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Maryland Family Law Update is a review of events as they affect the practice of domestic relations in law in the state of Maryland published by The Daily Record, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
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3 Child Advocacy: Child wellbeing still a still a concern despite fall in overdoses.
4 Cover Story: MD Supreme Court to hear case on public school districts’ CVA liability
5
In the News:
Father’s consent not required for adoption
A state appeals court has ruled that the consent of a father is not required for his child to be adopted.
6 Monthly Memo
Former wife lacked standing to contest foreclosure notice … Son’s mental illness not basis for compassionate release, judge says … Michigan appeals court affirms, overturns parts of divorce case … Massachusetts court reverses order to return child to Indiana … Court overturns fees awarded for argument over parenting time
Child wellbeing still a concern despite fall in overdoses
Parental Substance Use Disorder impacts children in all socio-economic sectors, including children in foster care; parental death from overdose is devastating for children.
Nationally, drug overdose and drug-related hospitalization rates impact child welfare caseloadsgenerally, counties with higher such rates have higher caseload rates, and those cases tend to be more complex and severe.
“Generally, counties with higher overdose death and drug hospitalization rates have higher caseload rates.”
“In addition, these substance use indicators correlate with rates of more complex and severe child welfare cases.”
About 1,550 fatal overdoses were reported in Maryland in 2024, a 38% decrease from the previous year, and the lowest number recorded since 2015.
Baltimore — which in recent years has been experiencing an overdose crisis— also saw a similarly significant decrease in fatalities.
There were 680 reported overdose deaths in Baltimore last year, down from 1,043 in 2023.
The overdose death rate in Baltimore has consistently surpassed that of Maryland and the United States as a whole; for example, in 2023, there were 147.2 per 100,000 overdose fatalities in the city as compared to 40.1 in Maryland and 29.9 in the nation.
Of concern is that Baltimore represents less than 10% of Maryland’s population, but nearly 40% of the state’s overdose fatalities occur there, and most of those deaths involve fentanyl.
JOAN
LITTLE
Child Advocacy
Of further concern is that in the last six months, there have been three mass overdose incidents in the Penn North area in Baltimore.
Prince George’s County and Montgomery counties also have higher rates of overdose fatalities.
The rate of fatal overdose among women aged 15-44 increased 78% between 2018 and 2023 in Baltimore; 320 female residents aged 15-44 died of fentanyl-related overdose in Baltimore in 2023.
The “consensus amongst researchers, clinicians, and policy makers [is] that parental substance abuse negatively affects child wellbeing”, potentially causing longterm effects on a child’s well-being.
When a child loses a parent, even if the child is in foster care, the child will experience trauma due to that loss.
Two elementary school-aged sisters were in foster care when their mother died suddenly of an overdose.
They had hoped to be reunified with their mother as she had re-engaged in substance abuse treatment and her health appeared to be improving.
The girls were devastated at this unexpected outcome.
Their hopes of reunification were dashed in an instant, and their familial connection was uprooted.
“A large body of evidence spanning several decades has documented that the children of parents [engaged in] parental substance abuse are more likely to develop a variety of emotional,
behavioral, physical, cognitive, academic, and social problems in the short and long run.”
In the case of the two sisters, they have exhibited poor school attendance, problems focusing at school, behavioral challenges such as sudden outbursts with minimal provocation, and disrupted foster care placements.
Despite having the benefits of educational supports, individual therapy, and psychiatric medications, they still struggle to self-regulate.
With reunification no longer possible and no relatives available to care for the girls, the development of a new permanency plan with a nonrelative was fraught with obstacles, which were fundamentally driven by the sisters’ struggle to make a secure connection with their foster family.
Services to the sisters have been augmented to include placement in treatment foster care, family therapy with the treatment foster family, additional educational support, changes in psychiatric medication, and a one-on-one aide.
Hopefully, these services will enhance the capacity of the sisters to overcome the devastating loss that they continue to grieve.
Efforts to combat parental Substance Use Disorder are essential to minimizing the harm to children that arises out of parental overdose fatalities and have the potential to increase rates of reunification and permanency with family.
Joan F. Little is a Chief Attorney at Maryland Legal Aid.
MD Supreme Court to hear case on public school districts’ CVA liability
By Ian Round BridgeTower Media Newswires
The Maryland Supreme Court on Jan. 6 granted review to a Child Victims Act case about the liability of public school districts for abuse that occurred before mid-1971.
The state’s high court in April is scheduled to hear arguments in the case of Rhonda Sturm, a woman in her 60s who alleged abuse during the 1970-71 school year in Wicomico County.
School boards had complete immunity against lawsuits until July 1971, when a state law took effect requiring them to purchase $100,000 insurance policies; after that, they were immune beyond what insurance would cover.
The 2023 Child Victims Act ended the statute of limitations for claims against the institutions that employed abusers.
The Wicomico County Board of Education argues Sturm’s claim couldn’t be “revived” by the CVA because she never had a claim, due to school districts’ immunity. It also argued that there is no available liability insurance for claims from mid-1971 or earlier. That means that if it has to pay Sturm, it would have to use appropriated educational funds.
“Whether boards of education must use educational funds allocated to them by the State, the County governments, and the federal government, to pay for historical wrongs instead of to pay for the education of today’s students is a matter of grave public concern,” states the board’s petition for writ of certiorari.
“The Framers of Maryland’s Constitution sought to prevent funds allocated to the education of Maryland’s children from being used for any purpose other than education.”
The Maryland Supreme Court granted review of a Child Victims Act case about the liability of public school districts for abuse that occurred before mid-1971.
The board, which declined to comment, is represented by Cullen Casey and Gregory VanGeisen of Anderson, Coe & King in Baltimore. VanGeisen also declined to comment but provided court filings.
Sturm’s lawyers argue the Child Victims Act was clear in providing a remedy to victims who previously could not seek justice. They also argue Sturm and others in her position are entitled to the full damages allowed under the Child Victims Act and its 2025 amendment, which significantly lowered the amount of money victims could receive but still may be greater than insurance coverage.
“The precedent makes very clear that the look-back window looked back,” said New York-based lawyer Hillary Nappi, who represents Sturm. “On its face, this is what it says.”
Nappi said the board is attempting to “disregard the legislature,” and that the CVA “fully intended for survivors to collect (damages).”
The case arrives at the Maryland Supreme Court in a strange procedural position — without a trial court resolution — which the court will also review.
The school board appealed after a Wicomico County Circuit Court judge in September denied its motion to dismiss, in which it argued it was immune. The Maryland Appellate Court quickly dismissed the appeal, agreeing with Sturm that litigants can’t appeal motions to dismiss. The board filed a certiorari petition shortly thereafter.
In addition to considering school districts’ liability for pre-1971 claims and their ability to pay them, the court will consider whether parties can immediately appeal motions to dismiss.
Robert Jenner, a Baltimore-based lawyer also representing Sturm, said it was significant that the court agreed to hear the case with “rocket-docket speed.”
THE DAILY RECORD FILE PHOTO
NY appeals court: Father’s consent not required for adoption
BRIdgetoweR MedIa newswIRes
ROCHESTER, NY -- A state appeals court has ruled that the consent of a father is not required for his child to be adopted.
In July 2024, Yates County Family Court Judge Patrick F. McAllister ruled that the biological father’s consent was not required for the adoption because he had essentially abandoned the child.
The biological father appealed, and the Appellate Division of state Supreme Court, Fourth Department, affirmed McAllister’s ruling.
The child was adopted by a man who is married to the child’s mother and has acted as the child’s stepfather since she was approximately 18 months old.
“Where, as here, a child is conceived or born in wedlock, a parent’s consent to adoption is required unless the parent evinces an intent to forego their parental or custodial rights and obligations as manifested by their failure for a period of six months to visit the child and communicate with the child or person having legal custody of the child, although able to do so,” according to the Fourth Department decision.
“When a parent’s inability to visit with the child results from their own deliberate acts, such as criminal conduct, the underlying circumstances need not preclude a finding of a lack of contact with the child evincing an intent to abandon the child,” the court wrote.
“The fact that a parent is incarcerated does not in itself excuse their failure to support, maintain contact with, or plan for the future of the child,’ the panel wrote.
“Where the person having custody of the child thwarts or interferes with the noncustodial parent’s efforts to visit or communicate with the child, a finding of abandonment is inappropriate,” the court wrote.
The party seeking a finding of abandonment “has the burden of establishing abandonment by clear and convincing evidence,” according to the decision.
“We conclude that Family Court properly dispensed with respondent’s consent to the adoption of the child inasmuch as petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent abandoned the child,” the court wrote.
McCallister considered the biological father’s contact with the child during the period of time immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
Contrary to the father’s contention, even though he was incarcerated for a part of that period, “that does not in itself excuse his failure to maintain contact with the child,” the court wrote.
“The evidence presented at the hearing established that (the biological father) sent the child a single letter during his period of incarceration of approximately 2½ years, which constitutes insubstantial and infre -
quent contact that is insufficient to preclude a finding of abandonment,” the court ruled.
“The court was entitled to reject respondent’s testimony that he was logistically and financially unable to contact the child more during his incarceration, particularly considering the evidence that he had the means to contact other people from prison, such as his sister,” the panel wrote.
The court also noted that contrary to the contention that he could not contact the child following his release from prison due to the conditions of his parole “falls short of adequately explaining his failure to meet his parental obligations inasmuch as there is no indication that he was precluded from contacting the mother, which he failed to do.”
“We conclude that the court properly determined that the record does not support the conclusion that petitioner or the mother thwarted or interfered with respondent’s efforts to communicate with the child,” the court wrote.
Bridgetower Media Newswires
The New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department.
Former wife lacked standing to contest foreclosure notice
BOSTON, MA — A woman who obtained title to her home through divorce lacked standing to challenge the sufficiency of a notice of default issued in foreclosure proceedings commenced against her ex-husband for his failure to make mortgage payments on the property, the Appeals Court has ruled.
The case involved foreclosure proceedings commenced when Frank T. Costa Jr. defaulted on payments on a mortgage held on a house in Peabody. Costa had previously transferred title to the home to Kathleen McIntosh in connection with their divorce.
Plaintiff MTGLQ Investors brought a summary process action after acquiring title to the property through foreclosure.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Son’s mental illness not basis for compassionate release, judge says
PROVIDENCE, RI -- A defendant’s motion for compassionate release should be denied because she did not establish how her son’s mental illness renders him incapacitated in a way that would make him incapable of caring for her grandchild, a U.S. District Court judge has decided.
The defendant was sentenced in April 2024 to a 102-month term of incarceration for drug distribution offenses.
Judge Mary S. McElroy noted that the defendant alleged two circumstances that she argued constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.” The first was that she exhibited symptoms indicating she may have had or was in danger of having a stroke.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Michigan appeals court affirms, overturns parts of divorce case
DETROIT, MI — Where an appeal has been filed in a divorce case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revising the parties’ uniform spousal support order, but the court abused its discretion by awarding counsel fees without conducting an evidentiary hear-
Monthly Memo
ing or making any factual findings to support the award.
“Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying his spousal support obligation, rather than terminating it. He further contends that the court abused its discretion by failing to retroactively modify spousal support and by failing to award him an appropriate amount of attorney fees. On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the court erred by finding that a change in circumstances existed to justify the modification of spousal support. She additionally contends that the court abused its discretion by failing to make adequate factual findings regarding the parties’ income for spousal support purposes.
“The trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing or make finding of facts regarding the reasonableness of plaintiff’s request for attorney fees. Thus, the record is inadequate to allow for meaningful review of the issue. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the revised USSO pertaining to attorney fees, and direct the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make appropriate findings of fact on remand.
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Massachusetts court reverses order to return child to Indiana
BOSTON, MA — Where a Juvenile Court judge ordered that a child be returned to Indiana pursuant to a requisition issued by an Indiana court under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles (ICJ), that order should be reversed because custody proceedings commenced in Massachusetts before the Indiana court initiated the requisition proceedings, so the ICJ and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act precluded the Indiana court from issuing the requisition and the Juvenile Court judge erred by enforcing it and ordering the child’s return to Indiana.
“We consider whether a Juvenile Court judge properly ordered that the child, Vale, be returned to Indiana pursuant to a requisition issued by an Indiana court under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles (ICJ), as adopted by Massachusetts in G.L.c. 120A, §1, and Indiana in Ind. Code §31-37-23-1 (1997).
The child is an unaccompanied refugee minor who lived in Indiana for fewer than six months and then ran away to Massachusetts, where the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a care and protection petition. Because the custody proceedings commenced in the Juvenile Court before the Indiana court initiated the requisition proceedings, we conclude that the ICJ and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. §1738A, precluded the Indiana court from issuing the requisition and the judge erred by enforcing it and ordering the child’s return to Indiana. We further conclude that the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MCCJA), G.L.c. 209B, §2(a)(2), grants default jurisdiction to Massachusetts because no other State has ‘home state’ jurisdiction and it is in the best interest of the child that a Massachusetts court assume jurisdiction of the custody proceeding. …
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Court overturns fees awarded for argument over parenting time
DETROIT, MI — Where a plaintiff has filed an appeals challenging an awarding the defendant counsel fees for time spent opposing the plaintiff’s objection to the referee’s recommendation that his request for a modification of parenting time be denied, the fee order should be reversed because the trial court did not articulate any findings of fact that would support a conclusion that the plaintiff’s motion was filed with the improper purpose of harassment.
“Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that his second motion to modify parenting time and his objection to the referee’s recommendation denying this motion were frivolous. …
“At the hearing on plaintiff’s objection to the referee’s recommendation, defendant argued that plaintiff’s motion to modify parenting time and objection to the referee’s recommendation were frivolous because they were intended to harass defendant, and plaintiff’s position was devoid of arguable legal merit. The trial court agreed that the objection was frivolous, but it did not specify the reasoning for this determination. …
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Family Law Digest
POONAM MALIK V. SANJEEV JATAIN
Supplemental complaint; judgment of divorce; fraud, mistake or irregularity
The Appellate Court affirmed the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court’s dismissal of wife’s supplemental complaint. Because the supplemental complaint was an attempt to revise the judgment of divorce, but it was made more than 30 days after the entry of judgment, wife needed to show fraud, mistake or irregularity, which she failed to do.
The Appellate Court vacated the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s alimony award. Having found that wife was disabled, unable to work and unlikely to benefit from further education, the trial court failed to explain why it declined wife’s indefinite alimony request in favor of a fixed, two-year alimony award.
The Appellate Court dismissal an appeal from the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s May 2022 order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. Because the May order was a final judgment, but wife did not note her appeal until June 7, 2024, her appeal was dismissed as untimely.
The Appellate Court reversed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s grant of wife’s motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement of a judgment that was entered more than 12 years earlier and had not been renewed in accordance with Md. Rule 2-625. An action on a judgment must be brought within 12 years after entry of the judgment. Because there was no existing money judgment capable of being enforced when wife filed her motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement, she was not entitled to that relief.
MELANIE EITELMAN V. MICHAEL EITELMAN
Expert; Daubert; mental health
No. 0285, September Term 2025
Argued before: Wells, C.J; Beachley, Battaglia (retired; specially assigned), JJ.
Opinion by: Battaglia, J.
Filed: Nov. 18, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s decision to admit testimony of a court-appointed psychological expert as to his mental health evaluation of mother, its decision that all her overnight visitation with the children must be supervised and its decision to not impose a particularized summer and holiday visitation schedule.
CHERYL L. ZIEGLER RAGLAND V. EDWARD A. RAGLAND JR.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s termination of mother’s parental rights as to one of her children. The child participated in therapy, was still suffering severe trauma years after witnessing mother’s assault on her sister and her therapist never recommended starting family therapy. The juvenile court found that no amount of services from the Department would have changed these facts, and that it was not in the child’s best interest to wait any longer.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s child support and health insurance award, as well as its order requiring husband to pay wife attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,231.21. The case was remanded to the circuit court for the limited purpose of considering whether to award post-award attorney’s fees and, if so, in what amount.
TOAN VU V. CHAU DINH
Divorce; marital home; monetary award
No. 0906, September Term 2024
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Nazarian, J.
Filed: Nov. 7, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s judgment of absolute divorce. Although husband challenged the length of time the court took to issue its decision, the court’s order that husband transfer his interest in the marital home to wife, the denial of husband’s request for a monetary award and the denial of husband’s request for a division of wife’s retirement assets, these arguments were rejected.
SCOTT HARMAN V. PATRICIA HARMAN
Brokerage account; marital property; exemption
No. 2250, September Term 2022
Argued before: Leahy, Reed, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Reed, J.
Filed: Nov. 7, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s conclusion that funds in a brokerage account were marital property. Husband argued that, because the funds were allegedly inherited from his late father, they should have been classified as non-marital property. But given the lack of documentation to support his testimony, the trial court was permitted to find his answers not credible, especially given husband’s assertions of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.
JENNIFER S. HORNE V. ROBERT M. HORNE
Fraud; extrinsic fraud; hearing
Nos. 817 & 1701, September Term 2024; No. 102, September Term 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order requiring the sale of the marital home following wife’s divorce from husband, and after wife refused multiple opportunities to purchase the house. Although wife argued that the circuit court’s refusal to grant her an evidentiary hearing on her allegations of fraud was tantamount to extrinsic fraud, this argument was rejected.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 1 (2026)
Supplemental complaint; judgment of divorce; fraud, mistake or irregularity
The Appellate Court affirmed the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court’s dismissal of wife’s supplemental complaint. Because the supplemental complaint was an attempt to revise the judgment of divorce, but it was made more than 30 days after the entry of judgment, wife needed to show fraud, mistake or irregularity, which she failed to do.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
a. Did the trial court err in dismissing the supplemental complaint based upon the doctrine of res judicata?
b. Did the trial court err in dismissing the supplemental complaint based upon the determination that the complaint failed to state a claim?
c. Did the trial court err in dismissing the supplemental complaint because the trial court deemed this Court’s previous opinion as not binding?
d. Did the trial court err in dismissing the supplemental complaint because the trial court deemed that this Court’s opinion—related to the settlement agreement—was dispositive?
For the reasons to follow, we hold that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the supplemental complaint.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
To provide context to the issues in the present appeal, we set forth the following summary of the factual background from our unreported opinion in the prior appeal:
Appellant Poonam Malik and appellee Sanjeev Jatain obtained a Judgment of Absolute Divorce on April 7, 2021, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In January of 2023, Ms. Malik filed a motion to revise that judgment pursuant to Rule 2-535(b).1 Central to Ms. Malik’s motion to revise was her claim that the parties had executed a written marital settlement agreement prior to the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, which she claimed was not incorporated into the divorce judgment because Mr. Jatain fraudulently concealed the existence of the agreement. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted Ms. Malik’s motion, concluding that the parties had executed a written marital settlement agreement and that the divorce judgment was procured by extrinsic fraud. On Mr. Jatain’s appeal, this Court reversed, holding that, although there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the parties entered into a written agreement, the evidence did not support a finding of extrinsic fraud necessary to grant relief under Rule 2-535(b).
Ms. Malik then filed a supplemental complaint in the divorce case, asking the court to determine the terms of the parties’ written agreement, find Mr. Jatain in breach of the agreement, and incorporate the agreement into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce. Mr. Jatain filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint, which the trial court granted.
Ms. Malik appeals from the dismissal of her supplemental complaint, and presents the following issues:
Did the trial court err when it granted [Mr. Jatain’s] motion to dismiss [Ms. Malik’s] supplemental complaint?
Mr. Jatain and Ms. Malik were married on February 6, 2003, in India, and had two children as a product of their marriage. The parties subsequently moved to Maryland. In late 2019, the parties decided to end their marriage. Throughout 2020, the couple had numerous discussions concerning custody, child support, and the disposition of their assets. Ms. Malik alleges that these conversations culminated in a written agreement regarding property disposition and other marital issues, which she signed in December 2020 when Mr. Jatain provided her with forms for an uncontested divorce. Mr. Jatain unequivocally denies that he and his wife ever executed a written agreement resolving their marital issues.
There is no dispute that both parties wanted to obtain a divorce. Mr. Jatain initiated the divorce by filing a complaint for absolute divorce on December 9, 2020. In the complaint, Mr. Jatain alleged that there was a “mutual agreement not to seek any alimony.” Mr. Jatain checked the following box in the courtapproved form complaint: “My spouse and I have no marital property or debts that need to be decided by the court.” Mr. Jatain filed an affidavit of service that Ms. Malik was served with the complaint on December 18, 2020.
Although Ms. Malik claims that she was never served with the complaint, she acknowledges that
she signed a court-approved form answer, which Mr. Jatain filed on February 22, 2021. The answer admits all allegations in the complaint and presents no defenses, although Ms. Malik avers that she only saw the signature page of the answer. Mr. Jatain signed the certificate of service for the answer (meaning that he essentially certified service to himself).
Mr. Jatain filed a case information report for each of the parties. Both case information reports were filled out by Mr. Jatain and list the case as being uncontested. Ms. Malik’s case information report was signed by her in December 2020. Mr. Jatain and Ms. Malik were both self-represented throughout the uncontested divorce proceeding.
Both parties attended a virtual hearing before a magistrate on April 6, 2021. When the magistrate asked, “Have the parties resolved all of their outstanding issues?” and “the two of you have distributed all of your property, is that correct?,” both parties answered affirmatively. The magistrate also advised both parties that “you did not make a request for alimony, monetary award or retirement benefit and because of that, that is a waiver that you cannot come back to the [c]ourt at a later date and ask the [c]ourt to grant your relief, you understand that?” Both Mr. Jatain and Ms. Malik indicated that they understood the waiver as explained by the magistrate. Although the magistrate understood that the parties “wanted to take care of the children pursuant to [their] agreement,” the magistrate advised them that the law required a determination of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Accordingly, the magistrate took testimony concerning the parties’ incomes and children’s health insurance expenses, and ordered Mr. Jatain to pay $2,112 per month in child support directly to Ms. Malik. Despite the reference in Mr. Jatain’s complaint about the parties’ “mutual agreement,” neither party mentioned nor referred to any written agreement during the hearing.
The circuit court entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce on April 7, 2021. The court granted Ms. Malik sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the children, with liberal visitation to Mr. Jatain. The judgment approved the magistrate’s recommendation that Mr. Jatain pay $2,112 per month in child support. The order further provided that “both parties have waived their right to request alimony, monetary award and retirement benefits from the other party, and all other marital property issues resulting from the marriage have been resolved by agreement of the parties.”
In September 2022, Ms. Malik retained counsel and requested copies of the filings from the circuit court. She alleges that this was the first time she saw the complaint and the complete answer. Upon discovering that the written agreement had not been filed with the court as she thought, Ms. Malik sent an email to Mr. Jatain requesting a copy of the agreement. Mr. Jatain replied that there was no written agreement. On January
6, 2023, Ms. Malik filed a Motion for Court to Exercise Revisory Power, to Reopen Case, and for Other, Further Relief. She alleged that the Judgment of Absolute Divorce was obtained through extrinsic fraud. Mr. Jatain then moved to dismiss Ms. Malik’s motion to revise.
The circuit court held a hearing on the motions on May 26, 2023. The court first denied Mr. Jatain’s motion to dismiss, noting that the allegations in Ms. Malik’s motion to revise, if proven, could support a finding of extrinsic fraud. The court then allowed the parties to present evidence on Ms. Malik’s motion to revise.
Jatain v. Malik, No. 847, Sept. Term 2023, slip op. at 1-4 (filed Jan. 3, 2024).
At the May 26, 2023 hearing on the motion to revise, Ms. Malik testified that in late December 2020, Mr. Jatain presented her with a set of documents related to the divorce, including the case information report, the signature page of the answer, and a written settlement agreement. She was under the impression at that time that all of the documents would be filed with the court. Ms. Malik trusted Mr. Jatain to file the documents, believed he had done so, and did not look at the court filings because she “just want[ed] to take care of [the] kids and be done with this thing.” Thus, when she answered “yes” to the magistrate’s question at the divorce hearing whether the property issues were resolved, she meant “resolved, yes, based on the agreement we have.”
Ms. Malik testified to her recollection of the terms of the written agreement, and introduced into evidence a document she prepared outlining the basic terms of the agreement. According to Ms. Malik, the text of the agreement consisted of a “single page,” with a second page that listed “financial, assets and liabilities.” She stated that the agreement did not address retirement and included an alimony waiver.
Mr. Jatain testified that the parties never created a written agreement. He testified that he presented Ms. Malik with the complaint for divorce in December 2020, but did not discuss her answer until February 2021. He said he told the magistrate presiding at the divorce hearing that the property issues were resolved because he and Ms. Malik were discussing those issues and did not need the court to intervene. He explained that the money he had given Ms. Malik since their separation was based on what he believed to be her “fair share,” rather than pursuant to any agreement between them. When asked why he would pay her money when there was no order or agreement that he do so, Mr. Jatain testified: “Because as a human being, if I was with someone, as a responsibility I will pay 50 percent which is her share.”
Several emails, from both before and after the divorce, were entered into evidence. In these emails, the parties discussed various aspects of the property distribution. In a June 26, 2020 email, Mr. Jatain stated he would “prepare a financial agreement on what we talked [about].”
After receiving evidence and arguments from counsel, the court rendered its opinion from the bench. The court concluded that the evidence of extrinsic fraud was “clearcut.” The court found Ms. Malik’s testimony credible concerning the existence of a written agreement. Based on its finding of extrinsic fraud, the court entered an order vacating the judgment of absolute divorce on May 31, 2023.
THE FIRST APPEAL
Mr. Jatain appealed the order vacating the judgment of absolute divorce, and we reversed. We first noted that the court was not clearly erroneous in finding that a written agreement existed: “In light of the court’s credibility finding in favor of Ms. Malik, her testimony alone is sufficient to support the court’s determination that the parties executed a written settlement agreement resolving marital property and other issues related to the divorce.” Id., slip op. at 12. However, we held that Mr. Jatain’s actions as described by Ms. Malik did not constitute extrinsic fraud as defined by Maryland law and therefore the circuit court erred in vacating the judgment of divorce on that basis. Id., slip op. at 13, 21.
PROCEDURE AFTER THE FIRST APPEAL
On February 1, 2024, Ms. Malik filed, in the divorce case, a “Supplemental Complaint to Establish Terms of Agreement, for Enforcement, Specific Performance; and for Incorporation, but not Merger, of the Parties’ Agreement into an Order of this Court.” In the supplemental complaint, Ms. Malik noted the previous finding that a written agreement existed and this Court’s determination that the finding on this point was not clearly erroneous. She sought to have the court determine “what the terms of the parties’ Agreement were, and if necessary, enforce such terms.” She also sought monetary damages for breach of the agreement and specific performance of certain terms related to ongoing payments and establishment of a trust for the children. Finally, Ms. Malik requested that the agreement be incorporated into an order of the court.
Mr. Jatain moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint, arguing that it failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata Ms. Malik responded that her claims were not barred by res judicata because the issue of the terms of the settlement agreement had not been previously litigated.
On July 1, 2024, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint. Counsel for Mr. Jatain argued that when the judgment of absolute divorce was reinstated as a result of our unreported opinion, any claims regarding the parties’ assets were barred by res judicata because the judgment of absolute divorce “deals with all of the issues that would have been covered under the alleged written agreement.” Counsel for Ms. Malik argued that this Court “kind of upheld” the finding that the parties executed a written agreement, and anticipated that there would be further litigation regarding the terms of the agreement. Ms. Malik’s counsel explained that he filed the supplemental complaint in the divorce case rather than “fil[ing] a whole new case . . . to promote efficiency” and because the terms of the agreement relate to “marital property and support for the children.”2
The court announced its decision from the bench: The motion to dismiss is granted. I do believe that the [A]ppellate [C]ourt’s ruling is dispositive and agree with [Mr. Jatain’s counsel’s] argument. The [A] ppellate [C]ourt did not affirm, in any part, [the trial
judge’s] ruling that there was a written agreement. That being the case, I’m not sure how we could now go back and say that a written agreement exists based on no factual basis because his ruling was reversed, in total reversed. And the judgment of absolute divorce resolves all issues relating to the parties and their property. So the motion is granted.
Ms. Malik noted this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Malik argues that the court erred in dismissing her supplemental complaint because (1) the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the determination of the terms of the settlement agreement; (2) the supplemental complaint did not fail to state a claim; (3) this Court’s determination that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that a written agreement existed caused that finding to become the “law of the case”; and (4) the trial court improperly treated our reversal in the prior appeal to be dispositive of the question of whether a written agreement existed.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Bennett v. Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP, 259 Md. App. 403, 451 (2023). “This Court may affirm the dismissal of a complaint on any ground adequately shown by the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground or whether the parties raised that ground.” Id. (citing Mostofi v. Midland Funding, LLC, 223 Md. App. 687, 695-96 (2015)).
We hold that the court properly dismissed Ms. Malik’s contract action because she improperly filed the supplemental complaint in the divorce case where there was an extant final enrolled judgment. Ms. Malik filed her supplemental complaint years after the judgment of divorce was entered. Because the supplemental complaint was in the nature of an amended pleading, it could not be filed without leave of court. See Rule 2-341(b) (Complaints may be amended later than 30 days before trial only with leave of court.).
Furthermore, Ms. Malik’s supplemental complaint in part represents an attempt to revise the judgment of divorce in order to incorporate the agreement. However, to do so more than 30 days after the entry of judgment, she would need to show fraud, mistake, or irregularity. 3 Rule 2-535(b). As we discussed in our prior unreported opinion, Ms. Malik failed to prove extrinsic fraud. Because Ms. Malik does not allege mistake or irregularity, dismissal of her complaint was appropriate. In short, the divorce judgment is final, and the court has no authority to determine marital property, grant a monetary award, or incorporate any marital settlement agreement into a new or revised divorce decree. Accordingly, the court correctly dismissed Ms. Malik’s supplemental complaint because it was improperly filed in the divorce case.4
In summary, Ms. Malik’s breach of contract claim concerning the alleged marital settlement agreement which was not incorporated into the judgment of divorce must be filed as a separate civil case.5 We therefore affirm the court’s dismissal of Ms. Malik’s supplemental complaint. JUDGMENT
FOOTNOTES
1 Rule 2-535(b) provides: “On motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.”
2 The supplemental complaint requested specific performance of a term requiring Mr. Jatain to “[s]et up a Trust for the parties’ children,” but did not raise any claims related to child support.
3 Counsel for Ms. Malik conceded at oral argument that the agreement can no longer be incorporated into the divorce judgment.
4 At oral argument, appellant’s counsel could not provide any persuasive authority to support the filing of the supplemental complaint in the divorce case.
5 At oral argument, the parties revealed that Ms. Malik had filed a separate breach of contract action during the pendency of this appeal. We express no opinion as to the viability of defenses that may be available to Mr. Jatain in the contract action.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court vacated the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s alimony award. Having found that wife was disabled, unable to work and unlikely to benefit from further education, the trial court failed to explain why it declined wife’s indefinite alimony request in favor of a fixed, two-year alimony award.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
was sixty-five years old, and Mr. Day was about to turn sixtysix.
The parties appeared before the trial court on May 29, 2024, for a merits trial on the issues of divorce, alimony, division of marital assets, and Ms. Day’s request for a monetary award and attorney’s fees. Both Mr. Day and Ms. Day testified, and they called no other witnesses.
There was “substantial agreement” by the parties on a number of the facts, as acknowledged by the court after opening statements. Ms. Day and Mr. Day were married nearly forty years. Both parties worked throughout the marriage up to 2020, when Ms. Day went on disability leave. In addition to working, the bulk of the household and family obligations fell to Ms. Day. She cleaned, cooked, laundered, and reared the children. But Mr. Day helped with mowing the lawn and with caring for both children. Mr. Day and Ms. Day enjoyed a “comfortable, middle-class lifestyle” while they were married.
This appeal comes to us from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County following the issuance of a Judgment of Absolute Divorce (“JAD”) that dissolved the marriage of Appellant Doreen Day and Appellee Charles Day. Here, Ms. Day challenges the circuit court’s granting of rehabilitative alimony for a period of two years.
On appeal, Ms. Day presents one question for our review: [Did] the Circuit Court abuse[] its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for a period of two years, despite finding that Appellant is disabled and “unable to hold employment,” rendering her unable to selfsupport within the meaning of FL § 11-106?
