Physical security principles

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CONTRIBUTORS The success of this publication is directly related to the peer review process recognized by most professions. Security professionals, members of academia, and other subject matter experts contributed current information, conducted research, reviewed submissions, and provided constructive comments.

It is with sincere appreciation that I wish to thank the following individuals who contributed to Physical Security Principles: Michael E. Knoke, CPP Managing Editor Kevin E. Peterson, CPP Co-Editor

Peter E. Ohlhausen Technical Editor

Eva Giercuszkiewicz ASIS Project Manager

Evangeline Pappas ASIS Production Manager

Dana W. Adams, CPP James E. Beadel, PSP John Bekisz, Jr., PSP Howard J. Belfor, CPP Dennis R. Blass, CPP, PSP Geoffrey T. Craighead, CPP Eric Davidson, PSP Anthony V. DiSalvatore, CPP, PCI, PSP Lisa Dolan, CPP Colin Doniger, CPP, PSP Sean T. Doyle, PSP Richard L. Edmond, PSP

Heinrich F. Eisenberg, CPP James W. Ellis, CPP, PSP Chris Freeman, CPP, PSP Michael A. Franke, CPP, PSP Jeffrey R. Geiger, PSP Leo P. Gonnering, PSP Dawn V. Gregory, CPP Donald R. Green, CPP Richard A. Hawkins, CPP, PSP Edward C. Heisler, CPP, PSP Scott J. Hogan, PSP Jennifer L. Holcomb, PE, PSP Gregory L. Hurd, CPP Jeffrey C. Insdahl, PSP Richard W. Jackson, PSP Gregory W. Jarpey, PSP Keith L. Kambic, CPP Steven T. Kerley, CPP Myrah L. Kirkwood, CPP Glen W. Kitteringham, CPP Patrick W. Klaassen, PSP Daniel H. Kropp, CPP Robert F. Leahy, CPP, PSP Karl F. Langhorst, CPP Jeffrey S. Leonard, CPP, PSP Jennifer McLamb, CPP, PCI, PSP Dante I. Moriconi, CPP, PSP

Richard A. Michau, CPP Bonnie S. Michelman, CPP Monsie C. Mintz, CPP Owen J. Monaghan, CPP William J. Moore, PSP Luis H. Morales, CPP Thomas L. Norman, CPP, PSP Jaime P. Owens, CPP Kevin E. Peterson, CPP Doug Powell, CPP, PSP Robert Rowe, CPP, PSP Larry W. Simmons, CPP Rodney J. Taylor, CPP Francisco Tranchesi, CPP, PSP Ann Trinca, JD, CPP, PCI, PSP Mike A. van Drongelen, CPP, PCI, PSP

INTRODUCTION

Physical Security Principles is meant to serve three purposes. First, the authors, reviewers, and other contributors hope that security professionals worldwide will find it to be a valuable desk reference on aspects of the practice of physical security.

Second, the book may be an appropriate text for college and CTE (career and technical education) courses related to physical security. Third, it is a great reference as it contains the breadth and depth necessary for everyone interested in obtaining a certification in physical security.

Our intent throughout is to present, discuss, and contrast principles and practices in a complementary fashion and demonstrate their interrelatedness in every organization and every setting on a global scale. The objective for the security professional is to leverage longstanding, widely accepted concepts and tailor them to the particular situation at hand to best meet the identified protection objectives. All this must be done within the constraints of cost, time, space, culture, regulation, and operational needs. It is a challenge indeed, and this book is meant as a resource to help lay the groundwork for successful physical security projects in every situation.

Although physical security is only one element of a comprehensive protection strategy, it is generally the first thing that comes to mind for most people. It is a discipline that has always existed and most probably always will. As Bob McCrie, CPP, writes in The Handbook of Security by Professor Martin Gill:1 From the earliest known evidence, security became necessary for human existence.... A fundamental strategy was to use physical implementation wherever possible to protect from external incursions.

Often, geographic location could be significant for protection.... While geography eased the vulnerability for some communities, others required additional means of protection. An encompassing wall or physical barriers for protection [were often employed]. Posts, thick enclosures, heavy doors with stout closures, animals and traps all served to protect [communities].... Thus, a variety of physical and animate security resources emerged.

Today, with the confluence of physical threats, human threats, and cyber threats—in addition to the ever present natural and inadvertent threat—we live in an asymmetric world with respect to the risks we face. Still, physical security remains a key driver in asset protection programs in absolutely every setting, everywhere in the world. Physical and animate security resources continue to emerge. The techniques and tools of this discipline are applied in our homes and vehicles as well as in multinational corporations and government agencies. From the local convenience store to military installations, and from warehouses to data centers—physical security plays an essential role.

Each of this book’s four sections helps to define that role and offers practical, realworld tools for planning and implementing physical security in contemporary society.

Part I deals with the underlying concepts of security risk management and how they translate into effective and efficient security practices. An overview of design principles and practices is presented in Part II of the book. Part III addresses the specific tools and techniques within the framework of structural, electronic, and human means collaborating to satisfy protection objectives. Finally, Part IV addresses the project management aspects of security in both principle and practice. Appendices define key security terms and address special considerations for high-rise buildings.

Overall, we hope that this book will find use among practitioners as well as anyone involved or interested in the principles and practices of contemporary physical security.

In crafting this book, both in terms of content and format, we attempted to produce a pertinent and valuable resource for members of all three of those audiences. We sincerely hope we have achieved that objective.

