HAVE WE HIT AN ANGLO-AMERICAN CROSSROADS?
CHACR COMMENTARY // JUNE 2025
BY: Major Rocco P. Santurri III, freelance author and reservist
IN 1946, a triumphant but politically diminished Sir Winston Churchill travelled to America on a speaking tour of several universities. Despite losing the 1945 general election, the aura and mystique of Sir Winston was arguably at its zenith; crowds across America flocked to greet the British war hero. But while post-victory optimism was plentiful on both sides of the pond, Churchill struck a cautionary tone in his speeches. He warned of an “Iron Curtain” descending upon Europe, courtesy of allyturned-adversary, the Soviet Union. Difficult times lay ahead, Churchill warned, one that would require iron-clad cooperation between America and Western Europe, with the foundational piece being
what he coined the “special relationship” between the UK and America.
Over the next several decades, even Sir Winston might have been pleasantly surprised by the depth and longevity of the special relationship and its offspring, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The spirit that fuelled shoulder-to-shoulder battles and the storming of the beaches of Normandy on D-Day continued post 1945, with the UK and America conducting combat operations varying in scale and scope from Seoul to Belgrade, Baghdad to Kabul, and Basra to Helmand. Perhaps equally important, the special relationship also facilitated an enduring cooperative of shared interests and security concerns,
in the US Army
the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence apparatus. If NATO was the first offspring of the special relationship, the Five Eyes might be considered its less publicised but overachieving sibling. While conflicts are episodic, the need for intelligence is constant and, in a perfect world, helps states avoid conflict altogether – making the Five Eyes indispensable. Both the special relationship and the Five Eyes remain critical to security in Europe, currently under a renewed threat from a revanchist Russia willing to start the first continental war since 1945 to achieve its revisionist dreams. Indeed, coordinated support from the US, UK and NATO to Ukraine has enabled the out-manned and out-gunned underdog to turn a three-day operation into a three-year
grinding slugfest. Again, the special relationship weathered another challenge and, although strains are showing, prevented the conquest of Ukraine and pre-empted further Russian expansion westward.
It is also noteworthy to mention the global reach of the special relationship far beyond Europe; it has, for example, spawned additional offspring in Asia with the establishment of AUKUS. While the commitment of each partner to this entity is reasonably dependable, the special relationship remains the bedrock upon which all else rests. Given the American ‘pivot’ to Asia, the meteoric military ascent of China and the rapidly expanding RussianNorth Korean partnership, the
Asian ramifications of the special relationship may indeed become more consequential in the coming decade; regional conflicts stand to become increasingly globalised and the ‘Eurasian’ theatre an accepted reality.
“Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing, once all other possibilities have been exhausted.”
– Sir Winston Churchill
However, a threat previously unimagined now presents the special relationship and NATO with perhaps its most significant challenge: the danger from within. In January, Donald J. Trump returned to the Oval Office riding a wave of ‘America First’ populism. During his campaign, Trump relentlessly criticised NATO and suggested that as President, he would not authorise American military assistance to members who failed to meet the two per cent gross domestic product minimum for defence spending, even if attacked – a clear rejection of Article V. While Trump did not make a delineation between conventional support and extended nuclear deterrence, much was implied, which at the very least constituted an ominous warning to NATO. Though such statements certainly caught the eye of NATO members and adversaries, many attributed it to campaign rhetoric that would not become in-term policy.
That sentiment has proven misguided; while many political observers shared widespread trepidation about Trump 2.0, few predicted the upheaval in geopolitics the first half of 2025 has provided courtesy of America’s 47th President. With allies and partners watching warily, President Trump continued his criticism of NATO member contributions to collective security and threatened to upend tacit and written agreements that spanned decades. The special relationship wasn’t spared from the wrath of Trump; he derided the UK, among other
NATO members, for failing to spend enough on its defence and relying too heavily on American conventional military might and extended nuclear deterrence. The threats from Trump have remained steady at the six-month mark of his second term. With a likely successor in Vice President J.D. Vance, the possibility exists that we are witnessing the death throes of the special relationship and its prodigious legacies, NATO, the Five Eyes, and their younger sibling, AUKUS. Given these developments, many wonder if an existential restructuring of the international order is at hand. Or are the current times merely a tumultuous period courtesy of polarised American politics and election cycles?
“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them.”
–
Sir Winston Churchill
Disagreements among allies are as old as history itself; even the closest alliances have fractured due to the inevitable changing of geopolitical circumstances, leadership and state interests. Reviewing the relatively recent history of the UK and America, and past relations between various NATO members, showcases tumultuous periods that would make observers
during those times scoff at the thought of reconciliation. Founding Fathers James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and James Monroe, still alive in 1812 to see Washington burning, never envisioned the UK as a future ally and certainly not one with special consideration. Waterloo did not foreshadow a future alliance between the UK and France, while Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 did not foreshadow the critical role both must play together in the defence of Western Europe.
