The Claremont Journal of International Relations Spring 2015

Volume III Issue II

the

CLAREMONT Journal of International Relations

Spring 2015

Editor-in-Chief Assistant Editor-in Chief

staff

Editors

Molly Hickey PZ ’17 Forrest Fulgenzi PZ ‘17 Amina Abdu PO ’18 Kate Dolgenos PO ‘17 Sam Fox PZ ‘14 Ethan Matlin PO ‘18 Carlisle Micallef PZ ‘18 Ross Steinberg PO ‘18 Aarushi Tibrewala CM ‘18 Aaron Yang CM ‘14

Publishers

Carlisle Micallef PZ ‘18 Molly Hickey PZ ‘17

Design by

Jaya Williams PZ ‘14

www.claremontjir.com Dear Reader, The Claremont Journal of International Relations is a student-run publication that strives to promote discourse and engagement on world affairs. The organization is designed to create a forum for students to exchange ideas and gain knowledge about the world around them, both through the publication of this journal and the hosting of events with scholars in the field. We hope to foster open discussion to bridge our academic studies with personal learning outside of the classroom.

Each article in The Claremont Journal of International Relations reflects the opinion of its author and does not represent The Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, its staff, or the Claremont Colleges.

Sincerely, & Molly Hickey and Forrest Fulgenzi

The Claremont Journal of International Relations If you have questions, comments, concerns, or would like to get involved, please contact claremontjir@gmail.com.

Sponsored by the Pitzer College Student Senate

page 6 Julian Jacobs | PZ ‘18 Two State Deception: How Tribalism Poisons the Palestinian Conflict

page 12 Joseph Eyen | PZ ‘15 Environmental Racism in the United Arab Emirates

page 18 David Leathers | CM ‘15 Photo Essay: A Quieter Corner of the Middle East

IN

page 24 David White | CM ‘18 Percieving Suffering: A Constructivist Approach to South Sudan

page 30 Zhijun Gao | CGU China and Japan’s Dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: An Analysis from a Game Theory Perspective

DEX

page 38

Leyth Swidan | PO ‘16 The Surge from Syria: Effects of Displaced Syrains on Jordanian Communities

6

Two State Deception: How Tribalism Poisons the Palestinian Conflict Julian Jacobs| Pitzer ‘18 Julian is a freshman at Pitzer College majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics” (PPE). He is a writer for The Student Life Newspaper and has published interviews with Noam Chomsky, Richard Wolff, Reza Aslan, and Derek Parfit. He is also a member of the Student Secular Alliance and is the founder of the Gross National Happiness Exchange Program between the U.S. and Bhutan, in which he taught political philosophy to four schools across the country for two summers.

The bombs are falling in Palestine. As the sounds of explosions form a heinous litany in Israel’s occupied territory, the obsession with a two state solution has rendered diplomatic efforts useless and littered the international system with the corpses of dead negotiation bills. While the Israel-Palestine conflict is one that centers on the growing division between two ethno-religious groups, each side is a victim of separate parts of the same two-headed monster: tribalism1. That is, a combination of ethnocentrism and right wing nationalism on both sides has created a binary that leaves moderates voiceless and peace impossible. Since 2000, this conflict has claimed the lives of over 9,000 Palestinians while the chants of extremism continue to grow louder (see figure below). Moreover, peace efforts have

never been operated through a reasonable paradigm, as the Israeli government has consistently failed to produce a reasonable policy in their dealings with the Palestinians. Instead, they have infected their supporters with hatred and fear and allowed the violence to become increasingly brutal and costly. Of course, this is all done while Israel poses as a victim exercising justifiable self-defense in order to promote the illusory two state solution. This itself is a means of propagating hatred and violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis, as the jargon of ‘two states for two peoples’ has created a landscape in which lasting peace is fundamentally impossible. Furthermore, it promotes an artificial ethnic division and the extremist-inducing brutalization of the Palestinian people, two toxic consequenc-

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

7 es that could make even genocide seem a reasonable surrogate for diplomacy in the future. As a result, it is imperative that the Israeli government fulfill its role as a responsible international power and work to promote a single state solution. While this contradicts the immediate interests of the country’s current conservative leadership, the unification of Israel and Palestine is the only possible resolution to what might soon be one hundred years of increasingly violent conflict.

A History of Violence Although the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu has gone to remarkable lengths to instill and promote hatred between the two sides of the conflict, it would be fallacious to claim that these feelings are entirely a Likud project; they have a long and violent history.

The Zionist movements of the 1920s and 1930s allowed over 300,000 Jews to immigrate into British Mandate Palestine (BBC, 2005). These efforts provoked violent clashes between the Palestinians and the emerging Israeli nation, as the former viewed this intrusion as British colonialism. It is essential to note that Jews and Arabs shared comparative peace with one another before the Zionist movement.

The subsequent ‘colonial’ effort orchestrated by British destroyed this, as the Royal Commission Council under Lord Peel was the first to propose a two state division between the Jewish people and the Palestinians (BBC, 2005).

Naturally, Palestine rejected this proposal in an attempt to protect its sovereignty; the result of this was Britain summarily crushing its opposition and continuing the immigration process at an even greater rate (BBC, 2005). While Palestine objected to Ashkenazi Jews entering their

land, they did not protest Mizrahi Jews.

That is, they accepted the Jewish people who had been living in the Middle East (including Palestine) for centuries and opposed those they considered to be European colonists. Regardless, it is important to understand that they opposed their immigrants not because they were Jewish, but because they were seemingly part of a British colonial project (PBS, 2001).

Therefore, it is no surprise that the infamous 1947 UN Resolution partitioning the Jews from the Muslim Arabs was met with intense opposition from the Palestinians. While conservatives might have you believe that the Palestine-Israel conflict has ancient roots, it is, on the contrary, the product of a comparatively recent division. Moreover, Ashkenazi Jews (those who were immigrating) are unable to trace their heritage back to the Middle East in the same way that Mizrahi Jews can. As a result, the displacement of thousands of Palestinians (who had lived there for centuries) can be viewed as an entirely unjust occurrence that lacked even the most basic historical justification.

Two States for “Two Peoples” If the immigration of Ashkenazi Jews to Palestine took the form of colonialism, at best it was a failed effort. That is, it did not

The jargon of ‘two states for two peoples’ has created a landscape in which lasting peace is fundamentally impossible.

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8 entirely displace the Palestinian people, but instead served to form rival nations under the slogan ‘two states for two peoples’. This sparked new attitudes within the region: both ethnic groups defined themselves by their contrast from one another, creating an inherently antagonistic relationship. Furthermore, the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and Palestine as an Arab Muslim state has emphasized the divide even further, so much so that each country’s identity is unequivocally tied a certain religion and ethnicity. The result of this is a scenario where the right wing nationalism that each side fosters is inexorably linked with racism and sentiments of ethnic superiority. Perhaps this is also why Israel apologists are swift to confuse anti-Israel (or even anti-Netanyahu) sentiments with anti-Semitism. This troublesome relationship is the reason I use tribalism and nationalism as synonymous terms when discussing this conflict; each side cannot seem to identify where their culture ends and their state begins.

A recent example can be found in the Israelis that gathered to applaud the bombs exploding in Gaza this summer (RT News, 2014). While their behavior caused no more than a stir in social media, these actions reflect their conservative government’s success in dehumanizing the Palestinian population and promoting tribalism in order to justify their occupation (and, of course, provide a rallying point for the Likud Party during elections).

While the Israeli government seems readily disposed to foster these feelings, the attitudes themselves are not a recent occurrence. On the contrary, when the United Nations voted in favor of establishing the state of Israel, with 13 out of 33 countries voting against and 10 abstaining, they were attempting to create the first Jewish

state in nearly 2,000 years (BBC, 2005).

That is, they were establishing a country in the image of a certain cultural identity, thereby tasking future generations of Israelis with filtering out what is not distinctly Jewish from their state. Such a debate is currently happening now, as the Likud party has attempted to pass legislation that would discriminate against minorities in Israel (especially the Arabs that make up 20% of the population) (BenDavid, 2014). Israel simply is unable to separate its cultural identity from its political one, making it a powerful nation easily swayed by racist ethnocentric agendas.

The need for a single state to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine is born out of the partition that the UN created in 1947. Since each side has been forced to identify itself with a specific ethnic and religious group, a continued divide in the form of two states would merely perpetuate the schism that already exists. Moreover, the nationalism that each state promotes would blend with ethno-religious pride and work to promote dangerous degrees of racism and tribalism. While opponents of a single state solution might claim that such a resolution would attempt to advance an impossible and unnatural organization, leading to more violence, I would argue the contrary. Rather, the 1947 partition of Israel and Palestine created a divide that should never have existed and has created a dangerous level of ethnic tension between neighboring communities. While nationalism may always exist so long as states do, it is imperative that political identity (something that can change) never be blended with ethno-religious identity (something that cannot change), as it has in the case of Israel and Palestine.