CONTENTS Preface Contributors Introduction

P ART I RISK MANAGEMENT: THE BASIS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY Chapter 1. CONCEPTS IN SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 1.1 Taking a Strategic Risk Management Approach 1.2 The Security Risk Management Process 1.2.1 Considering Assets 1.2.2 A Comprehensive View of the Threat 1.2.3 Looking at Vulnerabilities 1.2.4 Analyzing the Risk 1.2.5 Protective Measures 1.3 Risk Mitigation 1.3.1 The Four Ds 1.3.2 The Five Avenues to Address Risk 1.3.3 Layered Security 1.4 Mitigation Measures References Chapter 2. FUNCTIONS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY 2.1 Definition and Purpose of Physical Security 2.2 Functions Versus Components of Physical Security 2.2.1 Structural Components 2.2.2 Electronic Components 2.2.3 Human Components 2.3 Peripheral Systems and Interfaces

References Chapter 3. PLANNING AND CONDUCTING PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS 3.1 General Risk Assessment Models and Considerations 3.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 3.2.1 Assets 3.2.2 Evaluating Threats 3.2.3 Vulnerabilities 3.2.4 Risk Analysis 3.2.5 Risk Mitigation 3.2.6 Leveraging Outside Expertise 3.3 Physical Security Assessments 3.3.1 Framing the Security Survey and Putting It in Context 3.3.2 Approaches to Physical Security Assessments 3.4 General Guidelines—Areas to Assess 3.4.1 Typical Areas and Items to Assess 3.4.2 Tests 3.5 Applying Assessment Results 3.6 Automated Assessment Tools References Chapter 4. MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS IN PHYSICAL SECURITY METRICS 4.1 Understanding Metrics 4.1.1 Benefits of a Security Metrics Program 4.1.2 Designing a Metrics Program 4.2 Physical Security Metrics 4.2.1 Physical Security Systems Metrics 4.2.2 Physical Security Personnel Metrics 4.2.3 Physical Security Compliance Metrics in the Public Sector 4.2.4 Presenting Aggregate Status for Physical Security Metrics 4.3 Additional Recommended Metrics

4.4 Application of Metrics Throughout This Book References

P ART II DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES Chapter 5. BASIC DESIGN CONCEPTS 5.1 Design Principles 5.1.1 Point Versus Area Security 5.1.2 Conflict Avoidance 5.1.3 Balance 5.1.4 Additional Design Elements 5.2 Examples of Design Practices: Good and Not So Good References Chapter 6. INFLUENCING FACTORS IN PHYSICAL SECURITY DESIGN 6.1 Characteristics of the Assets under Protection 6.2 Characteristics of the Building or Facility 6.2.1 Ownership and Occupancy 6.2.2 Purpose of the Facility 6.2.3 Access 6.3 Characteristics of the Surroundings 6.4 Characteristics of the Location 6.5 Additional Influencing Factors 6.5.1 Selecting Mitigation Options Based on Influencing Factors References Chapter 7. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND ENGINEERING 7.1 Design Overview 7.2 Codes and Regulations 7.3 Project Requirements

7.4 Type of Construction 7.5 Site Layout 7.5.1 Perimeter 7.5.2 Lighting 7.5.3 Building Design Against Blast 7.5.4 Building Access 7.6 Material Selection 7.6.1 Building Structure 7.6.2 Facades 7.6.3 Interior Layout 7.6.4 Glazing 7.7 Site Utilities 7.7.1 HVAC 7.7.2 Emergency Power 7.7.3 Other Utilities 7.8 Life Safety Systems 7.8.1 Evacuation 7.8.2 Shelter-in-Place 7.9 Publications Relevant to Security Architecture and Engineering References Chapter 8. INTEGRATED SECURITY AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES 8.1 Integrated Electronic Security Systems 8.2 Integrated Physical Security Elements 8.3 Integrated Security Programs 8.4 Integration in Enterprise Risk Management References

P ART III PHYSICAL SECURITY AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES Chapter 9. STRUCTURAL SECURITY MEASURES

9.1 Barriers 9.1.1 Walls 9.1.2 Doors 9.1.3 Windows and Other Openings 9.1.4 Roofs and Floors 9.1.5 Fencing and Perimeter Walls 9.1.6 Blocking Barriers 9.1.7 Symbolic and Natural Barriers 9.2 Containers and Vaults 9.2.1 Safes 9.2.2 Vaults 9.3 Locks and Locking Mechanisms 9.3.1 Mechanical Locks 9.3.2 Electrified Locking Mechanisms 9.3.3 Designing Security Locking Systems 9.4 Lighting and Security Applications 9.4.1 Types of Lighting Equipment and Lamps 9.4.2 Lighting Challenges 9.4.3 Characteristics of Light and Lighting 9.4.4 Overview of Lighting Systems 9.4.5 Economic Considerations 9.4.6 Starting and Restrike 9.4.7 Security Lighting for Selected Applications 9.4.8 Lighting Considerations for Electronic Surveillance Systems 9.4.9 Standards for Security Lighting Levels References Chapter 10. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIROMENTAL DESIGN 10.1 Principles of CPTED 10.1.1 Criminal Behaviors and Patterns 10.1.2 Later Developments in CPTED 10.2 Tools of CPTED 10.2.1 Tools That Address the Three Elements of CPTED 10.2.2 Reducing Crime Through Architectural Design

10.2.3 Access Control, Surveillance, and Territorial Reinforcement 10.3 CPTED Applications in Various Settings 10.3.1 Commercial Office Buildings 10.3.2 Industrial Buildings and Facilities 10.3.3 Parking Facilities 10.3.4 Schools 10.3.5 Automated Teller Machines (ATMS) 10.3.6 U.S. Federal Buildings 10.4 Integration of CPTED and Traditional Security 10.5 One Example of a CPTED Survey Template References Chapter 11. ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS 11.1 Access Control Systems 11.1.1 Personnel Access Control 11.1.2 Locks 11.2 Contraband Detection 11.2.1 Metal Detectors 11.2.2 Package Search 11.2.3 Explosives Detection 11.2.4 Chemical and Biological Agent Detection 11.3 Physical Intrusion Detection Systems 11.3.1 Performance Characteristics 11.3.2 Standards 11.3.3 Exterior Sensors 11.3.4 Interior Sensors 11.4 Video Surveillance 11.4.1 Functional Requirements 11.4.2 Theory of Visual Security 11.4.3 Uses of Video Subsystems in Security 11.4.4 Analog System Components 11.4.5 Digital System Components 11.4.6 System Design 11.4.7 Equipment Selection

