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Maryland Family Law Update is a review of events as they affect the practice of domestic relations in law in the state of Maryland published by The Daily Record, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
The laws of every jurisdiction may differ, and the facts are capable of many interpretations. The contents of this publication are not to be construed as legal advice and should not be acted upon without consulting an attorney. Letters selected for publication are subject to editing. Letters from litigants in pending cases or their representatives will not be accepted for publication until after their cases have been finally decided. Address letters and comments to Editor, Maryland Family Law Update, 200 St. Paul Place, Suite 2480, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. Maryland Family Law Update and The Daily Record Company are owned by Bridgetower Media.
3 Child Advocacy: One-on-one support for foster youth: What is it and does it work?
4 Cover Story: Parenting coordinators help clients tune in to each other.
6 In the News:
Baltimore County divorce attorney disbarred
A Baltimore County divorce lawyer was disbarred for failure to competently represent a client and lack of cooperation with the investigation by the bar counsel.
7 In the News:
Bill advocates say judges should consider toll of domestic abuse in sentencing
A bill in the Maryland legislature would allow victims of domestic violence to present evidence about how the abuse factored into their crimes while seeking lighter sentences.
8 In the News:
Grandson’s estate keeps property after killing grandfather
The estate of a man who killed his grandfather hours before taking his own life will keep the property the grandfather gave to the grandson.
9 Monthly Memo
Insufficient assertion of intent dooms divorce complaint … Child’s primary placement, best interests challenged … Parental rights termination order vacated for defective notice … SC appeals court overturns alimony award, upholds child support … RI Supreme Court reverses dissolution of protective order … Appeals court overturns juvenile guardianship
One-on-one support for foster youth: What is it and does it work?
In September 2025, 16-year-old Kanaiyah Ward tragically died, allegedly due to an overdose, in a Baltimore hotel.
A child in foster care, Kanaiyah had been placed in the hotel by the local department of social services (department), who had assigned her a one-on-one aide.
Children in foster care who have high service needs may be assigned a 1:1 temporarily by the department.
“The goal of providing oneon-one service(s) is to provide a more intensive level of care for the safety and security of the youth and others affected by the youth’s behavior.”
“These are exceptional interventions provided beyond the scope of the [foster care program] deemed necessary to resolve the immediate situation and to maintain the placement for the youth.”
1:1 services are temporary supplemental services that “are not intended to replace the professional treatment services needed by the youth and are generally for the purpose of providing awake supervision by staff comparable to Provider childcare staff.”
Importantly, “[y]outh who require long-term one-on-one support should not be placed with [foster care providers] whose service profiles do not address the intensity of need demonstrated by the youth.”
For children with intense medical or mental health needs, 1:1 support should supplement, not replace, a setting that can meet their needs.
Children in foster care who are diagnosed with serious medical conditions or a serious emotional, behavioral, or psychological condition are eligible for treatment
LITTLE JOAN
Child Advocacy
foster care placements. COMAR 07.02.11.33.
“The goal of treatment foster care is to provide intensive services to a child with a serious emotional, behavioral, medical, or psychological condition.” COMAR 07.02.21.02.
According to the State’s Request for Proposals for 1:1 services, all 1:1 staff must, among other requirements, pass a criminal background check; meet certain education and experience requirements; be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; and receive certification in Therapeutic Crisis Intervention, Crisis Prevention Intervention, and Safe Crisis Management, prior to providing any services.
The minimum education and experience requirements are an associate’s degree in a human services field and one year of experience working with children, adolescents, or transition-age youth or a high school diploma or GED and a minimum of two years’ experience working with children, adolescents, or transition-age youth.
Within 60 days of hiring, 1:1 staff must possess and maintain a Residential Child and Youth Care Practitioner license.
RCYCP Certification requires participation in a State Boardapproved training program designed to provide a “fundamental working knowledge of the varied aspects of performing the direct responsibilities related to activities of daily living, self-help, and socialization to children and youth in residential child care programs”,
and the passing of an online Standards Examination with a minimum score of 75%. See COMAR 10.57.01.01(B)(8)(a) and (b).
Topic areas covered in the RCYCP training include: (1) the Residential Child and Youth Care Practitioner, (2) Child and Adolescent Development, (3) Communication Skills, (4) Life Skills Development, (5) Trauma, (6) Legal and Ethical Issues in Residential Care, and 7) Standards of Health and Safety.
Regulations require weekly clinical supervision of 1:1 staff by a Licensed Clinical Social Worker and that staff “receive a minimum of two (2) in-service training programs annually on such topics as: child safety, trauma-informed care, crisis de-escalation, youth engagement and executive skills coaching.”
The requirements for and regulations governing 1:1 staff appear to provide for the appropriate degree of professionalism required.
However, there is a significant absence in the regulations addressing the number and length of contact hours 1:1s are to have with the foster children they serve.
The structure and purpose of those contact hours is also not subject to regulation.
The 1:1 serving Kanaiyah was reportedly on a 53-hour shift.
Regulations that provide guidance and standardization concerning a 1:1’s contacts with the child being served would encourage and support stability in that child’s placement and promote the best interests of children in the foster care system.
Joan Little is a Chief Attorney at Maryland Legal Aid.
Parenting coordinators help clients tune in to each other
By Hope Keller Special to The Daily Record
Parenting coordinators and mediators are both neutral third parties who focus on the best interests of children in divorce cases. But their roles are not interchangeable.
Governed by Maryland Rule 9-205.2, parenting coordination is defined as a process designed to reduce the effects or potential effects of conflict on a couple’s children. And, while a parenting coordinator, or PC, may use alternative dispute resolution techniques, the rule states that their role is distinct.
A court can order parents to work with a PC in the pre- or post-judgment phase of a case, attorneys can suggest clients consult a PC, or parents can seek out a parenting coordination professional themselves.
Help with communication
Heather McCabe, co-managing partner at McCabe Russell in Fulton, said parenting coordination is helpful when parents are struggling simply to understand each other.
“I recommend it most times where you have a couple that is sort of missing the ‘frequency’ of the other parent,” said McCabe, who is qualified as a parenting coordinator. “In those cases, it can be very easy for a professional, whether it’s a lawyer or a mental health person, to say, ‘You know, in translation what this person is trying to say is this,’ or ‘Hey, your email is not very friendly – you might try a different approach.’ “
Parenting coordinators in Maryland must have a graduate degree in a field such as law, psychology or social work.
McCabe emphasized that parenting coordination is not appropriate when there is a significant power imbalance or a history of abuse between the parties.
“Not all parents can be kumbaya,”
she said. “In some cases, I don’t think going to this ‘let’s all get along’ environment is going to be that useful.”
Role of parenting coordinators
Among other things, parenting coordinators are authorized to help resolve disputes over custody and visitation orders and to make minor, temporary modifications to a parenting schedule.
And, unlike mediators, parenting coordinators can be subpoenaed to
produce documents and to testify as fact witnesses – which can make them very helpful for attorneys.
“It can be a nice sort of lever in our toolbox to be able to say, ‘OK, we’ll agree to a parenting coordinator, but we want that person to be able to come testify about the parenting dynamic here if it becomes problematic,’ ” McCabe said. “Knowing that person has eyes on you as a potential witness, (a parent will) probably behave a little better.”
THE DAILY RECORD FILE PHOTO
Heather McCabe, co-managing partner at McCabe Russell in Fulton, said parenting coordination can be helpful when parents struggle to understand each other.
Lindsay Parvis, a partner at Joseph Greenwald & Laake in Rockville and a parenting coordinator, said PCs are particularly useful when one party has problems that disrupt a parenting schedule.
“It might be around a parent who has substance issues,” she said. “Having a parenting coordinator be able to step in and work with the family on how to adjust the parenting time schedule (is helpful) so that folks aren’t in the situation where every time something goes wrong they have to go back to court.”
PCs can also assist a two-household family when geography is an issue, either in daily life or when planning vacations that involve trips.
“Having the parenting coordinator to sort through the travel and the logistics and when things are going to happen, that can be very helpful for those families,” Parvis said.
Scope of service
Jessica Markham, managing principal at Markham Law Firm in Bethesda, said attorneys must be specific when drafting an order of appointment for a parenting coordinator. Vague terms such as “co-parenting therapy” can result in arguments over the scope of work, she said.
“(Attorneys need to ensure) that it says what they want it to say and the scope is what they want it to be,” Markham said.
Parvis, too, emphasized that precision is key.
“When parents choose to work with a parenting coordinator, the more detailed they can be about the responsibilities and scope of services – whether it’s a settlement agreement, a parenting plan or a custody order – the more helpful it is for expectation-setting for everybody,” she said. “Tell the PC what their lane is so they can then stay in their lane.”
Cost is another reason why it’s important to be clear about the parent-
ing coordinator’s role at the outset.
“PCs at heart are helpers, so we’re going to want to help in any way possible,” Parvis said. “But the unintended consequence of that is that
someone who doesn’t have a well-defined scope of PC services can end up involved in a PC process that’s much more expansive. And expansive means expensive.”
THE DAILY RECORD FILE PHOTO
Lindsay Parvis, partner at Joseph Greenwald & Laake, is a parenting coordinator and said they can be useful when one part has problems that disrupt a parenting schedule.
THE DAILY RECORD FILE PHOTO
Jessica Markham, managing principal at Markham Law Firm, said attorneys need to be specific when drafting the order for a parenting coordinator.
In the News
Baltimore County divorce lawyer disbarred
By Ian round IRound@TheDailyRecord.com
Baltimore County divorce lawyer Judith Marie Hamilton was disbarred in late January for her failure to competently represent a client and her subsequent lack of cooperation with the investigation by the Maryland Office of Bar Counsel.
Hamilton abandoned a client for four months in 2023. She didn’t participate in the discovery process, didn’t deposit her client’s $3,000 down payment into an Interest On Lawyers’ Trust Account, didn’t return the money after her client fired her and didn’t send records to that client’s new lawyer.
The Maryland Supreme Court disbarred her for violating the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct requiring competence, diligence and communication. She also violated rules regarding clients’ fees, the safekeeping of property and the termination of representation, and was found to have committed professional misconduct.
Hamilton ignored the bar counsel investigation. She was absent at hearings in June and July of 2025. The Baltimore County Circuit Court entered findings of fact without her objection, and the Maryland Supreme Court adopted them.
“In this case, Respondent wholly failed to participate in the disciplinary process,” Justice Peter Killough wrote. “She did not respond to the Petition, did not file exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s findings and conclusions, did not submit opposition memoranda to this Court, and waived oral argument.”
Hamilton did not respond to a request for comment. She did not have an attorney in the disciplinary process, according to court documents and Maryland Judiciary Case Search.
Hamilton in May 2023 entered an appearance in Baltimore County
Circuit Court and filed an answer to a counter-complaint. The judge accepted the answer, but rejected the entry of appearance because she failed to include a certificate of service.
She attended a scheduling conference in June and spoke to opposing counsel before and shortly after the conference. In early September, her client fired her, asked for his money back, and told the court he hadn’t heard from her since June.
She replied from a new email address, asking for additional documents. She did not acknowledge having been fired and, Killough wrote, she “provided no explanation regarding her long absence from his case.”
After that, her former client and opposing counsel filed complaints with the Attorney Grievance Commission. She didn’t respond.
The next spring, Bar Counsel investigators attempted to reach her at multiple email addresses, her home and office, and called nine different
phone numbers possibly associated with her. The investigator went to her house, but found it had been vacant for six months.
The state’s high court disbarred her without hearing oral arguments. She never responded to a notice that arguments were scheduled.
The court found several aggravating factors that weighed against her, including “dishonest and selfish behavior,” lack of cooperation, and indifference to rectifying the harm she caused. It found no mitigating factors that could have explained or lessened her punishment. While she had no disciplinary record, that was outweighed by her failure to cooperate with the investigation.
“Respondent’s complete lack of participation in this proceeding indicates a lack of respect for the profession and the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct,” Baltimore County Circuit Judge Garret Glennon Jr. wrote in the findings of fact. “The likelihood of repetition of such misconduct appears significant.”
Depositphotos
Judges should consider toll of domestic abuse in sentencing, advocates for bill say
By JasmIne Golden
The Washington Post
Domestic violence victims convicted of crimes in Maryland could present evidence of how the abuse factored into their crimes while seeking a lighter sentence under a bill being considered by state lawmakers.
A handful of states across the country have passed similar legislation in recent years, including Georgia, New York and Oklahoma.
Known as the PATH Act, short for providing alternatives through healing, the bill is co-sponsored by Sen. Shaneka Henson (D-Anne Arundel County) and Del. Stephanie Smith (D-Baltimore City). It awaits a hearing before the state Senate on Tuesday in Annapolis. The Maryland Alliance for Justice Reform, a nonpartisan advocacy organization, has named the bill one of its legislative priorities this session.