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

9 The Relationship Between Violence and Extremism The rampant and destructive tribalism in the Israel-Palestine conflict has a chance to become even more dangerous in the future, as the prolonged brutalization of a certain population has a historical tendency to induce violent extremism. For example, in the Soviet war in Afghanistan (which led to Al-Qaeda) and the more recent U.S.-Iraq War (which spawned ISIS), brutality and oppression against a specific group of people radicalizes them and ultimately helps to perpetuate violence.

This is a historical trend that Israel seems unaware of in its atrocious and misguided use of military force against the Palestinian people. If it truly intends on protecting its citizens and maintaining its sovereignty in the future, Israel needs to bind itself to Palestine as a single state or otherwise risk catastrophe.

Since, Israel has chosen to identify itself so closely with Judaism, its brutal and oppressive practices in Palestine have put (and will continue to put) other Jews at risk around the world. Following the 2014 episode of the Palestine-Israel conflict in the summer, anti-Semitism in Europe reached its highest point since the time of the Nazis, as the conflict has seemingly provided racists with a justification for their anti-Semitism. This has taken the form of hate crimes, school shootings, and racist protests (Henley 2014). While some might claim that this rise in anti-Semitism does not find its origin in Israel’s behavior in the Palestine conflict, several German cities saw protesters hold signs saying “Jew, coward pig, come out and fight alone,” and “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas” (Henley 2014). This can be seen as a casualty of having a state’s identity so inextricably linked with a single culture;

the faults of the government can easily be misinterpreted as the faults of the ethnic community.

With time and continued efforts to bring the two increasingly divided populations together, the distinctions between Israelis and Palestinians will cease to be relevant.

An End to the Schism While anti-Semitism rises in Europe, some polls assert that 70% of Palestinians favor a single state solution. This is an inconvenient truth for the conservative Israeli leadership, who has made it abundantly clear that they seek to uphold a distinctly “Jewish” state. However, the justification for their excessive use of military force is in their right to defend their people from militants. While few would contest this, Israel has not taken steps to pursue peaceful alternatives and support moderate Palestinians. Instead, the conservative Israeli government has opted to suppress their critics, such as Mads Gilbert, who was barred from working in a hospital in Palestine for criticizing Netanyahu (Shuttleworth, 2014). Moreover, the rhetoric they have utilized has centered on one highly illogical comparison: that Israel (a “responsible” government) is a competing force to Hamas (a radical regime). This comparison seems to indicate that Israel does not have any intention of maintaining its integrity in the international system so long as it hangs higher than Hamas. If the Israeli government truly wants peace, they must turn their obsessive fixation from Palestine’s radical

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10 ‘government’ towards the remaining moderates (who are persecuted by Hamas).

With time and continued efforts to bring the two increasingly divided populations together, the distinctions between Israelis and Palestinians will cease to be relevant.

Peace can only be secured when the Israeli government takes a leading hand in promoting cooperation between the unheard moderates of Palestine and its own people. This should take the form of outreach programs, Israeli-operated development projects in Palestine, and access for students and youth groups to their “enemy” country through education/goodwill programs. Moreover, violence should be utilized sparingly and precisely; Israel should begin to take convincing efforts to prevent civilian casualties (see figure below). When moderate Palestinains are given support from their neighbors, they will be able to operate with greater force, making it possible to conjoin Palestine and Israel into a single entity under one government. For this to happen, however, the Israeli people must also elect more moderate leaders: charismatic figures who hold their ability to maintain democracy and human rights over their ethnoreligious identity.

to promote discourse and peaceful interaction with moderate Palestinians as a means of ensuring an eventual end to the partition. If these steps to establish a single state are not taken, this conflict has the potential to transform into a bloodbath, as the Middle East may easily descend into a genocidal fit of anarchy so long as Israel is a state guided by racism and religious fanaticism.

This is not to posit that the transition into a single state will be bloodless or easy. It is simply to assert that the partition of Israel and Palestine has given way to increasingly radical behavior on both sides, making the formation of a single country imperative. As Israel’s brutality continues to allow extremism and ethnoreligious tribalism to breed in its neighboring land, a single state solution would ease these tensions and promote peace in the future. As a result, it is the responsibility of Israeli politicians and citizens Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

11 Works Cited BBC. “Gaza crisis: Toll of operations in Gaza.” BBC News. N.p., 1 Sept.

2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

- - -. “A History of Conflict.” BBC News.

BBC, 2005. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Ben-David, Calev. “Israeli Government in Turmoil Over ‘Jewish State’ Law Clash.” Bloomberg. N.p., 24 Nov. 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Henley, Jon. “Antisemitism on rise across Europe ‘in worst times since the Nazis.’” The Guardian. Guardian, 7 Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Mitnick, Joshua. “Netanyahu’s Approval Ratings Sink.” Wall Street Journal.

N.p., 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

PBS. “History of the Israel/Palestine Conflict.” PBS. American Documentary, Dec. 2001. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Shuttleworth, Kate. “Trauma surgeon Mads Gilbert will defy Israeli ban on Gaza entry.” The Guardian.

Guardian, 15 Nov. 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Weir, Alison, Paul Findley, and Andrew Killgore. “If Americans KnewWhat Every American Needs to Know about Israel/Palestine.” If Americans Knew. N.p., 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2014.

Endnotes 1 I consider tribalism to be a contextualized form of right wing nationalism and will treat both terms as synonymous.

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Environmental Racism in the United Arab Emirates Joseph Eyen | Pitzer ‘15 Joe Eyen is a Political Studies major and Environmental Analysis minor at Pitzer College. He works with The American Institute for Progressive Democracy, a Claremont-based think tank, and played four years on the Pomona-Pitzer basketball team.

Globalization is often criticized for the intensification of environmental problems and economic inequality around the world. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the most intensely globalized regions in the world today. Its diverse population, foreign direct investment from other countries, and dependence on the demand for oil has made it completely integrated with and dependent on the global economy. And it has been successful, experiencing 6.62 GDP growth from 2000-2009 (Sönmez, et al. 2014).

However, along with the benefits, the UAE has also experienced environmental problems and intense inequality, and environmental racism is a byproduct of that combination. According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, environmental justice is the “fair

treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies… everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work” (“What is Environmental Justice?” 2014).

Environmental racism on the other hand specifically regards injustice based on race. According to this definition, the Asian migrant workers in the UAE suffer environmental racism.

Eighty percent of the UAE are foreigners, predominately laborers from India,

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

13 Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and their standard of living and working conditions are described by Human Rights Watch as exploitive, abusive, and dangerous (“Building Towers, Cheating Workers” 2006). Asian migrant workers in the UAE experience environmental racism because they have no political power as a result of labor migration, a consequence of globalization. Neoliberal economic policies further complicates the protection of workers’ rights. However on the flip side, because of globalization, integrated economies and empowered non-state actors are more prepared to protect migratory workers than ever before.

The UAE is recognized most for its rapid growth since the oil boom that began in 2002 (Saif 2009). In 2013, the UAE experienced 5.2% growth, which is considerably high especially in light of the financial crisis after 2008 (“UAE economic growth accelerates to 5.2 pct in 2013” 2014). In addition, the UAE has also experienced an exceptionally low unemployment rate of 3% with a “percitizen-oil production almost six times that of SA (Saudi Arabia)” (Saif 2009, p. 2). Therefore, the UAE has a lot of money and insufficient labor, which has led to intense construction and imported workers. The GCC as a whole contracted $40 million worth of new projects in the 2014 first quarter alone, approaching $150 billion by year’s end, with the UAE accounting for more than $100 billion worth of new projects this year (“Inside the GCC’s booming construction industry” 2014). Dubai was blessed with only a fraction of the oil compared to Abu Dhabi and other GCC countries, so Sheikh Maktoum of Dubai decided to use the revenue it did receive to transform

Dubai city into a global center of finance and tourism (Hari 2009). He wanted to secure Dubai’s future by diversifying investments and avoiding a complete dependence on exporting oil. Dubai in particular has become known for engineering marvels, which include the world’s tallest skyscraper, the only seven star hotel in the world, man-made islands up for sale, and the world’s largest indoor ski resort. Dubai has become perhaps the purest example of neoliberalism, “the ultimate neoliberal Utopia… of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions or opposition parties (Molavi 2007; Davis 2006, p. 60). Describing Dubai, Nick Tosches said “shop, get rich, be rich. Without taxes… Welcome to the Western dream” (Tosches 2006).

