  between   the  union  and  and  the  department.   Over  <me,  the  Department  should  develop  comparable  accountabili<es  for  civilian  posi<ons   as  well.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

23  


Community  Policing   Current  Ini<a<ves  ―  Recommenda<ons  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

24  


Community  Policing   • 

• 

• 

Community  policing  has  been  a  cornerstone  for  police  agencies  throughout  the  country.    In   Cincinna<,  this  important  ini<a<ve  has  evolved  to  adopt  several  separate  components   grouped  into  two  units:  A  community  policing  unit  which  coordinates  specialized  ac<vi<es   with  various  community  groups  and  a  problem-­‐solving  unit  which  works  to  develop  guidance   on  addressing  on-­‐going  problem  solving  ac<vi<es  that  can  address  localized  issues  of  concern   to  the  community.   Upon  appointment,  Chief  Craig  moved  these  units  into  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police  under   a  police  Captain.    The  Chief  believed  that  having  them  in  the  Chief’s  Office  would  show  his   support  for  these  ac<vi<es  while  their  eventual  placement  in  the  organiza<on  was   determined.   Since  being  assigned  to  the  Chief’s  Office,  the  units  have  undertaken  a  number  of  ini<a<ves,   many  of  which  will  be  beneficial  to  the  Department  when  they  come  to  frui<on.  These   include:   –  Chief’s  Police  Advisory  Board     –  Faith  Based  Ini<a<ve  with  D3   –  La<no  Project   –  Urban  League/CPPC  Programming   –  Fraternal  Order  of  Police  Associates  Coordinator   –  Fine  Arts  Youth  Ini<a<ve   –  Community  Summit  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

25  


Community  Policing   • 

• 

Personnel  assigned  to  these  units  are  commiped  to  the  basic  principles  of  community   policing  and  problem-­‐oriented  policing;  policing  strategies  that  reflect  the  most  common   thread  of  policing  substance  in  forward  looking  police  agencies:   –  Strong  involvement  of  diverse  community  representa<ves  in  localized  policing  priority   semng  and  strategy.   –  Recogni<on  of  the  importance  of  trea<ng  all  persons  with  whom  the  police  come  in   contact  with  dignity  and  respect,  regardless  of  their  ac<vi<es.   –  Consistency  in  law  enforcement  (ensuring  that  all  neighborhoods  receive  the  same  level   and  type  of  service)  but  also  responding  to  each  neighborhoods’  unique  problems  and   priori<es.   The  Cincinna<  Police  Department  has  made  significant  strides  in  its  rela<onship  with  the   community  and  adop<on  of  these  principles.    Police  officers,  the  police  union,  and  the   management  staff  have  come  to  recognize  the  importance  of  building  strong  rela<onships  of   trust  with  the  community.    While  the  efforts  have  not  been  equal  in  all  parts  of  the   organiza<on,  it  appears  that  substan<al  progress  has  been  made  and  a  founda<on  upon   which  further  efforts  can  be  based  has  been  set.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

The  Chief  of  Police  should  form  a  Ci<zen’s  Advisory  Council  represen<ng  the  breadth  of  the   Cincinna<  community.    Mee<ng  monthly,  they  should  discuss  policy,  strategy  and  police   effec<veness.  

  Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

26  


Community  Policing   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

• 

Each  police  District  should  have  a  Ci<zen’s  Advisory  Council  consis<ng  of  a  diverse  group  of   residents  and  business  representa<ves  from  district  neighborhoods.  These  Councils  should   meet  monthly  with  the  District  Captain  to  discuss  policing  issues,  public  percep<ons,  crime   trends  and  ways  in  which  the  community  and  police  can  jointly  address  the  problem  areas  of   crime  and  disorder.   The  posi<on  of  Community  Liaison,  staffed  by  a  Lieutenant,  should  be  established  in  the   Chief’s  Office  with  the  following  du<es:   –  Monitoring  the  state  of  the  rela<onship  with  the  community  in  each  of  the  Districts  and   offering  assistance  in  building  rela<onships  of  trust   –  Overseeing  the  Department’s  strong  Volunteer  Program,  working  to  see  it  expanded  to   all  districts   –  Coordina<ng  the  School  Resource  Officers  with  the  School  Department  and  districts  to   see  that  all  schools  requiring  SRO  presence  receive  that  assignment,  even  if  part-­‐<me.     Even  though  the  SROs  will  be  assigned  to  the  Districts  and  report  through  supervisors  to   the  District  Commander,  the  Community  Liaison  Lieutenant  will  review  their  ac<vi<es   and  ensure  they  meet  required  standards  for  effec<ve  police-­‐youth-­‐school  rela<ons   –  Providing  training  to  SROs  in  interac<ng  with  youth  so  that  the  SROs  are  skilled   interveners  when  youth  issues  arise  

  Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Community  Policing   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   – 

•  • 

•  • 

Liaising  with  key  community  groups  for  the  Chief  of  Police  and  serving  as  a  key  point  of   contact  for  those  community  leaders  who  want  to  contact  the  Chief  about  issues  of   concern   –  Monitor  community  policing  ini<a<ves  in  other  communi<es  so  that  Cincinna<  can  take   advantage  of  best-­‐prac<ces  as  they  develop.   Most  community  policing  func<ons  now  performed  in  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police  should   be  decentralized  to  Neighborhood  Policing  Services.   The  remainder  of  the  community  policing  func<ons  should  be  combined  with  the  problem-­‐ solving  ac<vi<es  and  assigned  to  the  Patrol  Bureau  (which  we  recommend  be  renamed  the   Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau).    In  that  posi<on,  the  staff  assigned  to  these  func<ons  can   assist  District  Captains  in  implemen<ng  problem-­‐solving  strategies.  Coordina<on  of  the  crime   analysis  func<on  should  also  be  assigned  to  this  group,  and  it  should  also  support  and   func<onally  supervise  the  district  crime  analyst  work  (with  the  analysts  s<ll  repor<ng  to  the   District  Captain)  while  feeding  the  rejuvenated  CompStat  (Performance  Management)   process.   The  department  should  strengthen  problem-­‐solving  training  for  recruits  and  consider  an   award  at  gradua<on  for  the  recruit  who  did  best  in  this  part  of  the  curricula.   Problem-­‐solving  needs  to  be  a  central  part  of  the  commitment  to  community  policing.    The   Department  should  examine  the  nature  of  occurrences  in  neighborhoods  with  substan<al   problems  of  crime  and  disorder.    The  Problem-­‐solving  staff  of  the  Department  has  developed  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

28  


Community  Policing   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)  

• 

• 

a  proposal  for  a  Ci<Stat  process  that  fully  integrates  CompStat  (described  later  in  this   report),  the  Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  to  Reduce  Violence  (CIRV),  and  problem-­‐solving  ini<a<ves   to  iden<fy  how  loca<ons  impact  crime  and  what  strategies  can  change  that  environment   and  thus  reduce  crime.   The  Problem-­‐solving  staff,  which  will  be  expanded  under  the  recommenda<ons  above,   should  be  strongly  supported  by  the  Department’s  management  team  to  ensure  that  they   have  a  voice  in  decision-­‐making  for  all  the  elements  of  the  process.  They  should  arrange  to   have  UC  students  work  as  interns  in  their  unit.   The  ac<vi<es  to  be  simultaneously  undertaken  should  include  the  following:   –  Analysis  on  loca<ons  complements  and  benefits  the  CompStat  and  CIRV/offender   focused  strategies   –  CIRV  data  to  include  addi<onal  elements  of  shoo<ngs  and  homicide  incidents   –  Problem  loca<ons  are  iden<fied  by  the  following  tools  but  are  rarely  used  in  conjunc<on   with  CompStat  and  CIRV:   •  Chronic  nuisance     •  Liquor  permit  premises   •  Code  Enforcement  Response  Team  (CERT)  ac<ons   •  Search  warrant  loca<ons   •  Iden<fied  open-­‐air  drug  markets  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Community  Policing   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)  

• 

•  • 

•  Loca<ons  with  the  highest  calls  for  service   •  Gun  recovery  loca<ons  and  gun  arrest  loca<ons   •  Drug  arrest  loca<ons   –  Problem  solving  with  a  place-­‐based  focus  forces  analysis  of  the  condi<ons  that  enable   crimes  to  occur  chronically  at  a  small  number  of  loca<ons.   To  ensure  that  the  process  is  sustainable  and  effec<ve,  the  following  specific  ac<vi<es  must   be  undertaken:   –  Daily  mee<ngs  within  CPD  districts/units/sec<ons  to  review  24  hour  crime  incidents   –  Weekly  mee<ngs  (i.e.  CompStat  mee<ngs)  to  address  short-­‐term  analysis   –  Monthly  mee<ngs  to  review  the  effec<veness  of  prior  responses   –  A  semi-­‐annual  mee<ng  to  address  seasonal  crime  trends  and  ensure  strategic  problem-­‐ solving     The  faculty  and  staff  of  the  Department  of  Criminal  Jus<ce  at  the  University  of  Cincinna<   should  be  brought  into  this  process,  with  student  interns  joining  the  analysis  teams.   Any  commander  who  does  not  fully  and  ac<vely  support  this  problem-­‐solving  orienta<on  of   the  Department  should  be  counseled  and  then,  if  necessary,  disciplined.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

30  


Patrol  Services   Patrol  Services  Organiza<on  ―  District-­‐by-­‐District   Recommenda<ons  ―  Night  Chief  ―  Community-­‐ Oriented  Policing  Coordinator  ―  Special  Services   Sec<on  ―  Patrol  Resource  Alloca<on  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

31  


Patrol  Services  Organiza2on   • 

• 

• 

• 

The  Patrol  Bureau,  commanded  by  an  assistant  chief,  performs  all  primary  police  func<ons.     Bureau  personnel  respond  to  ci<zen  requests  for  police  assistance,  enforce  criminal  and   traffic  laws,  inves<gate  criminal  ac<vity,  take  offense  reports,  and  regulate  non-­‐criminal   conduct.    Components  of  the  Patrol  Bureau  include  the  five  police  districts,  the  Night  Chief,   Patrol  Administra<on,  (un<l  recently)  the  Community  Oriented  Policing  (COP)  Coordinator,   Special  Services  Sec<on,  and  the  Special  Weapons  And  Tac<cs  (SWAT)  Coordinator.   DISTRICTS:  The  City  of  Cincinna<  is  divided  into  five  police  districts,  each  commanded  by  a   Captain  who  is  responsible  for  opera<ons  and  personnel  deployment.  Police  officers  assigned   to  the  districts  for  uniform  patrol  ac<vity  are  generally  divided  into  three  fixed  shigs.     Each  shig  is  commanded  by  a  lieutenant.  The  first  shig’s  star<ng  <mes  are  0600  and  0700   hours.  The  second  shig’s  star<ng  <mes  are  1300,  1400,  or  1500  hours,  depending  upon  the   service  demands  of  each  individual  district.  The  third  shig’s  star<ng  <mes  are  2200  or  2300   hours.  Third  shig  is  supplemented  by  a  late  power  shig  and  has  a  star<ng  <me  between  1900   and  2100  hours.  This  increases  field  strength  when  the  demand  for  police  service  is  higher.   The  districts  provide  uniformed  patrols  in  a  variety  of  ways.  In  addi<on  to  marked  vehicle   and  foot  patrols,  each  district  contains  a  Mountain  Bike  Squad.  These  officers  provide  a  full   range  of  police  services.  The  district  efforts  are  supplemented  by  mounted  and  canine   patrols  as  needed.  

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

32  


Patrol  Services  Organiza2on   • 

• 

• 

• 

Each  district  has  an  inves<ga<ve  unit  commanded  by  a  lieutenant.  This  unit  inves<gates   crimes  occurring  within  the  district.  When  necessary,  the  unit  coordinates  these   inves<ga<ons  with  the  Criminal  Inves<ga<on  Sec<on  (CIS)  of  the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau.   Each  district  has  iden<fied  a  Community  Problem  Oriented  Policing  (CPOP)  liaison  supervisor   and  an  officer  on  each  shig  as  a  contact  for  the  community  to  address  recurring  problems.   Ci<zens  can  contact  these  officers  via  e-­‐mail  or  the  24-­‐hour  CPOP  cell  phone.  The  goal  is  for   all  officers  to  adopt  and  apply  the  components  of  problem-­‐solving  and  community  policing  to   address  community  concerns.   Each  district  fields  a  Violent  Crimes  Squad  (VCS)  supervised  by  a  sergeant.  VCS  officers   concentrate  on  responding  to  and  inves<ga<ng  reports  of  violent  crimes.  They  also  serve   outstanding  warrants  to  arrest  and  incarcerate  the  subjects  commimng  these  violent  crimes.   Each  district  assigns  officers  to  perform  specialized  law  enforcement  tasks  that  include  crime   preven<on,  community  rela<ons,  vice  enforcement  ac<vi<es,  traffic  control,  crime  analysis,   and  warrant  service.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

33  


Patrol  Services  Organiza2on   General  Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Re-­‐name  the  Patrol  Services  Bureau  the  Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau,  as  that  beper   describes  the  ac<vi<es  that  are  undertaken.    Policing  is  about  places,  the  neighborhoods  of   the  city.   This  <tle  more  accurately  reflects  the  manner  in  which  the  Department  delivers  service,   focusing  on  the  well-­‐established  neighborhoods  that  exist  in  the  city.    The  <tle  also  reflects   the  con<nuing  effort  to  decentralize  policing  services  to  the  District  Command,  strengthening   the  neighborhood  and  community  focus  of  the  manner  in  which  the  department  delivers   products  and  services.   The  name  change  is  congruent  with  several  other  recommenda<ons  that  aim  to  bolster  the   outreach  to  community  resources  and  strengthen  police-­‐community  rela<ons  at  the   opera<onal  level.   The  five  Districts  will  remain  in  the  Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau,  all  repor<ng  to  the   Assistant  Chief  of  the  Bureau.  There  should  be  a  Special  Opera<ons  Unit  which  coordinates   key  aspects  of  the  Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  for  the  Reduc<on  of  Violence  (CIRV)  as  well  as   specialized  func<ons,  such  as  SWAT,  traffic,  canine  and  related  ac<vi<es.   While  the  Special  Opera<ons  Unit  has  important  traffic  responsibili<es,  this  should  not   diminish  the  responsibility  of  District  officers  to  enforce  traffic  laws  in  a  robust  manner,  since   many  who  commit  crimes  violate  traffic  laws  regularly.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

34  


Patrol  Services  1st  District    -­‐  Neighborhoods      CBD-­‐Riverfront  *      Mt.  Adams      Over-­‐the-­‐Rhine      Queensgate      Pendleton    -­‐  Resources      1  Captain      7  Lieutenants      21  Sergeants      13  Specialists      96  Police  Officers      5  Clerk  Typists      1  Hostler      144  Total  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

35  


Patrol  Services:  Central  Business  District   *Central  Business  District  -­‐  Riverfront  

The  downtown  area  is  an  important  center  of  Cincinna<’s  conference  and  tourist  ac<vity,  as   well  as  a  business  center.   •  The  casino  being  built  in  this  area  will  require  substan<al  police  planning  and  a  highly  visible,   ac<ve  policing  presence  in  the  area.   •  Conven<ons  that  come  to  the  area  require  a  substan<al  policing  presence,  both  for  crowd   control  security  enhancement  and  traffic  movement.    In  policing  parlance,  the  area  requires   substan<al  police  planning  and  management  of  major  events  which  regularly  occur.   •  Recognizing  the  importance  of  this  area,  many  agree  that  a  separate  policing  group  needs  to   be  assigned  to  address  these  issues.   Recommenda2ons   •  A  Downtown  Area  be  created,  commanded  by  a  Police  Captain,  who  would  be  accountable   for  the  quality  of  service  provided  and  the  sophis<ca<on  of  planning  developed  for  policing   the  influx  of  thousands  to  the  new  casino.   •  This  area  should  operate  as  a  separate  sec<on,  with  officers  and  some  specialists  assigned   repor<ng  to  the  Captain,  who  should  report  to  the  Assistant  Chief  of  the  Neighborhood   Policing  Bureau.   •  The  Area  staff  should  operate  from  the  District  1  sta<on  in  Police  Headquarters  and  support   services  should  be  shared  with  the  District.    But  the  command  should  be  totally  separate   from  the  remainder  of  District  1.   •  The  event  planning  and  related  units  should  be  a  part  of  this  new  Area.    Personnel  should  be   allocated  from  the  exis<ng  District  1  complement,  with  addi<onal  officers  (and  two   inves<gators)  assigned  from  the  officers  being  moved  to  Neighborhood  Policing  Services   from  specialist  units.   • 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

36  


Patrol  Services:  2nd  District      -­‐  Neighborhoods      California      East  End      East  Walnut  Hills      Evanston      Hyde  Park      Kennedy  Heights      Linwood      Madisonville      Mt.  Lookout      Columbia  /  Tusculum      Kennedy  Heights      Mount  Washington      Oakley      O’Bryonville    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

37  


Patrol  Services:  2nd  District   Second  District  

•  •  • 

 -­‐  Resources      1  Captain      4  Lieutenants      19  Sergeants      7  Specialists      79  Police  Officers      4  Clerk  Typists      114  Total   Geographically,  this  is  an  extremely  large  district.   It’s  size  makes  it  difficult  and  <me-­‐consuming  to  travel  from  one  end  to  the  other.   This  may  be  significant  to  enabling  supervisors  to  monitor  the  performance  of  subordinates   or  to  get  onto  a  scene  when  their  presence  is  needed  in  a  cri<cal  situa<on.  

Recommenda2on.   • 

In  the  long  term  planning  for  the  organiza<on,  we  recommend  that  a  realignment  of  the   districts  be  reviewed,  as  such  a  realignment  may  lessen  travel  and  response  <mes  based  on   distance  travelled.    We  discuss  realignment  in  a  later  sec<on  of  this  report.      

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

38  


Patrol  Services  3rd  District    -­‐  Neighborhoods      Saylor  Park      Riverside      Sedamsville      North  Fairmount      English  Woods      East  Westwood      Milllvale      Fay  Apartments      S.  Cumminsville      East  Price  Hill      Westwood      Lower  Price  Hill  –  Queensgate      South  Fairmount        

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

39  


Patrol  Services  3rd  District  

•  •  •  • 

 -­‐  Resources      1  Captain      4  Lieutenants      18  Sergeants      24  Specialists      111  Police  Officers      4  Clerk  Typists      162  Total   The  Third  District  is  pilo<ng  a  “sector”  system  which  assigns  a  geographic  subdivision  of  the   district  to  a  lieutenant.   That  lieutenant  is  responsible  for  crime  reduc<on  efforts  in  that  area.   This  is  a  major  departure  from  the  typical  “watch  commander”  model  of  the  lieutenant’s  role   which  is  akin  to  being  a  shig  manager.   Forward  thinking  departments  are  moving  to  some  varia<on  of  this  “new”  model  and  it   deserves  our  apen<on  and  focus.  

Recommenda2ons   •  • 

More  cri<cal  analysis  needs  to  be  made  of  the  efforts  being  employed  by  this  district.      A  structured  evalua<on  of  expected  outcomes  should  be  coordinated  with  the  planning   unit     Another  varia<on  of  the  “sector”  model  should  be  studied  in  another  district,  to  determine   which  varia<on  is  best  suited  to  the  Cincinna<  structure.    Criteria  for  analysis  should  be   established  for  both  trial  districts    

   

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

40  


Patrol  Services  3rd  District   Recommenda2ons   •  The  study  should  focus  on  issues  related  to  crime  reduc<on,  community  outreach,  crime   preven<on  and  employee  management.   •  In  the  current  model  being  tested,  beside  the  crime  reduc<on  efforts,  the  lieutenant  is  also   accountable  for  the  performance  and  behavior  of  the  approximately  25-­‐30  subordinates  who   regularly  patrol  the  sector  area.   •  This  is  a  substan<al  change  to  the  historic  role  of  the  patrol  lieutenant.  It’s  an  important   ingredient  in  the  decentraliza<on  of  the  community  policing  effort;  the  provision  of  services   at  a  neighborhood  level;  closer  and  improved  management  of  the  officer  and  sergeants   assigned  to  the  sector;  and  responsibility  for  a  more  engaging  rela<onship  with  the  residents   and  business  within  the  district.   •  There  needs  to  be  a  strong  linkage  between  this  pilot  and  the  concepts  being  developed  by   the  Problem-­‐Oriented  Policing  Unit,  as  addressing  community  problems  in  an  effec<ve   manner  is  a  key  objec<ve  of  the  Lieutenant’s  role.   •  The  Third  District  is  also  par<cipa<ng  in  a  pilot  project  evalua<ng  a  “4-­‐10”  work  schedule.     Both  patrol  officers  and  inves<gators  have  been  included  in  the  evalua<on  of  this  schedule.   •  This  is  the  only  district  where  inves<gators  were  included  in  the  new  work  schedule.   Typically,  in  many  police  agencies,  the  adop<on  of  this  work  plan  is  restricted  to  patrol   resources.    One  of  the  key  objec<ves  for  a  department  in  adop<ng  this  work  schedule  is   crea<ng  incen<ves  to  retain  more  experienced  officers  in  patrol.        