11.4.8 Additional Design Considerations for Video Assessment 11.4.9 Evaluation of Video Assessment Systems 11.4.10 Maintenance 11.4.11 Future of Video Surveillance Systems 11.5 Communications and Annunciation Systems 11.5.1 AC&D Attributes 11.5.2 Alarm Communication Subsystem 11.5.3 Security Communications 11.5.4 Alarm Control and Display 11.6 Trends and Issues in Electronic Systems Integration References Chapter 12. SECURITY OFFICERS AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5

Security Officer Utilization Growth Contemporary Challenges Determining the Need for a Security Force Security Force Models Basic Security Officer Functions 12.5.1 Access Control 12.5.2 Patrol 12.5.3 Inspection 12.5.4 Monitoring 12.5.5 Emergency Response 12.5.6 Traffic Control 12.5.7 Dealing with Disturbed People 12.5.8 Escort 12.5.9 Special Assignments 12.5.10 Record Keeping 12.6 Security Officer Roles 12.6.1 Public Relations/Management Representative 12.6.2 Intelligence Agent 12.6.3 Enforcement/Compliance Agent 12.6.4 Legal Consultant 12.6.5 Physical Security Specialist

12.7 Uniforms and Equipment 12.7.1 Weapons 12.8 Security Officer Selection 12.8.1 ASIS Guideline PSO-2010 12.8.2 Canadian General Standards Board CAN/CGSB-133.1-99 12.8.3 Personal Attributes 12.9 Security Officer Training 12.9.1 Key Training Concepts 12.9.2 Benefits of Training 12.9.3 Identifying Training Requirements 12.9.4 Methods of Training 12.9.5 The Training Process 12.9.6 Obstacles to Providing Training 12.9.7 Training Strategies 12.10 Managing the Security Officer Force 12.10.1 Personnel Requirements 12.10.2 General, Post, and Special Orders 12.10.3 Scheduling 12.10.4 Supervision 12.10.5 Quality Assurance and Quality Control 12.10.6 Quality Control Inspections 12.10.7 Management Use of Data 12.10.8 Enhancing Job Performance 12.11 Leveraging the Human Element References

P ART IV MANAGING PHYSICAL SECURITY PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS Chapter 13. PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT Chapter 14. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

14.1 System Design Principles 14.2 Initial Phases 14.3 Design Phases 14.3.1 Development of Design Criteria 14.3.2 Basis of Design 14.3.3 Conceptual Design 14.3.4 Design and Documentation 14.3.5 Specifications 14.3.6 Drawings 14.3.7 Design Coordination 14.4 Contracting 14.4.1 Initial Budget 14.4.2 Estimation Considerations 14.4.3 Types of Cost Estimates 14.4.4 Life-Cycle Cost 14.4.5 Sample Estimate 14.5 The Role of Consultants 14.6 Video Systems 14.6.1 The First Evolution: Analog to Digital 14.6.2 The Second Evolution: Standard Resolution to Megapixel 14.6.3 Processed Video, Video Analytics, and Intelligent Video 14.6.4 Video Systems Integration 14.7 Merging Legacy Systems 14.7.1 Access Control Systems 14.7.2 Legacy Video Systems 14.7.3 Legacy Intercom Systems 14.7.4 Security Networks and Legacy Integration 14.8 Procurement 14.8.1 Procurement Forms 14.8.2 Procurement Process Chapter 15. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 15.1 Site Preparation 15.2 Contractor Coordination

15.3 Installation 15.3.1 Installation and Operation 15.3.2 Component Installation 15.3.3 Other Features and Considerations 15.3.4 Tuning the System 15.3.5 Maintaining the Operating Procedures 15.4 Testing and Warranty Issues 15.4.1 Predelivery or Factory Acceptance Testing 15.4.2 Site Acceptance Testing 15.4.3 Reliability or Availability Testing 15.4.4 Post-Implementation Testing 15.4.5 Warranty Issues 15.5 Training 15.5.1 General Training Requirements 15.5.2 Training Topics References Chapter 16. FOLLOW-ON AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 16.1 Maintenance 16.1.1 Remedial Maintenance 16.1.2 Preventive Maintenance 16.2 Evaluation 16.3 Replacement APPENDICES A. B. INDEX

Key Terms and Definitions Physical Security and Life Safety Considerations in High-Rise Buildings