Foreigners are unquestionably the overwhelming population, equaling 80% of the UAE, and 95% of the workforce, the majority of which come from poor Asian countries (Caplin 2009; “Building Towers, Cheating Workers” 2006).

Within these demographics unequal race dynamics also exist. Underneath Dubai’s glitz and glamour is a “hyperpolarized” society - extreme wealth accumulation and severe poverty - racially influenced, which has led to environmental racism (Buckley 2012). Westerners “dominate white-collar jobs (Sönmez, et al. 2014), even though only 4% of the UAE’s population is European (Caplin 2009).

For UAE nationals, they represent only 18% (Caplin 2009). For Dubai specifically, the percent is amazingly only 5% (Hari 2009).

As mentioned earlier, unemployment in the UAE is incredibly low and unfavorable for employers at 3%. They desire greater labor supply which leads

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14 to wage competition and drives down wages. As a result, the UAE (and other Gulf countries) have imported labor from developing countries such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The migrants are housed in employer-run labor camps with as many as 300,000 men (Hari 2009). The Health and Human Rights report describes the “shanty towns” as “overcrowded and grossly unhealthy… Inadequate sewage and ventilation, substandard drinking water, sleeping facilities and unsanitary food preparation areas are common.” (Sönmez, et al. 2014). Each day the men are bused between their construction sites and their camp on the city’s periphery, and until recently, they were transported on cattle trucks. Today they are transported in buses that are not air-conditioned which feel like “greenhouses” in the desert heat (Hari 2009).

The exchange of labor often occurs through a recruiting agency. Most poor laborers searching for jobs are uneducated and have never left their country or village, so they rely on a recruiter for information and logistical assistance. Recruiters are usually contracted by the companies in the UAE (or any Gulf country) and are hired to find and arrange flights to the UAE for willing workers. This is the first instance in which the laborers are mistreated, for they are lied to about their work and wages. Because construction is the major industry that is starving for labor, many of the migrants are men. But women also travel to find work because there is a high demand for domestic servants (in addition to sex trafficking).

Hari interviewed a Bangladeshi that said a recruiter told the men in his village that they could earn the equivalent of 400 English pounds a month for construction

work 8 hours a day. They are actually paid the amount of 90 English pounds, and the working conditions are horrendous calling it, “the worst in the world”: “You have to carry 50kg bricks and blocks of cement in the worst heat imaginable ... This heat – it is like nothing else (temperatures can exceed 130 degrees). You sweat so much you can’t pee, not for days or weeks. It’s like all the liquid comes out through your skin and you stink. You become dizzy and

Underneath Dubai’s glitz and glamour is a “hyperpolarized” society - extreme wealth accumulation and severe poverty - racially influenced, which has led to environmental racism. sick but you aren’t allowed to stop, except for an hour in the afternoon. You know if you drop anything or slip, you could die.

If you take time off sick, your wages are docked, and you are trapped here even longer” (Hari 2009).

Even though laborers willingly travel to the UAE, once they land, they are unfree.

On their arrival, they must forfeit their passport to their employer, allowing employers to “regulate their residency and employment, which gives employers near-total control over migrant workers’ salary, living conditions, nutrition, ability to work elsewhere, and even their ability to return home” (Sönmez, et al. 2014).

Human Rights Watch reported that exhaustion, overwork, and suicide are underreported by the UAE government,

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

15 for “the Indian consulate registered 971 deaths of their nationals in 2005 alone. After this figure was leaked, the consulates were told to stop counting” (Hari 2009). Another report made by Human Rights Watch says suicides occur as often as once a week (“Blinded by Dubai” 2007). According to a report from the Health and Human Rights Journal, some laborers work more than 50 hours per week, seven days a week, and 14 hours at a time (Sönmez, et al. 2014). Working conditions are unjust and different from what recruiters tell the Asian villagers.

Further, it is apparent that the government is interested in pushing these labor complaints under the rug, disputing reports produced by other countries and international organizations. Conditions for these workers certainly fail to provide a safe environment to “live, learn, and work,” and there is no “fair treatment and meaningful involvement… with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies” (“What is Environmental Justice?” 2014). Albeit this is the standard for the United States, which is considered more “developed” than the UAE, but many would argue that the concept of what is “just” and what is “racist” should not vary across countries.

Perhaps a less developed country would struggle to reach the same standards as the US, but the definition that they follow should be identical.

The migrant workers do not have the capability to voice their grievances, and protect themselves against dangerous working conditions such as environmental threats. It is illegal to unionize and strike in the UAE, so it is impossible for change to occur from within, especially because the business

and state interests are so entrenched.

UAE is intensely neoliberal, opposing any and all regulations. But states today are arguably more susceptible to outside influences such as other countries and international organizations. The globalized economy has increased interdependence, especially for oil dependent countries like the UAE. Therefore, the UAE should have greater receptivity to outside pressure, which is a benefit of “globalization.”

There are different sources that can pressure change in the UAE. One is the migrants’ home countries, for they have an interest in the health and safety of their citizens. But these countries want to avoid pushing too hard against the UAE, because benefit economically from remittances. Therefore their interest in change is mixed. Non-governmental organizations can also be influential.

This past year, labor injustices in Abu Dhabi (ironically on Happiness Island) - such as the withholding of passports, substandard working and living conditions, lack of healthcare, and physical abuse were illuminated by The International Trade Union Confederation and an art activism group called Gulf Labor. The construction projects include a new Louvre, a new Guggenheim, and an NYU satellite campus. Because these projects originate from “Western” institutions, the trade union and art activist group demanded that the projects be held to a higher standard. They brought this issue to public discourse in the Western media effectively shaming the groups. This method is likely to enact change as a result of the groups’ concern for their image. In addition to bilateral pressure (such as India demanding rights for its migratory workers),

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16 international organizations (such as the trade union and human rights groups mentioned earlier), change by private investors (like the Louvre or NYU), another example of influence is from a third-party governmental institution.

In this case, the EU (which exemplifies both an International Governmental Organization and sovereign country), specifically a German MP, called on the Louvre, Guggenheim, NYU, and UAE government to address the labor mistreatment so that “all migrants can fully enjoy their human rights� (Batty 2013). These examples demonstrate a diversity of pathways for creating change in another country.

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

17 Works Cited Batty, David. “Conditions for Abud Dhabi’s migrant workers ‘shame the west.’

The Guardian. 21 Dec. 2013. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.

“Blinded by Dubai.” Colombia Journalism Review. 1 Mar. 2007. Web. 17 Oct. 2014.

Buckley, Michelle. “Locating Neoliberalism in Dubai: Migrant Workers and Class Struggle in the Autocratic City. Antipode. Vol. 45 No. 2 2013 pp 256-274. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.

“Building Towers, Cheating Workers.”

Human Rights Watch. 12 Nov. 2006. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.

Caplin, Jessica. “Mirage in the Desert Oasis.” Harvard International Review. Winter 2009. pp 28-32.

Web. 17 Oct. 2014.

Davis, M. “Fear and Money in Dubai. New Left Review. 2008. 48:47-48.

Gilpin, Robert. Global Political Economy.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Print.

Hari, Johann. “The dark side of Dubai.”

The Independent. 7 Apr. 2009.

Web. 16 2014.

“Inside the GCC’s booming construction industry.” Alawaba Business. 17 Apr. 2014. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.

Molavi, A. “Sudden City: A feverish dream of the future springs from the sand in Dubai.” National Geographic.

Jan. 2007. p 94-111.

Saif, Ibrahim. “The Oil Boom in the GCC Countries, 2002-2008: Old Challenges, Changing Dynamics.”

Carnegie Papers. No. 15 (2009): 1-29. Web. 21 Oct. 2014.

Sönmez, Sevil. Apostopoulos, Yorghos.

Tran, Diane. & Rentrope, Shantyana. “Human rights and health disparities for migrant workers in the UAE.” Health and Human Rights Journal. n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2014.

Toshes, Nick. “Dubai’s the Limit.” Vanity Fair. Jun. 2006. Web. 20 Oct. 2014.

“UAE economic growth accelerates to 5.2 pct in 2013.” Reuters.com. 8 Jun. 2014. Web. 17 Oct. 2014.

“United Arab Emirates profile.” BBC.com.

1 Jul. 2014. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.

“What is Environmental Justice?” EPA. gov. nd. Web. 21 Oct. 2014.