   

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

41  


Patrol  Services  3rd  District   • 

•  • 

We  have  recommended  elsewhere  in  the  report  that  a  careful  evalua<on  be  undertaken  of   the  impact  of  such  a  change  in  the  work  schedule.    Issues  to  be  evaluated,  beyond  officer   morale,  include  use  of  costs,  officer  deployment,  beat  coverage,  vaca<on  and  sick  <me  and   impact  on  the  community.  Given  the  current  economic  climate,  the  implementa<on  of  the   4-­‐10  work  schedule  must  be  a  cost  neutral  undertaking  or,  if  there  are  costs  associated  with   it,  givebacks  equivalent  to  those  costs  be  considered.   As  we  noted  in  the  Second  District  ,  the  Third  District  also  has  a  unique  geographic   configura<on  that  makes  travel  difficult.   We  would  suggest  that  any  future  beat/district  re-­‐configura<on  take  these  issues  into   account.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

42  


Patrol  Services  4th  District    -­‐  Neighborhoods      Mount  Auburn      Corryville      Avondale      North  Avondale      Paddock  Hills      Hartwell      Carthage      Roselawn      Bondhill      Walnut  Hills    -­‐    Resources      1  Captain      3  Lieutenants      19  Sergeants      6  Specialists      1  Technician      3  Clerk  Typists      138  Total   Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

43  


Patrol  Services  4th  District   Recommenda2ons   •  •  •  •  • 

Our  observa<ons  alongside  our  call  response  and  crime  data  analyses  led  us  to  conclude  that   the  Fourth  District  needs  addi<onal  resources.   For  the  call  load  and  crime  problems  in  this  district,  more  patrol  staffing  is  needed.   The  priority  of  staffing  specialized  units  throughout  the  Department  has  leg  patrol  services   depleted  in  a  number  of  areas,  acutely  so  in  the  Fourth  District.   There  are  a  significant  number  of  calls  for  service  legover  for  succeeding  shigs  on  a  regular   basis.   As  personnel  are  recommiped  to  the  patrol  districts  as  a  result  of  recommenda<ons   accompanying  this  report,  special  apen<on  should  be  given  to  ensuring  that  the  Fourth   District  has  priority  for  addi<onal  staffing.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

44  


Patrol  Services:  5th  District      -­‐  Neighborhoods      College  Hill      University  Heights      Fairview      Northside      Cligon      Mounty  Airy      Winton  Hills      Winton  Place      Camp  Washington    -­‐  Resources      1  Captain      4  Lieutenants      19  Sergeants      13  Specialists      89  Police  Officers      4  Clerk  Typists      130  Total   Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

45  


Patrol  Services:  5th  District   Recommenda2ons   •  • 

The  Figh  District  is  also  par<cipa<ng  in  an  evalua<on  of  the  “4-­‐10”  work  schedule.    The  same   type  of  evalua<on  must  be  completed  for  this  ini<a<ve,  as  in  District  Three.   The  patrol  shigs  are  the  only  units  involved  in  this  pilot  of  the  10-­‐4  work  schedule.    The  same   criteria  listed  for  the  Third  District  evalua<on  should  also  apply  here.      

       

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

46  


Patrol  Services:  Administra2on   Night  Chief     • 

• 

A  Police  Captain  (some<mes  two  Captains)  have  been  responsible  for  providing  a  command   presence  for  the  Department  during  the  evening  and  overnight  hours.  This  captain  posi<on   carries  Department-­‐wide  responsibili<es.    The  Captain  goes  to  major  events  and  keeps  a   record  of  significant  events    during  the  work  shig,  which  forms  the  basis  of  a  daily  report  to   the  Command  Staff.   As  the  number  of  Captains  on  the  department  declines,  this  posi<on  appears  to  be   unnecessary  and  can  be  accomplished  by  lieutenants  in  any  of  a  variety  of  assignments  or   rota<onal  schemes.  

Patrol  Administra2on   •  • 

Commanded  by  a  Captain,  the  incumbent  coordinates  and  reviews  reports  and  other   informa<on  submiped  by  the  Districts  and  the  Night  Chief.     This  Captain  serves  as  the  deputy  commander/administra<ve  liaison  for  the  Patrol  Bureau   and  reports  to  the  Patrol  Bureau  Commander.  

Community  Oriented  Policing  (COP)  Coordinator   •  •  • 

A  lieutenant  responsible  for  the  progression  of  the  COP  philosophy  in  the  Department.     The  COP  Coordinator  guides  the  districts’  Community  Problem  Oriented  Policing  (CPOP)   liaison  supervisors  and  CPOP  liaison  officers  as  they  work  to  develop  neighborhood-­‐based   collabora<ons  with  ci<zens.  This  posi<on  was  recently  moved  to  the  Chief’s  Office.   The  COP  Coordinator  serves  as  the  clearinghouse  for  informa<on  on  community  policing.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

47  


Patrol  Services:  Administra2on   Recommenda2ons   • 

•  •  •  • 

Abolish  the  posi<on  of  Night  Chief  and  re-­‐assign  the  du<es  to  lieutenants  either  by   assignment  or  rota<on.    If  Lieutenants  are  available,  two  of  them  could  be  assigned  to  the   Office  of  the  Assistant  Chief  of  the  Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau.   As  an  op<on,  the  department  could  establish  a  rota<onal  system  in  which  all  lieutenants   share  these  du<es  on  an  equal  basis.   With  this  op<on,  this  duty  would  be  performed  in  addi<on  to  the  lieutenants’  regular     assignment.   The  Patrol  Administra<on  Captain  posi<on  should  be  eliminated  and  assigned  to  a   Lieutenant,  who  can  perform  the  du<es  formerly  performed  by  the  Captain.       The  Community-­‐Oriented  Policing  Captain  posi<on  should  be  re-­‐designated  as  “Community   Liaison”  and  assigned  to  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police.    The  responsibili<es  of  this  posi<on   are  covered  under  the  sec<on  on  Community  Policing.  

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

48  


Patrol  Services:  Special  Services  Sec2on   •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

• 

This  sec<on  is  commanded  by  a  Captain,  responsible  for  providing  specialized  police   func<ons  to  enhance  Department  patrol  opera<ons.     These  specialized  supplemental  services  are  provided  through  the  Park/Canine  Unit,  Traffic   Unit  and  un<l  recently,  the  Vortex  Unit.   Park/Canine  Unit,  commanded  by  a  lieutenant,  is  responsible  for  all  law  enforcement   ac<vi<es  within  the  Cincinna<  Park  System  and  oversight  of  all  police  canine  opera<ons.   These  tasks  are  carried  out  through  the  Park  Squad,  Patrol  Canine  Squad  and  Detec<on   Canine  Squad.   Park  Squad,  supervised  by  shig  sergeants,  has  responsibility  for  patrol  of  the  City’s  141  park   areas,  which  encompass  4,765  acres  of  land.     This  squad  is  commiped  to  providing  a  more  visible  police  presence  and  improving  safety  in   City  parks.   Other  responsibili<es  include:  response  to  ci<zen  requests  for  assistance,  enforcement  of   criminal  and  traffic  laws,  regula<on  of  non-­‐criminal  conduct,  repor<ng  incidents  and   offenses,  inves<ga<on  of  criminal  ac<vity,  and  enforcement  of  park  rules.     The  Park  Squad  also  represents  the  Department  on  mapers  concerning  the  planning  and   coordina<on  of  events  within  the  City’s  parks.  

   

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Patrol  Services:  Special  Services   • 

• 

•  • 

•  • 

Patrol  Canine  Squad,  supervised  by  a  sergeant,  is  responsible  for  assis<ng  district  officers  in   high-­‐risk  search  situa<ons.  On  a  coopera<ve  basis,  in  conjunc<on  with  the  mutual  aid   agreements,  and  with  the  approval  of  a  command  officer,  the  patrol  canine  teams  can  be   used  by  other  police  agencies  within  Hamilton  County.   Detec2on  Canine  Squad,  supervised  by  a  sergeant,  is  responsible  for  the  comple<on  of  two   dis<nct  missions:   –  The  narco<c  detec<on  teams  are  responsible  for  assis<ng  officers  in  detec<ng  and   loca<ng  illegal  narco<cs.     –  The  explosive  device  teams  are  responsible  for  assis<ng  officers  in  loca<ng  explosive   devices.     The  Detec<on  Squad  will  respond  to  calls  for  service,  be  available  for  planned  events,  and   conduct  proac<ve  searches.     On  a  coopera<ve  basis,  in  conjunc<on  with  the  mutual  aid  agreements,  and  with  the   approval  of  a  command  officer,  the  detec<on  canine  teams  can  be  u<lized  by  other  law   enforcement  agencies  within  Hamilton  County.   Traffic  Unit,  commanded  by  a  lieutenant,  is  responsible  for  coordina<ng  the  Department’s   traffic  enforcement  efforts.   It  has  staff  supervision  over  the  Department’s  selec<ve  enforcement  program  and  other   specialized  traffic-­‐related  programs.    

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50  


Patrol  Services:  Special  Services   • 

• 

•  • 

•  • 

This  unit’s  responsibili<es  include:  radar  and  intoxilyzer  training  and  cer<fica<on,  fatal   accident  inves<ga<on,  assis<ng  the  Federal  Avia<on  Administra<on  (FAA)  and  the  Ohio  State   Highway  Patrol  (OSHP)  in  aircrag  crash  inves<ga<ons,  and  assis<ng  the  Ohio  Department  of   Natural  Resources  (ODNR),  Division  of  Watercrag,  in  boat  crashes.     The  unit  also  acts  as  a  liaison  and  an  implementa<on  site  for  state  programs  such  as  the  seat   belt  and  holiday  drunk  driving  programs.  The  unit  supervises  and  coordinates  private  police   officers,  school  crossing  guards,  and  the  Public  Vehicles/Private  Police  Squad.   Vortex  Unit,  commanded  by  a  lieutenant,  is  a  highly  visible,  proac<ve  unit  that  has  a  zero-­‐ tolerance  approach  to  street  crimes,  drug  trafficking,  and  quality  of  life  issues.     The  focus  of  this  unit  is  to  seek  out  and  physically  arrest  both  minor  and  major  criminal   offenders  by  enforcing  every  law  and  employing  every  tool  available  to  inconvenience   criminals.     By  u<lizing  uniform  patrols,  mountain  bike  officers,  plainclothes  officers,  and  confiden<al   informants,  the  Vortex  Unit  makes  a  posi<ve  impact  in  the  City.     The  Vortex  Unit  assists  the  districts  by  targe<ng  hot  spots  and  providing  addi<onal  uniform   presence  during  high  profile  events  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Patrol  Services:  Special  Services   •  • 

• 

Special  Weapons  and  Tac2cs  (SWAT)  Unit,  commanded  by  a  lieutenant  responsible  for   supervising  all  SWAT  officers  and  SWAT  ac<vi<es.     All  SWAT  officers  have  full-­‐<me  responsibili<es  in  the  various  districts,  sec<ons,  and  units.   SWAT  trains  as  a  unit  on  a  regular  basis  and  responds  to  hostage,  barricaded  person,  and   other  high-­‐risk  situa<ons  as  needed.  SWAT  is  composed  of  two  elements:  Tac<cal  and   Nego<a<ons.     These  elements  complement  each  other  and  both  report  to  the  SWAT  Coordinator.      

Recommenda2ons   •  •  •  • 

•  • 

The  Sec<on  should  be  renamed  the  Special  Opera2ons  Sec2on   This  will  make  the  func<ons  of  the  unit  more  recognizable  to  other  agencies.   Unify  the  command  of  the  Parks  and  Canine  Squads  under  one  lieutenant.   K-­‐9  study.  While  canine  units  will  be  placed  under  the  overall  command  of  a  lieutenant,   there  should  be  an  examina<on  of  the  general  tac<cs  u<lized  by  the  Patrol  Canine  unit.  May   similarly  situated  departments  have  re-­‐oriented  their  training  to  a  “Stop  and  Bark”  policy.  A   similar  discussion  should  take  place  in  Cincinna<.   Rename  the  Vortex  Unit  the  Safe  Streets  Unit,  which  is  more  understandable  to  the  public   and  reflec<ve  of  its  orienta<on.   Transfer ��the  motorcycle  officers  currently  assigned  to  the  First  District  to  the  Traffic  Unit  and   replace  them  with  officers  currently  in  units  that  are  being  decentralized  or  disbanded.    

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Patrol  Services:  Special  Services   • 

• 

Since  SWAT  par<cipa<on  is    a  collateral  duty,  the  sugges<on  has  been  made  that  with   addi<onal    resources  being  assigned  to  patrol,  it  is  possible  to  have  SWAT  resources  on  both   the  day  and  evening  tours  of  duty.   Overall,  SWAT  requires  very  high  level  management  oversight  given  the  impact  of  its  ac<ons.     It  should  have  a  very  close  liaison,  at  least,  with  the  Training  Sec<on  in  the  proposed   Professional  Standards  Bureau.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Patrol  Services:  Resource  Alloca2on   • 

•  • 

• 

•  • 

The  Department  allocates  patrol  resources  between  the  Districts  and  beats  within  Districts   using  a  formula  that  is  primarily  based  on  call  for  workload,  the  number  of  calls,  the  minutes   of  ac<vity  these  calls  represent,  and  area  being  covered  (to  figure  response  <me  and  a   number  of  other  factors).   Police  agencies  have  used  this  method  for  years  despite  numerous  issues  having  arisen  over   the  formula’s  desirability.   Recently,  the  planning  staff  updated  the  formula  and  is  preparing  an  alternate  alloca<on   formula.  Either  way,  it  seems  clear  that  there  are  insufficient  officers  available  in  patrol  to   meet  these  formulas’  demands.   In  a  review  of  work  demands  for  District  1,  it  was  shown  that  under  the  current  system  and   officers  assigned  to  the  District,  there  were  over  6,000  calls  for  service  held  in  dispatch   pending  assignment  beyond  the  recommended  holding  <me  (which  is  3  minutes  for   emergencies,  5  minutes  for  “immediate  priority  calls,”  5  minutes  for  “immediate  traffic   calls,”  and  55  minutes  for  other  rou<ne  calls.)   These  calls  held  beyond  recommended  <mes  were  fairly  evenly  distributed  by  day  or  week.   The  required  staffing  levels  will  in  many  ways  drama<cally  change  under  the  piloted  10-­‐4   work  schedule  with  overlap  shigs  coupled  with  fewer  officer  work  days  per  week.    There  are   both  posi<ve  and  nega<ve  implica<ons  of  this  change,  which  will  hopefully  become  clear   from  the  evalua<on  of  the  pilots.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Patrol  Services:  Resource  Alloca2on   Recommenda2ons   •  • 

The  Department  needs  to  undertake  a  redistric<ng  study  to  match  patrol  assignment  areas   with  the  natural  neighborhoods  of  the  city.   The  analysis  should  include  the  following  key  concepts:   –  Neighborhoods  or  “par<cular  service  areas”  should  not  be  divided.  For  example,  the   University  of  Cincinna<  appears  to  be  spread  over  three  Districts.  It  could  be  considered   a  “neighborhood  unto  itself.”   –  Major  streets  should  not  be  used  as  district  or  beat  boundaries  (except  for  expressways)   as  every  street  must  be  in  an  iden<fied  district.  You  cannot  have  one  side  of  the  street   in  one  District  and  the  other  in  a  different  district.  Back  property  lines  need  to  be  the   boundaries  for  Districts  (and  beats  as  well).   –  Patrol  beat  areas  should  be  larger  than  they  are  now,  so  at  the  least  busy  <me,  only  a   single  unit  would  be  assigned  to  the  area  and  during  busier  <mes,  two  or  more  units   would  be  assigned.    During  slower  <mes  of  the  day,  “cover  units”  may  have  to  be   assigned  to  serve  as  back-­‐up  for  several  beat  areas.   –  The  analysis  undertaken  to  develop  the  redistric<ng  should  involve  overlaying  maps  of   neighborhoods,  poli<cal  boundaries,  natural  barriers  (such  as  rivers  and  streams,   expressways,  etc.),  and  various  other  factors.  An  overlay  should  show  the  “affinity”   between  neighborhoods  (either  strong,  medium  or  non-­‐existent),  laying  the  founda<on   for  merging  neighborhoods  into  District  and  beat  boundaries.  

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55  


Patrol  Services:  Resource  Alloca2on   Recommenda2ons   •  • 

Using  this  methodology,  new  district  lines  can  be  created.    Not  every  district  or  beat  must   have  equal  work  demands;  the  number  of  officers  assigned  will  reflect  the  work  demand,  not   the  number  of  beats.   Underlying  this  approach  to  police  service  area  boundaries  are  several  key  concepts:   –  Reducing  “out  of  beat”  <me  for  officers  assigned  to  a  geographic  area.  Now,  many   officers  spend  as  much  <me  out  of  their  assigned  area  as  they  do  in  the  beat.  The   community  wants  consistent  policing  presence.   –  Officers  should  have  25  minutes  of  unobligated  <me  on  patrol  per  each  hour  on  duty,   ager  call  service  <me  and  administra<ve  <me.  In  Cincinna<,  30%  of  officer  <me  in   District  1  is  claimed  to  be  administra<ve  <me,  a  very  high  figure.  That  needs  to  be   reduced  through  beper  use  of  technology  for  reports,  less  sta<on  <me  and  related   changes.   –  The  concept  of  “in-­‐service  –  when  not  answering  a  call”  and  out  of  service  “when   answering  a  call”  needs  to  be  reversed.   –  Use  of  alterna<ve  responses  are  cri<cal  if  officer  <me  is  to  be  moved  from  racing  from   call  to  call  to  engaging  in  proac<ve  policing  ac<vity.  As  noted  in  a  previous  sec<on  of   this  report,  police  should  only  de  dispatched  when  having  an  officer  on  the  scene  will   make  a  difference  in  resolving  the  situa<on.   –  The  difference  between  “problem-­‐solving  <me”  and  “self-­‐ini<ated  patrol  <me”  needs  to   be  collapsed  into  a  single  category  of  “problem-­‐oriented  policing”  <me.  