The architect behind the bill, Carmen Johnson, said the PATH ACT is aimed primarily at women whose offenses are directly linked to abuse, coercion or trauma. Without including domestic abuse as a mitigating factor at sentencing, Johnson said, domestic violence survivors convicted of crimes are re-traumatized.
“We’re asking that the judge consider domestic violence,” Johnson said. “Psychological, financial, physical, all of that.”
Johnson, co-founder and executive director of the social justice and research institute Helping Ourselves to Transform, took on the work for personal reasons. Formerly incarcerated herself, she said she’s also a survivor of domestic financial and psychological abuse. Johnson and her team spent months gathering research and information on domestic violence for an impact report alongside the bill.
In a letter addressed to Democratic Gov. Wes Moore published in the report,
the women of the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women wrote that many of them have experienced domestic violence.
“These experiences were not fully acknowledged or understood at the time of sentencing,” the women said in the letter. “Many of us reflect on our lives and hope that someone will one day take the time to understand our full stories with care and compassion.”
On a recent morning, Johnson, alongside Olinda Moyd, an attorney and executive board member of the Maryland Alliance for Justice Reform, went door to door lobbying for the PATH Act at lawmakers’ offices in Annapolis.
Moyd said victims don’t always report domestic violence to police. She explained to staffers the need to allow evidence from a variety of sources, including counselors, teachers or family members, which the bill would mandate.
The PATH Act would also allow those already incarcerated to introduce evidence of domestic violence if they qualify for a hearing for a new sentence. Prosecutors can introduce evidence that would rebut that evidence.
If a judge finds that domestic abuse contributed to a defendant’s crime, the sentence could go below the mandatory minimum or sentencing guidelines. The judge could also impose one that is “otherwise just and appropriate in light of the circumstances,” according to the bill.
Johnson doesn’t want to stop there. She would like to see commutations. Johnson said more than 20 women incarcerated in Maryland whose nonviolent crimes were related to domestic violence submitted commutation applications to the governor’s office.
In 1991, former Gov. William Donald Schaefer similarly commuted the sentences of eight women whose partners had abused them.
Lydia Watts, executive director of the Rebuild, Overcome, and Rise Center at
the University of Maryland at Baltimore, works with survivors of intimate partner violence.
Bills such as the PATH Act aren’t meant to avoid accountability for offenders, but to take into account all the circumstances, said Watts, who supports the bill. Alternatives to incarceration should also be explored, she said, such as providing services to help address root causes like poverty.
“That’s where things like the history of domestic violence become so critical so that we can actually come to a full assessment of what’s happened in this particular circumstance,” Watts said. “Why did this person feel like they had to act in this way? And what’s the appropriate way to hold them accountable?”
Reverend Melody Hession-Sigmon, an assistant to the bishop of the Delaware-Maryland Synod, part of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, said their church includes people at the Maryland Correctional Institute for Women.
Hession-Sigmon thinks about the case of a 63-year-old woman, who submitted testimony last year for another criminal justice reform bill. The woman wrote that she had only known her co-defendant for 30 days. She was sexually assaulted, held against her will and forced to take drugs, she said, before the crime, first-degree murder during a botched robbery, which she said she doesn’t remember.
“I had no desire to live,” the woman wrote in her testimony. “This would explain to me why I did not run away once I gained my co-defendant’s trust and he untied me.”
She was sentenced to life without parole and has been in prison for 36 years, Hession-Sigmon said.
“She got that harsh sentence without any of her traumatic context considered,” Hession-Sigmon said. “I don’t want that to happen to more women in the future.”
Grandson’s estate keeps property after grandson kills grandfather
BrIdGetower medIa newswIres
ROCHESTER, NY -- The estate of a man who killed his grandfather hours before taking his own life will keep the property the grandfather gave to the grandson.
Andrew Vahey, 24, fatally shot his grandfather, Joseph DePonceau, on June 27, 2024, then killed himself.
Theresa DePonceau and Tonya D. Wilson, the co-executors of the estate of DePonceau, filed a petition in Monroe County Surrogate’s Court to decide whether the property that DePonceau deeded to Vahey should be forfeited and revert back to DePonceau’s estate because Vahey killed his grandfather.
DePonceau deeded a home in Irondequoit to Vahey, while retaining a life use for himself. The life use obligated DePonceau to continue to be responsible for all taxes, assessments, and other expenses.
The deed of transfer also reserved to DePonceau the right to grant life use of the property to others. Under the arrangement, Vahey’s interest could be completely divested by DePonceau, but at the time of his death, DePonceau had not exercised that power.
“Petitioners believe that, because Andrew A. Vahey directly caused the death of decedent, Mr. Vahey’s estate must not profit therefrom, and his remainder interest should revert to the decedent’s estate,” according to the petition.
The estate contends summary judgment is warranted, forfeiting Vahey’s interest in the property because Vahey “directly caused” the death of his grandfather.
Vahey’s estate opposed the argument on the ground that Vahey’s interest was vested and not subject to forfeiture.
DePonceau’s estate conceded that Vahey’s interest was vested at the moment his grandfather deeded him the property, but argued that it was a “future interest subject to complete defeasance,” and because it could be “divested,” the property was subject to forfeiture for his act of killing his grandfather.
The estate argued that the vested interest was subject to being completely stripped by the exercise of DePonceau’s power of appointment, so Vahey was somehow less than fully vested because the arrangement was not unconditional and not protected.
“There is, however, a preliminary issue, one not briefed by either party, which is whether Andrew was a ‘wrongdoer,’ ” Judge Christopher S. Ciaccio wrote.
“No facts have been elicited to determine whether Andrew intentionally killed his grandfather or killed him involuntarily or … as a result of mental disease or defect,” Ciaccio wrote.
“Maybe the grandfather pushed him, and the gun, obviously loaded, unintentionally went off. Maybe it was pointed at the floor and Andrew stepped back, tripped and it pointed up and discharged. What happened is not known but certainly has not been established by anything approaching admissible non-hearsay evidence,” Ciaccio wrote.
“The assertion by the executors … that Andrew purposely killed his grandfather, does not constitute sufficient evidence,” Ciaccio wrote.
“The burden is on the estate to establish that Andrew is a wrongdoer,” he wrote.
“The burden not having been met, Andrew’s interest in the real property, which ascended to a fee simple absolute upon the death of his grandfather, passes to his estate,” Ciaccio wrote.
Depositphotos
Insufficient assertion of intent dooms divorce complaint
RICHMOND, VA -- A trial court granted a husband’s demurrer where his wife’s complaint for divorce did not expressly plead her intention to permanently separate on the date of their physical separation and the parties’ postnuptial agreement contradicted such an intent.
Finding no case law on point, Judge David A. Oblon of the Fairfax Circuit Court found support in opinions about desertion-based divorces that a “party seeking divorce based on living separate and apart must expressly or inferentially plead an intent to do so permanently.”
“The intent must commence at the time of the separation and predominate during the statutory period,” the judge wrote.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Child’s primary placement, best interests challenged
PROVIDENCE, RI -- Where a plaintiff father has challenged a Family Court order awarding the defendant mother primary placement of the parties’ two minor children, the order must be vacated because the Family Court judge neglected to make any factual findings concerning the children’s best interests.
“The plaintiff, Richard Conway, appeals from three Family Court orders. The first awards the defendant, Amanda Orenberg, primary placement of the parties’ two minor children, and the second, a handwritten order, details the plaintiff’s child-support obligation owed to the defendant. Further, the plaintiff requests that this Court vacate a child-support guideline worksheet simultaneously entered as an order of the Family Court in this matter. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the Family Court erred in (1) failing to entertain any testimony or evidence on the issues, (2) not considering the best interests of the children, and (3) entering orders as consent orders over his objection.
BridgeTower Media Newswires
Monthly Memo
Parental rights termination order vacated for defective notice
DETROIT, MI -- An order terminating the parental rights of a mother who was not present at a hearing has been vacated on appeal because of a lack of compliance with the statutory requirements for service of process.
“Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, ZW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions that led to the adjudication), (3)(c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), and (3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). Because respondent was not served in accordance with the requirements of MCL 712A.13 and the court rules, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings,” the Court of Appeals wrote in an unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bridgetower Media Newswire
SC appeals court overturns alimony award, upholds child support
COLUMBIA, SC -- The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a family court’s award of permanent alimony while affirming its child support determination and denial of attorneys’ fees in a divorce dispute between Wife and Husband.
The parties married in 1999, had two children, and separated in 2020. During the litigation, the family court entered temporary orders setting Husband’s gross monthly income at more than $25,000 and requiring him to pay $3,000 per month in both child support and alimony. Husband later sought reconsideration, asserting he was meeting those obligations by selling nonmarital restricted stock units (RSUs) earned during his prior employment with Google. Wife sought attorneys’ fees, which the family court denied.
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Supreme Court reverses dissolution of protective order
PROVIDENCE, RI -- A preponderance of the evidence standard should be used
in domestic protective order proceedings in which temporary firearm restrictions are imposed, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has decided.
After the plaintiff filed a domestic abuse complaint in District Court alleging that the defendant had sexually assaulted her, the judge entered a protective order barring the defendant from contacting the plaintiff for three years and requiring him to surrender all firearms during that period.
On appeal, a Superior Court judge, following a bench trial, dissolved the protective order, ruling that the plaintiff did not prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant had assaulted her.
Bridgetower Media Newswire
Appeals court overturns juvenile guardianship
DETROIT, MI -- Where a respondent mother has filed an appeal challenging an order placing her minor child under a juvenile guardianship, the order must be vacated because the trial court failed to comply with the relevant statutes and court rules governing juvenile guardianships.
“In this case, the trial court erred in a couple of ways. First, the trial court neglected to place its best-interest findings on the record. At the final permanency planning hearing, the trial court stated that a guardianship was ‘appropriate.’ But the court neglected to explain which factors supported a determination that the appointment of a guardian was in GB’s best interests. There was no other hearing and no other findings on the record until the trial court entered its ex parte order, in which it stated simply: ‘The court further finds that the appointment of a juvenile guardian is in the best interest of the child. The court has received and considered the information required by MCR 3.979(A)(1), and the proposed guardians should be appointed.’ As discussed, the statutory scheme requires the court to base its guardianship decision on the child’s best interests, which inherently necessitates articulating those findings. On this record, we determine that the trial court failed to do so.
The Appellate Court vacated the Washington County Circuit Court’s monetary award and attorney’s fees to husband. The court provided no explanation for the basis of the monetary award to husband, and there was no indication in the record that the court considered wife’s argument that she was entitled to a credit toward the acquisition of the marital home, the evidence of the parties’ monetary and non-monetary contributions to the family or the other equitable factors.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order relinquishing its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues related to the parties’ minor daughter pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The record makes plain that “the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent” did not “presently reside” in Maryland when the court entered the challenged order.
MELISSA M. JENKINS V. RICARDO T. JAMES
Custody; modification; best interests
No. 577, September Term 2025
Argued before: Berger, Leahy, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ.
Opinion by: Leahy, J.
Filed: Dec. 15, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s custody modification order that continued the parents’ joint legal custody but awarded father tiebreaking authority over daughter’s medical and
educational concerns. The circuit court operated within its broad discretion in determining that the parents’ inability to communicate effectively with each other established a material change in circumstances and in modifying legal custody to provide tie-breaking authority to father as in the best interest of daughter.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order modifying custody and child support. The circuit court independently reviewed the law governing child custody modification, deferred to the magistrate’s findings of fact and concluded that the magistrate’s recommendations were “well supported by the evidence presented and the applicable law.” The court was not obligated to revisit the facts found by the magistrate because mother did not explain why she did not present evidence to the magistrate.
SAYEEMAH S. AHMED V. AHMID BROWN
Emergency custody order; material change; best interests
The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s emergency custody order. The circuit court erred in issuing the emergency custody order, which modified the custody order, without first making a finding that the modification was justified by a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s interests.
The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s monetary award to wife, which found that certain real property was not marital property. The circuit court’s finding was not supported by any competent evidence in the record and is clearly erroneous.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Washington County Circuit Court’s order granting father tie-breaking authority on education and mental health issues. Neither parent agreed with the other’s choice of school, and, despite efforts to resolve their differences, the parties remained deadlocked. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by determining to maintain joint legal custody but grant tiebreaking authority to father on matters related to the education of the children.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s order denying husband’s request for a monetary award. Husband did not object to many of the issues he raised on appeal, attempted to reargue or relitigate issues decided by the circuit court or failed to show the circuit court erred.