We answer this question in the affirmative and vacate the circuit court’s judgment as to alimony and retroactive alimony. This decision necessitates that we also vacate the circuit court’s monetary award, division of marital property, and denial of Ms. Day’s request for attorney’s fees. We remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
The parties married in April 1983 and separated in April 2022. The couple had one child together, who is now an adult. Also in the household was Ms. Day’s child from a prior marriage. On September 7, 2023, Mr. Day filed for absolute divorce, and a couple weeks later, Ms. Day counterclaimed for an absolute divorce, monetary award, alimony, and related relief. At the time of the divorce proceeding, Ms. Day
They separated more than once during the marriage, but they separated for the final time in the spring of 2022. In 2021, prior to the separation, Ms. Day and Mr. Day moved in with Mr. Day’s sister and mother for a short period, so Ms. Day could take care of Mr. Day’s sister (who had cancer) and Mr. Day’s mother (who is elderly). A year later, the couple again moved in with Mr. Day’s sister and mother, to care for Mr. Day’s sister when her cancer recurred. Shortly thereafter, the couple had a disagreement, and Ms. Day moved back to their marital home. After about a year, Ms. Day and Mr. Day sold their home and divided the proceeds equally. Ms. Day moved to an independent-living apartment in a retirement community. Mr. Day continued residing at his mother’s home. Ms. Day did not request or receive money from Mr. Day since they sold the home.
Mr. Day provided background on his employment, living situation, and financial plans. Mr. Day began working at age fifteen, and he will be eligible for social security benefits upon being nearly sixty-nine (specifically, sixty-six years and eight months old). He works as an operations manager, overseeing an apartment complex. His sister passed away, and he is currently living on the lower level of his mother’s house. He takes care of his mother, but she has her own income to pay the bills. He plans to buy the house and make substantial repairs and renovations. He would like to retire within the next two years.
Ms. Day also testified regarding her disabilities and job history. Ms. Day suffers from anxiety, depression, fibromyalgia, Dupuytren’s disease,1 arthritis, and osteoarthritis. Her Dupuytren’s disease and osteoarthritis affect her ability to
use her hands, and she has a hard time grasping things or driving for long period of time. She also has osteoarthritis in her hips and arthritis in her spine, making it difficult to sit or stand at length and affecting her sleep. She also experiences nerve pain due to her fibromyalgia. She takes painkillers each morning but experiences pain on a daily basis.
Ms. Day worked throughout the marriage, working for an industrial filtration company for twenty years—up until 2020. As of August 2, 2020, the Social Security Administration deemed Ms. Day disabled, based on her anxiety, depression, and osteoarthritis. She receives $1,474 per month in Social Security Disability Income (“SSDI”). She briefly worked as a caregiver for three weeks in March 2024 but injured her back. Ms. Day does not currently withdraw the interest and income she receives on her assets, including her retirement account.
At the time of the divorce trial, Ms. Day lived alone and paid $1,076 in rent for her two-bedroom apartment. Her brother had lived with her in the apartment and contributed toward expenses for a while, but he moved out in early 2024 and could not move back in with Ms. Day due to a protective order. There was a waiting list for a one-bedroom apartment, which rented for $700 a month, in the same retirement community, but Ms. Day was not on the waiting list. Her daughter, to whom she recently sent cash to help with rent, could not move in with her due to the age restrictions of the retirement community. Ms. Day was not sure if she would move if a cheaper apartment became available, stating, “[m] entally and physically I’m not sure if I can go through that again.”
The parties both submitted exhibits during trial, including the closing contract for the sale of the marital home, paystubs and tax documents, financial statements, and credit card bills. Ms. Day introduced her attorney’s fees bills. Ms. Day’s financial statement indicated a total monthly income of $1,474 and total monthly expenses of $3,268. Mr. Day’s financial statement indicated a total monthly income of $3,926.95 and total monthly expenses of $4,146.59.
After closing arguments and a recess, the court delivered its oral ruling, awarding Ms. Day $1,000 per month alimony for a period of two years, among other things.
Dealing first with the factors that are applicable to both alimony and marital property under the Family Law Article, the two sections that apply there, they are virtually the same and I think any of the factors don’t -- to the extent that I don’t mention them, either evidence wasn’t provided or it’s a de minimus factor. So that the parties – let’s talk about the parties themselves.
They were married in 1983 and have been separated for the last time in 2022. September of 2022. Excuse me. In April, April 4th of 2022. They separated for the last time. They had been separated on and off prior to that time. Perhaps for as much as a couple of years at points. So this was a marriage of some length. Nearly 40 years they lived together as husband and wife.
In evaluating the contribution of the parties to the household, the testimony was from [Ms. Day] that both parties worked throughout the marriage,
at least up through 2020, and in addition to that, [Ms. Day] testified that she would take care of the household. She would do the cooking, the cleaning, the laundry and help raise the kids. The parties have one child between them and [Ms. Day] had another child from another relationship, from a prior marriage.
The testimony was that Mr. Day would do some of the outside work including cutting the lawn. It breaks down to be a fairly traditional division of responsibilities. It sounds like on the whole, [Ms. Day] probably did a little bit more than Mr. Day did, but I think that in fairness, both parties contributed to the well-being of the household, both monetarily and also in non-monetary ways. Again, if I had to choose a tie breaker there, I would probably go with [Ms. Day] having done a little bit more.
In terms of the factors that caused the dissolution of the marriage, in April of 2022, the parties had been having problems. I think it may have been exacerbated by the demands on both parties by the health of Mr. Day’s mother and sister. Both of whom required treatment and the testimony was uncontroverted that [Ms. Day], despite her own health issues, stepped in and helped to care for both Mr. Day’s mother and his sister, who ultimately succumbed to cancer. I get the sense that that created pressures on the marriage that ultimately kind of brought it down -- otherwise, it’s difficult to pinpoint in many marriages and these parties’ marriage isn’t really different.
There are all kinds of factors that cause two people to ultimately get to the point where they cannot live together and that’s what happened here. I don’t find any particular fault on the part of either party. It is a marriage that simply broke down.
In terms of the health and the particulars as to each of the parties, Mr. Day is 66 years old. He will be 66 on June 9th. His health is pretty good. [Ms. Day] is 65 years old and her health is not nearly as good. She has suffered this year from a herniated disc or the effects of it. Whether it was caused this year or not, it gave her enough trouble that she had to seek medical care for it. She has been determined to be disabled since 2020 by the Social Security Administration as a result of a variety of conditions, including anxiety, depression and osteoarthritis.
[Ms. Day] also testified that she suffers from fibromyalgia, all of which in her opinion, and the Court agrees, makes her unable to hold employment at this point in time.
During the course of the parties’ marriage, the testimony was consistent that they lived a modest, yet comfortable life. Neither too grand, nor too sparse. They were able to make their bills, raise their family and live in a home that they made for themselves.
At this time in terms of income, the Court finds that Mr. Day, who is employed as a project manager for an apartment complex, earns an amount of $3,926 net per month. I’ve taken that number from his financial statement that was submitted into evidence. That’s in terms of salary that he makes.
[Ms. Day]’s income is from Social Security Disability income from which nets each month in the amount of $1,474.
After addressing division of marital property (including a division of Mr. Day’s pensions from his previous employer, from which Ms. Day would receive about $242 in monthly income) and a monetary award to Ms. Day of $31,462 (from Mr. Day’s Fidelity accounts) , the court continued its discussion of the alimony factors:
The other issue and the more thorny one, frankly, is the request for alimony. As I described, [Ms. Day] has a disability that prevents her from working at this point. So she is living on the Social Security Disability income which she receives, at least at this point in time. That may change in the future depending upon eligibility for further Social Security benefits. There was no testimony as to what that might be and I don’t take that into account in any way. I take a snapshot of the parties’ situations at this point in time.
By dividing the two LaFarge pensions, [Ms. Day] will receive an additional $242 per month. She will also have an amount of approximately $105,000 in assets, retirement assets, at the end of the day. Those assets also generate income and they generate them for Mr. Day as well as [Ms. Day]. So that’s all understood.
In evaluating the parties’ financial statements, I have no particular reason to disagree with any of them. I do note that the amount listed for food for [Ms. Day] on [Ms. Day]’s statement, which I believe is $800 per month, is inconsistent with her testimony in which she said that she spends about
$100 per week on food. So I take that into account in evaluating the overall needs of the parties.
Mr. Day’s financial statement is different because he made an estimate as to what his rent would be. That was in January. Since that time, he is determined to purchase his mother’s house in which he’s been living and that the expenses related to that will be, including mortgage and gas and electric, about $1,400, $1,500. So there is that adjustment to the financial statement.
So considering all of this, and I have taken into account that Mr. -- I have taken into account Mr. Day’s testimony and I assumed this was discussed at some point, even though there was no specific testimony on, it’s fair to assume that the parties discussed something about their future at some point during their 40 years of marriage and it was
Mr. Day’s testimony that he always anticipated that he would retire when he got to be 68, 69 when he was eligible. That’s about 2 years hence. Again, I took stock of the parties and their income and needs as of today, not in contemplation of any future event. At this point in time it appears that the statements that Mr. Day, if I can just focus on income because the other matters kind of net out the division of the pension and retirement accounts, that Mr. Day makes approximately twice as much as [Ms. Day] receives at this moment in her disability benefits. If one were to add them together and divide them in half, that would leave a shortfall to [Ms. Day]. I think picking up on [Mr. Day’s counsel’s] argument that it is appropriate to consider that the transition that [Ms. Day] has gone through over the last couple of years, she had been able to share expenses with her brother up until earlier this year, that change has affected her pocketbook and her income because her brother would pick up some of the expenses. So considering all of that, the Court will award alimony for a period of 2 years. I think that ought to be enough to help [Ms. Day] through the transition. So I will award an amount of $1,000 per month to roughly equalize, and it doesn’t exactly equalize it, but roughly equalize the income the parties overall will have or have at this time. I will not make that -- I decline to make that retroactive to the date of filing.
So that covers the issue of alimony.
The court memorialized the award of rehabilitative alimony in its JAD, issued on June 10, 2024. This appeal timely followed.
We will add additional facts as necessary.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review an alimony award for clear error and abuse of discretion. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385 (1992) (“An alimony award will not be disturbed upon appellate review unless the trial judge’s discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment below was clearly wrong.”). We apply the abuse of discretion standard to a court’s refusal to grant indefinite alimony. Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md. App. 191, 195–96 (1987) (citing Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 28–29 (1982), among others). We apply the clearly erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings. Md. Rule 8–131(c).
This standard governs our review of both the first- and second-level findings involved in alimony decisions. Specifically, in the first-level facts—like the circuit court’s baseline findings on the § 11-106(b) factors in Maryland’s Family Law (“FL”) Article—we look only for clear error. Wenger v. Wenger, 42 Md. App. 596, 607 (1979). In the second-level findings—like whether a basis for indefinite alimony exists under Section 11–106(c)—we also look only for clear error. Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 196-97 (2004).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Framework
Section 11-106 of the Family Law Article guides a court’s analysis in determining whether, how much, and for how long to award alimony. Boemio v. Boemio, 414 Md. 118, 125 (2010). Specifically, a trial court must consider “all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award,” including twelve enumerated factors:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties;
(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:
(i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income;
(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and
(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and
(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from hom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur.
FL § 11-106(b). The court need not “employ a formal checklist, mention specifically each factor, or announce each and every reason for its ultimate decision.” Crabill v. Crabill, 119 Md. App. 249, 261 (1998). But its ruling must demonstrate “consideration of all necessary factors. After considering the twelve factors, the trial court must then decide whether to grant rehabilitative or indefinite alimony.” Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App. 591, 605 (2005) (cleaned up).
In Maryland, “the guiding principle [is] that alimony be temporary and rehabilitative” for the recipient spouse. Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 328 (2002). See also, Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 415 (2003) (“Maryland’s statutory scheme favors fixed-term, rehabilitative alimony rather than indefinite alimony.” (cleaned up)). We have said, The award of alimony in the ordinary case should be for a specific time, and that time should be stated in the Order or Decree making the award. Preferably, that time should be fixed in relation
to a specified program or goal on the part of the recipient party that will lead to self-sufficiency before that time.
Karmand, 145 Md. App. at 327 (quoting 1980 Report of the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, at 4).
Though the statute favors temporary alimony, Karmand, 145 Md. App. at 328, the circuit court may award indefinite alimony if the recipient is not capable of progressing toward self-support for enumerated reasons or will have “an unconscionably disparate” standard of living even after making as much progress toward self-support as can reasonably be expected. In this regard, Section 11-106(c) provides:
(c) The court may award alimony for an indefinite period, if the court finds that:
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming selfsupporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.
FL § 11-106(c).
Whether an alimony award should be for a fixed period (rehabilitative alimony) or for an indefinite period hinges in significant measure on the recipient spouse’s ability to be self-supporting in the future. St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 188 (2016) (“The core considerations of FL §§ 11-106(b) (1) and (b)(2) are closely connected to the issue of whether to grant alimony for a fixed or indefinite period.”). Where the trial court fails to address “the mandatory factor in [FL] [S]ection 11-106(b)(2), the time required for [the alimony recipient] to become wholly or partially self-supporting[,]” such that we cannot determine “from whence [the trial court’s] determination on duration of alimony came[,]” we will vacate the trial court’s alimony determination for further evaluation and findings. Long v. Long, 129 Md. App. 554, 581–82, 588 (2000). See also St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 189–90 (“If a reviewing court is in the dark as to what future income the trial judge thought the dependent spouse would have, the court is unable to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in the alimony ruling.” (cleaned up)); Lee v. Lee, 148 Md. App. 432, 447, 457–56 (2002) (vacating rehabilitative alimony award where “the duration of the rehabilitative alimony award appears to have been pulled out of ‘thin air’”); Benkin, 71 Md. App. at 204 (requiring “some relation” between the length of the alimony award and the trial court’s conclusion as to income disparity).
In Long v. Long, the chancellor granted rehabilitative alimony for four years without explaining this duration. 129 Md. App. at 565. There, Ms. Long (the alimony recipient) suffered from agoraphobia, which prevented her from maintaining a job. Id. The chancellor denied the wife’s request for indefinite alimony based on her history of employment, demonstrated job skills, and her engagement in therapy at the time of trial. Id. Specifically, the chancellor found that the wife could find a job earning a little more than two thousand
dollars a month, then awarded alimony of three thousand a month for four years. Id. at 581. On appeal, we held that the chancellor’s determination of alimony did not align with his findings of fact. Id. at 579. We found no error with the chancellor’s finding that the wife had valuable work skills and could successfully return to the workforce. Id. at 581. Instead, we focused on the chancellor’s failure to explain how and “why he reached specific findings.” Id. We were unable to “ascertain from whence his determination on duration of alimony came because he does not specifically treat the mandatory factor in [S]ection 11-106(b)(2), the time required for Wife to become wholly or partially self-supporting.” Id. at 581–82. Nor did the chancellor’s opinion “state from what evidence he determined that Wife could retain a job earning $2,083.33 per month, i.e., $25,000 per year, given her current and projected mental condition.” Id. at 582. We concluded, [T]he findings of fact show that the litigant before us is 52 years of age, has few assets, suffers from a mental health condition with an unknowable prognosis for full recovery, and has been out of the workforce, because of illness and perhaps at Husband’s behest, for several years. . . . The facts of the story as determined by the court below thus do not match the parsimonious award it ultimately granted. Because the chancellor failed to draw a solid line between the facts and the remedy, explaining fully how the former justifies the latter, he abused his discretion in our view.
Id. at 582–83.
In Lee, the chancellor denied indefinite alimony, awarding a wife rehabilitative alimony for a term of three years. 148 Md. App. at 433. There, the chancellor thought the wife “would benefit economically if she took some college courses[,]” but “gave no clue as to why he believed [the wife] could be selfsupporting in three years (assuming he did have that belief) or what line of work he thought she could engage in to allow her to become self-supporting.” Id. at 444. The wife, a high school graduate who had earned a few community college credits, “worked sporadically during the marriage but always at lowpaying jobs.” Id. at 435. Though not involving a claim under Section 11-106(c)(1), we likened this case to Long because, in both cases, the chancellor “provided an insufficient rationale” for the duration of the term alimony awarded. Id. at 446. We remanded for further findings on whether the wife had the ability to be self-supporting based on the evidence already presented or, if need be, additional evidence. Id. at 456. We noted that “if the durational aspect of an alimony award is not sufficiently explained, that deficiency makes it difficult to determine” whether the indefinite alimony factors have been “properly considered.” Id. at 444–47
In Benkin, we vacated a five-year alimony award after the trial court failed to explain its reasons for the duration of its award. 71 Md. App. at 198–204. Ms. Benkin was fiftyone years old when divorced, had arthritis, and had not been employed outside the home for nearly two decades. Id. at 196. We agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Benkin’s arthritis “was not of sufficient magnitude” to support an indefinite alimony award under Section 11-106(c) (1). Id. at 198. But the trial court also found that Mr. Benkin
was to receive his salary “for some time to come” while Ms. Benkin’s “situation . . . [was] almost totally the opposite[],” and that Ms. Benkin’s “standard of living [would] decline much more appreciably than” Mr. Benkin’s. Id. at 202.
Concluding that there was “no basis in the record for the five year limitation under the [11-106](c)(2) standard[,]” we held that “there must be some relation between the length of the award and the conclusion of fact as to the income disparity made by the court.” Id. at 203–04.
II. Analysis
Here, the trial court’s findings did not support its denial of Ms. Day’s indefinite alimony request. At the time of divorce, according to the trial court’s findings, Ms. Day was not selfsupporting because her reasonable expenses outstripped her income by about two to one. Thereafter, the trial court made no findings about how long it would take Ms. Day to become self-supporting. Instead, the trial court found that Ms. Day had a disability that prevented her from working and that she was not likely to secure enough additional training or education such that she could make substantial progress to becoming self-supporting. The trial court acknowledged that its findings were a “snapshot in time” as of the time of divorce. In other words, the trial court’s findings did not explain how, in the face of her disability, Ms. Day could make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting during the two-year duration of its rehabilitative alimony award.
A. Ability to be Wholly or Partly Self-Supporting
The trial court’s findings suggested that at the time of divorce, Ms. Day was not able to support herself financially.2 Under Section 11-106(b)(1), the trial court must consider “the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting[,]” among other factors. FL § 11-106(b) (1). Generally, a party is self-supporting when her income exceeds her reasonable expenses, as determined by the court. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. at 186. Here, the trial court’s findings demonstrated that Ms. Day’s monthly income, $2,116, was not enough to pay her reasonable monthly expenses of $2,868. Specifically, the trial court found that Ms. Day “[was] living on . . . Social Security Disability income[,]” a sum “which nets each month in the amount of $1,474.” In addition, found the trial court, Ms. Day would receive $242 per month from the LaFarge pensions and $105,000 in retirement and other assets. Of these assets, the trial court found “[t]hose assets also generate income” for Ms. Day. Although the trial court did not make explicit how much income these “other” assets would generate, Mr. Day’s counsel estimated in closing argument, and Ms. Day’s counsel agreed, that it would be $400 per month, a figure the trial court appears to have adopted. As for Ms. Day’s reasonable expenses, the trial court largely accepted the figures on Ms. Day’s financial statement but reduced her monthly food expense to $400 per month,3 leaving a monthly total of $2,868. Even with the passive income she was to receive from her retirement and other assets, the difference between Ms. Day’s monthly income ($1,474 plus $242 plus $400, or $2,116) and her reasonable expenses ($2,868) was $752.
B. Ability to Become Wholly or Partly Self-Supporting
With findings suggesting that Ms. Day was not selfsupporting at the time of divorce, the trial court failed to determine how long it would take for Ms. Day to become selfsupporting. Under Section 11-106(b)(2), the trial court must consider “the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment[.]” FL § 11-106(b)(2). This has been interpreted to mean “the time required for [the dependent spouse] to become wholly or partially self-supporting.” See Lee, 148 Md. App. at 445.
Here, instead of projecting how long it would take for Ms. Day to become self-supporting, the trial court found that Ms. Day was disabled, not able to work, and unlikely to benefit from further education:
[Ms. Day] is 65 years old and her health is not nearly as good. She has suffered this year from a herniated disc or the effects of it. Whether it was caused this year or not, it gave her enough trouble that she had to seek medical care for it. She has been determined to be disabled since 2020 by the Social Security Administration as a result of a variety of conditions, including anxiety, depression and osteoarthritis.
[Ms. Day] also testified that she suffers from fibromyalgia, all of which in her opinion, and the Court agrees, makes her unable to hold employment at this point in time.
Regarding further education, the trial court found that Ms. Day was not likely to benefit from further education. When, during closing argument, Ms. Day’s counsel focused on Ms. Day’s ability to get more education, the trial court suggested that counsel move along, saying “Okay. You don’t have to spend a lot of time on that. She is not going to get a degree in physics.”
Moreover, the trial court did not make findings about Ms. Day’s ability to become wholly or partially self-supporting in the future. Instead, the trial court largely took “a snapshot of the parties’ situations at this point in time[,]” adding that Ms. Day had a disability that prevented her from working “at this point in time.”
As I described, [Ms. Day] has a disability that prevents her from working at this point. So she is living on the Social Security Disability income which she receives, at least at this point in time. That may change in the future depending upon eligibility for further Social Security benefits. There was no testimony as to what that might be and I don’t take that into account in any way. I take a snapshot of the parties’ situations at this point in time.
C. The Two-Year Duration
Having found that Ms. Day was disabled and unable to work, and unlikely to benefit from further education, the trial court failed to explain why it declined Ms. Day’s indefinite alimony request in favor of a fixed, two-year alimony award. Of the two-year duration of its alimony award, the trial court said it was “to help [Ms. Day] through the transition.”
I think picking up on [Mr. Day’s counsel’s] argument that it is appropriate to consider that the transition that [Ms. Day] has gone through over the last couple of years, she had been able to share expenses with her brother up until earlier this year, that change has affected her pocketbook and her income because her brother would pick up some of the expenses. So considering all of that, the Court will award alimony for a period of 2 years. I think that ought to be enough to help [Ms. Day] through the transition. So I will award an amount of $1,000 per month to roughly equalize, and it doesn’t exactly equalize it, but roughly equalize the income the parties overall will have or have at this time. I will not make that -- I decline to make that retroactive to the date of filing.
But the trial court never explained what precisely “the transition” was or how Ms. Day would be self-supporting or would have made substantial progress toward becoming selfsupporting after “the transition.” At the time of trial, Ms. Day lived in a two-bedroom apartment that she had previously shared with her brother, who helped with household expenses while he lived there. The second bedroom had been vacant since her brother moved out, and Ms. Day was limited in her roommate selection, as the apartment complex only allowed senior residents. Ms. Day’s apartment complex had one-bedroom units, but, according to Ms. Day, there was a long waitlist for those units.
But even if Ms. Day were able to move to a one-bedroom apartment, the evidence did not suggest, and the trial court did not find, that she would have been self-supporting as a result. Instead, the evidence showed that even if she moved to a onebedroom, Ms. Day would not be self-supporting. Specifically, at the time of the divorce trial, Ms. Day’s two-bedroom apartment rented for $1,076. A one-bedroom apartment in the same complex would have rented for approximately $700, a difference of $376. Her overall expenses when living in a two-bedroom apartment were $2,868, but her expenses when living in a one-bedroom apartment ($2,492) would still surpass her $2,116 monthly income by $376 per month. In other words, while moving to a one-bedroom may have improved Ms. Day’s financial situation somewhat, doing so would not have rendered Ms. Day self-supporting.
Ultimately, where the trial court “fail[s] to draw a solid line between the facts and the remedy, explaining fully how the former justifies the latter, he abused his discretion in our view.” Long, 129 Md. App. at 582–83. Having found that Ms. Day was not self-supporting, and that she was disabled, the trial court failed to explain what would have changed for Ms. Day over the next two years such a fixed, rather than an indefinite, alimony award was justified. This was error.
Mr. Day argues that the two-year duration “was the amount of time the trial court found sufficient to help Ms. Day through her post-divorce transition prior to the parties’ retirement age.” We disagree. The trial court never explicitly found that “the transition” meant “the parties’ retirement age.” More important, even if Mr. Day’s anticipated retirement (presumably, Ms. Day would not be retiring in two years because she was not able to work) is what the
trial court meant by “the transition,” the trial court never found that Ms. Day could be self-supporting, or would make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting, by the time of Mr. Day’s anticipated retirement. Finally, “potential future retirement should not [be] considered in the alimony determination” if a “trial court’s consideration of [the payor spouse’s] potential future retirement [is] speculative.” K.B. v. D.B., 245 Md. App. 647, 678 (2020). Here, Mr. Day was not retired at the time of trial. Nor was it clear precisely when he would retire.4
So considering all of this, and I have taken into account that Mr. -- I have taken into account Mr. Day’s testimony and I assumed this was discussed at some point, even though there was no specific testimony on, it’s fair to assume that the parties discussed something about their future at some point during their 40 years of marriage and it was Mr. Day’s testimony that he always anticipated that he would retire when he got to be 68, 69 when he was eligible. That’s about 2 years hence.
(Emphasis added).
Mr. Day next argues that Ms. Day does not qualify for indefinite alimony because “regaining employment is not the measure of self-sufficiency[,]” and “[f]ixed term alimony does not necessarily have to provide economic rehabilitation so one can re-enter the work force.” To be sure, employability is not the only measure of one’s ability to be self-supporting. See Benkin, 71 Md. App. at 202–03 (considering income from various pensions to conclude the requesting’s spouse’s “age and her disability adversely affect her ability to earn income commensurate with her education and qualifications). Here, however, there was no evidence that within two years, Ms. Day would become, or make progress toward becoming, self-supporting, whether through employment, reliance on passive income, reduction of her living expenses, or otherwise. In other words, the trial court did not explain how, after two years, Ms. Day’s income and reasonable expenses would change such that she would cease to need the $1,000 in monthly alimony that it awarded her.
Mr. Day next argues that Ms. Day “did not meet the statutory prerequisite for [the] exceptional circumstance” of an indefinite alimony award, because the “facts of this case clearly did not indicate an “unconscionable disparity” in standards of living. Mr. Day points out that both parties here “are in similar, difficult financial circumstances[,]” unlike the parties in St. Cyr.
As we understand Mr. Day’s argument, he is suggesting that the similarities in the parties’ current economic circumstances is a valid basis for denying indefinite alimony. But this contention does not hold up to the plain language of Section 11-106(c). Again, Section 11-106(c) provides, (c) The court may award alimony for an indefinite period, if the court finds that:
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming selfsupporting as can reasonably be expected, the
respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.
FL § 11-106(c). Between Sections 11-106(c)(1) and 11106(c)(2) is an “or,” not an “and.” Benkin, 71 Md. App. at 196 (observing that Section 11-106(c) “is disjunctive”). In other words, Section 11-106(c) does not mean that a spouse who proves their entitlement to an award under Section 11-106(c) (1) will additionally have to prove that the award will not create unconscionable disparity under Section 11-106(c)(2). 5
Mr. Day next argues that Long, Lee, and Benkin are unpersuasive because they center around an unconscionable disparity between parties’ post-divorce standards of living, a disparity that does not exist here. We agree that there was no evidence of unconscionable disparity here. Nonetheless, and as above, these cases establish that once the trial court determines that it will award alimony, its decision on the duration of that award, whether rehabilitative or indefinite, must be adequately explained. Its decision must stand up to the facts. Here, the trial court did not explain what, during the two-year duration of its alimony award, would have changed for Ms. Day such that the length of its award was adequate.
III. The Monetary Award, Retroactive Alimony, the LaFarge Holdings Pension Plans, and Attorney’s Fees
Because we vacate the alimony award, we also vacate the trial court’s judgment regarding retroactive alimony, monetary award, division of marital property, and Ms. Day’s request for attorney’s fees. The court’s evaluation of the parties’ financial circumstances affects a monetary award and attorney’s fees as much as it affects the alimony award. See St. Cyr., 228 Md. App. at 198 (“The factors underlying such awards are so interrelated that, when a trial court considers a claim for one of them, it must weigh the award of any other.”); Long, 129 Md. App. at 585 (requiring the chancellor, on remand, to “reconsider the amount and duration of alimony as he re-evaluates the amount of the monetary award”). Thus, vacating the alimony award necessitates vacating the monetary award, division of retirement assets and other marital property, and the denial of attorney’s fees to Ms. Day.6 See, e.g., Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, 276, 283 (2021) (remanding for the court to adjust its marital property findings).
CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court’s judgment regarding alimony, retroactive alimony, the monetary award, division of marital property, and Ms. Day’s request for attorney’s fees.
We remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court may accept additional evidence. If Ms. Day’s disability and inability to work persist, the trial court must address whether Ms. Day can make progress toward becoming self-supporting and explain its findings in this regard. If the trial court determines that a fixed term of alimony is appropriate for Ms. Day, the trial court should explain why that duration is appropriate. We are not requiring that the trial court award Ms. Day indefinite alimony, though that may well be the trial court’s decision. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the circuit court
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY VACATED WITH RESPECT TO ALIMONY, RETROACTIVE ALIMONY, MONETARY AWARD, DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, AND MS. DAY’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES;
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY OTHERWISE AFFIRMED; ALIMONY TO REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT AS PENDENTE LITE ORDER PENDING FURTHER ORDERS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
FOOTNOTES
1 Dupuytren’s disease is “an abnormal thickening of the skin in the palm of your hand at the base of your fingers” which “can cause one or more finger to curl (contract), or pull sideways or in toward [the] palm.” Dupuytren’s Contracture, Johns Hopkins Medicine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/dupuytrens-contracture (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
2 The court found that dividing the parties’ total income in half “would leave a shortfall to [Ms. Day].”
3 Ms. Day’s financial statement showed a monthly grocery expense of $800, which contradicted her testimony that she spent $400 monthly.
4 This is not to say that Mr. Day will never be able to retire or that he will be required to pay alimony after he retires. An alimony award, whether rehabilitative or indefinite, is modifiable “as circumstances and justice require[,]” FL § 11-107(b), or may be terminated “if necessary to avoid a harsh and inequitable result[,]” FL § 11-108(3). If, on remand, the trial court awards Ms. Day indefinite (or rehabilitative) alimony, Mr. Day (or Ms. Day) will be able to petition the circuit court for modification or termination of the alimony obligation consistent with these statutes.
5 Presumably, if an alimony award is financially untenable for the payor spouse, that would be reflected in the trial court’s analysis of the Section 11-106(b) factors, particularly that of Section 11-106(b)(9) (“the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony”). Here, Mr. Day takes no issue with the trial court’s finding on this factor, nor does he challenge the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Ms. Day.
6 For clarity, the marital property division that we vacate pertains to the circuit court’s disposition of the items in Category 1 of the parties’ Joint Statement of Parties Regarding Marital and Non-Marital Property (“Joint Statement”) and the M&T primary savings account ending in 4434, which appears in Category 3 on the Joint Statement. The Joint Statement appears at Record Extract Pages 291 to 293. In our Order below, we refer to all of these items collectively as “marital property.” We do not disturb the trial court’s decisions regarding Ellie Mae, the parties’ dog.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court dismissal an appeal from the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s May 2022 order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. Because the May order was a final judgment, but wife did not note her appeal until June 7, 2024, her appeal was dismissed as untimely.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by issuing the May 15, 2024, money judgment against [Ziegler] nunc pro tunc?
V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by providing [Ragland] with a $47,500.00 monetary award?
Because we must ensure appellate jurisdiction before deciding an appeal, we first address the following issues:
I. Whether the 2018 memorandum is a final judgment and, if so, whether Ziegler’s appeal of it is timely.
II. Whether Ziegler’s appeal of the 2022 dismissal is timely.
III. Whether the circuit court erred in granting the May 2024 motion to enforce the judgment.
For the reasons to follow, we answer the first two questions as to timeliness in the negative and the third in the affirmative; however, finding any error to be harmless as to the May 2024 motion, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October of 2018, following a judgment of absolute divorce, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ordered Cheryl L. Ziegler Ragland (“Ziegler”), appellant, to pay Edward A. Ragland, Jr. (“Ragland”), appellee, a $44,750.00 marital award. Within ten days, Ziegler filed a revisory motion, which was never ruled upon. Almost four years later, in May of 2022, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution after notifying the parties and receiving no response from either party. Nearly two years after that, in April of 2024, Ragland filed a motion to enforce the 2018 marital award. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered two orders, one related to Ziegler’s federal Thrift Savings Plan, the other related to her Federal Employees Retirement System benefits (hereinafter the “retirement orders”).1 Ziegler then filed several motions and a response to Ragland’s motion.2 Without referencing Ziegler’s motions or response, the trial court granted Ragland’s motion to enforce the judgment, noting that “no opposition” was made. Ziegler subsequently filed a motion to vacate and stay the grant of enforcement, as well as a separate motion to vacate or stay the retirement orders. Ziegler then noted this appeal. The trial court granted Ziegler’s motion to stay.
Ziegler presents the following issues for our review:
I. Was the [2018] memorandum a final judgment?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting the motion to enforce and issuing [Ragland] a money judgment for the monetary award?
III. Did the trial court err by not adjudicating the timely filed motion to revise when it learned of the motion in the year 2024?
