IN-DEPTH BRIEFING //
Major Scott W Russell is the Chief of Operations of the 1st US Cavalry Division. He has been an exchange officer in the US Army since June 2023, and forward deployed to Eastern Europe with the Division HQ in May 2024.
DEPLOYING AN ARMOURED DIVISION: US ARMY FORCE PROJECTION
TThe Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
HE US Army routinely deploys armoured divisions overseas, which is something the British Army has not done since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. With the RussoUkraine War continuing in full spate and the NATO security context rapidly evolving, the British Army must give serious consideration to how it deploys its armoured forces to Eastern Europe and how it sustains them at warfighting consumption rates during large scale combat operations.
In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US demonstrated its commitment to NATO through its rapid surge of forces into Eastern Europe, and its longer-term commitment to enhance its Army Prepositioned Stocks in Europe. However, since January 2025, the US government has repeatedly stated that its European NATO allies must step up and take the lead for European security.1 A change in the US Army’s force posture or a realignment of capabilities in Eastern Europe is not inconceivable.2 And yet, the war in Ukraine rages on,
and this makes it all the more important that the British Army considers, with a critical eye, its own processes for deploying its armoured forces to Europe.
This In-Depth Briefing examines how the US Army projects its forces to Europe. Firstly, by focusing on the 1st Cavalry Division’s (1CD) 10-month rotational deployment in 2024, it outlines how armoured divisions are routinely deployed from the US to Europe. Secondly, it analyses how the US can project its forces rapidly overseas in the event of a crisis, highlighting the strategic value of the Army Prepositioned Stocks system for the US and NATO. Finally, having reviewed how the US Army deploys and sustains its armoured forces, the Briefing will then discuss considerations for the British Army in the deployment of its own forces to the continent.
US ARMY PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE
Following the Cold War, the US gradually began to reduce its presence in Europe. By 2014, whilst it maintained a substantial garrison presence in Germany,
the US Army had notably drawn down its troop numbers and capabilities.3 However, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Donbas, it began to reinforce its presence once again.
At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO announced the strengthening of its Eastern flank by establishing four Enhanced
1Olay, M. (2025) Hesgeth Calls on NATO Allies to Lead Europe’s Security, Rules Out Support for Ukraine’s Membership, US Government, Department of Defense Press Release dated 12 Feb 2025, available at: defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/ article/4064571/hegseth-calls-on-natoallies-to-lead-europes-security-rules-outsupport-for-ukr
2Whilst no plans have been announced to draw down US troops from Europe, it was reported in the media in March 2025 that the US Government is considering moving personnel from Germany to another European Country such as Hungary (Stringer, C. (2025) Trump Considers Pulling Troops out of Germany, The Telegraph, dated 7 March 2025, available at: telegraph.co.uk/ us/politics/2025/03/07/donald-trumpconsiders-pulling-troops-out-of-germany)
3Lostumbo, M., McNerney, M., Peltz, E., Eaton, D., Frelinger, D., Greenfield, V., Halliday, J., Mills, P., Nardulli, B., Pettyjohn, S., Sollinger, J., Worman, S. (2013) Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, RAND Research Report, p.8-9, available at: rand.org/pubs/research_ reports/RR201.html
AUTHOR
Forward Presence Battle Groups4 in Poland and the Baltics.5
The US not only assumed responsibility for the Polish Battle Group, but to reassure the alliance of its commitment to European security, it deployed an armoured brigade combat team to Poland in early 2017.6
When Russia began its largescale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US rapidly deployed a second armoured brigade combat team to Poland, along with other capabilities including a combat aviation brigade, and a division headquarters to provide command and control. Additionally, that same year, it deployed a third brigade, this time an infantry brigade combat team to Romania. Finally, to cohere all of its forces in Europe, the US Army permanently moved a forward HQ from V Corps to Poland.7
The initial surge of forces into Europe quickly evolved into a rotational division deployment, under the banner Op Atlantic Resolve. In early 2024, it was 1st Cavalry Division’s turn.