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Patrol  Services:  Resource  Demand  Management   •  •  • 

• 

As  we  have  noted,  the  department  cannot  immediately  send  an  officer  to  every  call  for   service.    Far  more  police  personnel  would  be  required  to  fully  meet  that  demand.   That  demand  has  been  created  because  police  have  tried  to  meet  the  goal  of  “you  call  for  an   officer  and  an  officer  will  come,”  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the  call.   No  other  service  business,  except  for  Fire  and  Emergency  Medical  services,  has  been  able  to   meet  the  demands  created  under  this  scenario.    Most  Fire  Departments  have  far  fewer  calls   for  service  than  some  years  ago,  as  fires  have  been  drama<cally  reduced  over  the  years.    This   is  not  so  for  police  agencies.   Police  officers  should  respond  quickly  only  when  having  a  police  officer  on  the  scene  will   impact  a  problem  that  cannot  be  handled  in  a  different  manner.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

An  analysis  of  the  call  for  service  workload  indicates  that  the  Department  should  engage  in  a   vigorous  examina<on  of  alterna<ve  methods  of  responding  to  calls  for  service.    The  call  for   service  work  demand  is  quite  high  on  many  days  of  the  week.    The  Department  cannot  afford   to  have  a  police  officer  respond  to  every  call  in  a  prompt  <me  frame.    Only  in  circumstances   where  ci<zens  would  benefit  from  having  a  police  officer  come  to  the  scene  should  an  officer   be  dispatched.   Many  police  departments  have    adopted  aggressive  call  management  ini<a<ves  designed  to   reduce  the  number  of  mobile  responses  required.    This  reduc<on  provides  patrol  officers   more  <me  to  undertake  dedicated  assignments  designed  to  target  crime  “hotspots,”  target   known  offenders,  amplify  police  presence,  and  prevent  future  crime  occurrences.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Patrol  Services:  Resource  Demand  Management   • 

• 

•  • 

• 

The  Milwaukee  Police  Department  has  ini<ated  a  successful  ini<a<ve  where  light  duty   officers  (officers  unable  to  work  patrol  assignments)  are  assigned  as  “call  interveners”  when   a  person  calls  with  a  complaint  or  situa<on  for  which  having  a  police  officer  respond  to  the   scene  is  unnecessary.    For  example,  for  noise  complaints,  the  officer  calls  the  noisy  party,   advising  them  that  they  need  to  turn  down  the  noise  or  a  cita<on  will  be  issued.    In  most   cases,  the  problem  is  resolved  and  the  complainant  calls  back  for  confirma<on  of  the   resolu<on.   There  are  numerous  categories  of  lower-­‐priority  calls  for  service  which  can  be  handled  in  this   manner.    While  the  Communica<ons  Center  is  separate  from  the  Police  Department,  those   calls  can  be  transferred  to  a  police  center  for  officer  call-­‐back  by  these  specially-­‐designated   officers.   The  Department  needs  to  explore  op<ons  such  as  the  above  to  reduce  the  call  response   requirements.   Note  that  when  your  cable  goes  out  and  you  call  the  Cable  Company,  you  are  given  a  <me   and  date  that  a  repair  person  will  come  to  your  house.    Everyone  accepts  that.  The  same  is   necessary  for  some  types  of  calls  for  service  that  come  to  the  police.   Obviously,  such  an  ini<a<ve  must  involve  the  public  and  must  be  thoroughly  discussed  by  the   ci<zen  advisory  commipees  we  recommend  in  this  report.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on   Organiza<on―  Case  Management  ―  Inves<gator   Assignment  Prac<ces  ―  Centralized  Inves<ga<ons   and  District  Opera<ons  ―  Inves<ga<ve   Assignment  Specializa<on  ―  Homicide  Unit  ―   Task  Forces  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Organiza2on   • 

The  current  organiza<on  of  the  Inves<ga<ve  Func<on  is  located  within  the  Inves<ga<ons   Bureau  and  consists  of  the  Central  Vice  Control  Sec<on,  with  the  Regional  Narco<cs  Unit   (RENU),  Mid-­‐Level  Drug  Unit,  and  Regulatory  Enforcement  Unit  assigned;  the  Criminal   Inves<ga<on  Sec<on,  consis<ng  of  the  Homicide  Unit,  Personal  Crimes  Unit,  and  Major   Offense  Unit;  and  the  Intelligence  Sec<on  is  responsible  for  SOFAST  and  Project  Disarm.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

The  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau  should  con<nue  to  house  all  elements  presently  assigned.    The   Fusion  Center  and  Real  Time  Crime  Units  should  be  transferred  from  the  Strategic   Development  Bureau  to  the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau  and  placed  with  within  the  intelligence   func<on.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Case  Management   Inves2ga2ve  Case  Management  Process   • 

• 

• 

The  current  case  management  system  is  described  as  a  manual  system  augmented  by  a   Records  Management  System  with  no  provision  for  monitoring  case  status  or  flagging   delinquent  cases.  For  the  most  part,  the  day-­‐to-­‐day  case  management  is  a  combina<on  of   using  the  query  func<on  with  memory  prompts  on  posted  notes.    The  system  does  not  link  to   other  case-­‐related  records,  and  separate  inquiries  have  to  be  ini<ated  in  each  database  with   the  reques<ng  officer  knowing  which  databases  to  explore  based  on  their  personally-­‐ developed  knowledge  of  the  system.    The  present  system  training  is  limited  and  no  sogware   opera<ons  manual  has  been  to  provided  to  any  employee  interviewed.   The  agency  does  not  have  a  computer-­‐based  report  system  presently;  rather,  police  officers     generate  a  hand-­‐wripen  report,  which  is  entered  into  a  “Report  Management  System”  (RMS)   by  a  clerk  –  a  process  which  can  take  as  long  as  seven  days.    Addi<onally,  with  the  secondary   entry  there  is  an  increased  opportunity  for  inaccuracies  or  data  transposi<on.   Agency  personnel  regardless  of  assignment  are  unable  to  check  a  name  and  through  one   source  gather  informa<on  regarding  previous  agency  contacts  as  a  suspect,  vic<m,  witness,   field  interroga<on,  traffic  cita<on,  or  traffic  accident  –  mul<ple  inquiries  must  be  generated   to  retrieve  data.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Case  Management   Recommenda2ons   • 

The  agency  should  ensure  there  is  a  contemporary  and  dynamic  Records  Management   System  that  integrates  the  en<re  agency’s  record-­‐genera<ng  components.    Officers   should  access  the  RMS  in  the  field  and  enter  reports,  subject  to  a  supervisor  approval,  the   incident  reports  are  then  forwarded  to  the  Case  Management  System,  which  should   include:   –  All  case  reports  that  require  follow-­‐up  are  uploaded  into  the  Case  Management       System.   –  Case  informa<on  that  can  be  reviewed  by  the  supervisor  and  assigned  to  the   appropriate  detec<ve  for  follow-­‐up.   –  During  case  assignment,  case  tasks  can  be  assigned  to  the  assigned  detec<ve  as       well.                                                                                         –  Deadlines  can  be  assigned  on  specific  case  tasks  and  the  case  will  flag  when  a  task   has  not  been  completed  as  assigned  by  a  <me  certain,  ensuring  a  supervisor  can   follow  up  with  the  person  assigned  the  case.    

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Case  Management   Recommenda2ons  (con2nued)     –  All  department  members  with  access  to  Case  Management  can  view  the  ini<al         incident  report.    Suppor<ng  documents  can  be  viewed  by  anyone  with  the  authorized   security  password.    Any  and  all  members  may  add  supplemental  reports  to  the  system.     The  system  should  print  informa<on  in  different  formats  depending  on  what  is  required   (detec<ve  report  format,    case  file  reports,  supplemental  reports  etc.).       –  Deadlines  can  be  assigned  by  supervisors  through  Case  Management  and  supervisors   can  review  the  cases  independently  of    the  assigned  detec<ve  to  ensure  that  deadlines   are  met.  Supplemental  reports  should  be  capable  of  being  viewed  wirelessly  so   detec<ves  with  laptops  can  access  the  system  from  the  field.       –  The  system  should  have  the  capability  to  track  persons,  suspects,  vic<ms,  stolen   property  etc.   –  The  system  should  have  the  means  to  track  the  <me  a  detec<ve  spends  inves<ga<ng  a   case.           –  The  system  should  track  property  recovery,  arrest  stats,  clearance  stats  per  detec<ve.   –  There  should  be  numerous  search  engines  for  the  system  to  include  searching  narra<ves   for  specific  informa<on.   –  The  system  should  track  ac<ve/suspended/cleared  cases  for  each  detec<ve.      

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Assignments   Inves2gator  Assignment  Prac2ces   • 

• 

District  Commanders  have  the  la<tude  of  assigning  district  detec<ves  either  by  crime  type,   geographical  area,  or  both.  Generally,  assignments  are  made  with  the  skill  sets  and   competencies  as  an  influence  but  not  the  domina<ng  determina<on.  The  number  of   detec<ves  assigned  to  Inves<ga<ons  in  the  districts  is  constantly  reviewed  and  assessed   based  on  outcomes  and  patrol  requirement  for  staffing  beats.  On  occasion,  detec<ve   strength  may  be  reduced  to  augment  the  patrol  func<on  if  there  is  a  reduc<on  in  personnel.   A  review  of  a  random  sampling  of  reports  from  detec<ves  assigned  to  the  various  districts   reflected  an  inconsistent  standard  within  the  agency  regarding  the  type  and  nature  of   documenta<on  accepted  by  supervisors  in  a  detec<ve  report.    In  some  cases,  the  narra<ves   were  fully  developed,  case  facts  and  witnesses  iden<fied,  and  their  informa<on  captured.  In   others,  there  was  a  dearth  of  documenta<on  and  almost  no  narra<ve.  The  reports   completed  by  detec<ves  ranged  from  very  good  to  poor.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

District  Commanders  should  be  free  to  allocate  their  detec<ve  resources    with  flexibility  and   in  a  manner  that  allows  them  to  address  crime  rates  and  detec<ve  skill  sets  to  their  unique   semng.    However,  a  universal  standard  of  case  documenta<on,  case  development  and  case   presenta<on  should  be  developed,  trained  and  supervised  to  ensure  sound  and  consistent   quality.    The  use  of  check  sheets  should  be  ins<tu<onalized  as  a  resource  to  aid  the  detec<ve   in  producing  a  professional  case  file.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Integra2on  With  Patrol   • 

• 

• 

• 

There  is  a  Criminal  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on  (CIS)  in  the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau;  District   Detec<ves  are  accountable  to  the  Patrol  Bureau.  Tradi<onally,  the  District  Detec<ves  are   assigned  to  work  robberies,  burglaries,  auto  theg,  domes<c  violence,  felonious  assault,  and   other  misdemeanors.     The  linkage  between  the  Criminal  Inves<ga<on  Sec<on  and  the  District  Detec<ves  is  driven   by  the  development  of  personal  rela<onships.  A  lack  of  technology  and  the  absence  of  a   consistently  scheduled  mee<ng  between  the  interested  par<es  (district  detec<ve,    CIS   detec<ves,  crime  analysis,  and  intelligence)  inhibits  informa<on  dissemina<on  that  could   assist  inves<ga<ons.    In  specific  cases  and  on  request,  crime  analysis  will  look  for  links,  but   the  free  exchange  of  informa<on  to  iden<fy  poten<al  inves<ga<ve  links  rela<ng  cases   worked  in  another  district  or  CIS  is  missing.   The  district  and  CIS  supervisors  meet  two  <mes  per  month  for  a  formal  face-­‐to-­‐face   exchange  of  informa<on.  These  are  not  in-­‐depth  reviews  and  thus  there  is  a  risk  that   important  informa<on  may  not  be  exchanged.   Un<l  recently,  certain  personnel  did  not  consider  Black-­‐on-­‐Black  crime  a  priority;   consequently,  informa<on  pursuit  rela<ve  to  it  was  not  a  main  concern.    Addi<onally,  some   ranking  district  members  believe  that  most  specialized  units  in  the  agency,  including  CIS,  do   not  view  themselves  as  supporters  of  districts  but  rather  that  the  districts  are  there  to   support  them.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Integra2on  with  Patrol   • 

• 

• 

It  has  been  commonplace  for  district  detec<ve  unit  commanders  not  to  receive  any   informa<on  or  briefings  on  homicides  that  occur  in  their  districts  aside  from  general  flyers;   they  ogen  receive  more  informa<on  about  pending  homicides  from  the  news  media  than   from  the  informa<on  disseminated  to  the  district  detec<ves  absent  a  personal  rela<onship   that  has  been  developed  between  the  homicide  detec<ve  and  the  district  detec<ve   supervisor.   District  detec<ve  unit  commanders  do  not  have  access  to  the  “Homicide  Folder”  with   updated  and  preliminary  informa<on  regarding  homicides;  only  the  district  captains  have   access.   There  is  a  general  percep<on  and  frustra<on  in  some  district  detec<ve  units  that  require   coopera<on  from  CIS  or  any  of  its  units  that  undue  effort  must  be  expended  to  track  down   informa<on.  If  an  interested  district  detec<ve  looks  hard  enough  and  leverages  enough   rela<onships  the  informa<on  can  be  obtained,  but  it  is  a  difficult  and  frustra<ng  process  that   undermines  service  efforts  to  the  community  and  its  ci<zen.    

Recommenda2ons   • 

The  agency  relies  on  informal  and  unstructured  processes  for  informa<on  exchange.    The   need  to  establish  a  formal  protocol  using  technology  is  clearly  evident.    A  formal  liaison   between  CIS    and  the  District  Detec<ves  and  weekly  mee<ngs  where  informa<on  can  be   exchanged  and  brought  back  to  the  district  creates  enhanced  opportuni<es  to  strengthen   communica<on  and  linkage.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Specializa2on   • 

• 

• 

The  support  role  of  CIS  must  be  detailed  in  policy  and  its  responsibility  to  work  closely   and  support  the  district  efforts  though  developing  and  sharing  inves<ga<ve  informa<on   emphasized.    Technology  should  be  employed  to  facilitate  the  exchange  of  informa<on   between  the  various  disciplines.     In  the  1980’s,  Vice  Control  Sec<on  (VCS)  had  approximately  ten  to  twelve  officers,  two   sergeants  and  one  lieutenant.    The  day  shig  consisted  of  the  lieutenant,  one  sergeant  and   two  officers,  while  the  night  shig  had  the  remaining  sergeant  and  officers.    VCS  had   overall  inves<ga<ve  authority  over  vice  func<ons  city-­‐wide  and  focused  on  liquor,   pros<tu<on,  gambling,  pornography,  and  drugs.    During  this  <me,  each  of  the  five  district   commanders  had  “Mini-­‐Tacs”  consis<ng  of  six  to  eight  officers  and  a  sergeant  to  work   vice  problem  areas  within  their  respec<ve  district  boundaries.   When  not  assigned  to  a  specific  problem,  the  Mini-­‐Tacs  focused  their  efforts  on  the  drug   problem.    Around  1988,  the  Patrol  Bureau  Commander  created  the  Street  Corner  Unit   (SCU)  to  combat  growing  drug  problems,  especially  crack  cocaine.  All  district  Mini-­‐Tacs   were  combined  into  one  large  off-­‐site  unit  with  mul<ple  sergeants  and  one  lieutenant  to   combat  “street  corner”  level  drug  dealers.    Soon  ager  SCU  was  created,  district   commanders  created  new  Mini-­‐Tacs  u<lizing  district  personnel  to  fill  the  void,  thus  taking   away  from  uniform  street  personnel.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Specializa2on   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

•  • 

• 

In  2006,  these  units  were  combined  into  one  sec<on  inves<ga<ng  all  vice  ac<vi<es.    A  “mid-­‐level”   drug  unit  was  formed  in  CVCS  at  this  <me  and  addi<onal  personnel  were  also  added,  ul<mately   crea<ng  a  sec<on  of  approximately  figy  officers,  eight  sergeants,  two  lieutenants,  and  one   captain.  In  2009,  the  Vortex  Unit  was  created  in  the  Patrol  Bureau  to  combat  city-­‐wide  problems.     Personnel  were  once  again  absorbed  from  the  district  Violent  Crime  Units  (previously  known  as   Mini-­‐Tacs),  crea<ng  another  void  in  the  districts.    Once  again,  district  Captains  back-­‐filled  from   their  uniform  patrol  personnel  to  fill  the  void  of  their  district  level  problem-­‐solvers.   Reduce  significantly  the  number  of  personnel  assigned  to  Vice  Control  Sec<on  and  re-­‐assign  a   complement  of  officers  to  each  district  for  street  level  vice  enforcement.     A  Centralized  Vice  Sec<on  should  remain  in  place  but  there  should  be  clear  guidelines  and   protocols  established  and  enforced  regarding  what  cons<tutes  a  threshold  case  that  is  referred  to   the  Vice  Control  Sec<on  for  inves<ga<on.    Likewise,    the  Centralized  Vice  Sec<on  should  refer   cases  that  do  not  comprise  the  elements  mee<ng  their  inves<ga<ve  threshold  back  to  the   districts.     District  Commanders  use  their  violent  crimes  unit  at  least  70%  of  the  <me  as  opposed  to  using   VICE  Unit  officers.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Homicide   • 

• 

• 

The  Homicide  Unit  is  responsible  for  inves<ga<ng  all  homicides  and  suspicious  deaths   occurring  within  the  City  of  Cincinna<  and  is  part  of  the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau.    The  Homicide   Unit  venue  is  known  throughout  the  city.    Informants,  witnesses,  and  concerned  ci<zens  with   informa<on  regarding  homicides  can  always  speak  with  homicide  detec<ves,  who  are   scheduled  to  work  staggered  shigs  seven  days  a  week,  8AM  –  2AM.    Detec<ves  from  other   departmental  units  and  inves<gators  from  outlying  agencies  frequently  request  the   Homicide  Unit’s  assistance  owing  to  its  exper<se.     Homicide  detec<ves  work  in  a  centralized    open  bay  area  that  facilitates  communica<on   among  all  unit  detec<ves,  enhancing  its  effec<veness.    Inves<gators  frequently  and   con<nually  discuss  vic<mology,  suspects’  methods  of  opera<on,  weapons  of  choice   commonali<es,  offender/vic<m  associates/associa<ons,  commonali<es  in  offender/vic<m   habits,  similari<es  case  fact  paperns,  case  law,  current  inves<ga<ve  trends  and  best   prac<ces.  The  Homicide  Unit  had  a  64%  clearance  rate  for  the  last  three  year  period   (2008-­‐2010).   Case  responsibility  for  imminent  death  cases  involving  felonious  assault  is  an  issue  in  some   districts;  the  current  protocol  is  too  subjec<ve  and  too  much  discre<on  lies  with  individual   homicide  inves<gators.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Homicide   Recommenda2ons   • 

The  Homicide  Unit  is  extremely  specialized,  works  very  well  as  presently  organized,  and   should  not  be  de-­‐centralized.    There  is  some  exchange  of  informa<on  between  the  districts   and  the  unit,  but  it  is  more  rela<onship  driven,  as  opposed  to  being  a  formal  func<on  of  the   unit.    An  expressed  protocol,  captured  in  policy,  detailing  the  dissemina<on  of  homicide   informa<on  to  the  district  detec<ves  and  commander  should  be  developed.  A  formal  liaison   between  the  Homicide  Unit  and  each  District  Commander  should  also  be  created.    The   Homicide  Unit  must  recognize  their  support  role  in  the  districts.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Officer-­‐Involved  Shoo2ngs   • 

• 

The  Homicide  Unit  is  also  responsible  for  officer  involved  shoo<ngs,  which  average  three  or   four  per  year.  However,  in  calendar  year  2011,  the  unit  inves<gated  nine  officer  involved   shoo<ngs,  three  within  a  two  week  period.    Less  than  half  of  the  unit  is  trained  to  conduct   officer  involved  shoo<ngs  inves<ga<ons,  placing  an  occasional  strain  on  the  unit’s  ability  to   work  those  cases  in  an  effec<ve  and  <mely  fashion.   The  officer  involved  shoo<ng  teams  work  all  cases  where  an  officer  shoots  a  subject,  or  in   cases  where  an  officer  is  shot.    The  unit  does  not  work  those  cases  where  an  officer  is  subject   to  gunfire,  but  does  not  receive  a  gunshot  wound.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

The  department  should  form  a  “shoo<ng  team”  to  inves<gate  all  officer-­‐involved  shoo<ngs,   coordinated  by  Internal  Affairs.    If  this  is  not  done,  the  agency  should  expand  the  number  of   teams  trained  to  conduct  officer  involved  shoo<ngs.  Though  2011  was  an  anomaly,  the   Homicide  Unit’s  ability  to  inves<gate    officer-­‐involved  shoo<ngs  was  not  op<mal.  These  cases   must  be  inves<gated  by  experienced  and  trained  personnel.  As  part  of  the  assignment  to  the   homicide  unit,  consider  manda<ng  that  all  homicide  teams  be  trained  to  conduct  officer-­‐ involved  shoo<ng  inves<ga<ons.  