The Appellate Court dismissed mother’s appeal from the Washington County Circuit Court’s order dismissing her petition for contempt. A party that files a petition for constructive civil contempt does not have a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of that petition.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s final protective order in Brittany Artis’s favor. Although Jonathan Everett argued the circuit court erred by not admitting Ring camera footage, the court reasonably concluded that since the videos did not show the dispositive moments of alleged physical contact, they lacked sufficient probative value on the central factual dispute.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court vacated the Washington County Circuit Court’s monetary award and attorney’s fees to husband. The court provided no explanation for the basis of the monetary award to husband, and there was no indication in the record that the court considered wife’s argument that she was entitled to a credit toward the acquisition of the marital home, the evidence of the parties’ monetary and non-monetary contributions to the family or the other equitable factors.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Husband testified that he paid the down payment on the marital home in the amount of $53,246.33 from nonmarital funds, specifically, $40,000 from his premarital 401(k), and $20,000 he had received as gift from his mother and aunt. Wife did not dispute that the $53,246 down payment consisted of Husband’s 401(k) funds and a gift from his mother and aunt. Wife testified that she paid the tax penalty on Husband’s 401(k) distribution, which she estimated as ten percent of the distribution amount. The parties financed the remainder of the purchase price with a mortgage in Husband’s name. The marital home is jointly titled in the parties’ names.
Husband introduced an appraisal of the marital home that valued the home at $310,000. Wife obtained a comparative market analysis on the marital home, and based on the comparative market analysis, Wife valued the home at $290,000. Wife indicated that she desired to continue living in the marital home and sought to purchase Husband’s interest in the home.
This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding involving Simone Mays (“Wife”) and David Mays (“Husband”). In a written order entered on February 20, 2025, the Circuit Court for Washington County granted the parties an absolute divorce, awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the parties’ minor child,1 and resolved issues of marital property. On appeal, Wife has filed an informal brief,2 wherein she presents the following questions for our review:
1. Should [Husband] be reimbursed $53,000.00 for a nonmarital contribution to the home?
2. Should [Wife] be required to pay for any of [Husband’s] attorney fees?
While we affirm the judgment of absolute divorce and custody, we vacate the judgment awarding a monetary award3 and attorney’s fees to Husband and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married on October 5, 2012 in Washington County, and share one minor child together. On July 25, 2022, Wife filed a complaint for absolute divorce. Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint for an absolute divorce. At trial, Husband was represented by counsel and Wife was self-represented.
On or about August 15, 2013, the parties purchased a home located in Williamsport (the “marital home”) for $178,000.
Wife was employed with Stulz Manufacturing until she was injured in a work-related accident in 2018. She suffered nerve damage and had difficulty walking. The marital home was modified to be handicap accessible, and a chair lift was installed on the stairs. Following Wife’s injury, Husband brought her to her medical appointments, shopped for groceries, and did laundry. Wife noted that she did the family’s laundry from 2010 to 2021.
From 2018 to 2022 while Wife was not working, she received approximately seventy-five percent of her salary. In 2019, Wife had an annual income of $74,000. She stated that she had earned an annual income of up to $200,000 prior to her injury. Wife returned to work in 2022.
Wife received worker’s compensation benefits and a settlement. Husband acknowledged that the medical portion of Wife’s worker’s compensation settlement was nonmarital. He asserted that Wife also received a nonmedical award of $376,552. Wife explained that the award was paid in weekly payments. Husband introduced copies of Wife’s paystubs showing that she was also paid by her employer between 2020 and 2022, while she was injured. Wife stated that the payments from her employer were not income, but rather it was her “PTO[4] covering [their] insurance.” Wife stated that she also received a $100,000 payment in settlement of her worker’s compensation claim, and she used those funds to pay for repairs to the marital home.
In 2022, the parties’ relationship became acrimonious. Wife stated that the marriage went “sour” when she returned
to work. According to Husband, Wife had accused him of infidelity and trying to change her medications. Both parties had sought protective orders at various points.
At the time of trial, Husband was sixty years old. He was employed as a sales representative for Triple-S Steel, earning approximately $65,000 per year. Husband stated that he had been employed for ninety-eight percent of the marriage, and that he had been unemployed for six or seven months in 2012. Husband’s salary varied over the years, but it averaged approximately $65,000. On cross-examination, Husband denied Wife’s assertion that he had been unemployed for twenty months in 2014 and 2015.
Husband acknowledged that there was a period of time during the marriage that he was unemployed, and Wife carried the financial burden of the family. Husband asserted that there were times when he carried the financial burden of the family. Husband was renting a three-bedroom townhouse for $1,325 per month. Husband is diabetic and has a heart condition. He testified that he had incurred $15,376.81 in attorney’s fees.
On February 14, 2025, the circuit court delivered an oral opinion on the record, followed by the entry of a written divorce, custody and property distribution order on February 20, 2025. Among other things, the order awarded Husband $53,000 “to compensate the premarital monies he contributed to the purchase of [the] family home.”
The circuit court determined the value of the marital home to be $310,000. The court reduced the value of the home by an additional $20,000, representing the realtor’s fee, should the parties sell the house. The court further determined that the house was subject to a mortgage of $100,000 and home equity loan of $22,000. The court calculated the remaining value, or net equity in the home, as $168,000 and found that “one-half of that being $84,000.” The court determined that the “buyout amount” for the house was $84,000 and ordered that Wife pay Husband $84,000 within six months. Should the parties fail to effectuate the buyout, the court ordered that the parties agree on a realtor within thirty days and have the home listed for sale.
The circuit court also awarded Husband $6,492, representing one-half of the marital portion of Wife’s worker’s compensation settlement. The court determined that Wife’s worker’s compensation award consisted of a medical and a non-medical settlement. The court found that the medical portion of the settlement, in the amount of $797,188.74, constituted nonmarital property. With respect to the non-medical portion of the settlement, representing lost earnings and lost earning potential in the amount of $376,552.52, the court determined that a portion of that amount was marital property. The evidence showed that Wife’s settlement award of $376,552.52 had been divided into 377 monthly payments in the amount of $998.82 each. The court calculated the marital share of those payments from September of 2023 until the date of divorce in October of 2024 to be $12,984.66 and found that “half of that is part of the payment that will ultimately be due and owing to [Husband].”
The circuit court also awarded Husband attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,650.
DISCUSSION
We start our analysis by noting that Wife submitted documents for this Court’s consideration as attachments to her brief and her reply brief. Because these documents were not introduced at trial, they are not part of the record and cannot be considered on appeal. See Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 682 n.6 (2012) (declining to consider documents not introduced as evidence during trial and otherwise not part of the record); Md. Rule 8-413 (“The record on appeal shall include: (1) a certified copy of the docket entries in the lower court; (2) the transcript required by Rule 8-411; . . . [and] (5) all original papers filed in the action in the lower court[.]” (emphasis added)).
1. The Standard of Review
“Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(c), where, as here, an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. 328, 335 (2010). We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error and determine whether the court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230 (2000); accord Friedman, 412 Md. at 335. We review a trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review. Nouri v. Dadgar, 245 Md. App. 324, 343 (2020).
2. The Monetary Award
Wife challenges the award to Husband of $53,000. She argues that, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, she paid $12,693 in penalties and taxes associated with Husband’s withdrawal from his investment account, and the circuit court failed to consider her contribution to the acquisition of the home. She also argues that the circuit court did not address her argument that Husband received the benefit of living in the house from 2013 to 2023 “while being unemployed for more than 50% of that time.”
Husband responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding him $53,000 to reimburse him for his nonmarital contribution to the purchase of the marital home. He argues that there is no evidence in the record to support Wife’s claims that she paid $12,693 in fees and taxes, though he acknowledges that Wife provided uncorroborated testimony at trial that she may have paid “a ten percent ‘penalty’ fee” on Husband’s retirement account withdrawal.
In determining the division of marital property upon divorce, trial courts must utilize a three-step process. Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 405 (2019); Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.) §§ 8-203–205 of the Family Law Article (“Fam. Law”). First, the trial court must determine which property is marital. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405 (citing Fam. Law § 8-203(a)). Second, the court must value all marital property. Id. (citing Fam. Law § 8-204(a)). The third step requires that the court determine whether the division of marital property according to its title would be inequitable, and if so, the court may grant a monetary award to either party to adjust that inequity. Id. at 405-06; Fam. Law § 8-205(a). “The ‘function [of the monetary award] is to provide a means for the adjustment of inequities that may result from distribution of certain property in accordance with the dictates of title.’”
Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 506 (1993) (quoting Herget v. Herget, 319 Md. 466, 471 (1990)).
Fam. Law § 8-205(b) requires a court to consider each of the following factors before making a monetary award or transferring an interest in property:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;
(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3)[5] of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.
Fam. Law § 8-205(b); see also Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 406; Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 161 (2006); Otley v. Otley, 147 Md. App. 540, 547 (2002).
In deciding whether to grant a monetary award, the court must make findings based on its consideration of the factors set forth in Fam. Law § 8-205(b). See Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md. App. 460, 464-65 (1990). “Although the court is not required to recite each factor in making a monetary award, appellate courts must be able to discern from the record that these factors were weighed.” Hart, 169 Md. App. at 166-67. It is “impossible to affirm” a monetary award unless the record demonstrates that the trial court considered the required factors. Id. at 166. A court’s failure to consider the statutory factors requires that any monetary award be vacated. Quinn, 83 Md. App. at 465; Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 78 (1986) (vacating the monetary award where the court “neither mention[ed] the statutory factors, nor provide[d] any clue as to the manner in which those factors were considered”).
In this case, the circuit court did not reference Fam. Law § 8-205(b) or the statutory factors before granting a monetary award to Husband. In its oral opinion, the circuit court stated that Husband contributed a nonmarital sum of $53,000, and “that $53,000 is [a] contribution that will have to be compensated . . . as we go forward. And that will be reflected in the order as well.” In its written order, the circuit court stated that “[Wife] shall pay to [Husband] the sum
of . . . ($53,000) to compensate the premarital monies he contributed to the purchase of [the] family home.” The circuit court also awarded Husband $6,492, representing one-half of the marital portion of Wife’s worker’s compensation settlement.
This Court previously addressed the issue of nonmarital contributions to the family home in Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583 (2007). In that case, after the parties were married, the wife contributed $30,000 from her premarital 401(k) plan toward the purchase of the parties’ home. Id. at 630. The trial court granted her a monetary award of $30,000, ruling that she should be given “a credit” for her contribution to the down payment and further directed that she receive the award “off the top” following the sale of the home. Id. at 629. There was no indication in the trial court’s oral opinion or judgment that it considered any of the statutory factors in making its award. Id. at 630.
This Court vacated the monetary award based on the circuit court’s failure to “consider[] all of the statutory factors, as it was required to do.” Id. at 629. We explained that “[FL § 8-205] does not authorize an automatic ‘credit’ or ‘reimbursement’ to a spouse who contributes nonmarital funds toward the acquisition of a marital home that is owned [as tenants by the entirety].” Id. at 630. Rather, Fam. Law § 8-205(b)(9), “is just one of eleven statutory factors that must be considered by the court before making a monetary award.” Id.
Returning to the case before us, the circuit court did not reference Fam. Law § 8-205(b) or the statutory factors, and it is unclear from the court’s ruling how the court assessed those factors in its decision to grant a monetary award to Husband. The court provided no explanation for the basis of the monetary award to Husband, and there was no indication in the record that the court considered Wife’s argument that she was entitled to a credit toward the acquisition of the marital home, the evidence of the parties’ monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the family, or the other equitable factors. It appears that the circuit court granted Husband an “automatic credit” for his nonmarital contribution to the down payment on the marital home without also considering the other statutory factors, which, as explained in Gordon, 174 Md. App. at 630, was error.
Where, as here, the circuit court fails to explain the basis for a monetary award, the proper remedy is to vacate the award and remand for further proceedings. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 522 (2008) (vacating a monetary award where the trial court “concluded, in a single sentence, that $30,000 was an appropriate award” and “did not adequately explain the basis for its monetary award”); Hart, 169 Md. App. at 166 (vacating a monetary award “due to the court’s failure to mention the term monetary award, Fam. Law § 8-205, or any of the statutory factors that must be considered with respect to every monetary award”).
Because the record does not demonstrate that the circuit court considered the mandatory statutory factors under Fam. Law § 8-205(b) in granting a monetary award to Husband, the monetary award must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. Should the circuit court order a monetary award on remand, that award should
be identified in the judgment as a single monetary award, pursuant to Fam. Law § 8-205(a)(1).
3. Attorney’s Fees
The factors underlying an award of attorney’s fees, alimony, child support and monetary awards are so interrelated that the reconsideration of one award requires a re-evaluation of any other award. Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 413 (2002) (after vacating alimony award, this Court vacated award of attorney’s fees, “so that the court may consider the issue of attorney’s fees based on accurate factual underpinnings”); Freedenburg v. Freedenburg, 123 Md. App. 729, 742 (1998) (explaining that the issue of attorney’s fees was “so intertwined and interrelated to the issue of alimony and monetary award that the vacation of a judgment as to either alimony or monetary award usually requires the lower
court to also reconsider counsel fees”).