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION
1CD (‘First Team’) is the largest of four armoured divisions in the US Army’s III Armoured
in M1A2 Abrams tanks during a rotation at the National Training Center in California.
Corps. It is based in Fort Cavazos, Texas, and comprises three armoured brigade combat teams, a Stryker brigade combat team, a combat aviation brigade, a divisional artillery brigade and a sustainment brigade. The Division is around 21,500 personnel in size.
Since its formation in 1921, 1CD has participated in all major US military campaigns throughout the world. In the Second World War, it served in the Pacific campaign, where it acquired its honorific ‘First Team’ after its troops were the first to reach both Manilla and Tokyo. It was deployed during the wars in Korea and Vietnam. More recently, it was heavily involved in Iraq (both in 1991 and from 2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2021). Indeed, throughout the 20 years of the Global War on Terror, there was rarely a time when there was not at least one brigade from the Division deployed.
FORT CAVAZOS
To understand how the US Army deploys, it is necessary to understand how it is based in the US and how it manages its equipment fleet.
The US Army organises its forces into formation sized
installations. Fort Cavazos is one of the largest bases in the US, housing the entirety of 1CD, III Armoured Corps HQ and several independent brigades. On its doorstep, the Fort Cavazos Training Area has a wide array of ranges and sufficient training space to exercise an armoured brigade combat team or combat aviation brigade. The training area is vast; large enough that brigades can practice deployment operations and test their logistics chains.
The US Army does not employ the concept of ‘Whole Fleet Management’. Each formation holds its own fleet of vehicles which it maintains, trains and deploys. Those who have visited Fort Cavazos for a Warfighter exercise will no doubt recall seeing hundreds of Abrams, Bradleys, Strykers and more, all lined-up in motor pools side-by-side for four miles. Not to mention the full aircraft complement of the Combat Aviation Brigade, whose Apaches, Chinooks and Blackhawks fill hangers next to the airfield on post.
Fort Cavazos is well equipped to support the rapid deployment of armoured forces. It has its own railhead and staging area, from which brigades can deploy their equipment by rail down to Texas’ Gulf Coast ports or out west to the National Training Center. Additionally, not only does it have its own airfield, but it is located next to a regional civilian airport.
TRAINING FOR THE DEPLOYMENTS
As in the British Army, the US Army has a comprehensive
training policy to ensure that its units are ready for operations. Brigades build readiness by progressing through a series of training tables, including gunnery tables (live fire progressions), staff tables (command post exercises) and field exercises. One of the main events to which armoured brigade combat teams focus their training is National Training Center rotations, which are designed to certify brigades ahead of deployments or high readiness periods. National Training Center rotations, located in Fort Irwin, California, are demanding exercises in which brigades manoeuvre against an opposing force brigade designed to test them against enemy tactics, techniques and procedures.
Division HQs also complete a training progression before certification. 1CD participated in a Warfighter exercise in summer 2023 and subsequently in a major corps-level exercise at Fort Cavazos Training Area in November 2023, which included
4These are now referred to as Forward Land Forces (FLF) BGs in 2024 NATO parlance.
5NATO (2024), NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance, available at: nato. int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
6Ibid; US DoD (2017) EUCOM Commander: US Armored Brigade’s Deployment to Poland ‘Significant’, DoD News, available at: army.mil/ article/180629/eucom_commander_us_ armored_brigades_deployment_to_poland_ significant
7Vandiver, J. (2022) ‘Built for this mission’: Most of V Corps’ HQ shifts from US to Europe in response to Russia, Start and Stripes, 4 Mar 2022, available at: stripes. com/theaters/europe/2022-03-04/v-corpsus-army-hq-europe-5222264.html
Soldiers assigned to 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, wait for orders while guarding their sector
U.S. Army photo by Master Sgt. Horace Murray
a live armoured brigade combat team wet-gap crossing.8 In the future, there are plans to deploy entire armoured divisions on National Training Center rotations.
