Tsunami and fukushima disaster design for reconstruction 1st edition rob roggema

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Rob Roggema · Wanglin Yan Editors

Tsunami and Fukushima Disaster: Design for Reconstruction

TsunamiandFukushimaDisaster:Design forReconstruction

RobRoggema • WanglinYan Editors

TsunamiandFukushima

Disaster:Design forReconstruction

Editors RobRoggema

FacultyofDesign,ArchitectureandBuilding

UniversityofTechnologySydney Ultimo,NSW

Australia

WanglinYan FacultyofEnvironmentandInformation Studies

KeioUniversity

Fujisawa,Kanagawa

Japan

ISBN978-3-319-56740-2ISBN978-3-319-56742-6(eBook) DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56742-6

LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017938123

© SpringerInternationalPublishingAG2017

Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart ofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations, recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmission orinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped.

Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthis publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfrom therelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.

Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthis bookarebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernorthe authorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinor foranyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardto jurisdictionalclaimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations.

Printedonacid-freepaper

ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbySpringerNature TheregisteredcompanyisSpringerInternationalPublishingAG Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland

Foreword

Itgivesmeimmensepleasuretowriteaforewordforthisbook.Thebooktargetsa veryimportantandrelevanttopicofdesigningrecovery.Sixyearshavepassedfrom theGreatEastJapanEarthquakeandTsunamiof2011.Differentlessonsarelearntin differentpartsoftheaffectedareas,however,thisbookispossiblyauniqueattempt inEnglishtodescribetherecoveryprocesswithspeci ficanddetailed fieldactivities. Communitybasedrecoveryprocesshasbecomepopularinrecentyears,andthere aredifferenttechniquesusedtoreceivecommunity’sviews,perceptionsandparticipationintherecoveryprocess.Thisbookexemplifiesdifferentdesigntechnology,whichisusedwiththeparticipationoflocalcommunitiestogettheirviewson thespatialissuesofrecovery.Thebookalsoillustratestheimportanceofblending localknowledgeandexternalexpertisetoreachaworkableandinnovativerecovery solution.Thethreekeylessonsindesigningrecoveryareacanbesummarizedas: flexibilityandopennessinlocalgovernancesystem,creatinganenvironmentand waytoincorporatecommunity’svoice,andappreciatingexternalexpertise.

Withinpastsixyears,wehavewitnessedseveralotherdisastersinJapan,aswellas indifferentpartsofAsiaandworld.The2013typhoonHaiyan(Yolanda)ofthe Philippineshasemphasizedtheneedofriskperceptionandappropriatecommunity actions.The2016Kumamotoearthquakehasshownustheimportanceoflesson sharingwithinJapanitself.Thelessonsanalyzedinthebookisnotonlyimportant withintheaffectedregioninTohoku,butalsocanbeappliedwidelyinotherpartsof Japan.Moreover,thebasicprinciplesofcommunityinvolvementinco-designrecovery processcanbeusedwidelyintheotherdisaster-hitareasinAsiaandtheworld.

Isincerelybelievethatthe fi ndingsofthebookwillbeusefulfortheresearchers, practitionersanddecisionmakers,andthisbookwillbeauniquereferencedocumentfordesigningfuturerecoveryprocess.Icongratulatetheeditorsforbringing outthisvaluablepieceofwork,andtoallcontributingauthorsfortheirdetailed analysisandimportant findings.

Prof.RajibShaw GradateSchoolofMediaandGovernance, KeioUniversity,ShonanFujisawaCampus(SFC)

Acknowledgements

Theeditorsofthisbookwouldliketoacknowledgethesupportforthedesign charrettesinMinamisomaandKesennuma,whichwasreceivedfromtheAustraliaJapanFoundation(AJF).Besidesthisessentialcontribution,theworkshopswould nothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupportofKEIOUniversityinJapan.

WanglinYanandRobRoggema

3TheLessonsDerivedfrom2011TohokuEarthquake andtheRepercussionoftheMyopic Decision-MakingStructures ................................

MisatoUeharaandWanglinYan

4GovernmentLedReconstructionActivitiesinFukushima withaSpecificFocusontheReconstructionSupporters Project:ImportanceofHumanRecovery

6PlanningandDesigninMinamisoma:Reborn, Rethink,Return

RobRoggema,LukeMiddletonandWanglinYan

7PlanningandDesigninKesennuma:Remember,Reconnect, Reform

WanglinYan,RobRoggemaandLukeMiddleton

8VisualisationofMinamisoma

RobRoggema,LukeMiddletonandWanglinYan 9VisualisationofKesennuma

RobRoggema,LukeMiddletonandWanglinYan

WanglinYanandRobRoggema

Chapter1 Introduction

RobRoggemaandWanglinYan

WheninMarch2011thetsunamihittheeastcoastofJapan,allthedisastermanuals wereinplace.Stilltheimpactwasdevastating.Hugewavesoverthrewevery coastalprotectionandcausedthemeltingofthenuclearpowerplantinFukushima. Withindaystheentireworldunderstoodtheseriousnessofthedisaster.The manualsjustcouldn’tcope.Manypeoplediedandthematerialdamagewashuge. The firstlearningthetsunamitaughtusisthatnotthemanualsforthe ‘when’ a disasteroccurswillpreventthepopulationfromitsimpact.No,itistheplanning anddesigningaheadofadisasterthatmightrelieftheimpactsofanaturaldisaster. However,planningaheadofproblemsseemstobeamostdiffi culttaskofplanners andgovernments.Theycannotrespondwithaplaniftheproblemisnotconcrete. Thedesignmustrespondtothe ‘asif ’ ofunforeseen,unprecedentedevents.

Evenafteradisastertakesplacethedesignofthefutureprovestobedifficult. The firstattentiongoes,naturally,tovictimsand firstaid.Butafterthe fi rstshock hasebbedawayplannersandgovernmentscanoftennotthinkofanythingmore thanrebuildingtheharmedsettlements.Thissecondstageofthedisasterrecoveryis oftenundertakenwithoutrealinvolvementofthepeoplelivingorreturningtothe area.Governmentsshowleadershipbyactingswiftlywithbig,visible,rebuilding plansinordertosatisfythepeople.Butarepeoplesatis fiedinthelongrun?Ordo they,intheend,opposethemeasuresthatdisruptthe,oftensubtle,environments

R.Roggema(&)

FacultyofDesign,ArchitectureandBuilding,UniversityofTechnologySydney, Ultimo,NSW,Australia

e-mail:rob.roggema@uts.edu.au

W.Yan

FacultyofEnvironmentandInformationStudies,KeioUniversity, Fujisawa,Kanagawa,Japan

e-mail:yan@sfc.keio.ac.jp

© SpringerInternationalPublishingAG2017

R.RoggemaandW.Yan(eds.), TsunamiandFukushimaDisaster: DesignforReconstruction,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56742-6_1

peopleusedtolivein?Forinstance,theproposaloftheJapanesefederalgovernmenttoimplementenormousdams,mostofthemover15minheight,couldcount onstrongresistanceacrosstheaffectedarea.

In2011,theSendairegionwassuddenlyconfrontedwithmultipleproblems.Not onlythedirectimpactsofthetsunamibeing floodingandradiation,butalsosecondaryimpactswerefeltdeeplyinthearea.Peopleneededtoleavetheirhomes, someofthemtemporarilyotherspermanently.Manypeople,especiallyfarmerslost theirjobsandcould,oncetheycouldreturn,notbeemployedintheiroldjobs. Tertiaryproblemsarosefromthis,suchasthefeelingofbeinguselessandtheloss ofprideontheareawheretheywereborn.