Within the short lifespan of NATO, there have been rough patches among strong allies; the UK and America are no exception. There are some notable examples of when London and Washington, while sharing strategic interests, weren’t in lockstep on episodic foreign policy challenges:
n The UK resists American pressure to commit troops to Vietnam. The UK supported US efforts in Vietnam, but for many reasons it did not deploy military forces to the conflict. The war was deeply unpopular in the UK; economic limitations and the perception that the conflict did not offer strategic benefits doomed any potential UK involvement. Given the eventual outcome, the UK’s
decision is difficult to contest with the benefit of hindsight. Despite the snub, the special relationship endured, assisted by a US government eager to limit post-mortem reflection and shut the door on all aspects of the Vietnam debacle.
n Command dysfunction in Serbia. A tumultuous and problematic command relationship between the US, UK and France during NATO action in Serbia during the 1990s certainly did not point to a harmonious relationship between NATO’s nuclear-armed members. These and other issues were preceded by intense American pressure to get a reluctant UK and France involved in the conflict. Despite worldwide outrage at civilian deaths from NATO airstrikes and President Bush and Prime Minister Blair labelled as war criminals, the special relationship momentarily wobbled but pressed on.
n The ill-fated adventure into Iraq. In 2003, the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, tasked to denuclearise Iraq, strained relations between the US, the UK and other NATO participants. Mass protests in London were vindicated when, years later, no operational weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, and accusations flew that pre-
invasion intelligence assessments by the Americans were erroneous at best and politically motivated at worst. Like the Serbian intervention, many claimed that the UK was deceived by the Americans into getting involved, which added pressure on London to follow the American lead. Despite massive protests and lingering ill sentiment, the special relationship trudged forward.
n The pivot to Asia that wasn’t. In 2014, newly elected President Barack Obama was widely accused of snubbing NATO, particularly the UK, as he sought to reorient American focus toward China. Obama’s pivot failed to take hold due to emergencies elsewhere that made his policy aspirations die on the vine. Nevertheless, the pivot ‘that didn’t’ did serve as a warning to NATO that would prove prescient; the Americans saw their near peer adversary of the future as China, not Russia, and NATO would inevitably have to face the prospects of less attention from Washington on Eurocentric security matters. But despite ominous bodings for the future, the special relationship endured, bloodied but inevitably unbowed.
n The NATO response to 9/11 and the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. In 2003, America invoked Article V of NATO after the 9/11 attacks, thus, in theory, triggering a collective response by all NATO members. Mass protests broke in both the UK and America, as many argued that while the Taliban provided sanctuary to the Al-Qaeda terrorists who conducted the attack, it did not pose a residual threat to America; therefore, Article V should not be invoked. Despite the domestic political tumult, the special relationship endured, with both UK and American soldiers fighting in Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and a total of 2,918 personnel making the ultimate sacrifice. The unilateral decision of President Joe Biden in 2021 to leave Afghanistan without consulting its allies, a policy called “imbecilic” by Tony Blair
“THE UNILATERAL DECISION OF JOE BIDEN IN 2021 TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT CONSULTING ITS ALLIES, A POLICY CALLED ‘IMBECILIC’ BY TONY BLAIR, ENSURED NATO’S DEFEAT AND A VISCERAL SENSE OF BETRAYAL IN LONDON.”
and probably echoed by thencurrent Prime Minister Boris Johnson, ensured NATO’s defeat and a visceral sense of betrayal in London. Nevertheless, a shaken special relationship eventually moved forward, partially assisted by the conflict in Ukraine.
There are lasting implications from these instances of strained relations despite the resiliency of the special relationship... but can a forgive and move-on mindset persist indefinitely?
“We must talk darlin’, it appears we must redefine the nature of our association.” – A bed-ridden and dying Doc Holiday, played by Val Kilmer, to his companion in the movie Tombstone
To paraphrase from the famous football announcer Peter Drury, where does the special relationship and NATO go from here? While there is no shortage of hypothetical courses of action that save both, the surest might be the most effective: the passage of time. Ironically, the cataclysm caused by the last American election might also be the panacea. Midterm elections loom in November 2026; historically, they have served as a decisive referendum on the performance of a president. If Democrats regain a majority in the Senate, Trump risks his efforts stalling during the second half of his presidency. Democrats could then stall legislation until the
next presidential election occurs, a tried and true approach to stymie an adversarial president. Senator Mitch McConnell, a long-time leader of the Senate Republicans, openly discussed this strategy before the second half of President Joe Biden’s term, alluding to its bipartisan application in American politics.
Aside from contentious geopolitical threats and brazen, unilateral actions, Trump’s application of tariffs could also give the Democrats a massive boost. Tariffs are much more effective as political leverage than economic policy; an already inflation-weary American populace stands to get hit even harder in the wallet while watching their investments dwindle, a double-blow to older Americans on fixed incomes who constitute a significant voting bloc. Their disgruntlement with Trump could loom large during midterm elections.