Deployment and redeployment operations are an important aspect of training during National Training Center rotations. Armoured brigade combat teams prepare and move their vehicles and equipment to and from the Center by rail and deploy over 3,000 personnel. Whilst US armoured brigade combat teams are accustomed to doing this, the efforts to load and transport hundreds of armoured vehicles is no mean feat. Fort Cavazos to the National Training Center is almost 1,500 miles. That they do this as a matter of routine belies the training advantage that such deployment operations have; the US Army is well drilled in the logistics of deploying its armoured brigade combat teams.
DIVISION HQ LAYDOWN
In United States European Command, US divisions are not deployed as single units. 1CD deployed its division HQ, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (1/1CD), combat aviation brigade, divisional artillery and sustainment brigade, and it did so in a staggered deployment over a six-month period from January-June 2024. Its second armoured brigade combat team came from the 4th Infantry Division and was already in theatre when it deployed. This rotational laydown has two implications. Firstly, for the deployed division HQ, there is rarely a period when there is not at least one brigade conducting a relief in place, and secondly, it means that large elements of each deployed division will be left back in the US. For 1CD, two armoured brigade combat teams remained back at Fort Cavazos, and its Stryker brigade combat team was deployed on rotation to Korea9 and due to return midway
through the European Command deployment. The armoured brigade combat teams both had upcoming National Training Center rotations, and one was preparing to deploy to Europe in 2025. The requirement to provide command and control for these brigades meant that the division HQ was required to split itself to maintain a robust rear HQ.
Fortunately, division HQs in the US Army are large enough that they have the capacity to do this. In addition to their core strength, they are supported by Army National Guard Main Command Post Operational Detachments.10 These detachments are purposebuilt organisations that are aligned to division HQs, which regularly train with them and augment them on operations. 1CD is supported by the Main Command Post Operational Detachment from the Texas Army National Guard, which mobilised to support them in European Command. Compared to the British Army Reserve, personnel from which can also be mobilised to backfill HQs on operations, the difference is that the detachments are specifically designed and trained for that purpose. They are composed of a range of specialists, with appropriate skills, training and expertise to allow them to plug into division staff sections.
DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS
Regarding the deployment itself,
to comply with EU directives, the first stage in deploying brigades from the US is to have all vehicles and equipment undergo a deep clean and agricultural sanitation, before then being moved to the railhead to be loaded and transported to port. This can take a month, give or take. Port operations can take a few weeks, and vessels usually take three to five weeks to reach Europe. On arrival, it then takes time to download the vessels and move equipment to forward operating sites. All in, it took about three months from starting the deep clean at Fort Cavazos for equipment to arrive in Eastern Europe.
Deploying a single armoured brigade combat team is complicated; deploying a division through a single mounting centre is complex. Minor delays to a single aspect of one brigade’s movement can have compound impacts for the other brigades. Intricate coordination is required. 1CD treated the deployment as a deliberate operation and planning started around nine months out. During execution, all aspects were carefully tracked to allow dynamic adjustments to be made to keep the deployment on ‘glidepath’.
‘SPIDERS ON A BOAT’
Of course, no amount of planning can account for every problem. A vessel containing
a large portion of 1/1CD’s equipment had a spider infestation. The infestation was discovered mid-way across the Atlantic forcing the vessel to return to Texas for fumigation, adding over a month to its deployment timeline. And in an unfortunate coincidence, another vessel carrying the remaining equipment from the same brigade broke down twice and arrived even later.
Although this placed pressure on the relief in place window, incumbent brigades do not begin to outload their equipment until incoming brigades arrive. By keeping one foot on the ground, the risk to mission can be reduced during periods of transition. Additionally, building redundancy into the timeline is essential to minimise the risk that deployment delays will impact the incumbent division’s redeployment. Fortunately, there was sufficient redundancy in 1/1CD’s timeline that it was not necessary to extend the incumbent brigade’s deployment.