Because we are remanding this case for reconsideration of the monetary awards in light of the required statutory factors under FL § 8-205(b), we will also vacate the award for attorney’s fees. On remand, the circuit court should reevaluate the issue of attorney’s fees in conjunction with its analysis of the monetary award issues. Additionally, the court should permit the parties to provide updated evidence as to their financial situations and other matters relevant to the issues before the court.
We close with a cautionary comment. The parties should not view our analysis and conclusions as either a vindication or a condemnation of either parties’ litigation strategy in this case.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.
THE PROVISIONS IN THE JUDGMENT GRANTING DIVORCE AND CUSTODY ARE AFFIRMED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUDGMENT CONCERNING MONETARY AWARDS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE VACATED.
THE CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
FOOTNOTES
1 Neither party challenges the trial court’s rulings on issues related to their child’s custody, visitation, and related matters. Child support was determined in a separate proceeding. See Washington County Circuit Court Case No. C-21FM-23-000492.
2 Mother filed an informal brief pursuant to this Court’s March 9, 2021 Administrative Order permitting informal briefing in family law cases in which the appellant is a self-represented litigant. See Md. Rule 8-502(a)(9).
3 In the judgment, the circuit court ordered Wife to make two separate payments to Husband. We shall refer to the courtordered payments to Husband collectively as the “monetary award”.
4 It is not clear what the acronym refers to.
5 Fam. Law § 8-201(e) states:
(e)(1) “Marital property” means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.
(2) “Marital property” includes any interest in real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety unless the real property is excluded by valid agreement.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, “marital property” does not include property:
(i) acquired before the marriage;
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party;
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
(iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order relinquishing its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues related to the parties’ minor daughter pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The record makes plain that “the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent” did not “presently reside” in Maryland when the court entered the challenged order.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Custody Case” and related filings requesting, among other things, that the court vacate its June 2023 order, in which the court relinquished jurisdiction, and reopen the case so that the parties could pursue the custody matter in Maryland. The court denied the motion, and Mother noted this appeal.
In this appeal, Mother presents three questions for our review. For clarity, we have consolidated those questions into a single question1:
Did the circuit court err or abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate its June 2023 order?
Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Relevant Law
“In 2004, Maryland adopted the UCCJEA to govern child custody actions.”
This appeal concerns the propriety of a Maryland court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction over a child custody determination pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). In 2019, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County entered an order granting sole legal and primary physical custody of a minor child, G., to appellant, the child’s mother (“Mother”). Shortly thereafter, the child’s father (“Father”) filed a motion to modify custody in the circuit court. In 2022, while Father’s motion was pending, Mother and G. moved to Kentucky. By that time, Father had relocated to Pennsylvania.
In 2023, Father filed, in the circuit court, a motion requesting that the court relinquish its jurisdiction and transfer the case to Kentucky. In June 2023, the court entered an order relinquishing its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues related to G., but declining to transfer the case to Kentucky. The court based its decision on the fact that none of the parties resided in Maryland.
Around that time, Father filed, in the Wayne County Circuit Court of Kentucky, a motion to modify the parties’ 2019 Maryland custody order. In March 2025, the Wayne County Circuit Court entered an order modifying Maryland’s custody order and granting Father sole physical and legal custody of G.
In March 2025, Mother filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, a “Motion to Reinstate the Maryland
Pilkington v. Pilkington, 230 Md. App. 561, 575 (2016). The UCCJEA was enacted to address the trend of parents taking children from their home state to another state in an effort to relitigate a custody determination in a more favorable forum. Id. at 575-76. One of the primary goals of the UCCJEA was to prevent jurisdictional conflicts between state courts regarding custody determinations, which in the past had resulted “in the shifting of children from State to State with harmful effects on their well-being[.]” Id. at 577-78. As such, the UCCJEA “imposes limits on the courts’ traditional subject matter jurisdiction to issue orders affecting a resident-parent’s custody rights.” Id. at 578.
In Maryland, the UCCJEA is codified at § 9.5-101 et seq. of the Family Law (“FL”) Article of the Maryland Code. Under the UCCJEA, a Maryland court has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under item (1) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum under § 9.5-207 or § 9.5-208 of this subtitle, and: (i) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(3) all courts having jurisdiction under item (1) or (2) of this subsection have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under § 9.5-207 or § 9.5-208 of this subtitle; or
(4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in item (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection.
Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-201(a).2
Once a Maryland court obtains jurisdiction and makes a child custody determination consistent with the UCCJEA, Maryland retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(1) a court of this State determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this State concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(2) a court of this State or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State.
Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-202(a).
In addition, a Maryland court that has properly obtained jurisdiction to make a child custody determination “may decline to exercise that jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.”
Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-207(a)(1). Before making that determination, however, the court must consider whether it is appropriate for another state to exercise jurisdiction based on several enumerated factors. Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-
207(b). If, after considering those factors, a Maryland court determines “that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.” Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-207(c).
Lastly, where a child custody determination has been made by a court of another state, a Maryland court may not modify that determination unless Maryland has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination pursuant to FL § 9.5-201(a)(1) or (2) and:
(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under § 9.5-202 of this subtitle or that a court of this State would be a more convenient forum under § 9.5-207 of this subtitle; or
(2) a court of this State or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.
Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-203.
The Instant Case
G. was born to Father and Mother in 2014. In 2015, Father filed, in the circuit court, a complaint for custody. Shortly thereafter, Mother filed a counter complaint for custody. At the time, both Mother and Father were residents of Maryland.
In January 2019, the circuit court entered an order granting sole legal and primary physical custody of G. to Mother. By that time, Mother had relocated to California, while Father had remained a resident of Maryland.
In May 2019, Father filed, in the circuit court, a motion to modify custody. In 2021, while his motion was pending, Father relocated to Pennsylvania. Then, in 2022, Mother and G. moved to Kentucky.
In February 2023, Father filed, in the circuit court, a “Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction to Kentucky.” Father argued that Maryland was no longer an appropriate forum to determine custody of G. At the time of Father’s motion, the court had yet to rule on Father’s motion to modify custody.
In June 2023, following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Father’s transfer motion. The court declared that it was “relinquishing exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues related to [G.] pursuant to [FL § 9.5-202(a) (2)] because the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State.” The court further declared that it was “not ordering that this case be transferred to a specific court in another state because this Court does not presume to know what court in Kentucky or elsewhere has jurisdiction and what specific venue is proper.” The court added that its ruling “paves the way for this case to be resolved by a court that has jurisdiction to decide custody and visitation issues related to [G.] and where venue is proper.”
Following the circuit court’s decision, Father pursued a custody action in the Wayne County (Kentucky) Circuit Court. Father asked the Wayne County Circuit Court to modify the existing Maryland custody order that granted Mother primary physical and legal custody of G., and enter a new order granting Father sole physical and legal custody of G. In March 2025, the Wayne County Circuit Court entered an order awarding Father sole physical and legal custody of G. Around that same time, Mother filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, a “Motion to Reinstate the Maryland Custody Case,” a “Motion for Immediate Recovery of Minor Child and Declaration of Invalidity of Kentucky Court Orders,” and related filings. In those filings, Mother requested, among other things, that the court vacate its June 2023 order, in which the court had relinquished jurisdiction, and reopen the case so that the parties could pursue the custody matter in Maryland. Mother’s primary argument was that the circuit court, in entering its June 2023 order, had failed to properly relinquish its jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
In April 2025, the circuit court entered an order denying Mother’s motions. The court found that there was “no legal or factual basis to reopen this case.”
Two days later, Mother filed, in the circuit court, a motion for reconsideration. That motion was subsequently denied. Mother then filed this appeal. Additional facts will be supplied as needed below.
DISCUSSION
Parties’ Contentions
Mother contends that the circuit court’s June 2023 order, in which the court relinquished jurisdiction based solely on FL § 9.5-202(a)(2), was erroneous because the UCCJEA does not permit the relinquishment of jurisdiction unless the court conducts an inconvenient-forum analysis pursuant to FL § 9.5-207. Mother argues, in other words, that “relinquishment under [FL § 9.5-202] cannot stand alone; it must be paired with a § 207 analysis[.]” Mother contends that the court’s exclusive reliance on FL § 9.5-202 to relinquish its jurisdiction over the parties’ custody matter “overlooked both the case’s context and the UCCJEA’s broader framework.” Mother argues, therefore, that the Wayne County Circuit Court custody order from March 2025, in which Father was granted sole physical and legal custody of G., should be declared void under the UCCJEA because “Maryland never lawfully yielded jurisdiction.”
Father contends that Mother has failed to establish any legal basis that would have justified the court vacating its June 2023 order. Father contends that none of Mother’s arguments has merit and that her requests for relief should be denied.
Before discussing the merits of Mother’s claims, we find it prudent to set forth the parameters of our review given the procedural posture of the case. Although Mother’s arguments focus almost exclusively on the circuit court’s June 2023 order, no appeal was taken from that order. Rather, the instant appeal was taken from the court’s April 2025 order denying Mother’s request to vacate the June 2023 order and reopen the custody case. As such, our review is limited to whether the court’s April 2025 order was erroneous. See Canaj, Inc. v. Baker and Division Phase III, LLC, 391 Md. 374, 400-01 (2006) (where a motion to set aside a judgment is filed more than thirty days after the judgment is entered, the only issue before the reviewing court is whether the court erred or abused its discretion in denying the motion).
Standard of Review
Generally, a court has discretionary power to revise a judgment within 30 days after entry of judgment. Md. Rule 2-535(a). After 30 days, however, “the judgment becomes enrolled and may be revised only ‘upon a finding of fraud, jurisdictional mistake, or irregularity which are narrowly construed.’” Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. 584, 606 (2021) (quoting LVNV Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 Md. 586, 607-08 (2019)). We review without deference a court’s decision regarding the existence of fraud, jurisdictional mistake, or irregularity. Id. at 601. Where fraud, jurisdictional mistake, or irregularity has been established, we review the court’s decision to revise a judgment for abuse of discretion. Id. Because our analysis involves the interpretation of a Maryland statute, we also set forth the well-known rules of statutory construction. “‘The paramount object of statutory construction is the ascertainment and effectuation of the real intention of the Legislature.’” Andrews & Lawrence Pro. Servs., LLC v. Mills, 467 Md. 126, 149 (2020) (quoting Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295,
301 (2001)). “The starting point of any statutory analysis is the plain language of the statute[.]” Kranz v. State, 459 Md. 456, 474 (2018). “If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction.” Noble v. State, 238 Md. App. 153, 161 (2018) (quoting Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311, 321-22 (2015)). If, on the other hand, words of a statute are ambiguous, “a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.” Id. at 162 (quoting Espina, 442 Md. at 321-22). In determining whether an ambiguity exists, we do not read the statute in a vacuum; rather, we review the statute’s plain language “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute[.]” Id. (quoting Espina, 442 Md. at 321-22). “In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Id. at 162 (quoting Espina, 442 Md. at 321-22).
Analysis
As noted, when a Maryland court makes a custody determination pursuant to the UCCJEA, the court ordinarily retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over that determination. Thereafter, the court has several options. First, the court “may decline to exercise that jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5207(a)(1). If the court chooses that path, it must conduct an “inconvenient-forum analysis” pursuant to FL § 9.5207, which involves considering whether it is appropriate for another state to exercise jurisdiction based on several enumerated factors. Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-207(b). The statute alternatively provides that the court may, pursuant to FL § 9.5-202, terminate its jurisdiction if it finds “that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State.” Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5202(a)(2). Those two options – the termination of jurisdiction pursuant to FL § 9.5-202 and the transfer of jurisdiction pursuant to FL § 9.5-207 – represent two distinct paths pertaining to termination of jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained, “[b]oth § 9.5-202(a) and 9.5207 are clear and unambiguous and they address separate situations, the former, the circumstances in which the court’s continuing exclusive jurisdiction may be terminated and the latter, when the court’s exercise of the jurisdiction to make a child custody determination may be declined.” Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 452 (2012).
That point is made even more clear when we consider the plain language of FL § 9.5-203. Under that provision of the UCCJEA, if a Maryland court has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under FL § 9.5-201(a)(1) or (2), the court may modify a custody determination made by a court of another state if “the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
under FL § 9.5-202 of this subtitle or that a court of this State would be a more convenient forum under FL § 9.5-207 of this subtitle[.]” Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-203(1) (emphasis added). In other words, the UCCJEA does not require FL § 9.5-202 and FL § 9.5-207 to be “paired” in order for a court to cede jurisdiction over an existing custody order. Rather, a court may cede jurisdiction by either: 1) determining it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under FL § 9.5202; or 2) determining that another court would be a more convenient forum under FL § 9.5-207.