IntheleadoffofthetsunamidisasterinJapantheSendaiFrameworkfor DisasterRiskReductionwasdeveloped.Theframeworkpresentsaguidefor dealingwithandpreventingtheriskofadisaster.Whenanareasuffersfroma disasteritcanbeusedtoalleviatetheimpactsandrecover.TheaimoftheSendai frameworkisto ‘preventnewandreduceexistingdisasterriskthroughthe implementationofintegratedandinclusiveeconomic,structural,legal,social, health,cultural,educational,environmental,technological,politicalandinstitutionalmeasuresthatpreventandreducehazardexposureandvulnerabilitytodisaster,increasepreparednessforresponseandrecovery,andthusstrengthen resilience’ (UNISDR 2015).

Thefollowingprioritiesaresetoutintheframework:

1.Understandingofdisasterriskinallitsdimensionsofvulnerability,capacity, exposureofpersonsandassets,hazardcharacteristicsandtheenvironment.This isapledgefordatacollection,monitoringandassessingvulnerabilitiesand hazards;

2.Strengtheningdisasterriskgovernanceforprevention,mitigation,preparedness, response,recoveryandrehabilitationisneededtomanagedisasterrisk.This consistsofaclearvision,plans,competence,guidanceandcoordinationwithin andacrosssectors,aswellasparticipationofrelevantstakeholders;

3.Investingindisasterriskreductionforresiliencetoenhancetheeconomic, social,healthandculturalresilienceofpersons,communities,countriesandtheir assets,aswellastheenvironment.Theseinvestmentsarealsothedriversof innovation,growthandjobcreation;

4.Enhancingdisasterpreparednessforeffectiveresponse,andto “BuildBack Better ” inrecovery,rehabilitationandreconstruction.

OnthebasisoftheseprioritiestheSendaiframeworkidenti fiesguidingprinciples (seetextbox).Thefocusoftheseprinciplesisoninclusivenessandengagementof governments,stakeholdersand ‘allofsociety’ intheprocessofrecovery.Inpractice howeverthefocusoftenistotechnicallyrepairthedamage,suchastherealisation ofdamstocreateasafersituation.Theroleofcitizensisunderestimated,andisstill notgivenfullattention.Ifcitizensareinvolvedtheyareonlybroughtinaposition torespondtogovernmentpropositions.

GuidingprinciplesSendaiframework

• PrimaryresponsibilityofStatestopreventandreducedisasterrisk, includingthroughcooperation

• SharedresponsibilitybetweencentralGovernmentandnationalauthorities,sectorsandstakeholdersasappropriatetonationalcircumstances

• Protectionofpersonsandtheirassetswhilepromotingandprotectingall humanrightsincludingtherighttodevelopment

• Engagementfromallofsociety

• FullengagementofallStateinstitutionsofanexecutiveandlegislative natureatnationalandlocallevels

• Empowermentoflocalauthoritiesandcommunitiesthroughresources, incentivesanddecision-makingresponsibilitiesasappropriate

• Decision-makingtobeinclusiveandrisk-informedwhileusinga multi-hazardapproach

• Coherenceofdisasterriskreductionandsustainabledevelopmentpolicies, plans,practicesandmechanisms,acrossdifferentsectors

• Accountingoflocalandspecificcharacteristicsofdisasterriskswhen determiningmeasurestoreducerisk

• Addressingunderlyingriskfactorscost-effectivelythroughinvestment versusrelyingprimarilyonpost-disasterresponseandrecovery

• “BuildBackBetter ” forpreventingthecreationof,andreducingexisting, disasterrisk

• Thequalityofglobalpartnershipandinternationalcooperationtobe effective,meaningfulandstrong

• Supportfromdevelopedcountriesandpartnerstodevelopingcountriesto betailoredaccordingtoneedsandprioritiesasidentifiedbythem.

Wewanttointroduce fivestagesofrespondingtoadisaster:

1. Recover:Inthis firststagetheconcernisoftenimmediatecare,rescueandto providetemporaryhousingandamenities;

2. Repair:thesecondstageischaracterizedbytheresponse: ‘thisshouldnever happenagain’.Thereisastrongpushformakingtheprotectivesystems stronger,suchasthebuildingofdams;

3. Rebuild:thisthirdstageisconcernedwithbuildingbackwhatwasbefore.By rebuildingsimilarurbanenvironmentsinthesameareasthesamevulnerability isreintroduced.Theseareasmayevenbecomemorevulnerable,astheriskat climateimpactsincreasesandthepopulationinthesekindsorareasrises;

4. Resettle:thisfourthstageistoresettleinthearea,butnotinsimilarurban environmentsthatweretherebefore.Resettlingaimstoincreasetheresilience, creatinganurbansystemthatbetterbouncesbackafterimpactedbyadisaster;

5. Redesign:this fi fthstageaimstoredesigntheareatoanticipateapossible disasterandtheurbanenvironmentisnotvulnerableanymore.Thisrequiresa designofrethinkingthelandscape.Theunderlyinglandscapesystemwithits water,ecologicalandsoilsystemsform,togetherwiththeculturalhistoryofthe placethebasisforurbandesign.

Ineverydisasterareathis fivestagesshouldbeapplied.Oftentheintentionsof decision-makers,governmentsandplannersaregood,butinpracticetheattention forrecoveryoftheareadropswhenthe first2–3stagesareover.Weseethisasa dangeroussituationasitmeansthattheareawillberebuildinverysimilarwaysas itwasbeforethedisaster.Moreover,involvementofthelocalpopulationinthe planningprocessforfutureresilienceislimitedinthese fi rstphases.Onlywhen stages4–5aredeliberatelyandinalltheirbroadnessareexecuted,thetransformationofthearea,withinvolvementofthelocalpopulationasco-creatorsinthe planningprocesscanbefullyexploredandimplemented.

Inthisbooktwocasestudiesarecentral.TheredesignsofbothMinamisomaas Kesennumaareextensivelydiscussed,thecontentandevensotheprocess.Both prefectureshavebeendeeplyhitbythedisaster,eachwiththeirowntypicalimpact.

InMinamisoma floodingofpartsoftheareaformsaproblemincombination withhighradiationlevels.Thisdoublecomplexproblemhasbeentroubling plannersanddecision-makers.Manyinitiatives,plansandpolicydocumentshave beenwrittenaboutMinamisoma.Manyprojectshavebeenproposedandtriedfrom public,privateaswellascitizengroups.

ThemainreasonforredesigningtheareaofMinamisomawasthelackofpride theoriginalinhabitantsoftheareahad.Asimplerebuildingprocessisthereforetoo simple.Itundoubtedlywouldprovidethenewhousesforpeople,andwouldeven arrangearegeneratedagriculturalsystem,buttheprideofthepeoplewouldnot return.Thesituationaskedforrethinkingthegenesoftheareaandthesewerefound intheculturalhistoricdimensionandthestrongrelationshipMinamisomaderives fromthehorsefestival.Thisformedthekeytolettheareabereborn.Re-instalment ofthehorsefestival,thehorsekeepingandextendingthehorseracewithadditional activitiescouldregaintheprideofthepeople,fromwhichthepeoplecouldstart theirlivesandactivitiesagain.Thismadeitpossibleforthepeopletoreturntotheir homeground.Thereforethemottoofthisredesignis ‘Rethink-Reborn-Return’ .

InKesennumatheimpactofthedisasterismainlyaninundatedarea.Thishas causedreplacementofpeopletohighergroundsintemporarybuildings,butitis uncertainwhetherpeopleevercouldreturntotheareaoftheirwashedawayhomes. TherearenumerousinitiativesandplansmadeforKesennuma.