TABLE OF FIGURES

1-1

Risk Management

1-2

The Four Ds

2-1

Relationship of Physical Security Concepts, Functions, and Measures

3-1

Comparative Perspectives on Topics to Consider in a Security Survey

3-2

SWOT Analysis Diagram

4-1

Enterprise Performance Framework

4-2

Total Forced Doors by Week

4-3

Total Forced Doors and Turnstiles by Week

4-4

Forced Door Details by Location and Week

4-5

Total Held Open Doors by Week

4-6

Total Unauthorized Access Attempts by Type and Week

4-7

Contractor Response Time by Completion Status and Month

4-8

Actual Contractor Response Time by Completion Status and Month

4-9

Metrics Summary Chart

5-1

HVAC/Environmental Control Systems at High-Tech Facilities

5-2

Design Features of a Professional Office Campus

5-3

Stylish Way to Segregate a Generator and Loading Dock

5-4

A Unique Terrain-Based Approach to Standoff

5-5

A Good Practice: Separating Shipping and Receiving

5-6

Inefficient Placement of Surveillance Cameras

5-7

First-Floor Office Lobby Using Compartmentation

5-8

Bollards...Protecting Half of a Driveway

7-1

Castel dell’Ovo, Naples, Italy

7-2

Castel Nuovo, Naples, Italy

7-3

Häme Castle, Hämeenlinna, Finland

7-4

Considerations in New Construction versus Retrofit/Renovation

7-5

Blast Pressure Effects on a Structure

7-6

Effects of Building Shape on Air Blast Loading Pressure Effects on a Structure

7-7

Security Zones

7-8

Effects of Progressive Collapse on Khobar Towers

7-9

Performance Conditions for Window System Response

7-10

Protecting Intakes for HVAC Systems

8-1

Survey Responses on Security Involvement in Nonsecurity Risks

9-1

Typical Chain Link Security Fence Installation

9-2

Typical Sizes of Wire and Mesh

9-3

Decorative Fencing in Concert with a Masonry Wall and Landscaping

9-4

Decorative Fencing with Top Barbs

9-5

Layout of Cable Fencing Used in Conjunction with Planting

9-6

Cross-Section View of Typical Bollard

9-7

Cross-Section View of a Retractable Bollard

9-8

Decorative Security Fencing with Supporting Bollards Spaced 1.5-3 ft. (0.5 to 0.9 m) Apart

9-9

Barrier Protection Ratings

9-10

Wedge Barriers

9-11

Installation of a Rising Wedge Barrier

9-12

Typical Rotating Edge Barrier

9-13

Custom Security Planter Barriers Installed in an Urban Professional Area

9-14

Planter Barriers Installed in a Sports Arena Setting with Logos

9-15

Cutaway of a Planter with an Interior Highway-Type Barrier

9-16

Jersey Barriers

9-17

Equivalent Pre-1972 and Current Classification Labels for Fire-Resistant Safes

9-18

Summary of UL Designations and Labels for Fire-Resistant Containers

9-19

Lighting Straight Down

9-20

Appropriate Overlap Versus Coverage Gap for Pole-Mounted Outdoor Lighting

9-21

Natural and Visual Light Levels

9-22

Reflectance Measurements

9-23

Color Temperature

9-24

Color Rendition Index for Various Lamp Types

9-25

Lamp Starting and Restrike Times

9-26

Guidelines for Minimum Lighting Levels

10-1

Tool for Evaluating CPTED 3-D Factors

10-2

Signage to Clarify Procedures

10-3

Typical Elevator Lobby

10-4

Berm and Tree Line for Perimeter Control and Privacy

10-5

Access and Hours

10-6

Layouts to Avoid

11-1

Bistatic Microwave Sensors

11-2

Glass Break Sensor

11-3

Shape of Microwave Detection Zone

11-4

Network Types and Required Transmission Media

11-5

Common IP Resolutions

11-6

Multiplexing on a Pair of Wires

11-7

Elements of Multiplexing

11-8

Simplified Time Division Multiplex System

11-9

Frequency Inverter

11-10 Band Splitter 11-11 Placement of Operator Controls in an AC&D Console 12-1

Uniforms and Equipment

12-2

Employment Screening Criteria

12-3

Training Criteria

12-4

Recommended Training Topics

14-1

System Design Process

14-2

Requirements Analysis

14-3

Countermeasures Development Table

14-4

Typical Floor Plan

14-5

Typical Drawing Device Symbology

14-6

Security Door Elevation

14-7

Sample Riser Diagram

14-8

Sample Door Schedule

14-9

Sample Camera Schedule

14-10 Sample Cost Estimate Format (Circa 2007) 14-11 Sample Estimate B-1

Typical High-Rise

B-2

Fresh Air Intake Protection Scheme

PART I

RISK MANAGEMENT: THE BASIS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTS IN SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT

Whether in the public or private sector, and whether dealing with traditional or cyber security (or both), assets protection is increasingly based on the principle of risk management.2 The term risk management has been in common use in other fields (such as insurance, business, research and development, and engineering) for many years.

However it has more recently been applied in security management and assets protection. The concept is a perfect fit since security’s primary objective is to manage risks by balancing the cost of protection measures (including physical security) with their benefit. To manage risk effectively, a security professional would eliminate or reduce the total number of incidents leading to loss. A goal of risk management is to manage loss effectively at the least cost. In fact, many professionals believe that “risk is the most significant factor that drives the deployment of security” (Vellani, 2007, p.

234).

1.1

TAKING A STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH Too often organization leaders look to the quick fix to satisfy their security needs. They buy a popular security system or are convinced by a sales representative that a particular product or service is the all-encompassing answer to their protection needs. They are convinced that their critical assets are then completely safe without ever asking what those assets are or what types of threats they face. Vellani (2010, p. 3) observes: [T]oo often recommendations...are presented with little or no thought as to why certain procedures or security equipment should be used.... Often, a security measure is deployed because other companies are doing it...[or] without [a] complete understanding of the problem.

Similarly, Gardner (1995) writes: One critical area...where outside professional advice is [too] seldom sought...is security and loss prevention. Too often, [assets protection] measures, if they exist at all, are implemented as a hurried reaction to a bad experience. These are frequently emotional rather than logical decisions.

Little or no research is done. Little effort is made to distinguish between real and perceived problems. No consideration is given to alternatives. The end result is a collection of independently operating procedures that, in some cases, may actually make matters worse. The benefits of a thoughtfully designed and coordinated system are lost. The patchwork approach to problem solving works no better in loss prevention than it does in the rest of the business world.

The solution is to develop a comprehensive assets protection strategy based on a strategic risk management approach. Taking a strategic approach means basing the enterprise’s assets protection practice on sound planning, management, and evaluation, and taking into consideration both the organization’s mission and the environment in which it operates. A strategy should articulate—to all involved —what is being protected, why it is being protected, and how it is being protected (Peterson, 2009).

