Order in the House Public Report by UMD College of Behavioral & Social Sciences

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Thanks to generous support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the University of Maryland (UMD) held a one-day symposium to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the 94th Congress by highlighting and exploring its record and the political change it helped to initiate. The forum, organized by UMD’s College of Behavioral and Social Sciences (BSOS) in collaboration with the United States Association of Former Members of Congress (USAFMC), took place at the U.S. Capitol Visitors Center on September 17, 2015, coinciding with Constitution Day. In addition to examining the work of the 94th Congress, the symposium also explored the record and reforms of the 104th Congress, marked by House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” analyzing the longterm impact of these two Congresses, and comparing and contrasting them with the current management and operation of the U.S. House of Representatives in today’s 114th Congress. The symposium provided insight in showing how the House has evolved over the last 40 years, and how previous reforms can be viewed in the context of the current political landscape, shining a light on key aspects that are important to the health and function of a representative democracy. A comprehensive group of experts was convened for the symposium. In all, 20 speakers and panelists participated in the event, including Mark Shields, longtime political analyst and commentator from the PBS News Hour, who served as the keynote speaker. The remaining speakers included 7 former members of Congress, 4 former staffers, 5 academic researchers from higher education, and 3 Congressional researchers, historians, and political analysts. The program included a combination of individual speakers and panel discussions. The complete program, as well as

speaker

bios

and

video

clips

from

the

event,

can

viewed

at:

http://www.go.umd.edu/orderinthehousedc.

LEAD-UP TO THE SYMPOSIUM: THE IDEA AND BUILDING A TEAM OF COLLABORATORS THE IDEA In the winter of 2014, the remaining Members of the Class of ‘74 still serving in the House, Henry Waxman and George Miller, announced their plans to retire; Tom Harkin, now in the Senate, had also decided to leave. This was to happen 40 years after the historic election of 1974 and its huge infusion of newly-elected House Democrats. As both a former staffer to then newly-elected Tim Wirth, and later his successor as a Member of the House, it struck David Skaggs that “something ought to be done” to commemorate the ’74 election and the dramatic impact those new Democrats had on reforming the House, most notably in shaking up the seniority system for picking powerful committee chairs. He initially tested the idea of some sort of event – a symposium and reunion, perhaps – with his old friend and fellow staffer, Les Francis, and with his colleague and member of that Class of ’74, Bob Carr. They thought the idea was worth pursuing, and consequently the three of them brought together a steering committee (see Symposium Program) comprised of other members of the class and contemporary staffers, along with some top scholars and students of Congress, and enlisted the help of the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress. That was the beginning of an 18-month process to plan, fundraise, organize and execute what on September 17, 2015, became “Order in the House.” David Skaggs served 12 years in Congress (1987-99) as U.S. Representative from the 2nd Congressional District of Colorado (the northwestern Denver suburbs) and three terms in the Colorado House (1981-87), the last two terms as Minority Leader. In Congress, Skaggs was on the House Appropriations Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He organized the effort to encourage greater civility and bipartisan cooperation in the House, resulting 3

in what came to be known as the House Bipartisan Retreats. After leaving Congress, he founded the Center for Democracy & Citizenship, which worked to strengthen American representative democracy through several projects and activities, including the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools (www.civicmissionofschools.org), the Congress to Campus Program, and the Campaign for Young Voters, as well as redistricting reform and lobbying reform. M. Robert "Bob" Carr served 18 years in Congress from Michigan. His service included the chairmanship of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee, as well as on the appropriations subcommittees funding the State, Commerce and Justice Departments and the legislative branch. Early in his Congressional career, he was a member of the Armed Services, Judiciary and (now) Natural Resources Committees. He was chair of the Congressional Arts Caucus whose mission was to guard funding for the national endowments for the arts and humanities.

Carr was an

Advisor/Observer to the SALT II arms control negotiations. Later, after congressional service, Carr has been an international business consultant, lawyer and currently teaches at The George Washington Universityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Graduate School of Political Management. He also teaches at Brookings Executive Education where he co-leads the Brookings Legislative Fellows program.