Ragland and Ziegler were married in a 2004 religious ceremony in Prince George’s County. In 2017, after the parties cross-filed for divorce, the circuit court issued a Judgment of Absolute Divorce that ordered Ziegler to pay Ragland a $53,500.00 marital award. Ziegler timely appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the award. Ragland v. Ragland, No. 2666, Sept. Term 2016, 2018 WL 2688117, at *10–11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., June 5, 2018). This Court agreed, vacating the award and remanding the case to the circuit court to “reassess and explain its findings regarding the marital award[.]” Id. at *23 n.17. Specifically, we instructed the trial court to “prov[ide] a value for [Ragland’s] scuba and photography equipment” because the previous judgment had failed to do so. Id. at *23 n.17.
On remand, Ziegler filed a “Verified Memorandum Regarding Calculation of [the] Marital Award[,]” which outlined the couple’s finances and assets to “assist in [the circuit court’s] determination of the appropriate calculation of the marital award[.]” On October 30, 2018, the circuit court filed a “Memorandum” announcing its marital award determination (the “2018 Memorandum”). The circuit court found that, upon review of the trial proceedings, there was no testimony regarding the scuba equipment and therefore valued it at $0. Without further explanation, the court modified the marital award to $44,750.00. The 2018 Memorandum was not accompanied by a separate order, however it was docketed in November 2018 as “Memorandum Opinion and Order.”3
Sixteen days later, Ziegler filed a timely Motion to Amend the Marital Award Judgment (“2018 Motion to Amend”) under Maryland Rule 2-535, asserting that the 2018 Memorandum
did not properly calculate the marital award. Additionally, as required by the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, Ziegler filed a Proposal to Satisfy the Monetary Award outlined in the 2018 Memorandum. The circuit court never ruled on the 2018 Motion to Amend.
Almost four years later, on May 5, 2022, the clerk of court filed a Notice of Contemplated Dismissal for the case based on lack of prosecution. The notice was mailed to both parties and their attorneys of record. Neither party responded to the notice. On June 13, 2022, more than thirty days after issuing the notice of proposed dismissal, having received no response, the clerk of court dismissed the case.
Almost two years later, on April 15, 2024, Ragland filed, in the form of a line to the court, a court order acceptable for processing in connection with Ziegler’s Federal Employees Retirement System benefits. Two days later, he filed a proposed retirement benefits order related to Ziegler’s federal Thrift Savings Plan, also in the form of a line to the circuit court. On April 18, 2024, Ragland additionally filed a “Verified Motion for Enforcement of Monetary Award, Entry of Judgment, and Other Relief” (the “Motion to Enforce”) based on Ziegler’s lack of payments under the 2018 Memorandum. The circuit court signed the retirement orders, which were entered into its electronic system; however, the court had not yet ruled on Ragland’s Motion to Enforce when Ziegler filed several motions: a motion to revive her 2018 Motion to Amend; a motion for judgment or an order memorializing the 2018 Memorandum; a motion to stay adjudication and extend the period to respond to the Motion to Enforce; and a preliminary response to the Motion to Enforce. On May 15, 2024, the circuit court granted the Motion to Enforce (“May 2024 Judgment”) without reference to any of Ziegler’s filings, indicating that the enforcement was without opposition.
Nine days later, on May 24, 2024, Ziegler filed a motion to vacate and stay the order granting the Motion to Enforce under Maryland Rules 2-534 and 2-535. On June 5, 2024, Ziegler additionally filed a motion to vacate or stay the retirement orders. On June 7, 2024, Ziegler appealed the May 2024 Judgment and “all orders pursuant to” the 2018 Memorandum.
Less than one month later, the circuit court issued an order granting Ziegler’s motion to stay pending a decision from this Court (the “July 2024 Order”). The circuit court did not specify which motion to stay was granted; nor did it make any ruling on the motions to vacate. The circuit court acknowledged that Ziegler’s 2018 Motion to Amend was filed with the court, however it was “never received or reviewed by Chambers.”
DISCUSSION
I. Ziegler’s Appeal of the 2018 Memorandum is Untimely. A. Party Contentions
Ziegler contends that the 2018 Memorandum is not a final judgment because it lacked the “separate document” required under Maryland Rule 2-601(a).4
Ragland asserts that the 2018 Memorandum is a final judgment because it was docketed as “Memorandum and Order[.]” Alternatively, Ragland argues that Ziegler accepted the 2018 Memorandum as final by treating it as such in her
2018 Motion to Amend or otherwise failing to object to the Memorandum.
B. Analysis i. Finality of the 2018 Memorandum
“With exceptions not relevant here, a ruling of a circuit court is not appealable unless it constitutes a final judgment.” Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 (1989). See also Silbersack v. AC & S, Inc., 402 Md. 673, 678 (2008); Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). A judgment is final if it determines and concludes all the rights involved or denies the appellant means of further prosecuting or defending their interests in the proceeding. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41 (citation omitted); Remson v. Krausen, 206 Md. App. 53, 71–72 (2012) (citation omitted). “Moreover, the ruling must ‘leave nothing more to be done in order to effectuate the court’s disposition of the matter.’” Remson, 206 Md. App. at 72 (quoting Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41). See also id. at 72 (dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction where there was no final judgment because the circuit court did not consider the merits of an outstanding motion to vacate).
Neither party argues that the 2018 Memorandum does not meet the substantive final judgment requirements. We agree that the 2018 Memorandum concluded all substantive rights involved in the proceeding. However, the issue is whether the 2018 Memorandum is, procedurally, a final judgment.
Under Maryland Rule 2-601, a judgment must be set out in a document separate from the memorandum, docket entry, or oral ruling. Hiob v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 440 Md. 466, 478–79 (2014). The purpose of the separate document requirement is to eliminate confusion about the timing for appeals and, therefore, to facilitate appellate review. Hiob, 440 Md. at 480, 497 (citations omitted). “Rule 2-601 . . . is to be applied ‘mechanically’ and its requirements relaxed only when doing so would preserve an appeal.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Maryland, the separate document requirement cannot be waived to make an appeal untimely; however, it may be waived where no party objects to the absence of the separate document, the circuit court clearly intended the entry on the docket to be a final judgment, and applying waiver preserves the right to appeal. Suburban Hospital, Inc. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 156 (2000); URS Corp. v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 452 Md. 48, 67 (2017); Taha v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 367 Md. 564, 569–71 (2002). See also Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 386 (1978) (finding waiver where the parties did not object to the lack of a separate document and waiver allowed for appealability rather than facilitated loss of the right to that appeal).
In Suburban Hospital, the Supreme Court of Maryland refrained from “setting the outer limits of the availability of waiver of the separate document requirement” however found waiver where: 1) there was a recorded verdict on the docket without a separate document; 2) no party objected to the absence of the separate document on appeal; and 3) finding waiver preserved the appeal rather than prejudiced the appeal. 362 Md. at 156. The Court compared the case to Byrum v. Horning, 360 Md. 23 (2000). In Byrum, the parties disagreed as to whether Maryland Rule 2-601(a)’s separate
document requirement was waived where appellants failed to appear at trial or answer a motion to dismiss. Byrum, 360 Md. at 32–33. The Court declined to apply waiver there because doing so would make the appeal untimely, and prejudicing appellate review is contrary to the nature of Rule 2-601. Id.; see also Suburban Hospital, 362 Md. at 156–57. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Maryland found waiver of the separate document rule in URS Corporation, stating that the case “f[ell] squarely into the framework identified in Suburban Hospital[.]” 452 Md. at 70. The Court considered dispositive that the judgment was entered on the docket alongside other related judgments that did have separate documents, leading to the conclusion that the trial court clearly intended the one without a separate document to be a final judgment as well; additionally, no party objected to the absence of the separate document. Id.
Here, the 2018 Memorandum was memorialized in the written narrative and filed on the docket as “Memorandum Opinion and Order.” The only party that objected to the finality of the 2018 Memorandum based upon the separate document rule is Ziegler, an assertion that would prejudice her own appeal. Ziegler challenged the 2018 Memorandum’s finality for the first time in her 2024 filings, five years after filing her post-judgment motion to amend the 2018 Memorandum. As in Suburban Hospital and URS Corporation, the written memorandum and the clerk’s entry of it on the docket made clear that the court intended the 2018 Memorandum to be a final judgment in this matter. See Suburban Hospital, 362 Md. at 156; URS Corp. at 70. See also Balt. Cnty. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 4, 439 Md. 547, 561–66 (2014). Where the previous cases differ from this case is in the objections. A party here—Ziegler—objects to the 2018 Memorandum’s lack of a separate document. Despite this, applying Ziegler’s objection as the obstacle here is antithetical to the purpose of waiver and therefore contrary to Maryland Rule 2-601. See Hiob, 440 Md. at 497. Further, Ziegler’s filing of the 2018 Motion to Amend treated the 2018 Memorandum as a final judgment. Accordingly, Ziegler’s objection is inapposite to the waiver analysis here; she was the only party that objected to waiver, yet is the party that benefited by it, and the waiver occurred three years after she acquiesced to the judgment as final by filing post-judgment motions. Finally, unlike in Byrum, applying waiver here preserves the judgment for appeal; therefore, doing so is in line with previous findings on waiver. See id.; Byrum, 360 Md. at 32–33; Suburban Hospital, 362 Md. at 156; URS Corp., 452 Md. at 70. For those reasons, the separate document rule was waived in the case sub judice because the facts at hand fall “squarely into the framework” identified in Suburban Hospital See URS Corp., 452 Md. at 70.
ii. Impact of the 2022 Dismissal
We next examine the effect of the 2022 dismissal upon the 2018 Memorandum. “An action is subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution at the expiration of one year from the last docket entry[.]” Md. Rule 2-507(c). When an action is subject to dismissal under 2-507(b), the clerk “shall serve notice on all parties” and if no responsive motion is filed within thirty days the clerk shall enter “[d]ismissed for lack of. . . prosecution
without prejudice[.]” Id. § 2-507(d). A dismissal for lack of prosecution, when entered, dismisses any pending motions but does not affect previous final judgments in the case. See Reed v. Cagan, 128 Md. App. 641, 645 (1999) (where other defendants in the case were granted summary judgment or dismissed by stipulation, a 2-507(b) dismissal of pending motions in the case did not dismiss their judgments).
Here, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-507(f), the clerk of court entered the case’s dismissal on the docket more than thirty days after notifying the parties of the contemplated dismissal, having received no response from either party. Because the 2018 Motion to Amend was pending at the time, the 2022 dismissal dismissed that motion. See id. In contrast, because the 2018 Memorandum was a final judgment, see supra, the 2022 dismissal did not dismiss that order. Id.
iii. Timeliness of Appeal of the 2018 Memorandum
We next examine timeliness with respect to the appeal of the 2018 Memorandum. Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment from which it is taken. Md. Rule 8-202(a). See also Kevin F. Arthur, Finality of Judgments and Other Appellate Trigger Issues § 7 (4th ed. 2025) (noting that an appellate court is authorized to dismiss an untimely appeal on its own motion or on the motion of the opposing party (citing Md. Rule 8-602(b)). The 2018 Memorandum was entered on November 11, 2018. Ziegler noted this appeal on June 7, 2024—almost six years later. That is well beyond the thirty-day notice requirement. Therefore, although the 2018 Memorandum is a final judgment, we dismiss Ziegler’s appeal as untimely.
II.
Appeal of the 2022 Dismissal is Untimely. 5
A. Party Contentions
Ziegler asserts that, in 2022, the trial court erroneously dismissed the case for lack of prosecution because the 2018 Motion to Amend was still pending before the court at that time.
Ragland contends that the 2022 dismissal was not erroneous because Ziegler failed to make any filings or show any “formal pleading of intention to proceed” for more than three years. Ragland adds that Ziegler then had the opportunity to object to the dismissal once the Notice of Contemplated Dismissal was served in 2022. Thus, Ragland contends, without any such action, the 2022 dismissal became final when it was entered in the docket.
B. Analysis
Maryland Rule 2-507(c) governs dismissal for lack of prosecution. Under the Rule, an action is subject to dismissal if a year has passed since the last docket entry without further action. Md. Rule 5-507(c). As noted above, Maryland Rule 2-507(d) requires that the clerk “shall serve a notice on all . . . that an order of dismissal for lack of . . . prosecution will be entered after the expiration of 30 days unless a motion is filed under section (e) of this Rule.” If, within thirty days after service of the notice, no party files a motion to defer dismissal, Maryland Rule 2-507(f) then instructs the clerk to enter on the docket “Dismissed for lack of prosecution
without prejudice.” A dismissal under Rule 2-507 is a final, appealable, judgment. See Reed, 128 Md. App. at 645; Spencer v. Est. of Newton, 227 Md. App. 154,160–61 (2016).
Here, regardless of the merits of the dismissal, the 2022 dismissal for lack of prosecution was procedurally proper because the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-507(f) were satisfied. More than a year had passed since the last docket entry, the clerk of court notified the parties of the contemplated dismissal, and the clerk entered the judgment on the docket after more than thirty days passed without a response. Because the 2022 dismissal is a final judgment,6 it was appealable for thirty days following entry on the docket on June 13, 2022. Md. Rule 8-202(a). Ziegler noted this appeal on June 7, 2024—almost two years later. Based on the parties’ failure to properly challenge the 2022 dismissal—with either a motion following the notice of contemplated dismissal or a timely appeal—we likewise, under Maryland Rule 8-602(b) (2), dismiss Ziegler’s appeal of the 2022 dismissal as untimely.
III. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the May 2024 Judgment; However, the Error was Harmless.
A. Party Contentions
In seeking appellate review in this matter, Ziegler does not directly address the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction over such an appeal. However, Ziegler contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by issuing the May 2024 Judgment prior to the expiration of the thirty days given to her to respond to the Motion to Enforce. Ziegler posits that the circuit court additionally erred by noting that the May 2024 Judgment was without opposition, despite her filing a response to the motion, and doing so before her thirty days to respond had expired.
Ragland also does not directly address the issue of appellate jurisdiction; however, he does note that this appeal was filed while several issues remain unsettled at the trial level and asserts that “[r]ejection of [Ziegler’s] claims in these proceedings would not foreclose future resolution of enforcement. . . at later time[] in proceedings before the trial judge.” As to the May 2024 Judgment, Ragland contends that the judgment “should be affirmed” without putting forth any reasons why we should do so.
B. Analysis
Where post-judgment motions filed within ten days of the judgment remain pending, appellate jurisdiction cannot be acquired until the post-judgment motions are resolved.7 See Sieck v. Sieck, 66 Md. App. 37, 41–42 (1986) (citing Unnamed Att’y v. Att’y Griev. Comm’n., 303 Md. 473, 494 (1985)). See also Edsall v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 332 Md. 502, 507–08 (1993); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143,165 (1999); Doe v. Sovereign Grace Ministries, Inc., 217 Md. App. 650, 668 (2014); Md. Rule 8-202(c). In contrast, “appellate jurisdiction attaches” to a judgment, even if a post-judgment motion is pending in the case, if the post-judgment motion was “filed more than ten days after a judgment but within thirty days of the judgment, under Rule 2-535(a)[.]” Unnamed Att’y, 303 Md. at 486.
In addressing the issue of finality here, we note that Ziegler’s motions to vacate are still pending at the circuit
court. Subsequent to the May 2024 Judgment granting Ragland’s Motion to Enforce, Ziegler filed two motions: 1) a motion to vacate and stay enforcement of the May 2024 Judgment, and 2) a motion to vacate or stay the retirement orders. It is unclear whether the trial court ruled on all the outstanding motions in the July 2024 Order. After articulating the case history, the circuit court wrote ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion to Stay pending an opinion from the Appellate Court of Maryland is GRANTED.
The plain language of that July 2024 order addresses only one of Ziegler’s motions to stay and does not address either motion to vacate. Despite this, neither of Ziegler’s revisory motions bar appellate jurisdiction over the matter. See Unnamed Att’y, 303 Md. at 486. The circuit court entered the order granting the Motion to Enforce on May 16, 2024. Ziegler then filed the motion to vacate and stay that order nineteen days later, on June 4, 2024. Ziegler’s motion to vacate the Motion to Enforce therefore does not bar appellate jurisdiction because it falls into the category of motions “filed more than ten days after a judgment but within thirty days of the judgment, under Rule 2-535(a)[.]” Id. Likewise, the circuit court entered the retirement orders on April 24, 2024, and Ziegler filed the motion to vacate or stay those orders fortytwo days later, on June 5, 2024. Because the motion to vacate or stay the retirement benefits was filed more than thirty days after entry of the order it seeks to revise, the portion of the motion seeking to vacate is untimely; and the request to stay was addressed in the circuit court’s July 2024 Order. Md. Rule 2-535(a). Having therefore acquired jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of Ziegler’s appeal of the May 2024 Judgment.8
On May 14, 2024, twenty-five days after she was served a summons to respond to the Motion to Enforce within thirty days, Ziegler filed a motion to extend the time to respond and file a “preliminary response” to the Motion to Enforce. Despite this clear opposition and time remaining for Ziegler to respond, the circuit court granted the Motion to Enforce, noting “no opposition[,]” on May 16, 2024. This grant was in error; however, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the error was harmless.
In civil cases, this Court “will not reverse a lower court judgment if the error is harm less [sic].” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 515 (2008) (quoting Flores v. Bell, 398 Md. 27, 33–34 (2007)). “The burden is on the complaining party to show prejudice as well as error.” Id. (citation omitted). In determining prejudice, and therefore, whether an error is harmless or not, “depend[s] upon the facts of each individual case.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]n error that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error.” Id. at 516 (citing Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004); Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 331 (1977)).
Here, although the circuit court failed to note Ziegler’s opposition, or wait to rule until after her allotted response time, any opposition Ziegler had or has to the Motion to Enforce is without merit, and therefore those failures were harmless. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 515. Ziegler’s opposition to the Motion to Enforce, both in her preliminary response and her appellate briefs, centered upon the 2018 Memorandum’s lack of finality, and that because “[t]he Motion to Enforce
[was] improperly filed” there was “no order to enforce.” As discussed supra, that argument holds no merit because the 2018 Memorandum was a final judgment. Even had the circuit court noted Ziegler’s opposition to the Motion to Enforce, or waited until the filing period had expired, the outcome of the case sub judice would be the same. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 516–17. Moreover, the Motion to Enforce was
simply enforcing a pre-existing duty. Ziegler owed Ragland the marital award under the final 2018 Memorandum; the May 2024 enforcement of that award did not change Ziegler’s legal obligations to Ragland.
Thus, any error made by the circuit court in granting the May 2024 Motion to Enforce was harmless.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 Ragland filed both retirement orders as proposed lines two days before filing his Motion to Enforce.
2 Ziegler titled her response “Preliminary Response to Plaintiff’s ‘Motion for Enforcement of Monetary Award, Entry of Money Judgment, and Other Relief[,]’” purporting to “reserve[] the right to supplement [her] Response” following adjudication of her other pending motions.
3 Ziegler contends that the 2018 Memorandum is referenced only as a “memorandum” on the Maryland Judiciary Case Search public database; however, the relevant page has the filing listed as a “Memorandum Opinion and Order.”
4 Ziegler additionally avers that the 2018 Memorandum is not a final judgment because the court did not address costs as required by Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(2). The Maryland Rule Ziegler cites does not discuss the cost requirement for judgments, so we understand Ziegler to be referring to Maryland Rule 2-602(a)(1)’s requirement that “each judgment. . . should include a statement of an allowance of costs[.]” Even so, the committee note under that rule specifies that the failure to include costs “does not preclude the document from constituting a final and appealable judgment.” Md. Rule 2-601(a)(1) note (citing Mattison v. Gelber, 202 Md. App. 44 (2011)).
5 We recognize that Ziegler does not directly address the 2022 dismissal in her notice of appeal. Nonetheless, we discuss it as it is encompassed by her appeal of all “orders issued pursuant to the [2018 Memorandum].” [RE 119] Moreover, this Court may raise issues of appellate jurisdiction sua sponte. See Johnson v. Johnson, 423 Md. 602, 605–06 (2011); Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 701 (1976); Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 293 (1979).
6 As above, a final judgment “leave[s] nothing more to be done in order to effectuate the court’s disposition of the matter.” Remson, 206 Md. App. at 72 (quoting Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41). The 2022 dismissal determined Ziegler and Ragland’s rights in the matter, effectively concluding all pending issues, and was therefore a final judgment. See id. (citation omitted).
7 In Maryland, there are three exceptions to this rule: appeals from interlocutory rulings specifically allowed by statute (Maryland Code, § 12-303 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article), immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602(b), and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.” Smith, 386 Md. at 21 (citation omitted). See also Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. Md. Dept. of Agric., 439 Md. 262, 286 (2012) (citations omitted). Here, the orders at issue do not fall under those enumerated in Maryland Code § 12-303, hence the first exception is inapplicable. Likewise, the second and third exceptions do not apply because this appeal concerns the merits of the case, and the circuit court did not make any express finding of “no just reasons for delay” of the appeal. See Waterkeeper All., Inc., at 288–89. As an additional note, neither the Rule 8-602(f) nor the Rule 8-602(g) savings provision applies under the circumstances sub judice. See Bussell v. Bussell, 194 Md. App. 137, 154 (2010); Smith, 386 Md. at 26; Kevin F. Arthur, Finality of Judgments and Other Appellate Trigger Issues § 7 (4th ed. 2025).
8 For the reasons discussed supra, we cannot reach Ziegler’s appeal of the 2018 Memorandum or 2022 dismissal and therefore only discuss the merits of her appeal of the May 2024 Judgment.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court reversed the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s grant of wife’s motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement of a judgment that was entered more than 12 years earlier and had not been renewed in accordance with Md. Rule 2-625. An action on a judgment must be brought within 12 years after entry of the judgment. Because there was no existing money judgment capable of being enforced when wife filed her motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement, she was not entitled to that relief.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
property owned by Husband in Bumpass, Virginia.
In 2010 and again in 2011, Wife filed in the circuit court to attempt to enforce her judgment. First, in December 2010, she filed a motion to enforce monetary judgment, along with a motion to modify child support. In a letter to the Clerk of the Court with respect to the motion to enforce the judgment, she alleged that Husband still owned the land in Virginia and would not deed it to her. She asked for the judgment to be enforced through “wage, bank account and asset garnishment” and provided a legal description of the land in Virginia. The court held a hearing on the motion to modify child support, but the record does not reflect any action on Wife’s motion to enforce the judgment.2
This appeal arises from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County’s grant of a motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement of a judgment. The judgment was entered in 2007 against George Redrick, Jr. (“Husband”), appellant, and in favor of Rosalind Redrick (“Wife”), appellee, in the parties’ divorce case. Husband presents two issues1 on appeal, which we combine as one:
I. Did the circuit court err by granting Wife’s motion to compel discovery to aid enforcement of a judgment that was entered more than twelve years earlier and had not been renewed in accordance with Md. Rule 2-625?
For the following reasons, we answer that question, “Yes,” and reverse the order of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
By judgment entered August 17, 2007, Wife was granted an absolute divorce from Husband. As part of the divorce decree, the court entered a judgment against Husband in favor of Wife in the amount of $39,556 as “a monetary award resolving the [Wife]’s claims for child support arrearage, mortgage contribution, repairs and improvements to the marital home, legal fees and the Parties[’] respective claims for dissipation of marital assets[.]”
Thereafter, Wife recorded a judgment lien against real
Second, in May 2011, Wife filed a request for a writ of garnishment of wages, naming First Transit, Inc. at Baltimore Washington International Airport as the garnishee. Notice was served upon First Transit, Inc. and, later that month, it responded that Husband was an employee, that he earned $24.72 per hour, that he was paid biweekly, and that $434.77 was garnished per pay period subject to a child support order for the parties’ child. It does not appear from the record that Husband’s wages were attached to satisfy the judgment but, in any event, by July 2011, Husband no longer was employed by First Transit according to Wife.
More than a decade later, on December 21, 2023, Wife, through counsel, served upon Husband requests for production of documents and interrogatories in aid of enforcement of the 2007 judgment. The next month, Husband, through counsel, responded that the docket entries in the divorce case did not reflect that Wife ever had renewed the 2007 judgment and consequently, that the judgment was “now well beyond the specialty statute of limitations of 12 years.” He asked Wife’s counsel to provide evidence of renewal of that judgment, if any existed. Wife’s counsel responded that, because of the “nature of this judgment[,]” counsel disagreed that the twelve-year limitations period applied.
On April 18, 2024, Wife filed in the circuit court a motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement. She attached to her motion the discovery requests served upon Husband and the response from Husband’s attorney. Wife alleged that the circuit court entered judgment in her favor on August 17, 2007, and that the “entry of the judgment specified that the judgment never expired.” Since that time, Wife had “encountered numerous roadblocks and obstacles in attempting to collect on the judgment.” Wife asserted that it was “well-established” that the twelve-year statute of limitations was inapplicable to a “judgment arising from child support arrearages, alimony, or similar obligations[,]”
citing two cases decided by this Court, Bland v. Larsen, 97 Md. App. 125 (1993), and Weidner v. Weidner, 78 Md. App. 367 (1989). She asked the court to enter an order compelling Husband to respond to the discovery requests within five days and award her fees and costs.
Husband opposed the motion, asserting that, contrary to Wife’s allegations, “there are no judgments in Maryland that do not expire” and that, under Md. Rule 2-625, a “money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent renewal.” He further emphasized that our decisions in Bland and Weidner directly supported that position. Husband asked the court to deny the motion to compel and award him attorneys’ fees and costs. Husband further requested a hearing on the motion.
On May 29, 2024, without holding a hearing, the court entered an order granting Wife’s motion to compel, ordering Husband to respond to the discovery requests within five days, and ordering Husband to pay Wife’s attorneys’ fees and costs.
Within ten days, Husband moved to alter or amend the judgment and requested that the court stay the judgment pending appeal. He argued that, because there was no judgment to enforce, Wife was not entitled to discovery in aid of enforcement of it.
Wife opposed that motion. She attached to her motion a copy of the Maryland Judiciary Case Search docket entries and highlighted information appearing in a section entitled, “Judgment Information.” That section reflected that a judgment was entered against Husband and in favor of Wife on August 17, 2007 for $39,556 and included the following language:
Judgment Expiration Date: Does not expire
By order entered July 2, 2024, the court denied the motion to alter or amend. This timely appeal followed.3
DISCUSSION
Maryland Rule 2-633 provides for post-judgment discovery in aid of enforcement of a judgment. Under subsection (a) of that Rule, “a judgment creditor may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment” through depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, and other methods.” Md. Rule 2-633(a). The rule “authorizes discovery in aid only of an actual, existing money judgment[.]” Johnson v. Francis, 239 Md. App. 530, 546 (2018) (emphasis added). At issue in this case is whether there is a money judgment in
existence subject to enforcement or whether the judgment expired after twelve years. Because our resolution of this issue turns upon statutory interpretation and interpretation of the Maryland Rules, we review the grant of Wife’s motion to compel de novo Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 373 (2021).
Section 5-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code governs limitations on actions on specialties. It provides that an action on a judgment must be brought within twelve years after entry of the judgment. CJP § 5-102(a)(3). “Rule 2-625 implements the twelve-year limitations period found in [CJP § 5-102(a)].” State, Cent. Collection Unit v. Buckingham, 214 Md. App. 672, 674 (2013). That Rule states: “A money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent renewal. At any time before expiration of the judgment, the judgment holder may file a notice of renewal and the clerk shall enter the judgment renewed.” Md. Rule 2-625. See also Kroop & Kurland, P.A. v. Lambros, 118 Md. App. 651, 657 (1998) (“A circuit court money judgment expires twelve years from its date of entry or twelve years from the date on which it was most recently renewed.”).
Contrary to Wife’s argument in her motion to compel discovery, Maryland law does not exempt money judgments arising from child support or alimony from this twelve-year limitations period. Both cases cited in the circuit court by Wife in support of that argument state the opposite. See Bland, 97 Md. App. at 133-34 (affirming award to ex-wife of child support arrearages for prior twelve years, but not beyond, due to application of CJP § 5-102(a)(3)); Weidner, 78 Md. App. at 375-76 (affirming award of alimony arrearages and noting that the ex-wife “did not claim that she was entitled to arrearages in alimony for more than 12 years, acknowledging the limitation on collection of judgments imposed by [CJP § 5-102(a)(3)]”).
In the instant case, the judgment was entered on August 17, 2007. Though Wife attempted to enforce it on two occasions, she never renewed the judgment. Consequently, the judgment expired on August 16, 2019, twelve years after it was entered.4 Because there was no existing money judgment capable of being enforced when Wife filed her motion to compel discovery in aid of enforcement, she was not entitled to that relief. For all these reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court compelling Husband to propound discovery responses and to pay fees and costs.
1 The issues as posed by Husband are:
FOOTNOTES
Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion to Compel Discovery in Aid of Enforcement?
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal?
2 According to Husband, at that hearing, the Family Law Master advised Wife that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over a lien on real property in Virginia.
3 We recognize that discovery orders ordinarily are interlocutory orders and are not immediately appealable under the final judgment rule. Baltimore City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 14 (1992) (“It is well settled in Maryland that discovery orders usually are not immediately appealable.”). Here, however, because a final judgment was entered in the underlying case in 2007, the only issue left to be decided is whether Wife is entitled to discovery to enforce the money judgment. Consequently, the order entered by the circuit court is properly before us. See Johnson v. Francis, 239 Md. App. 530, 540-41 (2018) (reasoning that an order granting protective orders and quashing subpoenas relative to post-judgment discovery was immediately appealable).
4 We decline to address Wife’s argument that she detrimentally relied upon the language that now appears on the docket stating that the “Judg[]ment does not expire.” Our review of the record reveals that, as of September 19, 2022, when the docket entries were printed out, the language “Judgment does not expire” did not appear on the docket. Thus, while it is unclear when this erroneous language first was added to the docket, it was sometime after the expiration of the judgment.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 1 (2026)
Expert; Daubert; mental health
Melanie Eitelman v. Michael Eitelman
No. 0285, September Term 2025
Argued before: Wells, C.J; Beachley, Battaglia (retired; specially assigned), JJ.
Opinion by: Battaglia, J.
Filed: Nov. 18, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Howard County Circuit Court’s decision to admit testimony of a court-appointed psychological expert as to his mental health evaluation of mother, its decision that all her overnight visitation with the children must be supervised and its decision to not impose a particularized summer and holiday visitation schedule.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
respect to the Appellant.2 We affirm the findings of the trial court in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
Melanie Eitelman, Appellant, (“Mother”) married Michael Eitelman, Appellee, (“Father”) in Middleburg, Virginia on November 1, 2008, and later welcomed four children: M.E. (born 2009), M.E. (born 2011), S.E. (born 2012), and G.E. (born 2013) (“Children” when referred to collectively). In April of 2017, Father filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Howard County. During the proceedings, Mother’s parents, Barnard
This family law case involves custody, visitation, and child support for four minor children, whose parents are Melanie Eitelman, Appellant, and Michael Eitelman, Appellee, who married in 2008. We have been asked to determine whether the trial court erred in several elements of its disposition of the parents’ cross-petitions to modify custody. Namely, six issues, which we have rephrased and reordered, are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a court-appointed psychological expert as to his mental health evaluation of the Appellant; (2) whether the trial court exceeded its authority in ordering supervised visitation of the children for the Appellant since it was not requested by the Appellee; (3) whether the trial court erred in not adjudging the Appellee in contempt of court for his alleged noncompliance with the parties’ then-existing Custody Consent Order during the modification proceedings; (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to specify a particularized summer and holiday visitation schedule in its order entered March 11, 2025; (5) whether the trial court erred by not considering the Appellant’s request that she be awarded child support; and (6) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Appellant and her mother to pay all the outstanding fees incurred by the Best Interest Attorney.1
For the reasons set forth below, we remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of the amount of child support and to whom it should be awarded, as well as for reassessment of the fees for the Best Interest Attorney with
Walsh (“Grandfather”) and Margaret Walsh (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” when referred to collectively) were granted a guardianship over Mother’s person and property after Mother was determined to be a “disabled adult.” In April of 2018, Grandparents, acting as Mother’s guardians, entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement with Father, which was ultimately incorporated, but not merged into the couple’s Judgment of Absolute Divorce that the Circuit Court issued on November 5, 2018. The Marital Settlement Agreement provided for shared physical custody of the Children between Father and Grandparents, with Mother’s access to the Children being determined by Grandparents.
Father married Megan Mason on April 24, 2021. In March of 2021, Father filed a Petition to Modify Child Custody, Child Support, and Other Further Relief, alleging both that his home life and financial situation had improved and that the Grandparents’ ability to care for the Children had declined. Father and Grandparents, who were still serving as Mother’s guardians, entered into a Custody Consent Order in May of 2022, which vested Father with primary physical and sole legal custody over the Children. Grandparents were granted visitation and retained control over Mother’s access to the Children.