ThereasonfortheredesignofKesennumawasthehugedevastatingimpactof the floodasresultofthetsunami.Ahugewave floodedtheareaandinundateda largepart.Manypeoplediedorweredisplaced.Thelowerarea,closetotheseawas washedawayandtheurbansettlementthatusedtobetherecouldnotberebuild. Thelinkageswithhistoricculturewerecutoff,almostliterallybythewater. Asimplerelocationofpeople,providingthemwithpermanenthousingistherefore notenough.Thepeopledeservetheirrebuilttownisembeddedinitshistoric

context.Onlyrecognitionofthedisastermakesitpossibletodealwithit.Therefore theredesign firstlyfocusedonremembering,notonlywhathappenedrecently,but alsowhatthestoriesreflectinghistorycouldtell.Theseaspectsofrecentandpast historyarerelevantnotonlytorememberthembutalsotoreconnectthepeople withtheirenvironment.Thismentalreconnectionissupplementedwithconcrete andphysicalconnections,betweenthemountainsandthesea,throughtherivers andotherinfrastructure.Thisreconnectionthenmadeitpossibletoreformthearea anddesignafutureforatransformedcoastalzoneandatransformedhinterland. Themottoforthisredesignistherefore: ‘Remember-Reconnect-Reform’ .

Thecommonissueinreconstructionofthedevastatedregionsishowto accommodatetheideasandplansfromvarioussourcesandbridgegovernmental departments,ndustrialsectionsandcitizengroupstoworktogether.Landscape planningandcitizenparticipationinthedesignprocessformaneffectiveplatform toaccommodatethoseinitiativesandprojectsinaspatialway.

Theappliedapproachinbothdesignprocessesisthedesigncharrette.This intensivewayofdesigningtogetherwithinhabitantsandstakeholders,withdesign expertsandacademicsallowsforlocalpeopletobeinvolvedinthedesignconception.Thisformofco-designholdsthepromiseofintegratedandsupported designs.Peoplefeelattachedtotheoutcomesandwillsupporttheimplementation oftheplans.Especiallyindisasterstruckareasitgivespeoplealsothemental supporttore-attachtotheirarea,whichgavethemtraumaticexperiencesbefore.

ThisbooksstartswithchaptertwoinwhichMisatoUeharadescribesthetsunami disasterandtheimpactthishadonthelandscapeintheregion.Thischapteris followedchapterthreeinwhichRioSakuraidigsintothegovernmentactivitiesand theimportanceofhumanrecovery.InchapterfourRoggemaandYandescribethe designprocessappliedfortheredesignsinMinamisomaandKesennuma.The designpropositionsforeachoftheseregionsdescribedindetailinchapter fi veand sixrespectively.Chaptersevenandeightcontainavisualstoryofthetwodesign processesinMinamisomaandKesennumarespectivelyandchapterninedraws conclusions,makesrecommendationsandpresentsanoutlookforplanningand designindisasterareas.

Chapter2

Post-3.11Reconstruction, anUneasyMission

WanglinYanandRobRoggema

2.1Introduction

SixyearshaveelapsedsincetheGreatEastJapanEarthquakestruckthecountry’s Tohokuregionon11March2011.Avarietyofprojectsareunderwayforthe reconstructionofthedisaster-affectedarea.Thegovernmentdeclaredthe five-year periodfrom2011untiltheendofMarch2016astheintensivereconstruction period,andispouringconsiderableeffortintothepillarsofitsreconstruction efforts,includingsupportforsurvivors,restorationofpublicinfrastructure,housing reconstructionandcommunitydevelopment,revivingindustryandlivelihoods, revitalizingandreconstructingFukushimaandcreationofa “NewTohoku” (http:// www.reconstruction.go.jp/en glish/topics/Progress_to_date/pdf/201608_process_ and_prospects.pdf ).Overthecourseof fi veyears,expendituresincluded10 trillionyenforhousingre constructionandcommunity development,4.1trillion yenforrevivingindustryandlivelihoo ds,2.1trillionyenforhealthandliving supportforsurvivors,and1.6trillionfor reconstructionandrevitalizationfrom thenuclearaccident.The rebuildingofhousesandre constructionoftownsand communitiesisbeingadvancedthroughthreeapproaches:independentreconstructionofhousing,grouprelocationfo rdisasterprevention,anddisasterpublic housingimprovement.AsofJanuary2016,49%oftheapproximately30,000 unitsdisaster-resilientpub lichousingwerecompleted,32%oftheapproximately 20,400unitsofnewhousingbyindependentreconstructionwerecompleted,and

W.Yan(&)

FacultyofEnvironmentandInformationStudies,KeioUniversity, Fujisawa,Kanagawa,Japan

e-mail:yan@sfc.keio.ac.jp

R.Roggema

FacultyofDesign,ArchitectureandBuilding,UniversityofTechnologySydney, Ultimo,NSW,Australia

e-mail:rob.roggema@uts.edu.au

© SpringerInternationalPublishingAG2017

R.RoggemaandW.Yan(eds.), TsunamiandFukushimaDisaster: DesignforReconstruction,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56742-6_2

restorationof2308schoolswasfor98%completed.Socialinfrastructureand seawallreconstructionwasfor25%completed,nationalroadreconstructionfor 99%,andrailwayreconstructionfor93%.Inindustry,74%offarmlandcouldbe planted, fi shingportreconstructionwasat73 %,andaquaculturefacilitieswere 93%backinoperation(Re constructionAgency 2016 ).

Thesestatisticsshowasteadyprogressinthereconstructionprocess.However, thedelayinindustrialandcommunityrecoverycomparedtopublicinfrastructure progressisaconcern.Evenbeforethedisaster,theregionalreadyhadissueswitha decliningpopulation,theagingofsociety,andthehollowingofindustry.Through thereconstructionthegovernmentwantedtouseFukushimaasamodelforthe revitalizationofJapan.However,thereisalargegapbetweenidealandreality.After fiveyears,182,000peoplewerestilllivingintemporaryhousing.Thepopulationof 42municipalitiesinthethreeTohokuprefecturesstruckbythedisasterhaddeclined byanaverageof10%,reachingtheprojectednumbersofpopulationlevelsfor2030 15yearsearly.Japanhadseena140%increaseintouristsnationallyover fi veyears, whilethethreeprefectureshadonlyreached70%oftheirpre-disasterlevels.

Also,theFukushimanuclearaccidentleftsomeseriouschallengesforreconstruction.Apreconditionforreconstructionistheclean-upofthenuclearaccident, butthereisnoendinsightforremovaloffuelrods,the finaldisposalofthe reactors,anddisposalofcontaminatedwater,etc.Asurveyundercitizensof MinamisomaCityinSeptember2015foundthattheystillhadprofoundconcerns aboutthefuture,with30%respondingthattheywouldliketoliveoutsidethe district,city,andprefecture.

Thisdisastermadepeopleawareofthemultiplethreatsofearthquakes,tsunamis andnuclearaccidents.Itisnotpossibletopreventadisasterinthecontextofthe complexityofnature,althoughwithproperapproaches,itispossibletolimitthe extentofdamage.Disastercountermeasuresrequireaneffortnotonlyintodisaster preventionbutalsodisasterreduction.Inotherwords,thingsshouldbedoneina waythat,evenifadisasteroccurs,recoverycanbequickly,andsocietycan recuperateassoonaspossible.Thisiscalledthe “resilience” approach.Afterthe disaster,thegovernmentreleasedits “ResilienceJapan” conceptandin2012passed theBasicActforNationalResilienceContributingtoPreventingandMitigating DisastersforDevelopingResilienceintheLivesoftheCitizenry(www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp).Baseduponthelegislation,thenational,prefectural,and municipalgovernmentsbasicplansforresiliencehavetobeformulated.However, thelegislationappearstoemphasizedisastercountermeasuresformega-quakesin theNankaiTroughandEastNankaiTrough,andnospecialconsiderationhasbeen giventoreconstructionoftheTohokuregion.ForsurvivorsoftheGreatEastJapan Earthquake,theirgreatesthopeistoescapeassoonaspossiblefromthe post-disasterdisruptionsandtoreturntoanewnormallife.Thisrestorationand recoveryisanotheraspectofresilience.

