IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #90 // MAY 25
‘HONEST’ ASSESSMENT LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR
AUTHOR Sam Cranny-Evans Associate Fellow RUSI and director of Calibre Defence
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
FROM the 1960s through to 1989, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) maintained a corps-sized force in Germany held at high readiness. Built of four divisions, the 1st British Corps (1 (BR) Corps) was expected to face off against the 3rd Shock Army. In the event of war with the Soviet Union, 1 (BR) Corps would push a screening force forward using well-rehearsed drills into preprepared – but hopefully secret – positions to establish the main line of effort. This would shape the deployment of the four armoured divisions, which would aim to delay the Soviets and force them to cycle to the second echelon made up of the 20th Guards Army. Artillery was expected to play a central and defining role on both sides, and was positioned to contribute extensively to the close battle.
The soldiers of 1 (BR) Corps knew they were exposed, the Belgian corps to their right was a suspected weak link that the Soviets might target to force a collapse. They also lacked the numbers to properly resist the Soviet forces, which is why the Royal Artillery maintained three regiments of nuclear artillery for most of the Cold War. Armed with Honest John unguided nuclear rockets, the Royal Artillery’s regiments were expected to deploy tactical payloads into the path of the 3rd Shock Army once it became clear that it could not be stopped. It was assumed that fallout from those nuclear weapons, as well as the Soviet chemical weapons, would catch friendly units. Those contaminated units were expected to ‘fight dirty’, continuing the battle without coming into contact with friendly units to limit the spread of contaminants.
Beyond that critical point, 1 (BR) Corps was not expected to play much more of a role. It was widely anticipated that strategic nuclear weapons would come into play after the tactical, and that nothing that they could do would matter after that.
For 40 years, the soldiers of 1 (BR) Corps prepared for this scenario or variants of it, focusing on little else beyond the 3rd Shock Army. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, the BAOR is often held up as an example of what the British Army should be doing now, at least in terms of size. Naturally, more British armoured divisions held at high readiness in Europe would certainly help deter and defeat Russia in the event of a war, but the costs would be immense and prohibitive. That is not to say, however, that we cannot learn from the Cold War generation of soldiers. So, for this
An Honest John of 24 Missile Regiment Royal Artillery is readied to fire during Exercise Spear Point (9-13 October 1961). Courtesy of Soldier Magazine
In-Depth Briefing, 15 gunners were interviewed on their experiences and expectations of a war with the Warsaw Pact to see what could be gleaned that might help the current generation prepare for what is likely to be decades of renewed confrontation with Russia.
The veterans’ experiences varied enormously, with some having joined the Army in the 1960s, and others in the 80s. Some left the service as majors and captains, two as generals, and several were still in uniform when the UK deployed the 1st Division to the Gulf in 1990 for Operation Granby. A select few were in service when the UK deployed to Iraq again in 2003. Over this time, the Royal Artillery’s ability to fight evolved with the introduction of new guns, MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System], battle management systems and antitank guided missiles. This meant that the expectations of how the war would be fought changed significantly between 1960 and 1989, but there are consistent threads raised by most of the interviewees that are indicative and potentially relevant to the modern day. This Briefing will focus on three of those threads, but it is worth noting that more than 27,000 words of notes were taken across the 15 interviews and some 20 hours of discussion. Those points that are explored here are those considered most relevant, but out of necessity do not fully address all of the lived experience of the 15 interviewees.
‘ROGER-READY’
In 1989, 1 (BR) Corps was able to call on the 1st Artillery Brigade, which included five regiments of guns equipped with 24 M107A2 175mm heavy guns and 36 FH70 155mm field guns, as well as 12 M110A2 203mm heavy guns. They served alongside the 50th Missile Regiment, initially armed with Honest John missiles and eventually the MGM-52 Lance
“ONE INTERVIEWEE REMEMBERED HIS REGIMENT SPENT ONE WEEK IN FOUR EXERCISING, OFTEN AT NIGHT AND IN NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL SUITS.”
ballistic missiles. At the same time, the four armoured divisions included three regiments of artillery, each with a technical complement of 24 guns per regiment at warfighting strength. Altogether, 1 (BR) Corps had some 360 guns ranging from the 105mm Abbot through to the nuclear-capable 203mm M110A2 at its disposal. Artillery was expected to play a significant role in stopping the Warsaw Pact and divisional fires – all 72 guns from an armoured division – were regularly practised to support this.