The National Infrastructure Protection Center (2002) defines risk management as “a systematic and analytical process by which an organization identifies, reduces and controls its potential risks and losses.” It further states that risk management •

offers a rational and defendable method for making decisions about expenditure of scarce resources and the selection of cost-effective countermeasures to protect valuable assets,

•

improves the success rate of an organization’s security efforts, and

•

helps security professionals and key decision makers answer the question “how much security is enough?”

Risk management should be a strong underlying consideration, regardless of whether a security professional is conducting an assessment, crafting a security program for an organization, building security into a facility, or drawing up a physical security system design. Like a computer’s operating system, it should always be running in the background, influencing decisions and guiding actions.

1.2

THE SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS The components of a risk management process are shown in Figure 1-1. The

process begins by establishing the context of the risk through communication and consultation with stakeholders and then conducting a comprehensive risk assessment (described further in Chapter 3, Planning and Conducting Physical Security Assessments). The assessment results in decisions on the suite of protective measures that will form the comprehensive assets protection strategy for an organization, facility, or other asset.

1.2.1

CONSIDERING ASSETS The first step in risk assessment is identification and valuation of assets. As Gardner (1995) asserts, “The first step in establishing [any] effective [assets protection] program involves identifying the business’s assets.” Although this step is frequently overlooked, no effective security program can be implemented without a thorough understanding (on the part of both the asset owner and the security professional) of what is being protected—or should be protected. All types of assets—tangible, intangible, and mixed—should be considered and incorporated into the risk assessment process. Too often, asset owners and security professionals focus exclusively on tangible assets or on those that appear on the accountant’s balance sheet. This is particularly true in the case of

physical security decisions. Security professionals and planners must incorporate the protection of intangible assets into their facility and security systems designs.

1.2.2

A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE THREAT Enterprises face a wide variety of threats, which fall into three categories: intentional, natural, and inadvertent. A comprehensive, and hence more meaningful, threat and vulnerability analysis, which is the first step, will consider all three categories. Since September 11, 2001, it is common to focus heavily (sometimes almost exclusively) on the terrorist threat when conducting corporate or organizational risk analyses. However, terrorism is only one aspect of one category of threats (intentional). The tendency to focus on one threat is not new. In the mid-1980s, for example, there was an overemphasis on the theft of advanced technology. At other times, the security community has focused too heavily on white-collar crime, cyberattacks, natural disasters, or other calamities.

Physical security planning should adopt an all hazards perspective—in other words, a balanced approach that looks at the big picture and identifies that in the context of risk, a hazard is a contributing factor to a peril. Some types of threats are more prevalent at certain times and in certain places. Long-term assets protection strategies, however, must be based on a realistic, full scope and balanced threat assessment. According to Winkler (1997, p. 37): Accurate assessment of the level of threat against your organization is critical to the success of your...security plan.... Threat is an essential factor in your risk reduction formula, and you must consider it carefully. If you don’t, you’ll simply be flying blind when it comes to prioritizing countermeasures....

1.2.3

LOOKING AT VULNERABILITIES Vulnerability is commonly viewed as a security weakness, gaps in an asset’s protection or problem. However, some vulnerabilities are simply existing conditions or business practices that support mission accomplishment. For example, engaging in sales by e-commerce can be viewed as a vulnerability, but it may also be an essential way of conducting business for a particular company.

One definition of vulnerability is “a weakness or organizational practice that may facilitate or allow a threat to be implemented or increase the magnitude of a

loss event” (ASIS International, 2007, p. 8).

An important difference between a threat and a vulnerability is that a vulnerability is a characteristic of the organization or facility. As such, it is generally something over which the organization can exercise at least some degree of control. Threats, on the other hand, are usually outside the control of the organization.

1.2.4

ANALYZING THE RISK This step of the security risk management process has two important roles. First, it introduces the concept of the impact3 of a loss event. While the threat and vulnerability considerations are included in the first step and address the likelihood and nature of a potential loss event or undesirable action, the impact factor deals with the severity of the situation if something does occur. This is important because not all incidents have the same effect on the safety or security posture of an organization’s facility or mission (i.e., strategic business goals).

The second role for risk analysis is to place the identified risks in some sort of priority or sequence of importance. This priority assists decision makers in determining which risks to address first or where to allocate resources in the most effective manner. The priority may be organized by category (e.g., risk of physical damage, risks to people, mission or operational risk, infrastructure risk, etc.) or in other ways (such as by level of projected mitigation cost, monetary value or suggested timeframe to address). Risk analysis is the process of identifying potential areas of loss, and implementing countermeasures to mitigate the probability of the loss.

Many corporate executives only want to hear about likely risks, but it is also important to consider low-probability/high-consequence risks (Garcia, 2000).

Examples of such risks are terrorist attacks, catastrophic workplace violence incidents, and major natural disasters. Again, the objective of a comprehensive assets protection strategy is to find the right balance between a focus on highprobability risks and low-probability (but high-consequence) risks.

1.2.5

PROTECTIVE MEASURES The next step is to recommend a suite of protective measures to effectively

address the relevant risks while considering available resources and any adverse impact on the enterprise’s mission and operations. This step includes the following tasks: •

Select. Although this may seem straightforward, it often is not. Security professionals should offer a menu of possible options to address the identified risks. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (2002) notes, “Whereas a single countermeasure may seem intuitive to an analyst or security manager, alternative countermeasures should be identified and evaluated to select those which offer an optimal trade-off between risk reduction and cost.” Options or option packages may be arranged by cost, urgency, convenience, aesthetics or some other factor. Even while offering a variety of options, the security professional should present a recommended option based on his or her expertise and understanding of the client’s needs. For example, while there are many countermeasures to locate listening devices, a professional should not overlook the advantages of a nonlinear junction detector as it is portable and will detect bugs even when they are turned off or malfunctioning.