THE PARTNERSHIP The symposium was the first collaboration of the United State Association of Former Members of Congress (USAFMC) and the University of Maryland College of Behavioral and Social Sciences (UMD BSOS). In January 2015, Dean Gregory Ball and Associate Dean Wayne McIntosh of UMD BSOS were introduced to the USAFMC CEO Pete Weichlein and Managing Director Sabine Schleidt, by Former Congressman Dennis Cardoza, a member of the BSOS Board of Visitors and an alumnus. Following that interaction, a series of conference calls were held to enlarge the circle of USAFMC and BSOS collaborators, engage the Foundations who had already shown interest in supporting the Symposium, and finalize detailed plans that would be executed by BSOS. The 4

Steering Committee originally convened by Skaggs and Carr also participated in high-level planning. A Program Committee chaired by John Lawrence, Ph.D., with co-chair Former Congressman Bob Carr worked to identify panelists for the Symposium. Members of the committee included: Phil Sharp, Mickey Edwards, David Skaggs, James Thurber, Norman Ornstein, William Pitts, Les Francis, Pete Weichlein, Charles Johnson and Walter Oleszek. Many of these committee members ultimately served as panelists or moderators. The USAFMC’s bipartisan, pro bono public service programs and democracy initiatives in the United States and abroad echo the mission of BSOS to “Be the Solution” to the world’s great challenges. BSOS is uniquely positioned to provide cutting-edge research, scholarship and educational opportunities on political and social issues through its Department of Government and Politics, its Center for American Politics and Citizenship and its campus-wide links to other academic units including the Phillip Merrill College of Journalism and the School of Public Policy. As a land grant, public institution, the University of Maryland is dedicated to serving its constituents, including the population of the wider Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, as well as its students and alumni, who represent all 50 states and over 120 countries. The possibilities for current and future collaboration between USAFMC and BSOS in the areas of public interest and education are limitless.

FOUNDATION SUPPORT Upon joining forces with UMD, the USAFMC had already made initial contact with three foundations to explore the possibilities of funding the planned event. The Carnegie Corporation of New York, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and UMD began discussing moving forward with plans in spring 2015. Officially securing funding became a priority for UMD in order to move forward confidently with logistical planning. By late spring 2015, UMD had submitted formal proposals to all three foundations. The proposal process had included input 5

from USAFMC collaborators, and most importantly, an open dialogue between the program officers at the foundations and UMD. By August 2015, grant approvals from all three foundations had been received for a total of $125,000.

DINNER ON THE EVE OF THE SYMPOSIUM The originators of the idea for the Symposium had planned for the event to coincide with a reunion of the Class of ’74. A dinner on the eve of the Symposium was arranged to include class members, panelists, organizers and foundation representatives.

The dinner took place at the

Cosmos Club in Washington D.C. on September 16, 2015. During the dinner, remarks were given by U.S. House of Representatives Historian and University of Maryland Ph.D. alumnus Matthew Wasniewski. BSOS Dean Gregory Ball served as Master of Ceremonies, USAFMC members David Skaggs and Bob Carr provided remarks and the floor was opened for any guest, but especially members of the Class of ’74, to comment on the topics to be discussed the following day at the Symposium. The comments made by members of the Class of ’74 were a distinct highlight of the evening. Overall, the dinner was a resounding success with approximately 100 attendees and set the tone for the following day’s proceedings.