Over the course of the next year, the co-parenting relationships deteriorated, as did Mother’s relationship with M.E., the oldest child. Subsequently, in August of 2023, Father filed a Complaint for Modification of Custody, which forms the basis for this appeal. Father’s complaint alleged that Grandparents had failed to supervise Mother during visitation with the Children and that Mother’s conduct jeopardized the Children’s emotional wellbeing. Father requested that Grandparents’ and Mother’s visitation be eliminated.
After Father had prevented Mother and Grandparents from seeing the Children, Mother and Grandparents filed a Petition for Contempt against Father in September of 2023 for
allegedly violating the 2022 Custody Consent Order. Mother and Grandparents subsequently filed a similar Amended Petition for Contempt and then a Second Amended Petition for Contempt in November of 2023, which made many of the same allegations and sought Father’s incarceration. In March of 2023, the court terminated Grandparents’ guardianship of Mother’s property, and in October of 2023, the court terminated Grandparents’ guardianship of her person.
In December of 2023, Craig J. Little, Esq. was appointed as the Best Interest Attorney to represent the oldest child, M.E., because of the high level of conflict between the parties. In January of 2024, Mother filed her own Counter-Motion to Modify Custody, Child Support, and for Other Relief which included requests for joint legal custody and shared physical custody, as well as arguments that Father should be held in contempt for withholding the Children. Thereafter, in May of 2024, Mr. Little’s representation was expanded to include all four of the Children. The order expanding his representation required the parties to each pay a $2,500 retainer for Mr. Little’s services and specified that he was to bill $200 per hour for the first ten hours of work and his standard hourly rate for any additional fees.
In May of 2024, the trial court also ordered that a mental health evaluation of Mother be undertaken by Dr. John Lefkowits, a forensic psychologist. Dr. Lefkowits provided his report to all parties on July 22, 2024. He diagnosed Mother with bipolar disorder in partial remission and generalized anxiety disorder and concluded that Mother lacked higher order parenting skills and was not ready to have fully unsupervised parenting time with the Children. The following week, Mother filed a motion to preclude Dr. Lefkowits’s recommendations pertaining to custody, arguing that his recommendations were outside the scope of a mental health evaluation, and that Dr. Lefkowits’s evaluation lacked the necessary elements of a custody evaluation. The trial court overruled Mother’s objection to the admission of the report into evidence and specifically overruled Mother’s objection to Dr. Lefkowits’s testimony regarding Mother’s ability to parent. Several weeks after Dr. Lefkowits testified, Mother filed a motion to strike Dr. Lefkowits’s report and testimony in their entirety, arguing that Dr. Lefkowits’s opinion was unreliable under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), because he did not use the generally accepted definition of bipolar disorder in partial remission from the DSM-5.3 This motion was denied.
The merits hearing regarding Father’s Complaint for Modification of Custody, Mother’s Counter-Motion to Modify, and Mother’s Second Amended Petition for Contempt was held over the course of three days on August 8, August 9, and November 4, 2024. The court heard testimony from Mother, Father, Grandmother, Father’s wife, Dr. Lefkowits, and Mother’s psychiatric expert, Dr. Patrick Harmon, as well as friends and other family members of the parties.
The Best Interest Attorney filed a motion for payment of his outstanding fees.4 He asserted that there were $9,850 in fees still outstanding and deferred to the court to determine their allocation. Mother and Grandmother filed a joint reply to Mr. Little’s motion, as did Father; no party objected to the
amount of fees, but each claimed that the other should be responsible for the entirety of the remaining balance.
On February 6, 2025, the trial judge gave an oral opinion putting the court’s findings and decisions on the record. The court awarded exclusive primary physical and sole legal custody to Father, with Mother having supervised overnight visitation every other weekend: for the first four months, a minimum of four hours of each visitation during the weekend was to be supervised by a professional supervisor; otherwise, visitation would be supervised by Grandmother or another agreed-upon adult.
The oldest child, M.E., was given discretion as to whether she wished to attend visitation and was empowered to end any visitation early. Mother was to have holiday and summer visitation with the Children, according to a reasonable schedule set by Father. No child support was awarded to either party. Mother and Grandmother were deemed jointly and severally liable for the entirety of Mr. Little’s outstanding attorneys’ fees, and Mother’s Second Amended Petition for Contempt was denied. Grandparents were removed as parties from the case.
On February 6, 2025, the court also entered an order assessing the balance of the Best Interest Attorney’s fees against Mother and Grandmother, who then filed a motion to alter or amend on February 14. Father opposed this motion. The court’s remaining rulings were set forth in a written order entered on March 11, 2025. Mother’s motion to alter or amend was denied by the trial judge on March 19. Mother timely noted her appeal on April 7, 2025.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Mother styles her challenges as legal error, each of the issues she has raised are reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. Concerning the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. Lefkowits’s testimony, “[a]ppellate courts review a trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of expert testimony under Maryland Rule 5-702 for abuse of discretion.” State v. Matthews, 479 Md. 278, 305 (2022). A trial court’s action in admitting or excluding such testimony “will seldom constitute ground for reversal.” Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 38–39 (2015). See also Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 216 (2002) (“Trial judges have ‘wide latitude in deciding whether to qualify a witness as an expert or to admit or exclude particular expert testimony.’”) (quoting Massie v. State, 349 Md. 834, 850–51 (1998)).
Child custody and visitation awards are predicated on the “best interest” of the children. Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 468 (1994). Accordingly, the standard of review in custody cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its custody determination. Id. at 470 (citing Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 125 (1977)).
“[C]hild support orders are within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Reichert v. Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 316 (2013). Likewise, the decision to modify a child support award is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, provided that the discretion was not arbitrarily used or based on incorrect legal principles. Walker v. Grow, 170 Md. App. 255, 266 (2006).
Finally, “when a court appoints counsel for a child and assesses the cost against a party to the action, that assessment will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellate court finds that it constituted an abuse of discretion.” Carroll Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 177 (1990) (citing Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 520–21 (1955)).
DISCUSSION
Dr. Lefkowits’s expert opinion
Mother’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. John Lefkowits because his opinion was not sufficiently reliable pursuant to the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and adopted by our Supreme Court in Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020). In his report, Dr. Lefkowits diagnosed Mother with “Bipolar Disorder, with psychotic features in partial remission” and “Generalized Anxiety Disorder,” and offered the opinion that Mother was not ready to have fully unsupervised parenting time with the Children. He also made recommendations as to Mother’s continued treatment and supervision. During his testimony, Dr. Lefkowits clarified that his recommendations with respect to supervision were not dependent upon whether Mother reached partial or full remission with her bipolar disorder, saying “I think [Mother’s] stability with her mental illness is a necessary but insufficient condition in order to immediately begin unsupervised parenting time with the minor children[.]”
Prior to the hearing, Mother filed a motion to preclude portions to Dr. Lefkowits’s testimony and the admission of his report, challenging his recommendations relating to custody and supervision. The trial judge took no action on the motion, and Mother again raised the objection when Dr. Lefkowits’s report was offered into evidence at the merits hearing on August 8, 2024, again challenging only the recommendations. Her objection was overruled, and the motion was identified as “moot” on the record.
After Dr. Lefkowits had testified as to his mental health evaluation of Mother at the merits hearing on August 8, 2024, that she was only in “partial remission,” Mother filed a motion on September 20, 2024, to strike Dr. Lefkowits’s report and testimony. In her motion to strike, Mother alleged that Dr. Lefkowits’s opinion fell short of the Daubert-Rochkind standard because his diagnosis that Mother had bipolar disorder in partial remission did not conform to the definition of that condition provided in the DSM-5. She contended that, in order to be reliable, Dr. Lefkowits would have needed to use the precise definition from the DSM-5, which would have identified Mother as being in full remission. Father opposed Mother’s motion, noting that the request for a Daubert analysis was inappropriate, as it was made after Dr. Lefkowits had testified and after the trial court had already decided to admit his testimony and report. The trial court denied Mother’s motion to strike without opinion, but, after Mother’s counsel renewed the motion at the subsequent hearing in November, the judge stated:
So, I do believe that Dr. Lefkowits properly explained what you’re talking about is straying
from I think that the definition that’s in the DSM, . . . I think it was properly explained and, certainly, I will give his testimony and his report the weight that I believe to be appropriate. So, I’ll deny the motion.
On appeal, Mother challenges both the reliability of Dr. Lefkowits’s testimony under Daubert and his inclusion of recommendations concerning supervision.
Expert testimony is governed by Rule 5-702 of the Maryland Rules. The Rule provides that, “[e]xpert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” In making such a determination, the Rule directs a court to assess the expert’s qualifications, the appropriateness of the expert’s testimony on the particular subject, and whether there is a sufficient factual basis to support the testimony. Md. Rule 5-702. In Rochkind, our Supreme Court emphasized that the appropriate focus when evaluating expert testimony is the overall reliability of the expert’s methodology, rather than solely the methodology’s general acceptance in the field. 471 Md. at 30-31 (“General acceptance remains an important consideration in the reliability analysis, but it cannot remain the sole consideration.”).
The admissibility of expert testimony is, generally, best resolved prior to trial, and is essential to be resolved prior to the testimony of the expert and/or the admission of his report. See Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 593 n.13 (2009) (citing Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 347–48 (2006)). The focus of a challenge under Rule 5-702 requires a trial court to rule prior to the expert’s testimony at trial, or “at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise, the objection is waived.” Md. Rule 2-517(a).
Here, the only challenge Mother filed pre-trial and pretestimonial to Dr. Lefkowits’s report concentrated on the portion regarding whether Mother needed to be supervised during visitation, which Mother alleged was outside the scope of a court-ordered mental health evaluation. Mother’s argument, however, did not preserve the Daubert challenge to Dr. Lefkowits’s testimony, nor did the post hoc motion to strike filed forty-three days after Dr. Lefkowits testified satisfy Mother’s obligation to raise the Daubert objection prior to Dr. Lefkowits’s testimony on August 8, 2024. This is so especially since Mother had been in possession of Dr. Lefkowits’s report—which contained the partial remission diagnosis—since July of 2024.
Even were there to have been a timely Daubert challenge to Dr. Lefkowits’s partial remission evaluation of Mother, the trial court did not rely upon that diagnosis. Rather, the trial judge found that Mother was “either clinically in remission or does not currently suffer from debilitating symptoms due to her ongoing treatment compliance and her medication and therapy.” Additionally, the judge declared, “[t]here was a disagreement between the experts on whether or not the Mother is in full remission.6 And there was a good amount of time spent on that. But to me, it’s not dispositive of what is in the best interests of the children.” The judge, therefore, did not rely upon Dr. Lefkowits’s opinion regarding partial remission.
Mother further takes issue with the fact that Dr. Lefkowits’s report included an opinion that Mother should be supervised when with the Children, which she claims exceeded the scope of the court’s order for a psychological evaluation and thereby risked prejudicing the court’s determination of custody and visitation. Mother claims she was in fact prejudiced because the trial court “adopted the remedy of supervision and professional coaching recommended by Dr. Lefkowits[.]”
The trial judge, however, made her own findings relative to the need for supervised visitation based upon her own observations. The judge noted:
The Mother, although capable of caring for the children at their current ages, still needs significant support from her own family, most importantly, her own parents. She lives with her parents and relies on them for housing and support. The Mother suffers from mental illness and undergoes regular and ongoing treatment, including medication management. Her mental illness is controlled with the treatment, and she has not had significant issues with her mental illness over the last three years.
Having well treated and controlled bi-polar does not make her an unfit parent, but neither does the fact that it is well controlled automatically render her a fit parent or one on equal footing with the fit Father. Her mental illness is one factor in a larger evaluation of her ability to parent.
The Court did order a psychological evaluation, and as I said, the Court did consider the testimony of Dr. Lefkowits and also the psychiatrist that evaluated the Mother as well. I went over what his recommendations were already.
It is the finding of the Court as regards to Mother’s fitness that she’s not fully capable at this time of independently parenting the children. She is a fit parent to have some access with the children. She should generally have her parenting time supervised by another appropriate adult. The Mother seems to the Court to be fragile and unable to regularly handle the social and emotional functioning that generally comes along with parenting children, especially older children and teens.
The Mother has the diagnosis that I already went over and was under a six-year guardianship. It took her years to get to ongoing consistent compliance with her medication regime, and she’s to be commended for the work that she has done. Her last hospitalization for her disorder was in 2021. Two years later, her guardianship was lifted.
I note also that she, the Mother, relied on the present [sic] of her parents during her own testimony. She looked to them for support and guidance. Of note also was her inability or her unwillingness to remain in the courtroom during the testimony of the Father’s new wife. She permitted, also, her own parents to create
a scene at the children’s home on Thanksgiving holiday while she waited up the street in a car. This is not the actions of an in-charge parent, but the actions of a child-like adult who’s use [sic] to allowing her own parents to make decisions and choices for not only her but for her children.
The record supports the trial judge’s factual findings, which, in turn, support her determination of supervised visitation. The trial judge did not err.
ORDER FOR SUPERVISED OVERNIGHT VISITATION
Mother challenges the trial court’s order that all her overnight visitation with the Children must be supervised because, she alleges, Father did not request supervised visitation in his Complaint for Modification of Custody. Father had requested that he have sole physical custody of the Children and that Mother’s visitation be eliminated. Mother claims that it was outside the court’s authority and a violation of her due process rights for the trial court to order supervised visitation, when Father did not specifically request that relief in his pleadings.
After making factual findings regarding Mother’s ability to parent, the trial judge determined:
Considering all the facts and circumstances and the factors that I must consider, it is in the best interests of the children that the Father be granted the primary physical and sole legal custody of the children, subject to some access granted to the Mother.
The Maternal Grandparents are to be removed as parties from the case.
I’m not ordering reunification, but I’m noting that the Father should consider reunification therapy between any of his children and the Mother when the time is right. I note the advocacy of the Best Interest Attorney on this issue.
Mother’s access is to be every other weekend from Saturday at ten until Sunday at five. All of the access shall be supervised by either a professional supervisor, by the Maternal Grandmother, or by another adult that is mutually agreed to.
For the first four months of access, there shall be a professional supervisor present with Mother and the children for four hours of every Saturday access, paid for by the Mother. All other access shall be supervised by the Maternal Grandmother. If she is unable or unwilling to supervise Mother’s access, then another supervisor, who is mutually agreeable to the Mother and Father, can be selected. And if there’s no agreement, then it must be by a professional supervisor.
The authority of a court to order supervised visitation is a power explicitly provided by statute. Section 9-101 of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2025 Supp.) empowers a court to “approve a supervised visitation arrangement that assures the safety and the physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.”
Mother, though, argues that she was not on notice that supervised visitation could be awarded since Father did not include that specific remedy in his pleadings. Under the rules of pleading, however, a plaintiff need only state such facts in his or her complaint as are necessary to show entitlement to relief. Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 698 (1997); Md. Rule 2-303(b) (“A pleading shall contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to relief or ground of defense.”). Relief, though, need not be so specific, though Father asked for no visitation at all.
Mother, nevertheless, relies on our decision in Ledvinka v. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. 420 (2003), for the premise that a trial court’s authority to act is limited by the issues framed by the pleadings. In Ledvinka, an annulment proceeding, we reversed the trial court’s order setting aside the fraudulent conveyance of real property because it was “beyond the scope of the pleadings and beyond the court’s authority.” 154 Md. App. at 430. The trial court in Ledvinka had concluded that the husband had fraudulently conveyed property “as a means of limiting his assets in anticipation of the divorce litigation.” Id. The wife, however, had not pled a cause of action in fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 428.
Ledvinka is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In his Complaint for Modification of Custody, Father gave notice of the bases for his request to modify custody and specified facts to show his entitlement to relief. Father alleged that leaving the Children alone with Mother had caused them emotional harm and also that “Mother is simply not able to use good judgment and decision-making, and should not be left alone with the Minor Children for any period of time.” Father’s complaint was sufficient to conform with pleading requirements. He also had asked for Mother’s visitation to be completely revoked. Accordingly, we find no error.
MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CONTEMPT
In September of 2023, Mother and Grandparents filed a Petition for Contempt alleging that Father unilaterally withheld the Children from Mother and Grandparents in contravention of the parties’ 2022 Custody Consent Order and that Father “ha[d] engaged in a scheme to alienate and disparage” Mother and Grandparents to the Children. In November of 2023, Mother and Grandparents filed an Amended Petition for Contempt and then a Second Amended Petition for Contempt seeking Father’s incarceration, making the same allegations, with the addition that Father stated at his deposition that he need not comply with the custody order because he had sole legal custody of the Children. Father responded in June of 2024 denying the allegations and stating that Mother and Grandparents’ recitation of the facts was oversimplified and taken out of context.
In ruling on Mother’s petition, the trial judge noted that:
[C]ontempt is a tool the Court uses to enforce compliance with an existing order. A purge provision is set in order to compel compliance. A purge provision is set in order to have the contemnor comply with the order—to force
them to comply with the order in order to avoid a sanction that is set by the Court.
The order, however, that was sought to be enforced was being modified through this litigation. And of particular note, the litigants were changing. The Mother, at the time of the hearing, was no longer under legal disability, and the Grandparents were asking to be removed as parties from the case. So, they were seeking to enforce an order that granted to them custody, or access but seeking no access rights as a result of the hearing. The tool of contempt, therefore, is useless in this matter, and the Court does not believe that the Father can be found in contempt of Court.
When discussing the merits of Mother’s contentions, the judge stated:
I believe that the Father, as the sole custodial parent, had a bona fide belief that he was withholding the children and doing what was best for them. He was not, importantly, taking the action that he took in order to thwart the authority of the Court. He hired a lawyer and filed for modification, and he continued to negotiate and participate and prepare for the ultimate litigation. His actions were not contemptuous of the Court’s authority. The Court denies the Petition for Contempt.
Mother now attempts to challenge the trial court’s denial of her petitions for contempt.
“The right to appeal in this State is wholly statutory.” Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 371 Md. 243, 247 (2002).
The general right of appeal is contained in Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) of the Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.). It provides that “[e] xcept as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” (Emphasis added). Section 12302(b) then specifies that “[s]ection 12-301 of this subtitle does not apply to appeals in contempt cases, which are governed by § 12-304 of this subtitle and § 12-402 of this title.” (Emphasis added). Section 12-304(a) provides: “Any person may appeal from any order or judgment passed to preserve the power or vindicate the dignity of the court and adjudging him in contempt of court, including an interlocutory order, remedial in nature, adjudging any person in contempt, whether or not a party to the action.” (Emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court has stated that Section 12-304 “clearly and unambiguously limits the right to appeal in contempt cases to persons adjudged in contempt.” Pack Shack, 371 Md. at 254. Accordingly, “where the circuit court has not adjudged any person or entity in contempt of court, issues pertaining to a petition for contempt are not appealable[.]” Trusted Sci. and Tech., Inc. v. Evancich, 262 Md. App. 621, 655 (2024). Mother, however, alleges that special circumstances here, such as the deprivation of time with the children, justify an exception to the Pack Shack rule, without any citation to authority. The denial of a contempt petition cannot be appealed.
SUMMER AND HOLIDAY VISITATION SCHEDULE
When setting the visitation schedule for the parties, the trial judge stated that, in addition to having access every other weekend, “Mother shall have access during the holidays that is on a reasonable schedule that is set by the Father after consultation with the Mother.” Concerning summer visitation, the judge further stated that she “made no changes in regard to summer. The parties are free to come up with something if they believe it’s appropriate.” The court’s order reflected the same, stating: “Defendant Mother shall have Holiday and Summer Access with the Minor Children according to a reasonable schedule set by Plaintiff [Father] following consultation with Defendant Mother[.]”
Mother argues that this order was not specific and alleges that the trial court “abused its discretion by failing to order a detailed summer and holiday access schedule.” She claims that the absence of such a schedule “creates uncertainty and increases the likelihood of disputes between the parties.” Without citing any authority, Mother contends that “Maryland courts have consistently emphasized the importance of providing clear and specific visitation schedules to avoid ambiguity and ensure compliance with court orders.” This Court has iterated that, “the best interests of the children are better served by a structure . . . that permits flexibility if the parents are able to handle it.” Meyr v. Meyr, 195 Md. App. 524, 550 (2010) (internal citations omitted). To that effect, our Supreme Court has stated: [T]here is a great deal of flexibility permitted in visitation orders. They run a gamut—a proper gamut. In the divorce, or post-divorce, setting, they may simply provide for “reasonable,” but otherwise unspecified, visitation, or they may set out a rather detailed schedule with respect to times, places, and conditions, or they may be somewhere between those poles, depending on the circumstances and the ability of the parties to agree to a mutually acceptable arrangement.
In re Justin D., 357 Md. 431, 447 (2000).
“‘[R]easonable,’ but otherwise unspecified” visitation is precisely what was provided for here. It was within the trial court’s discretion to determine that the parties here could communicate effectively enough to be able to create a reasonable summer and holiday schedule. We find no error.
MOTHER’S REQUEST FOR CHILD SUPPORT
Mother argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider her request for child support. Father concedes that the trial court should have conducted a child support analysis, pursuant to Section 12-202 of the Family Law Article, but asserts that he would be the likely recipient of any support awarded.
In her Counter-Motion to Modify Custody, Child Support, and for Other Relief, Mother requested that Father be ordered to pay child support, retroactive to the date of filing her motion. Father denied Mother’s allegation in his response but did not otherwise address the issue of child support. In awarding Father primary physical custody and Mother
supervised overnight visitation, the trial judge did not make any findings of fact on the record relating to child support or the amount to be awarded. The court stated only: “In consideration of the limited income of the Mother and the requirement that I’m putting on her for professional services, it’s better for the children that the Mother not be ordered to pay child support at this time.”7 The court did not otherwise address the impact of the child support guidelines provided in Section 12-204 of the Family Law Article to Mother’s overnight supervised visitation when making its decision.8
Parents of minor children “are jointly and severally responsible for the child[ren]’s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education[.]” FL § 5-203(b)(1). “This legal obligation to support a minor child is also a ‘moral obligation[,]’ which ‘is [a] well-settled [principle] in Maryland [law].’ Because the obligation is to support the child, Maryland courts have long recognized that the right to child support is a right held by the minor child—not a right held by the parent to whom the child support is paid.” Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592, 607 (2025) (citations omitted).
“The calculation of a child support award is governed by FL § 12-204” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 386 (2020). In cases such as this one, where the parents’ combined adjusted actual income is less than $30,000.01 per month,9 the Maryland child support guidelines control the calculation of each parent’s child support obligation. FL § 12-202(a)(1) (“[I]n any proceeding to establish or modify child support . . . the court shall use the child support guidelines set forth in this subtitle.”) (emphasis added); FL § 12-204(e) (providing a basic child support obligation schedule for parents with a combined adjusted actual income up to $30,000.00 per month). A parent’s entitlement to child support payments is determined by the number of overnights each of the children has with each parent. FL § 12-201(o) (defining “shared physical custody” based on the number of overnights a parent keeps a child per year and permitting a court to base a child support award “(i) solely on the amount of visitation awarded; and (ii) regardless of whether joint custody has been granted”).
On remand, the trial court must apply the child support guidelines and determine a support obligation in compliance with Sections 12-201 et seq. of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code.
ASSESSMENT OF BEST INTEREST ATTORNEY’S FEES
Mother takes issue with the trial court’s assessment that she and Grandmother were to be jointly and severally liable for the outstanding fees for the Children’s Best Interest Attorney. She argues that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the factors provided for in Section 12-103(b) of the Family Law Article. We agree.
In his Motion for Payment, Mr. Little (the Best Interest Attorney) included an affidavit affirming that he billed $200 per hour for ten hours and his customary rate of $250 per hour for all remaining hours in accordance with the court’s orders, with an attached invoice reflecting the same. He further affirmed that, less the payments already made, he was owed a balance of $9,850. Mother and Grandparents
then filed a reply asking the trial court to order Father to pay the entire balance, citing the disparity in incomes between Mother and Father. In response, Father filed his own motion in which he requested that Mother and Grandparents be solely responsible for the fee balance, arguing primarily that Mother and Grandparents maintained their causes of action without substantial justification.
In making her assessment of counsel fees, the trial judge said only that: Considering all the facts and circumstances regarding this case and the financial resources of both parties, considering the litigiousness of the Defendants, the contempt actions, the separate civil case, the Grandparents have apparently gifted to the Mother her cost of pursuing all of the litigation. She’s also not ordered to pay any child support at this time based on things I’ve already said.
I am awarding the full amount of outstanding Best Interest Attorney fees and requiring that the Defendants, Margaret [Walsh] and Melanie Eitelman, be jointly and severally responsible for the $9,850.00.
The judge made no further findings of fact as to the financial resources and needs of the parties, or whether the parties were substantially justified in maintaining and defending their respective causes of action. The court entered a written order memorializing its fee assessment on February 6, 2025, and on February 14, Mother and Grandmother filed a motion to alter or amend the assessment. While the motion was pending, the court entered an order on March 11 removing Grandmother as a party to the case, and thereafter denied Mother’s motion to alter or amend on March 19.
“A court order providing that one of the parties involved in a custody dispute pay counsel fees to a best interest attorney is clearly authorized by statute.” Meyr, 195 Md. App. at 555.
Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article provides, in relevant part:
(a) In an action in which custody, visitation rights, or the amount of support of a minor child is contested, the court may:
(1)(ii) appoint a lawyer who shall serve as a best interest attorney to represent the minor child and who may not represent any party to the action; and (2) impose counsel fees against one or more parties to the action.
“Thus the statute expressly provides that the court may, in its discretion, impose attorney’s fees against either or both parties as is just and proper under the circumstances.” Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 200 Md. App. 126, 137 (2011). However, the court “ought to state the basis for [its] decision so it can
be reviewed, if necessary, on appeal.” Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. App. 577, 589 (1986).
Section 1-202 alone does not set forth specific factors to consider in apportioning attorneys’ fees between the parties, but Maryland courts generally apply the factors set forth in Section 12-103(b) of the Family Law Article. Meyr, 195 Md. App. at 555–56 (“This statute, . . . does not set forth the specific factors that a court should consider in awarding counsel fees for a best interest attorney. The Court of Appeals has indicated, however, that the factors set forth in F.L. § 12-103(b), are relevant to the analysis.”). “Section 12-103 contemplates a systematic review of economic indicators in the assessment of the financial status and needs of the parties, as well as a determination of entitlement to attorneys’ fees based upon a review of the substantial justification of each of the parties’ positions in the litigation, mitigated by a review of reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees.” Davis v. Petito, 425 Md. 191, 206 (2012).
When assessing fees, the court need not specifically recite the statutory factors so long as “the evidence in the record indicates that the court engaged in the requisite analysis.”
Sayed A. v. Susan A., 265 Md. App. 40, 90 (2025). See, e.g., Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 179 (2012) (vacating an award of the best interest attorneys’ fees where there was “no indication that the court expressly considered any of the factors listed in FL § 12-103(b)”); Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. at 432–33 (remanding for a determination of attorneys’ fees in accordance with the statute where “the trial court failed to make findings of fact to justify the award of attorney’s fees”); Painter v. Painter, 113 Md. App. 504, 528–29 (1997) (vacating an attorneys’ fee award where the court was “unable to discern whether the trial court considered the then current ability of appellant to pay counsel fees” and could not “discern upon which basis the award of counsel fees was made”).
Turning to the case sub judice, it is unclear from the record that which the trial court relied upon in determining that Mother and Grandmother would be fully liable for all of Mr. Little’s outstanding fees. As such, we cannot properly review the decision. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. at 179 (“Because the court did not state the basis for its determination, however, we are unable to properly review the decision.”).
We vacate the trial court’s order assessing the Best Interest Attorney’s fees against Mother and remand for the court to make the requisite findings and reconsider its assessment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County modifying custody is vacated only as to child support and affirmed in all other respects. The order granting fees for the Best Interest Attorney is separately vacated as to Mother and remanded for reconsideration.10
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY MODIFYING CUSTODY ARE AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO CHILD SUPPORT. ORDERS GRANTING FEES FOR BEST INTEREST ATTORNEY VACATED AS TO APPELLANT AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
1 The questions as presented by the Appellant are:
FOOTNOTES
I. Whether the Court committed reversible error of law by admitting and relying on the expert report and opinion of Dr. Lefkowits because the expert report and opinions violates the Daubert principles and furthermore his custody recommendations exceed the scope of the Court Ordered psychological evaluation?
II. Whether the Court committed reversible error of law by ordering the Appellant’s visitation be supervised, at all times, when the Appellee did not file a pleading requesting supervised visitation?
III. Whether the Court committed reversible error by assessing 100% of the costs for Best Interest Attorney to Appellant?
IV. Whether the Court committed reversible error by not considering Appellant’s request for child support?
V. Whether the Court committed reversible error in failing to find Appellee in contempt for not abiding by the in-place custody order during the pendency of the custody modification proceeding?
VI. Whether the Court committed reversible error in failing to provide for a specific Summer and Holiday schedule and reducing Appellant’s visitation from the current court order
2 Margaret Walsh, referred to herein as “Grandmother,” did not appeal the trial court’s Best Interest Attorney fee assessment nor the denial of the motion she and Appellant filed to alter or amend the assessment. Grandmother was a party to the action when the fees were initially assessed on February 6, 2025. The motion she and Appellant filed to alter or amend the assessment of the Best Interest Attorney’s fees was filed on February 14. Grandmother’s motion to be removed as a party was granted on March 11. The motion to alter or amend was denied on March 19. As a result, the fee assessment against Grandmother remains as a judgment.
3 “DSM-5” refers to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a manual published by the American Psychiatric Association to diagnose mental disorders by providing criteria for symptoms. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR), Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, https://perma.cc/RQ53-UTM4.
4 Based on the invoice attached to Mr. Little’s motion, he spent a total of 73.4 hours working on this matter and incurred a total of $17,850 in fees. At the time the motion was filed, Father and Grandmother had each already paid $4,000 toward those fees.
5 The DSM-5, which Mother relied upon in her post hoc Daubert challenge, does not create a required methodology for psychological evaluations. When asked at oral argument for support for the assertion that the DSM-5 creates a standard of reliability for psychological evaluations, Mother’s counsel could point to none; likewise, we have found none. The DSM-5 itself cautions against its use in legal proceedings, saying that, “the definition of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health professionals, and research investigators rather than the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at 29 (5th ed., text rev. 2022).
6 Mother’s expert, Dr. Patrick Harmon, diagnosed Mother with “bipolar 1 disorder, currently in full sustained remission[,]”and opined that, “there is no reason to question her ability to participate in the normal activities and relationships that one might have during this stage of their life. She has the ability to succeed in a career of her choosing. She is capable of excelling as a parent or a relational partner.”
7 It is important to note that the trial court here ordered that “child support for the Minor Children shall be charged generally among [Father] and [Mother.]” Our Supreme Court recently has held that such “general charges” of child support, unless followed by the applicable child support framework, “violate the mandatory nature of the child support guidelines and potentially the child’s right to child support.” Matter of Marriage of Houser, 490 Md. 592, 623 n.20 (2025).
8 It is unclear whether the trial judge applied the child support guidelines at all in this case. When asked by Mother’s counsel, Linda M. Brown, Esq., at the February 6 hearing, the following exchange occurred:
MS. BROWN: Okay. And then the other thing is did you run child support guidelines?
THE COURT: Umm, maybe back at the time of the hearing. MS. BROWN: Okay, do you have a copy of those guidelines? THE COURT: Did you submit them?
MS. BROWN: I thought I did. I had run them before.
THE COURT: All right. I don’t know the answer to your question, Ms. Brown.
MS. BROWN: Okay. So, child support—I mean you indicated to—to the opposing counsel that child support was denied, so I did want have you look [sic] at those guidelines.
THE COURT: I did indicate that it is denied at this time.
MS. BROWN: Okay. And you didn’t run child support guidelines? THE COURT: I didn’t say that.
9 Mother reported a monthly income of $1,535.78. Father reported a monthly income of $10,850.00.
10 In our mandate, we have separated the order granting the Best Interest Attorney’s fees, because assessment of the Best Interest Attorney’s fees was collateral to the merits of the modification of child custody and child support issues; the court’s order assessing the $9,850.00 in fees against Mother and Grandmother, then, was independently appealable from the court’s March 11 order on the merits. See Blake v. Blake, 341 Md. 326, 336 (1996). Moreover, an order for the payment of money, such as attorneys’ fees in a domestic case, may be considered an interlocutory order immediately appealable under Section 12-303(3)(v) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 582 (1990).
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s termination of mother’s parental rights as to one of her children. The child participated in therapy, was still suffering severe trauma years after witnessing mother’s assault on her sister and her therapist never recommended starting family therapy. The juvenile court found that no amount of services from the Department would have changed these facts, and that it was not in the child’s best interest to wait any longer.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Removal of Children from Mother’s Custody
Mother suffers from bipolar disorder, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Mother takes medication for her diagnoses but was “unmedicated” for a time around January 9, 2023. On that night, Mother and Mo. got into an argument about Mo. cutting up Mo.’s jeans with a knife and scissors. The argument escalated and turned physical, culminating in Mother pinning Mo. against the wall by her neck while holding the knife. M.J.-P. witnessed the fight, ran to her room, and called 911. At that point, Ma. jumped on Mother’s back, hitting and disarming her. Mo. and Ma. were able to run to M.J.-P.’s bedroom and barricade the door until the police arrived.