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Felonious  Assaults   • 

• 

• 

• 

Presently,  felonious  assaults  are  assigned  to  the  individual  district  detec<ves  for  follow-­‐up   inves<ga<on.    The  differing  quality  of  the  inves<ga<ons  completed  by  the  district  detec<ves   and  the  Homicide  Unit  is  stark.    In  instances  where  a  vic<m  dies  months  ager  a  felonious  assault   and  the  suspect  has  not  been  charged,  the  district  inves<ga<on  that  is  turned  over  to  the   Homicide  Unit  for  follow-­‐up  can  be  seriously  flawed.    The  result  is  problema<c  for  the  homicide   detec<ve  and  the  outcome  of  that  inves<ga<on  can  be  compromised  because  of  the  lacking   resources  and  skill  sets  at  the  district  level.     Crime  scene  processing  is  a  considerable  challenge  for  district  inves<gators.    It  appears  very   liple  crime  scene  processing  occurs  at  the  district  level  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  including  a  lack   of  training  and  exper<se.    The  differing  quality  in  the  homicide  crime  scenes  worked  by  the   Criminalis<cs  Unit  compared  to  those  worked  in  the  districts  cannot  be  overstated.   A  review  of  15  felonious  assaults  (shoo<ngs)  at  randomly  selected  crime  scene  cases  worked  at   the  district  level  revealed  that  7/15  were  not  photographed;  11/15  did  not  have  close-­‐up   photographs;  7/15  did  not  have  overall  photographs;  14/15  did  use  placards  to  mark  or   “showcase”  evidence;  none  of  the  15  cases  had  measurements  documen<ng  the  loca<on  of  any   evidence  recovered;    14/15  did  not  contain  a  diagram  as  part  of  the  case  file;  and  6/15  had  no   evidence  collected.       The  following  chart  illustrates  the  deficiencies  inherent  in  the  reviewed  shoo<ng  crime  scenes   processed  by  district  detec<ves:  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Review  of  15  Felonious  Assault  (shoo2ngs)  Crime  Scenes  Processed  at  the  District  Level    

73  


The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Felonious  Assaults   Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

• 

The  Homicide  Unit  should  work  all  cases  where  an  officer  is  the  vic<m  of  a  felonious   assault  –  whether  a  gunshot  wound  is  sustained  or  not  –  to  ensure  a  proper  case  is   presented  for  prosecu<on  and  all  of  the  agency  resources  are  available  to  develop  that   case.   The  Homicide  Unit  should  receive  an  increase  in  personnel  and  be  tasked  with  working  all   felonious  assaults  and  unapended  deaths,  including  infant  deaths,  suicides,  and  imminent   deaths.    The  wripen  direc<ve  governing  the  Homicide  Unit  should  mandate  that  the   appropriate  district  commanders  receive  current  and  con<nual  informa<on  from  the   Homicide  Unit  as  a  maper  of  policy  on  all  cases  assigned.     The  close  rela<onship  between  the  Homicide  Unit  and  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  may   facilitate  an  increase  in  prosecu<on  of  felonious  assault  cases  if  they  are  “worked  up”  like   homicide  cases.    There  is  valid  and  substan<al  poten<al  for  an  increase  in  clearance  rates   for  felonious  assaults  if  these  cases  are  assigned  to  the  Homicide  Unit,  with  a   corresponding  reduc<on  of  “grudge”  felonious  assaults  and  homicides  if  the  shooters  are   iden<fied,  arrested,  prosecuted,  and  convicted.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Criminalis2cs   Homicide  Unit  and  Criminalis2cs  Unit  –  Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

• 

The  Criminalis<cs  Unit  should  receive  a  sufficient  increase  in  personnel  to  ensure   adequate  support  for  the  corresponding  increase  in  cases  that  will  be  assigned  to  the   Homicide  Unit.   We  recommend  a  three  month  training  rota<on  process  for  district  inves<gators  selected   by  their  immediate  supervisors  through  the  Criminalis<cs’  Unit  where  they  can  receive   training  in  crime  scene  processing,  u<lizing  the  equipment  available  to  them  at  their   District  of  assignment.    The  training  objec<ve  would  be  to  enhance  the  districts  crime   scene  processing  and  improve  case  presenta<on  in  court  to  increase  the  convic<on  rate.     Conduct  a  needs  assessment  of  districts’  crime  scene  processing  equipment  and  tools  to   determine  if  all  district  crime  scene  technicians  have  adequate  resources.    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

75  


The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Records  Management   • 

• 

• 

The  lack  of  technology  available  to  the  Homicide  Unit  is  substan<al.    Current  homicide  cases   are  maintained  in  metal  file  cabinets  in  paper  form,  but  the  Unit  also  stores  electronic   versions  that  consist  of  several  folders  and  document  files.  Criminalis<cs  apaches   photographs  and  property/evidence  receipts;  an  audio  folder  that  is  populated  with  all  audio   recordings,  including  witness  and  suspect  interviews,  911  calls,  and  police  radio   transmissions;    the  computer  document  file  will  contain  the  ini<al  report  of  inves<ga<on,   officer’s  log,  other  photographs,  media  releases,  and  case  summary.  The  paper  file  contains   the  bulk  of  the  inves<ga<on  such  as  laboratory  reports,  all  interview  notes,  photographic   line-­‐ups,  consent  search  forms,  and  Miranda  waiver.   In  the  Homicide  Unit,  supervision  of  cases  occur  through  a  combina<on  of  oral   communica<on  and  a  review  of  the  officers  log  –  no  computer  based  sogware  case   management  system  is  part  of  the  unit.    Consequently,  ac<ve  review  of  cases  by  supervisors   is  haphazard,  and  due  to  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  on-­‐going  cases,  creates  numerous   opportuni<es  for  missed  deadlines  or  case  oversight.    The  lack  of  a  computer-­‐based  sogware   system  results  in  the  Homicide  Unit  Commander  having  to  physically  inspect  as  many  as  60   cases  to  insure  that  proper  supervision  is  occurring  in  these  ac<ve  homicide  inves<ga<ons.   The  system  does  not  allow  for  two-­‐way  communica<on  between  Case  Management  and  the   Record  Management  System  (RMS).    Informa<on  transfers  from  the  RMS  at  the  first   download  but  does  not  update  informa<on.    Informa<on  that  is  added  to  the  Case   Management  System  does  not  move  into  the  RMS.    Dual  entries  are  required  on  all  arrests,   all  persons,  all  clearances,  and  all  property.   Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

76  


The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Records  Management   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

•  • 

• 

The  RMS  should  be  developed  in  a  manner  that  facilitates  all  aspects  of  case  management,   from  the  ini<al  report  taken  by  the  responding  officer  to  the  inves<ga<ng  detec<ve  accessing   and  augmen<ng  the  report.  The  RMS  should  provide  for  a  robust  exchange  of  informa<on   with  the  Chief  of  Police,  District  Commanders,  and  other  interested  Sec<ons  or  Units   regarding  the  ongoing  status  of  criminal  inves<ga<ons.   Since  1969  CPD  has  had  426  unsolved    homicide  cases.    In  2011,  seven  homicides  were   solved;  three  addi<onal  were  re-­‐opened,  and  two  are  awai<ng  grand  jury  presenta<on.     Based  on  an  assessment  of  the  remaining  cases  by  the  Homicide  Unit,  approximately  one   third,  or    about  140  cases,  should  be  re-­‐opened  as  they  have  workable  leads.    The   unavailability  of  those  for  access  has  made  it  very  difficult  to  navigate  through  those  cases.   Presently,  cases  more  than  two  years  old  are  physically  stored  off-­‐site  with  “Fortress,”  a   contracted  vendor.    “Fortress”    is  responsible  for  case  file  transporta<on,  storage,  retrieval,   and  return  to  the  Homicide  Unit  when  a  new  lead  is  discovered.    The  facility  and  its   personnel  have  not  been  veped  to  ensure  reliability  and  case  file  integrity.   All  homicide  cases    should  either  be  reduced  to  electronic  files  or  housed  in  a  storage  facility   directly  controlled  by  the  police  department.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

77  


The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on:  Task  Forces   Task  Forces   •  •  • 

• 

The  department  is  engaged  with  other  law  enforcement  agencies  in  a  number  of  Task  Forces   that  focus  on  special  problems,  mostly  on  a  regional  basis.    These  Task  Forces  generally  have   officers  from  a  number  of  different  police  agencies  par<cipa<ng  in  the  task  force  efforts.   Some  of  these  Task  Forces  are  run  by  federal  government  law  enforcement  agencies  while   others  are  run  by  the  County.   The  Department  has  had  a  long-­‐standing  involvement  with  a  County  Drug  Task  Force  called   RENU.    A  substan<al  number  of  departmental  police  officers  are  assigned  to  the  task  force,   addressing  vice  problems  in  Cincinna<  and  the  surrounding  area.    Some  of  the  ac<vity  is   within  Cincinna<  and  thus    leads  to  conflicts  between  the  Cincinna<  Police  Department’s  Vice   Unit  and  the  opera<ons  of  RENU,  as  those  opera<ons  are  not  always  coordinated.   There  have  also  been  indica<ons  that  members  of  the  RENU  team  have  acted  out  of  state   without  clear  authority.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

As  the  Vice  Unit  is  being  restructured  under  the  Interim  reorganiza<on,  and  numerous   officers  are  being  moved  to  Districts,  it  is  wise  for  the  Department  to  consolidate  drug   inves<ga<ons  that  remain  centralized  with  those  of  the  task  force.    Thus,  we  suggest  that  the   Department  no  longer  par<cipate  in  the  task  force,  allowing  some  of  those  officers  to  be   reassigned  to  the  recons<tuted  Vice  Unit.    The  Unit  should  seek  federal  standing,  partnering   with  ATF  and/or  DEA,  permimng  them  to  legally  follow  leads  across  the  state  border.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

78  


The  Intelligence  Func2on   Structure  ―  Informa<on  Dissemina<on  ―   Effec<ve  U<liza<on  ―  Special  Events  ―   Departmental  Coordina<on  ―  Phone  Surveillance            

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

79  


The  Intelligence  Func2on:  Structure   • 

•  •  • 

The  current  organiza<on  of  the  Inves<ga<ve  Func<on  is  located  within  the  Inves<ga<ons   Bureau  and  consists  of  the  Central  Vice  Control  Sec<on,    with  the  Regional  Narco<cs  Unit   (RENU),  Mid-­‐Level  Drug  Unit,  and  Regulatory  Enforcement  Unit  assigned;  the  Criminal   Inves<ga<on  Sec<on,  consis<ng  of  the  Homicide  Unit,  Personal  Crimes  Unit,  and  Major   Offense  Unit;  and  the  Intelligence  Sec<on  which  is  responsible  for  SOFAST  and  Project   Disarm.       The  Strategic  Development  Bureau  houses  the  Fusion  Center  and  Real  Time  Crime  Center.   Real  Time  Crime  Center  is  accessed  by  the  districts  for  license  plate  informa<on  and  social   networking,  which  has  an  important  intelligence  rela<onship.   The  organiza<onal  structure  of  placing  complemen<ng  resources  and  Intelligence  Sec<on   under  one  bureau  and  Real  Time  Crime  and  the  Fusion  Center  within  another  bureau  inhibits   the  ability  to  leverage  intelligence  and  informa<on  exchange  .  

Recommenda2ons   •  •  •  • 

Transfer  the  Fusion  and  Real  Time  Crime  Centers  from  the  Strategic  Development  Bureau    to   the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau.         Create  a  Special  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on,  with  a  Captain  assigned    as  Sec<on  Commander.   Assign  the  Intelligence  Unit  and  the  Fusion  Center  and  Real  Time  Crime  to  that  Sec<on.   Provide  comprehensive  guidance  to  the  Intelligence  Unit  and  audit  compliance  to  ensure   that  intelligence  ac<vi<es  are  always  within  Cons<tu<onal  requirements.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

80  


The  Intelligence  Func2on:  Informa2on  Dissemina2on   • 

• 

Many  in  the  department  are  uncertain  as  to  the  exact  nature  and  func<on  of  the  Intelligence   Unit.  Upon  request,  districts  receive  support  or  services,  but  it  has  only  been  in  the  last   couple  of  months  that  there  has  been  outreach  to  the  districts  with  an  assigned  liaison  in   each  district  that  allowed  it  to  iden<fy  and  assist  with  gang  ac<vity.         There  is  a  broad  view  at  the  district  level  that  the  Intelligence  Unit  is  in  possession  of   informa<on  that  is  seldom  disseminated  to  the  field.    Some  in  the  districts  believe  that  the   Intelligence  Unit  has  an  abundance  of  equipment  and  personnel  but  does  not  serve  the   districts;  rather,  the  unit  seems  focused  on  the  wrong  priori<es  and  provide  liple  ac<ve  or   useful  intelligence.  District  personnel  acknowledge  they  do  not  always  share  informa<on   with  the  Intelligence  Unit  because  it  is  a  “black  hole”  and  no  informa<on  is  ever  returned  to   the  districts.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

The  Intelligence  unit  should  remain  a  centralized  func<on  but  an  intelligence  liaison  officer   designated  by  each  district  and  accountable  to  the  district  commander  should  be  a  part  of   the  intelligence  process.    This  will  ensure  the  Intelligence  Unit  is  receiving  informa<on  from   the  districts  and  the  districts  are  receiving  informa<on  in  return  for  analysis  or  ac<on.   The  agency  should  develop  an  effec<ve  policy  for  gathering,  recording,  submimng,  and   dissemina<ng  intelligence  informa<on  throughout  the  police  department.    The  Intelligence   Unit  should  be  charged  with  crea<ng  an  effec<ve  “customer  service”  model  that  facilitates   that  important  func<on  for  those  authorized  to  receive  informa<on  relevant  to  their   responsibili<es  and  du<es.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

81  


The  Intelligence  Func2on:  U2liza2on   • 

The  Intelligence  Unit  is  not  a  relevant  resource  as  it  relates  to  current  threats  and  problems   experienced  at  the  district  level.    Emphasis  in  the  Intelligence  Unit  seems  to  be  on   motorcycle  gangs  as  opposed  to  the  street  gang  ac<vity  responsible  for  the  majority  of   serious  crime  in  the  districts  –  despite  that  the  Intelligence  Unit  is  the  agency’s  gang  experts.     There  is  shared  sen<ment  in  the  districts  that  there  is  liple  pro-­‐ac<ve  measures  taken  by  the   Intelligence  Unit  connec<ng  or  iden<fying  the  receivers  of  stolen  property  and  informa<on   surrounding  “fences”  and  similar  facilitators  of  property  crimes.    There  is  universal   agreement  that  in  the  recent  past,  the  Intelligence  Unit  has  become  more  responsive.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

The  Intelligence  Unit  must  market  themselves  throughout  the  agency  as  a  support  func<on   and  con<nually  demonstrate  a  responsive  and  proac<ve  posture,  with  an  emphasis  on  crime   types,  such  as  felonious  assaults,  robberies,  burglaries,  and  stolen  property,  along  with  other   linking  elements.  Ul<mately,  providing  informa<on  to  the  districts  for  follow-­‐up  and  ac<on   plans.       The  gang  exper<se  in  the  Intelligence  Unit,  as  a  resource  mul<plier,  should  be  shared  and   expanded  into  the  districts  through  the  training  of  district  personnel.    This  would  increase   the  “eyes  and  ears”  on  the  street  at  the  district  level  and  complement  the  informa<on   gathering  city-­‐wide.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

82  


The  Intelligence  Func2on:  Special  Events   • 

• 

In  the  planning  of  special  events,  the  Intelligence  Unit  has  failed  to  provide  thorough     informa<on  to  agency  members  responsible  for  planning  and  coordina<ng  unique   occurrences.       Events  involving  the  tea  party  protest,  concerts  or  circuses  (where  PETA-­‐like  interest   ac<vity  may  occur)  have  historically  not  been  a  focus  of  the  Intelligence  Unit.    Frequently,   the  Intelligence  Unit  will  provide  liple  beyond  a  web  search  of  related  ac<vi<es  reported   in  other  jurisdic<ons,  unless  specifically  requested  or  directed  by  the  personnel   responsible  for  planning  or  coordina<ng  special  event  .      

Recommenda2ons   •  • 

The  Intelligence  Unit  must  understand  its  func<on  in  the  planning  of  special  events,  and   obtain  training  if  needed  to  ensure  the  unit  fully  develops  their  role  and  responsibili<es.   A  needs  assessment  should  be  conducted  with  all  agency  personnel  charged  with  the   responsibility  of  planning  special  events  and  the  role  of  the  Intelligence  Unit  in  these   events  described  and  defined  in  policy.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

83  


The  Intelligence  Func2on:  Coordina2on   • 

• 

There  is  an  absence  of  clear  policy  and  considerable  confusion  at  the  district  level  as  to     which  func<on  should  drive  intelligence,  the  Intelligence  Unit,  Fusion  Center,  Real  Time   Crime,  or  district  crime  analysis.    Consequently,  there  is  no  formal  protocol  that  enables  the   district  to  share  informa<on  with  one  another  or  with  the  intelligence  Unit,  resul<ng  in   informa<on  vemng  and  dissemina<on  based  on  individual  custom  developed  by  the  districts.       Presently,  informa<on  is  shared  primarily  through  informal  rela<onships  established  by   detec<ves  with  their  colleagues  in  other  districts  or  sec<ons,  as  opposed  to  a  formally   developed  intelligence  and  informa<on  sharing  process.  They  have  had  an  effec<ve   informa<on  sharing  role  in  ac<ve  city-­‐wide  inves<ga<ons,  but  rou<ne  intelligence  at  the   district  level  appears  challenging.  

Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

The  Intelligence  Unit,  Fusion  Center  ,  and  Real  Time  Crime  should  be  under  the  same   command.  Real  Time  Crime  and  the  Fusion  Center  should  be  developing  and  sharing  the  data   with  the  Intelligence  Unit,  who  can  act  on  the  hard  informa<on  by  conduc<ng  surveillance   and  developing  that  informa<on  then  ensuring  it  is  passed  to  the  proper  districts,  units  and   sec<ons  throughout  the  agency.   A  policy  should  be  developed  describing  the  role  of  each  intelligence  discipline  and  the  role   and  responsibility  of  agency  members  receiving  or  repor<ng  intelligence.    

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The  Intelligence  Func2on:  Phone  Surveillance   • 

• 

The  Intelligence  Unit  is  very  effec<ve  in  obtaining  cell  phone  and  telephone  records,  but  is   only    available  on  weekdays.    There  is  a  sense  that  the  unit  is  overwhelmed  by  cell  phone   informa<on  requests,  consequently  the  response  is  not  always  <mely.   If  the  Intelligence  Unit  is  not  able  to  process  a  request  for  cell  phone  records  promptly,  a   district  detec<ve  will  ini<ate  the  necessary  documents,  obtain  the  phone  records,  and   submit  them  later  to  the  Intelligence  Unit.      

Recommenda2ons   •  •  • 

The  phone  subpoena  task  should  be  handled  by  the  appropriate  districts  or  inves<ga<ve   sec<ons  to  expedite  the  process.       A  detailed  policy  should  be  developed  and  inves<gators  properly  train  and  sufficiently   supervised  to  ensure  safeguards    are  in  place  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  process.       The  Intelligence  Unit  should  act  as  the  clearing  house  for  all  phone  records  obtained  by  the   agency,  with  a  copy  of  all  those  records  and  suppor<ng  documents    being  forwarded  to  them   to  ensure  the  correct  processes  and  procedures  were  followed.  

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support   Services   Internal  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on  ―  Planning  Sec<on    ―     Inspec<ons  Sec<on  ―  Court  Control  Unit  ―  Detail   Coordina<on  Unit  ―  Accredita<on  Unit  ―  Training   Sec<on  ―  Organiza<on  ―  Technology  ―  Court  and   Other  Over<me    Compensa<on  ―  Financial   Management  and  Personnel    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   •  •  •  • 

• 

• 

• 

• 

This  bureau,  commanded  by  an  assistant  chief,  is  responsible  for  coordina<ng  and   performing  inter-­‐bureau  planning  tasks  and  special  research  evalua<on  studies.       Administra<on  Bureau  consists  of  the  Internal  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on,  Planning  Sec<on,  and   Inspec<ons  Sec<on.   The  Planning  Sec<on,  with  the  excep<on  of  the  policy  development  process,  is  not  in  the   most  func<onally  sound  loca<on  in  the  department.   Internal  Inves2ga2on  Sec2on,  commanded  by  a  captain,  is  responsible  for  inves<ga<ng   ci<zen  complaints  of  a  serious  nature:  complaints  of  alleged  police  misconduct,  alleged   misconduct  of  Department  civilian  employees  and  use  of  force  incidents  that  result  in  serious   injury  or  death.       This  sec<on  coordinates  pre-­‐disciplinary  hearings  in  conjunc<on  with  the  Department   hearing  officer(s)  and  coordinates  the  inves<ga<on  of  complaints  referred  by  the  Ci<zen   Complaint  Authority   Planning  Sec2on,  commanded  by  a  captain,  is  responsible  for  planning,  research,  and  the   development  of  programs  that  maximize  the  effec<ve  use  of  Department  personnel  and   resources.       This  sec<on  is  responsible  for  long-­‐range  planning,  developing  and  maintaining  forms  and   procedures,  conduc<ng  legal  research  and  tracking  civil  li<ga<on  involving  the  Department   and  its  members.       This  sec<on  serves  as  the  Department’s  liaison  with  the  City  Solicitor’s  Office.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   • 

• 

• 

Inspec2ons  Sec2on,  commanded  by  a  captain,  monitors  the  ac<vity  of  the  Department   through  staff  inspec<ons  and  unannounced  inspec<ons  conducted  on  a  random  basis,   including  the  Department’s  random  drug-­‐tes<ng  program.    At  the  annual  uniform  inspec<on,   this  sec<on  monitors  the  condi<on  of  issued  equipment  and  ensures  compliance  with   Department  dress  and  grooming  standards.    Inspec<ons  Sec<on  conducts  cri<cal  reviews  of   all  use  of  force  incidents  and  serves  as  the  Department’s  central  record  repository  for  all  use   of  force  incidents.    This  sec<on  is  also  responsible  for  ensuring  the  Department  meets  CALEA   standards.   Court  Control  Unit,  supervised  by  a  sergeant,  is  the  police  liaison  with  the  local  judiciary  and   manages  police  officer  apendance  in  court  by  monitoring  officers’  court  appearances.    This   unit  verifies  apendance,  <me  spent  in  court  by  officers,  as  well  as  ensuring  the  Police   Department  dress  and  grooming  standards  are  met.    The  Court  Control  supervisor  randomly   visits  courtrooms  to  monitor  officers’  tes<mony  and  case  prepara<on.   Detail  Coordina2on  Unit,  supervised  by  a  sergeant,  coordinates  all  outside  employment   extension  of  police  service  details.    This  unit  also  maintains  the  Police  Department’s  outside   employment  ac<vity  records  for  all  officers.    These  records  are  reviewed  monthly  to  ensure   compliance  with  Department  policy.    The  Detail  Coordina<on  Unit  supervisor  also  conducts   audits  and  random  inspec<ons  of  outside  employment  details.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

88  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   • 

• 

•  •  • 

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The  Training  Sec2on,  commanded  by  a  Captain,  develops  and  conducts  training  programs  for   the  Police  Department.    This  includes  recruit,  in-­‐service,  and  firearms  training  in  both  live  fire   and  the  firearms  training  simulator  (FATS).       The  Training  Sec<on  conducts  training  in  the  areas  of  supervision,  management,  physical   fitness,  self-­‐defense,  officer  survival,  interpersonal  skills,  legal  issues,  and  current  topics.    It   also  coordinates  numerous  outside  training  requests,  FBI  training  programs,  and  computer   training  programs.       The  training  staff  produces  training  bulle<ns,  memos,  and  video  programs  for  Department   use  at  department  roll  calls.       The  Training  Sec<on  also  conducts  the  Ci<zen  Police  Academy  and  the  Student  Police   Academy.   The  Firearms  Training  Unit  of  the  Training  Sec<on,  supervised  by  a  Sergeant,  is  responsible   for  the  Department’s  live  firearms  training.    The  unit  conducts  annual  firearms  qualifica<ons   for  all  sworn  personnel  and  firearms  instruc<on  for  police  recruits.    It  inspects,  repairs,  and   evaluates  Department  firearms  and  makes  recommenda<ons  on  appropriate  ammuni<on  for   Department  use.   Overall,  the  training  ac<vi<es  of  the  department  are  comprehensive  and  an  important   element  in  officer  development.    Many  officers  at  various  ranks  have  the  ability  to  apend   specialized  training  related  to  their  assignment.    But  there  is  a  percep<on  among  some   officers  that  apendance  at  specialized  training  is  provided  mostly  to  those  who  have  prior   rela<onships  with  senior  managers.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   Recommenda2ons   •  • 