RESULTS AND OUTCOMES VISIBILITY AND ENGAGEMENT The University of Maryland and the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress worked together to reach out to a diverse audience to invite participation in the symposium. There were over 150 registrations in advance of the event, with 112 attendees. Attendees included current and former staffers and members, academic researchers, students, political analysts, historians, and many others, including Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen. In addition to those who attended, audiences were reached remotely through live streaming of the event. A press release about the symposium appeared on over 200 news websites with a viewing audience of more than 22 million from across the country. An event listing was sent to all college newspapers and websites, daily and weekly newspapers, and political papers in Washington, D.C., Baltimore and Northern Virginia. The news release and media advisory was also shared with more than 200 political reporters, as well as local TV, radio and other media outlets. An op-ed written by David Skaggs and University of Maryland Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and Politics Irwin Morris appeared in The Hill, and can be seen at the following link: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/lawmaker-news/253849-order-in-the-house The social media plan for promoting the symposium included posts on Facebook, Twitter, as well as Instagram. Posts were scheduled to go out every other day, leading up to the event. Posts were broadcast more frequently in the days immediately before and during the event. Speakers and panelists, as well as symposium attendees, were also encouraged to post about the symposium on their own social media accounts, using the following hashtag: #OrderinTheHouseDC.

FUTURE PROGRAMS BUILDING ON THE SYMPOSIUM The University of Maryland and the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress both share a strong desire to maintain momentum from the symposium and continue the important discussions and work that came out of the event. Both organizations have a strong interest in collaborating to help provide more discourse and functionality in Congress, moving forward. The work is all the more urgent and important, given the current state of affairs in Congress, and the fact that so many Congressional members are young, with limited historical, institutional knowledge. UMD researchers are also exploring the psychological and behavioral aspects of political cooperation as an additional lens through which to examine the current polarized environment and how it might be changed. UMD and USAFMC plan to reach out to additional partners and pursue further opportunities to support collaboration around activities, research, and events that address these important issues.

EDUCATIONAL TOOLS PROGRAM , VIDEO AND TRANSCRIPTION A printed program was provided the day of the event, on site at the U.S. Capitol Visitor Center. The Symposium was live streamed and professionally recorded. An electronic version of the program, video of the proceedings in their entirety, as well as an edited, condensed version (approximately 40 minutes in length) is available in perpetuity on a website hosted by the University of Maryland College of Behavioral and Social Sciences: https://bsos.umd.edu/academicsresearch/conflict-order-and-reform. The condensed version provides a great educational tool for students. Full transcription of the entire day is also available upon request from the Office of the Dean, College of Behavioral and Social Sciences (contact information is available at the link above).

APPENDIX C:

SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS OF SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS By Casey Burgat, University of Maryland CONDITIONS FOR THE 1970S REFORM : WHY WERE REFORMS NEEDED AND WHAT CONTEXTS FACILITATED THEIR PASSAGE ? The early 1970’s were a tumultuous time in the United States and within Congress. Growing antipathy towards the Vietnam War and intensifying women’s and civil rights social movements, coupled with a declining trust in the government because of the Watergate scandal, produced an aware and engaged electorate focused on increasing transparency and openness in congressional procedures. Campaigning vigorously against the DC establishment and calling for reform within Congress, 75 freshman Democrats were elected to the House of Representatives in 1974. Put simply, the class of 1974 was elected with a ‘democratic impulse’ to reform the culture of Washington, D.C. (Edwards). Once elected, the new class of representatives provided crucial support to a growing number of incumbents who had voiced concern over a Congress that had long been strictly controlled by committee chairmen. Long-serving Southern Democrats whose autocratic management style and conservative voting records were at variance with the growing liberal majority of the Caucus chaired many congressional committees thanks to conventions of seniority rather than the use of Caucus elections.

The concentration of power in the conservative wing of the party produced policy

frustrations from many members who were unable to advance their bills without the approval of the chairs. In the words of former Congressman David Obey, the procedural status quo of the time resulted in chairmen and their staffs being “arrogant, arbitrary, and insufferable.” Thanks to well-read books authored by Richard Bolling (1966; 1968) and Democratic Study Group reform proposals pushed by its Executive Director Richard Conlon, problematic chamber 9

procedures and sources of gridlock were highlighted and made public, generating an organized reform coalition and an involved electorate supporting politicians’ calls for reform. As put by Princeton historian Julian Zelizer, reforms were finally successful because of the efforts of a powerful coalition made up of important civil-rights, labor, anti-war, and public interest groups, along with a series of scandals focusing public ire on how business was done in Washington. Taken together, these factors coalesced to bring new attention to procedural problems that had previously gone overlooked by the public. These efforts culminated in a series of important institutional reforms. First, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 allowed for more public access to committee votes and transcripts, as well as the filing of minority reports and expanded opportunities to demand recorded votes on amendments offered on the House floor.