Once the police arrived, they arrested Mother and charged her with first- and second-degree assault. The girls were placed with Maternal Grandmother. The next day, Mother was ordered to be held without bail and not to have contact with the children.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County, sitting as a juvenile court, terminated the parental rights of appellant D.P. (“Mother”) with respect to one of her children, M.J.-P., and granted guardianship to the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (“the Department”). Mother appealed and presents two questions for our review, which we have divided into three, reordered, and rephrased for clarity:1
I. Did the court err in finding it was futile for the Department to offer services to facilitate reunification?
II. Did the court err in considering M.J.-P.’s feelings about terminating the parental relationship?
III. Did the court err in explaining its conclusion that exceptional circumstances existed that made continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to M.J.-P.’s best interest?
For the reasons below, we shall affirm.
BACKGROUND 2
Mother has three daughters: Mo. and Ma., twin girls born in June 2008, and M.J.-P., born in November 2014.3 M.J.-P. and her sisters have different fathers. M.J.-P.’s father died when she was five years old. For the next several years, Mother raised her daughters alone, except for a period in 2022 when she received treatment at a mental health hospital. During that time, the three girls lived with their maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”). There was no evidence of Child Protective Services involvement with the family until January 2023.
CINA Proceedings 4
Maternal Grandmother could not care for M.J.-P. alone, so the Department placed M.J.-P. in shelter care with her paternal grandmother (“Paternal Grandmother”).5 After a hearing, the juvenile court continued M.J.-P.’s shelter care placement.
On February 24, 2023, the juvenile court held adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. Mother, who was still detained at the detention center, did not participate in the hearings. The juvenile court ultimately declared M.J.-P. to be a CINA on March 7, 2023, and awarded custody to the Department. The court continued to prohibit any contact between Mother and M.J.-P. M.J.-P. remained with Paternal Grandmother, who had support and help from M.J.-P.’s paternal aunt (“Aunt”), a retired nurse who lives next door to Paternal Grandmother. Aunt described M.J.-P. as “emotionally dysregulated” when she was first placed with her paternal relatives. If she heard a noise outside, she would “go into a wall and cry and be scared and it would take a while for her to calm down and her heart rate to slow and just to reassure her.” M.J.-P. regularly expressed to Aunt she was “terrified” that Mother would come and get her, and she had nightmares about that occurring. On February 23, 2023, M.J.-P. started therapy. Once she resided with Paternal Grandmother, M.J.-P. was enrolled in the local elementary school.
First Review Period
Through the first CINA review period, Mother remained detained at the Baltimore County Detention Center. She was
held in seclusion, placed on suicide watch, and not allowed to leave her cell. During this time, the Department was unable to contact Mother and did not receive any updates or information about her mental health treatment. At the initial CINA review hearing on July 10, 2023, which Mother attended, the juvenile court adopted a permanency plan of reunification concurrent with placement with a relative for custody and guardianship. The court continued its no-contact order and also ordered Mother to complete a psychological and psychiatric evaluation, to release that evaluation to the Department, and to maintain contact with the Department.
Second Review Period
During the second CINA review period, Mother was transferred from the detention center to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”), a maximum-security psychiatric facility. The Department continued its efforts to receive updates regarding Mother’s mental health and the status of her criminal case. At some point during her time at Perkins, Mother was found not competent to stand trial.
M.J.-P. continued to do well with Paternal Grandmother, but she feared Mother regaining custody and had difficulty discussing her trauma with her therapist. At the time of the review hearing on November 3, 2023, Paternal Grandmother was searching for a new therapist who could assist M.J.-P. with processing her feelings toward Mother. After the hearing, the juvenile court continued M.J.-P’s concurrent permanency plans and its no-contact order.
Third Review Period
Throughout the third CINA review period, Mother communicated with the Department several times per month to provide updates on her treatment and to receive updates about M.J.-P.’s health and education. During this time, the Department also connected with Mother’s assigned social worker at Perkins, who reported that Mother had made significant progress since entering the facility: she was taking her medication, participating in groups, and completing her evaluations. According to Mother, the team at Perkins was supportive and knowledgeable, which she believed helped rehabilitate and stabilize her mental health.
In this period, M.J.-P. was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome (EDS) and orthostatic intolerance. To address her conditions, M.J.-P. started seeing a host of specialists, including a rheumatologist, geneticist, cardiologist, neurologist, gastroenterologist, speech therapist, and physical therapist. She also started seeing a therapist at school, with whom the Department collaborated to find the best ways to move forward addressing M.J.-P.’s fears regarding her maternal family and having contact with Mother.
Since M.J.-P.’s placement with Paternal Grandmother, Aunt had taken on the responsibility of caring for M.J.-P. Aunt provided additional childcare and supervision when needed, maintained contact with M.J.-P.’s school, and transported her to various doctor’s appointments. On December 25, 2023, the Department placed M.J.-P. with Aunt.
After a hearing on February 2, 2024, the juvenile court again continued M.J.-P.’s concurrent permanency plans and its no-contact order.
Fourth Review Period
On April 16, 2024, Mother pleaded guilty to second-degree assault of Mo. She remained at Perkins until her sentencing and maintained contact with the Department throughout her stay. When direct contact was not possible, Mother and the Department communicated through Maternal Grandmother. On June 17, 2024, the circuit court sentenced Mother to ten years’ incarceration, all but time served suspended, and placed her on five years of unsupervised probation. The sentence also required Mother to comply with her medical and psychiatric needs and forbade her from contacting her daughters. The same day Mother was released from Perkins, she left Maryland and moved to Florida to care for her father. She did not advise the Department that she planned to relocate and did not immediately update the Department after she moved.
M.J.-P. continued exhibiting significant anxiety about maintaining contact with maternal family members and refused to have any contact with Mother. In May 2024, she transitioned from her regular therapist to a trauma therapist. Overall, though, M.J.-P. was happy living with Aunt and told the Department that she wanted Aunt to adopt her.
After a hearing on July 1, 2024, the juvenile court changed M.J.-P.’s permanency plan to a sole plan of adoption by a relative. In line with Mother’s sentence, the no-contact order remained in place.
Fifth Review Period
On August 2, 2024, Mother moved to modify the nocontact provision of her sentence. The court granted her motion on August 23, 2024, and modified Mother’s probation to allow contact with M.J.-P., but only if “therapeutically recommended” and only as permitted in the CINA proceeding. A few days later, Mother moved, in the CINA case, to be allowed weekly, one-hour in-person or virtual visitation with M.J.-P. The Department, joined by M.J.-P.’s counsel, opposed. On September 13, 2024, the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion, concluding that “[i]t [was] not in [M.J.-P.’s] best interest to have visitation with [Mother] at th[at] time.” Mother still communicated with the Department throughout this period, seeking information about M.J.-P., and noting her concern about M.J.-P.’s unwillingness to have contact.
M.J.-P. continued to thrive in school during this time and remained in weekly trauma therapy. She had developed a strong bond with Aunt and still wanted Aunt to adopt her. After a hearing on December 2, 2024, the juvenile court continued M.J.-P.’s permanency plan of adoption by a relative. The court also authorized liberal and supervised visitation between Mother and M.J.-P. “when therapeutically appropriate and at the discretion of [M.J.-P.].”
Termination of Parental Rights
Within the fifth review period, on September 3, 2024, the Department petitioned for guardianship of M.J.-P., with the right to consent to adoption or long-term care. The court held a remote termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing on the Department’s petition on February 27 and April 15 and 16, 2025. M.J.-P. was nine years old at the time of the hearing and had been in foster care for just over two years. The court
heard testimony from Mother, Aunt, and Candace DeShields, an adoption social worker. All three witnesses, including Mother, were called by the Department.
Mother’s Status
On the first hearing date, Mother still lived in Florida, but she returned to Maryland a few days later in March 2025. She remained on the same medications she had been prescribed at Perkins, which she felt were effective. After moving to Florida, Mother had also, of her own accord, sought mental health treatment from a provider in Miami. In her view, she was now doing well with her mental health when on medication.
During her testimony, Mother was frustrated about the focus on the fallout from her assault of Mo. rather than on her parenting before then: “No one’s looking at that part. They’re just looking at the incident that happened and I paid and did my time for that incident, and I’ve been rehabilitated. So, the concern should be lower than it was because I’m doing good.” When asked about how she thought M.J.-P. was affected by the incident, Mother stated she thought it would have “very little” impact on M.J.-P. “if she was back around her sisters and [Mother].” On cross-examination by M.J.-P.’s counsel, Mother clarified why: “She wasn’t participating in any of it. And she wasn’t crying or anything when it happened. So, I feel that it was very little. She was probably traumatized a little bit but, you know, I’m not a doctor.” In Mother’s view, if M.J.-P. was fully informed about Mother’s mental health progress and medication, it “would ease [M.J.-P.’s] mind a bit not to be scared of [Mother] or have anxiety.”
Mother confirmed that she had remained in compliance with the no-contact order. She testified that seeing M.J.-P. was her first desire after being released from Perkins, but she did not want to violate the court’s order. Mother explained that she had not asked to visit with M.J.-P. “because they say she’s not ready for it.” She agreed that M.J.-P.’s opinion as to whether she should see Mother was important.
Finally, Mother testified about the lack of services offered by the Department. She was never service planned, and the Department did not even try to service plan her until December 2024—after it had already petitioned to terminate her parental rights. Mother did not know whether she could have received services while incarcerated, and she conceded that moving to Florida may have impeded the Department’s providing services. She hoped that, on her return to Maryland, she could enroll in some services, such as reparenting classes, though she admitted that she did not request parenting classes from the Department until the first day of the TPR hearing. Mother was also adamant that family therapy would help reunite her with M.J.-P. Even so, she was willing to give M.J.-P. more time if she needed it. Ultimately, however, the Department never provided any services to Mother.
M.J.-P.’s Status
Aunt testified that M.J.-P. had been thriving in her care. When M.J.-P. first came into Aunt’s care, she “was very scared” and “unsure about everything.” She was “[v]ery reactive” and “would have emotional responses that were
stronger than what seemed to be called for.” Aunt explained that M.J.-P., through her trauma therapy, had learned healthy coping mechanisms for when she gets scared. Aunt described M.J.-P. as “very happy.” She “loves to go to school,” “loves art,” “loves to cook and bake,” and “loves to go outside and play.” M.J.-P. calls Aunt’s house her house and is “very comfortable” in her home.
Aunt took M.J.-P. to all of her medical appointments. M.J.-P. had thirteen standing monthly appointments: in addition to the specialists that she saw for her EDS and orthostatic intolerance, M.J.-P. went to weekly trauma therapy, physical therapy twice per week, and an orthodontist once per month. Aunt did not believe that M.J.-P.’s physical medical health had been addressed before she came into Aunt’s care.
Aunt testified that M.J.-P. is “very, very vocal” about what she is afraid of: “She’s terrified that [] Mother is gonna come and get her. She has a lot of nightmares about that.” She explained that M.J.-P. had the same emotional issues as when she was removed, just not to the same degree. Despite some progress, however, M.J.-P. still did not want to talk about Mother. Aunt stated that M.J.-P. did not like even being told when hearings are: “It sets her back. It causes her to have bad dreams.” According to Aunt, every time M.J.-P. heard about Mother or the case, she wet her bed.
Thus, Aunt left it up to M.J.-P.’s trauma therapist to discuss Mother with her. Aunt spoke to M.J.-P. about Mother only when M.J.-P. brought it up. She described those conversations as “more of [M.J.-P.] need[ing] somebody to talk to about the things that happened to her” and explained they occur “usually when [M.J.-P.] wakes up from nightmares.”
The only notable progress that M.J.-P. had made regarding Mother was agreeing to send Mother a yearly update with a photograph. But, according to Aunt, any time a social worker asked M.J.-P. if she wanted to see Mother, “it sets her back.” Aunt did not believe that informing M.J.-P. of Mother’s mental health treatment would ease her fears.
Expert Testimony
The juvenile court, over Mother’s objection, accepted Ms. DeShields as an expert in trauma-informed care and bonding. Ms. DeShields explained that her main concern with returning M.J.-P. to Mother was Mother’s “ongoing mental health history.” Although Mother reported she was in treatment, Ms. DeShields observed that Mother’s history of crises, which sometimes forced her to leave the home, showed a lack of ability to properly care for M.J.-P. and her sisters. Further, having witnessed Mother’s testimony, Ms. DeShields noted that Mother still refused to “fully acknowledge the extent of everything that occurred” and minimized “her role and responsibility” in the assault and its effect on M.J.-P. This, in Ms. DeShields’s view, showed a “lack of accountability” that made Ms. DeShields “concerned that a situation like that could possibly happen again[.]”
Ms. DeShields also explained that the Department had not been able to effectively service plan with Mother. She elaborated that “service plans are areas of focus for the case of what the parents will be working on with the Department to, hopefully, gain stability with their needs and, hopefully, get on track to reunify with the child, if possible.” The
Department could not service plan with Mother because she was first incarcerated and then moved out of state.
Ms. DeShields echoed Aunt’s testimony about M.J.-P.’s reaction to discussion about Mother and confirmed that it was “not exaggeration . . . [that] the mention of [] Mother’s name causes physical distress.” Ms. DeShields explained that “anything referring to [] Mother” causes M.J.-P. “physical observable issues that are left for [Aunt] to deal with . . . [and] take[s] [M.J.-P.] days to process and get through [and which] she continues to work on in therapy.” Although she acknowledged there were services that could support Mother, Ms. DeShields did not know if those services would affect Mother’s “ability to properly care for [her daughters].” And in any event, based on M.J.-P.’s continued reaction to any mention of Mother, Ms. DeShields opined that “having any services where [Mother and M.J.-P.] could possibly engage, communicate, or anything, [was] just not appropriate.”
As for the care M.J.-P. was receiving from Aunt, Ms. DeShields had no concerns. She noted that M.J.-P. had substantial needs related to her medical and mental health and that Aunt ensured those were all addressed. Overall, Ms. DeShields observed that M.J.-P. was “very, very happy in her placement” and “would love to be adopted.” She expressed that removing M.J.-P. from Aunt to a “home where it’s obvious that she does not feel all those positive feelings towards the caregiver w[ould] be detrimental and cause great harm to her.”
Court’s Ruling
On April 16, 2025, the juvenile court granted the Department’s petition and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The court prefaced its oral ruling by saying that it found “no basis to deem [Mother] unfit” as a parent. Instead, the court “view[ed] this to be exceptional circumstances exclusively and thus, everything I am about to say is within the guise of exceptional circumstances.” The court proceeded to make findings of fact and discussed in detail all the factors in Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (“FL”) § 5-323(d), which we have reordered sequentially and set forth below:
FL § 5-323(d)(1)(i) required the court to consider all services offered to Mother before M.J.-P.’s placement. The court found this factor “inapplicable because there was no reason for the Department to provide services prior to placement[.]” “[T]he incident which precipitated this . . . was unforeseen and unforeseeable.”
FL § 5-323(d)(1)(ii) required the juvenile court to consider the extent, nature, and timeliness of the services offered by the Department to facilitate the reunification of M.J.-P. with Mother. The court found that “the Department made no[—] or minimal beyond the word no[—]efforts on reunification.” That said, the court ultimately found that it would have been futile for the Department to offer any services. It explained that “the five-star issue between parent and child was Mother’s mental health.” The court observed that, before moving to Florida, the “much more profound issues” related to Mother’s mental health “were being addressed independently of anything the Department could only recommend.” At Perkins, the court noted, Mother received “intensive treatment [from] the best professionals in the State.” And although the court
acknowledged that the Department could have done more upon Mother’s release in June of 2024, it recognized that Mother’s failure to promptly contact the Department upon moving to Florida was a contributing factor. Moreover, the court was not convinced that even “the provision of every effort in the world as to Mother, would facilitate reunion as to a child who has bad dreams and wets the bed upon mention of [] Mother’s name.”
FL § 5-323(d)(1)(iii) required the court to consider the extent to which the Department and Mother fulfilled their obligations under any social services agreement. There was no evidence of a social services agreement here, so the court found this factor inapplicable.
FL
§ 5-323(d)(2)(i) required the court to consider the extent to which Mother maintained regular contact with M.J.-P., the Department, and if feasible, M.J.-P.’s caregiver. The court observed that there were periods with no contact between Mother and the Department while she was incarcerated and in mental health treatment. The court also explained that it would not hold Mother’s move to Florida against her. It noted, however, that Mother did not contact the Department immediately upon relocating and that it factored her delayed communication into other areas of its analysis. As for contact with M.J.-P., the court found that there had been no contact between Mother and M.J.-P. The court noted that this was initially due to a court order, but when that order was modified, it was modified to permit contact if therapeutically recommended, which it was not.
FL § 5-323(d)(2)(ii) required the court to consider Mother’s contribution to a reasonable part of M.J.-P.’s care and support, if she was financially able to do so. The court found that there was “no evidence of any financial contribution.” The court explained, however, that, “recognizing the financial position in which Mother is and has been in,” it would not hold this lack of evidence against her.
FL § 5-323(d)(2)(iii) required the court to consider the existence of a parental disability that makes Mother consistently unable to care for M.J.-P.’s immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs for long periods of time. The court found “no evidence of a parental disability . . . other than [Mother’s] mental health issues[,]” which the court discussed elsewhere.
FL § 5-323(d)(2)(iv) required the court to consider whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment so that M.J.-P. could be returned to Mother within an ascertainable time not to exceed 18 months from the date of placement, unless the court makes a specific finding that it is in M.J.-P.’s best interests to extend the time for a specific period. The court observed that, by the time of the hearing, it had already been more than 18 months since M.J.-P.’s original placement, and nearly 18 months since she had been placed with Aunt. Yet M.J.-P. still was not “in a position where [] Mother’s name can be mentioned without traumatic effect[.]” The court also “d[id] not believe [Mother] appreciate[d] the gravity of the circumstances into which M.J.-P. has been placed by her conduct.” The court found “that there ha[d] been an utter failure to appreciate the gravity of the circumstances and, thus, without appreciating the gravity and the impact, there can be no amelioration.”
The court could not “fix any amount of time in which additional services would likely bring about a lasting parental adjustment.” Even if it forecasted 18 months from the hearing, the court did not believe M.J.-P. could go from “ha[ving] traumatic effects of bad dreams and bed wetting just upon mention of the prospect of a court hearing in this case to [] thriving and well-adjusted within [] Mother’s care and custody.” The court found “zero basis to think that[ was] achievable,” with or without additional services, “[l]et alone within an ascertainable time.”
FL § 5-323(d)(3)(i) required the court to consider whether Mother had abused or neglected M.J.-P. or a minor and the seriousness of that abuse or neglect. The court found that Mother had assaulted a child, “M.J.-P.’s sister, in M.J.-P.’s presence, causing the girls to run to a separate bedroom, [and] barricade themselves therein.” The court found that this abuse of a minor was serious and that “[t]he family trauma within the home also has had a direct and a profound impact on M.J.-P.”
FL § 5-323(d)(3)(ii) required the court to consider whether M.J.-P. was a substance-exposed newborn. The court found this factor inapplicable.
FL § 5-323(d)(3)(iii) required the court to consider whether Mother subjected M.J.-P. to chronic abuse or neglect. The court found there was no evidence of this factor.
FL § 5-323(d)(3)(iv) required the court to consider whether Mother had been convicted of a crime of violence against her children. The court found that this factor did not weigh against Mother because second-degree assault is not a crime of violence under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 14-101(a). Even so, the court “w[ould] not ignore that it is a violent crime . . . and w[ould] factor it in as appropriate[] in other factors[.]”
FL § 5-323(d)(3)(v) required the court to consider whether Mother had involuntarily lost parental rights to one of M.J.-P.’s siblings. The court found there was no evidence to support this factor.
FL § 5-323(d)(4)(i) required the court to consider M.J.-P.’s emotional ties with and feelings toward Mother, her siblings, and others who may affect her best interests significantly. The court found that M.J.-P. had developed a strong bond with Aunt and loved living with her. M.J.-P’s feelings toward Mother, on the other hand, were fearful. The court observed that, even two years after the incident, M.J.-P. was “traumatized at the very mention of [] Mother. Not at her return to care, not at living with [] Mother, but at the very mention of [] Mother’s name.”
FL § 5-323(d)(4)(ii) required the court to consider M.J.P.’s adjustment to community, home, placement, and school. The court found “that M.J.-P. is well adjusted and thriving in her current placement.” She “has a welcoming home, an aunt that’s caring for her,” and “has adjusted well to the community.” The court further found that M.J.-P. was “being cared for[,]” that she was “thriving in school” and “with the animals she cares for[,]” and that, by all accounts, she loves her current placement.
FL § 5-323(d)(4)(iii) required the court to consider M.J.-P.’s feelings about severing the parent-child relationship. Based on the physical response she experienced at the mention of Mother and her consistent refusal of visitation, the court
found that M.J.-P. had no desire to continue her relationship with Mother.
Finally, FL § 5-323(d)(4)(iv) required the court to consider the likely impact of terminating parental rights on M.J.-P.’s well-being. The court found that terminating parental rights would allow M.J.-P.’s “wellbeing to continue to thrive.” In contrast, the court found that failure to do so “would only exacerbate the uncertainty, exacerbate [M.J.-P.’s] profound reaction to the prospect of reunification with [] Mother.”
Based on its findings, the juvenile court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that exceptional circumstances existed and that it was in M.J.-P.’s best interest that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. It explained:
I cannot ignore, nor will I, the efforts here, but I cannot, nor will I, that they would be concurrent to addressing profound issues being addressed elsewhere. I cannot ignore, nor would I, the position that M.J.-P. is in vis-à-vis Mother, and I cannot ignore, nor will I, the factors under [§ 5-323(d)(4)(iii) and (iv)], the child’s feelings nor the likely impact of terminating parental rights in the child, or in this case, the impact of failing to terminate parental rights.
I also cannot ignore, nor will I, that the child is still a CINA and the CINA case is extant, and that she will not be, if I was to deny the petition, it would not be return to custody of the Mother; it would be a continuation of the now temporary related placement with the aunt.
It would only exacerbate and extend that which the statute instructs [] [w]e are to [] shield [against] which is the limbo of a child in placement. It would only extend and exacerbate the uncertainty in an area in which the statute has shown we need certainty. It would only extend and show the lack of permanence in the child’s life in the area in which we have been instructed demands permanence.
The same day, the court entered a written order consistent with its oral ruling. This appeal followed. We include additional facts in our discussion of the issues.
TPR FRAMEWORK
“Parents have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to ‘make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.’” In re Adoption/Guardianship of C.E., 464 Md. 26, 48 (2019) (citation omitted). To harmonize these rights with “the State’s interest in protecting children,” our “General Assembly has established a legal framework to assess whether it is in a child’s best interests to terminate parental rights that balances the child’s best interests and the appropriate protection for parental rights.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 216 (2018). “The statutory scheme for terminating parental rights has ‘three critical elements in . . . balance that serve to give heightened protection to parental rights in the TPR context.’” Id. at 217 (citation omitted). The termination of parental rights constitutes a total rescission of the legal relationship between a parent and child and is
generally final. Id. at 218.
First, “there is ‘a presumption of law and fact [] that it is in the best interest of children to remain in the care and custody of their parents.’” Id. at 216 (citation omitted). The presumption in favor of parental custody may be rebutted only by “showing that the parent is either unfit [to continue the parental relationship] or that exceptional circumstances exist that would make the continued relationship detrimental to the child’s best interest.” Id. at 217 (citation omitted).
Second, the State is subject to a higher burden of proof in the TPR context than in standard custody cases: “[i]t must establish unfitness or exceptional circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 218. “Third, the General Assembly provide[s] factors that the juvenile court must expressly consider in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest.” C.E., 464 Md. at 50
The exceptional circumstances prong is a separate legal conclusion from unfitness and requires a separate inquiry. Id. at 54. “If a juvenile court deems a parent fit, then the juvenile court is required to examine whether any exceptional circumstances exist that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interests of the child.” Id. The court here expressly found that that there was no basis to find Mother an unfit parent. We shall therefore focus our discussion on exceptional circumstances.
“An exceptional circumstances analysis must turn on whether the presence—or absence—of particular facts and circumstances makes continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the child’s best interests.” H.W., 460 Md. at 231. “In addition to being mandatory considerations prior to a termination of parental rights, the factors outlined in FL § 5-323 also serve ‘as criteria for determining the kinds of exceptional circumstances that would suffice to rebut the presumption favoring a continued parental relationship and justify termination of that relationship.’” In re Adoption/ Guardianship of C.A. & D.A.¸ 234 Md. App. 30, 50 (2017) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 499 (2007)).
The Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that the § 5-323(d) factors “are divided by topic and include consideration of”:
(1) the services that the Department has offered to assist in achieving reunification of the child with the parents; (2) the results of the parent’s effort to adjust their behaviors so that the child can return home; (3) the existence and severity of aggravating circumstances; [and] (4) the child’s emotional ties, feelings, and adjustment to community and placement and the child’s general well-being.
C.E., 464 Md. at 51.
Other criteria relevant to an exceptional circumstances determination include: [T]he length of time that the child has been with [their] adoptive parents; the strength of the bond between the child and the adoptive parent; the relative stability of the child’s future with the parent; the age of the child at placement; the emotional effect of the adoption on the child; the effect on the child’s stability of maintaining
the parental relationship; whether the parent abandoned or failed to support or visit with the child; and, the behavior and character of the parent, including the parent’s stability with regard to employment, housing, and compliance with the law.
C.A. & D.A., 234 Md. App. at 50 (citing In re Adoption/ Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 562–64 (1994)).
None of the factors necessarily receives more weight than another, nor is it “necessary that every factor apply, or even be found, in every case.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of Jasmine D., 217 Md. App. 718, 737 (2014). Moreover, “exceptional circumstances do not, by themselves, mandate a decision to terminate parental rights[,]” but only “demonstrate that the presumption favoring the parent has been overcome.” H.W., 460 Md. at 218. The ultimate decision of whether to terminate parental rights “must always revolve around the best interests of the child.” Id. at 218–19 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
To that end, the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that:
The [juvenile] court’s role in TPR cases is to give the most careful consideration to the relevant statutory factors, to make specific findings based on the evidence with respect to each of them, and, mindful of the presumption favoring a continuation of the parental relationship, determine expressly whether those findings suffice either to show an unfitness on the part of the parent to remain in a parental relationship with the child or to constitute an exceptional circumstance that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child, and, if so, how. If the court does that—articulates its conclusion as to the best interest of the child in that manner—the parental rights we have recognized and the statutory basis for terminating those rights are in proper and harmonious balance.
Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 501. This harmonizing, the Court later emphasized, “should be the touchstone for courts in TPR cases.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 111 (2010).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Termination of parental rights decisions are reviewed under three interrelated standards: clear error review for factual findings, de novo review for legal conclusions, and abuse of discretion for the juvenile court’s ultimate decision.” In re K.H., 253 Md. App. 134, 156 (2021). In evaluating the court’s findings of fact, we must give “the greatest respect” to the court’s opportunity to view and assess witness testimony and evidence. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Amber R., 417 Md. 701, 719 (2011). “[W]e must assume the truth of all the evidence, and of all of the favorable inferences fairly deducible therefrom, tending to support the factual conclusion of the trial court.” In re B.C., 234 Md. App. 698, 708 (2017) (citation omitted). “A trial court’s findings are ‘not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence
in the record to support the court’s conclusion.’” Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 372 (2019) (quoting Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 628 (1996)).
“Legal conclusions of unfitness and exceptional circumstances are reviewed without deference.” C.E., 464 Md. at 47. But “when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [juvenile court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” K.H., 253 Md. App. at 156 (citation omitted). A decision will be reversed for abuse of discretion only if it is “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 583–84 (2003) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
Reasonable Efforts at Reunification
Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights after finding that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. In Mother’s view, this finding, alone, requires reversal “because [M.J.-P.’s] best interests were not served by termination when she and her mother had not first been given a chance to reunify.” We are not persuaded.
“The court is required to consider the timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by DSS or other support agencies, the social service agreements between DSS and the parents, the extent to which both parties have fulfilled their obligations under those agreements, and whether additional services would be likely to bring about a sufficient and lasting parental adjustment that would allow the child to be returned to the parent.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 500; see FL § 5-323(d)(1), (2). “Implicit in that requirement is that a reasonable level of those services, designed to address both the root causes and the effect of the problem, must be offered.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 500. The Supreme Court of Maryland has made clear, however, that there are limits to what the Department must do. Id. Where “attempts at reunification would obviously be futile, the Department need not go through the motions in offering services doomed to failure.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 117 (1994).
The juvenile court here was “cognizant” of this. The court recognized that “the root causes and the effect of the problem” were Mother’s mental health and M.J.-P.’s trauma and that any services offered by the Department would have needed to be “designed to address” those issues. See Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 500. The court found that it would have been futile for the Department to offer services to Mother during her time at Perkins because she was already receiving “intensive treatment [from] the best professionals in the State” to address her “big picture mental health items.” Likewise, M.J.P.’s trauma was being addressed independently with her own therapist.
To be sure, the court noted that the Department could have done more upon Mother’s release in June of 2024. The
court also noted, however, that Mother’s failure to promptly contact the Department upon moving to Florida was a contributing factor. In the end, the court was not convinced that even “the provision of every effort in the world as to Mother, . . . would facilitate reunion as to a child who has bad dreams and wets the bed upon mention of [] Mother’s name.” The court found “zero basis to think” any amount of services would have addressed the root causes and the effect of the problem here, “[l]et alone within an ascertainable time.” See id. at 499–500 (“What the statute appropriately looks to is whether the parent is, or within a reasonable time will be, able to care for the child in a way that does not endanger the child’s welfare.”) (emphasis added). The court effectively reasoned that the Department was not required to “go through the motions in offering services doomed to failure.” No. 10941, 335 Md. at 117.
Even so, Mother insists that the Department should have set up family therapy before her parental rights were terminated. But contact between Mother and M.J.-P. still was not therapeutically recommended by the time of the TPR hearing. Thus, if the Department had set up family therapy, it would have violated the juvenile court’s CINA Orders.
In sum, it is undisputed that M.J.-P. participated in therapy, that she was still suffering severe trauma years after witnessing Mother’s assault on her sister, and that M.J.-P.’s therapist never recommended starting family therapy. The fact that M.J.-P. had not made significant progress did not mean, as Mother seems to suggest, that the Department should have pushed forward with family therapy. The evidence instead supports an inference that the severe emotional trauma that Mother inflicted on M.J.-P. produced a wound that simply would not foreseeably heal. The juvenile court found that no amount of services from the Department would have changed this and that it was not in M.J.-P.’s best interest to wait any longer. As the court explained, it assessed “whether [it] may grant the petition where all factors weigh in favor of granting the petition, notwithstanding the fact that the Department made no or minimal . . . efforts on reunification. [I]t’s the totality of the circumstances, no one factor is dispositive.” The court did not err in terminating parental rights despite the finding that the Department had not made reasonable efforts at reunification in this case.
II.
Child’s Preference
Next, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in considering M.J.-P.’s desire that Aunt adopt her. In her view, the court should have ignored M.J.-P.’s preference because she is too young to understand the significance of the decision. Again, we are not persuaded.
Although this Court has held that “[i]t cannot be left up to the unfettered discretion of . . . five-year old children whether to visit with their mother,” we recognize also that factoring the child’s wishes into the analysis may be reasonable to prevent children from being “physically forced, kicking and screaming, into their mother’s presence[.]” In re Barry E., 107 Md. App. 206, 220–21 (1995). Indeed, in the TPR context, a juvenile court is required to consider “the child’s feelings about severance of the parent-child relationship[.]” FL §
5-323(d)(4)(iii). The General Assembly did not carve out any exceptions based on the child’s age. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in considering M.J.-P.’s desire that Aunt adopt her.
III.
Exceptional Circumstances
Finally, Mother contends that the juvenile court failed to adequately articulate its conclusion that exceptional circumstances existed. We disagree. The juvenile court considered the required factors under FL § 5-323(d) and made specific findings of fact as to each factor, which were not clearly erroneous. From these findings—all of which were either neutral or favored a termination of Mother’s parental rights—the court concluded that, under FL § 5-323(b), exceptional circumstances existed that would make a continuation of the parental relationship between Mother and M.J.-P. detrimental to M.J.-P.’s best interest and that severing Mother’s parental rights was in M.J.-P.’s best interest. Critical to its determination, the court expressly cited (1) the futility of any services that could be offered by the Department; (2) M.J.-P.’s feelings about termination,
including her lasting trauma; and (3) the impact of failing to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The court also stressed M.J.-P.’s need for permanency. It explained that denying the Department’s petition “would be a continuation of the now temporary related placement with [] [A]unt,” which “would only exacerbate and extend that which the statute instructs[] [w]e are to []shield [against] which is the limbo of a child in a placement.” See Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 501 (recognizing “that children have a right to reasonable stability in their lives and that permanent foster care is generally not a preferred option”).