• 

Every  effort  should  be  made  to  ensure  that  the  selec<on  of  officers  for  special  schools  is   transparent  to  avoid  percep<ons  of  favori<sm.   The  Department  should  explore  training  trainers  in  modern  prac<ces  of  officer-­‐to-­‐youth   contact,  since  those  rela<onships  can  have  a  long  term  impact  on  the  future  legi<macy  of  the   Department  as  youth  grow  up.    There  is  a  knowledge  base  developing  about  how  police   interac<ons  with  youth  can  be  drama<cally  improved  by  understanding  how  the  youth  brain   sees  the  world.   In  the  future,  when  recruit  classes  are  hired,  a  number  of  new  training  and  orienta<on   prac<ces  should  be  explored:   –  Following  the  academy,  before  officers  are  assigned  to  a  neighborhood  for  field  training,   they  should  spend  a  few  days  to  a  week  with  a  selected  neighborhood  organiza<on  that   will  assume  responsibility  for  introducing  them  to  the  neighborhood,  its  environment,   leadership  and  issues.    Experience  shows  that  such  orienta<on  increases  not  only  the   new  officer’s  knowledge  but  the  community’s  willingness  to  share  responsibility  for  the   success  of  the  new  officer.   –  Recruits  should  spend  some  <me  as  observers  in  marked  police  units  at  various  stages     of  their  training  to  see  what  the  “real  world”  of  policing  is  like.    This  permits  them  to  ask   ques<ons  about  what  they  have  seen  in  the  academy  semng  ager  these  ride-­‐alongs.    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Organiza2on    Recommenda2ons   •  Rename  the  Administra<ve  Services  Bureau  to  Professional  Standards  Bureau.   •  This  is  a  beper  reflec<on  of  the  industry  standard  for  this  grouping  of  departmental   responsibili<es.   •  Planning  and  Development  should  be  relocated  in  the  Resource  Management  Bureau.   •  The  policy  and  procedure  func<on  should  be  absorbed  into  the  Inspec<ons  Unit.   •  The  Training  Sec<on  should  be  relocated  to  the  Professional  Standards  Bureau.   •  This  is  a  coloca<on  of  func<ons  that  seems  to  be  gathering  adop<on  by  the  more  forward   thinking  agencies.     •  The  idea  of  having  policy  and  training  curricula  wripen  in  closely  aligned  units  should  ensure   more  uniformity  and  consistency  in  both  efforts.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

91  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   Technology   •  • 

• 

•  •  •  • 

The  Department  has  many  technology  systems  which  greatly  affect  the  quality  of  opera<ons,   safely  of  field  personnel  and  <me  consumed  with  documen<ng  ac<vi<es  and  informa<on   received.   The  development  of  systems  in  the  Department  appears  have  had  a  near-­‐term  focus  rather   than  a  longer-­‐term  strategic  focus.  Technology  has  not  been  integrated  into  the  core   func<ons  of  the  Department,  but  a  significant  number  of  posi<ve  steps  have  been  taken  over   the  years.   There  has  not  been  training  nor  pressure  on  employees  to  fully  use  the  technological   capabili<es  available  to  them  today.  For  example,  though  mandated  by  police,  there  are   con<nually  a  substan<al  number  of  police  reports  from  the  field  that  have  not  been   electronically  submiped,  reviewed  or  acknowledged  by  officers  or  supervisors.    Management   has  ogen  not  been  willing  to  ensure  that  the  required  standard  is  met,  thus  directly  impeding   the  real  <me  informa<on  flow  that  is  so  cri<cal  to  effec<ve  response  to  crime  and  preven<on   of  future  occurrences.   In  this  sense,  technology  u<liza<on  has,  to  some  degree,  become  an  outlier  in  the  basic   opera<ons  of  the  Department  when  it  must  become  an  integrated  system  used  by  all.   There  have  also  been  a  number  of  issues  related  to  knowledge  of  systems  and  technology  at   the  management  level  of  the  Department.    The  managers  assigned  appear  to  have  done  a   good  job  within  the  limita<ons  of  their  knowledge  of  this  science.   Personnel  staffing  to  support  the  technology  area  has  ogen  been  limited  and  far  below  what   is  required  for  successful  implementa<on.   For  the  department  as  a  whole,  there  is  no  Strategic  Plan  for  Technology  Development.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   Technology   • 

The  Department  currently  has  a  number  of  important  technology  systems  that  are  in  the   process  of  development  or  upda<ng  or  needing  replacement.    These  include…   –  Records  Management  System:  deployed  in  2004,  moves  from  under  warranty  in  2012.     The  vendor  has  been  Motorola,  which  has  developed  the  more  advanced  versions  of   this  important  sogware  in  collabora<on  with  the  Department.    There  has  been  an   absence  of  field  tes<ng  and  audi<ng  of  system  sogware.   –  Field  Repor<ng  and  Processing:  a  process  cri<cal  to  the  Department’s  crime   management  ini<a<ves  (such  as  CIRV  and  CompStat).  As  previously  noted,  current   system  opera<on  ogen  involves  delays  in  processing  dates  from  24  to  48  hours.   –  License  Plate  Reader:  a  Homeland  Security  Project  for  the  Southern  Ohio,  Indiana  and   Northern  Kentucky  region.    The  Department  is  a  pilot  leader  in  the  US  for  use  of  this   new  technology.   –  Community  Crime  Cameras:  A  comprehensive  effort  between  the  52  neighborhoods  of   the  city  and  the  Central  Riverfront.    While  implementa<on  has  occurred,  apparently   there  has  been  inadequate  planning  for  addressing  a  variety  of  issues,  such  as  data   access,  public  records  requests,  etc.   –  Computer/SAN  Replacement:  Funding  has  been  encumbered  to  replace  the  550  exis<ng   computer  worksta<ons  in  the  Department  because  of  the  age  of  the  equipment.  The   poten<al  use  of  the  Smart  Client  plaworm  needs  to  be  explored  rather  than  just   purchasing  networked  computers.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

93  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   Technology   –  Mobile  Data  Computer  (MDC)  replacement:    This  project  seeks  to  replace  in-­‐car   computers  in  211  CPD  vehicles  as  a  part  of  this  County  project.    The  equipment   purchased  needs  to  meet  CPD  needs,  but  it  appears  that  there  has  been  only  limited   involvement  in  system  specifica<ons.   These  are  just  a  sampling  of  issues  currently  exis<ng  in  the  technology  area.    A  lis<ng  of   current  projects  and  the  staff  assigned  is  listed  on  the  following  page.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   Technology  Projects   PROJECT  

Desktop  Refresh   SAN  Upgrade   RMS  Servers   AD  Migra<on   Academy  Training  Lab/Mobile  Training   Lab   RMS  Support  

DESCRIPTION  

LEAD  

Replace  computers/upgrade  opera<ng  system   to  Windows  7/upgrade  Office  package  to  2010   Tom  Lind   Upgrade  the  SAN   Tom  Lind   Replace  outdated  RMS  servers   Tom  Lind   Move  Ac<ve  Directory  to  RCCAD   Tom  Lind/Mike  Arnold   Implement  mobile  and  permanent  training  lab   Tom  Lind/Academy   in  conjunc<on  with  the  Academy  staff   Staff   Lt.  Ogilvie/Lt.   Carmichael   Development,  report  wri<ng,  support   Gerry  Geisel  

Development  of  custom  applica<ons,  assist  in   project  management,  troubleshoot  problems   Heather  Whipon   Installa<on,  troubleshoo<ng,  support,  etc.   Barry  Whipon   Finish  the  i2  installa<on  that  will  allow   connec<on  to  diverse  databases   i2  Sogware  Installa<on   Jim  Olthaus   Upgrade  the  current  payroll  database  from   Access  to  SQL   Upgrade  of  Payroll  to  SQL  database   Jim  Olthaus   SCPA  Hiring   Fill  SCPA  posi<on   Jim  Olthaus   CPA  Hiring   Fill  CPA  posi<on   Jim  Olthaus   CPS  Hiring  (Grant)   Fill  CPA  posi<on  (Grant)   Heather  Whipon   Install  updated  technology  in  the  command  a   Command  Van-­‐SWAT  Nego<ator  Van   SWAT  nego<a<ons  vans  (computers,  wireless,   Technology  Update   etc.)   Lt.  Wolf   MVR  Wireless  Project   Sgt.  Tom  Snith   Mobile  RMS  Project   The  servers  in  the  districts  to  upload  video  are   in  need  of  replacement  and  upgrade;  look  into   networking   Update  DEMM  Servers   Upgrade  computer  to  Windows  7  (64  bit)  and   add  memory  to  see  if  the  problems  with   locking  up  are  fixed   Upgrade  Criminalis<cs  computers   Tony  Schlegel   LPR  Support   CNPS  Camera  Project  

Review  Omega  Products  

Review  Telestaff  Product  

BACKUP  

Tony  Schlegel   Tony  Schlegel  

START   DATE  

END   DATE   COMMENTS  

01/01/12   04/31/12   06/01/11   03/15/12   01/01/12   06/01/12   04/01/10   06/01/12   09/01/10   06/30/12  Pending  upgrade  of  Training  Lab   10  BC  

Ongoing  

11/01/09   Ongoing   01/01/08   Ongoing   01/01/10   03/31/12  

Tom  Lind   Tom  Lind   Jim  Olthaus  

02/01/12   02/29/12   12/01/12   03/31/12   01/01/12   03/31/12   01/01/12   03/31/12  

Jim  Olthaus/Tom   Lind   Field  Tes<ng  1  sta<on  

Jim  Olthaus  

12/15/11   01/15/12  

Review  the  Omega  groups  products  of   Crimeview  Dashboard,  Crimeview  Mobile,  etc.   Review  and  request  another  demo  of  the   Telestaff  product  to  replace  <me  books,  court   management,  lineups,  etc.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

95  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   Technology    -­‐  Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

• 

• 

The  Department  should  hire  a  Technology  and  Systems  Manager  to  oversee  the  en<re   informa<on  technology  area.    This  posi<on  requires  specialized  educa<on  and  experience  in   technology-­‐related  fields.    It  should  be  a  trained,  qualified  civilian.   The  first  task  for  the  new  Manager  should  be  a  review  of  current  systems  projects,  then  the   development  of  a  Strategic  Plan  for  Technology  that  presents  objec<ves,  systems  proposed   and  costs  associated  with  their  development.   The  Department  should  aggressively  require  that  employees  at  all  levels  use  the  current   technology  systems  as  required  by  exis<ng  policy,  within  the  <meframes  that  have  been   established.    Employees  who  con<nually  fail  to  meet  the  required  deadlines  for  submission   of  field  reports,  for  example,  or  approve  those  submiped  should  be  disciplined  ager  being   no<fied  of  this  deficiency  should  it  con<nue.   Many  police  personnel  assigned  to  technology  should  be  replaced  with  qualified  civilians   over  <me.    Some  police  officer  liaison  must  always  be  maintained  within  the  technology  units   but  not  in  management  posi<ons  or  for  highly  technical  ac<vi<es.    Police  officer  roles  should   focus  on  ensuring  that  systems  developers  understand  the  needs  and  requirements  of  those   who  will  use  the  technology.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

96  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Fiscal  &  Personnel   Financial  Management  and  Personnel   •  •  • 

• 

The  Financial  Management  and  Personnel  func<ons  are  combined  under  a  single  manager,   repor<ng  to  the  Assistant  Chief,  Resources  Bureau.   The  Personnel  Sec<on  manages  all  the  Department’s  personnel  mapers,    except  for   recrui<ng,  which  operates  under  Training.    The  variety  of  func<ons  is  expansive,  and  the   small  staff  assigned  operates  under  the  direct  supervision  of  a  Police  Sergeant.   In  coming  months,  the  Department  may  be  scheduling  a  recruit  class,  which  will  put  pressure   on  this  sec<on  to  recruit  and  screen  candidates.    The  Lieutenant  assigned  to  Personnel   should  assume  responsibility  for  coordina<ng  and  managing  these  ac<vi<es.    While  in  the   future  this  posi<on  might  be  civilianized,  in  the  near  term  it  should  remain  a  police  manager   posi<on.   The  Fiscal  Sec<on  oversees  the  Department  budget  process  and  expenditures.      

Recommenda2ons   •  •  • 

The  Fiscal  Sec<on  should  be  moved  to  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police,  where  fiscal  decisions   and  oversight  of  expenditures  can  get  to  the  Chief  of  Police  without  filtering.    Personnel   should  remain  under  the  Resource  Management  Bureau.   The  alloca<on  and  expenditure  of  funds  received  by  the  Department  from  asset  forfeiture   also  requires  direct  repor<ng  to  the  Chief.    The  current  prac<ce  of  having  fiscal  under  an   Assistant  Chief  means  that  fiscal  decisions  go  through  one  extra  organiza<onal  layer.     While  financial  oversight  is  now  very  strong,  opera<onally  the  Department  should  think   strategically  about  how  asset  forfeiture  funds  are  allocated,  ensuring  that  they  carefully   reflect  thought-­‐out  priori<es.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

97  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Fiscal  and  Personnel   Financial  Management  and  Personnel  –  Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

The  Department  needs  to  invest  in  technology  that  will  bring  the  employee  apendance   process  online.    Apendance  informa<on  is  currently  entered  manually  in  each  unit  of  the   Department.    In  the  near  term,  Timekeepers  should  be  organized  centrally  but  an  automa<c   system  will  save  a  tremendous  amount  of  clerical  staff  <me,  which  can  then  be  allocated  to   other  pressing  mapers.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

98  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Court  Over2me   •  • 

Current  court  pay  is  cos<ng  the  city  approximately  $3  million  annually.     Court  over<me  is  awarded  three  different  ways:    -­‐    Court  (minimum  of  3  hours  over<me  for  a  solitary  appearance),  the  current  year  to      date  is  331,515.65.    -­‐  Dead  Time/Off  Days  (defined  as  less  than  8  hours  between  shig  and  court          appearance,  and  off  days  is  defined  as  those  days  commencing  with  the  last  hour        worked  on  a  normal  tour  of  duty  the  employee  is  not  required  to  return  to  work        within  the  next  24hr  period  including  preplanned  vaca<on  and  compensatory  <me),      the  current  year  to  date  total  is  873,471.54.    -­‐    Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  -­‐  federal  law  requiring  workers  to  be  paid  over<me  in  excess      of  480  hours  worked  compensatory  <me.  Year  to  date  total  is  1,559,121.71    

Recommenda2ons   •  •  •  • 

Ensure  that  only  essen<al  personnel  are  indicated  on  arrest  slips.   Meet  with  key  judicial  officials  to  improve  u<liza<on  of  officers  schedules  to  subpoena   officers  on  their  working  days.   Work  with  courts  to  not  schedule  officers  on  first  call  cita<ons,  traffic  offenses,  and  specific   misdemeanors.   Review  schedules  in  top  Districts  and  hours  of  ac<ve  units  to  reduce  dead  <me.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

99  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Court  Over2me   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  •  • 

Consider  flat  rate  for  court  appearance.   Eliminate  Dead  Time/Off  Day  provision.   Acquire  administra<ve  court  technology  to  lessen  burden  on  court  personnel  to  determine   officer  working  schedules.   Designate  regular  personnel  to  present  reports  on  first  call  cases  and  preliminary  hearings.   If  adopted,  u<lize  the  overlapping  schedule  from  the  4/10  plan  to  schedule  officers  for  later     court  start.    

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

100  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Over2me   Over2me   • 

The  department  currently  spends  about  $5,465,000  on  over<me:   OVERTIME  BUDGET   FOR  2010

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

COUNCIL  MANDATED  PVO

2008

2009

$1,866,217.67

$704,071.20

2010

2011  BUDGET

CONTINGENCY

$1,228,932.80

$1,278,890.59

$1,496,070.92

$2,596,207.79

$2,481,601.49

$1,587,930.49

$1,204,463.89

$994,532.10

$711,453.10

$265,720.00

INCREMENT

$1,869,537.04

$2,073,108.53

$2,110,437.00

$1,670,836.84

$2,027,741.59

$1,753,772.12

$2,069,405.26

$1,920,966.23

$1,507,028.19

$1,850,000.00

COURT

$601,690.86

$695,263.78

$779,434.60

$695,865.86

$819,938.87

$752,785.91

$559,157.38

$493,631.47

$418,491.55

$450,000.00

FLSA

$670,514.31

$730,879.80

$899,991.88

$991,740.45

$1,295,113.96

$1,147,491.68

$1,404,512.63

$1,564,321.49

$1,726,026.08

$1,800,000.00

OFF

$742,222.94

$860,900.64

$1,016,174.95

$1,032,153.99

$1,279,120.99

$1,118,482.23

$1,082,526.18

$1,111,889.07

$1,080,285.87

$1,100,000.00

$5,112,897.95

$5,639,043.34

$6,302,109.35

$6,986,804.93

$7,903,516.90

$6,360,462.43

$8,186,283.01

$6,789,411.56

$5,443,284.79

$5,465,720.00

-­‐$500,000.00

-­‐$1,200,000.00

-­‐$1,200,000.00

-­‐$1,500,000.00

-­‐$1,866,217.67

-­‐$704,071.20 -­‐$397,988.14

-­‐$350,000.00

COMMUNICATIONS

TOTAL ADJ  FOR  TAKE  BACK  OUR  STREETS  /  CMPVO LESS  COMMUNICATIONS ADJ  TOTAL

$5,112,897.95

$5,639,043.34

$5,802,109.35

$5,786,804.93

$6,703,516.90

$4,860,462.43

$6,320,065.34

$6,085,340.36

$5,045,296.65

$5,115,720.00

10.29%

2.89%

-­‐0.26%

15.84%

-­‐27.49%

30.03%

-­‐3.71%

-­‐17.09%

1.40%

INC/DEC  FROM  PRIOR  YEAR

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

101  


Administra2ve  and  Support  Services:  Over2me   •  •  • 

Many  of  the  over<me  expenditures  are  mandated  by  contract  or  federal  regula<on  (FLSA).     Por<ons  of  over<me  are  reimbursed  by  federal  and  state  grants  or  other  agencies.   However,  the  Department  does  not  allocate  other  over<me  to  individual  units,  requiring  that   Commanders  of  those  units  live  within  the  allocated  amounts.   Police  agencies  that  provide  adequate  control  over  their  over<me  do  such  alloca<ons,   reserving  up  to  20%  or  more  of  over<me  budge<ng  for  a  “con<ngency  fund.”  

Recommenda2ons   •  •  • 

• 

The  Department  should  develop  an  over<me  alloca<on  strategy,  providing  each  District  and   each  specialized  unit  with  an  alloca<on  of  the  over<me  provided  in  the  budget.   Commanders  of  each  unit  should  be  held  accountable  for  staying  within  the  allocated   amounts  unless  given  explicit  approval  by  the  Chief  of  Police.   Commanders  must  allocate  their  over<me  in  a  manner  that  recognizes  that  over<me  needed   during  the  summer  months  may  be  far  greater  than  that  needed  during  late  fall  or  late   winter  months.   Commanders  must  ensure  that  over<me  is  not  used  for  duplicate  work,  such  as  when  two   Captains  are  drawn  to  a  scene  of  an  incident  when  one  Captain  would  be  sufficient.      