In 1973, the congressional parties adopted further

reforms permitting secret ballot votes to retain chairmen and ranking minority members. Additionally, Republican minority staffing was increased and minority committees were allocated a minimum of one third of the total investigative funds granted to each committee. Democrats also instituted the “subcommittee bill of rights,” decentralizing power in committees by guaranteeing subcommittees staff and jurisdictional authority. In 1972, reformers passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, which greatly increased transparency in campaign fundraising. The Class of 1974 brought new impetus to strengthen and extend these reforms.

They

organized and joined forces with reform minded incumbents to “rein in unaccountable power centers, the unelected committee chairmen” (Obey). Importantly, the Class of 1974 joined with other Caucus reformers to reject three sitting committee chairmen, thereby putting all other chairs on notice that they needed to be responsive to the party’s rank and file. In addition to curbing the power held by a small number of committee chairs, reformers frustrated with the growing power of the president called for institutional changes that empowered

the Legislative Branch in its dealings with the Executive. To combat the sentiment that the President was dictating to Congress regarding budgets and the management of the War in Vietnam, Congress passed measures such as the Congressional Budget Act and the War Powers Resolution. Also, the mission of the Legislative Reference Service (now the Congressional Research Service) was updated to provide more direct research and analytical policy assistance to Congress and the power of the Comptroller General was expanded to amplify the policy analysis capabilities of each Member of Congress. Another critical reform was the Budget Act of 1974, which created the House and Senate budget committees and the Congressional Budget Office and instituted a budget process in Congress.

These new budget institutions and procedures allowed Congress to counter the

administration’s budget analysis and to write a budget on its own as an alternative to the president’s budget. Each of these reforms made the executive more accountable to Congress by instituting new auditing requirements and budgetary procedures as well as specifying the conditions under which the president must consult with Congress over troop commitments. Taken together, the 1970s reforms of Congress had wide ranging effects on how the institution functioned. Among other consequences, the reforms made the process more open and transparent. For the first time, the public was able to see how their Representatives voted in committee and on many amendments on the floor, including on contentious issues such as Vietnam and busing for racial integration of public schools. After the Class of 1974 joined in the rejection of three longstanding committee chairs, power devolved to younger, more reform-minded subcommittee chairs and to the Caucus as a whole. The fact that these reforms were passed during a forty-year reign by the Democratic Party is also relevant.

As pointed out by University of Maryland professor Frances Lee, the political

circumstances of the time—that is to say, large and stable Democratic majorities in both chambers—made it easier for Democrats to decentralize power and thereby grant more influence to

Republicans (such as enhanced minority staffing and increased ability to demand roll-call votes) without fearing a Republican takeover. Reforms were passed to satisfy both public and intraCongress calls for more transparency, all while seemingly not threatening the Democratic majority that had grown so entrenched. In essence, the passing of reforms was good politics by granting more influence to all members over floor and committee agendas and processes, and also because it did not seem to endanger the long-standing Democratic majorities in Congress.

WHAT WERE THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMS PASSED BY THE CLASS OF 1974? As with most dramatic overhauls of congressional procedure and leadership, numerous unintended consequences were borne out of the reforms passed in the early 1970s.