Researchregardingresiliencebeganinthe1970s(Holling 1973),andtodayis seenasanessentialfactorforsustainablesociety(ZolliandHealy 2012).Resilience hastwodimensions:resistancetodisaster,andtheabilitytorecover.Bothofthese arecapacitiesthatneedtobedevelopedforacountry,region,organization,or

system.Inotherwords, fi rstdiscovervulnerabilitiesforchangesfromtheexternal environment,secondlybuildresistance,andthenevenifanincidentoccurs,the abilitytoabsorbthedisruptionexistsandlimitsthedamage.Afterthisadaptto environmentalchange,andtransformtoabettersituation.Whenthisisappliedto disastersandreconstruction,thisthinkingmeanspreparingwellduringnormal timesfortheadaptationtodisasterrisk,absorbingtheshockwhenadisasteroccurs, thenreconstructquicklyandmakeanefforttobestrongerthanbeforethedisaster. Thisapproachofabsorbing,adapting,transforming,andthinkingaboutchangeand transformationiscalled “resiliencethinking” (WalkerandSalt 2006).

Adisasterisnotdesirable,butiftheformersystemisdamagedbyadisaster,the subsequentreconstructionpresentsopportunitiestobuildandincreaseresilience. However,restorationandrecoverymeanstakingactionandtheyappearasavariety ofshort-termprojectsafteradisaster.Thecapacitytorecoveristhecapacity,which isbuiltupfromsuchactions,andittakestimetobuildthiscapacity.Findinga balancebetweentheshort-termandlong-termisamajorchallengeinrecovering fromadisaster.Figure 2.1 summarizestheseconcepts.

Inthe figure,theverticalaxisrepresentsthelivingconditions(qualityoflife),the horizontalaxisrepresentstime,andtheblackdotshowsthelivingconditionsof survivors.Ifthedisasterissevere,thedeclineinlivingconditionsissignificant. Therearevariousbarriersonthepathtogetoutofthatsituation,andtheapproach togettherewilldependonthevisionforreconstruction.Fromthisobservationwe canextractfourkeyconcepts:

1.Thedisasteritself,

2.Thebarrierstoreconstruction, Fig.2.1 Resilienceapproachtoreconstruction(byauthor) 2Post-3.11Reconstruction,anUneasyMission9

3.Thereconstructionvision, 4.Thereconstructionapproach.

Ifthevisionisclear,projectsandrecoveryactivitiesareeasiertoexecute.However, therealityiscomplex.Iftheaimistocreatebetterconditionsthanbeforethe disaster(ReconstructionvisionA),thingswillnotgoaccordingtoexpectation unlesstheapproachiscommensurate.Itiscommontohearpeoplesay: ‘Weare makinganeffortbutwithoutresults’ and ‘Theideaisgoodbutnotpermittedbythe system’.Inotherwords,reconstructionisnotjustasimplematteroftechnology. Japanisamaturesocietybutdidnotestablishclearanswerstothefollowingkey questions:Whatisthenatureofthedisaster,whatshouldbetheaimsofreconstruction,andwhatapproachesarebest?

Withtheaimofcreatingthelocally-basedcapacitytorecover,thischapterlooks atthereconstructionfromtheperspectiveofresilience,presentsapproachesto promoteco-creativereconstructiontownplanning,basedonmanystakeholders workingtogether,andthenconsiderstheoutcomesandchallenges.

ThischapterdevelopstheconceptofresilientreconstructiondepictedinFig. 2.1 Section 2.2 coverscharacteristicsofthedisaster,Sect. 2.3 coversbarriersto reconstruction.Thisdiscussionlaysabasefortheco-creativereconstruction practiceinlaterchapters.

2.2CharacteristicsoftheGreatEastJapanEarthquake

Somepeoplesaythereconstructionafterthedisasterwasdelayed,butperhapsthe reconstructionplanwasmadewithtoomuchreferencetotheGreatHanshin Earthquake,alsoknownastheKobeEarthquake,whichoccurredJanuary17,1995. InthefaceoftheunprecedenteddisasterandunanticipatedconditionsoftheGreat EastJapanEarthquake,somesaytheJapaneseexperiencewasineffective.Inthe contextofreconstructionandcommunityplanning,itisimportanttounderstandthe characterofthedisaster.Itisalsoimportanttorecognisethatthedisasterconditions weredifferentinIwate,MiyagiandFukushimaprefectures,andthattherefore,one singleapproachtoreconstructionmaynotbethebest.

2.2.1MultipleDisastersfromEarthquake,Tsunami andNuclearAccident

TheGreatHanshinEarthquakewasanurbanearthquakeinadensely-populated region.Anearthquakedamageshouses,buildingsandstructures,andtherewillbe victimsiftheycollapse.Intheeventofanearthquake,thelocalsocialinfrastructure needtoberebuiltandlifestylesmustberestored.Theearthquakeandtsunamiofthe GreatEastJapanEarthquakewereofasizethatoccursonlyonceinathousand

2Post-3.11Reconstruction,anUneasyMission11

years.Survivorsofthetsunamineededtochoosebetweenmovingawayor returningtoliveintheoriginallow-lyingarea.Afterthedisaster,manyofthem wantedtomovetohighergroundtoavoidanyfuturetsunami.Thegovernmentand researchersencouragedareconstructionmodel,whichseparatesemploymentand settlements,withemploymentbeinglocatedinlow-lyingareasandhousingon higherland.However,itisalongprocess,whichtakestimeto findresettlement sites,developplans,preparetheurbaninfrastructure,andconstructhousing.The Sanrikucoasthasonlya fi niteamountof flatland,so findingresettlementsitesis notaneasytask.Also,tomake flatlandandlow-lyingareassafer,thegroundlevel ofthetownmustberaised.Forthelandtosettle,ittakesalsotime.Meanwhile, areasaffectedbythenuclearaccidentfaceanotherlevelofdifficulty.Thepolicies differforaradiusof10,20,and30km.Inplaceswheregovernmentfunctionshave movedaway,therearestillnoprospectsforrestoringthem.Decontaminationwork isalsonotmakingprogress,soitisstilldifficulttomakeanyprojections.

Ifthechallengewasonlytodealwithearthquakes,considerableexperience existstobuildseismicallyrobustdesignsforbuildingsandstructures.However,as inthiscaseofmultipledisasters,normalassumptionsmaynotbereliable.Whatis truesafety,andwhatispracticality?Itisattractivetolivenearthecoast,but tsunamisareamajorrisk.Higherlandissafer,buttheremaybenotenoughwork. Atowncanbebetterprotectediftheseawalllevelisraised,butsomepeoplefeel uncomfortablewhentheycannotviewthesea.Peoplethoughtnuclearpowerwasa cleanandconvenientenergysource,butitturnedoutnottobeso.Thisdisaster resultedinprofoundanxietywithresidents,anditwilltaketimeandeffortto alleviatethatanxiety.

2.2.2DamagetoaRegionwithaDecliningPopulation, anAgingSociety,andaWeakIndustrialBase

ThesixprefecturesintheTohokuregionaccountfor17.7%ofJapan’slandarea and7.1%ofthepopulation,butitcountsforonly6.0%ofthegrossdomestic product,orGDP(METI 2011).Intermsofindustry,theSanrikucoastalregionhas fisheryproductprocessingandshipbuilding(fishingboats),butnotenoughmanufacturing,knowledge,andserviceindustriesthatattractyoungpeople.Theresidentsheregenerallywerelivingaself-sufficientlifeneartheseabycultivating oysters,scallops,ascidians(seasquirts)and wakame seaweed,whileonlandthey grewrice.Butthischangedwithindustrialisationandurbanisation.Aftertheperiod ofrapideconomicgrowthinthetwentiethcentury,thepopulationintheSanriku regionwassteadilydeclining.Manytownsweredealingalowbirthrateandan agingpopulation,andfacingtough fi scalchallenges.Thedisasterwasacatastrophicshock,lifting fi shingboatsanddroppingtheminland,inundating fishing ports,andsmashingseawalls.Muchoftheinfrastructurehasbeenrebuilt,including roadsand fishingports,butworkersarenotreturning.Youngpeopleareless

interestedin fishingandfarming.Thereareconcernsthatinfrastructure,whichwas restoredwithbigeffortsmayenduptobeusedverylittle.Reconstructionmustnot onlymeanrestoringfacilities,butasustainedsocio-economiccapacityshouldalso beinstalled.