Against this backdrop, we hold that the court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights based on exceptional circumstances. The court methodically and comprehensively analyzed the requisite statutory factors, made findings based on those factors that were not clearly erroneous, and applied the correct legal standard in reaching its ultimate conclusions. The court’s findings provided ample evidence from which it could conclude that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in M.J.-P.’s best interest, and the court properly linked its findings to that conclusion. We shall therefore affirm its judgment.6
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
1 The questions presented in Mother’s brief are:
FOOTNOTES
I. Did the juvenile court err in not explaining how its factual findings amounted exceptional circumstances?
II. Did the juvenile court err in concluding that there were exceptional circumstances which made it detrimental to [M.J.-P.] for her mother to continue being her legal parent?
Counsel for M.J.-P. did not file a brief and instead filed a Line, stating that M.J.-P. “does have considered judgment” and asking the Court to affirm.
2 At the outset of the TPR (termination of parental rights) trial, the juvenile court took judicial notice of certain records from M.J.-P.’s CINA case and Mother’s criminal case. The facts set out herein synthesize those records and trial testimony from this case.
3 Because this case concerns only M.J.-P., we discuss her sisters only as necessary.
4 A CINA, or “child in need of assistance,” is “a child who requires court intervention because: (1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and (2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 3-801(f).
5 “‘Shelter care’ means a temporary placement of a child outside of the home at any time before disposition” of a CINA petition. CJP § 3-801(cc).
6 Mother cites various cases to support her argument that the absence of reunification services merits reversal of a TPR. She cites various studies and articles to challenge the assumption that children who achieve permanency through adoption go on to do well. She cites several other cases to argue that the court could not find exceptional circumstances based on the length of time M.J.-P. was out of the home and M.J.-P.’s feelings about adoption. However, these cases, studies, and articles are unavailing because they do not account for the particular facts before the court in the instant case.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s child support and health insurance award, as well as its order requiring husband to pay wife attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,231.21. The case was remanded to the circuit court for the limited purpose of considering whether to award post-award attorney’s fees and, if so, in what amount.
BACKGROUND
Sarfo and Addae are the unmarried parents of a child. In 2022, Addae and the child moved from Montgomery County, Maryland, to Ottawa, Canada. Pursuant to informal agreement, Sarfo paid Addae $1,000 per month in child support. In 2023, Sarfo unilaterally reduced that to $200 biweekly and suggested that he would stop paying altogether in the future. Addae filed an action for custody1 and child support in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The circuit court ordered Sarfo to pay child support in the amount of $3,068.00 monthly, determined arrearages (and a payment schedule for those arrearages), entered an earnings withholding order, and ordered Sarfo to pay Addae’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,231.21. Sarfo noted this appeal.2 Although Sarfo has identified ten “major issues” in this informal brief,3 we have condensed and reordered them to four: jurisdiction, child support, stay, and the award of attorney’s fees. 4
DISCUSSION
Before we begin, we think it is worthwhile to explain the method and function of appellate review. We review the decisions of the circuit court to ensure that its legal rulings were legally correct and its factual determinations were reasonable. We can’t reevaluate credibility. We don’t reweigh evidence. We don’t review whether things were
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
fair. And, even if the circuit court made a mistake, we won’t reverse unless it actually harmed a party. With that in mind, we turn to the issues presented.
I. JURISDICTION
Originally, Addae’s complaint was for custody and for child support. There are separate jurisdictional standards that govern these two aspects of the case. Jurisdiction in a child custody case is governed by the Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), Section 9.5-201 of the Family Law (“FL”) article of the Maryland Code, and with exceptions that don’t apply here, generally lies exclusively in the home state of the child. See FADER’S MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 8-5 (Cynthia Callahan & Thomas C. Ries eds., 2021). By contrast, jurisdiction in a child support case is determined pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), FL § 10-304, and permits the courts of this state to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents by personal service, by consent, by former or current residence, or by the act of conceiving the child. Id.; Friedetzky v. Hsia, 223 Md. App. 723 (2015) (comparing UCCJEA and UIFSA).
When Addae dismissed her complaint for custody, the case proceeded on the issue of child support only. In this appeal, Sarfo argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case (Argument #8). When considering child support only, there can be no doubt that the court had jurisdiction under UIFSA over Sarfo, a resident of Maryland. It is also clear that the circuit court had jurisdiction over Addae and the child by their consent.5 As such, we see no error here.
II. CHILD SUPPORT
In Maryland, the amount of money that a noncustodial parent must pay to the custodial parent in child support is determined by use of the child support guidelines found in FL § 12-202. Using those guidelines, the circuit court calculated that Sarfo would be required to pay Addae $3,068 per month. Sarfo has identified four things that he thinks were wrong with the circuit court’s inputs that resulted in an erroneous child support award. We have combined and reordered these arguments, but will go through each.
A. Property in Ghana
Sarfo argues (Argument #2) that he doesn’t own the Venice View Beach Resort in Ghana—he says that he testified that it “belonged to a board and is registered in a different person’s name”—and that the circuit court erred
in determining that he is the owner. This argument cannot succeed for two reasons. First, the judge wasn’t required to believe the testimony and could reasonably believe that the “board” and the “other person” were merely fronts erected to shield the true ownership from the court’s consideration. Second, although the court counted this property as belonging to Sarfo, it did not determine that he derived any income from his ownership and therefore excluded it from the computation of Sarfo’s income. We don’t think that the circuit court erred, but even if it did, that error was harmless.
B. Sarfo’s Income
Sarfo notes that Addae testified to her belief that Sarfo’s income was around $14,440 but that the circuit court increased that to “$23,000 without showing any proof.” (Arguments #3, #10). In fact, despite Sarfo’s failure to participate in discovery, the circuit court found that Sarfo earns income from three sources in the following amounts:
from his income. Here, the circuit court took judicial notice and credited Sarfo with paying $1,200 per month in Case #169830FL. In this appeal, however, Sarfo contends that the circuit court erred by not crediting him with the payment of child support for other children, including two children living with their maternal grandmothers in Ghana (Argument #7) and a third child who was the subject of other litigation in the circuit court (Argument #4). The simple answer here is that the circuit court did not receive documentation to support those assertions and did not believe Sarfo’s testimony that he is actually making payments to support these children.6
D. Health Insurance
The circuit court credited Addae with paying $41 per month for the minor child’s health insurance. Sarfo argues that this credit is duplicative because he testified that he, too, pays for the child’s health insurance (Argument #6). To be clear, Sarfo isn’t disputing that Addae pays for health insurance. Rather, he is asserting that he too pays for insurance. There was no evidence in the record of this appeal that Sarfo makes such payments, that he provided documentation to support that he makes such payments, or that he objected to not being credited for such payments. On the state of the record before this Court, we see no basis for a ruling other than the one made by the circuit court. It is affirmed.
III. STAY
We begin by pointing out that the circuit court believed that Sarfo earns considerably more than this, pointing to several unexplained deposits to his bank accounts. Despite this, however, the circuit court did not attribute (as it might have) a higher income to Sarfo, but used the amount proven at trial—$20,358 (not $23,000)—in calculating his child support obligation.
Sarfo also complains that the circuit court failed to credit his testimony that Sarfo’s jobs, listed above, were coming to an end (Argument #5). There are, as Addae notes, two answers to this question. First, the circuit court, as the finder of fact, is entitled to credit all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011). If it did not believe Sarfo’s testimony that the jobs were ending, it didn’t have to reduce his income for the child support calculation. Second, if, in fact, Sarfo’s income does change in the future, he is entitled to seek a modification of child support. FL § 12-104. We see no error here.
C. Other Child Support Obligations
The amount that a parent is paying for child support for other children is deducted from that parent’s income. FL §§ 12-201(c)(2), 12-204(a)(2)(ii). Sarfo argues that the circuit court failed to deduct his other child support payments
Sarfo also argues (Argument #9) that the circuit court abused its discretion by “ignor[ing]” his motion to stay the child support order and wage garnishment order “even though the clerk of courts accepted the filing with no errors.” It is not plain to us precisely what Sarfo expects here. There is no merit to the suggestion that the circuit court “ignored” the motion. It considered it and explicitly denied it on the record. There is also no merit to the idea that the action of the clerk in accepting a pleading somehow binds the circuit court’s decision in any way. And finally, the standard for issuance of a stay requires an applicant to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of harm, irreparable injury, and the public interest. MD. R. 15-504(a). All Sarfo argued in support of his stay request was a vague request that these orders be stayed “pending … the outcome of the Hague international child abduction case.” That was an insufficient showing, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue such a stay.7
IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES
The circuit court ordered Sarfo to pay Addae’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,231.21. Sarfo objects to this award as violating “Maryland and Federal Law,” which, he asserts (Argument #1), requires “that everyone pays their attorney fees.” While it is certainly true that in general civil litigation, Maryland follows the so-called American Rule, which requires that parties pay their own attorney’s fees, the Maryland General Assembly has modified this rule in child support cases. FL § 12-103(a). The legislature has also provided courts with a list of mandatory
considerations to make such an award. FL § 12-103(b), (c). We have reviewed the hearing transcript, and it is clear to us that the circuit court judge knew and carefully followed the law. Moreover, Sarfo’s only complaint (besides his erroneous belief that the American Rule governs this case) is his discovery of an alleged typographical error in a date in Addae’s lawyer’s billing statement. We don’t think this minor typographical error—if proven—has any bearing on the fees assessed. We affirm this aspect of the circuit court’s order.8
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH FOOTNOTE 8 OF THIS OPINION. COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT, GEORGE APPIAH SARFO.
FOOTNOTES
1 The Complaint for custody was dismissed, as is discussed below.
2 Sarfo’s notice of appeal was likely late. Addae has not moved to dismiss the appeal on this basis, and we do not have the benefit of briefing on this issue. Regardless, because we affirm the lower court, dismissing Sarfo’s appeal as untimely would not change the result.
3 Informal briefing is permitted in cases in which at least one party is self-represented. A litigant who files an informal brief must adhere to the protocols set forth in the informal briefing administrative order. MD. R. 8-502(a)(9); Appellate Court of Maryland Administrative Order (Dec. 19, 2022), https://perma.cc/FBE6-UDUD. The informal briefing guidelines require that a brief set forth the issues on appeal, the party’s supporting arguments, and a statement of the facts. Guideline for Informal Briefs, at (b)(2) (June 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/65UM-N5GA. Sarfo’s brief, although thin, does not violate these requirements.
4 We have reproduced Sarfo’s ten claims here verbatim (including his idiosyncratic capitalization):
1. Trial Judge’s abuse of discretion and power in awarding Attorney fees of [$]16,000+ to appellee. The judge abused her discretion and disregarded Maryland and Federal Law. I, The appellant requested during Trial that everyone pays their attorney fees as per Federal/MD law. There was at least one error identified in the attorney fees attached, where a date of 2020 was used and billed, this case started in August 2023.
2. The Trial Judge wrongfully allocated a property in Ghana to me even though I had stated during trial that the property belonged to a board and is registered in a different person’s name. Trial Judge didn’t give me an order or power to go claim the property after claiming it was mine.
3. Trial Judge, Miscalculated the earnings of appellant, during the trial, the appellee stated my income was around $14,440 but trial Judge Miscalculated it and raised it to $23,000 without showing any proof.
4. Trial Judge, Ignored a pending Child Support Case (Case No[.] C-15-FM-23-004525[,] Which Precedes This case in calculating the Child Support Amount This is not in the best interest of the child.
5. The Trial Judge, Ignored the fact that those Jobs used to calculate the Child Support Amount were ending, and indeed ended whilst the trial was on-going. The Trial Court Was Notified of the Job Termination by the Employers, yet they ignored the notification and didn’t adjust the calculated amount.
6. The Trial Judge Erred on the issue of Health Insurance for the Minor, I, the Appellant, stated that the Minor Child Already has Health Insurance but Trial Judge included health insurance costs into the child support sheet calculation and ignored it by saying, Appellant didn’t mention how much it would cost to add Minor Child. There is no need to state costs if Minor Child Already has health insurance which is already in possession of the appellee.
7. The trial Judge refused to include Child Support paid to my Other Kids who are American Citizens. She mentioned there was no evidence in support of that and my oral statement is not enough. The trial Judge was bias and admitted my oral statements about my new business Byte College Without any Evidence but didn’t admit my oral statements regarding my Existing Child Support Obligation to my other US Citizen Kids.
8. As per the case filings, an initial motion of child support was brought by appellee who resides in Canada with the Minor. Later, the appellee who never appeared in court with the minor filed an amended motion for child support and full physical custody and full legal custody. During the trial, I moved for the case to be dismissed because of their physical presence in Canada for over 2 years since they left the USA and their refusal to appear in court. The Trial Judge didn’t dismiss the case but went ahead with the case and only dropped the motion for full physical custody and full legal custody.
9. The Trial Judge, abused her discretion, and when I, the appellant filed for a motion to stay the Child Support order
along with Wage Garnishment Orders, they were ignored even though the clerk of courts accepted the filings with no errors.
10. Child Support Calculations Were Wrong, and the Income To Be Used In Calculated Amount even if Job losses were not considered should have been $14,440 and not $23,000 as wrongfully stated by the Trial Judge.
5 If, at some point in the future, either of the parties wish to contest custody, that party can file a case in the appropriate jurisdiction at that time.
6 As a part of his argument, Sarfo notes the apparent inconsistency of the circuit court accepting his oral testimony regarding the amount of his income from Byte College without supporting documentation but declining to accept his oral testimony without supporting documentation regarding his child support payments. The simple answer is that the circuit judge, as finder of fact, is entitled to accept all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony. Omayaka, 417 Md. at 659. Moreover, as must be apparent, it is eminently reasonable to attribute a higher degree of credibility to statements that cost the witness than to those that benefit that witness. In any event, there is no error here.
7 We note that the child support payment awarded is for the benefit of the child. There can be no doubt that this child needs support even during the pendency of any other legal proceedings.
8 Addae has also asked this Court to award additional attorney’s fees for work performed in opposing Sarfo’s numerous post-award motions in the circuit court and in this appeal. After this case was submitted, the circuit court denied Addae’s motion for fees incurred in opposing some of Sarfo’s post-award motions. The rest of the fees are sought by Addae, for the first time, in her brief to this Court. In a child custody case such as this one, the decision of whether to award these attorney’s fees requires an in-depth factual inquiry. FL § 12-103(b). The circuit court, rather than our Court, is in the best position to make that fact-based determination. Accordingly, we remand the case to the circuit court for the limited purpose of considering whether to award post-award attorney’s fees and, if so, in what amount. See Friolo v. Frankel, 438 Md. 304, 329 (2014) (remanding for computation of appellate attorney’s fees).
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 1 (2026)
Divorce;
marital
home; monetary award
Toan Vu v. Chau Dinh
No. 0906, September Term 2024
Argued before: Berger, Nazarian, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Nazarian, J.
Filed: Nov. 7, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s judgment of absolute divorce. Although husband challenged the length of time the court took to issue its decision, the court’s order that husband transfer his interest in the marital home to wife, the denial of husband’s request for a monetary award and the denial of husband’s request for a division of wife’s retirement assets, these arguments were rejected.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
The parties appeared in the circuit court on July 18 and 19, 2023, for a merits trial. The court heard testimony from Husband and Wife and from two additional witnesses who testified on Wife’s behalf. On June 7, 2024, the court issued a written “Divorce, Child Support, and Marital Property Opinion” and judgment that granted Wife a judgment of absolute divorce and detailed the court’s findings and conclusions. Among the findings and conclusions, the court denied Husband’s request for a monetary award and ordered him to transfer his title and interest in the family home, Hall Court, to Wife. The court also denied Husband’s request to transfer half of Wife’s retirement accounts to him. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. We include additional facts as appropriate below.
II. DISCUSSION
We can rephrase and consolidate both Husband’s and Wife’s Questions Presented1 into one issue: whether the circuit court erred in how it divided the parties’ marital estate. It didn’t.
On June 7, 2024, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted Chau Dinh (“Wife”) an absolute divorce from Toan Vu (“Husband”). On appeal, Husband challenges four aspects of the court’s marital property division—the length of time the court took to issue its decision, the court’s order that Husband transfer his interest in the marital home to Wife, the denial of Husband’s request for a monetary award, and the denial of Husband’s request for a division of Wife’s retirement assets. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Husband and Wife married on November 6, 1999. They had two children together. The parties separated in August 2019 when Wife left the marital home with the children.
On August 11, 2020, Wife filed an initial complaint for absolute divorce, custody, child support, and other relief. She amended her complaint on February 8, 2023. In the amended complaint, she alleged adultery, constructive desertion, cruelty, and separation. She requested, among other things, pendente lite and permanent child support and a monetary award. Husband answered the first complaint and filed a counter-complaint for absolute divorce, custody, child support, and other relief on October 9, 2020. He amended his counter-complaint on October 30, 2020. He asked the court to grant him an absolute divorce based on desertion, constructive desertion, or separation. He also asked the court for a monetary award, among other things.
A. The Circuit Court Did Not Err In How It Distributed The Marital Property.
Husband argues first that the court mis-valued the marital property by taking too long after trial to enter judgment. He argues second and third that the court abused its discretion by awarding Wife his interest in their marital home in lieu of a monetary award and by denying his request for a monetary award. And fourth, Husband asserts that the court erred by not transferring a portion of Wife’s assets to him. Wife responds first that Maryland law and this record do not support Husband’s complaints about the delay in ruling. She argues second and third that the court considered all the evidence and the appropriate factors carefully before dividing the property and denying Husband’s request for a monetary award. And finally, Wife disputes that equity entitles Husband to a share of her retirement assets.
“[A]n appellate court . . . . will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a monetary award based on the distribution of marital property, we review that decision against an abuse of discretion standard. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 216 Md. App. 205, 218–19 (2014). A court abuses its discretion “‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court’”; “when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles’”; “when the ruling under consideration ‘appears to have been made on untenable grounds,’ [or] is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts
and inferences before the court’”; “when the ruling is ‘clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result’”; “when the ruling is ‘violative of fact and logic’”; or “when it constitutes an ‘untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.’” Id. at 219 (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13–14 (1994) (citations omitted)). “Within that context, ‘we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result.’” Richards v. Richards, 166 Md. App. 263, 272 (2005) (quoting Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230 (2000)).
When a divorcing party seeks a monetary award, the court undertakes a three-step analysis: (1) the court decides whether property is marital, Md. Code (1999, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”); (2) values the marital property, FL § 8-204(a); then (3) divides the property equitably, including a monetary award if appropriate, FL § 8-205. See Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 498–500 (1993); Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 354 (2025).
1. The passage of time between trial and judgment didn’t cause Husband any prejudice.
Husband begins by taking issue with the length of time between the conclusion of trial and the entry of judgment, a period of approximately eleven months. Husband doesn’t raise any issues about the status of the property as marital or non-marital or the value of the property as of the time of trial.2 Instead, he complains that the delay between the close of evidence and the entry of judgment was unreasonable and “constitute[d] legal error under the first two steps. It also constitute[d] error under the third step.” That, however, is as specific as his complaints in this regard get—neither in his briefs nor at oral argument, even when pressed, could Husband identify any prejudice he suffered as a result of the delay in ruling. That leaves us nothing to resolve on this point, and we decline the invitation to establish a rigid standard for how quickly judgments must issue.
At the second step of the marital property analysis, the trial court values the marital property “as of the date of the decree of absolute divorce based upon the evidence produced at trial.” Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md. App. 662, 676 (1984). This standard recognizes that there may be a delay between the close of evidence and the entry of judgment, and to require otherwise would be “highly impractical.” Green v. Green, 64 Md. App. 122, 140 (1985); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 507 (1985). Hence, “[w]e will not, nor should we, encourage hasty decision making in such cases.” Green, 64 Md. App. at 140–41. At some point, a long enough delay might cause a meaningful gap between the value the evidence adduced at trial supports and the actual value at the time of judgment. At one end of the spectrum, we held in Rosenberg that one month between the close of evidence and the divorce judgment didn’t disconnect the judgment value from the value supportedby the evidence adduced at trial. 64 Md. App. at 507–08. At the other end, in Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329 (1995), the court relied on evidence that was at least two years old, rendering that evidence stale and violating the general rule that the value of marital property should be determined as of the date the divorce is entered. Id. at 348. And in Fuge v. Fuge,
146 Md. App. 142 (2002), the case was on its third appeal, so the monetary award had been entered three years earlier, and we required the circuit court to reconsider what was equitable in light of our “appellate decision.” Id. at 145, 173, 177.
But unreasonableness for these purposes isn’t reflexively a function of time. The relative impact of the time difference depends more on the property at issue and how time affects its value. See Green, 64 Md. App. at 141 (“[U]nreasonable delays between the close of the evidence and the rendering of the judgment may in some cases cause distortion in the valuation of certain highly volatile marital property, resulting in prejudice to one of the parties.”). Investment assets are a good example: in Dobbyn, because of the volatility of some of the assets in controversy, namely, “stocks, securities and other interest bearing accounts,” we held that the circuit court should have valued the asset as of the date of absolute divorce rather than the date of the divorce filing and that the thirteenmonth period between those events made a difference in the correctness of the marital property award. 57 Md. App. at 674–77.
The evidence in this case closed on July 20, 2023 and the judgment issued on June 7, 2024, not quite eleven months later. Husband doesn’t argue, and hasn’t offered any evidence in the circuit court or here, that the values of any of the marital property changed from July 20, 2023 to June 7, 2024. He doesn’t identify which property he believes may have changed in value during that time. He acknowledges in his brief that he isn’t challenging the values the court received at trial and relied on to reach its ultimate conclusion. And at oral argument in this Court, when we asked how Husband believed he had been prejudiced by the delay, he couldn’t articulate any form of prejudice. Because Husband doesn’t identify which assets may have increased or decreased in value, we would be speculating to consider any potential volatility. And in any event, as Wife points out, the majority of the parties’ marital estate consists of real property rather than stock portfolios. Cf. Dobbyn, 57 Md. App. at 676 (“As a consequence of the unique nature and sensitivity of the stock and commodity markets, these financial products are inherently endowed with a high propensity towards fluctuation.”).
This leaves us with nothing: if Husband can’t identify any sort of impact or prejudice from the delay between trial and judgment, we have no basis from which we could conclude that the eleven-month delay in this case was unreasonable. See Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. at 508 (court did not err in using retirement account value adduced at trial, where no objection was raised at trial when value was presented, and husband did not offer more recent valuation). By statute, the baseline valuation period is the time of judgment. The court must consider “the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made,” FL § 8-205(b)(3), and that is what the circuit court did here. In the absence of any discernible (or even asserted) prejudice from the delay, there is no basis on which we could hold that the court abused its discretion by issuing its decision eleven months after the close of evidence.
2. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital estate.
Husband argues that the property division in this case was “not justified by the trial court’s own analysis,” where the court “touched on the factors” but relied primarily on three in deciding to transfer to Wife Husband’s interest in Hall Court. Wife counters that the court was authorized to transfer Husband’s interest in Hall Court and that after walking through each of the FL § 8-205(b) factors, the court found three factors significant and that was all that was required. Wife is right.
When dividing marital property, a court may order one party to transfer ownership of an interest in property, such as retirement assets, personal property, or the marital home, to the other. FL § 8-205(a)(1). For a marital home, the court can carry out the division by ordering one party to transfer their interest in the home to the other, permitting one party to purchase the other’s interest, or both:
(2) The court may transfer ownership of an interest in:
(i) a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, from one party to either or both parties;
(ii) subject to the consent of any lienholders, family use personal property, from one or both parties to either or both parties; and
(iii) subject to the terms of any lien, real property jointly owned by the parties and used as the principal residence of the parties when they lived together, by:
1. ordering the transfer of ownership of the real property or any interest of one of the parties in the real property to the other party if the party to whom the real property is transferred obtains the release of the other party from any lien against the real property;
2. authorizing one party to purchase the interest of the other party in the real property, in accordance with the terms and conditions ordered by the court; or
3. both.
FL § 8-205(a)(2). In deciding whether to order one spouse to transfer their interest in the marital home to the other or to grant a monetary award, the court must consider eleven factors that bear on how to allocate the home’s value and how to effect the division:
(1). the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2). the value of all property interests of each party;
(3). the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4). the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5). the duration of the marriage;
(6). the age of each party;
(7). the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8). how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;
(9). the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real
property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10). any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(11). any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.
FL § 8-205(b).
“‘While consideration of the factors is mandatory, the trial court need not go through a detailed check list of the statutory factors, specifically referring to each, however beneficial such a procedure might be for purposes of appellate review.’”
Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 410–11 (2002) (cleaned up) (quoting Doser, 106 Md. App. at 351). This is because the trial judge is presumed to know the law and is not required to list each factor that the judge considers mechanically so long as the record reveals whether and how the court considered and relied on these factors. Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 166 (2006) (citing Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 429–30 (2003)). Where the court does not “‘provide at least some of the steps in [its] thought process[, it] leaves [itself] open to the contention that [the court] did not in fact consider the required factors.’” Id.
Before addressing how the court reached its conclusions in this case, we outline the actual division. Again, neither party disputes the circuit court’s findings as to what property was marital or the values of any of the marital property, at least as of the date the record closed. The overall value of the entire marital estate was $3,938,962.22. That figure encompassed properties titled jointly, including the marital home (Hall Court) and rental properties (Marcus Court, Cedar Hills, Brandy Court, and Carr Avenue). The value of the jointly titled property was $2,537,567. The marital estate also included property titled in each party’s name only. The marital property titled in Husband’s name was valued at $726,400.13 and the marital property titled in Wife’s name was $674,995.09.
The court decided that the parties were to sell the rental properties and divide the proceeds equally. In addition, the court directed Husband to transfer his interest in Hall Court to Wife. Altogether, the division of the parties’ marital estate resulted in $1,564,227.13 for Husband:
$198,758.50 (half of the net value of Marcus Court)
+ $243,885.50 (half of the net value of Cedar Hills)
+ $226,600.50 (half of the net value of Brandy Court)
+ $168,582.50 (half of the net value of Carr Avenue)
+
$726,400.13 (marital property titled in Husband’s name)
= $1,564,227.13 (Husband’s adjusted share of the marital estate)
Wife’s portion of the marital estate was worth $2,374,753.09: $198,758.50 (half of net value of Marcus Court)
+ $243,885.50 (half of the net value of Cedar Hills)
+ $226,600.50 (half of the net value of Brandy Court)
+ $168,582.50 (half of the net value of Carr Avenue)
+ $816,913 (the net value of the marital home)
+ $674,995.09 (marital property titled in Wife’s name)
=
$2,374,735.09 (Wife’s adjusted share of the marital estate)
The result was Wife receiving approximately 60% of the net marital estate: $2,374,735.09 (Wife’s share) divided by $3,938,962.22 (value of all marital property) = 60.3%.
Neither party disputes that the court addressed each of the statutory factors. Their dispute turns on how the court assessed three of the statutory factors, but the court considered and made findings relating to all of them:
• Wife’s monetary and non-monetary contributions were more significant than Husband’s, FL § 8-205(b)(1);
• The overall marital estate value was valued at $3,938,962.22, with $726,400.13 in Husband’s name only and $674,995.09 in Wife’s, FL § 8-205(b)(2);
• Husband’s share of all marital property is about 50.653%, whereas Wife’s is 49.347%. For child support purposes, Husband’s total actual monthly income is $12,916.67 and Wife’s is $16,793.25, FL § 8-205(b)(3);
• Several factors caused the marriage to fail: a disagreement on fundamental lifestyle decisions, Husband’s lack of involvement at times, and both parties’ busy lifestyles, FL § 8-205(b)(4);
• The parties separated after 19¾ years of marriage and had been married for 23¾ years at the time of trial, FL § 8-205(b)(5);
• Husband was fifty-two years old and Wife was fifty years old at the time of trial, FL § 8-205(b)(6);
• Both parties were in good physical and mental health, FL § 8-205(b)(7);
• In general, both parties contributed to the acquisition of marital property, FL § 8-205(b)(8);
• There was insufficient evidence to make a finding about either Husband’s or Wife’s contribution to the acquisition of property held as tenants by the entireties, FL § 8-205(b)(9);
• The court did not award alimony or use and possession of personal property or the family home, FL § 8-205(b)(10); and
• The court did not consider any other factors, FL § 8-205(b)(11).
Husband argues that the court merely “touched on” these factors in its analysis. He contends that ascribing particular significance to three factors failed to explain adequately the court’s decision to transfer Hall Court to Wife as part of the monetary award. The three factors with which Husband takes issue are factors 1, 4, and 5 of FL § 8-205(b): the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the family’s well-being; the circumstances that contributed to the parties’ estrangement; and their marriage duration. The court found these “[m]ost significant.” As we detail below, the record supported the court’s findings under each factor, the findings
weren’t clearly erroneous, and the court’s conclusion to deny Husband’s request for a monetary award fell well within its broad discretion.
a. The record supported the court’s findings under FL § 8-205(b)(1).
This factor required the court to assess the “contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family.” FL § 8-205(b)(1). The court found that Wife’s contributions were “more substantial than Husband’s, despite there being evidence that Husband also made monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the family.” The record is replete with evidence supporting this conclusion.
The court began by acknowledging how, early in their marriage, Husband’s and Wife’s annual earnings were $40,000 and $32,000, respectively. The record supported this. The court highlighted how both parties maintained their respective employment during the marriage, although, for Husband, he had intermittent periods of unemployment. Wife helped Husband obtain his current role at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Wife testified to this and Husband didn’t refute it.
As for the parties’ real estate portfolio, the court noted that Wife was the “significant contributor to the real estate investments by doing most of the renovation work to flip the properties.” Wife was not the only one who testified about this—her witnesses corroborated it. Dimitri Apostolopoulos, the commercial real estate agent who helped the parties with all their real estate transactions, testified that he worked with Wife 95% of the time. Dong Bui, who performed all the repairs for the parties’ properties, testified that he only ever worked with Wife, not Husband. Wife testified that she did most of the work. This included managing the properties, ensuring that they were up to code, listing them for sale, showing them to potential tenants, screening those tenants, and ensuring that the rentals complied with state regulations. She also testified that Husband identified some properties. Husband testified that he helped identify some properties, took pictures of the homes, and posted them for sale on Craigslist. He said that he helped show potential tenants the homes and procured appliances for the rentals. But the evidence supported the court’s conclusion that Wife’s contributions were more substantial than Husband’s.
The court also noted that the parties lived in the marital home as strangers to avoid hurting the children. That is exactly what Husband testified. The court highlighted how Wife handled most of the domestic chores except during her pregnancies, when Husband contributed more to those chores. Wife testified that she undertook all the household chores, including cooking and cleaning, both before and after the parties had their children. She also testified that she handled the chores even when Husband was unemployed. Mr. Bui testified that he observed some of these chores, including watching Wife pick up the children from school. Mr. Apostolopoulos also testified that he observed Wife “spearheading” the domestic work. Wife also testified that during her pregnancies, Husband helped with the chores. And he, too, testified as much. None of these findings were clearly erroneous.
Husband argues that a “qualitative discussion” by the circuit
court under FL § 8-205(b)(1) did not justify the “quantitative result” of Wife receiving the full net value of Hall Court. What he really is arguing, against the backdrop of correct factual findings, is that the court should have weighed the facts differently. But balancing the equities is a matter commended to the court’s “broad discretion.” Hart, 169 Md. App. at 161; see also Caccamise v. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. 505, 521 (2000) (“It is well settled that ‘a trial court decision in granting a monetary award will not be overturned unless the judgment is clearly erroneous . . . .’” (quoting Gallagher v. Gallagher, 118 Md. App. 567, 580–81 (1997))).
The “quantitative result” that the court reached after dividing the property according to title was that Husband’s share of the marital property was approximately 50.653%, whereas Wife’s was approximately 49.347%. The court stated this finding as part of its consideration of factor 3, each party’s economic circumstances at the time the award is to be made. FL § 8-205(b)(3). Had the court divided Hall Court equally, as it did with their rental properties, Husband’s share would have been $1,995,183.63 and Wife’s share would have been $1,903,778.59. Those values, divided by the value of the entire marital estate, $3,938,962.22, result in shares of 50.653% and 49.347%, respectively. That finding was not clearly erroneous.3 By awarding Wife Hall Court, the circuit court was concluding that the 50.653%-49.347% split was inequitable under the circumstances of this case. See Hart, 169 Md. App. at 160 (“Granting a monetary award allows a court ‘to counterbalance any unfairness that may result from the actual distribution of property acquired during the marriage strictly in accordance with its title.’” (quoting Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 339 (1982)); see also FL § 8-205(a) (to adjust an inequity created by dividing the marital property by title, the court has three options: transfer one party’s ownership interest in certain property, grant a monetary award, or both).
