Centre for a Democratic Iran
February 24, 2016
The Coup d’état on 22nd of February, 1921 and the Emergence of Reza Shah Was not the Plot of the English A talk with Dr. Homayoun Katouzian
Ali Eftekhari Rouzbehani: Mohammad Ali Homayoon Katouzian, the Iranian historian and professor of Oxford University believes that the common belief about the role of the English in the coup d’etat on 22nd of February, 1921 and the emergence of Reza Shah (king of Iran and the founder of Pahlavi dynasty) is wrong. In this talk, Katouzian explains the historical process leading to the coup, and the political descent and performance of the prime minister of the government of the coup, that is, Seyyed Zia Tabatabaee.
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Centre for a Democratic Iran
February 24, 2016
Katouzian says that in his book “State and Society in Iran: the Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis” he explored the story of the coup in a detailed way. Following you will read the answers of Dr. Katouzian to the questions of the “Qanoon” --As the first question, the coup d’etat of the 22nd of February was based on what political and social context, in other words, what political status did Iran have that made the coup inevitable? The coup was the result of 10 to 12 years of instability and chaos both in the provinces and the capital of the country. After the Constitutional Revolution in Iran instead of a legal and stable government (let alone Democratic) to come into power, the collapse of the totalitarian regime caused a rampant condition. The rich and the aristocrats who had inherited the power of the government had no harmony with each other and couldn’t form an integrated social class. As a result, there was not any coordination in the parliament, either and also the cabinets which formed every six or seven month could hardly manage the affairs from one day to another. This lack of a central power led to disobedience and arrogance and chaos in the provinces. Meanwhile, the First World War spread to our country, despite the impartiality declared by the government of Iran. Also in 1916 another government was formed in Kermanshah titled the interim government of the immigrants, which didn’t accept the central government and by declaring war against Russia and England to some extent justified their attacks and interference. When the war ended the country was about to disintegrate. A widespread and hard famine on one hand, and an epidemic Spanish flu, which had spread throughout the world and was really fatal, on the other hand, perhaps killed 2 million people out of the 12 millions of the population. The government’s treasury was completely empty in a way that the English paid a monthly amount of money to the government for administrative costs and another amount of money for the costs of the Cossack Division because after the Russian Revolution, this force had no relationship with Russia. The cabinet of Vosugeddoleh signed a contract with England to get technical and financial support in 1919. But from the very day of signing this contract an increasing number of people believed that this contract means “protectorate” of Iran and fought hard against it. Meanwhile, Mirza Koochak Khan continued his work in the Jungle, and Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani revolted in Azerbaijan, too, and a short while later the Iranian and Russian Bolsheviks went to Rasht and formed a coalition with Mirza Koochak Khan which didn’t last long. In this situation, Vosugeddoleh, whose policy had failed, resigned in the summer of 1920 and during the next two cabinets of Moshiroddoleh and Sepahdar Rashti the condition was going to collapse fast. Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office of England were still hopeful that after forming of the parliament the contract of 1919 would be approved and put in force. But all
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Centre for a Democratic Iran
February 24, 2016
those who had a hand in the fire knew that the contract was in practice void, and this applied to “all” the members of the British Embassy in Tehran, the English Officers in Iran, and including the financial and military advisors who were temporarily in Tehran in relation to this contract. But Curzon still insisted on officially clarifying the status of the contract. That was why some started to think about changing the situations. Seyyed Zia, who was the leader of the “Committee of Iron” and once supported both Vosug and the contract, had come to this result, too. --In your book, State and Society in Iran (The Eclipse of Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis), you challenged the public belief about the February 22nd coup d’état as being English. What was the stance of the English towards the events in Iran in 1920 1n 1921? I didn’t challenge anything but I used Iranian and English documents and evidence and I showed that unlike