2.2.3DisasterinaTimeofUncertainEconomicFuture

Thedisasteroccurredaftertheglobal financialcrisisof2008,whentheglobal economywasstillunstable.Thedisasterinterruptedsupplychains,andmany expertsbelieveditwouldhaveanegativeimpactontheglobaleconomy. Meanwhile,somehadtheviewthatspecialdemanddrivenbyreconstructionwould acceleratetheeconomicrecovery.Thedisasterresultedinenormouslosses,as muchas16–22trillionyen,butitwasalsoseenasanopportunity,withtheconcentrationofaconsiderableamountofmoneyfrom financialgovernmentassistance,privatesectorcasualtyinsurance,publicdonations,andsoon.Thepastfew yearshaveevenbeenreferredtoasareconstructionbubbleinthedisaster-affected area.Thereisnoclearsocialconsensus,however,onwhereandhowtheseenormoussumsofreconstructionfundsshouldbespent.Somehaveexpressedtheview thateconomicefficiencyshouldbeimproved,byusingreconstructionasan opportunitytoselect,concentrate,andplacebothindustryandthelabourforcein largecitiesandindustrialclusters.Ifthisapproachischosen,itwouldmean abandoning fishingvillagesandsmallsettlements.Certainly,concentrationcan boostefficiency.Butwhenitcomestohumanbeings,effi ciencyisnottheonly desirablefactortoconsider.Modernisationisbasedontheeconomicsystem.But theadverseeffectsoftheearthquakedisasterrevealedweaknesses.Concentration dependsonheavyandlarge-scalesocialinfrastructure,andproduction,transport, andconsumptioncreatesenormousemissionsofgases,wastewater,andwaste,with negativeimpactsonthelocalandglobalenvironmentanddeleteriouseffectson sustainabilityofsocietyasawhole.Butsustainabilityofsocietydoesnotmean prosperityforjustoneareaofconcentrationorabundanceforjustonesegmentof thepopulation.Also,duetoitssteepterrains,theSanrikucoastisperhapsnotsuited tobeasocietythatprioritisesefficiency.Inthisregion,reconstructionusingthe conventionalmodelthatprioritisesefficiencymightnotbethemostsustainableone.

2.2.4NaturalDisasterorMan-MadeDisaster?

Thisdisasterwasanearthquakethatstruckasanoverwhelmingexternalforce, whichtriggeredatsunami,andresultedinthelossofatremendousamountoflife andproperty.Thismadeitimpossibletooperatenuclearpowerplants,whichcould beconsideredadelicatesystemformodernsociety,resultinginenormouseconomiclossesandsocialdisruption.Theearthquakeandtsunamiwereunavoidable

2Post-3.11Reconstruction,anUneasyMission13

naturaldisasters,butthenuclearaccidentwasnotinevitable.Investigativereports andmassmediaportrayedthisaccidentashumanerrorandconcludedthatthiswas ahuman-causeddisaster(AsahiShimbun 2014).

Adisasterisanaturalandsocietalincident,andresultsinphysicalandhuman losses.Weknowthatnaturecanbeviolent,andthathumanscanmakemistakes. Thepotentialtobeexposedtoanundesirableincidentisknownasrisk.Butevenif thatriskisknown,itdoesnotmeanthatonecanimmediatelytakeevasiveaction. Wemakedecisionsinthemidstofconstraintsontime, finances,strength,and capacity.Governmentsimplementprojectsbasedonpolicy,andcorporations conductbusinessbasedon finance.Itisnotpossibletocompletelyeliminateall risksinonesweep.Itisnotpossibletopreventadisasterfromoccurringtomorrow. However,itispossibletoimagineavarietyofscenariosoccurringinday-to-daylife andtolimitlosses.Thatisthesignificanceofresiliencethinking.Disasterreduction requiresconsiderationofdisastercausesandeffects,andintegratedconsiderationof impactsonhumanactivitiesandthebehaviourofpeopleindisasters.Lossesthat occurwhenthesethingsareneglectedcouldbeallreferredtoasman-madeor human-causeddisaster.Seenfromthisperspective,thisearthquakedisasterwasnot onlythenuclearaccident,butitalsoincludedmanyelementsofhuman-caused disastersinmanydimensions.Theyaretoonumeroustomention,butsomeofthese are:thebuildingofprimaryandmiddleschoolsonlow-lyingland,thelackof evacuationroads,thefailureofcommunicationsandnotificationsystemstofunctionduringacrisis,andpeopleshouldnothavebeenlivingonlow-lyingland. Modernsocietyisbuiltuponfragilefoundationslikethis,andthisisattherootof human-causeddisasters(Beck 1992).Reconstructionmustre-launchitselffrom reflectionaboutthosethings,andestablisharesilientfutureorientedvision.

2.3ReconstructionChallenges

2.3.1ConfusedVisionsforReconstruction

Soonafterthedisaster,thenationalandlocalgovernmentsstartedtoformulate reconstructionplans.Attheendof2011,theaffectedprefecturesreleasedtheir respectivereconstructionplans.Allofthemportrayedabrightfuturewithtargets forlivelihoodrestoration,industrialreconstruction,safetyandsecurityandliveability.After fi veyearshavepassed,somestakeholdersaskediftheoriginalplans wereappropriate,andaskediftheyshouldbereconsidered(NHK 2015).Thebasic trendbeforethedisasterwasadecliningpopulation,butwillthereconstruction processbecapableofhaltingthattrend?AssuggestedbyFig. 2.1,whatshouldbe thedirectionofreconstruction,andhowfaralongthepathcanwecallitreconstruction?Theestablishmentofthisvisionisnoteasy.Theresultingpopulationand GDPmightbelowerthanbeforethedisaster.However,resilienceisnotjusta matterofquantity,butcanalsobeviewedassomethingthatshouldalsobe

measuredintermsofhumanhappinessandleveloflivingconditions.The ReconstructionAgencyregularlyissuesareportonreconstructionstatusand challenges,IwatePrefectureusesareconstructionINDEX,andMiyagiPrefecture issuesreconstructionreports.However,theyarestillnothingmorethanlistsof individualindicators,andhavenotreachedthepointofindicatingtheoverall directiontobeheaded.Westilltendtomeasureeconomicactivityintermsof GDP.Asteady-stateeconomyisasustainableeconomythatdoesnothaveGDP growthtargets(Daly 1974;YanandTajima 2013).Incontrastto “smartgrowth” thereisalsotheideaof “smartretreat” (ScienceCouncilofJapan 2011).However, steady-stateeconomicshasneverbeentestedforadecliningpopulation.