These

consequences have allowed current-serving officials, scholars, and the public to learn several lessons from the class of 1974 and the reforms they championed. Many scholars have highlighted the cyclical nature of reforms and their calls for passage. While the political climate of the 1970s created strong and successful coalitions for change within Congress, that political climate, like all others, was fleeting. As governmental trust recovered after Watergate and a more transparent, equitable Congress operated after the Sunshine Reforms, the political environment changed. Yet the reforms remained. The rules passed in response to a different era outlasted the coalition, and the consequences of the reforms were altered. The reforms of the 1970s helped to facilitate stronger partisanship in Congress, as members used the more open process to score political points against their opponents. By making it easier to force roll-call votes, the reforms made it possible for members to design amendments to embarrass members of the opposing party. Such votes on hot-button issues could then be shared with the campaign committees, so members could claim that their opponents had voted against a balanced

budget, for forced integration, and other matters. Similarly, the televising of the House and other transparency reforms of the 1970s were also very useful to a minority party seeking to force its issues into public view. As Republicans seized these opportunities, Democrats adopted more creative procedures to clamp down and restrict opportunities to participate. The feedback loop worked in favor of increasing centralization of power in the leadership. House leaders now govern the House floor with a much heavier hand than they did in the 1970s. In the words of forty-year Republican Congressional staffer Don Wolfensberger, “Every time you have a change in party control, the party in the minority says, ‘If we get in the majority we're going to be more fair and open.’ They get into the majority, and it's even more restrictive than it was.” Structurally, the reforms achieved their primary objective of hedging the power of committee chairs in favor of a leadership voted on by the entire Caucus. Though the change wasn’t immediate, as the first committee chairs weren’t defeated by Caucus votes until 1975, the previously unimaginable thought of removing a chair from power proved to be possible. However, some scholars and officials argue that power was only transferred from a few members to another, even smaller group of representatives: party leaders. Perhaps, they claim, the reforms went too far in curbing the power of chairs, ultimately making it extremely difficult for them to act independently of their party leadership at all. George Washington University political science professor Sarah Binder suggests that increased political gridlock is a direct, yet unanticipated, result of the reforms passed in the 1970s. Once the political climate of the reformist early 1970s changed and competition for control of the House increased, parties polarized, and the majority party pursued caucus policies through more restrictive floor rules. However, once the majority caucus fractured within the more competitive, partisan environment it could no longer assume full support from their caucus on policy initiatives, forcing the majority to reach out to the minority party to ensure bill passage. “And if it’s unwilling to reach

out to the minority, the result is difficulty in bringing bills and working them from the floorâ&#x20AC;? (Binder). The lesson was again seen after the election of Tea Party conservatives to Congress in 2010, and their subsequent obstructionist stances taken on policy advancement. Since their fracturing of the Republican Party caucus, on many critical legislative matters the GOP has been unable to legislate without support from the minority-party Democrats, particularly on appropriations and taxes. In other cases, such as with legislation approving the building of the Keystone Pipeline (Northern Route Approval Act), the Republican Party has neither been able to legislate on its own nor to coax sufficient Democratic support for legislation, and gridlock has reigned.as in the case of repeated attempted repeals of the Affordable Care Act. Relatedly, and perhaps most significantly, the reforms permitting more recorded

votes is

thought to be a catalyst for the polarization of voting behavior and policy stances within Congress. Once recorded voting was permitted in the Committee of the Whole, amending activity within Congress increased substantially. However, the reform permitted the abuse of open voting rules by giving members the ability to introduce amendments on hot-button issues with the sole intention of putting their opponents on the record. These votes were, and currently are, used as fodder for partisan campaigns, often neglecting the political purposes for which the amendments were introduced in the first place. Thus, many posit that the increased transparency intended with the Sunshine Reforms has proved to be a mechanism for increasing the politicization of voting within Congress. Consequently, members and parties have become concerned with how their votes will be used against them in future elections, and party polarization has widened. The reforms and elections of the early 1970s also demonstrated the effectiveness of campaigning on an anti-Washington, anti-establishment message. Candidates and incumbents recognized that the electorate responded to populist denunciations of the status quo and career politicians. Former

Washington Post editorialist and current CNN moderator Mark Shields maintains that this anti-DC theme has become so ingrained that virtually all campaigns of current representatives and candidates reinforce the message that the federal government is a problem, not a solution. This campaign message remains effective today, though Shields maintains that such a method of victory comes at a great cost to the capacity to govern. While the passage of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act allowed for dramatically more involvement of Congress in federal budgeting, this process has proved to be incredibly time and labor intensive for the institution, requiring significant levels of technical and substantive knowledge pertaining to federal agencies, operations, and appropriations.