Against that backdrop, and assuming without deciding that Mother’s complaints regarding the circuit court’s June 2023 order constitute sufficient grounds to justify revision of that judgment, we hold that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate its June 2023 order. The record makes plain that “the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent” did not “presently reside” in Maryland when the court entered its June 2023 order.3 The court therefore had the authority, pursuant to FL § 9.5-
202, to terminate its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over G.’s custody and visitation.4 That decision did not require an “inconvenient-forum analysis,” nor did it create any jurisdictional conflict regarding modification of the court’s prior custody determination. Again, the termination of jurisdiction (under FL § 9.5-202) and the refusal to exercise jurisdiction in favor of a more convenient forum (under FL § 9.5-207) represent two alternative paths for a court to cede jurisdiction, and the UCCJEA permits a state to modify a custody determination made in another state if, among other things, the other state either terminates its jurisdiction or declines to exercise its jurisdiction. In this case, the circuit court chose the former path, which opened the door for a court of another state to assume jurisdiction and modify the circuit court’s prior custody order. That decision was wholly consistent with both the plain language of the UCCJEA and its purpose. As such, there was no fraud, jurisdictional mistake, or irregularity in the court’s June 2023 order. 5
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
1 Mother phrased her questions as:
FOOTNOTES
1. Whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore County erred in relinquishing exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Maryland Family Law §, [sic] where jurisdiction had attached at the commencement of [Father’s] 2019 modification petition, custody matters remained unresolved, and the court failed to conduct the mandatory inconvenient-forum analysis required by § 9.5-207.
2. Whether, consistent with the UCCJEA’s directive that jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding and is not lost by subsequent relocations, the [Father’s] procurement and enforcement of a custody modification from Kentucky while Maryland’s case remained pending constitutes an unauthorized exercise of custody jurisdiction, rendering Kentucky’s March 4, 2025 order void under Maryland Family Law § 9.5-203 and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.
3. Whether the Circuit Court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction, without ensuring an orderly transfer or resolving outstanding contempt and support issues, contravened the purposes of the UCCJEA and deprived Appellant of due process.
2 There are two general exceptions to the jurisdictional restrictions set forth in FL § 9.5-201(a). First, a Maryland court may assume temporary emergency jurisdiction if a child has been abandoned or if doing so would protect the child, or a sibling or parent, from mistreatment or abuse. Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-204. Second, a Maryland court may not exercise jurisdiction, absent certain circumstances, if a custody proceeding has already been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction in accordance with the UCCJEA. Md. Code, Fam. Law § 9.5-206. Neither of those exceptions is relevant here.
3 Mother argues that “some courts” have interpreted “presently” as “referring to when the proceeding began, not later.” Mother cites no authority for this proposition.
4 For this reason, Mother’s reliance on Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419 (2012), and Kalman v. Fuste, 207 Md. App. 389 (2012), is misplaced. In those cases, the court did not make any finding pursuant to FL § 9.5-202.
5 We decline appellee’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 1-341. See Christian v. Maternal-Fetal Med. Assocs. of Md., LLC, 459 Md. 1, 30 (2018) (“Ordering attorney’s fees to be paid by an adverse party who brought a claim in bad faith or without substantial justification is within the discretion of the court, as is the discretion to not award attorney’s fees.”).
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 2 (2026)
Custody; modification; best interests
Melissa M. Jenkins v. Ricardo T. James
No. 577, September Term 2025
Argued before: Berger, Leahy, Eyler, James (retired; specially assigned), JJ.
Opinion by: Leahy, J.
Filed: Dec. 15, 2025
The Appellate Court affirmed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s custody modification order that continued the parents’ joint legal custody but awarded father tiebreaking authority over daughter’s medical and educational concerns. The circuit court operated within its broad discretion in determining that the parents’ inability to communicate effectively with each other established a material change in circumstances and in modifying legal custody to provide tie-breaking authority to father as in the best interest of daughter.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
agreement. On Christmas Day 2021, however, Mother and Daughter argued, and Daughter asked Father to pick her up from Mother’s home. Since then, Daughter has declined to return to Mother’s home and has remained in Father’s physical custody.
As a result of that precipitating incident, on February 4, 2022, Mother filed a petition for contempt and a motion to modify custody, asserting that Father refused to return Daughter to her physical custody, despite the prevailing custody order. According to Mother, Father also showed favoritism toward Daughter, to the point that Son did not want to engage in visitation with him. Moreover, Mother claimed, Father changed the children’s medical appointments without consulting Mother and refused to pay his portion of doctors’ co-pays. Finally, Mother was concerned that a physical altercation between Father and the children’s stepmother, L. J. (“Stepmother”) had resulted in a visit by the police. Mother said that Stepmother had been convicted of driving while impaired and placed on probation, and while she was on probation, Father unlawfully kept a firearm in his house. Mother, therefore, sought tie-breaking authority as a modification to the parties’ joint legal custody.
Appellant Melissa M. Jenkins (now known as Melissa Oliva) (“Mother”) timely appealed an order entered by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County pertaining to modification of legal custody of one of the minor children she shares with appellee Ricardo T. James (“Father”). Mother mainly challenges the circuit court’s alleged failure to consider certain evidence and assigns error to the court’s decision to award Father tie-breaking authority over Daughter’s medical and educational concerns. 1
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the circuit court’s custody modification order.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father married in August 2008 and have two children together, a daughter born in 2008 (“Daughter”) and a son born in 2011 (“Son”).2 In 2017, Father filed a complaint for absolute divorce. Mother and Father entered into a voluntary separation agreement, which provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of the children, and that Mother would have primary physical custody. The circuit court granted Father a judgment of absolute divorce by order entered October 24, 2017, and incorporating, but not merging, the separation agreement therein.
From 2017 through most of 2021, Mother and Father were, for the most part, able to co-parent the children and abide by the custody and visitation terms of the settlement
On March 24, 2022, Father filed a cross-petition for contempt and a cross-motion to modify custody, averring that Mother had repeatedly violated the terms of the separation agreement and denied him access to the children. Father asserted, as a material change in circumstances, Daughter’s attainment of an age and level of maturity to take into account her preference regarding custody and access time. He said it was Daughter’s decision to continue to reside primarily with him due to her estrangement from Mother. Father therefore sought primary physical custody of Daughter. 3
Mother amended her motion to modify custody on April 18, 2022, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody of the children, on the ground that Father had manifested significant behavioral changes, which detrimentally impacted his ability to maintain joint legal custody and access to the children.
The circuit court heard argument on Mother’s and Father’s competing custody modification motions on October 2-3, 2023. Daughter’s maternal half-sister testified that the incident on Christmas Day 2021 began when Mother demanded that the children clean up while they were still opening their presents. Annoyed, Daughter told her half-sister that Father was coming to get her. Since then, Daughter seemed always to be angry at Mother and other members of the family.
Daughter, aged 15 at the time of the hearing, added that Mother called her a “brat” and “spoiled” and made fun of her when she asked for medical treatment for the severe
gastrointestinal symptoms she had been having. 4 By contrast, Father always did his best to make her feel as if her feelings matter. Daughter said she asked Father to pick her up that Christmas Day because she “couldn’t take it anymore” and that if Father told her she had to go back to Mother’s home, she did not believe she could stay there.
Mother testified that from October 2017 through Christmas Day 2021, she and Father had abided amicably by the access schedule set forth in their separation agreement. She said she spoke to Father after he picked Daughter up on Christmas Day, and he told her that Daughter was upset. Father asked if Daughter could stay with him for a few days, and Mother agreed. Once school resumed following the winter break, however, Mother realized that Father did not intend to return the child to her custody.
Since then, Mother said she had seen Daughter only at a few visitations with Father, at school events, and during doctors’ visits. She was upset that Daughter called her derogatory names and referred to her by her first name, while calling Stepmother “mommy.” Mother therefore asked the court to grant her sole legal custody, so as to permit her to make all final decisions relating to both children’s medical and academic interests.
According to Father, Daughter called him on Christmas Day 2021, and asked him to pick her up from Mother’s house because Mother and Daughter’s half-siblings were screaming at her. He offered to keep Daughter with him through the rest of the winter break to alleviate the tension, with Mother’s acquiescence.
Father testified that when he took Daughter to Mother’s house to retrieve some clothes and school items Mother pushed the child out of the house and told her, “If you leave, you leave with nothing.” Although her siblings brought some of her belongings outside to her, Daughter was upset with Mother for her reaction. As a result, Father declined to return Daughter to Mother’s home because Daughter was “adamant” about not going back to Mother, saying she was “scared” and that Mother did not take her health concerns seriously.
Father said that when he later attempted to visit with Son, Mother refused, responding, “If you want to see [Son] that much, that must mean your [sic] returning [Daughter] to me.” The last time Son had been in Father’s home was Christmas 2022. It was Father’s opinion that Mother was being “punitive” by not permitting him to see Son because Daughter refused to return to Mother’s home.
Father was concerned that if forced to return to Mother’s primary physical custody, Daughter would be “unhappy and just miserable.” He did not believe that having a relationship with Mother meant Daughter had to live with her. Father agreed that Mother should play a role in Daughter’s life, but opined that professional intervention by a therapist was required to facilitate a better relationship between them. Father therefore asked the court to award him primary physical custody of Daughter and to enforce his parenting time with Son.
At the close of all the testimony, Mother and Father informed the court that they had reached an agreement in lieu of having the court decide the custody issues. Each would
withdraw their motions for contempt without findings. In addition, Mother and Father agreed to continued joint legal custody as to both children and participation in therapy, with acceptance of the chosen therapist’s recommendation as to where Daughter should live. Until that recommendation was offered, Daughter would remain with Father, and Son would remain with Mother. Visitation among all four family members at a nearby Wegman’s food court, which had begun in 2022 but was unsuccessful, would resume. Mother and Father each acknowledged that the agreement was in the best interest of the children.
The circuit court entered a consent order on November 7, 2023, incorporating those terms and thereby resolving the outstanding issues of custody and visitation.5
On December 30, 2023, Mother moved to vacate the consent order, “due to procedural errors, [Father’s] inflexibility with academic and medical appointment scheduling, [Father’s] encouragement of negative behavior towards [Mother] by their daughter, and demonstrable prejudice against [Mother.]”
On January 10, 2024, Mother moved to amend the consent order, requesting a change in visitation location, modification of custody, and a re-allocation of Daughter’s health expenses between the parents. By order entered January 24, 2024, the circuit court denied Mother’s motion to vacate, and by order entered February 29, 2024, the court dismissed Mother’s motion to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and failure to show a material change in circumstances since the entry of the consent order.
On January 26, 2024, Mother moved for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to vacate the consent order. The circuit court denied the reconsideration motion on February 21, 2024. 6
On June 6, 2024, Mother filed an emergency motion to modify custody. 7 Therein, she repeated a claim that she had made in her petition for contempt and motion to modify custody on February 4, 2022—namely, that the children had been present in Father’s home during two incidents of domestic violence. 8 Mother also noted that during this period, she had received a text message from Father stating that he had purchased a firearm. She claimed, therefore, that Father had lied to the responding police officers when he said there were no firearms on the premises. Finally, Mother attached a report authored by a psychologist who found parental interference and alienation by Father’s refusal to return Daughter to Mother’s custody, and recommended the immediate removal of Daughter from Father’s home.
When Father did not respond to Mother’s emergency motion, Mother requested an order of default. Father then filed an affidavit stating he never received service of Mother’s motion. He was ultimately served on December 26, 2024. The court entered an order of default against Father, but it later vacated the order.
Mother filed a second motion to modify the consent custody order on March 27, 2025. Mother claimed that since Daughter had been in Father’s physical custody, Father had not scheduled medical, dental, vision, and therapy appointments and that Father had mismanaged Daughter’s prescription drugs and permitted her to miss excessive amounts of school. In addition, Father had not contributed
toward medical co-pays, nor communicated with Mother regarding Daughter’s medical and educational concerns. In response, Father denied all the claims in Mother’s motion.
The circuit court heard argument on Mother’s motions to modify custody on April 14 and 15, 2025. Mother was represented by counsel, and Father appeared pro se. During her testimony, Mother reasserted that Father was: (1) not properly caring for Daughter’s medical issues by failing to arrange for doctors’ and dental routine visits and childhood immunizations; (2) failing to communicate with Mother about medical and educational issues; (3) only permitting Mother to visit with Daughter in medical waiting rooms during doctors’ appointments; and (4) permitting Daughter to miss an excess of school days. In essence, Mother stated, Father was willfully flouting the terms of their joint legal custody.
Mother acknowledged on cross examination, however, that Father continued to pay child support to her for Daughter, even though Daughter had been living with Father exclusively since December 2021. She also acknowledged that, despite her claim that Father did not keep her informed as to Daughter’s education, he sent her reports of Daughter’s grades.