When a battery of guns was lined up, ready to receive fire missions as part of a divisional fire plan, the target coordinates would be received and the gun crews would acknowledge their receipt in order of seniority. But, as one gunner recounted, if a crew answered that call with the words “roger-ready”, it meant that the gun had not only received the coordinates, but was ready to fire on them too. “It was very
there by the adjutant’s wife. At the same time, his regiment spent one week in four exercising, often at night and in nuclear, biological and chemical suits. “That level of preparation was quite sensible, quite professional. We got used to operating at night whether it was on the roads, in the barracks or in the fields.” By the 1980s, when that officer was still in service, the mood had changed. The four divisions in Germany were as ready as the government would have allowed, he explained, adding that “there may have been a shortage of weapons and men, but the threat was fading”.
prestigious to be the first battery ready to go, and it was even more prestigious to report ready during divisional fires. But, if you didn’t fire immediately when the orders were issued, then you would be walking to the commander’s tent for an interview without coffee.” This serves as a valuable jumping off point as, across the board, the interviewees noted the pride and professionalism they had in their roles as gunners. Few doubted their ability to fight and contribute to the war at their own level. However, several expressed doubts about 1 (BR) Corps’ overall readiness for conflict.
One interviewee, who joined the BAOR in the 1960s, remembered most households storing rations in the basement and having covers for the windows. At a regimental level, he was involved in making plans to transport the regiment’s families – spouses and children – to the English Channel in the event of a war. They would be loaded onto a bus and driven
By the 1980s, challenges were beginning to grow for the BAOR; despite having tens of thousands of artillery rounds in storage, few had ever experienced a full loadout, which involved taking the ammunition out of its bunkers, placing it onto trucks and moving it to fighting positions. A known bottleneck was the availability of forklift trucks to move the ammunition pallets, as well as the lack of alternative routes to and from the depots, which would likely become clogged with refugees. “We never rehearsed it [an ammunition loadout] with all of the BAOR trying to get their equipment and what would happen if the trucks broke down and so on. Not to mention the 5th columnists,” one interviewee explained, adding that everyone knew where the ammunition was stored. Another officer in the 1980s planned a full ammunition loadout, which drew attention from several senior officers. His regiment extracted live ammunition from its bunkers, drove it to the barracks and ‘bombed up’ their howitzers. Because the M109s had full crews, they could not carry all of the ammunition that they were expected to, which was a surprise for the watching senior officers. “However well drilled we were, and we were, I’m not sure that we were really prepared for war.”
This lack of foresight extended to artillery barrels, “we were expected to fire at maximum charge nearly all of the time to evade counter-battery fire, which would wear the barrels out in about 24 hours at the expected expenditure rate. This issue was somewhat parked.” This thinking was impacted by the expectation that the war would not last very long, that the Russians would deploy nuclear and chemical weapons, and that the guns would run out of ammunition anyway. If the war had lasted more than a few days, the availability of new barrels and ammunition may have prevented 1 (BR) Corps from effectively resisting the Soviet advance. One interviewee recounted the struggles 1 (BR) Corps faced when trying to coordinate a corps-level fire plan, and others from the nuclear regiments recalled that they had rarely, if ever, loaded live warheads onto their rockets for a variety of reasons.
This was not all, the BAOR’s wartime strength relied on the reserve system, former soldiers and territorials who were expected to bring six gun batteries up to eight, fill out the gun crews, and provide air defence sentries and observation posts. However, it is unlikely that all of those reserves will have ever seen the guns they were expected to fight with in Germany, and equally unlikely that the regulars would have been familiar with the reserves they would receive during war. The logistics of moving reserves from the UK to Germany were occasionally tested, using a mixture of aircraft, ferries and buses. But integrating reserves into a regiment was another matter, leading one officer to simulate the process by borrowing 300 soldiers from a neighbouring regiment not familiar with the M109. “It was a real eye opener for my regiment, it reduced the space in the M109 and caused all sorts of other challenges”.