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A Quieter Corner of the Middle East David Leathers | Claremont McKenna ‘15

The Middle East is on the front page every day in most Western news outlets. Not surprisingly, this focus tends to highlight only the political spats, violence, terrorism, and problems with the region. But this is a narrow view of the lives of many people in the region. Jordan, a small country situated between Israel, the West Bank, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, has largely avoided recent violence and conflict that has affected many of Jordan’s neighbors. But to many, Jordan is defined by its refugee crisis, riots in the north, a pilot getting shot down by ISIS, and high-level political relations. These photos are meant to show what life is like for many Jordanians. Many Jordanians are distant--both physically and emotionally--from what outsiders may perceive to be important issues. This photo essay focuses on nomadic Bedouin populations in Jordan’s south. They have lived on and around the same land for hundreds of years; they have been a constant in a part of the world so often in flux. This essay is not meant at all to diminish the lives of those in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine and other places which have seen ongoing conflict. Instead, these photos provide a small window into the lives of rural, Bedouin Jordanians--a quieter corner of the Middle East.

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A permanent Bedouin encampment is seen at sunrise. Bedouins in Jordan have been nomadic for thousands of years, only recently settling down (after encouragement by the government) post- WWII.

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A Bedouin child in southern Jordan carries two small goats off into the distance.

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The rolling hills of Feynan, an area in southern Jordan, are seen from atop an old Roman village.

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Bedouins say hello to a tour group in the middle of Wadi Rum, a famous World Heritage site in southern Jordan.

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A small storage facility in a Bedouin village in southern Jordan near Wadi Guair, a popular hiking spot. Bedouins largely live outside in tents; permanent structures are rarely used for housing.

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Percieving Suffering: A Constructivist Approach to South Sudan David White | Claremont McKenna ‘18 Originally from San Luis Obispo, California, David White is a currently a Claremont McKenna College freshman majoring in International Relations and Film. Particularly interested in plants, Latin America, and the Middle East, David will spend this summer WWOOFing in the Chilean Andes.

The fledgling nation of South Sudan has found itself in the midst of warfare yet again. The most recent series of conflicts, a competition for political power between two conflicting ethnic groups has already left thousands dead and millions more displaced.1 It seems clear that such suffering tangibly affects regional neighbors, both as refugee outflow wears down the social and economic systems of bordering nations, and as nearby military forces are sucked into the conflict.2 The following analysis will instead focus on whether conflict in Sudan affects physically distant Western nations.

Whereas traditional examinations of international repercussions would likely explore global economic impacts or precedents set for institutions and national governments on the second and

third levels of analysis, consideration here will focus upon first image impact.

That is, how individual actors interact with news and information about atrocities in the rest of the world. More specifically, constructivist principles suggest that the existence of suffering in South Sudan will contribute to how individuals understand that part of the world. Human suffering in South Sudan becomes a global issue when examined as an indicator and an example of similar atrocities in the region that have actually normalized such events and numbed onlookers to the concept of mass suffering.

A brief history of the South Sudanese conflict is essential in order to understand the implications of the issue. South

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

25 Sudan’s independence in 2011 followed decades of civil war within Sudan proper, which had claimed over two and a half million lives.3 The established leadership for the new nation of South Sudan included a president, Salva Kiir, and a vice president, Riek Machar, that belonged to rival ethnic groups within South Sudan: the Dinka and Nuer tribes, respectively. Though roughly united in opposition to the government in Khartoum and their struggle for independence, the ethnic rivalry and other conflicting interests bubbled to the surface within two years of the new nation’s birth. In July of 2013, Kiir fired Machar and all other ethnic Nuer from his cabinet.4 On 15 December of the same year, Kiir demanded the disarmament of all ethnic Nuer in his presidential guard, fearing a military coup by the deposed vice president.5 Kiir specifically feared that these Nuer members of the state military would resist the arrest of Machar, planned for the same night, and revolt. Accordingly, the Nuer soldiers did in fact resist their disarmament, and fighting broke out within the Tiger military barrack of Juba.6 Over the following several days, fighting bled out across the capital city, including doorto-door killings of ethnic Nuer civilians by the Dinka state military.7 In the most explicit display of state-sponsored ethnic violence during these initial days, Kiir’s Dinka army rounded up and massacred over 300 Nuer inhabitants of Juba’s Grudelle neighborhood in the local police station.8 The ethnic atrocities have been mutual, exemplified by the slaughtering of over 400 Dinka civilians by Nuer rebels in Bentiu.9 By the end of 2014 alone, the conflict had already claimed several thousand South Sudanese lives, displaced nearly two million civilians,

and left nearly four million in need of humanitarian support.10 With this in mind, the following analysis will use the South Sudanese case as a current example of similar situations in Africa and the Middle East that together constitute a larger trend in widespread suffering and its implications. The conflict in South Sudan has already echoed some facets of previous atrocities and even genocides, exemplified by the use of FM radio to incite support for a massacre on Dinka civilians. This was the same tactic used in the Rwandan genocide that claimed nearly a million lives in the mid-1990s.11 Nearby in the Central African Republic, the past decade has seen thousands of fatalities and over a million citizens displaced.12 The Darfur genocide in Sudan proper ended nearly 300,000 lives and displaced well over three million civilians.13 Concurrent with the South Sudanese conflict is news from Nigeria of dozens of civilians dying at a time in mass killings stemming from the clash between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military. In the Middle East, just since the 2011 Arab Spring, over one hundred thousand citizens have died in Syria alone, with over ten million displaced.14 These are only a few examples, and do not even begin to

Counter-intuitively, large-scale humanitarian crises actually build, among average first image actors, apathy toward that suffering.

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26 touch upon the constant updates of mass suffering at the hands of ISIS, atrocities in the deteriorating nation of Yemen, or civilian damage in the seemingly ever-present Israel-Palestine conflict.

Undeniably, each of these conflicts is extremely different, and the human suffering is simply a shared symptom of varying and complex roots. However, when considering what these issues mean to Western first-image actors, average civilians in the far away first world, an understanding of the political complexities cannot be presumed.

Rather, these sweeping statistics about humanitarian crises, as in South Sudan, are essentially how average individuals will shape their entire perceptions of those far-away regions.

What do these grand numbers mean to detached individuals in the first world? Counter-intuitively, large-scale humanitarian crises actually build, among average first image actors, apathy toward that suffering. Professor of psychology Paul Slovic studied the numbing effects of sweeping statistics about human suffering. Two famous quotes to epitomize his argument: first,

by Mother Teresa, “If I look at the mass I never act, but if I look at the one, I will,” and by Joseph Stalin, “One death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.”

Through meticulous psychological evidence, Slovic elaborates on these quotes, proving that even those people who are extremely empathetic to the struggles of another individual will become more indifferent to the same suffering when that individual is assimilated into a larger, impersonal mass. As Slovic writes, “statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers…fail to spark emotion or

feeling and thus fail to motivate action” (Slovic). To explain this point, Slovic draws from Seymour Epstein’s work regarding dual mechanisms through which humans process information, systems of thinking dubbed “System 1” and “System 2.” System 1 concerns intuitive emotional responses to personal experiences and stimuli, whereas System 2 is a mathematical, analytical, and impersonal lens that processes facts and information.15 The struggles of a nearby individual play into System 1, triggering empathy and an emotional motivation to offer assistance. By this logic, increases in the mass of those suffering should seemingly trigger stronger and stronger empathetic responses. However, at a certain point the suffering crosses a threshold, whether due to severed proximity or sheer quantity of those involved, at which point humans stop feeling an emotional and empathetic bond to the struggles, and the suffering instead begins to be understood through the removed mathematical lens of System 2.16 The string of far away and massive humanitarian crises in Africa and the Middle East, into which the events in South Sudan merge, has crossed this threshold. Enormous statistics that should seemingly trigger proportionally grand empathetic reactions in fact dehumanize that suffering.17 By constantly perceiving these atrocities through a mathematical and statistical lens, first-image actors become progressively more numb to these atrocities, and begin to accept them as mathematical facets of an eternally war-torn region, rather than as preventable humanitarian crises.

The fact that individual psychological reactions to repeated atrocities shift the understanding of the issues in the first-

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27 image is consistent with the constructivist paradigm. As explained by Alexander Wendt, constructivists hold dear that people act toward objects, issues, and events, “on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them.”18 Furthermore, those meanings are formed and evolved based upon repeated reactions to similar objects and events.19 Accordingly, when actors in the first image perceive great human suffering through System 2 thinking, the result is emotional desensitization to that suffering. With each very similar depiction of suffering that follows, System 2 perception of the atrocities is further bolstered, and in accordance with constructivist shaping of understanding, the observer grows less and less emotionally attached to the suffering and more and more indifferent to, and even accepting of, a normal landscape that includes drastic human rights violations. The civilian suffering in South Sudan is the current link in this chain of desensitizing humanitarian crises, and through the statistical representations of refugee outflow and child kidnapping that describe the conflict to first world observers, the entire issue only contributes more to the growing apathy toward such events.