Inits AnnualReportontheJapaneseEconomyandPublicFinance2012,the yearafterthedisaster,Japan’sCabinetOfficediscussedthedisasterandhowthe economicsystemshouldbe(CabinetOffice 2012).Itraisedtheideaof ‘thequality ofdevelopment’ andassertedthathouseholds,corporationsandsocietyneedtobe moreawareof ‘tailrisks’ thathaveseriousimpactsbutlowprobabilityofoccurring, suchasearthquakesandglobal financialcrises,andthatitisnecessarytohave resilientlifestylefoundations,corporatemanagement,andaglobaleconomy. However,otherthanproposingtheuseofrenewableenergy,itmadeveryfew speci ficrecommendationsforbroadanddiversereconstructionofdisaster-affected areas.Nevertheless,itdidaskquestionsthatwerenotaskedatthetimeoftheKobe Earthquake.Shouldreconstructiongiveaprioritytoefficiencyintermsofthe traditionaleconomicsystem?Orshouldreconstructionemphasisethesustainability andqualityofsocietyandincreaseitsresilience.Ultimately,resiliencemeans respondingwiththecapacitytospare,andthatitisinitselfincompatiblewith efficiency.

The2011disasterremindedpeopleofthecommunityandhumanconnections andbondsintheTohokuregion.Intherestorationaswell,thereisatoneof thinkingaboutraisingthelevelofhappinessintermsofthelocalcommunity(a givencollectionofpeople)ratherthantheindividual(TohokuRegional AdvancementCentre 2012).However,anelevationofthelevelofhappinessis somethingthatisfosteredovertime.Itcannotbesynchronizedwithreconstruction targetsthatmustbeachievedinashortperiodoftime.Thequestionofhowtoclose thisgapisamajorissue.

2.3.2DeclineoftheCommunity

Whenitcomestorisk,humanstendtohaveastronginterestintheirsurrounding areaandwhattheycandirectlysee.Peoplewillpayattentiontofamilyhealth insuranceandemploymentinsurance,butitislesscommonforpeopletotake actionproactivelyregardingtherisksandfutureforthetownasawhole.Afterthe 2011disaster,helpinghandsarrivedfromaroundthecountry,andconnections spreadout,and ‘ResilienceJapan’ movedtheworld.Butthatwasduringabrief disasterutopiaperiod(Solnit 2010).Asthesituationsettleddown,peoplebecame

2Post-3.11Reconstruction,anUneasyMission15

moredistantfromtheactivities,andcommunicationdeclined.Therewasnot necessarilyabigopportunityforaninclusivediscussionaboutthepreferable directionofreconstruction.Also,discussionson “soft” (non-physical)dimensions, cultural,mediumandlong-termissuesdonoteasily fi ndtheirwaytothegovernment’s “menu” oftopicstoaddress.

TheTohokuregionwasoriginallymadeupofhamletsandtownsinanenvironmentcharacterizedbyariacoast,acoastlinewithmultipleparallelinletsseparatedbyprominentridgesextendinginland,andwithahighleveloflocal self-sufficiency.Anumberofhamletswerecombinedtobecometowns,whichthe fishermen,craftsmen,andfarmersshared.Theindividualhamletshadtheirown fire brigades, floodbrigades,youthassociations,chambersofcommerce,housewives’ groups,andsoon,andcommunitieswerelivelywithactivity.AfterJapan’s post-warperiodofrapideconomicgrowth,youngpeopleleft,thelocalareashifted fromprimaryindustriestomanufacturingandserviceindustries,andorganizations likethiswithlocaltiestotheregiondissolved.

MunicipalgovernmentsaffectedbythedisasterinFukushimahavebeenfragmentedinamulti-layeredwayduetothetsunamiandnuclearaccident.Thedamage differeddependingonthearea.Theconditionsforreconstructioncoulddifferon oppositesidesofaroad,forexampleintermsoftsunami floodingriskzoneversusa housingrestrictedzone.Soitwasdifficultforpeoplecouldspeakwithonevoice.In otherplacestheissuesweredelayedinnucleardecontaminationwork,damageto brandreputation,oradeclineinemployment.Elsewhere,therecouldbeconcerns aboutfutureemploymentandhealth.Itwasnotraretoseefamiliesbetornapart,for example,withtheelderlymembersremaining,childrenbeingsentawaytoschool, andparentsgoingelsewheretowork(Zhangetal. 2014).

Inthiscontext,questionsarebeingaskedaboutwhatitmeanstoemphasisethe localcommunity,andwhatwillbecomeofthecommunityduetoreconstruction.

2.3.3Project-BasedReconstruction

Immediatelyafterthedisaster,thetalksaboutthereconstructionraisedexpectations,asevidencedbyslogans,suchas ‘Reconstructionisare-launchfromzero’ and ‘ThefutureofJapanwillstartinTohoku’.Theyearafterthedisaster,the governmentlaunchedtheReconstructionAgency,inanefforttoavoidtheadverse effectsofavertical-splinteredbureaucracy.However,therealitywasthatthe budgetswereformulatedbythetraditionalgovernmentstructure,withministry jurisdictions.Forexample,forhousereconstructionitwastheMinistryofLand, Infrastructure,TransportandTourismincharge,fordecontaminationtheMinistry oftheEnvironment,andforcareofsurvivors,theMinistryofHealth,Labourand Welfare.Eventhoughreconstructionandcommunityplanningrequiresanintegratedapproach,thebudgetswerestillisolated,onaproject-by-projectbasis.Asa result,gapsappearbetweenprojects(Akanuma 2014).

Whiletermslike ‘creativereconstruction’ wereusedbandiedabout,eachofthe projectstendedtofollowconventionalapproachesandnottakeinnovativesteps. Housereconstructionsimplyfollowedthestandardgovernmentapproachof public-manageddisasterreconstruction,andonlytheminimumstandardsofdisasterpreventiondesigncouldbeapplied.The fishingportprojectswerenothing morethan ‘restoration’ ofdamagedfacilities,andcoastalprojectstendedtobe nothingbutbuilding ‘seawalls’.Ideasthatshouldhavebeenconsidered,suchas ‘livelihoodrestoration’ , ‘industrialrecovery’,and ‘environmentalharmony’,didnot apply.Withthesekindsofproject-basedbudgetsandprojectstructureinmunicipal governments,theattentiongoestowardseekinghowtoacquirethebudgetand workproceedsintheusualway,withoutacompletepictureofthefuture.For example,everytownhasareconstructionplan,butineveryoneofthem,theroads, facilities,andhousesareplannedsimplyinabstractterms.Inmanycases,when objectivelyreviewedlater,peoplequestionwhetherthatapproachwasgood enough.Ifsomeoneweretoraisequestionsabouthowreconstructioncouldreflecta town’sidentity,theresourcesoftheland,orincorporatepeoples’ wishes,itwasrare tobeseriouslyconsidered.Instead,themunicipalgovernments,whichshouldspeak forthelocalpeople,wereunderthejurisdictionorauthorityofthenationalgovernmentortheprefecture,sotheydidnotwanttotakeresponsibility.Unlikethe modelthatpropelledJapanintoadevelopedcountryinpost-warreforms,amodel ofcreativereconstructiontoputJapanonthepathofsustainabledevelopmenthas notyetbeenfound(Mikuriya 2016).

2.3.4RolesofGovernment,PrivateSectorandCitizens

Thedisasterdamagednaturalandsocietalsystems,sorestorationhastobedone basedonnewenvironmentalconditions.Forrestorationandreconstructionafterthe disaster,differentthingsareneededdependingonthephase.Torespondtothis situation,newinformationandmethodsareneeded.Whenpeopleareaskedwhat changedinTohokuwiththedisaster,manywillsaythatitwasthe flowofpeople andinformation.Afterthedisaster,civicparticipationwasactiveineverytown. Non-profi torganisationsanduniversitystudents flowedintotheregion,and experiencedthedisastertogetherwiththepeople,spokeabouthopesforreconstructionandpreparedplans.Thegovernment,aswell,paidattentionnotonlyto hardware,thephysicalconstruction,butalsotosoftware.About20%ofthe reconstructionfundsfor ‘NewTohoku’ wereallocatedtonon-physicalprojects. Themajorityofthosefundswereallocatedtoreconstructionprojectsdoneby citizensandNPO(Non-Pro fitOrganisation)stakeholders.Theprojectscovereda broadrangesofareas,suchasrenewableenergy,careforpeoplelivingintemporary housingandtourismpromotion.Inresponse,manysmallandmedium-sized organisationsstarted,includingNPO’sandgeneralincorporatedassociations,atype ofgovernmentdesignationforregisteredorganisations.Immediatelyafterthe

2Post-3.11Reconstruction,anUneasyMission17

disaster,privatesectorcorporationswerealsohighlyvisibleandcompaniesaround thecountryshowedtheirdesiretoparticipateinreconstructionprojects.