Father conceded that he had failed to schedule some routine medical and dental appointments during Daughter’s many other medical treatments for her Crohn’s Disease. However, Father countered that: (1) he was undertaking all Daughter’s doctor-recommended treatments and providing her with all doctor-recommended medications; (2) Daughter was up to date on all required immunizations; (3) Mother—with her joint legal custody—could make medical appointments for Daughter herself; (4) Daughter had no unexcused absences from school; and (5) any failure of visitation or communication rested on Mother, who had tried to renege on the parties’ consent custody agreement almost as soon as she had signed it in November 2023. Adding that Mother had not permitted him to see Son in over a year, Father said he just wanted to continue following the plan in the consent order and to have the court enforce it.
Following an in camera interview with Daughter, then 16-years-old, the circuit court summarized its discussion, stating that Daughter was worried about the outcome of the case because she believed herself to be the healthiest she has been since living with Father, and she didn’t think Mother would provide the same level of care if she were returned to Mother’s physical custody. She also expressed her comfort and happiness in living with Father.
In closing, Mother’s attorney suggested that the parents’ inability to communicate effectively—which they blamed on each other—was itself a sufficient reason to modify legal custody. Mother requested sole legal custody of Daughter, or, at the very least, tie-breaking authority regarding medical, educational, and religious issues. She also sought a court order requiring that Daughter visit with her outside of doctors’ appointments.
Father responded by stating that Mother had failed to show any material change in circumstances since the last hearing to justify a change in custody. In his view, Mother was just trying to relitigate the custody agreement that she had signed but had since decided she didn’t like.
Mother replied that the change in circumstance was the lack of true joint legal custody and Father’s failure to follow the court’s order by failing to make doctors’ appointments or engage in visitation. Therefore, Mother reiterated that she required at least tie-breaking authority.
In its oral ruling, the circuit court found both parents to be credible witnesses. The court agreed that the parents were not able to communicate effectively about the welfare of the children and that that inability, along with the absence of visitation with each parent’s non-custodial child, despite the consent custody agreement, constituted a material change in circumstances affecting the children. The court thus found that Mother had satisfied her burden of proving a need for a modification of legal custody, but not of physical custody, of Daughter.
Having found a material change in circumstances, the circuit court went on to discuss the suggested factors in considering a custody award, pursuant to Montgomery County Dep’t of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406 (1977), and Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986), explicitly finding that:
(1) both parents were fit to have access to the children;
(2) there were no concerns about the character and reputation of either parent;
(3) both parents were sincere in their requests for access to the children and wanting to be participants in their lives;
(4) the parents were not willing or able to share custody of either child, despite their consent custody agreement;
(5) neither party presented evidence as to the children’s extended family;
(6) Father testified that he encourages a relationship between Mother and Daughter, and family therapy will help that relationship, as well as the relationship between Daughter and Son;
(7) there are no other children living in Father’s home, and no evidence was presented of children other than Son living in Mother’s home, as it appeared that Mother’s older children were emancipated and living elsewhere;
(8) an interview with Daughter revealed her to be of sufficient age and capacity to form rational judgment, and she did not appear to be subject to manipulation in expressing her comfort and happiness in living with Father and trepidation about having to return to Mother’s home;
(9) Mother and Father did not have the capacity to communicate and reach shared decisions about the children’s welfare;
(10) there was no evidence regarding the parents’ geographical proximity, but Father’s home was appropriate and stable;
(11) there was no negative evidence presented about either parent’s financial status, except for the fact that their jobs were then insecure, as both parents worked for the federal government and were subject to termination by DOGE action;
(12) as to the age, health, and sex of the children, Daughter was 16 and suffered from IBD and Crohn’s Disease, and Son was 13 and suffered from scoliosis and a failure to thrive;
(13) there was no evidence of a natural separation of the children from their parents, other than the length of time since each parent had had access to the noncustodial child;
(14) Daughter was strongly bonded to Father, but her bond with Mother appeared to be “fractured”;
(15) the testimony revealed that Mother takes good care of Son and is bonded with him, but Father’s bond with Son was damaged due to lack of access;
(16) the parties could not co-parent without disrupting Daughter’s life, but modifying access provisions of the consent custody agreement would not be disruptive to the children’s lives;
(17) both parents wanted to be involved in the children’s lives and educational and social growth. Father had met those needs with regard to Daughter but Mother, despite trying, had not. Both parents had met Son’s needs;
(18) the parents had not been able to shield Daughter from their conflict;
(19) Father had not tried to alienate Daughter from Mother and had continued to attempt visitation at Wegman’s for weeks even when Mother failed to appear. While the court did not find that Mother had tried to alienate Son from Father, the court was “concerned” that Father had not had contact with Son in so long;
(20) despite Mother’s claim of domestic violence in Father’s home, there was no evidence presented of that, and Daughter told the court she had seen none;
(21) each parent was meeting the needs of the child in their physical custody, including Daughter’s medical needs; and
(22) neither parent had engaged in vexatious litigation.
The circuit court entered its written order on April 22, 2025, granting in part, and denying in part Mother’s motions to modify the consent custody order. The court continued the parties’ joint legal custody of Son. The court also continued the parties’ joint legal custody of Daughter, but added tie-breaking provisions to Father regarding medical and educational decisions for her, on the ground that Mother and Father were not effective at communicating with each other, and even when they did communicate, “they are not able to reach decisions and do not have productive conversations.”
As the parents had not shown the court an ability to make joint decisions, Father would be responsible for scheduling Daughter’s medical appointments but must inform Mother and permit her to attend. Both parents would have access to all school and medical portals and be permitted to attend all school and social events.
The court further ordered that visitation with Mother, Father, Daughter, and Son resume for two hours every other Thursday evening so that the non-custodial parent could spend time with the child not in their custody and the siblings could spend time with each other. Neither party was permitted to interfere with the children’s communication with the other parent or with each other. To the extent that the terms of the November 7, 2023, consent order had not been amended, they remained in effect, including the physical custody arrangement.
Mother, acting pro se, noted her appeal of the court’s order on May 16, 2025. 9
DISCUSSION
In her informal brief, Mother raises a litany of reasons why she believes we should reverse the circuit court’s custody modification order, most of which are based on allegations of Father’s alleged perjury and on evidence that she did not seek to have admitted at the hearing, was properly excluded by the court, or was considered by the court and found not to be relevant or compelling.10 Mother’s primary challenge is to the circuit court’s determination to continue the parents’ joint legal custody but award Father tie-breaking authority over Daughter’s medical and educational concerns, which she claims is not in the best interest of the children. See McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 594 (2008). We hold that the circuit court operated within its broad discretion in determining that the parents’ inability to communicate effectively with each other established a material change in circumstances and in modifying legal custody to provide tie-breaking authority to Father as in the best interest of Daughter.11
Standard of Review
In a custody case tried before the circuit court, “an appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence[,]” and we “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous,” giving “due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). Indeed, “[t]he trial judge who sees the witnesses and the parties, and hears the testimony is in a far better position than the appellate court, which has only a transcript before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the child.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 201 (2020) (cleaned up).
Specifically, the decision of “whether to grant a [custody] modification rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless that discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment was clearly wrong.” Leineweber v. Leineweber, 220 Md. App. 50, 61 (2014) (cleaned up). A court abuses its discretion “when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.” Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 201.
Analysis
When, as here, a parent moves for modification of custody, the circuit court engages in a two-step process in deciding the motion. The court must consider: “(1) whether there has been a material change in circumstances, and (2) what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the children.” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 639 (2016). A material change in circumstances requires some evidence that a change has occurred since the prior custody determination that “affects the welfare of the child.” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 171 (2012). If the court finds that there has been a material change, the next consideration is the best interests
of the child. Id. at 173.
Our decisional law instructs that “the two steps are often interrelated.” Id. at 171; McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 594 (2005) (“‘Deciding whether those changes are sufficient to require a change in custody necessarily requires a consideration of the best interest of the child. Thus, the question of ‘changed circumstances’ may infrequently be a threshold question, but is more often involved in the ‘best interest’ determination[.]’”) (quoting McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 482 (1991)). The moving party has the burden of showing that there has been a material change in circumstances. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 17172; Sigurdsson v. Nodeen, 180 Md. App. 326, 344 (2008). The two-step process is intended to prevent relitigating earlier determinations by litigious or disappointed parents upon the same facts. See McCready, 323 Md. at 481.
In the instant case, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred. Since the Christmas Day 2021 argument between Mother and Daughter, Daughter has resided with Father, despite the prevailing custody order providing Mother with physical custody. Mother and Father, once able to amicably communicate and co-parent, suffered a breakdown in communication over Daughter’s decision to stay with Father, leading to anger amongst the family members, failure of visitation with each parent’s noncustodial child, lapse in routine doctors’ visits for Daughter, and loss of information sharing between Mother and Father relating to the children’s school activities and medical issues. We therefore agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the parents’ inability to communicate adversely affected the children and constituted a material change in circumstances. See Taylor, 306 Md. at 304 (recognizing that the parents’ ability to communicate and reach shared decisions “is clearly the most important factor in the determination of whether an award of joint legal custody is appropriate[.]”); see also Santo, 448 Md. at 628 (“Taylor stands for the proposition that effective parental communication is weighty in a joint legal custody situation”).
Having found a material change in circumstances, the circuit court then explicitly and thoroughly considered the Taylor/Sanders factors in order to determine an appropriate custody arrangement that is in the best interests of Daughter. After considering all the evidence, including Father’s assurance that he would be more attentive in scheduling Daughter’s routine medical appointments, as well as
JUDGMENT
Daughter’s interview in which she expressed that Father was better able to manage her complex health issues, the court determined to maintain the parents’ joint legal custody but grant Father tie-breaking authority over Daughter’s medical and educational decisions. See Santo, 448 Md. at 633 (A tie-breaking provision is “consonant with the core concept of joint custody,” because such provision requires parents “to work together to decide issues affecting their children” and ensure each parent to have “a voice in the decision making process.”). Additionally, although the court did not change the physical custody provision set forth in the November 2023 consent custody agreement, the court required more access time for each child with their non-custodial parent, which is appropriate in light of the evidence that Mother and Daughter needed to repair their relationship and Father was being denied access to Son.
In order for us to set the tie-breaking provision of the custody order aside, we must conclude that the trial court’s decision was “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994). On the record before us, we cannot reach that conclusion.
The circuit court appropriately took the various factors and Daughter’s best interest into account and “carefully set out the facts and conclusions that support[ed]” its award of tie-breaking authority. Santo, 448 Md. at 630. In light of the undisputed communication challenges between the parties and the circuit court’s first-hand observations of the parties during the modification hearing, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to award joint legal custody with tiebreaking authority to Father. Tie-breaking authority is “not a rare or extraordinary measure,” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 587 (2018), and it is appropriate in situations like this one where parents’ difficulties in communicating can affect the best interests of their child.
Conclusion
We conclude that the circuit court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and its custody modification ruling was founded upon sound legal principles. The circuit court’s decision was not “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” North, 102 Md. App. at 14. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s April 22, 2025 custody and visitation order.
FOOTNOTES
1 The questions to be considered, as set forth verbatim by Mother in her informal brief, are:
1. Is the trial court’s judgment void where the Appellee engaged in a pervasive campaign of intrinsic fraud (perjury, misleading cross-examination) and extrinsic fraud (paternal alienation, misrepresentation to third parties), compounded by unethical conduct from Plaintiff counsel?
2. Did the trial court violate the Appellant’s constitutional right to due process by refusing to admit her evidence, ignoring a prior judicial finding, creating a contradictory and unfair process, and failing to appoint a Child Custody Evaluator in a high-conflict case?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to consider the Appellee’s history of domestic violence, as documented in police reports, thereby violating its statutory duty?
4. Did the trial court err in modifying custody by rewarding the Appellee’s custodial interference and destabilizing conduct while failing to make any findings regarding his parental unfitness?
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting tie-breaking authority to a parent with a documented history of bad faith, medical neglect, and coercive control?
6. Did the trial court err by basing its custody decision on the stated preference of a child who is the victim of documented parental alienation and emotional abuse?
7. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to appoint a Child Custody Evaluator, thereby abdicating its duty to protect a vulnerable child?
8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to rule on Appellant’s pending motions for firearm removal, reinstatement of child support arrears, and supervised visitation?
9. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by quashing valid subpoenaed evidence of certified police records that would have proven the Appellee committed perjury regarding domestic abuse?
2 Two other children did not survive infancy. In addition, Mother and Father each have two older children from prior marriages.
3 Father made no assertion that physical custody of Son should change.
4 Daughter was diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease and Inflammatory Bowel Disease (“IBD”) in 2022. She required surgeries with lengthy hospital stays in March and July 2023.