Outside of personal psychological reactions, constructivists claim that observing the reactions of others, including major world leaders and institutions, will also help shape individuals’ perception of issues.20 With respect to South Sudan, both the European Union and the United States have done no more than pass limited sanctions of specific military leaders.21 Ban Ki Moon, the UN Secretary-General, has pushed for “punitive measures;” however, the Security Council has yet

to act, claiming they are deferring to the more regional institution, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).22 Meanwhile, the IGAD’s Cessation of Hostilities Act has been violated over a dozen times without the imposition of any consequence; the IGAD’s strongest threat has been to “impose punitive measures, including asset freezes and travel bans, on individuals obstructing the peace process,” but deadlines have come and gone without action.23 An average firstimage actor may perceive these actions, or lack thereof, as indifference on the part of major world powers. These responses in South Sudan fit with the broader history of treating cases of mass suffering, during which the United States and other world powers have consistently offered verbal condemnations of regimes perpetuating the atrocities, but historically have been slow to react tangibly to end the suffering.24 Again, as Slovic himself agrees, this seeming second-image indifference stems from the fact that “every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique social, economic, military, and political obstacles to intervention.”25 Nevertheless, the constructivist paradigm prioritizes the perception of these actions by observers, not the true intention behind them.26 If average first-image observers perceive major world powers as indifferent toward ending human suffering, that shapes these individuals’ understanding of the issues. Specifically, it leads to increased tolerance and even acceptance of civilian suffering as part of the landscape of wartorn regions.

Insofar as it reinforces individuals’ tendency to overlook mass suffering, the civilian damage in South Sudan is a

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28 global issue. It is in fact not too far a leap to assert that a trend toward first-image apathy in regards to suffering abroad can apply just as well to indifference toward the actions of first-world citizens’ own nations upon foreign civilians. Consider for example our era of increasing collateral civilian damage as part of US drone attacks: a rising indifference among first-image actors towards the plight of masses abroad, or the normalization of civilian suffering abroad in the eyes of first-world citizens, is a phenomenon that can only lead to more indifference.

This analysis only scratches the surface of the constructivist implications of mass civilian destruction. A closer examination of the relationship between how general first-image perceptions influence second-image actions would greatly advance this discussion. In addition, an optimist’s analysis of what circumstances would allow major atrocities to in fact expand first-image concern rather than diminish it, perhaps including a more in-depth examination of media coverage and its role, would offer a worthwhile perspective. The world will have to watch and see how the situation in Sudan continues to manifest itself within its borders and in the eyes of the rest of the world.

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29 Endnotes 1 “Conflicts in South Sudan.”

EnoughProject. October 1, 2014.

2 Bruno, Alessandro. “The Regional Impact of a South Sudan Civil War.” Geopolitical Monitor. December 31, 2013.

3 “Conflicts in South Sudan.”

EnoughProject. October 1, 2014.

4 Obonyo, Raphael. “Peace in South Sudan Critical to Regional Stabilit.”

Africa Renewal Online. August 1, 2014.

5 ibid 6 ibid 7 “Conflicts in South Sudan.”

EnoughProject. October 1, 2014.

8 Joak, Daniel. “Major Causes of the Current Conflict in South Sudan.” South Sudan News Agency. February 20, 2014.

9 Lustig, Robin. “South Sudan Crisis: Famine and Genocide Threaten to Engulf Nation.” May 17, 2014.

10 “South Sudan Crisis: ECHO Factsheet.”

11 Lustig, Robin. “South Sudan Crisis: Famine and Genocide Threaten to Engulf Nation.” May 17, 2014.

12 “ACD.” Armed Conflict Database.

13 ibid 14 ibid 15 Slovic, Paul. “”If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide.” Judgement and Decision Making, no. 2 (2007): 79-95.

16 ibid 17 ibid 18 Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction Of Power Politics.” International Organization46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

19 ibid 20 ibid 21 “Conflicts in South Sudan.”

EnoughProject. October 1, 2014.

ibid ibid 24 Shah, Anup. “Rwanda.” Global Issues.

25 Slovic, Paul. “”If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide.” Judgement and Decision Making2, no. 2 (2007): 79-95.

26 Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction Of Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

22 23

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30

China and Japan’s Dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: An Analysis from a Game Theory Perspective Zhijun Gao | CGU Zhijun Gao received his Bachelor of Public Administration from the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in China in 2010 and Master of Public Administration from the University of Southern California (USC) in 2012. He is a second year PhD student majoring in International Political Economy and Development Economics at the Claremont Graduate University, where he also works as a research assistant and conducts projects with professors in the areas of China’s economic development, corruption, foreign direct investment and contract.

Abstract This paper applies game theory method to analyze the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. It consists of four sections: the first section introduces the background of the island dispute and the stances of China, Japan and the United States. The second section makes assumptions and sets up a sequential game between China and Japan; the author will then use the rollback equilibrium to find the predicted outcome of the game and evaluate if the outcome is Pareto efficient. The third section extends the game by adding one strategy for each player and adding United Nations as the third player and then compares this with the basic game. The last section puts for-

ward policy implications based on the analysis in sections II and III. Background of the Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute refers to a territorial dispute between China and Japan over several uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. The islands had been under Chinese sovereignty until 1895, when China (Qing Dynasty) and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. After that, Japan controlled the islands (except for the period when the United States administered the island from 1945 to 1972).

Since Japan’s loss of the Second World War, China has consistently demanded the return of the islands, arguing that they traditionally belonged to China

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31 and that they should be returned along with the other territories that were lost in the Second World War. The situation became extremely tense in September 2012 when the Japanese government nationalized three of the disputed islands from a Japanese “private owner.”

This resulted in a huge reaction, with protests all throughout China. In many cities, people burned Japanese cars and damaged Japanese stores; they organized anti-Japan demonstrations, during which they argued for the return of the islands. At the beginning of February 2013, the situation was regarded as, “the most serious for SinoJapanese relations in the post-war period in terms of the risk of militarized conflict.” The protests escalated and became violent, forcing the Chinese government to intervene.

The United States officially takes a neutral stance on the dispute, but President Obama has clearly stated that the islands are included within the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (U.S. says Senkaku Islands fall within scope of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, 2012). This means that the United States would intervene militarily if Chinese military forces were to attack the islands.

Since China and Japan have close economic ties, the trade and exchange of human capital play important roles for each country’s economic and social development. The dispute over the islands will have a negative influence on this bilateral economic relationship.

Thus, the question of how to resolve this issue is very important to the two countries’ decision makers. In the next section, we will use a sequential game

to find out how to achieve this objective.

Sequential game between China and Japan The essence of a game of strategy is the interaction of the players’ decisions. In a sequential game, there is one player who is the first mover and all of the other players make moves based on the observation of the prior player’s move. One important principle of the sequential game is to, “look ahead and reason backward” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991), which means that each player can foresee the outcome of the game. Thus, the player will try to make a decision that is the best response to his opponents’ moves.

Before setting up the game between China and Japan, I will make eleven assumptions: 1.

Each country can choose between taking military action and using diplomacy to solve the dispute.

2.

Each country will suffer 30 billion US dollars in losses if it takes military action.

3.

If one side takes military action while the other does not, the former will win the battle and get a payoff of 100 billion U.S. dollars, but that side will also incur 30 billion U.S. dollars in costs.

4.

When there is a war, the probability of China winning will be p, so the probability of Japan winning will be 1-p.

5.

If China wins the war through military action, it will claim ownership of the islands; likewise for Japan.

6.

If a country takes military action but loses the war, it will suffer 30 billion U.S. dollars in losses.

7.

If a country seeks a diplomatic way out of the crisis but loses due to

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32 the fact that the opponent takes military action, the former’s payoff would be 0 U.S. dollars while the latter’s payoff would be 90 billion U.S. dollars net the cost of military action (the losses would be lower compared to a war).

8.

If a country responds to the counterpart’s diplomatic negotiation with military action, the country will lose 60 billion U.S. dollars as a consequence of negative reputation and possible revenge of the counterpart.

9.

If the two countries seek a diplomatic solution, the probability that the dispute will be resolved is 0.3 (since the issue is sensitive and associated with vast political and economic interests) and the probability of retaining the status quo will be 0.7 (Here I use real numbers to prevent there being two unknowns in the comparison of expected payoff).

10.

If the issue gets resolved through diplomatic means, each country claims ownership of half of the islands and will receive a payoff of 50 billion U.S. dollars.

11.

China’s payoff will be 0 if the status quo is retained; however, Japan will

gain 100 billion U.S. dollars if the situation does not change because it currently controls the islands.

Based on the above assumptions, we can set China and Japan’s preferences of ordering as seen in tables 1 and 2.

As we know, when we are drawing a game tree, we need to set the payoff.