In creating their budget, time-

strapped officials are expected to allocate months towards reconciliation negotiations within committee and across their chamber, and then with the president and his staffers regarding the administration’s entirely different budget proposal. Obey argues that because “nobody went to God to ask him to add four months to the calendar” to accommodate the time needed to plan and negotiate the federal budget between polarized parties, funding the government through regular continuing resolutions rather than executed budgets should come as no surprise. (Obey). More importantly, former Congressman Obey argues this reform “has made budgeting far more political and far more partisan…It’s made the process far less real.” Congressional budget writers are now thought to use their budget as political leverage, producing estimates that are overly optimistic or pessimistic depending on party control of Congress and the White House, and are never truly expected to be a genuine substitute to the executive budget. Budgets have become political messaging tools that are not assumed to be grounded in realistic assessments, and are not possible for appropriators to implement in practice.

Obey and others see this unanticipated

consequence as a key reason behind current delays and inabilities to produce on-time federal budgets, as well as recent governmental shutdowns over the federal deficit and spending.

WHAT IS DIFFERENT BETWEEN NOW AND THE 1970S? Nearly every scholar, journalist, former staffer, and elected official taking part in the symposium was quick to point out one of the defining characteristics of our current political climate is the extreme levels of polarization within Congress. Most all attribute blame to both political parties for losing the ‘democratic impulse’ of the reforms passed in the 1970s. Former Congressman Mickey Edwards suggests that representatives of the reform era valued constitution over party, while current representatives are beholden to their party or ideology over the institution. He’s not alone. Norm Ornstein asserts ‘party tribalism’ has taken over Congress and dysfunction has reigned in the absence of legislative compromises. Professor Frances Lee argues political polarization is partly a result of a change in political circumstances since the reform era of the early 1970s. Beginning in 1980, the two parties have competed for control of national institutions at relative parity. After President Reagan’s sweeping victory and the Republican capture of the Senate majority, House Republicans began to believe that a majority was in reach for them, too. At the same time, when Democrats went into the minority, they did not see themselves as a permanent minority, but instead began to strategize about ways to regain power. The upshot is that minority parties since 1980 have continually seen themselves within striking distance of holding majorities in both chambers, and majorities have worried about loss of power. When political control is in play, Lee posits, partisan political considerations carry greater weight. Members continually view issues through the lens of how it might potentially impact party control. As a consequence, partisan identity frequently takes precedence over institutional patriotism, and polarization ensues as each party becomes less willing to advance legislation that might permit the opposing party to claim credit. In 1974 Democrats allowed for the passage of reforms partly because they never thought their majorities would be threatened. That is no longer 16

the case. In the contemporary Congress, reform proposals advanced are assumed to be driven by partisan motives, and thus the opposing party will likely move to thwart any such efforts. Votes are used as political and campaign tools, and often occur as a straight party-line exercise with each party reflexively opposing the other. In the era of polarization, many political observers agree that Congress has lost power relative to the other branches of government, particularly to the president. Former Congressman Edwards suggests Congress has ‘submitted’ to the president, citing that post-1980 presidents have eclipsed the constitutional powers of the House of Representative over budgeting, trade, and war. Most agree that both parties have contributed to the rising tides of dysfunction and gridlock, and that in current political circumstances reforms to address current problems are not likely to succeed. Unlike the early 1970s, when social movements, a well-resourced news media, and an engaged electorate fueled electoral pressure to officials to propose and advance reforms, a less engaged and attentive public is present in current American politics (Lewis-Beck 2014). Additionally, the intraCongress organization of reformers and the Democratic Study Group seen in the 1970s has not been replicated, and no large reform-minded coalition has developed.