With the timelines involved, careful synchronisation proved essential. The division’s outflow to Europe had to be completed without impacting the training of the remaining armoured brigade
8Dumas, D. (2023) ‘First Team’ troopers participate in Remagen Ready 24-1, US Army press release, available at: army. mil/article/271549/first_team_troopers_ participate_in_remagen_ready_24_1
9Espinel, L. (2024) 3rd Cavalry Regiment arrives in South Korea as Rotational Force, US Army press release, available at: army. mil/article/273338/3rd_cavalry_ regiment_arrives_in_south_korea_as_ rotational_force
10US DoD (2021), FM 3-94: Armies, Corps and Division Operations, Department of the Army Field Manual, at 5-11; Dalzell, S., Schnaubelt, C., Linick, M., Gulden, T., Colabella, L., Straus, S., Sladden, J., Jensen, R., Olson, M., Donohue, A., Hastings, J., Reininger, H., and Speed, P. (2019) Main Command Post-Operational Detachments (MCP-ODs) and Division Headquarters Readiness, RAND Research Report dated 3 June 2019, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_ reports/RR2615.html
An Abrams tank belonging to the 1st Cavalry Division is loaded onto railheads at the port of Esbjerg in Denmark during a week-long joint reception, staging and onward movement operation conducted by the British US and Danish armies in June 2024.
U.S. Army photo by Spc. Samuel Signor
combat teams, whilst ensuring that relief in place timelines were met in sufficient time to allow the incoming brigades to reach full operating capability in time for the NATO training exercises to which they were aligned.
RAPID DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO CRISIS
So far, this In-Depth Briefing has discussed how divisions and armoured brigade combat teams deploy with their organic equipment sets on operations. However, even for a well-oiled machine such as the US Army, moving large volumes of heavy equipment overseas takes time. So, how does the US project force rapidly during a crisis? This is where Army Prepositioned Stock comes in.
The US Department of Defense has enormous quantities of equipment and supplies prepositioned strategically around the world. Whilst it is well known that the US has large amounts of ammunition stored in Europe, the scale of Army Prepositioned Stock goes way beyond this. For example, entire armoured brigade combat teams’ worth of vehicles and equipment are maintained at high readiness in environmentally controlled warehouses.
The programme was established during the Cold War and remains a ‘cornerstone of the [US] Army’s ability to rapidly project power’.11 According to Department of Defense doctrine, the strategic prepositioning of equipment acts as a deterrence to potential adversaries, whilst reassuring allies of US commitment and providing a range of options to the US government to respond to crises.12 There are currently seven Army Prepositioned Stock sites (in Europe, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South America and Africa, and a further one afloat and one based in the US). These include operational project stocks, comprising all classifications of supply items
(ammunition, fuel, medical stores and more), and ‘Unit Sets’, which include sufficient equipment and vehicles to fully equip an armoured brigade combat team. Conceptually, if the US Army needs to deploy forces at ‘no notice’, it can direct a brigade to simply board aircraft and deploy – carrying only their essential personal equipment – to a theatre, where they will draw an entire equipment set and enough supplies to sustain them at warfighting consumption rates until a supply chain can be established.13
The value of Army Prepositioned Stock can be seen from its employment in the Iraq War in 2002/3, when a significant amount of equipment was repositioned to Kuwait from several sites and then issued to US forces on their arrival –‘the vanguard for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was predominantly equipped with Army Prepositioned Stock material’.14
More recently, in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US deployed circa 7,000 soldiers to Europe.15 This included the rapid deployment of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division (1/3ID) to Poland, which received its entire equipment holdings from Army Prepositioned Stock when it arrived in theatre. The speed of 1/3ID’s deployment highlights
the utility of the programme:
n 24th February: Russian invaded Ukraine;
n 24th February: 1/3ID ordered to deploy to Germany; n 24th February: 405th Army Force Support Brigade, based in Germany, ordered to issue Army Prepositioned Stock equipment to 1/3ID;
n 27th February: 1/3ID begin to deploy personnel from Georgia, US, to Germany; n 27th February – 24th March: 405th Army Force Support Brigade bring equipment out of Army Prepositioned Stock storage sites, transport them to a staging area and prepare them for handover;
n 14th March – 1st April: Entire armoured brigade combat team equipment set is issued to 1/3ID;
n 1st April: Army Prepositioned Stock issue complete; 1/3ID at full combat capability.16
This was the first time that the Army Prepositioned Stock in Europe had issued a full unit set to facilitate the rapid deployment of an armoured brigade combat team, and in its wake the Department of Defense conducted a detailed review.17 Whilst it identified several areas for improvement, the speed of the draw still shows the utility that the system provides the US Army in facilitating deployments overseas at pace. Within little over a month of receiving a ‘no
notice’ deployment order, 1/3ID had deployed to Germany, taken over an equipment set and was fully combat ready. In the future, by learning the lessons from 1/3ID’s deployment, the process should be significantly faster.