China and Japan’s payoffs in the different outcomes are based on the following factual data: Although the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are uninhabited, they contain rich oil, natural gas, and fishing resources. This abundance of resources is one of the most important reasons for the two countries’ strong stances in terms of the ownership of the islands.

In 2006 the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy conducted a study on the islands and concluded that, “the combined oil and natural gas on the Japanese side of the median line between China and Japan ‘is around the oil equivalent of 500 million kilometers.’” If we convert this figure to the oil figure, it will reach 3 billion

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33 Chart 1

barrels.” (Point of View/Yasushi Nakashima: The value of Senkaku oil and the costs for Japan and China, 2012).

Furthermore, if either country takes over the islands, it will not only possess the resources on the island, but can stretch out to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as well. “Under the United Nations’ International Convention on the Law of the Sea, the EEZ of a nation stretches 200 nautical miles from that nation’s continental shelf or to the median line between the nations.” (Diaoyu Island dispute about resources not land, 2012). Therefore, if China or Japan possesses the islands, it will stretch out the area for fishing and further exploit natural resources.

If we convert all of these values to U.S. dollars, we will get a figure of around 100 billion U.S. dollars.

ing of the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship. This economic tie is important for both countries: for Japan, after the “lost 20 years,” selling automobiles and electronic products to China is a key component of Japan’s economic recovery and high rate of employment. On the other side of the relationship, China needs the capital and high-end technology from Japan to help the country make the transition from extensive growth to intensive development. Thus, if a war between the two countries were to break out, both of them would suffer huge economic losses. After rough calculation, the estimated losses for each country would be 30 billion U.S. dollars if there were a war. The payoff below the outcome of the game tree is based on the above data and analysis (Chart 1).

Since China and Japan have formed close economic ties, launching a war will be detrimental to the interests of both sides. Total trade reached 334 billion U.S. dollars in 2012, but this dropped by 18% in 2013 due to a fray-

In this game, China moves first by deciding whether to take military actions or seek a diplomatic way to solve the dispute. Then Japan will make its decision based on China’s move; it can choose either taking military action

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34 or diplomatic negotiation. I listed all of the possibilities in the game tree. If China chooses military action, then the probability of China winning the war will be p. We need to calculate the expected payoff for both countries if there is a war, it would be (100p-30, 70-100p).

So if 70-100p>0, i.e. if p<0.7, then Japan will fight back. The rollback equilibrium of this sub-game is (China, Japan) = (military action, military action) under this condition. On the other hand, if China demonstrates moderation by seeking negotiation with Japan, Japan will need to decide whether to take military action to finalize its possession and control of the islands or agree to cooperate with China and make a deal. As I mentioned above, since the territorial dispute is sensitive in both countries, the probability of reaching an agreement is 0.3, and the probability of an unsuccessful negotiation is 0.7.

Although completely occupying the islands is an attractive option, it would look bad in the eyes of the world and China might seek revenge by waging war. Therefore, the Japanese government will probably choose to talk with Chinese leaders to discuss the solutions of the dispute since the expected payoff of negotiation is larger than the payoff of taking military action. So the rollback equilibrium of this sub-game is (China, Japan) = (negotiation, negotiation).

However, if we solve this entire game through backward induction, we will find that if the expected payoff for China launching a war is larger than its payoff for negotiation, 100p-30>15 (0.45<p<0.7), the predicted outcome will be China takes military action, Japan responds with military action,

and the two countries will suffer from huge economic losses. Since China is a larger country and has a larger defense budget, it is very likely that the probability of China winning the war exceeds 0.45; considering this, a war would be unavoidable. Furthermore, the predicted outcome is not Pareto efficient, because if we move it to the possible outcome where both countries seek diplomatic negotiation and solve the dispute, each side’s payoff will increase without making the other side worse off.

Game Extension Since this predicted outcome would be a military conflict, which would be detrimental to both countries’ well-being and violate the international norm of using negotiation to solve territorial disputes, we need to find ways to help the two countries start seeking diplomatic negotiations. If this occurs, a disastrous war would be prevented. Here we extend the game by adding a third player – the United Nations, which is the largest international organization that advocates peace and development. We will look at whether the UN can help these two countries use diplomacy instead of the military to resolve the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.

In addition, to make the game more complete, we add a third strategy for both countries, which is to do nothing.

Now, as the game has been extended, we need to outline the revised set of assumptions: 1. The previous 11 assumptions in the basic game will also apply to the extended game.

2. If China seeks negotiation andJapan chooses to do nothing, Japan will lose 40 billion U.S. dollars

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35 in payoffs because doing nothing will look bad internationally.

3. Since both countries are membersof the United Nations, they will feel pressure as the United Nations gets involved. This would be conducive to successful negotiations. In this case, the probability of getting the issue resolved will increase to 0.7 and the probability of it remaining unresolved will be 0.3. (Similar to assumption 9 in the basic game, here I also use real numbers to prevent there being two unknowns in the comparison of expected payoffs.)

4. If the dispute is solved through diplomatic means, the United Nations will gain 20 billion U.S. dollars in payoffs because solving the crisis would make the public

trust them more. If the dispute is not solved, the payoff is 0 U.S. dollars, meaning that the UN has had a negligible role in the proceedings. If, however, either or both countries take military action, the payoff for the United Nations will be -20 billion U.S. dollars, indicating that its ability to prevent a war has shrunk.

After stating the players and additional assumptions, we set up the extended sequential game below: As the first country to move, China can choose among taking military action, seeking diplomatic negotiations, and doing nothing. Japan can respond to Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strategy with the same moves.

If the expected payoff for Japan win-

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36 ning the war is higher than its payoff for negotiation and doing nothing (70100p>0: p<0.7), the Japanese government will choose to fight back. Having the United Nations as a third player would incur losses because it would not prevent a ruinous war between the two great powers.

If China chooses negotiation, the Japanese government could choose the same strategy. As the third party, the United Nations could choose to pressure both sides in order to facilitate a successful negotiation. And, if it decides to do so, the probability of getting the issue resolved will increase to 0.7; meanwhile, the probability of maintaining the status quo will be 0.3.

Under this circumstance, the expected payoff of exerting pressure is (35, 65, 14), compared to the payoff for not exerting pressure of (15, 85, 6). As a result, the United Nations would choose to exert pressure on both countries. Since, in this scenario, Japan will lose a lot with regard to payoffs if it chooses either military action or to do nothing, the Japanese government would also seek to negotiate after making the trade-off.

efficient since it makes the Japanese worse off, it prevents a war that would cause huge losses for both countries.

This is the greatest merit of the extended game, and the active role of the United Nations is key.

Policy Implications and Conclusion Based on the analysis of the above two sequential games, we find that if we were to let the two countries deal with the dispute by themselves, there would be a very high probability that a war would take place. This would be harmful to the well-being of the two nations as well as to the international community. The two countries must start communicating and negotiating. To facilitate this, the United Nations or other influential third parties are essential.

This type of â&#x20AC;&#x153;special playerâ&#x20AC;? will play a significant role in preventing a war between two great powers and in doing so will maintain world peace and ensure sustained development.

If China chooses to do nothing, Japan will also do nothing since it currently controls the islands, the status quo suits its interests. So the payoff for this sub-game is (0, 100, 0).

When we consider the entire game and conduct the rollback induction, we will see that if Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s expected payoff for negotiation is higher than the payoff for taking military action and doing nothing (35>100p-30: p<0.65), the predicted outcome of this extended game will be for both countries to choose to use negotiation to solve the dispute.

Although this result is also not Pareto Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

37 Works Cited Dixit, A and Barry, N. Thinking strate=

gically: The competitive edge in

business, politics, and everday

life. New York: W. W Norton & Company.

Downs, E and Saunders, P. Legitimacy

and the Limits of Nationalism:

China and the Diaoyu Islands. International Security,

Vol 23, No. 3. Retrieved from Kyodo News (2012, August 20). US

says Senkaku Islands fall within

scope of Japan-US security trea- ty.

South China Morning Post (2012, De

cember 04). Diaoyu Islands Dis-

pute about resources not land.

The Asahi Shimbun (2012, October

29). Point of View/ Yasushi Na-

kashima: The value of Senkaku

oil and the costs for Japan and

China. Retrieved from

The World Post (2012, Septemb

er 18).

China Japan protests: Japanese

business in China hits as demonstrations rage.

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38

The Surge from Syria: Effects of Displaced Syrians on Jordanian Communities Leyth Swidan | Pomona ‘16 Leyth Swidan is a junior at Pomona studying international relations and Middle Eastern studies. He spent his fall 2014 semester studying at the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy in Amman, Jordan, and is currently studying abroad at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

Leyth’s interests include social and political developments in the Middle East, the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis, and domestic labor workers in the Gulf states.