•

Test. In many circumstances, recommended hardware, software, or procedures will have to be tested against several questions, such as these: — Does the solution operate as expected in this specific environment?

— Does the integration of different components of the overall system with one another seem to be successful?

— Is the solution operating as expected with other systems in the facility?

— Is the solution having the desired effect in terms of risk reduction?

— Are people (security staff, employees, and facility users) adapting well to the new solution?

— Can the short-term and long-term costs of operating the system be projected accurately?

In some cases, these questions cannot be answered until the solution is up and running. Thus it may be advisable to implement the solution (or parts of the solution) on a trial basis or in a limited physical area (e.g., part of the building) to allow for testing and working out the bugs.

•

Implement. This task may be simple or complicated depending on the

chosen solution. Factors to consider when implementing a solution include notification of employees (and visitors if applicable), cost of installation, possible disruption to facilities or access to them, possible downtime or partial facility closures, the need for signage to support the new solution, facility access for an installation team, necessary changes to policies and procedures, and the time needed for staff and employees to acclimate to the solution.

•

Train. Security staff, maintenance personnel, and other employees may need training on new hardware or procedures. This training must be factored into the cost of the solution in terms of time and money, and it should be incorporated into the overall implementation plan.

Additional information on these important steps is provided in Part IV, Managing Physical Security Projects and Programs.

Finally, risk management must be recognized as a cyclical process that must regularly reevaluate changes in assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and loss event impact. These factors are in constant flux and must be monitored carefully to ensure that the overall assets protection strategy and its components remain effective and efficient.

Although other factors (such as budgets, culture, and politics) also matter, the primary basis of an organization’s assets protection strategy should always be risk.

1.3

RISK MITIGATION Risk mitigation strategies involve the selection and implementation of security and other measures to address the identified and prioritized risks to an organization, facility, mission, or asset. Several concepts support risk mitigation strategies: the four Ds, the five avenues to address risk, and layered security.

The most effective protection programs are based on those foundational concepts.

1.3.1

THE FOUR Ds This is a classic principle in crime prevention, and it applies equally well to

almost any aspect of assets protection or security risk management. The four Ds are deter, detect, delay, and deny.

The first objective in protecting assets is to deter any type of attack or attempt by a potential adversary to cause harm.

The second objective, should deterrence fail, is to detect the attack, event, or situation. This can be done in a variety of ways, traditionally using surveillance and intrusion detection systems, human observation, or even a management system that is located on the outermost defensive layer to provide the earliest detection and immediately identifies or flags shortages or inconsistencies (e.g., an inventory tracking system that reports out-of-tolerance conditions).

Once an attack or attempt is in progress, security professionals want to delay the perpetrators (or the situation) enough either to convince them to give up the attempt or to allow an appropriate security, law enforcement, or other emergency response to the scene.

The ultimate objective is to deny the potential adversary access to the target (the asset or facility). Such denial is typically achieved through access controls and other physical, personnel-based, or technical security measures.

1.3.2

THE FIVE AVENUES TO ADDRESS RISK Five distinct avenues can be followed to address identified risks to various assets. The five avenues are risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk spreading, risk reduction, and risk acceptance. Generally, a comprehensive assets protection strategy incorporates a well-thought-out combination of all or most of these avenues.

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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI

Newala, too, suffers from the distance of its water-supply—at least the Newala of to-day does; there was once another Newala in a lovely valley at the foot of the plateau. I visited it and found scarcely a trace of houses, only a Christian cemetery, with the graves of several missionaries and their converts, remaining as a monument of its former glories. But the surroundings are wonderfully beautiful. A thick grove of splendid mango-trees closes in the weather-worn crosses and headstones; behind them, combining the useful and the agreeable, is a whole plantation of lemon-trees covered with ripe fruit; not the small African kind, but a much larger and also juicier imported variety, which drops into the hands of the passing traveller, without calling for any exertion on his part. Old Newala is now under the jurisdiction of the native pastor, Daudi, at Chingulungulu, who, as I am on very friendly terms with him, allows me, as a matter of course, the use of this lemon-grove during my stay at Newala.

FEET MUTILATED BY THE RAVAGES OF THE “JIGGER” (Sarcopsylla penetrans)

The water-supply of New Newala is in the bottom of the valley, some 1,600 feet lower down. The way is not only long and fatiguing, but the water, when we get it, is thoroughly bad. We are suffering not only from this, but from the fact that the arrangements at Newala are nothing short of luxurious. We have a separate kitchen—a hut built against the boma palisade on the right of the baraza, the interior of which is not visible from our usual position. Our two cooks were not long in finding this out, and they consequently do—or rather neglect to do—what they please. In any case they do not seem to be very particular about the boiling of our drinking-water—at least I can attribute to no other cause certain attacks of a dysenteric nature, from which both Knudsen and I have suffered for some time. If a man like Omari has to be left unwatched for a moment, he is capable of anything. Besides this complaint, we are inconvenienced by the state of our nails, which have become as hard as glass, and crack on the slightest provocation, and I have the additional infliction of pimples all over me. As if all this were not enough, we have also, for the last week been waging war against the jigger, who has found his Eldorado in the hot sand of the Makonde plateau. Our men are seen all day long—whenever their chronic colds and the dysentery likewise raging among them permit—occupied in removing this scourge of Africa from their feet and trying to prevent the disastrous consequences of its presence. It is quite common to see natives of this place with one or two toes missing; many have lost all their toes,

or even the whole front part of the foot, so that a well-formed leg ends in a shapeless stump. These ravages are caused by the female of Sarcopsylla penetrans, which bores its way under the skin and there develops an egg-sac the size of a pea. In all books on the subject, it is stated that one’s attention is called to the presence of this parasite by an intolerable itching. This agrees very well with my experience, so far as the softer parts of the sole, the spaces between and under the toes, and the side of the foot are concerned, but if the creature penetrates through the harder parts of the heel or ball of the foot, it may escape even the most careful search till it has reached maturity.