the public beliefs, the English government didn’t plot to bring Reza Khan into power by the coup and later to make him the king. The English diplomats and officers who were hopeless about a change in Curzon’s policy tried to take another measure with the help of Iranians themselves. As I said Seyyed Zia was the leader of a committee called the committee of iron in which some gendarme officers were members, especially, Major Masoud Khan Keyhan, and Colonel Kazem Khan Sayyah. Notice that at that time, that is, mid-1920 and early 1921 when the coup happened, Bolsheviks settled in Gilan had formed the “Red Republic of Iran” and constantly threatened that they would soon move to Tehran, in a way that in January, 1921 because of fear and panic they were about to transfer the capital from Tehran to Isfahan. The only supporting force was the 6000 soldier army of England named “Norperforce” concentrated in Qazvin. And the Iranian effective military force was the Cossack Division, which had already been defeated in a war by Gilan Bolsheviks and retreated to the Headquarter of Norperforce and was under training there. The Foreign Office of England and the government of Iran wanted Norperforce to remain in Iran as a support but the war department of England didn’t want a war against the Bolsheviks of Iran and intended to withdraw them from Iran as soon as possible. General Ironside, the commander of Norperforce who had been ordered to withdraw the Norperforce from Iran as soon as possible entered into talks with Reza Khan Mir Panj, one of the commanders of the Cossacks to go to Tehran with Cossack forces and fix the things before Norperforce would leave. On the other hand, as we saw Seyyed Zia and the committee of iron and his friends in the British Embassy were planning to form an organized and powerful regime. That was why the gendarme friends of Seyyed Zia and Masoud Khan Keyhan, and Kazem Khan Sayyah in Qazvin communicated with Reza Khan that finally led to moving of the Cossack Division and entering Tehran without any bloodshed.
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Centre for a Democratic Iran
February 24, 2016
This point is also worth mentioning that both Seyyed Zia and Colonel Ghahremani, the Cossack officer mention in their memories that they had first offered this to Amir Movassagh (later Major General Mohammad Nakhjavan) but he didn’t accept. This also must be said that the February 22nd, coup d’etat as a result of which Seyyed Zia cancelled the contract of 1919 immediately, was so heavy for Lord Curzon the minister of Foreing Office of England at that time that he didn’t accept to assist the performers of the coup in any way. --The role of a journalist like Seyyed Zia had been always a question. How did he have relations with Cossack Division and how did he make Reza Khan support him? His opinions published in Ra’d and Shargh newspapers were a mixture of anarchism and lack of stability in opinions and advocating England. Truly, what plan did he have in Iran when he received the decree of prime minister from the Shah? I almost explained it in above answers. Seyyed Zia was a clever and efficient and ambitious journalist who had taken part in the Constitutional Revolution when he was young, and after the Constitution he was always active as a journalist. He was one of those who believed that constant chaos finally would lead to the disintegration of the country and as a result, supported Vosugeddoleh and the contract of 1919. Meanwhile, he formed his committee of iron. At that time, although he didn’t have any job except for journalism, he was considered as a young politician and especially was friend with Walter Smart, the oriental minister of the British embassy and James Balfour the assistant of the financial advisor. His plan was what mentioned in his statement as prime minister: Restoring order and peace, excellence and grandeur of Iran and its development and progress, and slogans like this. Why did Seyyed Zia resorted to detain political figures mainly Constitutionalist and of course feudal? Were his actions and speeches against the aristocracy kind of populist political propaganda or he was afraid of the actions of those figures against him? For both reasons: The rich and the aristocrats were all political elites who had become ministers and parliament members in those 10 to 20 years and of course most of them were feudal and (sometimes) very rich. Seyyed Zia intended to get rid of their reactions and also make young nationalists like Aref Qazvini, and Mirzadeh Eshghi his supporters. The lyric by Aref in praise of Seyyed Zia after his leaving Iran is famous: “Come back! Oh, my soul devoted to you and your black color! Come back!” A few years later Mirzadeh Eshghi in his ode of the fourth parliament wrote: “It is not enough as much we admire Zia, we won’t afford it….I say something but he was something else……
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