Beyond the midterms, the enigmatic cult of personality that is Donald J. Trump will likely prove irreplaceable with the inevitable conclusion of his term. Republican presidential candidates might attempt to imitate Trump, but it is unlikely any will replicate Trump’s aura and unique connection with his voter base. It is doubtful Vice President J.D. Vance has the same gravitas and resiliency as Trump, who has consistently
survived political crises that doomed previous presidents. Political pragmatism could see Republicans (including Vance) jerk back toward more centrist policies and claim they were unwitting accomplices at best, prisoners at worst, to the jolting presidency of #47. Either way, Democrats pitching a ‘return to normalcy’ as Republicans did in 1920 could stand to take back the Oval Office and make considerable gains in Congress, likely to the benefit of the special relationship and NATO.
Additionally, UK and European perceptions of Trump’s policies might shift as his term progresses into its second half. Offence and animosity might give way to grudging acceptance of a harsh reality: more must be done by NATO’s European members in support of collective security. UK, France, Germany and several NATO members have openly admitted that their defence funding must increase. While Trump’s delivery method has ruffled feathers and veered beyond the fringes of standard diplomatic protocol, his main point remains valid. That Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Greece are leading the way in percentagebased NATO defence spending has caused alarm, given the size and capability disparities between these members and more traditional NATO military ‘heavies’. Recent announcements by Poland and Germany have gone some way to correct the imbalance but uncertainties remain and the NATO Summit in The Hague will be watched keenly for announcements on defence spending. Doctrinally sound strategic military planning implores consideration of the adversary’s most dangerous courses of action; while not an enemy, the US pulling funding from NATO certainly benefits the continent’s most dangerous and resilient threat, Russia. Therefore, NATO should be prepared to repel Russia on its own merits; conventional assistance from the US would only hasten the defeat of a Russian incursion, but lack
of US assistance should not be a fatal flaw.
“The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”
– Mark Twain
Additionally, while many political commentators lament the end of the Americaninspired Rules-Based International Order, one could offer that these sentiments are indeed prisoners of the moment. Even Zhou Enlai might admit that while the period of unipolarity is ending, it is ‘too soon to tell’ if a postmortem on America, the special relationship, and NATO is warranted. An examination of the eventful but short history of America catalogues several periods of vacillation between isolationism and adventurism. Existentially, American history is also littered with instances in which the overwhelming sentiment was that the American Experiment was all but declared dead – one of particular note was the ‘crisis of confidence’ America experienced during the Carter administration in the late 1970s, and of course 9/11.
Similarly, the rumours about the death of the special relationship and NATO could be considered exaggerated.
“A POWERFUL AND UNITED EUROPE, CONVENTIONALLY ARMED, CAPABLE AND COORDINATED, COUPLED WITH THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR TRIAD STANDING BY FOR THE UNTHINKABLE, IS NECESSARY IN THE FACE OF ‘CRINK’ AND PRESENTS A VISION OF THE FUTURE THAT WOULD MAKE THE CURRENT TUMULT BEARABLE. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IS CRUCIAL TO SUCH A VISION BECOMING REALITY.”
spheres, compounded by the associative inclusion of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, increased adversarial resources and capabilities demand an iron-clad special relationship as the bedrock of an alliance even greater in scale and scope than NATO’s current incarnation; both sides of the Atlantic should know this to be true. The axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, or ‘CRINK’, presents a new and more dynamic challenge. Unlike the Soviet menace, which was primarily limited to Europe and militaristic in composition, CRINK presents a worldwide threat that is not limited to diplomatic and military spheres. Economic danger might be the most significant long-term concern. China’s relationship with Russia and growing economic power will require a reinvigorated alliance that includes Pacific partners. Once again, the special relationship would be at
its core, with Commonwealth nations Australia, India and New Zealand, as well as newer allies Japan and South Korea, which provide badly needed economic and military muscle to contest the challenge of CRINK. At the same time, CRINK could be considered more of a cartel of collusion than a coalition of shared values. Nevertheless, it is folly to underestimate the threat it poses. Hence, a powerful and united Europe, conventionally armed, capable and coordinated, coupled with the American nuclear triad standing by for the unthinkable, is necessary in the face of CRINK and presents a vision of the future that would make the current tumult bearable. The special relationship is crucial to such a vision becoming reality.
“In the days to come the British and American peoples will, for their own safety and for the good of all, walk together side by side
in majesty, in justice, and in peace.” – Sir Winston Churchill
The special relationship was never destined to be perfect but inherently equipped to be durable; that there is a special relationship at all, given the events of 1776, 1812 and the 1860s, is a testament to the strength of the commonalities between two former foes. Furthermore, memories are short when pragmatism is necessary; grudges and animosity fade quickly when the winds of war rip at the flag and the enemy is at the gate. In echoes of pre-First World War, America’s inherent and vacillating isolationist tendencies, still persistent but periodically pliant, inevitably give way and intertwine its fate with that of NATO and Europe, along political, defence and economic lines (the recent trade deal between the UK and America certainly doesn’t hurt these prospects). While the level of cooperation and harmony might lessen, the undeniable endurance of shared interests in the face of a diametrically opposed adversary remains an essential bedrock; the UK and America share more that unites and less of what divides, a criticality heightened by the prospect of existential conflict. In a rapidly changing geopolitical world, an imperfect