5 Per the court’s request, the consent order was sealed; it was not entered into MDEC.
6 Mother also moved for an en banc review hearing on the denial of her motion to vacate, but she later withdrew that request. The court dismissed the en banc hearing with prejudice.
7 The record reflects that Mother’s motion was subject to a notice of deficiency by the clerk’s office, for failure to include her signature, address, email address, and telephone number. The docket does not show a re-submitted motion ameliorating the deficiency until August 26, 2024.
8 The police incident reports Mother attached to her motion indicate the disturbances occurred in 2019 and 2020.
9 After the filing of her notice of appeal, Mother filed a flurry of motions in the circuit court, including motions to vacate the November 2023 consent custody order and the April 2025 modification order. The court denied the motions to vacate, on the ground that, pending appeal, the circuit court was divested of jurisdicWtion over the matter.
10 For example, Mother claims that the judicial process was corrupted by Father’s fraud upon the court in perjuring himself by failing to admit to his history of domestic abuse. The court, however, considered Mother’s allegations of Father’s domestic abuse and found the evidence lacking, especially after Father vehemently denied the allegation and Daughter told the court she had seen no violence in Father’s home. And, any other claims of Father’s “perjury” in Mother’s brief amount more to a claim about Father’s credibility in his testimony, e.g., about the content of notes he sent to Daughter’s school. Mother was, however, represented by counsel at the custody hearings, and her attorney had the opportunity to cross-examine Father. Any determination of the credibility of the witnesses was properly left to the circuit court. See Edsall v. Huffaker, 159 Md. App. 337, 342 (2004) (quoting Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md. App. 706, 725 (1977)) (A circuit court “‘may believe or disbelieve, accredit or disregard’” any testimony adduced at the hearing.).
Mother also complains that the court’s custody decision was based primarily on the stated preference of Daughter. However, the record shows that the court specifically denied asking Daughter about her preference during the in camera interview, and there is nothing to suggest that the court based the custody ruling on that factor, other than briefly mentioning her expression of comfort and happiness in living with Father and concern about returning to Mother’s home.
In addition, Mother claims that the court violated her right to due process by failing to appoint a child custody evaluator, but the record does not reflect any request to the court for such appointment. Therefore, we will not consider the issue for the first time on appeal. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”).
Mother also avers that an award of tie-breaking authority to Father relating to medical decisions “unlawfully interferes with [her] private insurance contracts” as the policyholder of the children’s insurance because Father would have the authority to make decisions that legally and financially bind Mother. Again, this argument was not made to the circuit court and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
11 Mother, in the conclusion section of her brief, asks this Court to “reinstate her as the primary physical custodian” and “enter an order awarding [her] sole legal and physical custodian.” To the extent that she is challenging Daughter’s continued physical custody with Father, her argument must fail. Following the custody modification hearing, the circuit court left in place the physical custody award agreed to by the parties in the November 2023 consent custody order. As a general rule, “no appeal lies from a consent order.” Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Md. App. 390, 411 (2008). Any attempt by Mother to regain physical custody of Daughter would best be achieved through another motion to modify.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s order modifying custody and child support. The circuit court independently reviewed the law governing child custody modification, deferred to the magistrate’s findings of fact and concluded that the magistrate’s recommendations were “well supported by the evidence presented and the applicable law.” The court was not obligated to revisit the facts found by the magistrate because mother did not explain why she did not present evidence to the magistrate.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
November 22, 2019, the circuit court entered a consent order modifying custody to grant Mother sole legal and physical custody of B. Father was ordered to pay Mother $1,500 each month in child support. In February 2023, by agreement of the parties, B. moved to Maryland to live with Father.
On April 4, 2024, Father moved to modify custody and child support. Between July and August 2024, the circuit court denied Mother’s motions to, inter alia, stay proceedings and vacate orders concerning Father’s payment of child support. Mother appealed four of these denials.3 In November 2024, Mother moved for a stay pending the appeal. The court denied this motion and Mother’s subsequent motion to reconsider.
Shauntese Curry Trye (“Mother”), appellant, again appeals to this Court from orders entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County in a custody dispute involving B.,1 the minor child she shares with Stephen Trye (“Father”), appellee. See Trye v. Trye, No. 1211, Sept. Term 2024, 2025 WL 1603637 (Md. App. June 6, 2025). Mother now appeals orders arising from her exceptions to the magistrate’s report and recommendations.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Mother presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased as follows:2
1. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s exceptions to the magistrate’s report and recommendations.
2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to alter or amend and for reconsideration.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
We summarize the underlying facts as recounted in Trye, 2025 WL 1603637, at *1, and supplement with additional procedural history relevant to the instant appeal.
The parties are the divorced parents of B. Mother resides in Florida and Father resides in Hanover, Maryland. On
On February 20, 2025, a magistrate held a hearing on Father’s motion to modify custody and child support. Mother did not appear. The magistrate’s March 3, 2025 report and recommendations determined that there had been material changes in circumstances since the 2019 consent order, including Father’s sole physical custody of B. since February 2023, B.’s age, and B.’s gender identity developments. Thus, the magistrate concluded that it was in B.’s best interest to modify custody to grant Father sole legal and physical custody, and that Father should no longer owe Mother $1,500 per month in child support.
Approximately one week after the magistrate entered the report and recommendations, Mother filed exceptions.4 At the April 29, 2025 hearing on her exceptions, Mother told the circuit court that the magistrate was not given complete information regarding B.’s medical diagnoses. Mother also stated that, before signing the February 2023 agreement, B. “physically attack[ed]” her, and “punched [her] in [her] face in a way that just was very frightening and very dangerous[,]” so she allowed “temporary emergency placement with [Father.]” Mother did not explain why she failed to appear at the magistrate’s hearing or why any of her evidence could not have come before the magistrate.
Following this hearing, the circuit court denied Mother’s exceptions, concluding that “there [was] not a legal or factual basis to disturb” the magistrate’s report and recommendations. The court then entered an order adopting in full the magistrate’s report and recommendations, thereby granting Father sole legal and physical custody of B. and terminating Father’s child support payments to Mother.
Mother timely appealed. We supplement with additional facts below as necessary.
DISCUSSION
I. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Mother’s Exceptions.
A. The Parties’ Contentions
In her informal brief, Mother first argues that the circuit court “misapplied the custody-modification framework, relied on clearly erroneous baseline facts, and failed to conduct the independent, de novo determination required by [Maryland] Rule 9-208.” Specifically, Mother claims that the court’s opinion incorrectly states that the 2019 consent order granted Father sole legal and physical custody, and that the exceptions hearing was on April 20, not April 29, 2025. Mother also argues that the court did not “exercise independent judgment de novo” because it “neither took additional evidence nor explained why it rejected [Mother’s] showing” of “newly learned facts[.]” (Emphasis added.)
Father counters that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to take additional evidence or order a de novo hearing because “Mother failed to appear for the hearing before the magistrate and never offered any evidence that her failure to appear was not by choice or negligence.”
B. Legal Framework
We begin with an overview of the procedural framework guiding child custody modifications. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 9-208(a)(1)(F), circuit courts “shall” refer custody modification petitions to the standing magistrate. “[T]he magistrate shall prepare written recommendations, which shall include a brief statement of the magistrate’s findings and shall be accompanied by a proposed order.” Md. Rule 9-208(e)(1).
Within ten days of the entry of the magistrate’s recommendations, “a party may file exceptions with the clerk.” Md. Rule 9-208(f). The court must decide the exceptions on the evidence presented to the magistrate unless: “(A) the excepting party sets forth with particularity the additional evidence to be offered and the reasons why the evidence was not offered before the magistrate; and (B) the court determines that the additional evidence should be considered.” Md. Rule 9-208(h)(1) (emphases added).
Ultimately, this Court reviews a circuit court’s custody determination for abuse of discretion. Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 625 (2016) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has described the abuse of discretion standard as one encompassing three interrelated standards:
When an appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131(c)] applies. [I]f it appears that the chancellor erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the chancellor founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the chancellor’s decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 126 (1977)). See also Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394, 398 (1989) (recognizing that appellate and circuit courts review a magistrate’s “first-level” factual findings with deference, but do not accord deference “to ‘second-level’ facts or to recommendations[,]” i.e., “conclusions and inferences drawn from first-level facts” (citing In re Danielle, 78 Md. App. 41, 60-61 (1989))).
In assessing a request for a modification of custody, a trial court typically follows a “chronological two-step process.” Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 28 (1996). First, the court considers whether there has been a material change in circumstances. Id. A change is “material” if it “affects the welfare of the child.” Gillespie v. Gillespie, 206 Md. App. 146, 171 (2012) (citation omitted). To determine whether a material change has occurred, the trial court looks at the circumstances that were “known to the [] court when it rendered the prior order.” Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 28.
Second, the court must consider the child’s best interests to “[d]ecid[e] whether [the material] change[] [is] sufficient to require a change in custody.” McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 594 (2005) (quoting McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 482 (1991)). Although both steps are often connected, they are distinct, and the trial “court must make a threshold determination whether a material change in circumstances has occurred” before analyzing the child’s best interest. Velasquez v. Fuentes, 262 Md. App. 215, 249 (2024).
C. Analysis
Here, the magistrate held a hearing on Father’s motion to modify custody and child support on February 20, 2025. Mother did not appear. During the April 29, 2025 hearing on Mother’s exceptions, Mother told the circuit court that the magistrate was not given complete information, but did not otherwise explain why she was absent from the magistrate’s hearing.
In its order denying Mother’s exceptions, the circuit court concluded that Mother failed to explain why she did not appear and present evidence before the magistrate as required by Maryland Rule 9-208(h)(1)(A). The court reasoned that the Rule “does not seem to be intended to benefit a party who decided, for whatever reason, not to appear at a hearing regarding the proposed modification of a custody order.” Therefore, the court reviewed only the evidence presented to the magistrate in evaluating Father’s petition for modification.
Mother’s specific challenges to the circuit court’s order denying her exceptions are without merit. Our review of the denial reveals that the court relied on the 2019 consent order, which it characterized as giving Mother “primary physical custody and sole legal custody,” as the “starting point for the material-change-in-circumstances analysis[.]” Although the court incorrectly states at one point that the exceptions hearing was held on “April 20, 2025,” the court also references the correct date, April 29, 2025. Mother does not explain how this ostensible typo affected the court’s analysis or caused reversible legal error.
Our review of the record reveals that the circuit court
independently reviewed the law governing child custody modification, deferred to the magistrate’s findings of fact, and concluded that the magistrate’s recommendations were “well supported by the evidence presented and the applicable law.” The court was not obligated to revisit the facts found by the magistrate because Mother did not explain, pursuant to Maryland Rule 9-208(h)(1)(A), why she did not present evidence to the magistrate.
For these reasons, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s exceptions.
II. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Mother’s Motion To Alter Or Amend And For Reconsideration.
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Mother next argues that the circuit court “erred and abused its discretion” in denying her “[m]otion to [a]lter or [a]mend and for [r]econsideration because the motion identified (1) clear errors of law, (2) material factual mistakes, and (3) overlooked, outcome-determinative best-interest proffers that required the court to revisit its ruling under [Maryland] Rules 2-534 and 2-535(a).” Mother contends that the court was obligated to correct “legal and factual errors” and that its refusal was “manifestly unreasonable.”
Father counters that “Mother’s post-trial motion did not raise any issues that she had not raised in her exceptions[,]” and therefore, “[f]or the same reasons that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s exceptions, it also did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s posttrial motion.”
JUDGMENTS
B. Analysis
“In general, the denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment or for reconsideration is reviewed by appellate courts for abuse of discretion.” Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 438 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). We note that “trial judges do not have discretion to apply inappropriate legal standards, even when making decisions that are regarded as discretionary in nature.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A trial court that applies the correct legal standards may nonetheless abuse its discretion when the decision is “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable.” North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994).
Mother’s omnibus motion to alter or amend or for reconsideration repeats the arguments made at the prior exceptions hearing. The contention that the court abused its discretion by again refusing to consider evidence presented at the exceptions hearing is, for the same reasons as explained above, without merit. As previously discussed, the circuit court independently surveyed the relevant law in reviewing (and ultimately denying) Mother’s exceptions. We are further unpersuaded that the court’s denial of Mother’s post-exceptions hearing motion is “well-removed from any center mark[.]” North, 102 Md. App. at 14. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to alter or amend and for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s exceptions or by denying the motion to alter or amend and for reconsideration.
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
FOOTNOTES
1 We refer to the minor child using an anonymized initial.
2 In her informal brief, Mother phrased the issues as follows:
1. [Whether] [t]he trial court erred [in] Denying [Mother’s] Exceptions to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendations.
2. [Whether] [t]he trial court erred in denying [Mother’s] Motion to Alter or Amend and for Reconsideration.
