DOUBLE DEPENDABILITY

HARDWOOD DlVlSlONt

3855 E. Woshington Blvd.

Los Angeles 23, Gqlif. ANgelus 3-6844

SOFTWOOD DIVISION:

423O Bondini Blvd. Los Angeles 23'Calil. ANgelus 2-4148

FINE DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED HARDWOOD FOR EVERY PURPOSE FOR THE RETAITER Att SPECIES AND Att GRADES OF PACIFIC COAST SOFTWOODS PTUS SPECIATTIES

A FULI LINE OF WESTERN RED CEDAR FROM BETTER MIttS

The Mqnqgemeni of Credit

(Continued from Page 6) bent for sales who considered their credit department and office a necessarv evil. Thev didn't realize the impotiu.t." of iniegrating these administrative functions.

Certain obstacles line the course of integration. Owners and managers with" a flair for friends will object to es\ablishing a systematic credit and credit salei program. Fear of losing customers was so significant theY "couldn't see the woods because of the trees." I have heard more than one good level-headed and experienced iredit man threaten to quit because the boss had given him the responsibility as guardiin of the receivables, and then destroyed what initiative he had by over-ruling turn downs to Poor credit risks.

An example was a progressive dealer client of mine who needid money. He lvanted his delinquent accounts collected, and a plan of management installed to keep serious delinquency from happening again. A quick look at his situation showed that the dealer himself was at fault. He knew his customers "too well." He readily admitted, "I can't say no when my friends ask me for credit." Simply definedl he was an over-aggressive salesman, and totally unmindful of the pitfalls of such selling techniques. There is nothing wrong with aggressive selling for cash. Credit selling takes on a different aspect. Invariably, I find a top-flight sales department in dealerships that are overboard with receivables indicating good salesmanship and inadequate control of credit department functions. In this case of our over-aggressive salesman, his ofifice manager was given training, his sales and credit departments were properly integrated and within a very short time delinquency was reduced over $40,000.00.

Results

I have had many dealers say that a standard plan of credit management wouldn't work-that it would work in a big store but not in theirs. My reply was always the same: if it works in a big store it will work in theirs, only by practicing standard credit management on a smaller scale.

Of course, results depend on cooperation of the staff, and the managers ability "TO MANAGE" his entire operation. He must bring about this cooperation and maintain it. Credit is here to stay. He guides his stafi around errors in inventory conitrols. He helps with sales, displays, advertising, general store improvements, and approves of many of their ideas. There is no better time than now to review credit management procedures.

If you don't know how-learn how.

Here are some specific examples of actual dealerships, identified by alphabetical letter, showing the amount by which accounts receivable were reduced after instituting the author's plan of credit management.

Dealer A: $10,981.

Dealer B: $8,833.

Dealer C: $26.205 in six months. During the first four months, sales were increased more than $22,000.00 over the same period for the previous year.

Dealer D: $5,971.

Dealer E: $15,141.

Dealer F: $15,097 in 90 days.

Dealer G: $32,222 in four months. Dealer G's bank depos- its jumped an average of $10,000.00 during this period.

The above examples represent a cross section of dealers; large and small volume outlets, tlpt--erq_ managed by business men iintereste-6-.ln improving credit selling bnd collectio\ standards. \

Don't go along believing that sales will be lost if you establish standard credit management practices as offered by the author. It can be proved this isn't true. In all cases where I have in(Continu,eil on Page 52)