Then there is no time to be lost, if the horrible ulceration, of which we see cases by the dozen every day, is to be prevented. It is much easier, by the way, to discover the insect on the white skin of a European than on that of a native, on which the dark speck scarcely shows. The four or five jiggers which, in spite of the fact that I constantly wore high laced boots, chose my feet to settle in, were taken out for me by the all-accomplished Knudsen, after which I thought it advisable to wash out the cavities with corrosive sublimate. The natives have a different sort of disinfectant—they fill the hole with scraped roots. In a tiny Makua village on the slope of the plateau south of Newala, we saw an old woman who had filled all the spaces under her toe-nails with powdered roots by way of prophylactic treatment. What will be the result, if any, who can say?

The rest of the many trifling ills which trouble our existence are really more comic than serious. In the absence of anything else to smoke, Knudsen and I at last opened a box of cigars procured from the Indian store-keeper at Lindi, and tried them, with the most distressing results. Whether they contain opium or some other narcotic, neither of us can say, but after the tenth puff we were both “off,” three-quarters stupefied and unspeakably wretched. Slowly we recovered—and what happened next? Half-an-hour later we were once more smoking these poisonous concoctions—so insatiable is the craving for tobacco in the tropics.

Even my present attacks of fever scarcely deserve to be taken seriously. I have had no less than three here at Newala, all of which have run their course in an incredibly short time. In the early afternoon, I am busy with my old natives, asking questions and making notes. The strong midday coffee has stimulated my spirits to

an extraordinary degree, the brain is active and vigorous, and work progresses rapidly, while a pleasant warmth pervades the whole body. Suddenly this gives place to a violent chill, forcing me to put on my overcoat, though it is only half-past three and the afternoon sun is at its hottest. Now the brain no longer works with such acuteness and logical precision; more especially does it fail me in trying to establish the syntax of the difficult Makua language on which I have ventured, as if I had not enough to do without it. Under the circumstances it seems advisable to take my temperature, and I do so, to save trouble, without leaving my seat, and while going on with my work. On examination, I find it to be 101·48°. My tutors are abruptly dismissed and my bed set up in the baraza; a few minutes later I am in it and treating myself internally with hot water and lemon-juice.

Three hours later, the thermometer marks nearly 104°, and I make them carry me back into the tent, bed and all, as I am now perspiring heavily, and exposure to the cold wind just beginning to blow might mean a fatal chill. I lie still for a little while, and then find, to my great relief, that the temperature is not rising, but rather falling. This is about 7.30 p.m. At 8 p.m. I find, to my unbounded astonishment, that it has fallen below 98·6°, and I feel perfectly well. I read for an hour or two, and could very well enjoy a smoke, if I had the wherewithal—Indian cigars being out of the question.

Having no medical training, I am at a loss to account for this state of things. It is impossible that these transitory attacks of high fever should be malarial; it seems more probable that they are due to a kind of sunstroke. On consulting my note-book, I become more and more inclined to think this is the case, for these attacks regularly follow extreme fatigue and long exposure to strong sunshine. They at least have the advantage of being only short interruptions to my work, as on the following morning I am always quite fresh and fit.

My treasure of a cook is suffering from an enormous hydrocele which makes it difficult for him to get up, and Moritz is obliged to keep in the dark on account of his inflamed eyes. Knudsen’s cook, a raw boy from somewhere in the bush, knows still less of cooking than Omari; consequently Nils Knudsen himself has been promoted to the vacant post. Finding that we had come to the end of our supplies, he began by sending to Chingulungulu for the four sucking-pigs which we had

bought from Matola and temporarily left in his charge; and when they came up, neatly packed in a large crate, he callously slaughtered the biggest of them. The first joint we were thoughtless enough to entrust for roasting to Knudsen’s mshenzi cook, and it was consequently uneatable; but we made the rest of the animal into a jelly which we ate with great relish after weeks of underfeeding, consuming incredible helpings of it at both midday and evening meals. The only drawback is a certain want of variety in the tinned vegetables. Dr. Jäger, to whom the Geographical Commission entrusted the provisioning of the expeditions—mine as well as his own—because he had more time on his hands than the rest of us, seems to have laid in a huge stock of Teltow turnips,[46] an article of food which is all very well for occasional use, but which quickly palls when set before one every day; and we seem to have no other tins left. There is no help for it—we must put up with the turnips; but I am certain that, once I am home again, I shall not touch them for ten years to come.

Amid all these minor evils, which, after all, go to make up the genuine flavour of Africa, there is at least one cheering touch: Knudsen has, with the dexterity of a skilled mechanic, repaired my 9 × 12 cm. camera, at least so far that I can use it with a little care.

How, in the absence of finger-nails, he was able to accomplish such a ticklish piece of work, having no tool but a clumsy screw-driver for taking to pieces and putting together again the complicated mechanism of the instantaneous shutter, is still a mystery to me; but he did it successfully. The loss of his finger-nails shows him in a light contrasting curiously enough with the intelligence evinced by the above operation; though, after all, it is scarcely surprising after his ten years’ residence in the bush. One day, at Lindi, he had occasion to wash a dog, which must have been in need of very thorough cleansing, for the bottle handed to our friend for the purpose had an extremely strong smell. Having performed his task in the most conscientious manner, he perceived with some surprise that the dog did not appear much the better for it, and was further surprised by finding his own nails ulcerating away in the course of the next few days. “How was I to know that carbolic acid has to be diluted?” he mutters indignantly, from time to time, with a troubled gaze at his mutilated finger-tips.