In all, the evidence gathered from the interviews indicates that 1 (BR) Corps was tactically and technically proficient with a high degree of professionalism and competency in core soldiering skills. However, really difficult elements of warfighting seem to have been overlooked or parked. This might feel familiar for serving soldiers, many of whom will never have experienced adversary jamming of either comms or GPS. Or others who are so familiar with Salisbury Plain that they can guess where the opposition force is likely to be and engage them pre-emptively. It is perhaps the single biggest takeaway from the interviews –the British Army of today should practice and think about the hard problems, ensuring that everyone knows what to do.
STANDING
‘WHEEL-TO-WHEEL’
“It was said that the Soviet armies could line their artillery pieces up wheel-to-wheel all along the German border,” one interviewee explained, as he tried to convey the extent to which 1 (BR) Corps was outnumbered. And yet, despite overwhelming odds, they were prepared with a plan based upon a thorough understanding of the enemy’s doctrine and ways of war. A thorough understanding of the Warsaw Pact stands out
as the second most pertinent thread. Throughout the Royal Artillery’s regiments, and from 1960 until 1991, that knowledge was obsessively maintained and improved upon with several operational outputs intended to flow from it. One of the more significant expected applications came in the form of shaping how 1 (BR) Corps would fight the Warsaw Pact based on their understanding of the adversary’s doctrine and tactics.
This was achieved through different means that converged to provide an in-depth knowledge base amongst 1 (BR) Corps’ gunners. Study groups were formed and materials shared between them; one interviewee even recalled spending Christmas Day watching recognition videos with soldiers from his regiment. The subject was often seen as a hobby, and a regular magazine was distributed, which provided updates on Warsaw Pact tactics and equipment. There were centrally-run courses operated by the Ministry of Defence that allowed personnel to return to their units and become a focal point of training for the wider staff. There were other elements like an open source Soviet studies research centre, which had correctly assessed some Warsaw Pact tactics without the use of classified sources.
This education was important for several reasons, it helped 1 (BR) Corps prepare for its adversary and was a key element in understanding what element of the Soviet advance the corps was facing. For instance, understanding the order of battle and typical approach to reconnaissance enabled the forward screen to interpret the units that it was observing. This was critical as the fire support available was essentially limited, and the divisions would be expected to switch fire in support of each other as Soviet advances developed. Few of the gunners would ever have seen Soviet vehicles during battle, they should have been far enough to the rear of the fighting. However, knowing about the Soviets helped them to feel prepared and to understand what they would likely have to achieve. There was also a more practical side to this too, all field gun regiments prepared and considered how they would defend against Russia’s Spetsnaz reconnaissance forces. The nuclear regiments also had to understand how the Spetsnaz forces would push ahead of the main Soviet advance to find them, which shaped their approach to training accordingly with emphasis on camouflage and concealment.
Knowing the enemy also informed the approach to
“FEW OF THE GUNNERS WOULD EVER HAVE SEEN SOVIET VEHICLES DURING BATTLE. HOWEVER, KNOWING ABOUT THE SOVIETS HELPED THEM TO FEEL PREPARED.”
fighting the guns; it was anticipated that the Warsaw Pact would quickly engage the areas occupied by artillery with massed rocket artillery and long-range fires that neither the UK nor its partners could reach with their field guns. For most of the Cold War, this meant that guns would be expected to hold a prepared position, even in the face of counter-battery fire, and only move when absolutely necessary. The Soviets were also expected to employ pre-emptive fires and differing forms of artillery location, like sound and flash ranging, to find British artillery before fixing crews and guns in place with fire missions that would include chemical weapons if possible. This knowledge helped inform the way that 1 (BR) Corps’ artillery would have fought, and also shaped the development of future artillery doctrine and technology that has enabled guns to be fought dispersed and separated from each other. Overall, knowing the adversary and its likely approach to the start of a war was an important element of education for the BAOR. However, this was made possible because NATO had one opponent for close to 50 years, and deployments to Germany tended to be long, allowing deep soaks in the subject matter. There are efforts to re-develop and re-establish these practices within the UK’s regiments now, which is encouraging, so long as it translates into practice.