Executive Summary The government of Jordan along with UN agencies and NGO partners have made significant pushes to alleviate pressures on services and infrastructure and intervene in support of host communities. However, local state institutions, particularly education and health care, along with employment prospects and affordable housing continue to be strained due to additional pressures from Syrian refugees on the limited resources in host communities.

This, consequently, leads to growing tensions between these refugees and local communities in Amman, Zarqa, Mafraq and Irbid. Because current relief programs are largely limited in meeting refugees’ and host communities’ shortterm needs and resolving immediate

infrastructure problems, immediate humanitarian efforts should be sustained by long-term strategies as the Syrian crisis moves beyond the threeyear mark.

Introduction With the Syrian civil war in its third year, the Syrian refugee crisis has become one of the largest refugees crises in the world, with approximately 3.2 million Syrians internationally displaced and more than 7.6 million internally displaced.i All of Syria’s neighbors have been affected by the refugee crisis, but Jordan has been hit especially hard. While the Syrian refugee crisis has received an enormous amount of international publicity, far less attention has been given to the plight of host communities in Jordan.

Spring 2015 | The Claremont Journal of International Relations

39 As of October 2014, Jordan has housed 620,016 UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees.ii While camps sheltering Syrian refugees, such as Zaatari, capture most of the media attention and international funding, they do not attract the majority of Syrian refugees. In fact, 522,334, or 84.2%, Syrians refugees registered with UNHCR live outside of camps in host communities, including Amman (32%), Irbid (29%), Mafraq (14%) and Zarqa (10%).iii The Syrian refugee crisis has been placing increasing strains on Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy and social structure since 2011 as the high refugee influx has strained Jordanian institutions. Public services have been forced to accommodate the Syrian refugees who live outside of the camps, which has exerted significant pressure on the health system, both in terms of human and financial resources.

Similarly, schools are running beyond capacity, with 13% of public schools currently holding a second shift in the afternoon in order to accommodate Syrian children.iv Mafraq and Irbid, which receive a large number of Syrian refugees, have poverty rates that range from 15% - 25%, further limiting their ability to adequately absorb the shocks of a large influx of refugees.v Given these underlying factors, it is necessary to understand the social and economic vulnerabilities of both Syrians and Jordanians in order to adequately address the sources of tension between the two.

The social and economic effects of the crisis in Jordan have proven to be devastating as public services, such as education and healthcare, have deteriorated. Finding employment has

also become increasingly challenging as competition between Syrian refugees and working-class Jordanians has raised unemployment and driven wages down and increased prices for basic necessities and fuel. These strains have not only undermined the protection environment for refugees, but also contributed to a hardening of attitudes toward refugee protection and assistance.

Many drivers of tension between refugees and host communities stem from systemic vulnerabilities that predate the Syrian crisis across communities in Jordan, especially in Zarqa, Mafraq and Irbid. Growing pressure on already constrained local resources is inflating housing rent prices, increasing competition for income-generating activities and overcrowding public sector services, particularly health and education. These do not originate from the Syrian crisis but are exacerbated by the exceeding strain they have come under as a result of the large influx of refugees. In light of the these tensions caused by the ongoing refugee situation in Jordan, it is necessary for the government of Jordan to rehabilitate and reinforce the socioeconomic infrastructure affected by the crisis as well as strengthen capacities to deliver basic social services to vulnerable people living inside Jordan.

Impact on Host Communities Historically, Jordan has been open to many refugee populations, specifically Iraqi and Palestinian refugees. There has been an open-border policy in effect for Syrian refugees, exempting them from visa requirements to enter and residence

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40

The social and economic effects of the crisis in Jordan have proven to be devastating as public services, such as education and healthcare, have deteriorated. permits to stay. However, Jordan remains a resource-poor country. Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s financial constraints and infrastructure limitations have negatively affected its traditionally welcome attitude towards refugees. Increased pressure on limited public services in Jordanian host communities is currently seen as the main current threat to social cohesion, resulting in tensions within host communities. Essential services and resources in this regard include access to affordable housing, municipal services, education, and prospects for income-generating opportunities, which all emerge as drivers of tension. As the refugee population in host communities continues to grow, the discrepancy between supply and demand for resources further expands, intensifying an already precarious situation.

Jordan may be known for its generosity, but generosity has its limits. Despite an initial warm welcome, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s humanitarian policy of receiving Syrian refugees fleeing conflict has inevitably resulted in high socioeconomic costs. Besides refugees straining the education, health and employment sectors of Jordan, they

have saturated housing markets, which have led to steep rent increases for both refugees and locals. Commodity prices have also increased while wages have decreased, which has further fueled tensions between refugees and host communities. In Mafraq, for example, a poll conducted in September 2012 reports that 80% of residents feel that the Syrian refugees should be housed in refugee camps segregated from the community.vi Such a response reflects the underlying tensions amongst host communities.

The influx of international donor assistance has primarily benefited Syrian refugees and excluded local host communities. Because of this, Jordanians, who often have the same living conditions as the Syrians, feel neglected by the international community and become resentful. For example, Syrian children receive free school bags though UNICEF, while Jordanian children do not. Jordanianâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s attitudes towards Syrians can be understood through a nationwide poll in which 65% of Jordanians opposed admitting more Syrians into the country and 80% favored segregating Syrian populations into camp communities.vii Employment The economic situation of refugee households in urban areas in Jordan is deteriorating. Depletion of household resources and the high cost of housing combined with limited formal incomegenerating activities contribute to high levels of poverty and increasing food insecurity. As a result, many are resorting to risky coping mechanisms including child labor and early marriage of children. It is estimated that Syrian

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41 refugees in Jordan comprise about 8.4% of the workforce in the informal sector in the four governorates that host the highest numbers of refugees, Amman, Irbid, Zarqa and Mafraq, comprising as much as 3.5% of all employed persons.viii In Mafraq, economically active Syrians make up 9% of all employed.

40% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan are within the ages of 18-49, which provides excessive supply for the labor market.x Since Syrians provide qualified labor for lower wages than Jordanians, they dominate the labor market, which results in job opportunities diminishing and Jordanians losing their jobs. The influx of Syrian refugees has also increased competition for unskilled work in the informal sector due to the fact that they are not permitted to work legally in the country due to restrictions from the Jordanian Ministry of Labor.

For the few refugees that have been able to find work in the informal sector, the opportunities tend to be illegal, scarce, exploitative and insufficient.

Jordan has had longstanding employment problems, which has been exacerbated by the inflow of large numbers of Syrian refugees working illegally. The result of this increased supply of labor is a decline in the employment rate, an increase in unemployment and a decline in earnings as wages decrease. Because of this, the competition over jobs and livelihood opportunities is a growing source of tension between refugees and host communities, especially in poor area like Mafraq and Zarqa. Mahmoud Zaarour, a 28-year-old man working in his fatherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s paint company in Zarqa, blamed Syrian refugees for the lack of available work opportunities. Given

Zarqaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s already limited work positions in both the public and private sectors, Zaarour believes that refugees who work illegally must be fined or deported in order for Jordan to ensure its own citizens are employed first.

Housing The increased competition for scarce affordable housing serves as one of the main sources of refugee and host community tension. Housing has become a main issue in Jordan as a result of significant inflation in rental prices with a corresponding reduction in availability, impacting vulnerable host communities. Rising rental rates on current property are forcing Jordanian households to divert a large portion of their monthly income to housing costs. The rental market continues to inflate due to increased demand from the refugee influx coupled with a preexisting housing shortage. In Mafraq, for example, average rents have reportedly increased fourfold from 50 JD per month to 150â&#x20AC;&#x201C;200 JD.xi The combination of limited availability in some areas due to high demand along with high rents has led people to move into unfinished and poor-quality buildings or temporary shelters.

Community member Kawkab Atout of Zarqa expressed her frustration over her living situation after her landlord increased her rent from 150 JD per month to 300 JD in 2012, when Syrians began populating the city. When asked about what her ideal solution to the housing crisis would be, she suggested that all Syrian refugees, especially those in Zarqa, be sent to Zaatari or new camp in northern Jordan. In that way, the Jordanian government and the

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42 international community would become responsible for them, allowing her and other citizens of Zarqa to regain their previous lifestyles prior to 2012.

Socially, this has had significant consequences as young Jordanian men, for example, are frequently unable to afford housing, which delays or prevents them from getting married and starting a family. This disrupts the social norm in place as marriage delays are becoming more often.

Education The increase in refugee population in host communities is also stretching municipal services. As of March 2014, 9,612 refugee children have enrolled in public schools in host communities. xii While Jordan has graciously opened classes to refugees free of charge, there is a lack of absorptive capacity in public schools. For example, 41% of schools in host communities in Jordan are overcrowded, resulting in fewer supplies and higher teacher to pupil ratios.xiii Despite efforts of the Jordanian government and international agencies, education systems are unable to adequately manage the volume of demand in terms of the number of available places, equipment, qualified teachers and the psychosocial needs of children.