Army Prepositioned Stock 2 (European holdings) is the largest of the seven, and it has been significantly expanded in recent years. It is based across several locations in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, and is currently being grown to include a second unit set with a new site being established in Poland.18 This new site, located at Powidz, is the largest NATO
11US Congressional Research Service (2022), Defense Primer: Department of Defense PrePositioned Material [UNCLASSIFIED], available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/ product/pdf/IF/IF11699
12US DoD (2022), ATP 3-35.1: Army Pre-Positioned Operations, p.1-3 [UNCLASSIFIED]; see also Bell, D. (2022) Just Add Soldiers: Army Prepositioned Stock and Agile Force Projection, US Army Heritage and Education Centre, US Army War College, available at: https://ahec.armywarcollege. edu/documents/Bell_POMCUS%20_ Modernization_Study%20_Complete.pdf
13US DoD (2022), ATP 3-35.1.
14Association of the United States Army (2008), Army Prepositioned Stocks: Indispensable to America’s Global Forceprojection Capability, available at: ausa. org/sites/default/files/TBIP-2008Army-Prepositioned-Stocks-Indispensableto-Americas-Global-Force-ProjectionCapability.pdf
15Garamone, J. (2022) Austin Orders Fort Stewart Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, US DoD press release dated 24 Feb 2022, available at: defense.gov/News/ News-Stories/Article/Article/2945855/ austin-orders-fort-stewart-armored-brigadecombat-team-to-europe
16-17US DoD (2023), (U) Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued in Response to Ukraine and the NATO Defense Forces, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. DODIG-2023-053, at p.6-7, available at: media.defense.gov/2023/ Feb/27/2003168552/-1/-1/1/ DODIG-2023-053_REDACTED.PDF
18Mastrangelo, M. (2024) Powidz APS-2 Worksite Begins to Receive Armored Vehicles and Equipment, US Army Press Release dated 28 June 2024, available at: army.mil/ article/277656/powidz_aps_2_worksite_ begins_to_receive_armored_vehicles_and_ equipment
Congressional and US Embassy staff move through one of the storage warehouses at the Army Prepositioned Stocks site in Powidz, Poland.
Picture: Capt. James Bath
infrastructure project in Europe for more than 30 years.19 With the addition of this site, the US Army will hold sufficient pre-positioned equipment in Europe to fully arm two armoured brigade combat teams. The strategic importance of this was underlined when the US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, visited the new site during his recent visit to Europe in February 2025.20
As the US is geographically isolated from its areas of operation, Army Prepositioned Stock is necessary for it to project forces rapidly to Europe and elsewhere. The system provides an impressive deployment capability, but it comes at a cost. According to a 2020 report, the annual cost of maintaining the programme in Europe was $2.36 billion,21 and that was prior to its expansion.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE BRITISH ARMY
The US Army’s ability to project forces rapidly is critical to its relevancy, and therefore at the core of how it operates. Its deployment operations are well-oiled and impressively resourced, and by routinely exercising its systems, it is thoroughly capable of projecting forces overseas. In contrast, the British Army has not deployed an armoured division overseas for over 20 years. During Warfighter exercises, the 3rd UK Division and its NATO partner forces begin already postured in Eastern Europe, with robust supply chains that allow them to conduct large scale combat operations. But how certain are we that we could get to the starting line in good order?