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

102  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   The  History  ―  Strategy/Implementa<on  ―  Law   Enforcement  Team  ―  Services  Team  ―   Community  Team  ―  Systems  Team  ―  Team   Recommenda<ons  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

103  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   The  History   • 

• 

• 

• 

In  a  bold  step  a  few  years  ago,  the  City  agreed  to  be  a  pilot  organiza<on  for  a  new  crime   preven<on  and  reduc<on  strategy  developed  by  staff  at  the  John  Jay  College  of  Criminal   Jus<ce  in  New  York  City.    This  strategy  had  been  tested  in  a  series  of  communi<es,  including   Boston  (where  its  impact  became  well-­‐known  as  the  “Boston  Miracle“)  and  High  Point,  North   Carolina  (where  street-­‐level  drug  markets  were  eliminated  throughout  the  city).   The  Cincinna<  strategy  was  en<tled  “Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  to  Reduce  Violence”  (CIRV)  and   began  in  2007.    There  was  a  strong  commitment  to  the  strategy  by  the  Mayor,  City  Manager   and  Chief  of  Police  at  the  <me.    The  strategy  had  substan<al  results  in  the  first  few  years,   drama<cally  lowering  the  level  of  violent  crime  in  the  Districts  where  it  was  implemented.   The  department  received  substan<al  assistance  from  faculty  at  the  University  of  Cincinna<,   and  the  efforts  became  an  exemplary  collabora<ve  of  efforts  by  many  stakeholders,  including   the  Cincinna<  community,  police,  proba<on  and  parole  and  many  of  the  community’s  social   service  agencies.   In  the  last  year,  the  ini<a<ve  has  languished  in  the  background  of  department  change,  most   importantly  the  former  Chief  of  Police’s  re<rement.    The  opportunity  is  now  present  to   revitalize  the  ini<a<ve  in  a  way  that  will  not  only  drama<cally  reduce  violent  crime  in   Cincinna<  but  place  the  city  among  the  few  across  the  country  who  have  been  able  to   address  violent  crime  in  a  strategic  manner  focused  on  preven<ng  occurrences,  not  just   arres<ng  offenders  ager  the  fact.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

104  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   The  ac<vi<es  that  need  to  be  undertaken  for  re-­‐vitalizing  CIRV  are  detailed  below,  drawn  from   discussions  with  program  staff,  Dr.  Robin  Engel  of  the  University  of  Cincinna<  and  David  Kennedy   (and  staff)  of  the  John  Jay  College  of  Criminal  Jus<ce  in  New  York,  who  created  the  concept  that   CIRV  embodies  as  its  base  opera<ng  philosophy.   STRATEGY/IMPLEMENTATION   •  Personnel  with  prior  CIRV  experience  should  be  placed  in  leadership  posi<ons  to  guide  the   ini<a<ve   –  Key  leadership  posi<ons  include:   •  Co-­‐chair   •  Project  Manager   •  LE  Team  Chair  (and  opera<onal  leader)   •  Services  Team  Chair   •  Community  Team  Chair   •  Systems  Team  Chair     •  Establish  recommitment  of  the  Mayor,  City  Manager,  City  Council,  and  Chief  to  the  core   ideologies  of  focused  deterrence   –  Realignment  and  agreement  on  goals  of  ini<a<ve   –  Clear  agreement  on  defini<ons  and  targets  of  ini<a<ve  (e.g.,  defining  gang)   –  Reestablish  quarterly  Governing  Board  mee<ngs   –  Reestablish  rou<ne  presenta<ons  to  City  Council  by  CIRV  Strategy/Implementa<on   Team     105   Strategic  Policy  Partnership    


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   • 

• 

• 

Determine  financial  commitment  from  City  for  costs  associated  with  CIRV   –  Costs  include:   •  Street  Advocates   •  Provision  of  social  services  (e.g.,  Talbert  House)   •  Community  Engagement  (e.g.,  Partnering  Center)   •  Data  collec<on,  analysis,  evalua<on,  and  report  wri<ng  (University  of  Cincinna<)   •  CPD  over<me  expenditures  associated  with  CIRV  Opera<ons   –  Seek  addi<onal  funding  sources  (e.g.,  federal  and  state  grant  opportuni<es,  private   funding  sources)     Once  leadership  personnel  are  selected,  conduct  a  strategic  planning  sessions  for  all  CIRV   partners   –  Recommitment  to  CIRV,  including  OGSM  process  (Objec<ves,  Goals,  Strategies,   Measures)   –  Update  OGSM  and  strive  for  balanced  scorecards   –  Establish  short-­‐term  and  long-­‐term  goals  for  each  team     Develop  new  communica<on  strategy   –  Determine  if  offender  no<fica<on  mee<ngs  (i.e.,  call-­‐in  sessions)  remain  effec<ve  and   feasible   –  Iden<fy  and  implement  addi<onal  tac<cs  for  offender  no<fica<on   –  Pilot  test  and  evaluate  effec<veness  of  new  tac<cs  

  Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

106  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   • 

• 

Long-­‐term  goal:    Develop  a  comprehensive  violence  reduc<on  strategy  that  includes   domes<c  violence  and  violence  associated  with  open-­‐air  drug  markets   –  Conduct  analyses  to  determine  the  rela<onship  between  group-­‐related  violence,   domes<c  violence,  and  violence  associated  with  open-­‐air  drug  markets   –  Iden<fy  common  offenders,  vic<ms,  and  loca<ons   –  Determine  the  feasibility  of  using  focused  deterrence  strategies  to  address  other   violence  categories     –  Establish  coordina<on  across  CPD  units  (personal  crimes,  vice,  homicide,  patrol  districts,   real-­‐<me  crime,  etc.)   Embed  focused  deterrence  /  problem  solving  approach  within  CPD   –  Reestablish  in-­‐service  training  that  explains  CIRV  and  underlying  principles  of  focused   deterrence   –  Establish  CompStat  process  that  clearly  iden<fies  violence  reduc<on  goals  and  holds   commanders  responsible   –  Establish  reward  structure  that  encourages  innova<on  and  adherence  to  focused   deterrence  /problem  solving  principles  

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

107  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   LAW  ENFORCEMENT  TEAM   •  Increase  coopera<on  and  coordina<on  across  LE  Team  members   –  In  par<cular,  seek  reengagement  of  Hamilton  Co.  Proba<on  Department,  Ohio   Department  of  Rehabilita<on  and  Correc<ons,  Hamilton  Co.  Prosecutors  Office,  and  U.S.   Aporney’s  Office         •  Increase  coordina<on  between  Real  Time  Crime  Center,  Intelligence  Sec<on,    Patrol  Districts,   and  CIRV  Team   –  Conduct  coordinated  and  systema<c  intelligence  updates   –  Coordinate  data  collec<on  and  analysis   •  Direct  involvement  of  UC  team  for  assistance       •  Reestablish  CPD  Opera<onal  units  dedicated  to  CIRV  group/gang  opera<ons,  coordinated  by   Commanders  with  CIRV  knowledge/experience   –  Includes  opera<onal  units  at  department  and  individual  district  levels  (e.g.,  Vortex,  ATF   Task  Force,  and  Patrol  District  VCS)   •  Coordinate  direct  involvement  of  Intelligence  Sec<on  in  CIRV  Opera<ons   –  Increase  informa<on  sharing  across  units  (e.g.,  homicide,  vice,  patrol  districts)         Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

108  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   SERVICES  TEAM   •  Needs  to  be  recreated   •  Iden<fy  new  partners   •  Secure  funding  sources   •  Recommitment  to  evidence-­‐based  prac<ces   COMMUNITY  TEAM   •  Iden<fy  new  tac<cs  for  successful  community  engagement   •  Secure  funding  sources   •  Recommitment  to  evidence-­‐based  prac<ces   •  Establish  commitment  to  data  collec<on  and  evalua<on  process      

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

109  


Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   SYSTEMS  TEAM   •  Iden<fy  one  CPD  unit  specifically  tasked  with  data  collec<on,  analysis,  and  other  associated   documenta<on  tasks   •  Unit  should  have  ready  access  to  all  data  needed  to  complete  their  tasks,  including:   –  Arrest  Informa<on   –  Suspect  Informa<on   –  Vic<miza<on  Informa<on   –  Group  Enforcement  Informa<on   –  Call-­‐in  Informa<on   –  FIR  Database   •  CPD  analysts  charged  with  CIRV-­‐related  documenta<on  must  have  all  necessary  sogware  to   complete  tasks   •  CPD  unit  charged  with  CIRV  documenta<on  must  work  directly  with  UC  research  team     –  Develop  and  use  common  defini<ons  for  all  measures   –  Develop  data  sharing  plan   –  Develop  clear  expecta<ons  for  task  responsibili<es  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

• 

•  • 

We  strongly  support  the  ac<on  steps  detailed  on  the  previous  pages.    It  is  impera<ve  that  all   levels  of  city  government,  agencies  throughout  the  community  and  the  community  itself  re-­‐ engage  in  the  CIRV  process,  with  a  commitment  to  showing  the  small  percentage  of  persons   in  Cincinna<  who  engage  in  violence  that  such  ac<vity  will  not  be  tolerated.   Within  the  department,  the  CIRV  effort  must  be  an  effort  that  involves  all  Bureaus,  and  in   which  informa<on  rela<ve  to  the  CIRV  process  is  widely  shared,  without  silos  evolving  which   prevent  such  communica<on.   For  city  government,  it  is  cri<cal  that  the  community  and  agency  efforts  that  are  an  integral   part  of  the  CIRV  strategy  be  resourced.    A  source  of  funding  for  cri<cal  component  costs   must  be  found.    It  is  an  incredibly  important  investment  in  Cincinna<’s  future  and  the   economic  viability  of  the  community.   It  is  also  important  that  the  performance  measures  for  the  CIRV  ini<a<ve  be  incorporated   into  the  department’s  performance  management  process  (CompStat).   The  en<re  effort  can  have  increased  if  the  problem-­‐solving  strategy  being  developed  by  the   Problem-­‐Solving  Unit  gets  incorporated  in  an  integral  manner  with  CIRV.    Focusing  apen<on   on  the  nature  of  the  environmental  loca<ons  (places)  where  a  majority  of  violent  crime   occurs  can  create  ac<ons  that  bring  the  community  and  the  city  into  building  neighborhood   safeguards  that  will  prevent  future  occurrences  of  violent  criminal  acts.    It  can  become  a   model  for  the  country.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Managing  Performance   General  Background  ―  General   Recommenda<ons  ―  Status  of  Accredita<on  ―   Strengthening  Personnel  Competencies        

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

112  


Managing  Performance   • 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The  Department  has  had  a  CompStat  process  that  has  been  neither  very  effec<ve  nor  very   robust  in  its  opera<on.  Mee<ngs  have  been  held  around  a  conference  table,  making  it   difficult  for  par<cipants  to  observe  data  on  screens  in  the  room.    It  has  generally  been   expected  that  senior  managers  would  ques<on  District  Captains  about  the  status  of  crime  in   their  areas  but  ogen  the  discussions  randomly  roamed  off  to  other  topics,  with  the  session   losing  its  focus.    Chief  Craig,  upon  appointment  implemented  what  he  termed  “CompStat   Lite”  as  a  star<ng  point  for  strengthening  the  process.   Generally,  the  District  Captains  appear  to  have  a  reasonable  degree  of  knowledge  regarding   crime  in  their  district.    The  Department  has  been  fairly  robust  in  responding  to  crime  events   and  the  CIRV  ini<a<ve  has  had  drama<c  impacts  in  several  past  years.    But  the  CompStat   process  has  been  a  useful  mechanism  for  staying  on  top  of  crime  paperns  and  status.   One  of  the  most  important  underpinnings  for  an  effec<ve  CompStat  process  is  the  availability   of  real-­‐<me  crime  data  on  a  daily  basis.    Cincinna<  has  not  had  this  capability  for  a  series  of   complicated  reasons  but  plans  are  underway  to  improve  data  repor<ng  in  a  manner  that  will   provide  a  founda<on  for  effec<ve  performance  management.   Effec<ve  CompStat  processes  generally  move  toward  group  discussions  about  how   department  resources  can  best  be  used  to  intervene  in  paperns  of  crime.    The  New  York  City   Police  Department,  the  pioneer  of  these  processes,  developed  the  concept  of  “cops  on  the   dots:”  Gemng  a  picture  of  crime  occurrences  daily  permiped  each  NYPD  precinct  to  move   officers  to  those  areas  where  crime  was  occurring,  all  aimed  at  preven<ng  the  next   occurrence.   In  the  earliest  NYPD  Compstat,  the  ques<oning  of  precinct  commanders  was  very  aggressive   and  ogen  rude  and  demeaning.    Experience  has  shown  that  this  is  not  the  best  model.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

113  


Managing  Performance   Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Building  on  “CompStat  Lite,”  the  Department  must  develop  a  robust  real-­‐<me  system  for   collec<ng  the  type  of  performance  data  that  serves  as  the  basis  for  performance   management.    That  data  need  to  be  available  to  the  impacted  managers  prior  to  any   performance  management  review.   The  involvement  of  the  Crime  Analysis  staff  and  Problem-­‐oriented  staff  is  cri<cal  to  a   successful  performance  management  process.    This  staff  can  provide  analysis  of  the  data   produced  by  the  Department’s  technology  staff.   For  crime  sta<s<cs,  the  Department  should  hold  a  morning  mee<ng  of  District  Commanders,   Inves<ga<ve  Commanders,  unit  heads,  and  the  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Neighborhood  Policing   and  Inves<ga<ons  to  review  crime  status  for  the  previous  24  hours.    The  District  Captains  (or   their  designated  representa<ve  if  they  are  absent  from  duty)  can  join  the  mee<ngs  via  video   conference  from  their  office.    A  review  for  each  District  should  occur,  describing  the  major   crime  events  from  12:00  AM  to  11:59  PM  the  previous  day  and  any  significant  events  which   have  occurred  between  midnight  and  the  the  morning  mee<ng.   These  morning  reviews,  which  should  not  last  more  than  30  minutes,  should  briefly  review   major  crimes,  discuss  linkages  between  events  and  the  deployment  plans  for  that  day.    The   Lieutenant  of  the  Problem-­‐Solving  and  Crime  Analysis  Group  should  be  included  on  the  call.   In  support  of  this  daily  review  (Monday  through  Friday  but  not  weekends),  a  daily  crime   report  should  be  produced  by  the  Informa<on  Technology  Unit  modeled  ager  the  repor<ng   developed  by  the  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin  Police  Department.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

114  


Managing  Performance   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   •  • 

• 

•  •  • 

A  CompStat  room  should  be  created  in  which  performance  management  mee<ngs  are  held.     We  have  provided  the  department  with  an  outline  of  how  the  room  should  be  structured,  so   that  adequate  video  presenta<ons  of  crime  data  can  be  seen  by  all.   The  CompStat  sessions,  which  should  occur  once  a  week  in  that  room,  should  be  chaired  by   the  Assistant  Chief  of  Neighborhood  Policing  Services.    The  other  Assistant  Chiefs  should   apend  as  well,  simng  at  a  “ques<oner  table.”    Each  District  Captain  should  be  called  to   describe  the  state  of  crime  and  disorder  in  their  District,  evolving  problems  and  their  strategy   to  address  apparent  paperns.    With  the  responsible  inves<ga<ve  commander’s  par<cipa<on,   they  should  also  review  case  status  of  serious  crime  cases.   With  all  District  Commanders  in  apendance  along  with  representa<ves  of  special  units,  such   as  Special  Opera<ons,  others  in  the  room  should  offer  sugges<ons  and  resource  assignments   that  will  assist  the  District  Captain  address  the  problems  iden<fied  as  strategies  are   discussed.   The  objec<ve  of  the  session  is  collabora<ve  problem-­‐solving.    It  is  not  to  embarrass  an   individual  commander  but  bring  together  Department  capabili<es  to  immediately  address   evolving  paperns  of  crime  and  disorder.   Once  every  six  weeks,  following  the  CompStat  update  for  all  Districts,  one  District  should  be   scheduled  for  a  more  intensive  review,  looking  at  issues  such  as  sick  leave  use,  over<me   expenditures,  community  par<cipa<on,  and  related  mapers.   Eventually  other  units  in  the  Department  should  be  subject  to  the  same  type  of  review,  but   on  a  less  frequent  schedule.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Managing  Performance:  Accredita2on   • 

• 

The    Cincinna<  Police  Department  has  been  accredited  by  the  Commission  on  Accredita<on   for  Law  Enforcement  Agencies  (CALEA)  since  1997.    Ranking  agency  members  tend  to   characterize  CALEA  Accredita<on  as  having  developed  bench  marks  for  the  agency,  no<ng  it   is  a  very  posi<ve  process  that  ensures  sound  business  prac<ces  and  reassures  the  public  that   the  business  model  is  a  posi<ve  one.      However,  a  number  of  mid-­‐level  and  line  personnel     are  frustrated  that  CALEA  was  not  more  helpful  during  the  federal    review  of  the  agency  ager   the  “riots.”  But  those  tasked  with  sa<sfying    DOJ  compliance  requirements  indicated  that  the   agency  fulfilled  those  requirements  more  rapidly  and  easier  because  of  the  plaworm  the   agency  had  created  through  the  CALEA  process.  Those  familiar  with  evidence  and  property   mapers  support  accredita<on  because  of  the  quality  control  of  evidence,  which  ensures  the   integrity  of  the  evidence  process.   The  agency  members  affiliated  with  the  Accredita<on  Unit  have  developed  an  effec<ve   paper  process  of  gathering  proofs  of  compliance  throughout  the  various  bureaus.    

Recommenda2ons   • 

•  • 

The  agency  has  been  accredited  since  1997  and  should  consider  con<nuing  its  affilia<on  with   CALEA.  The  process  of  peer  review  is  invaluable,  par<cularly  as  it  relates  to  cri<cal  tasks,  i.e.   evidence  processing  and  handling,  use  of  force  and  pursuit  analysis.   If  con<nuing  with  CALEA,  the  agency  should  emphasize  the  role  of  CALEA  as  a  management   tool  for  con<nuous  improvement,  not  a  process  that  is  a  subs<tute  for  robust  leadership.   Likewise,  the  agency  should  develop  an  electronic  method  of  gathering  documents  necessary   to  demonstrate  proofs  of  compliance  with  the  standards.      

 

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

116  


Managing  Performance:  Accredita2on   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

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Some  agency  personnel  believe  unnecessary  reports  are  required  that  do  not  serve  any   effec<ve  purpose,  specifically  the  quarterly  report  to  the  police  chief  regarding  ci<zen   concerns.    Addi<onally,  there  is  a  percep<on  that  a  specific  number  of  training  hours  are   required  by  CALEA  Accredita<on,    for  example,  8  hours  of  training  is  mandatory  when  4   hours  would  do.     The  agency  should  complete  a  comprehensive  review  of  all  reports,  analyses,  and   documented  reviews  to  ascertain  if  they  properly  serve  the  agency  and  add  value.    In  those   instances  where  reports  or  documents  are  generated  merely  to  sa<sfy  a  standard,  those   reports  should  be  discon<nued  and  replaced  with  a  document  that  is  useful  and  valuable  to   the  agency  mission.    Agency  members  should  be  challenged  if  they  claim  that  a  CALEA   standard  dictates  how  an  agency  achieves  compliance:  CALEA  describes  the  task  that  must   be  addressed,  it  does  not  mandate  the  manner.   A  review  of  specific  training  hours  characterized  as  mandatory  to  ensure  compliance  with  a   CALEA  standard  should  be  scru<nized;  no  CALEA  standard  requires  an  explicit  number  of   training  hours  to  demonstrate  compliance.   Even  given  the  above,  the  department  should  carefully  review  the  return  from  remaining  an   accredited  agency.    A  number  of  the  deficiencies  found  in  this  review  were  not  iden<fied  by   the  accredita<on  process,  and  probably  would  not  be.    That  raises  important  issues  regarding   the  value  of  the  accredita<on  process  for  Cincinna<.  

    Strategic   Policy  Partnership    

117  


Managing  Performance:  Performance  Evalua2on   Performance  Evalua2on   •  •  •  •  •  • 

From  the  conversa<ons  held  with  personnel  and  our  review  of  the  Performance  Evalua<on   Manual,  we  find  the  appraisal  system  lacking  in  a  number  of  substan<al  ways.     We  were  told  that  the  evalua<on  system  is  not  taken  very  seriously  and  that  it  has  no   connec<on  to  job  assignment,  transfer,  advanced  training  or  promo<on.   The  appraisal  is  conducted  once  a  year,  less  than  the  standard  employed  by  forward  thinking   departments  of  comparable  size.   The  436A,  which  is  used  by  patrol  resources  to  capture  ac<vity,  seems  to  have  no  direct   connec<on  to  the  evalua<on  process.   There  appears  to  be  no  career  development  component  of  the  evalua<on  system.   By  policy,  only  the  extreme  ra<ngs  require  documenta<on.  

Recommenda2ons   •  • 

At  a  minimum,  conduct  appraisals  twice  a  year.   Ini<ate    a  review  of  the  performance  evalua<on  system  by  researching  the  approaches  of   similarly  situated  police  departments  and  current  innova<ons  in  the  industry  by  HR  experts.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Managing  Performance:  Performance  Evalua2on   Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  •   

Encourage  supervisors  to  have  quarterly  discussions  with  each  of  their  subordinates  about   performance.   Make  career  development  a  formal  part  of  performance  evalua<on.   Have  the  reviewer  play  a  more  significant  role  in  the  evalua<on  of  the  employee.   Provide  documenta<on  substan<a<ng  all  ra<ngs.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the   Department   Staffing  Levels  ―  Departmental  Organiza<on  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  -­‐  How  many  Officers  Does  a  City  Require?    