Many members are

discontented with how Congress operates. Many members came to Congress on the strength of anti-establishment, anti-institution, ‘Washington is broken’ campaign messages. Discontent is also evident in the demands for reform from Tea Party and other conservative House members, as well as widespread worry about excessive use of the filibuster in the Senate. Fractures within both political parties have proven troublesome for party leaders, however.

No large-scale reform

coalition has unified around a set of reforms aimed at addressing these institutional concerns. Several journalists at the symposium noted a key difference in media coverage of Congress between the 1970s and today. Mark Shields highlights that there are very few small-town newspaper reporting on congressional actions and procedures such as existed in the earlier era. This reporting

had served to inform constituents of the specific votes taken by their representative in Congress. As fewer newspapers commit correspondents to the Capitol, the information link between the electorate and Congress has weakened. Contemporary coverage has been taken over by cable news commentators, big-city newspapers, and online commentary that typically comes with a well-known political slant, Shields says. Former congressional columnist Norm Ornstein agrees. He adds that current reporters on Congress are often unaware of the political history of the institution, and how its evolution provides context to political events of the day. Instead, modern reporters are generally focused on topical issues, while procedural stories—which are necessary to highlight the needs for institutional reform—are typically seen as not worth of publication. Finally, current members playing a role in the budgeting process must have a substantive and technical knowledge of the process that wasn’t required of 1970s representatives. The Budget Act of 1974 mandated Congress to submit a budget of its own to counter the president’s budget analysis. However, the Act has resulted in gaps between the wishes of congressional leadership and what budget committee members and staffers know to be possible. Former Congressman David Obey suggests that the leadership is not sufficiently knowledgeable of budgetary details, procedures, and expert recommendations, and consequently consistently calls for unrealistic budget blueprints. Obey maintains that a better balance must be struck between the budgets leaders propose and the recommendations put forth by independent experts and the appropriations bills that leaders can actually pass. Currently, the gap between passable budgets and realistic appropriations is too wide, and partisan budget showdowns have become commonplace.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? WHAT REFORMS ARE BEING ADVOCATED NOW AND WHAT IS THEIR LIKELIHOOD OF PASSAGE ? Though today’s political culture unquestionably differs from the early 1970s and the divisions between parties are far more entrenched, many political observers agree on the types of reforms that could help the institution operate more transparently. First and most often stressed by symposium participants, changes to current campaign finance laws are seen as necessary, but most acknowledge the likelihood of passage is fraught with political obstacles. Campaign finance regulations have been profoundly altered as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings allowing for unlimited and undisclosed donations to candidates. At the same time, and likely as a result of the Court’s actions, campaign costs have exploded in recent election cycles. As a signal of potential viability, candidates typically need to exhibit an ability to raise funds to be competitive generally through connections to big donors. However, while many accept the need for campaign finance reform, the specific reforms aimed at curbing the impact of money in politics are varied. Suggestions range from public financing of congressional campaigns and eliminating political action committees to requiring more reporting of bundled and group donations and to outright lifting contributions caps. The consensus among observers, though, is any such reforms are extremely unlikely to pass in the near term. Many members want to rise to positions of leadership within their chamber, and one of the expected requirements to do so is to raise funds for the good of the party. As a result, numerous members feel obligated to create leadership PACs and funnel donations to their caucus. Several panelists also pointed out that much of the electorate sees the federal government as dominated by big money and believes that elected officials are beholden to a non-representative constituency rather than to the average voter. In other words, members of Congress are widely thought to be constantly ‘dialing for dollars’ rather than working on district issues or visiting with voters in their district. Ideally,