The court found this “quantitative result” more equitable given that Wife was the only party paying down the mortgage on Hall Court during the parties’ separation, despite the fact that Wife and the children didn’t live there from August 2019, the parties’ separation, to April 2023. Even after Wife returned to the marital home in April 2023, she continued to pay that same mortgage, and again was the only one paying. Around that time, the parties agreed and signed an agreement that Husband would move into Marcus Court and pay the mortgage there, while Wife would continue paying the mortgage on Hall Court. Husband didn’t make the agreed-upon payments, while Wife did. And this was in addition to her already paying the mortgage on the house she was occupying.
Wife’s contributions to the well-being of the family also were “most significant” to the court because, in addition to her domestic work efforts, the court found that she was the significant “nonmonetary contributor” to the parties’ real estate portfolio. That portfolio comprised $2,537,567, or 64% of their marital estate: $2,537,567 (the total value of the parties’ real estate) divided by $3,938,962.22 (the total value of the parties’ marital estate). On balance, the court determined that equity mandated this result, given Wife’s significant contributions to growing the parties’ marital estate.
b. The record supported the court’s findings under FL §
8-205(b)(4).
The fourth factor required the court to assess the “circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties.” FL § 8-205(b)(4). The court found that “a constellation of symptoms caused the marriage’s demise”: the couple’s disagreements on “fundamental lifestyle decisions” and Husband’s lack of involvement at times, coupled with their busy lifestyles, took a toll on their relationship.
Some of the symptoms leading to the marriage’s demise that the court identified were Husband’s verbal and emotional abuse, as Wife testified. The court noted that Wife described how Husband choked her, threw water on her, put her clothes in the driveway for Husband to drive over, and deprived her of sleep. Wife also revealed how Husband threatened her and their children and poured water on Wife and the children while all three were asleep. At times, Husband ranted in the early morning hours that “I know you wake up at 4:00 or 5:00 in the morning take care of domestic issues before you leave home at 5:00, so I’m going to do this so that you would not be able to sleep and then you would die in a car crash.” Husband did not refute this.
The court found as well that Husband FaceTimed other women in front of Wife and told Wife how other women wanted him. This came directly from Wife’s testimony. The court also credited Wife’s testimony about Husband partying often when he was not home and not seeing the parties’ children. This was all evidence that Wife presented to demonstrate why the parties’ marriage failed. Other than Husband denying allegations of having committed adultery before the parties’ separation, Husband offered no evidence on why the marriage failed. That said, as the court noted, Husband did stipulate to adultery as grounds for divorce, and the record supported that stipulation. Although Husband testified that he and Wife agreed to live in the house “as strangers,” that arrangement acknowledged that the marital relationship wasn’t working. The court’s findings under this factor were not clearly erroneous.
Husband argues that there needed to be a nexus between a spouse’s conduct and the estrangement before the court could rely on this factor to favor Wife. Again, the court’s findings under FL § 8-205(b)(4) were not clearly erroneous, so again, Husband really is disputing the relative weight the court gave to this factor. There need not be a specific connection between his conduct and the court’s decision to deny him a monetary award—all that was required was that the court consider the factor. See Mount v. Mount, 59 Md. App. 538, 553–54 (1984) (reversing the circuit court when it did not consider this factor despite overwhelming evidence that only one party was solely responsible for the marriage’s deterioration). The court’s findings supported its conclusion and were not clearly erroneous, and that is enough to affirm on this factor. See Court v. Court, 67 Md. App. 676, 689–90 (1986) (affirming monetary award where court considered FL § 8-205(b)(4) amongst other factors and made findings under that factor that were not clearly erroneous), superseded by rule on other grounds, Md. Rule 9-207, as stated in Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492 (2008).
c. The record supported the court’s findings under FL § 8-205(b)(5).
The fifth factor required the court to assess the “duration of the [parties’] marriage.” FL § 8-205(b)(5). The court here found that the parties had been married for 19 ¾ years at the time of separation and 23 ¾ years at the time of trial. This fact was not in any serious dispute. The parties married on November 6, 1999, and separated in August 2019. Although Husband testified that the two began living in the house as strangers in August 2018, he also testified that they separated in August 2019. The trial started on July 19, 2023. The record supported the court’s findings.
Husband argues that although the court didn’t specify the direction in which this factor swayed the court, “a reasonable inference regarding this factor is that it favors equal division where the marriage is of long duration.” Not so. We have said, as Husband reminds us, that “[u]pon the dissolution of most long term marriages, the trial judge divides the marital property equally.” Caccamise, 130 Md. App. at 521. To the extent that division reflects common practice, it nevertheless isn’t required. Id. (citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 131 (1981)).
In Caccamise, a case on which Husband relies, we held that the trial court had abused its discretion by relying solely on the work the husband put into the family business, the ages of the parties, and “all other relevant factors” to determine the monetary award. 130 Md. App. at 521–22. We reasoned that the court hadn’t explained what other work the husband performed beyond what would be expected from him ordinarily as the only working spouse in the relationship. Id. at 522. As to the ages, the parties were fifty-one and fifty-two, respectively, but we didn’t see why that was significant to the court’s conclusion. Id. Finally, the court’s categorical inclusion of “all other relevant factors” was inadequate for us to assess whether there was an abuse of discretion. Id.
In contrast, the court in this case made findings under all the § 8-205(b) factors and explained how the evidence supported those findings. Those findings were not clearly erroneous. And the court walked through each factor and highlighted the three it found most significant. Furthermore, the court’s findings supported a 60-40 split in Wife’s favor. Cf. Long v. Long, 129 Md. App. 554, 577–79 (2000) (monetary award that left Wife with less than 20% of marital estate, despite Wife’s health, unemployment, lack of marital fault, and contributions to Husband acquiring over 35% of marital assets vacated). So although the result was not an equal division of the property, the court set forth the factors that influenced its unequal division and explained how the result was equitable. Cf. Caccamise, 130 Md. App. at 522; Hart, 169 Md. App. at 166–67 (because record in that case did not indicate that circuit court even considered statutory factors for a monetary award, let alone used the term “monetary award,” vacate and remand was appropriate); Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 522 (monetary award that resulted in one party receiving 90% of the marital estate without the court explaining its rationale adequately vacated).
Husband argues that the court’s commentary on the remaining factors “does not reflect any finding favorable to Wife that would serve as a basis for a monetary award or transfer of Hall Court to her.” But aside from the argument that the court’s findings under those other factors were clearly
erroneous, there’s no argument that any additional degree of proof was necessary to support the court’s division of the marital property. It’s also not true that the court “did not expressly mention any other statutory factor that influenced the real property transfer determination.” Although it found three factors most significant, it considered the remaining factors. The court walked through each and listed its findings, then exercised its discretion in dividing the property, denying Husband’s request for a monetary award, and ordering Husband to transfer his interest in the marital home to Wife. See FL § 8-205(a). We discern no abuse of discretion in any of these conclusions.
d. The court considered Wife’s post-separation contributions to her retirement accounts correctly when distributing the marital estate.
Husband argues next that the circuit court erred by not transferring a portion of Wife’s retirement accounts to him. He continues that the court misapplied the FL § 8-205(b) factors by relying on only the eighth and ninth factors, although the ninth factor didn’t apply. He adds that the increase in value in Wife’s Thrift Savings Plan (“TSP”) and Charles Schwab 401(k) (“401(k)”) accounts in the time after separation could have been due to her contributions or due to market conditions. Wife responds that Husband’s analysis attempts to decouple the retirement analysis from the monetary award analysis.4 Under the totality of the parties’ circumstances, Wife submits, the court did not need to find which portions of Wife’s retirement accounts were solely due to her contributions. Initially, Wife is right about Husband’s approach to the analysis. To transfer an ownership interest in one spouse’s retirement assets, the circuit court must perform the analysis required by FL § 8-205(a)(2) and consider the § 8-205(b) factors. As part of that analysis, the court can give more weight to different factors depending on the circumstances of the case. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 507 (1993). In Alston, the Supreme Court of Maryland highlighted how an equal division of marital property acquired after separation and without any effort from the noncontributing spouse may be inequitable: Where one party, wholly through his or her own efforts, and without any direct or indirect contribution by the other, acquires a specific item of marital property after the parties have separated and after the marital family has, as a practical matter, ceased to exist, a monetary award representing an equal division of that particular property would not ordinarily be consonant with the history and purpose of the statute.
Id. Circuit courts must consider the extent to which a spouse’s efforts “led to [the] acquisition of property or an increase in its value without any monetary or non-monetary contribution by the other spouse after the parties separated” when “determining what would constitute an equitable monetary award.” Wilen v. Wilen, 61 Md. App. 337, 354–55 (1985). And this applies with full force to the appreciation of a retirement asset. See Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md. App. 460, 466–67 (1990) (monetary award where circuit court failed to consider ex-husband’s post-separation efforts that increased value of, among other things, ex-husband’s retirement fund vacated).
In this case, though, we see no abuse of the circuit court’s discretion. The parties don’t dispute the values the court assigned to Wife’s retirement assets. Husband’s qualm with the court’s conclusion is its reliance on two FL § 8-205(b) factors: FL § 8-205(b)(8) and FL § 8-205(b)(9). Under the former, the court found that both parties acquired retirement assets in their individual names. The record supported that finding. Although the latter factor indeed concerned the parties’ contributions toward acquiring the property that they held as tenants by the entireties, which was only the real estate, the court stated that it was considering that factor, along with the eighth factor, “among other factors.” Put another way, the court conducted its monetary award analysis with the factors outlined in FL § 8-205(b) in mind. See Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 533 (“‘[A] trial judge’s failure to state each and every consideration or factor’ does not, without demonstration of some improper consideration, ‘constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion.’” (quoting Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md. App. 431, 445 (2003))); see also Quinn, 83 Md. App. at 466 (“In arriving at a monetary award, the trial judge is not required to ‘articulate every step in [their] thought processes.’ The trial judge is presumed to know the law and to apply it correctly.” (citations omitted)).
And indeed, the circuit court knew and applied the law correctly in this case. With regard to the TSP and 401(k) accounts, the court noted that all of the increases in those accounts were marital property. But that did not, by itself, mean that those increases were subject to equitable division. See Alston, 331 Md. at 507. The court noted that Wife’s accounts “significantly increased,” specifically by 88%. Wife produced evidence of the accounts’ respective balances around the separation date and during the month of trial. And the court found that Husband contributed nothing toward those balances. Husband doesn’t dispute that Wife’s contributions increased the accounts’ value, but says that was just one possibility. It was not unreasonable, though, for the court to afford Wife’s contributions, as one factor among the others, more weight. And because “not all marital property necessarily will be subject to equitable distribution when awarding a monetary award,” the court found it more equitable for each party to retain their respective retirement assets. Sims, 266 Md. App. at 359; see Wilen, 61 Md. App. at 355 (“How much weight should be given to each factor in each case is a matter entirely within the [court’s] sound discretion.”).
We see no abuse of discretion in these judgments and affirm the division of property and denial of Husband’s request for a monetary award.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.
1 Husband’s brief stated his Question Presented as:
FOOTNOTES
Did the trial court clearly err and abuse its discretion by ordering Husband to transfer to Wife his title and interest in their jointly owned real property located in Potomac, Maryland and by denying Husband’s request for a monetary award and the transfer to him of ownership of certain retirement benefits of Wife to adjust the rights and equities of the parties in their marital property?
Wife responded to the issues raised in Husband’s brief in one overarching Question Presented with three parts:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted Wife a monetary award and denied Husband’s request for a monetary award?
a. Was 11 months too lengthy before the court issued its ruling and opinion?
b. Did the court adequately explain its reasoning under 8-205 in granting Wife’s request for a monetary award and denying Husband’s request for a monetary award?
c. Did the court abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s request to order Wife to transfer retirement benefits to him?
2 Husband does not contend, for example, that either party acquired any other marital property during the eleven-month period. The only actual effect of the delay was the change in the value of retirement assets over that period.
3 In light of our earlier discussion about the time between the close of evidence and the court’s judgment, Section A.1., Husband’s timing arguments under FL § 8-205(b)(3)—the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made—don’t affect this analysis.
4 Wife argues as well that Husband ignores how he retained $200,000 more in value of his nonmarital property than Wife. But there is no mention of $200,000 in the circuit court’s findings of nonmarital property or elsewhere in the record.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 1 (2026)
Brokerage account; marital property; exemption
Scott Harman v. Patricia Harman
No. 2250, September Term 2022
Argued before: Leahy, Reed, Ripken, JJ.
Opinion by: Reed, J.
Filed: Nov. 7, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s conclusion that funds in a brokerage account were marital property. Husband argued that, because the funds were allegedly inherited from his late father, they should have been classified as non-marital property. But given the lack of documentation to support his testimony, the trial court was permitted to find his answers not credible, especially given husband’s assertions of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
On May 28, 2021, Appellee filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Later, Appellee amended her Complaint to a Complaint for Absolute Divorce on April 20, 2022, based on one year of separation between the parties. The divorce case was heard in a trial before the Honorable Vicki Ballou-Watts in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 17, 18, and 19, 2022.
Patricia Harman, Appellee, filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce on April 20, 2022, against Scott Harman, Appellant.1 The divorce case was heard in a trial before the Honorable Vicki Ballou-Watts in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 17, 18, and 19, 2022. The parties disagreed on the property classification of an account with Summit Investment Advisors, Inc. After the trial, the court granted the parties a divorce and declared that the Summit Account was marital property.
In bringing his appeal, Appellant presents two questions for appellate review:
I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Summit Account was marital property and thus subject to a monetary award?
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment of Absolute Divorce?
For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties, Appellant and Appellee, were married in a religious ceremony on September 13, 1986, in Harford County, Maryland. The parties had three children together who all reached the age of majority. The parties began living apart on April 3, 2021. Appellee moved out of the marriage domicile into her mother’s condominium.
Prior to trial, the parties filed a joint statement concerning marital and non-marital property. The parties were able to agree on the property classification of many assets but had a few disputes. One dispute was over an account with Summit Investment Advisors, Inc. (the “Summit Account”). The parties agreed the account was valued at $363,382.59 in September 2022. In Appellant’s answers to Interrogatories, Appellant did not identify any property held in any trust, estate, or bank accounts as non-marital property. In his deposition and in his testimony at trial, Appellant did not produce any documentation related to or identifying his interest in any trust. However, Appellant later argued that the Summit Account was not marital property because it was not commingled, and Appellee disagreed.
On January 15, 2020, before the parties’ divorce case, Appellant’s father, Ronald E. Harman, passed away. A few weeks after his funeral, Appellant’s brother, Todd Harman, informed Appellant of an inheritance from his father. Todd Harman was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Ronald E. Harman on July 7, 2020. Appellant stated that he received about $730,000 as an inheritance from his father.
Appellant testified that he put the largest check and other checks from his inheritance in a First National Bank account in his name alone. Appellant asserted that he moved these funds into the Summit Account in June 2023. Appellant testified that his brother dealt with their father’s estate, specifically with an investment broker and later a trustee. Appellant said that the funds from the account were disbursed through various checks. Appellant specifically identified three checks that he put in the Heritage Account from his inheritance. These checks were sent “from an account holder of Morgan Stanley” to Appellant. The first check was for $500,000.00, dated July 25, 2020. The second check was for $715.03, dated the same day. This check was not entered into evidence. The final check was for $63,523.61, dated October 28, 2020.
Appellee questioned Appellant about documentation related to the inheritance and specifically the trust. Appellant did not produce documentation at his deposition
or at trial about the trust. Appellee asked Appellant, “So you had no documentation that you’ve produced either at your deposition or here today pursuant to subpoenas that were issued to you that would show your ability to show the tracing of the monies, right?” to which Appellant replied, “Correct.” Further, Appellant asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when Appellee asked him about his tax returns.
The estate documents for Ronald Harman were entered into evidence. In these documents, Appellant was listed as an heir of the decedent. Cheri Dorsey signed the Estate Petition and other legal documents related to the estate. The gross estate of Ronald Harmon was worth $233,759.13, with a net residue of $222,485.75 distributed to Todd Harman, who was the Trustee of the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust. This estate was to pour over into the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust. Appellant testified that his brother showed him the trust balance, and, at one time, the balance was 1.3 million dollars, though Appellant then said, “I don’t know if that’s accurate.”
Judge Ballou-Watts ruled from the bench on November 29, 2022. She granted the parties’ divorce. Regarding the Summit Account, Judge Ballou-Watts did not find Appellant’s claim that the account was non-marital property to be credible because Appellant “did not produce any document from the alleged trust reflecting the disbursements to him.”
The trial court noted that Appellant introduced checks into evidence, but concluded they were not proven to be from the trust proceeds or even that the original amount received from the trust was proven to be from Appellant’s inheritance. In making this credibility determination, the trial court also noted that there was a discrepancy between the amount Appellant claimed was in the estate, about 1.3 million dollars, and the amount of the gross estate reflected in the underlying documents, $233,759.13. The trial court concluded the Summit Account was marital property.
Upon reviewing the monetary award factors, the trial court concluded that Appellee’s non-retirement marital property was valued at $202,925.00 and Appellant’s non-retirement marital property, including the Summit Account, was valued at $578,109.00. The trial court explained that if this were divided equally, each party would receive $390,517.00. “By title however this would leave [Appellee] with a deficit of $309,517 minus $202,925.” Therefore, to account for the difference, the trial court granted Appellee a monetary award of $187,592.00.
The court ruled on January 5, 2023. After this ruling, Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend judgment and a motion for a new trial. The motion argued that the Summit Account funds were non-marital in nature.2 Appellant argued that the trial record was sufficient to support his claim and attached further exhibits to support this argument. These exhibits included an affidavit from Cheri H. Dorsey, Esq., who represented the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust. The affidavit stated that the funds from the checks were payments from the trust. Appellant also attached additional documentation supporting the source of payments.
Appellee filed a response, arguing that she met her burden
of proof on the Summit Account being marital property, and that Appellant failed to provide proof otherwise. Appellee argued that a post-trial motion does not give a losing party boundless discretion to make new arguments and there was already a complete trial on the matter.
The court denied the motion to alter or amend judgment on February 15, 2023. Appellant then filed this timely appeal on February 22, 2023.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an action is tried without a jury, this Court reviews the lower court on both the law and the evidence. Md. Rule 8-131(c). This Court will not set aside the trial court’s judgment “unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. This standard means that this Court “may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result, absent an abuse of discretion.” Nouri v. Dadgar, 245 Md. App. 324, 342 (2020) (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 626 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). “[U] nder an abuse of discretion standard . . . appellate courts will accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings.” Id. (quoting Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 326 (2002)) (internal quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Property Status of the Summit Account A. Parties’ Contentions
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the funds in the Summit Account were marital property. Appellant argues that because the funds were inherited from his late father, they should have been classified as non-marital property rather than marital property, and thus should not have been subject to the monetary award granted at trial. Appellant contends he presented sufficient evidence to show that the Summit Account funds came from his inheritance through three checks that were deposited into the Heritage Account before being transferred to the Summit Account and argues there was no evidence presented at trial to contradict this argument. Appellant claims that the trial court erred by disregarding his uncontradicted testimony and documentary evidence supporting the existence of his father’s trust.
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence as to why the checks were made. Appellant criticizes Appellee for trying to confuse Appellant during trial with the differences between an estate and a trust. Appellant argues that the trial court failed to recognize that Appellant’s late father created a trust that was funded by the net residue of his estate.
Appellee argues the trial court’s ruling was proper because Appellant failed to directly trace the Summit Account funds to a non-marital source. Appellee contends that the evidence of Appellant’s father’s estate does not adequately account for the funds in the Summit Account
that Appellant claims as non-marital property. Appellee rejects that the trial court could have properly inferred that the funds came from a trust because it required too many unreasonable inferences. Appellee argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper because Appellant did not present sufficient evidence to persuade the trial court that the funds came from a non-marital source. Additionally, Appellee argues that the trial court properly determined that Appellant’s claims were not credible based on his testimony and therefore the evidence he presented was similarly not credible.
B. Standard of Review
The trial court’s determination of whether an asset is marital or non-marital property is a question of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, 269 (2021) (quoting Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 408–09 (2002)). Under the clearly erroneous standard, we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings “[i]f any competent material evidence exists in support of the trial court’s factual findings.” Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 409 (2008) (quoting Schade v. Maryland State Bd. of Elections, 401 Md. 1, 33 (2007) (citations omitted)).
C. Analysis
If parties in a divorce action dispute whether property is marital property, then the trial court shall make that determination when granting an absolute divorce. Md. Code, Fam. Law § 8-203(a). Marital property is defined as “the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” Md. Code, Fam. Law § 8-201(e)(1). Marital property does not include property: “(i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.” Id. at § 8-201(e)(3). “‘Directly traceable’ is not synonymous with ‘attributable.’” Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 187 (1990). “Property that is initially non-marital can become marital[.]” Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 227 (2000). “If a property interest cannot be traced to a nonmarital source, it is considered marital property.”
Id. (citing Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 281 (1993), cert. denied, 331 Md. 197 (1993)); see also Melrod, 83 Md. App. at 187 (stating similarly that an “inability to trace property acquired during the marriage directly to a non-marital source simply means that all property so acquired was marital property”).
Here, the property in dispute was an account with Summit Investment Advisors, Inc. that both parties agreed was worth $363,382.59. The parties disagreed over whether the account’s funds were commingled and therefore whether the property could be properly traced to a nonmarital source. The funds originated from three checks paid into Appellant’s account with Heritage Financial Consultants, LLC. The first two checks were for $500,000.00 and $715.03 and were both dated July 25, 2020. The final check was for $63,523.61, dated October 28, 2020. In July of 2022, Appellant transferred the entire remaining account
from Heritage Financial Consultants, LLC to the Summit Account. Appellant argued that the three checks came from his late father’s inheritance and therefore were nonmarital property. Money acquired by inheritance is nonmarital property, but Appellant bears the burden of proof for whether the Summit Account being contested at trial was directly traceable to that source.
Appellant argues that Appellee provided no evidence at trial to contradict his assertions that the money he put in the Heritage Account came from an inheritance from his late father’s estate. However, this argument misapplies the burden of proof for marital property. Appellant bears the burden to show that this money he acquired during the marriage was non-marital property. It is true that “the burden of proof as to the classification of property as marital or nonmarital rests upon the party who asserts a marital interest in the property, and that party must present evidence as to the identity and value of the property.” Murray v. Murray, 190 Md. App. 553, 570 (2010) (citing Pickett v. Haislip, 73 Md. App. 89, 97 (1987), cert. denied, 311 Md. 719 (1998)); see also Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 428 (2003) (“The party who claims a marital interest in property has the burden of proof as to that claim.”). “Conversely, ‘[t] he party seeking to demonstrate that particular property acquired during the marriage is nonmarital must trace the property to a nonmarital source.’” Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 227 (quoting Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. at 283).
Here, Appellee first had the burden to show that the Summit Account was acquired during the marriage and could therefore be classified as marital property. Appellee met that burden because the three checks at issue were written in July and October of 2020, which was after the parties married, in 1986, and before the marriage ended on November 29, 2022, when their absolute divorce was granted. Thus, the burden of proof then shifted back to Appellant to show that the property fell within an exception to be classified as non-marital property, i.e. that the property could be directly traced to Appellant’s father’s inheritance.
Appellant was able to show that in July of 2022, the remaining money in the Heritage Account was transferred into the Summit Account. Appellant testified that these funds totaled $363,382.59. Next, Appellant was required to prove that the money that went into the Heritage Account came from his late father’s inheritance. Appellant claimed he received $730,000 in funds from his inheritance. Appellant pointed to three checks deposited into the Heritage Account, totaling $565,238.64. These checks were sent “from an account holder of Morgan Stanley” to Appellant. The first check was for $500,000 dated July 25, 2020. The memo on the trust says “Ohio Nat’l Annuity Distribution Per Trust.” The second check was for $715.03, dated the same day as the first check. Appellant testified that he believed the second check was an IRS tax return check from his father’s estate. The third and final check was for $63,523.61, dated October 28, 2020. Appellant entered cancelled checks for the first and third check into evidence but produced no check for the second check. These checks were addressed to “Scott E. Harman c/o Cheri Dorsey, Sessa & Dorsey LLC . . .”
Appellant testified that the discrepancy between the $363,382.59 in the Summit Account, the $565,238.64 originally deposited in the Heritage Account that was subsequently transferred into the Summit account, and the $730,000 he claimed to inherit from his father’s estate could be attributed to him using some of the money to live, buying “the Mustang,” paying taxes, and losing some of the money in a downturn in the market.
The estate documents for Ronald Harman were also entered into evidence. In these documents, Appellant was listed as an heir of the decedent. Cheri Dorsey signed the Estate Petition and other legal documents related to the estate. The gross estate of Ronald Harman was worth $233,759.13, with a net residue of $222,485.75 distributed to Todd Harman, who was the Trustee of the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust. This estate was to pour over into the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust.
There is a discrepancy between the $222,485.75 net residue in Appellant’s father’s estate that was in evidence and the $730,000 Appellant claimed to have inherited from his father. Furthermore, Appellant testified that he believed there was 1.3 million dollars in his father’s revocable trust, but Appellant entered no documents related to that trust into evidence. Such documents could have verified the amounts and proven disbursements to Appellant.
Appellant was a beneficiary of the revocable trust. Maryland statutes allow a trustee to request “a report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and amount of the compensation of the trustee, a listing of the trust assets, and, if feasible, the respective market values of the trust assets.” Md. Code, Est. & Trusts § 14.5-813(c). Appellant testified that his brother, the trustee for the revocable trust, would show him “what the account balances were and what could be distributed at the time.” Therefore, at the time of the trial, documentation of this trust was available to Appellant to show a distribution from the trust as the source of the funds. The trial court also pointed out that Appellant’s brother lived locally but was not brought to testify at the trial “to explain what [Appellant’s] interest is or was.”
As previously stated, whether property is classified as marital or non-marital property depends on a party’s ability to sufficiently trace the property. For example, in Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, the trial court determined that various accounts held by the appellant were entirely marital property even though the appellant presented evidence that portions of the accounts were directly traceable to pre-marital contributions. Id. at 268. Because the appellant “produced documentation showing every contribution, dividend, and capital gain accumulated” in a 403(b) account and the number of shares never decreased below the pre-marital amount, the appellant showed that there was directly traceable non-marital property. Id. at 272. By contrast, in Long v. Long, 129 Md. App. 554 (2000), the appellant had a model train collection worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Id. at 559–60. However, the appellant “could produce no records, receipts, log books, inventories, or even specific recollections of his purchases” to determine which items were pre-marital property. Id.
The trial court said that the trains were commingled “to the point that direct tracing is impossible” and found that the entire collection was marital property. Id. at 564. This Court did not disturb that finding on appeal. Id. at 576–77.
The circumstances in this case were closer to Long than Wasyluszko. In Wasyluszko, detailed documentation was presented that allowed the court to analyze whether portions of accounts retained a non-marital character or were commingled. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263. Here, Appellant failed to provide sufficient information or documentation at trial to allow the trial court to trace the money from Ronald Harman’s estate or trust to the Summit Account. While Appellant showed two of the three checks that were deposited into the Heritage Account, insufficient information was provided about the source of the money sent through those checks. Since Appellant “could produce no records[,]” the trial court determined that the Summit Account was marital property.
Further, the trial court did not find Appellant’s testimony to be credible on the issue of the source of the Summit Account funds. The trial court said it did not find the claim that the account was directly traceable to the estate and trust to be credible because Appellant “did not produce any document from the alleged trust reflecting the disbursements to him.” The court noted that the checks Appellant entered into evidence “did not indicate that they were from that trust or those trust proceeds.” The court highlighted the difference between the size of the gross estate, $233,759.13, and the $733,000 dollars Appellant claimed he received from the trust, as discussed above. Lastly, the court said, “[t]he biggest difficulty in determining [Appellant’s] present economic circumstances has been his pleading the Fifth and refusing to testify or produce supporting documents regarding his income taxes and his earnings.”
We do not hold that the trial court erred in making its determination on Appellant’s credibility on this claim. Notably, sitting as an appellate court, we must “give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). “When weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence, ‘the fact-finder has the discretion to decide which evidence to credit and which to reject.’” Qun Lin v. Cruz, 247 Md. App. 606, 629 (2020) (quoting Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 136 (2000)).
During Appellant’s testimony at trial, Appellee asked multiple questions about the documentation of the trust. Appellant said he did not have that documentation at the deposition and did not produce any documentation at trial. This included any documentation “that would show [Appellant’s] ability to show the tracing of the monies,” any documentation “of the trust document,” or any documentation “regarding any payments from the trust.” Given the lack of documentation to support his testimony about the trust, the trial court was permitted to find his answers about the trust as the source of the money to be not credible.
The trial court’s credibility determination is further supported by Appellant’s assertions of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. In civil cases like this family law matter, “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences . . . when [parties] refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”
Kramer v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 575, 585 (1989) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 US. 308, 318 (1976)); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 516 (1992) (stating that “the fact finder in the civil proceeding is entitled to draw an adverse inference against the party” who invoked the Fifth Amendment). Appellant asserted this right when Appellee asked Appellant about his tax returns. As a result of Appellant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment, Appellee was unable to question Appellant about information in his tax returns, including his assets and taxes paid on them. Appellant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment permitted the trial court to draw an inference that the information contained in those tax returns would have been adverse to his interests.3
In Long, 141 Md. App. 341, this Court found that the trial court erred by inferring the appellant’s income and determining he was voluntarily impoverished after the appellant invoked his Fifth Amendment right related to his tax returns. Id. at 350. We held that the trial court was permitted to draw an adverse inference but could not “penalize the exercise of the privilege” without supporting evidence. Id. at 349. Here, the trial court was not penalizing the exercise of Appellant’s privilege because it did not solely rely on Appellant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights to make the finding that the Summit Account was nonmarital property. The trial court also relied on Appellant’s lack of documentation and other evidence against his credibility to support the conclusion that Appellant did not meet his burden of proof. The court did not use the Fifth Amendment assertion to make any findings that were not supported by the evidence or, as here, the lack of evidence provided by Appellant.
Despite the lack of specific evidence tracing the funds, Appellant argues that the trial court should have drawn certain reasonable inferences about the source of the funds. Specifically, Appellant argues that because the $500,000 check stated that the funds were paid to Appellant and “c/o Cheri H. Dorsey[,] Sessa & Dorsey, LLC[,]” which was the attorney listed as the attorney for Appellant’s father’s estate, the court should have drawn the inference that “it was being paid in care of Cheri H. Dorsey as she was administering the trust.” Appellant also asserts that this same check’s memo, which stated “Ohio Nat’l of documentation, in coming to its conclusion about Appellant’s credibility and the Summit Account’s property status, so the trial court did not relieve Appellee of their burden of proof based on Appellant’s refusal to testify. Annuity Distribution Per Trust,” supported the inference that this check came from Appellant’s father’s estate.
As previously provided, the trial court’s determination of whether an asset is marital or non-marital property is a question of fact, which under the clearly erroneous standard, this Court will not disturb “[i]f any competent material evidence exists in support of the trial court’s factual findings.” Figgins, 403 Md. at 409 (quoting Schade, 401 Md.
at 33); see also Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. at 269. Here, the trial court concluded that the evidence, and lack thereof, supported the factual finding that the Summit Account property could not be traced to a nonmarital source, i.e. an inheritance from Appellant’s father. Specifically, the trial court relied on the fact that Appellant did not produce any trust documents, that the checks Appellant produced did not indicate that they were from his father’s trust, and that there was a discrepancy between the funds in the Summit Account and the amount Appellant claimed to inherit. This Court will not disturb this factual finding, which the trial court reached based on “competent material evidence[,]” that the Summit Account was marital property. See Figgins, 403 Md. at 409 (quoting Schade, 401 Md. at 33 (citations omitted)).
Appellant’s argument that the trial court had sufficient evidence to show that the checks came from the trust is just one interpretation of the facts, an interpretation the trial court chose not to believe. The inferences that Appellant argues the trial court should have made require many logical steps to reach. For instance, reaching the conclusion that the check’s memo stating “Ohio Nat’l Annuity Distribution Per Trust,” established that this check came from Appellant’s father’s trust would have required the factfinder to believe that “Per Trust” meant Appellant’s father’s trust, rather than some other potential trust. While the trial court could have reached these inferences based on the evidence at trial, it did not, and it was not required to do so. Instead, the trial court reached different factual conclusions, as outlined above, which were based on the trial court’s credibility determinations and supported by evidence and thus not clearly erroneous. See Figgins, 403 Md. at 409 (quoting Schade, 401 Md. at 33 (citations omitted)).