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• 

• 

There  is  a  debate  regarding  the  number  of  police  officers  a  city  requires  to  adequately   provide  service  and  meet  the  policing  challenges  of  the  community.   The  number  of  police  officers  in  American  ci<es  varies  greatly  from  region  to  region.  The   Western  United  States  generally  has  far  fewer  police  officers  per  popula<on  than  Mid-­‐west   and  East  Coast  communi<es.    Some  of  this  owes  to  the  evolu<on  of  West  Coast  police   agencies  ager  the  development  of  certain  East  Coast  public  sector  prac<ces;  the  Western   ci<es  ogen  had  far  lower  density  and  their  ci<es  had  more  modern  city  management   organiza<ons.    Thus,  these  newer  ci<es  commonly  had  less  officers.   Addi<onally,  the  popula<on  density  of  most  Eastern  ci<es  is  far  greater  than  those  in   Western  parts  of  the  country,  mostly  because  the  land  available  for  newer  ci<es  to  expand   with  growth  was  more  common  in  the  West.   It  has  been  common  to  view  the  number  of  officers  required  as  a  ra<o  of  officers  per  1000   popula<on.    Largest  East  Coast/Midwest  ci<es  have  ogen  had  a  ra<o  of  3  to  4  police  officers   per  thousand,  with  a  few  ci<es  approaching  6  officers  per  thousand.    On  the  West  Coast,  it  is   common  to  have  2  officers  per  thousand  or  less.    In  many  cases,  the  number  of  civilian   employees  to  police  officers  is  also  far  greater  than  Eastern/Midwest  communi<es.   In  <mes  of  fiscal  austerity,  many  communi<es  –  both  on  the  East  Coast/Midwest  and  West   Coast  –  are  finding  that  they  can  not  afford  the  numbers  of  police  officers  they  have   supported  during  past  <mes.    The  common  view  is  that  ci<es  must  trim  the  number  of   officers  in  the  future  if  city  financial  health  is  to  remain  viable.      

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  -­‐  Impact  within  the  Current  Environment   • 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Almost  all  ci<es  are  financially  stressed  within  the  current  economic  environment.    Few  have   the  capacity  to  increase  police  strength;  many  have  had  to  reduce  the  number  of  police   officers.   It  has  become  common  for  thoughwul  administrators  to  address  the  percentage  of  police   agency  strength  that  is  allocated  to  sworn  officers  and  that  which  is  allocated  to  civilian   employees.    It  has  been  shown  that  many  posi<ons  in  a  police  organiza<on  currently  filled  by   sworn  officers  could  be  performed  equally  well  or  even  beper  by  civilians,  ogen  at  less  cost.   When  financial  <mes  are  difficult,  governments  are  ogen  reluctant  to  reduce  police  officer   staffing  when  there  are  civilians  in  the  department.    Thus,  many  ci<es  reduce  civilian   posi<ons  first,  ogen  resul<ng  in  police  officer  reassignment  from  field  police  du<es  to  jobs   that  do  not  require  police  officers  training  and  skill.    This  is  an  unwise  ac<on  for  a   government  to  take.   It  now  appears  obvious  that  policing  must  be  performed  with  fewer  police  officers  than  in   the  past.    New  policing  strategies,  a  focus  on  predic<ve  policing,  community  policing   ingrained  as  an  organiza<onal  culture,  crime  preven<on  and  targeted  enforcement  against   repeat  or  serial  offenders  can  reduce  the  number  of  officers  required,  providing  civilian  staff   assumes  du<es  for  which  civilians  are  trained  and  can  effec<vely  perform.   The  table  on  the  following  page  shows  how  ci<es  comparable  to  Cincinna<  compare  with   regards  to  staffing  levels.    The  comparable  ci<es  are  mostly  “rust  belt”  Midwestern  ci<es.  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Cincinna<  and  CPD  -­‐  Comparable  Ci<es  and  Departments   City   Cincinna<   Buffalo   Cleveland   Milwaukee   Pipsburgh   St.  Louis   Toledo  

City   Cincinna<   Buffalo   Cleveland   Milwaukee   Pipsburgh   St.  Louis   Toledo  

Popula<on   (City)  

Popula<on   (Metro)  

296,943   261,310   396,815   594,833   305,704   319,294   287,208  

2,130,151   1,135,509   2,250,871   1,555,908   2,356,285   2,845,298   651,409  

2

Square  Miles   Density  (/mi )   (Land)   78.0   40.6   77.6   96.1   55.5   61.9   80.6  

"Part  I"  Crimes   Crime  Rate  (per   Officers  per   (2010)   100,000  pop)   1000  pop   24,121   18,352   28,961   38,049   14,094   33,529   11,830*  

8123   7023   7298   6396   4610   10500   4118    

3.6   2.9   3.9   2.9   4.3   4.3   2.0  

PD  Size  -­‐   Sworn  

PD  Size  -­‐   Civilian  

PD  Size   %  Civilian   (Total)  

4,273.5   6,656.2   5,113.0   6,296.3   5,636.0   5,158.2   3,767.7  

1,059   768   1,559   1,936   887   1,363   566  

119   150   246   727   67   557   111  

1,178   918   1,805   2,663   954   1,920   677  

Officer  per   Square  Mile  

Employees   per  1000  

 

 

13.6   18.9   20.1   20.1   16.0   22.0   7.0  

3.98   3.52   4.56   4.48   3.13   6.02   2.36  

10.10%   16.34%   13.63%   27.30%   7.02%   29.01%   16.40%  

 

*Excludes  larceny   Sources:  2010  Census,  2010  FBI  Crime  in  the  United  States  (UCR)  Report  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  -­‐  Where  Cincinna2  Stands   • 

• 

• 

•  • 

Compared  with  the  comparable  ci<es,  Cincinna<  does  not  stand  out  at  the  top  or  bopom  of   any  of  the  comparisons,  except  that  it  has  the  second  lowest  number  of  civilians  as  a   percentage  of  total  police  department  staffing  out  of  all  the  listed  departments.     Our  review  of  the  level  of  civiliza<on  in  the  Department  noted  that  there  are  a  substan<al   number  of  posi<ons  currently  staffed  by  police  officers  that  most  other  police  agencies  have   converted  to  civilian  posi<ons,  many  at  lower  cost.    Only  10%  of  the  Department’s  staffing  is   civilian,  compared  to  Milwaukee’s  27%,  St.  Louis’  29%,  and  Toledo  and  Buffalo’s  16%.   There  are  also  some  posi<ons  where  technical  skill  is  required,  beyond  that  found  among   police  personnel.    The  police  personnel  assigned  to  those  posi<ons,  such  as  Director  of   Informa<on  Technology,  have  done  a  good  job  learning  the  field  and  trying  to  move  the   Department  forward,  but  having  civilian  managers  in  some  of  these  areas  would  be  far  more   effec<ve,  a  fact  with  which  a  number  of  current  posi<on  incumbents  agree.   Civilianiza<on  will  take  <me,  and  officers  replaced  can  then  move  to  field  posi<ons  now  filled   with  officers  who  are  re<ring  or  otherwise  leaving  the  Department.   But  if  civilianiza<on  occurs,  it  is  important  that  the  civilian  strength  be  maintained  over  the   longer  term,  so  a  situa<on  is  created  that  forces  the  Department  to  fill  vacant  civilian   posi<ons  with  sworn  officers,  something  that  will  occur  if  the  func<on  is  cri<cal  and  must  be   staffed.  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  -­‐  Where  Cincinna2  Stands   • 

• 

• 

Cincinna<  also  has  a  low  ra<o  of  officers  to  supervisors,  and  supervisors  to  managers.    The   current  ra<os  are  as  follows:   –  Captains  to  Assistant  Chiefs:  3.2   –  Lieutenants  to  Captains:  3.0   –  Sergeants  to  Lieutenants:  3.48   –  Police  Officers  to  Sergeants:  4.77   The  norm  for  urban  police  agencies  is  a  ra<o  of  6-­‐7  police  officers  per  Sergeant.    It  appears   that  over  the  years,  the  department  has  promoted  individuals  to  supervisory  posi<ons  that   did  not  have  meaningful  supervisory  responsibili<es;  that  is,  the  work  of  the  posi<ons  could   have  been  accomplished  by  lower-­‐level  personnel.   The  department  has  recently  taken  steps  to  reduce  the  number  of  Assistant  Chiefs,  Captains   and  Lieutenants,  which  will  help  restructure  assignments  and  responsibili<es,  pushing  down   these  responsibili<es  to  lower  levels  of  the  organiza<on  where  higher-­‐level  authori<es  are   not  required.    This  is  a  posi<ve  step,  not  only  in  <mes  of  fiscal  pressure  but  in  crea<ng  a   beper  func<oning  organiza<on.  

Staffing  Levels  –  Recommenda2ons   • 

Ensure  that  each  supervisory  and  management  posi<ons  have  responsibili<es  and  authori<es   commensurate  with  that  rank.  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  -­‐  Recommenda2ons   • 

The  Department  should  move  to  civilianize  the  following  posi<ons  in  a  structured,  organized   manner,  with  officers  being  moved  out  of  them  back  into  the  field  as  police  vacancies  occur.   Potential Sworn Positions to be Civilianized Bureau 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

Position IT Section Commander Police Academy Commander Records Unit Commander Personnel Unit Commander CALEA Unit - Administrative Support Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit TCRU positions TCRU positions TCRU positions Crime Analyst - CIS Crime Analyst - Intelligence Crime Analyst - Vice Criminalist Criminalist Crime Analyst - D1 Crime Analyst - D2 Crime Analyst - D3 Crime Analyst - D4 Crime Analyst - D5 Crime Analyst - Traffic PFMS - Grant Writer Supply - Storekeeper District Desk or Clerical positions D1 District Desk or Clerical positions D1 District Desk or Clerical positions D2 District Desk or Clerical positions D2 District Desk or Clerical positions D3 District Desk or Clerical positions D3 District Desk or Clerical positions D4 District Desk or Clerical positions D4 District Desk or Clerical positions D5 District Desk or Clerical positions D5 Sr. Criminalists Sr. Criminalists Patrol Adm - Crossing Guard Coordinator PIO Commander Court Control Unit Commander Detail Coordination Unit Commander Planning Researcher Information Analysis Unit Supervisor IT Unit Commander Administrative Sergeant D1 Administrative Sergeant D2 Administrative Sergeant D3 Administrative Sergeant D4 Administrative Sergeant D5 Administrative Sergeant CIS Employee Relations Squad Commander

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

Information Mgmt Resource Mgmt Information Mgmt Resource Mgmt Administration Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Investigation Investigation Investigation Investigation Investigation Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Resource Mgmt Resource Mgmt Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Investigation Investigation Patrol Chief's Office Administration Administration Administration Information Mgmt Information Mgmt Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Investigation Resource Mgmt

Sworn Rank Captain Captain Lieutenant Lieutenant PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PO PS PS PS Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant

Salary $99,480.11 $99,480.11 $85,758.72 $85,758.72 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $63,383.00 $68,453.64 $68,453.64 $68,453.64 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93 $73,929.93

Non-sworn Classification IT Manager Police Acad. Manager Supv Management Analyst Supv HR Analyst Adm Tech Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Clerk Typist 3 Clerk Typist 3 Clerk Typist 3 Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Police Criminalist Police Criminalist Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Crime Analyst Adm Tech Laborer Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Clerk Typist 2 Sr. Criminalist Sr. Criminalist Adm Specialist Sr. Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Sr. Crime Analyst Comp Oper Support Supv Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Adm Specialist Human Resource Analyst

Salary $106,438.34 $99,662.58 $87,921.14 $87,921.14 $48,720.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $38,070.45 $38,070.45 $38,070.45 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $54,287.52 $54,287.52 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,719.49 $48,720.49 $36,404.34 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $34,898.37 $61,312.64 $61,312.64 $63,083.59 $74,835.74 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $64,326.48 $64,326.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59 $63,083.59

Difference ($6,958.23) ($182.47) ($2,162.42) ($2,162.42) $14,662.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $25,312.55 $25,312.55 $25,312.55 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $9,095.48 $9,095.48 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,663.51 $14,662.51 $26,978.66 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $28,484.63 $7,141.00 $7,141.00 $5,370.05 ($905.81) $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $9,603.45 $9,603.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34 $10,846.34

$760,855.11

126  


Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  –  Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

• 

The  Department  should  also  transfer  a  number  of  officers  assigned  to  specialist  posi<ons  to   patrol,  filling  shortages  of  patrol  officers  in  the  Districts.    While  some  believe  that  the   specialist  posi<ons  need  to  be  protected,  given  the  movement  of  the  Department  to  making   District  assignments  the  priority,  reinforcing  the  authori<es  District  Commanders  have  over   how  they  use  their  personnel,  and  holding  these  Commanders  accountable  for  the  outcomes   they  achieve  makes  redeployment  impera<ve.   Based  on  our  analysis,  we  recommend  the  following  transfers  to  field  patrol  du<es:          Sgts  POs     –  Elimina<on  of  the  Dare  Program    1  6   –  Civilianiza<on  of  Court      4   –  Civilianiza<on  of  Supply  1  1   –  Civilianiza<on  of  Financial  Management    1   –  Intelligence  Reduc<on  2  8   –  Vice  Unit  Reduc<on  6  25   •  RENU    2         –  TOTALS  1st  Itera2on  10  47  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Staffing  Levels  –  Recommenda2ons  (Con2nued)   • 

• 

•  • 

• 

• 

The  Dare  program’s  elimina<on  reflects  growing  na<onal  concern  over  evalua<ons  that  show   liple  if  any  impact  on  the  children  receiving  the  courses.    The  Department  should  instead   invest  in  improving  School  Resource  Officers’  and  neighborhood  police  officers’  interac<ons   with  youth.   The  movement  of  these  officers  from  the  listed  assignments  is  part  of  the  decentraliza<on  of   personnel  that  the  Department  needs  to  undertake.    Many  of  the  officers  will  move  to  patrol   assignments  in  their  designated  Districts  of  assignment.    Overall,  when  completed,  there  will   be  almost  a  9.5%  increase  in  police  officers  available  in  District  assignments.   A  few  of  the  assignments  cannot  be  completed  un<l  civilian  replacements  are  provided,  but   these  are  only  7  of  the  listed  57  posi<ons.    The  remainder  can  be  transferred  at  once.   Moving  these  police  officers  from  the  listed  assignments  will  thus  allow  an  increase  of   District  staffing  at  minimal  cost.    It  will  provide  District  Commanders  with  assignment   flexibility,  allowing  them  to  beper  fulfill  call  for  service  work  demands  and  strengthen  District   narco<cs  interven<ons  and  related  ac<vi<es.   It  is  important  that  an  alloca<on  plan  be  developed  quickly  indica<ng  how  many  of  these   officers  will  go  to  which  District.    But  given  the  fact  that  District  4  appears  to  have  a   substan<al  shortage  of  personnel,  a  number  of  these  officers  should  be  assigned  to  that   District.   We  believe  there  are  other  such  assignments  that  can  be  made  and  would  suggest  working   toward  a  second  set  of  transfers  of  up  to  25  addi<onal  personnel  from  inside  assignments.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

128  


Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Departmental  Organiza2on   • 

• 

•  •  • 

• 

The  Department  has  been  organized  in  a  tradi<onal  hierarchical  structure,  with  five  major   Bureaus  repor<ng  to  the  Chief  of  Police.    Each  Bureau  was  commanded  by  an  Assistant  Chief.     When  Chief  Craig  assumed  the  office  of  Chief  he  moved  some  units  –  basically  those  focused   on  community  policing  –  into  the  Chief’s  Office.    He  also  iden<fied  a  number  of  police  senior   management  posi<ons  that  should  be  eliminated,  reflec<ng  his  sense  that  the  Department   was  too  top-­‐heavy.       The  Department’s  underlying  focus  must  be  policing  “where  the  rubber  hits  the  road”  in  the   city’s  neighborhoods.    Police  officers  assigned  to  the  police  District  handle  the  calls  for   assistance  from  the  community,  intervene  in  a  wide  variety  of  neighborhood  situa<ons,  are   the  first  to  inves<gate  reported  crime  and  largely  develop  the  rela<onship  of  trust  with  the   community  that  results  in  the  Department’s  legi<macy  as  perceived  by  the  community.   “Silos,”  with  limited  communica<on  between  the  personnel  assigned  to  each,  have  ogen   featured  in  the  Department’s  history.   There  has  also  been  a  large  degree  of  specializa<on  in  the  Department.  Units  formed  with  a   valid  purpose  grew  over  <me  into  larger  units,  reducing  the  number  of  personnel  available   for  staffing  in  the  neighborhood  police  Districts.   The  trend  in  American  policing  has  been  to  reduce  specializa<on,  to  ensure  that  units   created  are  reviewed  every  few  years  to  see  if  the  original  purpose  remains  valid,  and  to   ensure  that  there  is  a  rota<on  policy  that  prevents  officers  from  remaining  in  specialized   func<ons  for  many  years  and  thus  losing  touch  with  neighborhood  policing.   The  following  was  the  table  of  organiza<on  under  the  former  Chief:  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Departmental  Organiza2on  –  Recommenda2ons   • 

• 

The  Department  should  be  restructured  to  reflect  the  following  elements:   –  Reduce  specializa<on  so  that  the  number  of  personnel  assigned  to  neighborhood   policing  in  the  police  Districts  can  be  increased.   –  Merge  like  func<ons  so  that  each  Bureau  has  a  clear,  substan<ve  area  of  responsibility.   –  Increase  available  staffing  to  the  police  Districts  so  that  the  District  Commanders  will   have  sufficient  resources  to  achieve  their  objec<ves,  thus  allowing  them  to  be  held   accountable  for  the  quality  of  police  service  in  the  neighborhoods.   –  Reduce  the  number  of  Bureaus  from  five  to  four.   The  ini<al  reorganiza<on  should  be  an  “Interim”  organiza<onal  structure.    That  structure   should  stay  in  place  un<l  the  following  occur:   –  A  Bureau  Chief  re<res,  thus  permimng  one  of  the  Bureaus  to  be  headed  by  a  civilian   manager  who  would  oversee  the  technical  and  administra<ve  sec<ons  of  the   Department.   –  Up  to  four  Captains  re<re,  thus  permimng  technical  posi<ons  now  filled  by  Captains  to   be  filled  by  highly-­‐trained  civilians.   –  Up  to  five  Lieutenants  re<re,  thus  permimng  a  series  of  other  administra<ve   management  posi<ons  to  be  filled  by  qualified  civilians.  

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Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   Recommenda2ons-­‐  (Con<nued)   • 

•  • 

The  Fiscal  Sec<on  should  be  separated  from  the  Personnel  func<on  and  moved  to  the  Office   of  the  Chief,  providing  the  Chief  with  unfepered  knowledge  of  the  status  of  fiscal  affairs.    The   sec<on  is  well  run,  but  needs  to  report  to  the  Chief.   Personnel  should  remain  assigned  under  the  Resource  Management  Bureau.   The  Chief  of  Police  should  appoint  a  Chief  of  Staff,  at  Captains  rank,  to  manage  func<ons  in   the  Office  of  the  Chief,  monitor  the  status  of  the  improvement  strategies  set  forth  in  this   review,  follow-­‐up  on  direc<ves  issues  by  the  Chief  to  subordinates  and  maintain  oversight  of   department  and  community  outreach  efforts  ini<ated  by  the  Chief.    Most  highly  effec<ve   police  organiza<ons  have  used  such  a  posi<on  with  great  success  to  ensure  that  progress   toward  the  department’s  goals  in  maintained.  

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Police Chief James E. Craig Chief of Staff Captain Paul H. Humphries

Executive Assistant Ms. Sabrina Burton-Simonson

Chief's Adjutant Lieutenant Maurice Robinson

Community Liaison Lieutenant Lisa A. Davis Public Information Office Sgt.

Fiscal Affairs Director Ella Topham Payroll & Purchasing Ms. R. Smith Special Funds Ms. A. Napier Grants Ms. N. Wagner Neighborhood Policing Bureau Assistant Chief James L. Whalen Central Business Captain Kimberly A. Frey Downtown Services Unit (1st Rel.) Lieutenant Downtown Services Unit (2nd Rel.) Lieutenant Special Events Unit Lieutenant Marine Patrol Sgt. Mounted Patrol Sgt.

Crime Analysis & Problem Solving Lieutenant Patrol Administration Lieutenant School Resource Officers Sgt. Night Inspectors 2 - Lieutenants

Investigations Bureau Assistant Chief Vincent L. Demasi Central Vice Investigations Captain Stephen G. Luebbe Vice Control Lieutenant Regional Narcotics Unit (RENU) Sgt. Regulatory Enforcement Sgt. Criminal Investigations Captain Thomas A. Johns Personal Crimes Lieutenant

District One Captain Gary W. Lee

Major Offenders Lieutenant

District Two Captain Paul F. Broxterman

Homicide Lieutenant

District Three Captain Russell A. Neville District Four Captain Eliot K. Isaac District Five Captain Paul W. Neudigate Special Operations Captain Daniel W. Gerard SWAT & Tactical Planning Lieutenant

Special Investigations Captain Michael U. Neville Intelligence & Fusion Lieutenant Fusion Center Sgt.

Professional Standards Bureau Assistant Chief Richard L. Janke Internal Investigations Captain Teresa A. Theege Assistant Commander Lieutenant Inspections, Policy & Procedure Captain Andrew G. Raabe Inspections Lieutenant Court Control Sgt. Detail Coordination Sgt. Policy & Procedure Lieutenant

Resource Management Bureau Assistant Chief Cindy M. Combs Technology & Systems Captain Jeffrey L. Butler, Jr. Special Projects Lieutenant Planning & Development Captain David J. Bailey

Evidence & Property Management Lieutenant Court Property Sgt. Impound Sgt. Supply Sgt.