campaign finance reform would alleviate the need for perpetual fundraising on behalf of parties and candidates and would allay the publicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s concerns about the undue influence of moneyed interests. Secondly, several panel speakers noted the lack of any organized social movements unified behind a set of specific reforms as a fundamental reason behind more muted calls for reform within Congress. Though several outside organizations such as the Congressional Instituteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Congressional Reform Project advocate for congressional reforms, observers argue that there is not a consistent and clear enough message to organize the public behind their calls. And, without mass support there isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t a level of electoral accountability to incentivize officials to advance the cause. Thus, scholars, journalists, and observers consistently posit that reform interests would be far more successful should they unite their efforts, detail specific and realistic reform measures, and generate a level of electoral support that could potentially threaten incumbent members. To do so, media coverage of Congress needs significant strengthening. History professor Julian Zelizer explains that in the 1970s news coverage included detailed accounts of procedural happenings in Congress. The Watergate investigation and the Nixon impeachment hearings also contributed to demand for reform. With the advent of the 24-hour news cycle, substance has taken a back seat to headlines. Explicitly ideological media outlets, including both cable news channels and online sources, cultivate an audience by reinforcing its biases. American University professor James Thurber contends that reforms are borne out of acknowledged procedural abuses of power that an ideologically objective media writes about. However, modern media forced to fill a neverending 24-hour news cycle is focused on manufactured scandal and ideology rather than concerns of process. Consequently, the electorate is not presented with the context or specifics as to why reforms are needed. In addition, a public that sees Congress as an institution dominated by the wealthy and powerful grows more cynical in believing the system is rigged. Similar to the issue of campaign finance, panelists could not agree on a specific set of measures as to the best way to

reform the media, even though they expressed concern about how media coverage had evolved. Professor Zelizer and others warn that reform demands an overhaul of what and how journalists are taught to cover Congress, a prospect that would require a fundamental shift of political and campaign coverage that is unlikely to occur. Professor James Thurber closed the symposium offering a wide-ranging list of reforms that have been proposed by governmental organizations, elected officials, staffers, and experienced political operatives. Among these is a mandate for a five-day workweek for members that would facilitate more interaction among officials, theoretically leading to more conversation and compromise across party lines. In addition, reform of the budget process is needed. Disallowing the use of continuing resolutions would force spending decisions to be made in a timely manner. An end to votes to raise the debt limit would also reduce the risk of a major crisis. Former Congressman David Obey argues that the Budget Resolution Act of 1974 should be ripped up and replaced with a modern alternative to depoliticize budget negotiations. Another key reform would strengthen the 2007 Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act by better defining what is considered lobbying. Also, the current committee system is thought to need streamlining by redesigning the subcommittee system to limit overlap in jurisdiction between subcommittees. Finally, congressional districting lines should be drawn by independent commissions to prevent politically gerrymandered districts.

REFERENCES Binder, Sarah. Panel I “Congressional Reform in the 1970s” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Bolling, Richard Walker. House out of Order." Dutton. 1965. Bolling, Richard Walker. Power in the House: A History of the Leadership of the House of Representatives. Dutton, 1968. Cable, William H. Panel I “Congressional Reform in the 1970s” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech.

Edwards, Mickey. Panel II “Congressional Reform and the Republican Resurgence” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Lawrence, John A. Panel III “Lessons Learned: The Future of Congressional Reform” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Lee, Frances E. Panel III “Lessons Learned: The Future of Congressional Reform” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. The American voter revisited. University of Michigan Press, 2014. Obey, Hon. David. Panel I “Congressional Reform in the 1970s” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Oleszek, Walter J. Panel I “Congressional Reform in the 1970s” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Ornstein, Norman. Panel III “Lessons Learned: The Future of Congressional Reform” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Pitts, William R. Panel II “Congressional Reform and the Republican Resurgence” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Shields, Mark. Keynote Address "Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses." Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Thurber, James. Closing Remarks "Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses." Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Wolfensberger, Donald R. Panel II “Congressional Reform and the Republican Resurgence” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech. Zelizer, Julian E. Panel III “Lessons Learned: The Future of Congressional Reform” Order in the House? Conflict, Order, and Reform: The 94th – 114th Congresses. Washington, D.C. 17 Sept. 2015. Speech.