Currently, students must deal with overcrowded classrooms, which are insufficiently supported and unable to offer adequate educational or psychosocial support, and a lack of teachers and mental health professionals. To meet the high demand and ease stress on overcrowded and understaffed classrooms, the Jordanian

government has introduced second sessions of classes during the day, known as double shifts, in existing schools to accommodate the influx of Syrian children. This move has added to the strain on teachers and school infrastructure, as well as heightening social tensions between refugee and host communities. However, schools still require assistance in increasing their capacity to cope with rising demand, including extra teachers, administration, textbooks and stationery.

Among those refugee children who do attend school, there is significant concern within their families that the quality of education will be diminished due to the low levels of training and experience of newly hired teachers and reduced school hours. For example, many teachers in host schools are illequipped to assist traumatized children.

The increasing number of students also raises the work burden of teachers.

While other schools may have space, refugees and Jordanians alike may live far away and do not have the money for school supplies or transportation.

Health Care Gaining access to health care is a major problem for urban refugees as free health service for Syrians has increased the burden in the health sector and decreased the quality of services.

Many refugees arrived in Jordan with chronic illness and medical needs, and very high fertility rates compared with local populations, and have flooded the few hospitals and clinics where they can receive free services. Syrian refugee girls under the age of 18 years have been pressured into marriage in search of financial, physical, and livelihoods security for themselves and

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43 their families. As a result, a significant number of Syrian refugee girls have experienced serious health risks, such as anemia and high blood pressure, due to teen pregnancy.

The surging Syrian refugee population has put extraordinary stress on the healthcare system as the Ministry of Health has spent US $53 million to cover the health care needs of the Syrian refugees as of March 2014.xiv Despite high coverage, health facilities for both refugees and local populations are strained due to growing demand as increasing number of patients per doctor causes workload. While Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s health system has been made available to refugees until November 2014 when it was no longer able to cope with the additional burdens on its healthcare system, the specific nature of health problems presented by refugees, such as vaccine preventable and noncommunicable diseases and mental health needs, and the volume of demand have overburdened and overstretched local health facilities. A study of hospitals and health centers under the Ministry of Health in northern Jordan (Mafraq, Zarqa and Irbid) revealed that about one in ten of total patient visits were by Syrians, totaling 35,200 per month.xv Recommendations Despite Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own resource scarcity and weak infrastructure, its efforts towards refugees have been commendable. However, addressing the growing tensions in Jordan between Syrian refugees and the host population should be considered as part of a wider agenda of addressing structural vulnerabilities in host communities.

Due to the nature of these challenges, strengthening social cohesion and resilience in host communities in Jordan needs to be approached as a longer-term undertaking through an increase of the capacity of national, regional and local governments to deliver services. Finding successful solutions to displacement is crucial for the development of Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s social, economic and political agendas.

Humanitarian programs generally remain short-term, costly and may have limited impact in terms of capacity development and sustainability. As so, international organizations must shift from a humanitarian approach to more sustainable programs aimed at meeting immediate needs while also contributing to increased resilience of households, communities and national systems. However, overall efforts to address the longer-term vulnerabilities of affected populations, particularly refugee -hosting communities, remain small scale relative to needs and the socioeconomic impact of the crisis.

Rapid expansion of engagement by development partners in the response is crucial to redressing this balance.

Addressing the growing tensions in Jordan between Syrian refugees and the host population should be considered as part of a wider agenda of addressing structural vulnerabilities in host communities.

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44 The government of Jordan must enhance development of the country to accommodate the increased demand for public services in Amman, Zarqa, Mafraq and Irbid for both refugee and Jordanian communities. Joint development projects are necessary to improve social relations between Jordanians and Syrian refugees, as well as enhance Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy and develop its infrastructure. Adequate funding for the humanitarian response to refugees should be complemented with increased development funding in order to support local government capacity and services, and to strengthen social cohesion within communities in Jordan. Without additional international support, there will be more competition for limited resources between refugees and their local hosts and consequently, a greater risk of tension between them.

Support for overextended host communities should be premised on strengthening infrastructure, building the capacity of local service providers, partnering with local authorities and businesses and procuring local supplies. Humanitarian assistance programs should also be made available for vulnerable local families impacted by the influx of refugees as a means of meeting their needs and preventing or reducing tension. Strengthening community-based activities would also be beneficial for building social cohesion and positive psychological benefits among Syrian refugees and Jordanians.

In order to address informal employment, the government of Jordan must facilitate legal work opportunities for Syrian refugees by issuing them

work permits. Taxation policies toward Syrian workers that can create mutually beneficial outcomes for Jordanian and Syrian refugees alike should be explored. While Jordan should encourage refugees to continue to work in various labor fields in order to fill a void in the Jordanian economy since many of its nationals do not wish to fill these positions, public and private sector initiatives aimed at creating employment opportunities for refugees who have received vocational training should be promoted. Additionally, the scope and enforcement of existing local labor laws must be extended in order to encompass refugee children in Jordan and to protect them from child labor, abuse and exploitation.

The most vulnerable families and households in urban areas must be provided with sustained cash assistance in order to maintain the most basic standard of living, especially during the winter months where the increase in the cost of fuel will place a significant burden on refugee families without livelihood support or savings. Monthly cash assistance will be vital in ensuring that urban refugees do not fall further into vulnerability and can afford to feed their families, pay rent, repair or winterize shelters, and purchase clothing and basic household supplies.

Access to quality education must be expanded, which can be done by the international community providing a significant increase in support to the Jordanian government to build and staff an adequate number of new schools while also funding more teacher training programs. Vocational training opportunities for Syrians and Jordanians in urban settings must be expanded and improved. Training opportunities would

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45 provide refugees with (1) transferable skills that can be used to develop livelihood opportunities in both Jordan and Syria, and (2) psychosocial benefits associated with becoming engaged in meaningful activity outside of the house and meeting new people and networks. Support for informal learning opportunities, non-formal education and remedial education programs must also be increased. Overall, improving the quality of education requires working with local communities and teachers to prevent violence, reduce the size of classes and foster a positive and safe school atmosphere.

Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s public health system is overstretched as a lack of funding in the health sector and urgent needs of increased and improved staffing in order to meet increasing demand for medical services pose grave risks to health status and social stability. Jordan needs a significant investment from the donor community to sustain its health services for Jordanians and Syrian refugees, starting with reinstating free primary healthcare for all Syrian refugees. Medical infrastructure in Jordan must be strengthened with a focus on quality primary health care by training more physicians and nurses.

The capacity to provide more medicine, medical equipment, and mental and public health services to refugees in local hospitals must also be increased once the government restores free coverage. International donors must help hospitals and clinics in host communities meet the cost of treating thousands of extra patients daily, while funding additional health facilities in order to provide refugees with free healthcare again.

Conclusion Jordan has a long history of welcoming and hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees to settle throughout Jordan. Besides its borders, Jordan has also opened the education and health care systems to refugees with support from the international community.

However, the Syrian refugee crisis is taking a heavy economic and social toll on Jordanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s urban communities. Urban refugees are straining the education, health, workforce and until recently, healthcare sectors of host communities.

With competition over livelihoods and income-generating opportunities increasing, wages in the informal sector have also continued to decrease.

It is imperative to improve the conditions of Syrian refugees living in urban areas in Jordan as well as the situation confronting Jordanian citizens. Both groups face increasingly dire living conditions in overstretched neighborhoods, schools, and healthcare facilities throughout the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s cities.

Given this reality, urgent improvements to numerous policies and practices relating specifically to access to livelihoods, healthcare, and education are needed within Jordan. The above recommendations will serve to ensure the best possible response in the path to bettering the lives of hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians and their host communities in Jordan.

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Endnotes i UNFPA, “Regional Situation Report for Syria Crisis.” ii UNHCR, “Jordan Inter-Agency Operational Update.” iii Ibid. iv UNHCR, WFP & UNICEF. “Joint Assessment Review of the Syrian Refugee Response in Jordan.” v REACH. “Evaluating the Effect of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Stability and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities.” vi Elena Buryan, “Analysis of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq, Jordan.” vii Nicholas Seeley, “Most Jordanians Say No More Syrian Refugees.” viii Salem Ajluni & Mary Kawar, “The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market in Jordan. ix Ibid. x Oytun Orhan, “The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighboring Countries.” xi Buryan, “Analysis of Host CommunityRefugee Tensions in Mafraq, Jordan xii Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Planning and International, “National Resilience Plan 2014-2016.” xiii UNOCHA, “Comprehensive Regional The Claremont Journal of International Relations | Spring 2015