Since we came to Newala we have been making excursions in all directions through the surrounding country, in accordance with old habit, and also because the akida Sefu did not get together the tribal elders from whom I wanted information so speedily as he had promised. There is, however, no harm done, as, even if seen only from the outside, the country and people are interesting enough.

The Makonde plateau is like a large rectangular table rounded off at the corners. Measured from the Indian Ocean to Newala, it is about seventy-five miles long, and between the Rovuma and the Lukuledi it averages fifty miles in breadth, so that its superficial area is about two-thirds of that of the kingdom of Saxony. The surface, however, is not level, but uniformly inclined from its south-western edge to the ocean. From the upper edge, on which Newala lies, the eye ranges for many miles east and north-east, without encountering any obstacle, over the Makonde bush. It is a green sea, from which here and there thick clouds of smoke rise, to show that it, too, is inhabited by men who carry on their tillage like so many other primitive peoples, by cutting down and burning the bush, and manuring with the ashes. Even in the radiant light of a tropical day such a fire is a grand sight.

Much less effective is the impression produced just now by the great western plain as seen from the edge of the plateau. As often as time permits, I stroll along this edge, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, in the hope of finding the air clear enough to let me enjoy the view; but I have always been disappointed.

Wherever one looks, clouds of smoke rise from the burning bush, and the air is full of smoke and vapour. It is a pity, for under more favourable circumstances the panorama of the whole country up to the distant Majeje hills must be truly magnificent. It is of little use taking photographs now, and an outline sketch gives a very poor idea of the scenery. In one of these excursions I went out of my way to make a personal attempt on the Makonde bush. The present edge of the plateau is the result of a far-reaching process of destruction through erosion and denudation. The Makonde strata are everywhere cut into by ravines, which, though short, are hundreds of yards in depth. In consequence of the loose stratification of these beds, not only are the walls of these ravines nearly vertical, but their upper end is closed by an equally steep escarpment, so that the

western edge of the Makonde plateau is hemmed in by a series of deep, basin-like valleys. In order to get from one side of such a ravine to the other, I cut my way through the bush with a dozen of my men.

It was a very open part, with more grass than scrub, but even so the short stretch of less than two hundred yards was very hard work; at the end of it the men’s calicoes were in rags and they themselves bleeding from hundreds of scratches, while even our strong khaki suits had not escaped scatheless.

NATIVE PATH THROUGH THE MAKONDE BUSH, NEAR MAHUTA

I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process

may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe— not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more, between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them— cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes, perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.

This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the secondary bush.

After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact, receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains, where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were accustomed to rule.

But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and

lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible, impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and come back to his starting point.

The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.

According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast, to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however, correct.

The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau, instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks and springs of the low country.

“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.

He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a stillborn child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which

was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In course of time, the couple had many more children, and called themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams, for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest wateringplace; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”

The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?

Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short, woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood, ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia, Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably) would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded

by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.

The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.

Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.

This knowledge is crystallized in the ancestral warning against settling in the valleys and near the great waters, the dwelling-places of disease and death. At the same time, for security against the hostile Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted that every settlement must be not less than a certain distance from the southern edge of the plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the present day. It is not such a bad one, and certainly they are both safer and more comfortable than the Makua, the recent intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain, especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the

most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.

The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.

It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding out how the back door is fastened.

MAKONDE LOCK AND KEY AT JUMBE CHAURO

This is the general way of closing a house. The Makonde at Jumbe Chauro, however, have a much more complicated, solid and original one. Here, too, the door is as already described, except that there is only one post on the inside, standing by itself about six inches from one side of the doorway. Opposite this post is a hole in the wall just large enough to admit a man’s arm. The door is closed inside by a large wooden bolt passing through a hole in this post and pressing with its free end against the door. The other end has three holes into which fit three pegs running in vertical grooves inside the post. The door is opened with a wooden key about a foot long, somewhat curved and sloped off at the butt; the other end has three pegs corresponding to the holes, in the bolt, so that, when it is thrust through the hole in the wall and inserted into the rectangular opening in the post, the pegs can be lifted and the bolt drawn out.[50]

MODE OF INSERTING THE KEY

With no small pride first one householder and then a second showed me on the spot the action of this greatest invention of the Makonde Highlands. To both with an admiring exclamation of “Vizuri sana!” (“Very fine!”). I expressed the wish to take back these marvels with me to Ulaya, to show the Wazungu what clever fellows the Makonde are. Scarcely five minutes after my return to camp at Newala, the two men came up sweating under the weight of two heavy logs which they laid down at my feet, handing over at the same time the keys of the fallen fortress. Arguing, logically enough, that if the key was wanted, the lock would be wanted with it, they had taken their axes and chopped down the posts—as it never occurred to them to dig them out of the ground and so bring them intact. Thus I have

two badly damaged specimens, and the owners, instead of praise, come in for a blowing-up.

The Makua huts in the environs of Newala are especially miserable; their more than slovenly construction reminds one of the temporary erections of the Makua at Hatia’s, though the people here have not been concerned in a war. It must therefore be due to congenital idleness, or else to the absence of a powerful chief. Even the baraza at Mlipa’s, a short hour’s walk south-east of Newala, shares in this general neglect. While public buildings in this country are usually looked after more or less carefully, this is in evident danger of being blown over by the first strong easterly gale. The only attractive object in this whole district is the grave of the late chief Mlipa. I visited it in the morning, while the sun was still trying with partial success to break through the rolling mists, and the circular grove of tall euphorbias, which, with a broken pot, is all that marks the old king’s resting-place, impressed one with a touch of pathos.

Even my very materially-minded carriers seemed to feel something of the sort, for instead of their usual ribald songs, they chanted solemnly, as we marched on through the dense green of the Makonde bush:—