However,itshouldbenotedthattheexpectationsofcorporations,NPO’sand universitiesdifferfromeachother,soitisnotsosimpleforalltocometogetherina unifiedwayforacreativereconstruction.Afterthedisaster,awaveofhelpersand participantsrushedintotheareaandinsomecasesthelocalswereoverwhelmed. TheexternalNPO’s,universitiesandcorporationsdidnotadequatelygraspthe localneeds,andhadatendencytoimposetheirownideas.Inthatsituation,inIwate Prefecture,IwateUniversityplayedacentralroleandthegovernmentcreateda liaisonofficesandcontactpoints.InKesennumaCity(MiyagiPrefecture)aswell anduniversitiesplayedanactiverole.Fortyuniversitiesgotinvolved,createda networkandsupportedthereconstruction.NPO’sandgeneralassociationsalso playedaroleinprovidingintermediarysupport.However,asactivitiesshifted towardreconstruction,theneedsbecamemorediverse,makingitmoredifficultfor highqualityassistancetobeprovidedbypeopleservingasvolunteers.Atthisstage ofreconstruction,itisimportanttohaveframeworksinplacethatcancoordinate internalandexternalcollaboration.

2.4Conclusions

TheGreatEastJapanEarthquakeof2011wasamultipledisasterthatoccurredin themidstofacomplexdomesticandinternationalsituation.Forreconstructionitis necessarytoprovideurgentassistancesothatsurvivorscanquicklyfreethemselves fromtheconditionsofthedisaster,andalsotobalancethoseneedswithafuture planthatconsiderssustainability.Asapproachesforthat,weoftensee government-directedcitizen-participationmodels,butintheraceagainsttime, reconstructionoftendoesnotadvancethewaypeoplemayhaveexpected. Meanwhile,withthereconstructionofthe2011disaster,manyexpertswentintothe localareaandcooperatingonreconstructionwithdiversestakeholders,including universities,governments,citizens,andcompanies.Insuchacontext,thegovernment,citizens,andexperts,thoughttogetheraboutthefuture,withoutdistinction orhierarchy,andfromthatsituationthepotentialwasinitiatedforplansanddesign. Thischapterreferstothatapproachas ‘co-creativereconstructionandcommunity planning’.InthischaptertheauthorsdescribetheirexperiencesofhavingparticipatedinsuchprocessesinMinamisomaCityandKesennumaCity,andexplainthe detailsoftheseapproaches.

References

Akanuma.2014.Fourbarriers,Tokeiren,Aug2014(inJapanese). AsahiShimbun.2014.Yoshidareport. http://www.asahi.com/special/yoshida_report/ .Lastaccess date24Apr2016(inJapanese).

Beck,U.1992. Risksociety:Towardsanewmordernity.London,ThousandOaks,NewDelhi:Sage Publications.Retrievedfrom http://www.amazon.com/Risk-Society-Modernity-Publishedassociation/dp/0803983468.

CabinetOffice,GovernmentofJapan.2012. http://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je12/h02_03.html Lastaccessed24Jan2017(inJapanese).

Daly,H.1974.Theeconomicsofthesteadystate. TheAmericanEconomicReview 64(2):15–21. Holling,C.S.1973.Resilienceandstability. AnnualReviewofEcologicalSystems 4:1–23. METI.2011.TohokuTodaybyData. http://www.tohoku.meti.go.jp/kids/databook/ .Lastaccess date24Apr2016(inJapanese).

Mikuriya.2016.ThinkingaboutJapanfromPost-wartoPost-disaster,Nihonkeizaisinbun,10Mar 2016. http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO97981080T00C16A3000000/.Lastaccessdate 24Apr2016(inJapanese).

NHK.2015.What’sneededinthe5thyearofreconstruction,KaisetsuStudio,21Mar2015. ReconstructionAgency.2016.TheStatusquoofreconstructionandprospects,Mar2016. http:// www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-1/160315_mitinoritomitoshi.pdf.Lastaccess date24Apr2016(inJapanese).

ScienceCouncilofJapan.2011.Strategiesforsustainablerevitalisationofthenationandregions. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/pdf/kohyo-21-t133-1.pdf .Lastaccessdate24Apr2016(in Japanese).

Solnit,R.2010. Aparadisebuiltinhell:Theextraordinarycommunitiesthatariseindisaster Penguin.Retrievedfrom http://www.amazon.co .jp/Paradise-Built-He ll-ExtraordinaryCommunities-ebook/dp/B003X QEVLM/ref=sr_1_4?ie=U TF8&qid=1447652705&sr=8-4& keywords=rebecca+solnit

TohokuRegionalAdvancementCentre.2012.ReportonthequalificationofHappiness. http://www.kasseiken.jp/pdf/library/guide/24fy-0601.pdf .Lastaccessdate24Apr2016(in Japanese).

Walker,B.,andD.Salt.2006. Resiliencethinking:Sustainingecosystemsandpeopleina changingworld.IslandPress.

Yan,W.,andH.Tajima.2013. TowardtheSustainableDevelopmentofAsi:Inperspectiveof Economy,SocietyandCulture,p.340.KeioUniversityPress.

Zhang,H.,W.Yan,A.Oba,andW.Zhang.2014.Radiation-drivenmigration:Thecaseof MinamisomaCity,Fukushima,Japan,aftertheFukushimaNuclearAccident. International JournalofEnvironmentalResearchandPublicHealth 11(9):9286–9305.doi:10.3390/ ijerph110909286

Zolli,N.,andA.M.Healy.2012. Resilience:Whythingsbounceback.HeadlineReview.

Chapter3

TheLessonsDerivedfrom2011Tohoku

EarthquakeandtheRepercussion oftheMyopicDecision-MakingStructures

MisatoUeharaandWanglinYan

Abstract Theholisticlanduseplanningprocessmightcontributetoreducetherisk ofnaturaldisasterandmitigateclimatechange.Thisalsoreduceshugenational budgetwasteforreconstructionandsocialcareafterdisasters.Theaimofthisstudy wastorevealthelessonsderivedfrom2011TohokuEarthquake,Tsunami,andthe Fukushimanuclearaccident.Thehistoryof2011Tohokudisasterarea’slanduse planningandactuallandusechangewasanalyzed.Thisfoundthatdestroyed developmentsby2011disasterhaveanessentiallysimilarissue;badrepercussions ofthemyopicdecisionmakingstructures.Itsuggeststhatholisticdecisionmaking withinteractivelanduseplanningprocessisimportant.

3.1Introduction

Themagnitude9.0TohokuEarthquakeoccurredat14:46on11March2011,in frontoftheeastcoastofJapan.Thepacificplatesub-ductionzonecausedthis earthquakeandthehuge(twototwentymeterhigh)tsunami.Thedestructive aftermathofthisnaturaldisasterleadtoanirreparablesituation.NotonlyforJapan, butalsoforthewholeworldwerehazardousandcausedanunexpectedtragedy becausethedamagesofthenuclearpowerplants.

Thehumandamagebythisdisasterwas15,889casualtiesand2594missing(asof9 July2015).Morethan400,000buildingsweredemolishedorpartiallydestroyed.