Assistant Commander Lieutenant

Fleet Management Mr. D. Diersing Personnel, Recruitment & Background Lieutenant Employee Relations Sgt.

Accreditation Sgt.

Police Records Lieutenant

Training Captain Douglas M. Wiesman Assistant Commander Lieutenant Target Range & Firearms Training Sgt.

S.O.F.A.S.T. Sgt. Project DISARM Sgt.

Safe Streets Lieutenant Parks & Canine Unit Lieutenant Parks Squad Sgt. Patrol Canine Squad Sgt. Detection Canine Squad Sgt. Traffic Unit Lieutenant

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Accountabili2es   •  • 

All  sworn  personnel  understand  their  accountabili<es,  and  develop  strategies  for  improving   performance  when  issues  arise  pertaining  to  them.   Over  <me,  the  Department  should  develop  comparable  accountabili<es  for  civilian  posi<ons   as  well.  

Community  Policing   •  • 

• 

• 

The  Chief  of  Police  should  form  a  Ci<zen’s  Advisory  Council,  mee<ng  with  it  monthly  to   discuss  policy,  strategy,  and  police  effec<veness.   Form  a  Ci<zens’  Advisory  Commipee  in  each  district  that  will  meet  monthly  with  the  District   Captain  to  discuss  policing  issues,  public  percep<ons,  crime  trends,  and  joint  strategies  to   combat  crime  and  disorder.   The  Chief’s  Office  should  establish  a  Community  Liaison,  staffed  by  a  Lieutenant,  that  will   monitor  and  assist  police-­‐community  rela<onships  in  each  district,  oversee  the  Department’s   Volunteer  Program,  coordinate  and  train  the  School  Resource  Officers,  liaise  with  community   leaders,  and  monitor  community  policing  ini<a<ves  in  other  locales  and  to  find  best-­‐prac<ces   as  they  develop.   Move  most  community  policing  func<ons  now  performed  in  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police   to  Neighborhood  Policing  Services  (except  those  that  will  operate  under  the  Community   Liaison).  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Community  Policing  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  • 

• 

•  • 

Combine  community  policing  func<ons  with  the  problem-­‐solving  ac<vi<es  assigned  to  the   Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau  and  also  assign  it  coordina<on  of  the  crime  analysis  func<on.   Make  problem-­‐solving  a  central  part  of  the  commitment  to  community  policing.   Give  the  problem-­‐solving  staff  a  strong  voice  in  decision-­‐making  for  all  elements  of  the   community  policing  process.   Simultaneously  ins<tute  loca<ons  analyzing  that  complements  and  coordinates  with  the   CompStat  and  Cincinna<  Ini<a<ve  to  Reduce  Violence  (CIRV)/offender-­‐focused  strategies   along  with  including  addi<onal  elements  of  shoo<ngs  and  homicides  in  CIRV  data.   Schedule  daily  mee<ngs  within  CPD  districts/units/sec<ons  to  review  24-­‐hour  crime   incidents,  weekly  mee<ngs  to  address  short-­‐term  analysis,  monthly  mee<ngs  to  review  prior   responses  effec<veness,  and  a  semi-­‐annual  mee<ng  to  address  seasonal  crime  trends  and   ensure  strategic  problem-­‐solving.   Coordinate  community  policing  processes  with  the  University  of  Cincinna<’s  Department  of   Criminal  Jus<ce.   Counsel  and,  if  necessary,  discipline  commanders  who  do  not  fully  and  ac<vely  support  the   Department’s  problem-­‐solving  orienta<on.  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Patrol  Services  Organiza2on   •  •  • 

•  • 

Re-­‐name  the  Patrol  Services  Bureau  the  “Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau.”   Keep  all  five  districts  in  the  Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau,  repor<ng  to  the  Assistant  Chief  of   the  Bureau,  and  create  a  Special  Opera<ons  Unit  that  coordinates  key  aspects  of  the  CIRV  as   well  as  specialized  func<ons  such  as  SWAT,  traffic,  and  canine  ac<vi<es.   Create  a  “Downtown  Area,”  commanded  by  a  Captain  under  the  Assistant  Chief  of  the   Neighborhood  Policing  Bureau,  to  accommodate  Cincinna<’s  conference  and  tourist  ac<vity   as  well  as  the  new  casino.   –  It  should  operate  as  a  separate  sec<on  with  officers  and  specialists  repor<ng  to  the   Captain.   –  Staff  should  operate  from  the  District  1  sta<on  in  Police  Headquarters  and  the  Area   should  share  support  services,  but  command  should  be  totally  separate  from  the   remainder  of  District  1.   –  The  event  planning  and  related  units  should  be  part  of  this  new  Area,  and  personnel   should  be  allocated  from  the  exis<ng  District  1  complement  alongside  officers  moved  to   Neighborhood  Policing  from  specialist  units.   Ini<ate  a  structured  evalua<on  of  expected  outcomes  in  the  3rd  District  coordinated  with  the   Planning  Unit.   Study  the  “sector  model”  currently  piloted  in  the  3rd  District  in  another  District  to  determine   whether  it  outperforms  standard  models,  ensure  strong  linkage  with  concepts  under   development  by  the  Problem-­‐Oriented  Policing  Unit.  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Patrol  Services  Organiza2on  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Monitor  “4-­‐10”  work  schedule  pilots  in  the  3rd  and  5th  Districts,  ensure  cost  neutrality.   Consider  unique  geographic  circumstances  and  travel  <me  into  future  beat/district  re-­‐ configura<ons.   Allocate  addi<onal  patrol  resources  to  the  4th  District.   Eliminate  the  Night  Chief  posi<on,  reassign  its  du<es  to  lieutenants  by  assignment  or   rota<on.   Eliminate  the  Patrol  Administra<ve  Captain  and  assign  its  du<es  to  a  Lieutenant.   Re-­‐designate  the  Community-­‐Oriented  Policing  Captain  the  “Community  Liaison,”  assign  it  to   the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police.   Rename  the  Special  Services  Sec<on  the  “Special  Opera<ons  Sec<on.”   Ini<ate  a  study  of  K-­‐9  Unit  tac<cs.   Rename  the  Vortex  Unit  the  “Safe  Street  Unit.”   Transfer  the  motorcycle  officers  currently  assigned  to  the  1st  District  to  the  Traffic  Unit  and   replace  them  with  officers  currently  in  units  that  are  being  decentralized  or  disbanded.   Examine  whether  it  is  possible  to  have  SWAT  resources  available  on  both  day  and  evening   tours  of  duty.   Ensure  close  SWAT  liaison  with  the  Training  Sec<on  in  the  proposed  Professional  Standards   Bureau.  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Patrol  Services  Organiza2on  (Con2nued)   •  • 

Ini<ate  a  redistric<ng  study  to  match  patrol  assignment  areas    with  the  natural   neighborhoods  of  the  city  and  ensure  that  officers  in  each  district  are  alloped  sufficient  <me   for  problem-­‐oriented  policing.   Examine  alterna<ve  response  methods  to  calls  for  service  to  ensure  that  officers  are   dispatched  only  when  their  presence  will  benefit  ci<zens.  

The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on   •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Transfer  the  Fusion  Center  and  Real  Time  Crime  Units  from  the  Strategic  Development   Bureau  to  the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau  and  place  it  within  The  Intelligence  Func<on.   Ensure  that  Record  Management  and  Case  Management  Systems  are  dynamic  and  fully  up-­‐ to-­‐date.   Create  a  universal  standard  of  case  documenta<on,  development,  and  presenta<on.   Establish  weekly  informa<onal  mee<ngs  between  the  Criminal  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on  (CIS)   and  the  District  Detec<ves    alongside  a  formal  protocol  for  using  technology  to  disseminate   informa<on.   Detail  in  policy  CIS’  support  responsibility  to  work  closely  with  Districts  through  developing   and  sharing  informa<on.   Reduce  personnel  assigned  to  the  Vice  Control  Sec<on  (VCU)  and  re-­‐assign  a  complement  of   officers  to  each  district  for  street  level  vice  enforcement.   Establish  clear  guidelines  detailing  which  cases  are  referred  to  the  VCU.  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   The  Inves2ga2ve  Func2on  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Create  policy  protocols  requiring  informa<onal  exchange  between  the  Homicide  Unit  and   Districts,  including  a  formal  liaison  with  District  Commanders.   Form  a  “shoo<ng  team,”  coordinated  by  Internal  Affairs,  to  inves<gate  all  officer-­‐involved   shoo<ngs.   Assign  the  Homicide  Unit  to  work  all  cases  in  which  an  officer  is  the  vic<m  of  a  felonious   assault  –  whether  a  gunshot  wound  is  sustained  or  not.   Increase  Homicide  Unit  personnel  and  assign  it  to  all  felonious  assaults  and  unapended   deaths,  also  formally  ensuring  that  the  appropriate  district  commander  receives  current  and   con<nual  informa<on  from  the  Unit.   Increase  Criminalis<cs  Unit  personnel  to  ensure  adequate  support  for  the  corresponding   increase  in  cases  assigned  to  the  Homicide  Unit   Enhance  district  crime  scene  processing  and  improve  case  presenta<on  by  introducing  a  3-­‐ month  training  rota<on.   Conduct  a  needs  assessment  of  district  crime  scene  processing  equipment  and  tools  to   ensure  that  district  crime  scene  technicians  are  adequately  resourced.   Develop  the  Records  Management  System  to  facilitate  all  aspects  of  case  management.   Reduce  all  homicide  cases  to  electronic  files  or  house  them  in  Departmental  (not  vendor)   storage  facili<es.   Terminate  VCU  par<cipa<on  in  the  Regional  Narco<cs  Unit  (RENU)  and  seek  VCU  federal   standing  with  ATF/DEA  to  permit  legal  lead  pursuit  across  state  borders.  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   The  Intelligence  Func2on   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Transfer  the  Fusion  and  Real  Time  Crime  Centers  from  the  Strategic  Development  Bureau    to   the  Inves<ga<ons  Bureau.     Create  a  Special  Inves<ga<ons  Sec<on,  with  a  Captain  assigned    as  Sec<on  Commander.   Assign  the  Intelligence  Unit  and  the  Fusion  Center  and  Real  Time  Crime  to  that  Sec<on.   Provide  comprehensive  guidance  to  the  Intelligence  Unit  and  audit  compliance  to  ensure   that  intelligence  ac<vi<es  are  always  within  Cons<tu<onal  requirements.   Designate  intelligence  liaison  officers,  accountable  to  District  Commanders,  from  each   district  to  liaise  with  the  Intelligence  Unit.   Develop  a  policy  to  effec<vely  gather,  record,  submit,  and  disseminate  intelligence   throughout  the  Department  based  on  a  “customer  service”  model.   Market  the  Intelligence  Unit  throughout  the  agency  as  a  responsive  and  proac<ve  Unit  with   an  emphasis  on  crime  types  and  providing  informa<on  to  districts  for  follow-­‐up.   Share  Intelligence  Unit  gang  exper<se  as  a  resource  mul<plier,  expanding  it  into  districts   through  the  training  of  district  personnel.   Ensure  that  the  Intelligence  Unit  understands  its  role  in  special  events.   Conduct  a  needs  assessment  with  all  agency  personnel  assigned  to  planning  special  events     to  ensure  that  the  Intelligence  Unit  is  capable  of  mee<ng  all  guidelines  as  set  by  policy.   Develop  a  policy  describing  the  roles  and  responsibili<es  of  the  Intelligence  Unit,  Fusion   Center,  and  Real  Time  Crime  Centers.     Re-­‐assign  the  phone  subpoena  task  to  appropriate  districts  or  inves<ga<ve  sec<ons.  

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   The  Intelligence  Func2on  (Con2nued)   •  • 

Develop  policy  to  ensure  that  inves<gators  are  properly  trained  and  supervised  to  ensure   adequate  telephonic  surveillance  safeguards.   Forward  a  copy  of  all  phone  records  and  suppor<ng  documents  to  the  Intelligence  Unit  to   ensure  correct  procedures  are  followed.  

Administra2ve  and  Support  Services   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Ensure  that  the  selec<on  of  officers  for  special  schools  is  transparent  to  avoid  percep<ons  of   favori<sm.   Consider  training  trainers  in  modern  prac<ces  of  officer-­‐to-­‐youth  contact.   Consider  requiring  recruits  to  spend  <me  with  neighborhood  organiza<ons  and  in  ride-­‐alongs   with  marked  police  units  when  new  recruit  classes  are  hired.   Hire  a  civilian  Technology  and  Systems  Manager  to  oversee  the  en<re  informa<on   technology  area,  assigning  her/him  to  first  review  current  systems  projects  and  develop  a   Strategic  Plan  for  Technology.    Eliminate  the  Captain’s  posi<on  now  having  this  func<on.   Enforce  employee  compliance  with  technological  systems  usage  guidelines,  especially  those   over  punctuality.   Replace  sworn  personnel  assigned  to  technology  with  qualified  civilians  over  <me  and  where   appropriate.   Move  the  Fiscal  Sec<on  to  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Police.   Con<nue  to  ensure  that  funds  from  asset  forfeiture  are  used  prudently,  strategically,  and  in   compliance  with  federal  requirements.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Administra2ve  and  Support  Services  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Acquire  technology  to  move  employee  apendance  process  online.   Ensure  that  only  essen<al  personnel  are  indicated  on  arrest  slips.   Meet  with  key  judicial  officials  to  improve  u<liza<on  of  officers  schedules  to  subpoena   officers  on  their  working  days.   Work  with  courts  to  not  schedule  officers  on  first  call  cita<ons,  traffic  offenses,  and  specific   misdemeanors.   Review  schedules  in  top  Districts  and  hours  of  ac<ve  units  to  reduce  dead  <me.   Consider  flat  rate  for  court  appearance.   Eliminate  Dead  Time/Off  Day  provision.   Acquire  administra<ve  court  technology  to  lessen  burden  on  court  personnel  to  determine   officer  working  schedules.   Designate  regular  personnel  to  present  reports  on  first  call  cases  and  preliminary  hearings.   If  adopted,  u<lize  the  overlapping  schedule  from  the  4/10  plan  to  schedule  officers  for  later     court  start.     Develop  an  over<me  alloca<on  strategy,  providing  each  District  and  each  specialized  unit   with  an  alloca<on  of  the  over<me  provided  in  the  budget.   Hold  commanders  of  each  unit  accountable  for  staying  within  the  allocated  amounts  unless   given  explicit  approval  by  the  Chief  of  Police.   Instruct  commanders  to  consider  seasonal  demands  in  over<me  alloca<on.   Instruct  commanders  to  ensure  that  over<me  is  not  used  for  duplicate  work.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Assign  personnel  with  prior  CIRV  experience  in  leadership  posi<ons.   Establish  recommitment  of  the  Mayor,  City  Manager,  City  Council,  and  Chief  to  the  core   ideologies  of  focused  deterrence.   Determine  financial  commitment  from  City  for  costs  associated  with  CIRV.   Conduct  a  strategic  planning  sessions  for  all  CIRV  partners  once  leadership  personnel  are   selected.   Develop  a  new  communica<on  strategy.   Develop  a  comprehensive  violence  reduc<on  strategy  that  includes  domes<c  violence  and   violence  associated  with  open-­‐air  drug  markets    as  a  long-­‐term  goal.   Embed  focused  deterrence  /  problem  solving  approach  within  CPD   Increase  coopera<on  and  coordina<on  across  LE  Team  members   Increase  coordina<on  between  Real  Time  Crime  Center,  Intelligence  Sec<on,  Patrol  Districts,   and  CIRV  Team   Reestablish  CPD  Opera<onal  units  dedicated  to  CIRV  group/gang  opera<ons,  coordinated  by   Commanders  with  CIRV  knowledge/experience   Coordinate  direct  involvement  of  Intelligence  Sec<on  in  CIRV  Opera<ons   Re-­‐create  a  Services  Team  with  new  partners,  secure  funding  sources,  and  a  commitment  to   evidence-­‐based  prac<ces.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Addressing  Crime  and  Disorder  (Con2nued)   •  • 

Iden<fy  new  community  engagement  tac<cs,  secure  funding  sources,  commitment  to   evidence-­‐based  prac<ces,  and  established  commitments  to  data  collec<on  and  evalua<on   processes  among  the  Community  Team.   Task  one  unit  with  data  collec<on,  analysis,  and  other  associated  documenta<on  tasks;   ensure  that  it  possesses  all  necessary  data  and  resources  and  works  alongside  the  University   of  Cincinna<  research  team.  

Managing  Performance   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

Develop  a  robust,  real-­‐<me  system  for  collec<ng  the  type  of  data  that  serves  as  the  basis  for   performance  management  and  is  available  to  impacted  managers.   Involve  Crime  Analysis  and  Problem-­‐oriented  staff  in  the  performance  management  process.   Ini<ate  morning  crime  sta<s<cs  mee<ngs  with  District  Commanders,  Inves<ga<ve   Commanders,  unit  heads,  and  the  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Neighborhood  Policing  and   Inves<ga<ons  to  review  crime  status  for  the  previous  24  hours.   Assign  the  Informa<on  Technology  Unit  to  issue  a  daily  crime  report  in  support  of  morning   crime  sta<s<cs  mee<ngs.   Create  a  CompStat  room  to  hold  performance  management  mee<ngs.   Reform  the  lay-­‐out  and  order  of  CompState  sessions  in  the  manner  described  on  113.   Schedule  districts  for  intensive  CompStat  reviews  on  a  rota<ng  basis.   Schedule  other  units  for  such  reviews  on  a  less  frequent  basis.   Rename  the  Administra<ve  Services  Bureau  to  the  “Professional  Standards  Bureau.”  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Managing  Performance  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 

•  • 

Relocate  Planning  and  Development  to  the  Resource  Management  Bureau.   Transfer  the  policy  and  procedure  func<on  into  the  Inspec<ons  Unit.   Relocate  the  Professional  Standards  Bureau  into  the  Training  Sec<on.   Con<nue  affilia<on  with  the  Commission  on  Accredita<on  for  Law  Enforcement  Agencies   (CALEA).   Emphasize  CALEA’s  role  as  a  management  tool  for  con<nuous  improvement,  not  a  process   that  is  a  subs<tute  for  robust  leadership.   Develop  an  electronic  method  of  document  gathering  to  demonstrate  proofs  of  compliance   with  standards.   Ini<ate  a  comprehensive  review  of  all  reports,  analyses,  and  documented  reviews  to   ascertain  whether  they  properly  serve  the  agency  and  add  value.   Examine  the  review  of  specific  training  hours  characterized  as  mandatory  to  ensure   compliance  with  CALEA  standards  (no  CALEA  standard  requires  an  explicit  number  of  training   hours  to  demonstrate  compliance).   The  department  should  carefully  review  the  return  from  remaining  an  accredited  agency.    A   number  of  the  deficiencies  found  in  this  review  were  not  iden<fied  by  the  accredita<on   process,  and  probably  would  not  be.    That  raises  important  issues  regarding  the  value  of  the   accredita<on  process  for  Cincinna<.   Conduct  performance  evalua<on  appraisals  at  least  twice  per  year.   Ini<ate    a  review  of  the  performance  evalua<on  system  by  researching  the  approaches  of   similarly  situated  police  departments  and  current  innova<ons  in  the  industry  by  HR  experts.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

146  


Summary  of  Recommenda2ons   Managing  Performance  (Con2nued)   •  •  •  • 

Encourage  supervisors  to  have  quarterly  discussions  with  each  of  their  subordinates  about   performance.   Make  career  development  a  formal  part  of  performance  evalua<on.   Have  the  reviewer  play  a  more  significant  role  in  the  evalua<on  of  the  employee.   Provide  documenta<on  substan<a<ng  all  ra<ngs.  

Restructuring  and  Resourcing  the  Department   •  •  •  •  •  • 

Civilianize  some  sworn  posi<ons  and  move  officers  back  into  the  field  as  police  vacancies   occur  (See  Table  on  124  for  a  proposed  list  of  posi<ons  to  civilianize).   Transfer  some  officers  assigned  to  specialist  posi<ons  to  patrol  (See  Table  on  125  for  a  list ��of   proposed  specialist  transfers).   Restructure  the  Department  to  reflect  reduc<ons  in  specializa<on,  merged  like-­‐func<ons,   increased  staffing  available  to  District  commanders,  reduc<on  in  Bureaus  from  five  to  four.   Maintain  new  structure  as  “interim”  un<l  a  Bureau  Chief  re<res,  up  to  four  Captains  re<re,  or   up  to  five  Lieutenants  re<re.   Appoint  a  Chief  of  Staff  at  Captain’s  rank  for  the  Chief  of  Police  (the  Captain  will  be  selected   by  the  Chief  of  Police).   For  a  proposed  reorganiza<onal  chart,  see  131.  

Strategic  Policy  Partnership    

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Full CPD report