Despite our geographical proximity to the European continent, there are factors that make deploying a British division complicated compared to how the US Army conducts deployment operations. Firstly, the British Army’s units are spread throughout the UK, rather
than being centralised in large brigade or division installations, and we employ ‘whole fleet management’, which means they do not hold their own equipment sets. Secondly, unlike military bases in the US, our bases are not designed with rapid deployments in mind; they do not have mounting centres with railheads running directly to ports or their own airfields. These factors mean that there are many moving parts that must converge in time and space to deliver capability where it is needed and at the right time.
When considering deployments in the context of large scale combat operations, planning cannot be conducted in isolation and must be set within a NATO context. Should NATO become involved in large scale combat operations, the port and rail network will quickly become congested as equipment and personnel flow into Eastern Europe. Indeed, such congestion can be seen during major NATO exercises. How will we deconflict the use of ports, railheads and major transport hubs in Europe? To complicate matters further, the British Army would undoubtedly have to rely largely on contracted transportation to deploy armoured forces at scale. For example, there would be a need to contract heavy equipment transporters, the availability of which are likely to be as scarce at the outbreak of war in Europe as personal protective equipment was at the start of the COVID pandemic.
Finally, whilst the prepositioning
of large quantities of armoured vehicles is a capability unique to the US Army, given its extensive stocks, Army Prepositioned Stock holdings also include enormous quantities of ammunition and other consumables, ready to support combat operations. If the British Army deploys a division on large scale combat operations, how will it supply that division at warfighting consumption rates until a robust logistics chain can be established? Given the complexity inherent in large-scale deployments, will we have the capacity to rush vast quantities of ammunition and fuel forward at the same time as we are deploying the force? If the answer is no, then the forward stockpiling of consumables is essential.
CONCLUSION
By analysing how the US Army projects its forces, this In-Depth Briefing has discussed frictions and complexities associated with large-scale deployments and identified considerations pertinent to the British Army. One key lesson from the US Army’s approach is that there is real value in regularly exercising deployment processes by projecting armoured forces to their areas of operation. Not only does this provide a training benefit, but without testing the system it is not possible to validate planning assumptions and refine the process.
Since 2022, the US has demonstrated its commitment to NATO through its rapid surge of forces into Eastern Europe, and its longer-term commitment to
enhance its Army Prepositioned Stock in Europe. Whilst the US Government has been driving its European partners to take a more central role in NATO, the deployment of V Corps HQ to Poland and the expansion of the Army Prepositioned Stock fleet to include two complete brigade equipment sets is significant. It means that, even if changes are made to the posture of its rotational forces, the US Army will remain well positioned to rapidly field two fully equipped armoured brigade combat teams to Eastern Europe, which could be combined with their brigades permanently based in Germany22 to form a robust armoured division within a matter of weeks. This provides the US with valuable strategic options that allow it to respond quickly if the security situation in Eastern Europe changes.
19Shkolnikova, S. (2024) ‘This is Combat Power’: US Builds on Poland Presence with New Weapons Stock Site, Stars and Stripes, dated 10 Oct 2024, available at: stripes.com/ theaters/europe/2024-10-10/army-polandmilitary-equipment-nato-15453916.html
20Connor, J. (2025) Sec Def visits Army Prepositioned Stocks Site, Soldiers in Poland, US Army Press Release dated 18 Feb 2025, available at: army.mil/article/283155/ sec_def_visits_army_prepositioned_stocks_ site_soldiers_in_poland
21US European Command Public Affairs Office (2019) FY 2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), report dated March 2019, at page 10, available at: https://comptroller.defense.gov/ portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2020/ fy2020_edi_jbook.pdf
22The US Army’s permanent garrison presence in Germany includes a Mechanised Brigade Combat Team (the 2nd Cavalry Regiment), an Aviation Brigade and a Fires Brigade.
U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Christopher Dennis, 1st ABCT PAO, 1st Cav. Div