Given the lack of evidence provided by Appellant at trial about the source of the money in the Summit Account, we hold that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in its determination that the Summit Account was marital property, and thus subject to a monetary award.
Denial of the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment A. Parties’ Contentions
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment of Absolute Divorce (the “Motion”). Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant amending the judgment, and Appellant also points to the additional evidence offered in the Motion to support the Summit Account being non-marital property. Appellant argues that the court’s decision was against the logic and effect of the facts before it. Appellant also argues that this issue was clearly litigated during the trial and therefore within the scope of a Motion to Alter or Amend.
Appellee points to the trial court’s broad discretion on deciding whether to grant a motion to alter or amend and argues that that discretion was not abused in this case. Appellee argues that the necessary documents were available to Appellant at the time of trial and Appellant was on notice that he would need them. Appellee contends Appellant is trying to improperly use the Motion to get
another day in court, and the trial court properly denied that request.
B. Standard of Review
“In general, the denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment or for reconsideration is reviewed by appellate courts for abuse of discretion.” Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 438 (2012) (quoting RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Maryland, Inc., 413 Md. 638, 673 (2010)). A court abuses its discretion “‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court’ or where the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’” Johnson v. Francis, 239 Md. App. 530, 542 (2018) (quoting Powell v. Breslin, 430 Md. 52, 62 (2013)). Further, “an abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,’ or when the ruling is ‘violative of fact and logic.’” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 (1997) (citations omitted). Additionally, “in appeals from the denial of a post-judgment motion, reversal is warranted in cases where there is both an error and a compelling reason to reconsider the underlying ruling.” Schlotzhauer v. Morton, 224 Md. App. 72, 85 (2015) (citations omitted).
C. Analysis
Maryland Rule 2-534 states that a circuit court “may open the judgment to receive additional evidence, may amend its findings or its statement of reasons for the decision, may set forth additional findings or reasons, may enter new findings or new reasons, may amend the judgment, or may enter a new judgment.” Md. Rules 2-534. The discretion held by a trial judge when denying a Motion to Alter or Amend “is more than broad; it is virtually without limit.” Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 484 (2002); see also Della Ratta v. Dyas, 183 Md. App. 344, 374 (2008), aff’d, 414 Md. 556 (2010) (“The discretion that a court exercises to receive or reject additional evidence after trial is very broad.”). The Motion to Alter or Amend “is not a time machine in which to travel back to a recently concluded trial in order to try the case better with hindsight.” Steinhoff, 144 Md. App. at 484. “The trial judge has boundless discretion not to indulge this all-too-natural desire to raise issues after the fact that could have been raised earlier but were not . . . Losers do not enjoy carte blanche, through post-trial motions, to replay the game as a matter of right.” Id.
We have previously stated that the principal factors for a court to consider on receiving or rejecting additional evidence after trial is “whether the proffered evidence is ‘essential’ to a party’s case or ‘supplemental,’” “whether a party will be improperly prejudiced,” and “whether the omission was inadvertent.” Della Ratta, 183 Md. App. at 374 (citing Cooper v. Sacco, 357 Md. 622, 638–40 (2000)).
Here, Appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence towards his claim that the Summit Account was nonmarital property. In the Motion to Alter or Amend, Appellant presented additional evidence to support this argument. This included an affidavit from Cheri Dorsey that stated that the funds received by Appellant were
payments from the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust. Attached to the affidavit were exhibits showing the checks and payments out of the trust. This included a Morgan Stanley bank statement including the $500,000.00 payment and the $63,523.61 payment to the Appellant. Appellant also included a copy of the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust.
The evidence presented by Appellant in the Motion to Alter or Amend was “essential” to Appellant’s case to prove that the Summit Account was non-marital property. The documents presented were the evidence that was missing at trial that was needed to trace the funds from the Ronald E. Harman Revocable Trust to the Summit Account. However, Appellee claims that the presentation of this evidence would have been improperly prejudicial because the documents were not disclosed properly in discovery or timely offered.
At trial, Appellant made the same argument as he made in this motion, that the Summit Account was non-marital property. So, this is not a case where a party is attempting to “raise issues after the fact that could have been raised earlier but were not.” Steinhoff, 144 Md. App. at 484. However, Appellant is raising evidence that could have been raised in trial but was not.
As for whether the omission was inadvertent, it must be determined if these documents were previously available to Appellant. These documents were in fact available to Appellant at the time of trial. This was a trust of which Appellant was a beneficiary, and he had the means to obtain documentation of the trust leading up to trial. There was no evidence presented that Appellant attempted to enter trust documents prior to trial or at trial. Appellant was also specifically asked about these documents and whether he brought them to trial. The omission appears to be purposeful since Appellant was on notice about the importance of these documents to the case, yet did not provide them during the trial until an adverse ruling was made. Additionally, Cheri Dorsey was previously available as a witness but was not brought before the trial court.
“When a party requests that a court reconsider a ruling solely because of new arguments that the party could have raised before the court ruled, the court has almost limitless discretion not to consider those arguments. By contrast, when a party makes a prompt and timely request that a court reconsider a ruling because of a development that the party could not have raised before the court ruled, the court can and should reconsider its decision.” Schlotzhauer, 224 Md. App. at 85, aff’d, 449 Md. 217 (citing Steinhoff, 144 Md. App. at 484). This case does not involve a development that the party could not have raised before the court ruled.
While Appellant presented evidence necessary to support his position on the issue of the classification of marital property, we review the trial court’s decision to deny a Motion to Alter or Amend a judgment for abuse of discretion. Because of that highly deferential standard, one where the trial court’s discretion “is virtually without limit,” Steinhoff, 144 Md. App. at 484, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend.
We agree with Appellant that this case does not involve
Appellant using a Motion to Alter or Amend to present a new issue not raised before the trial court. However, the fact remains that a Motion to Alter or Amend is not an opportunity for Appellant to gain an additional opportunity to relitigate issues that were already addressed in a threeday trial. See Steinhoff, 144 Md. App. at 484. After initially presenting evidence to argue that the Summit Account should be classified as non-marital property and losing on this issue, Appellant used the post-trial Motion to present new evidence, which was neither unavailable to Appellant prior to trial, inadvertently omitted at trial, nor newly discovered after trial, in the hopes of receiving a different
outcome. The trial court acted within its discretion by not allowing Appellant to re-try this issue with new evidence. See Della Ratta, 183 Md. App. at 374 (citing Cooper, 357 Md. at 638–40). Appellant should have taken the initial trial as the opportunity to present this evidence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 Originally, Appellee filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce on May 28, 2021. After the parties had been separated for the requisite amount of time, Appellee amended her Complaint to a Complaint for Absolute Divorce.
2 In this motion, the Appellant also argued he should have received a monetary award for half of the Appellee’s retirement funds. He does not raise that argument on appeal so we will not address it further.
3 We note that “the adverse party’s refusal, taken alone, does not relieve a party of his or her burden of proof on the issue which was the subject of the question.” Long, 141 Md. App. at 348 (citing Robinson, 328 Md. at 516 n.2). As discussed above, Appellant had the burden of proof to show the Summit Account was marital property. The trial court also did not solely rely on the invocation of the Fifth Amendment, but also the Appellant’s lack
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 1 (2026)
Fraud; extrinsic fraud; hearing
Jennifer S. Horne v.
Robert M. Horne
Nos. 817 & 1701, September Term 2024; No. 102, September Term 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order requiring the sale of the marital home following wife’s divorce from husband, and after wife refused multiple opportunities to purchase the house. Although wife argued that the circuit court’s refusal to grant her an evidentiary hearing on her allegations of fraud was tantamount to extrinsic fraud, this argument was rejected.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
the circuit court’s deadline. Those efforts were unsuccessful, however, and in October 2022, the circuit court granted the Trustee’s motion to begin the process of a public sale.
In January 2023, the Trustee received an acceptable offer to purchase the house. Before accepting that offer, the Trustee made one final attempt to reach an agreement that would allow Jennifer to acquire the house. When that attempt was also unsuccessful, the Trustee accepted the third-party offer and signed a contract of sale on February 1, 2023.
In March 2023, the Trustee filed a motion informing the circuit court that defects in the title needed to be cured before the title could be insured by a Maryland licensed title insurer and the sale could proceed. The Trustee requested permission to take actions to cure those defects so that he could give a merchantable title. On March 28, 2023, the circuit court issued an order approving the contract of sale and the addenda, approving the purchasers (the Phelps), approving the purchase price, authorizing the Trustee to convey the house to the purchasers, and ordering that the house be vacated by 9:00 a.m. on March 31, 2023.
In these appeals,1 appellant Jennifer Horne seeks to void the actions of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County ordering the sale of her former marital home following her divorce from appellee Robert Horne. To do so, she appeals the circuit court’s denial of her exceptions to the Auditor’s report following the sale, and the denial of two motions asking the circuit court to exercise its revisory powers under Maryland Rule 2-535(b). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the actions of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
This case has a long and complex history that we will not recite in its entirety. As is relevant to the current appeals, the parties were granted a Judgment of Absolute Divorce in April 2022. One of the provisions of that judgment gave Jennifer the option to purchase Robert’s equity in the house for the amount designated in the judgment. Unhappy with the circuit court’s calculation, Jennifer declined to follow the judgment and instead began a campaign to challenge it.2
Notwithstanding Jennifer’s efforts, in August 2022, a Trustee was appointed to sell the house after the deadline had passed for her to exercise the purchase option.
After the Trustee was appointed, he attempted to reach an agreement with Jennifer and Robert that would have allowed Jennifer to purchase the house even though she had missed
Despite the court’s order, on the morning of March 31st, although Jennifer had left the house, she had not removed any of her personal belongings or household items. As a result, the Phelps’ title company would not move forward with the sale. Rather than terminate the sale, the Phelps and the Trustee completed another addendum to the contract to postpone settlement to April 3, 2023. By the night of April 2, 2023, however, Jennifer still had not moved her belongings out of the house and yet another addendum was executed to postpone settlement until 11 a.m. on April 7, 2023. Over the following two days, Jennifer and her movers worked under the supervision of the Trustee’s agent to remove her belongings. By the night of April 6, 2023, although the move was incomplete and the house was not in proper condition to be transferred, Jennifer informed the Trustee that she would not return to reclaim property left behind or to clean. After a walkthrough, the Phelps informed the Trustee that settlement could not occur with the house in its current condition. As a result, the Trustee hired third-party agents to finish removing abandoned property and trash from the house. Settlement ultimately occurred on April 7, 2023. The Trustee filed the report of sale on April 13, 2023. The sale was ratified by the circuit court on July 1, 2023.
Jennifer has unsuccessfully challenged the sale of the house in numerous motions and appeals. In addition to a direct appeal from the judgment of absolute divorce, Jennifer filed a separate notice of appeal challenging the circuit court’s March 2023 order approving the contract of
sale and authorizing the Trustee to move forward. This Court dismissed that action as an improper interlocutory appeal. See Horne v. Horne, No. 411, September Term 2023 (dismissed June 8, 2023). On April 4, 2023, after her failure to vacate the house had delayed settlement, Jennifer filed a Motion for Immediate Possession alleging that because the settlement did not occur on time, the contract was void. The circuit court denied the motion on May 1, 2023. On May 12, 2023, Jennifer filed a motion to hold the Trustee in contempt and have the report of sale withdrawn. On May 15, 2023, Jennifer filed exceptions to the report of sale and requested a hearing. The circuit court dismissed the petition for contempt on June 2, 2023, and denied Jennifer’s exceptions without a hearing and ratified the sale on July 1, 2023. On July 3, 2023, Jennifer filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court’s ratification order. That action was stayed pending the resolution of her appeal of the judgment of absolute divorce. In December 2023, this Court issued an unreported opinion on direct appeal of the judgment of absolute divorce, affirming the orders of the circuit court. Horne v. Horne, No. 483, September Term 2022 (December 8, 2023). Thereafter, in February 2024, this Court dismissed Jennifer’s appeal of the ratification order as moot. Horne v. Horne, No. 889, September Term 2023 (dismissed February 2, 2024).
In April 2024, the Auditor filed his report. Jennifer filed exceptions and requested a hearing. She also filed a motion asking the circuit court to reconsider its order approving the payment of the Trustee’s fees. The circuit court denied both motions without a hearing. The circuit court ratified the Auditor’s report on April 26, 2024, and Jennifer filed a motion asking the circuit court to reconsider. After the circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration, Jennifer filed a notice of appeal, docketed in this Court as No. 817 of the 2024 term.
A few months later, in August 2024, Jennifer filed a motion under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) titled “Emergency Motion to Void the Trial Courts Ratification Order and Deed Under Rule 2-535(b) Request Hearing.” In that motion, Jennifer sought to have the circuit court void its orders ratifying the sale of the house because, she alleged, the Trustee and the purchasers had committed fraud. She requested a hearing on her motion. She also filed a motion asking that the judge assigned to her case be reassigned so that her motion would be decided by a different judge. The circuit court denied Jennifer’s motion on September 13, 2024, with the notation that the “sale of 33A Brett Manor Court, and ratification of the sale was lawful, fair, and proper and has been fully and finally concluded. Each request for relief DENIED.” Jennifer again filed motions to reconsider that were also denied. Jennifer then filed a notice of appeal, docketed in this Court as No. 1701 of the 2024 term.
Finally, in December 2024, Jennifer filed another motion under Rule 2-535(b), titled “Plaintiff Motion Under Rule 2-535(b) to Vacate the Trial Court’s Judgment of Absolute Divorce and Transfer of the House.” In this motion, Jennifer asked the circuit court to vacate the judgment of absolute divorce and void all of the actions that had occurred since it was entered. Jennifer alleged that the circuit court had acted without jurisdiction by incorporating the parties’ preexisting custody order into the judgment of absolute divorce and that Robert had committed extrinsic fraud. The circuit
court denied the motion to vacate and the ensuing motion to reconsider. Jennifer filed another notice of appeal, docketed in this Court as No. 102 of the 2025 term.
This brings us up to the present opinion addressing all three pending appeals. We will address the issues in the order that the appeals were filed.
DISCUSSION
I. Auditor’s Report
We first address Jennifer’s appeal of the circuit court’s denial of her exceptions to the Auditor’s report and release of funds without first granting her a hearing. In response, Robert argues that Jennifer was not entitled to a hearing because, although she requested one under a separate heading at the end of her motion, she failed to note the request in the title of the motion as required by MD. RULE 2-311(f).3 Upon review of the record, we conclude that even if Jennifer properly requested a hearing, she has failed to identify harm that would require reversal.
Jennifer listed eight exceptions to the Auditor’s report: (#1) that the seller’s credit should have been taken only from Robert’s portion of the proceeds because she did not approve it; (#2) to the sale in general; (#3) to the commissions paid to the buyer’s and seller’s agents; (#4) to the Trustee’s fees and expenses; (#5) to the Auditor’s fee; (#6) to the amount paid to the children’s best interest attorney; (#7) that the deductions were made prior to the division of funds between her and Robert; and (#8) to the overall amount being paid to her. Jennifer attached a 43-page affidavit as an exhibit to her exceptions.
We note first that Jennifer’s broad exception to the sale in general (#2, above) is beyond the scope of proper exceptions to an Auditor’s report. Exceptions to an Auditor’s report are appropriate when they are directed “to the allowance or disallowance of expenses of the sale or the distribution of net proceeds.” Huertas v. Ward, 248 Md. App. 187, 206 (2020) (quoting Hood v. Driscoll, 227 Md. App. 689, 694 n.1 (2016)). “The opportunity to file exceptions to the Auditor’s report is not an additional opportunity to challenge the adjudication of rights in the real property.” Huertas, 248 Md. App. at 206 (2020). Thus, Jennifer cannot challenge the validity of the sale itself as an exception to the Auditor’s report.
Next, two of the exceptions (#4 and #6, above) are duplicative of challenges that have been previously adjudicated and are thus barred by res judicata Shirk v. Sneeringer, 163 Md. 265 (1932) (holding that “the rule that the court cannot permit litigation of the same subject by the same parties twice” applies “in cases of second exceptions filed to accounts after adjudication of earlier exceptions”). The Trustee’s fees and expenses (#4, above) were approved separately by the circuit court in an order dated April 9, 2023, and the circuit court denied her motion to reconsider that approval. Jennifer cannot relitigate those same exceptions again. And the amount and allocation of fees to the children’s best interest attorney (#6, above) was ordered by the circuit court in the judgment of absolute divorce and affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. Jennifer cannot relitigate that finding as an exception to the Auditor’s report.
Of the remaining five exceptions, Jennifer provides support for only one. Jennifer excepts to the commissions paid to the buyer’s and seller’s agents (#3, above) on the grounds that the Phelps were contractually obligated to pay those expenses. In her affidavit, Jennifer refers us to paragraph 50 of the sales contract. The text of paragraph 50 does not, however, support her exception. Paragraph 50 of the sales contract provides that the buyers would pay all settlement costs and charges, including, but not limited to, all Lender’s fees in connection herewith, including title examination and title insurance fees, loan insurance premiums, all document preparation and recording fees, notary fees, survey fees where required, and all recording charges, except those incident to clearing existing encumbrances or title defects.
Paragraph 50 does not list real estate agent commissions as among the closing costs. Moreover, real estate commissions are typically contractual obligations that are not contingent on closing. See MD. CODE, REAL PROP. § 14-105. Thus, Jennifer has failed to show that she would be entitled to any relief on this exception (#4).
For the final four exceptions (#1, #5, #7, and #8, above), Jennifer provides no explanation or support, either in the exceptions themselves or in her lengthy affidavit. It is well-established that “‘appellate courts of this State will not reverse a lower court judgment for harmless error.’” Sumpter v. Sumpter, 436 Md. 74, 82 (2013) (quoting Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 319 (1987)). To justify reversal, Jennifer had the burden of demonstrating not only error, but prejudicial error that caused an identifiable injury. Harris, 310 Md. at 319 (citing Joseph Bros. Co. v. Schonthal, 99 Md. 382, 400 (1904)). To reverse the order of the circuit court and remand for a hearing, it is not enough to state that she disagrees with some of the calculations. There must be some foundation for that disagreement that could potentially entitle Jennifer to relief. See MD. RULE 2-543(g) (1) (“Exceptions shall be in writing and shall set forth the asserted error with particularity.”). Because she has failed to make that showing, we conclude that any error in the circuit court’s denial of Jennifer’s exceptions and release of the funds without a hearing was harmless. 4
II. Motion to Void the Ratification Order and Deed
We next address Jennifer’s August 2024 Motion to Void the Trial Court’s Ratification Order and Deed under Maryland Rule 2-535(b). In her motion, Jennifer argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to ratify the sale of the house because of fraud. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. On appeal, Jennifer now argues that the circuit court’s repeated refusal to grant her an evidentiary hearing on her allegations of fraud, including the emergency motion, is tantamount to extrinsic fraud because she has been prevented from presenting her claims to the court. She is mistaken.
A. Rule 2-535(b)
Because more than 30 days had elapsed between the entry of the judgment and the filing of the motion for reconsideration, the circuit court can only exercise its revisory power under
very narrow circumstances. Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. 584, 604-05 (2021). To be eligible for relief, Jennifer must make a showing of “fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” MD. RULE 2-535(b). For purposes of Rule 2-535(b), these categories are interpreted very narrowly. Peay v. Barnett, 236 Md. App. 306, 321 (2018). Fraud is limited to extrinsic fraud, mistake is limited to jurisdictional mistakes, and irregularity is limited to procedural irregularity. Facey, 249 Md. App. at 604-05; Thacker v. Hale, 146 Md. App. 203, 219-222 (2002). The circuit court has broad discretion when ruling on a motion to revise a judgment, and we review its decision for an abuse of that discretion only. Peay, 236 Md. App. at 315-16; Shih Ping Li v. Tzu Lee, 210 Md. App. 73, 97 (2013) (citing Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 484-85 (2002)).
Here, Jennifer has failed to establish the necessary factual predicates to support the exercise of the court’s revisory power.
Jennifer’s primary argument in her motion—that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to ratify the sale— is based on a misunderstanding of what constitutes a “jurisdictional error.” As a general matter, “jurisdiction refers to two quite distinct concepts: (i) the power of a court to render a valid decree, and (ii) the propriety of granting the relief sought.” Thacker, 146 Md. App. at 224 (quoting Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497, 507 (1958)). Rule 2-535(b) provides relief only where the power of a court to act is in question, that is, where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action and the relief sought or lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties involved. Thacker, 146 Md. App. at 224. There is no real dispute that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the sale of the house pursuant to the judgment of absolute divorce, or that it had personal jurisdiction over Jennifer, Robert, and the court-appointed Trustee. Even if we were to assume that all of Jennifer’s allegations are true, she has at most alleged that the circuit court made “simply a legal mistake or error of law.” Id. at 227 (cleaned up) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 75 Md. App. 364, 372 (1988)). An error of law is voidable on direct appeal but does not render the entire judgment either void ab initio or subject to collateral attack under Rule 2-535(b).
Jennifer’s argument on appeal—that by repeatedly denying her requests for a hearing, the circuit court has acted in way that is “tantamount to extrinsic fraud”—is simply wrong. Extrinsic fraud is an act that is “collateral to the issues tried in the case” and “prevents an adversarial trial [because] it keeps a party ignorant of the action and prevents them from presenting their case.” Facey, 249 Md. App. at 632. When a party commits extrinsic fraud, it has the effect of preventing the case from reaching the court. When a court decides a motion, with or without a hearing, the case has most assuredly reached the court for a decision to be made. Nothing a court does is extrinsic (as opposed to intrinsic) fraud.
Jennifer’s insistence that she has never been allowed to present her allegations is based on the misconception that without an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court cannot, will not, and did not consider the substance of her allegations. That is simply not true. A written motion to the court must “state with particularity the grounds and the authorities
in support of each ground” and must include either as an attachment, by reference to the record, or in an affidavit, the evidence that the movant wishes the court to consider. MD. RULE 2-311(c), (d). By denying a motion without a hearing, the court is not refusing to consider the movant’s allegations. The court has considered her allegations and determined that there was already enough information either included with the motion or already contained in the record to rule on the motion. Jennifer has filed several affidavits with the circuit court, and as described by her motions, all of the purportedly fraudulent actions occurred within the confines of the judicial sale of the house, under the supervision of the circuit court, and are well documented in the record. No evidentiary hearing was necessary.
B. Recusal
In connection with her motion to void the ratification order, Jennifer filed several motions— some with the circuit court itself and some directed at the Baltimore County administrative judge—requesting that the judge assigned to her case, Judge Robert E. Cahill, Jr., either recuse himself or be recused. Jennifer specifically sought to have someone other than Judge Cahill rule on her motion because she believed that Judge Cahill “had animus toward her as a litigant” and could not make impartial decisions about her case. Although Jennifer argues on appeal that Judge Cahill erred in denying her requests to recuse himself, she is very wrong.
For a judge to be recused from a case, the party seeking recusal must allege prejudice that stems from “an extrajudicial source.” Conner v. State, 472 Md. 722, 744 (2021) (quoting Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 77 (1990)). A judge’s impartiality cannot be attacked “on the basis of information and beliefs acquired while acting in [their] judicial capacity.” Conner, 472 Md. at 744 (quoting Boyd, 321 Md. at 77). Here, the only evidence of prejudice that Jennifer identifies is that Judge Cahill denied all of her requests for evidentiary hearings on her motions and that she believes those denials demonstrate personal bias against her. We disagree. There is a strong presumption that judges know the law and apply it correctly. State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 181 (2003). Thus, our presumption is that Judge Cahill denied each request for a hearing based on the correct application of the law. Adverse rulings “[do] not automatically mean that [the judge was] biased or prejudiced against” a party. Hill v. Hill, 79 Md. App. 708, 716 & n.4 (1989). Indeed, if an adverse ruling or denial of a hearing were enough for a litigant to claim bias, no judge would be qualified to preside over a case to its end. Recusal is not required when the complaining party alleges bias arising solely from “a source within the ‘four corners of the courtroom.’” Conner, 472 Md. at 744 (quoting Doering v. Fader, 316 Md. 351, 355 (1989)). Because that is the only kind of bias Jennifer alleges, we see no abuse of discretion in Judge Cahill’s refusal to recuse himself.
III. Motion to Vacate Judgment of Absolute Divorce
Finally, we address Jennifer’s appeal of the circuit court’s denial of her Rule 2-535(b) Motion to Vacate the Judgment of Absolute Divorce on the grounds that (#1) the circuit
court made a jurisdictional mistake when it incorporated the parties’ amended custody order into the judgment of absolute divorce; and (#2) that Robert committed extrinsic fraud in the post-trial proceedings and in the direct appeal. As relief, Jennifer requests that this Court vacate its previous unreported opinion and void the circuit court’s orders all the way back to the judgment of absolute divorce, including all actions pertaining to the sale of the house. As with Jennifer’s previous Rule 2-535(b) motion, neither allegation meets the meets the requirements for the circuit court to exercise its revisory power under Rule 2-535(b).
A. Amended Custody Order
In her brief, Jennifer asserts that by the time the judgment of absolute divorce was entered, the amended custody order had been superseded by a contempt order which prevented Robert from having overnight access with the children until he met certain conditions. Jennifer argues that, because those conditions were never met, custody of the parties’ children was controlled by the contempt order, and by incorporating the amended custody order into the judgment of absolute divorce, the circuit court improperly modified custody without first finding that there had been a material change in circumstances.5 She further argues that because custody was not an issue before the circuit court at the hearing, it did not have jurisdiction to modify custody in the judgment of absolute divorce, and that this constituted a jurisdictional mistake that makes the judgment of absolute divorce void ab initio
Similar to the error in her previous Rule 2-535(b) motion, Jennifer’s argument misunderstands what constitutes jurisdictional error. There is no real question that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce proceedings. Although child custody was determined in the first half of the bifurcated proceedings, the court retains continuing jurisdiction of child custody cases. MD. CODE, FAM. LAW § 9.5-202. The circuit court therefore had personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Thacker, 146 Md. App. at 224. Even if we were to assume that by incorporating the amended custody order into the judgment of absolute divorce the circuit court had unintentionally modified custody,6 it would at most be a legal mistake or error of law. Id. at 227. Thus, had Jennifer successfully raised such an argument on direct appeal, the court’s action could have been voidable. But it was not void ab initio and is not subject to collateral attack under Rule 2-535(b).
B. Extrinsic Fraud
Jennifer also misunderstands the distinction between extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud. As previously explained, extrinsic fraud is something that prevents an adversarial trial from occurring, while intrinsic fraud is something that occurs during the course of the litigation. Facey, 249 Md. App. at 616. Only a finding of extrinsic fraud will render a judgment voidable under Rule 2-535(b). Id. at 611.
Jennifer argues that Robert committed fraud twice: first, in his post-trial memorandum to the circuit court by requesting an indemnity clause for the first time and misrepresenting
facts about the parties’ respective financial liabilities; and second, by improperly redacting documents in the record on direct appeal, resulting in an unjust opinion from this Court that relied on false facts. Jennifer argues that these actions should be considered extrinsic fraud because she was not allowed to directly respond to Robert’s post-trial memorandum, and because Robert’s misrepresentations prevented this Court and the circuit court from making a fair evaluation of the issues. She is mistaken.
All the actions that Jennifer describes indisputably occurred within the adversarial proceedings. Indeed, Jennifer challenged the circuit court’s use of Robert’s posttrial memorandum on direct appeal, and she acknowledges that on direct appeal, she submitted unredacted copies of the same evidence. Thus, any purported fraud was intrinsic and fails to meet the standard for revision under Rule 2-535(b). The circuit court did not err in denying her motion to vacate the judgment of absolute divorce.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 Although filed as three separate appeals, the cases all stem from the same original circuit court case, involve the same parties, and many of the arguments are duplicative. We therefore exercise our discretion to address them in one opinion.
2 Jennifer disputed the circuit court’s calculation of the buyout price primarily on the grounds that the circuit court failed to properly credit her contribution of non-marital funds used to purchase the house. Specifically, the circuit court found that a gift of $100,000 from Jennifer’s mother was to both Jennifer and Robert, not to Jennifer individually. Jennifer has consistently maintained that she could not agree to the buyout price until she was credited for the additional $50,000 contribution of individual funds and the buyout price was corrected. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of absolute divorce and the circuit court’s calculation of the buyout price. See Horne v. Horne, No. 483, September Term 2022, at *4-5 (December 8, 2023).
3 The Maryland Rules provide that the “court may decide exceptions [to an Auditor’s report] without a hearing unless a hearing is requested with the exceptions.” MD. RULE 2-543(h). The rules further provide that a “party desiring a hearing on a motion … shall request the hearing in the motion or response under the heading ‘Request for Hearing.’ The title of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested.” MD. RULE 2-311(f). In this case, although Jennifer did not state that a hearing was requested in the title of her motion, she did request a hearing under a separate heading. We exercise our discretion to decline to base our decision on whether Jennifer’s request fully complied with the Maryland Rules and instead base it on Jennifer’s failure to show that she was prejudiced by the lack of a hearing.
4 Jennifer also challenges the circuit court’s denial of her motion to reconsider the order ratifying the Auditor’s report. A circuit court has almost unlimited authority to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. Shih Ping Li v. Tzu Lee, 210 Md. App. 73, 97-98 (2013) (citing Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 484-85 (2002)). In her motion to reconsider, Jennifer identified the same exceptions but added details about the calculations and amounts that had been entirely absent from her initial filing. A motion to reconsider is not an opportunity to raise arguments that could have been raised previously. Shih Ping Li, 210 Md. App. at 97-98 (citing Steinhoff, 144 Md. App. at 484-85). We see no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s refusal to reconsider its order.
5 Based solely on this allegation, appeal no. 102 of the 2025 Term was expedited under Maryland Rule 8-207.
6 We note that Jennifer’s factual assertions misrepresent the contempt order in several respects. First, Jennifer was the party found in contempt, not Robert. Although it appears that neither Jennifer nor Robert completed the actions ordered by the circuit court,
7 We note that apart from failing to meet the requirements of Rule 2-535(b), all of the arguments Jennifer raised in her motions to void and vacate would be barred by res judicata
The doctrine of res judicata “bars the relitigation of a claim if there is a final judgment in a previous litigation where the parties, the subject matter[,] and causes of action are identical or substantially identical” to either issues that were actually litigated or issues that could or should have been litigated. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 106-07 (2005). The purpose of res judicata is to protect “the courts, as well as the parties, from the attendant burdens of relitigation.” Id. at 107. “To avoid the vagaries of res judicata’s preclusive effect, a party must assert all the legal theories he wishes to in his initial action.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 392 (2000) (emphasis removed). Failure to assert a legal theory “does not deprive the ensuing judgment of its effect as res judicata.” Id. (emphasis removed). Indeed, “even if a ruling in an original suit was found later to be in error, the mere fact that the prior ruling is wrong does not deprive it of res judicata effect.” Powell v. Breslin, 430 Md. 52, 64 (2013) (cleaned up).
The “effect of a final ratification of sale is res judicata as to the validity of such sale, except in the case of fraud or illegality.” Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 72 (2008) (citations omitted). Even with that caveat, Jennifer cannot continue to challenge
the sale of the house because her allegations of fraud and irregularity have been previously adjudicated and are barred by res judicata. Jennifer has repeatedly argued that the Trustee and Phelps committed fraud in the sale of the house because the title and deed were transferred to the Phelps before the sale was ratified by the court. Although the circuit court had granted the Trustee’s motion to transfer the property, Jennifer maintains that the transaction was invalid, and as a result, the Phelps committed fraud when they filed the deed with the county, thereby invalidating their status as bona fide purchasers and rendering the deed akin to a forgery. Jennifer has vigorously and repeatedly argued that this rendered the entire sale void ab initio and the circuit court should void the ratification and award her ownership and immediate possession of the house, with an award of monetary damages to be determined later.
Although not exhaustive, our review of the record shows that Jennifer has made this same argument to the circuit court no less than four times: in her March 28, 2023 Motion for Reconsideration of the circuit court’s order allowing the Trustee to convey 33A Brett Manor Court to the Phelps; in her April 4, 2023 Motion for Immediate Possession; in her May 12, 2023 petition for Contempt against the Trustee; and in her May 15, 2023 Exceptions to the Notice of Sale. All of these motions were denied by the circuit court, as were their corresponding motions for reconsideration. Even if we assume that there was something erroneous in the transfer of the house, the validity of the sale has been finally litigated and res judicata precludes Jennifer from continuing to raise these allegations. Indeed, this is precisely the type of situation that res judicata is intended to prevent. At some point, litigation has to end.
Jennifer’s challenges to the judgment of the absolute divorce are similarly barred by res judicata. Jennifer had the opportunity—and did—appeal the judgment of absolute divorce to this Court. It was incumbent upon her to raise any possible grounds for relief at that time. She cannot reopen the litigation every time she thinks of a new legal theory.