Later,itwasdiscoveredthattheseasideareasunkonemeterandthelandof Tohokuwaspulled5.3mintothePaci ficOcean.Moreover,theexplosionand

M.Uehara(&)

GraduateSchoolofScienceandTechnologyInaCampusLandscapePlanningLaboratory, ShinshuUniversity,Nagano,Japan

e-mail:ueharam@shinshu-u.ac.jp

W.Yan

FacultyofEnvironmentandInformationStudies,KeioUniversity, Fujisawa,Kanagawa,Japan

e-mail:yan@sfc.keio.ac.jp

© SpringerInternationalPublishingAG2017

R.RoggemaandW.Yan(eds.), TsunamiandFukushimaDisaster: DesignforReconstruction,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56742-6_3

demolitionoftheFukushimaDaiichiNuclearPowerPlantcausedradioactive contaminationinanareaaroundthepowerplant,withirreversibledamagestothe environment.

Thisnuclearaccidentimmediatelyfollowedtheearthquakeandtsunamidisaster. 400,000peoplehadtoleavetheirhometowntoanother,saferplaceasresultofthistriple disaster.TheInternationalNuclearEventScaleaddedthisnuclearpowerplantaccidentto theseverestlevel(rank7)ofnuclearaccidents,similartotheChernobyldisasterin1986.

MostoftheundertakenresearchoftheEastJapangreatearthquakeisaimingto discussfacts.Forexample,Fujiietal.(2011)andMaedaetal.(2011)reporteda tsunamiinitiatedwaveforminversionbyocean-bottompressureandGPSwave, whichcanobservethetsunamiseawaterlevelchange.Morietal.(2011)presented aregionaldependenceoftsunamicharacteristics.Somestudiesconsiderthe regionalplanningissue.Kanakoetal.triedtocomparesituationsofthelocal reconstructionplanningofTohokudisasterareaintheir fi rstyear.Matanle(2013) alsoindicatedamismatchbetweenthereconstructionplanningandregionalsituationofashrinkingpopulationandcommunityaging.Zare(2012)framedthe FukushimaDaiichinuclearplant’saccidentasadministrativecrisismanagementin hisanalysis.And fi nally,Takeuchietal.(2014)proposedtheconversionofregional planningfromengineeringtoecologicalresilience.

However,fewresearchershaveaddressedtheproblemofoverallconsiderationof whywasthisdisastersocruel.Infact,the analysisofman-madedisaster(spatial planningfailure)seemsinsufficiencywhilethisdisasterhasbothnaturalandsocial aspects.Thischaptertriestofocusonsomeofthelessonslearntfromtheman-made failureofthedisaster.

Thisanalysisbringsustwoimportantnotesfromtheviewpointofregional planning.The firstnoteisthatdecision-makershouldconsidernotonlydevelopmentarea,butalsosurroundingarea;inmanycases,developmentareaseems benefitsrecipient,surroundingareaseemspotentialdisadvantagerecipient.The secondnoteisthatthebenefitsandcostsofregionaldevelopmentshouldbeconsideredbeforedecision-making.

3.2WhatHappenedinFukushimaandtheTohoku2011 DisasterRegion,BeforeandShortAftertheDisaster

Figure 3.1 showsdifferencesofearlyinformation aboutradioactivecontaminationfrom FukushimaDaiichinuclearplantprovidedbyJapanandFrance.Unfortunately, Japaneseradioactivecontaminationpredictiondependedononlylineardistancefrom FukushimaDaiichinuclearplant:Japanesegovernmentofferedevacuationinstruction toresidentswholivewithin20kmfromFukushimaDaiichinuclearplant.Theyalso offeredshelteringindoorsinstructiontoresidentswholivewithin30km(Fig. 3.1 left).

However,theactualradioactivecontaminationcrossedoverthedivided administrativeboundariesbythelocalwindblowingatthetimeofthedisaster,as theFrancesimulation,IRSN(2011)shows(Fig. 3.1 right).

Fig.3.1 DifferenceofJapaneseandFrenchearlywarningaftertheaccidentinFukushimaDaiichi nuclearplant

Fukushima’snuclearradioactivediffusionteachesusthatthepotentialdisadvantagerecipientareaisnotcorrespondingwiththepowerplantdevelopedsite.In the1970sFukushimaandJapaneseGovernmentdecision-makers,andnuclear expertsdidnotconsiderthepossibilityofthepotentialdisasterdisadvantageoutside thenuclearplant-buildingsite.In1980–1990,thereweresomeassignmentsto reviewthepotentiallyriskofthenuclearplant-buildingplannedsitebylandscape architectsandanotherpublicsectors:NationalLandAgencyofJapan.

However,from1980to2010decision-makersandnuclearexpertsdidnotdeal withthepossibilityofthepotentialdisasterdisadvantagerecipient(area)outsideof thebene fitrecipienteither,becausethisadditionalreadjustmentrequiredalotof extramoneyandtime.

Figure 3.2 showsthedamagescausedbythetsunamiinTaro-cho,Iwate Prefecture,whichhadthelargestseawallinJapan.Theseseawallswerebuiltinall thecoastalareasinTohokuareaanddefendedthelandfromanassumedsmall tsunami,inordertomakepossibleformanypeopletoliveinthecoastalarea.This seawallgavetheTohokucoastalregionanadvantagecomparedtotheother,less protected,coastalregions.

However,housesbuildinthecoastalarea,whichwasprotectedbythehuge seawallwasdestroyedbythetsunamionMarch11(Fig. 3.3).Somepeopledidnot noticethetsunamidisasterbecauseofthehugeseawall,andsomewerekilledby theconcreteblockofbrokenseawallsameasalotofTohokucoastalmunicipalities. Whenanaturaldisasterexceedssuppositionoftsunamilevel,sameproblemswill occur,thoughthereconstructionofahigherseawallisnowadvancing.

Indeed,thedevelopercansellanumbersofthesebuildingestatesinshortperiod, onreclaimedeasytooccupy flatpartsofthecoast.Itseemsthattherewasahefty

10mhighseawallandcoastaltowndestroyedby2011tsunami

Fig.3.3 Formertsunamidisasterareawasdestroyedagainby2011tsunami,despitetheyhadthe largestseawallinJapan

profittakenbyaparticularkindofparty.However,boththebenefitandthecostsof regionaldevelopmentformanyinvolvedpartiesshouldbeconsideredbefore decision-making.Inthiscase,theshort-sightedbenefitistheeaseoflandacquisitionforthedeveloper,whiletheless-visiblecostsofresidentsandthegovernment werethelandvulnerabilityforearthquakesandtsunamidisaster.Itisnecessaryto considerbothelementsatthesametime.

Fig.3.2

3.3WhatHappenedinFukushimaandTohokuRegion After2011Disaster

Inadditiontowhatwediscussedabove,wewouldliketothinkaboutanew probleminthetsunamistrickenareaafter2011disaster.Figure 3.4 showsa landscapechangesimulationofa10mseawalldevelopmentplaninabeautiful fishingvillage(Karakuwa-cho,Shibitachi-chiku)inKesennumaCity,Miyagi Prefecture.Becauseofacomplicatedcoastallandform(riascoast)inthisarea,an extraordinaryhighseawallisplannedinthisareaaftertheTohokuearthquakeand tsunamidisaster.Thisvisualizationshowsthattheenvironmentofcontinentalareas andtheseaiscompletelydivided.Theseashoreenvironmentwilldisappearcompletelybecauseofthewidthandheightofthenewseawallhastobebiggerthan existeddesignstandards.Indeed,oldseawallbasementwasdestroyedby2001 tsunami,andtheseseawallscouldnotsaveabout15,000coastalpeoplelives.

Fig.3.4 Landscapechangepredictionofplanfora10mseawallafter2011disasterinabeautiful fishingvillage(Miyagiprefecture).Afterthissimulation,apartofseawallinthisareawasstopped byMiyagi-prefecture,forresident’sprotest