DIGGING IN
The final thread drawn out here is on the subject of digging in, specifically in terms of preparing hides for guns – a process not all of the interviewees had experienced, either for command posts or for their guns. One interviewee recalled it taking 24 to 36 hours to conceal a battery of Abbots, the 105mm self-propelled howitzer used by the field artillery, which was somewhat smaller than the
guns used today. That process was supported by a combat engineering vehicle, which broke down frequently and was considered an unrealistic option in the event of war as such equipment would more likely be dedicated to other missions like preparing hides for command posts.
The process was extensive because a lot of focus was placed upon survival, which meant ensuring that batteries could withstand some of the fire that would come their way. Hides had to be prepared for the gun crew, trenches for supporting crew and a space for ammunition. “Wriggly tin” had to be brought in and the trenches revetted before some form of top cover and camouflage was added. One interviewee mentioned how exhausting the process was for the crew: “You would have a couple of guns in a field in a normal manner [providing fire support] and then work on digging other guns in and rotating through different roles. You would do an hour on radio stag, two hours on digging, two hours for rest and back. It’s really debilitating for a crew and obviously nobody was shooting at you either.” After the positions were prepared, the gun crews would also have to take steps to minimise their visual signature by moving spoil and hiding track marks where possible. Once emplaced, the gun crews were expected to remain in situ until ordered to move, regardless of how much fire they received. Regardless of the availability of engineering assets, “you would always dig in if the threat dictated it”.
The nuclear regiments had to go through a similar process, albeit by learning to quickly camouflage their launchers in a woodblock and prepare their own positions for sleeping and fighting if necessary. The abiding takeaway from the collective experience of digging in is that it is immensely
questioned whether or not it would have been possible to dig all of the guns and ammunition in given the rarity of engineering assets. The question of digging in also became contentious as 1 (BR) Corps moved towards a manoeuvrist approach, embracing the concept of movement to disrupt a Soviet advance, rather than assuming that they would try to hold defensive positions and withdraw. This was demonstrated in Kuwait, where the UK’s artillery prepared extensive gun positions, only to abandon them almost as soon as the offensive was initiated.
IN SUM
The interviews indicate that 1 (BR) Corps was proficient and capable in the tactical application of warfare, with a firm sense of professionalism and pride that seems to have remained throughout the Cold War. However, the BAOR was ultimately lucky that war never came, that the loadout procedure from the depots at Sennelager was never tested, or that nuclear fire plans were not needed for real. The elements of fighting a war that are most difficult were rarely practised; things like corps fire plans were hard to test and train during the annual training cycles that the BAOR used to stay ready. As one interviewee remarked, it was known that replacing barrels would have been a challenge, but it was quietly parked. With all of this said, however, it is clear that the artillery elements of 1 (BR) Corps did a lot of things well. The self-taught expertise in Soviet formations and equipment gave a thorough understanding of the adversary, which ultimately
fought well, but there would have been a lot of challenges that 1 (BR) Corps would have had to address in the teeth of a Soviet invasion.
In that light, perhaps the greatest single lesson that the current generation can learn from the Cold War is to address challenges and short-comings now, in peacetime. To find ways to prepare a large fire plan designed to disrupt a determined advance or motor rifle brigade in the defence. There is, as already mentioned, an effort to develop subject matter expertise on the Russian armed forces, which is valuable and welcome. However, there are challenges around scaling these efforts and they are often – as was the case during the Cold War – grassroots initiatives. Changing a barrel is something few gunners will ever have experienced, and yet it is a regular occurrence in Ukraine. Equally, few will have ever loaded out hundreds of rounds, taken them from their pallets and into the turret or bustle of a gun. Nor will they have repeated that process dozens of times over the course of a week, testing their physical and mental preparedness. Preparing for these challenges outside of a war can be difficult, but it would be preferable to do that in Larkhill or on Salisbury Plain, providing the opportunity to safely develop workarounds and solutions, rather than whilst also trying to avoid Russia’s loitering munitions and counter-battery fire.
The author would like to extend his sincerest gratitude to the 15 interviewees and the Royal Artillery Historical Society.