3 This Court dismissed her appeal in June 2025 for lack of jurisdiction. Trye, 2025 WL 1603637 at *1-2.
4 In her exceptions filing, Mother asserted that she “was unable to appear at the [magistrate’s] hearing due to her reasonable belief that [Father] had been granted a default judgment and her understanding that her appeal of the default and suspension of child support were still pending before the [Appellate Court of Maryland].” Mother also claimed that “she was not properly served with the underlying custody modification complaint and was deprived of due process.” Mother did not raise this argument in the exceptions hearing, and, as a result, the circuit court did not address it. Mother nonetheless attempts to raise this alleged service issue in her appellate brief. Generally, we will not decide any issue “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]” Md. Rule 8-131(a). This Rule “exists to prevent sandbagging and to give the trial court the opportunity to correct possible mistakes in its rulings. An appeal is not an opportunity for parties to argue the issues they forgot to raise in a timely manner at trial.” Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 126 (2015) (internal marks and citations omitted). Here, because the alleged deficient service issue was neither raised in the exceptions hearing nor decided by the circuit court, we decline to address it now.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
Cite as 11 MFLU Supp. 2 (2026)
Emergency custody order; material change; best interests
The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s emergency custody order. The circuit court erred in issuing the emergency custody order, which modified the custody order, without first making a finding that the modification was justified by a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s interests.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
Sayeemah Ahmed (“Mother”) and Ahmid Brown (“Father”) are the parents of a minor child, S. In July 2022, Father filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking primary physical custody and sole legal custody of S, and in October of that year, Mother filed a counter-complaint that likewise requested sole custody. In January 2024, the circuit court entered an order granting the parties joint legal custody, granting Mother primary physical custody, and granting Father parenting time with S every other weekend. The following month, Mother began withholding visitation, purportedly because S had started to exhibit sexually inappropriate behavior after her second weekend with Father. After filing multiple petitions for contempt that the court denied or dismissed for lack of service, Father filed an emergency motion for temporary custody in April 2025, raising concerns that S was exhibiting sexually inappropriate behavior due to Mother’s conduct. After an emergency hearing, the court granted Father’s motion in part and issued an order modifying the original custody order temporarily. Mother appeals from the emergency custody order, and we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
S was born to Mother and Father in November 2020. Mother and Father were never married and Mother acted as S’s primary caregiver for the first two years of S’s life. In July 2022, Father, then a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
filed a Complaint for Custody in the circuit court against Mother, then a resident of Lanham. Father requested primary physical custody of S on the grounds that Mother was “unfit, mentally unstable, and struggles with continual suicidal ideations and attempts” and “lives a very unhealthy and unstable lifestyle.” He also requested sole legal custody on the basis that Mother “lacks decision making skills and is very easily influenced by others.” He asked that the court allow Mother visitation with S every other weekend. Mother responded with a Counter-Complaint For Custody, Child Support, And Other Appropriate Relief in October 2022. She alleged that Father was “not a fit and proper person to have custody of [S].” Among other allegations, she claimed that Father had abused her “physically, verbally and emotionally” and that there were pending actions against Father for committing acts of domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, violation of a protective order, and theft against Mother. She alleged as well that Father hadn’t contributed financially to S’s care since the child’s birth. Mother asserted that it was in S’s best interest that she be granted “sole physical and legal custody . . . . both pendente lite and permanently.” Father amended his complaint a day later, alleging further that Mother was unfit to care for S because she suffers from various mental health conditions and “consistently has mental blackouts and breakdowns that causes her to become violent and abusive”; because, “[u]pon information and belief,” she “is employed as a sex worker and constantly has [S] in unsafe environments” and “leaves [S] with strangers while she is working”; because she “has a history of disappearing with [S] and not informing Father of her whereabouts and safety”; and because “every time Father received [S] she is dirty and unbathed.” He argued that because he had a flexible job and could provide S with a stable home and a safe environment, the court should grant him sole legal and shared physical custody.
On February 27, 2023, the circuit court entered a pendente lite order granting Mother primary physical custody of S.
After discovery and a merits hearing, the court entered a final Custody And Access Order on January 31, 2024 (the “Custody Order”). The Custody Order awarded the parents joint legal custody of S and gave Mother tie-breaking authority and primary physical custody. The Custody Order granted Father visitation with S every other weekend and directed exchanges to occur at Apple Tree Child Care Center in College Park.
On February 26, 2024, Father filed a Petition For Contempt, stating that Mother failed to deliver S to him for visitation the weekend before. About a month later, on March 22, Mother
filed an Emergency Motion To Suspend Access. Mother alleged in her motion that about three weeks earlier, a friend of Father’s had informed her that Father had “naked photographs” of S on his cellphone. She also alleged that she had observed S stripping the clothing from her dolls and acting out sexualized behavior with her one-year-old brother, and that S’s childcare provider had notified her that S was “acting differently and did not want anyone to touch her.” Mother represented that based on her observations and the information she’d received, she had filed for a protective order against Father that led to an “inconclusive” Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report. She asked the court to suspend Father’s access to S because, she alleged, Father had threatened to sell nude photos of S that he had on his phone if she did not “drop child support.” She contended as well that meeting with Father to deliver S for visitation would put Mother in harm’s way because Father had threatened to commit acts of violence against her if she didn’t give him full custody of S. In reply to Father’s Petition For Contempt, Mother admitted to withholding S from him based on the same concerns she described in her motion. Father replied to Mother’s Emergency Motion To Suspend Access and denied Mother’s allegations, and the circuit court denied both Father’s Petition and Mother’s motion.
Father filed two more contempt petitions in October 2024 and March 2025, both of which the court dismissed for lack of service. On April 11, 2025, Father filed an Emergency Motion For Custody And Enforcement requesting temporary legal and physical custody of S on the basis of his alleged concerns that Mother caused S to exhibit inappropriate sexual behavior; that S had reported to CPS that Mother hits her; that S “was found walking naked and unattended in a hotel hallway” while in Mother’s care in April 2024; that Mother had enrolled S in therapy but had been secretive with Father about her reasons for doing so; and that CPS had informed Father in January 2025 that they had conducted a welfare check of S with police after they received a call from a concerned individual and had been unable at the time to locate Mother and S.
The court held a hearing on Father’s emergency motion on May 29. During the hearing, the court heard arguments from counsel on both sides, but did not take testimony or receive evidence. On June 6, the court issued an Emergency Custody Order granting Father’s motion in part and providing that Father would have custody of S every weekend until the court could conduct a full custody merits hearing. Under the Emergency Custody Order, Father would pick up S each Friday afternoon at her preschool in Rockville and Mother would pick up S each Sunday evening either at Father’s current residence in Riverside, New Jersey or at the nearest police station. Mother noted a timely appeal from the Emergency Custody Order.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother presents four issues for our review.1 Three of them are not properly before us, 2 and we rephrase the remaining question as follows: did the circuit court err in issuing its Emergency Custody Order, which modified the Custody Order, without first making a finding that the modification
was justified by a material change in circumstances affecting S’s best interests? 3 We hold that it did.
“[T]hree distinct standards of appellate review apply to [child custody] matters.” Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 55 (1984). First, we uphold the factual findings of the circuit court unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 55 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 125 (1977)). Second, upon a finding that the court erred as a matter of law, we ordinarily order additional proceedings in that court unless the error was harmless. Id. (quoting Davis, 280 Md. at 126). Third, if we find that the circuit court’s decision was “founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,” we disturb that decision only for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 55–56.
Mother argues that the circuit court erred in issuing the Emergency Custody Order and modifying the original Custody Order without hearing any testimony or receiving any evidence at the May 29, 2025 hearing. Failure to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, she asserts, prevented the court from examining the facts at issue carefully or evaluating properly whether temporary modification of the Custody Order was in the child’s best interests, the “paramount concern” in any child custody case. Father counters that the Emergency Custody Order was proper because the same judge issued both orders and was “familiar with the parties and the case”; the court “heard briefly from both parties and from . . . Father’s girlfriend” at the hearing; and the Emergency Custody Order “did not substantially modify the Custody Order of January 2024.”
We make no decision here about the level of factfinding a trial court must undertake before ordering modification of an existing custody order in the best interest of the child, a decision to which we generally accord great deference. See Shunk, 87 Md. App. at 398 (“When a [court] finds that the moving party has satisfied th[e] heavy burden [to establish] a significant justification for a change in custody, those findings must be accorded great deference on appeal, and will only be disturbed if they are plainly arbitrary or clearly erroneous.”). Rather, we hold that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by not determining first whether a modification of custody was necessary to protect S’s best interests.
As both the Supreme Court of Maryland and this Court have emphasized on numerous occasions, “in any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best interest of the child.” Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303 (1986); see also Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 83 (1986) (“Overarching all of the contentions in disputes concerning custody or visitation is the best interest of the child.”); McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 481 (1991); Shunk, 87 Md. App. at 396 (“The guiding principle of any child custody decision, whether it be an original award of custody or a modification thereof, is the protection of the welfare and best interests of the child.”); Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 11. Section 9-201 of the Family Law Article (“FL”) lists sixteen factors for a court to consider when making a custody decision to ensure that the decision is in the child’s best interest.4 The statute also requires the court to “articulate its findings of fact on the record or in a written opinion, including [its] consideration” of the “best interest” factors “and any other factor that the
court considered.” FL § 9-201(b) (2025 Cum. Supp.). And once the circuit court enters a child custody order, it may modify that order if it “determines that there has been a material change in circumstances since the issuance of the order that relates to the needs of the child or the ability of the parents to meet those needs and that modifying the order is in the best interest of the child.” FL § 9-202(a) (2025 Cum. Supp.); see also Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 492–93 (1991) (“[O]nce [a custody] decision has been entered as a judgment, it will ordinarily not be modified except upon a showing of a change in circumstances justifying a change in custody to accommodate the best interest of the child.”).
As such, the statute directs a two-step analysis on a motion to modify custody, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 28 (applying twostep analysis when reviewing temporary custody order); see also McCready, 323 Md. at 479–81 (reviewing physical custody order under analysis). First, as a threshold question, the court must determine if a material change in circumstances has occurred since the issuance of the custody order to be modified. Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 28; see McCready, 323 Md. at 482. To be material, the alleged change in circumstances must affect the child’s welfare. Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 28, 33. Without a material change in circumstances, “there can be no modification of custody,” and the inquiry ends. Id. at 29. This threshold requirement helps to ensure that the stability in the life of the child under the existing custody order is not disturbed needlessly and to prevent “litigious or disappointed parent[s]” from “relitigat[ing] questions of custody endlessly on the same facts.” McCready, 323 Md. at 481.
Second, “[i]f a material change of circumstance is found to exist . . . the court, in resolving the custody issue, considers the best interest of the child as if it were an original custody proceeding.” Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 28. In other words, the court must decide whether a modification of custody is in the child’s best interest based on the changed circumstances, and the court must do so by considering the FL § 9-201(a) factors on the record or in a written opinion. See FL §§ 9-201(b), 9-202(a) (2025 Cum. Supp.). The party seeking a change in custody bears the burden of demonstrating both the existence of a sufficient change in circumstances to justify that change and that a change in custody would be in the best interest of the child. Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 30–31; Shunk, 87 Md. App. at 397–98 (“The burden . . . is clearly on the party ‘who affirmatively seeks action by the [court]’” to “establish that the modification is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child.” (quoting Jordan v. Jordan, 50 Md. App. 437, 443 (1982), abrogated by Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 (1991))).
As an initial matter, the Emergency Custody Order did, in fact, modify the original Custody Order. The original Custody Order granted Mother, who resides in Maryland, primary physical custody of S and granted Father visitation with S every other weekend, with exchanges to occur in College Park. Although Mother retains primary physical custody under the Emergency Custody Order, that order increased the frequency of Father’s visitation to every weekend and required Mother to pick up S from Father’s residence in Riverside, New Jersey each Sunday.
The order is silent, however, as to what, if any, material change in circumstances the court found to support this modification—neither the record at the emergency custody hearing nor the Emergency Custody Order includes any such determination. It’s unlikely that the court could have relied on Father’s assertion that Mother had, through her alleged occupation as a sex worker, exposed S to inappropriate conduct, as Father had been making such allegations in his filings since before the court issued the original Custody Order. It’s possible that the circuit court recognized Mother’s withholding of visitation from Father as a change in circumstances that arose after the issuance of the Custody Order. At the hearing on May 29, 2025, Father’s counsel stated that Mother had only delivered S for visitation twice and that he had not seen S since February 2024, over a year before. Mother’s counsel confirmed that Mother was unwilling to give Father access to S because she “firmly believe[d]” that Father was exposing S to sexualized behavior. And denial of visitation can constitute a material change in circumstances justifying modification of custody if the denial affects the welfare of the child. See Shunk, 87 Md. App. at 399–401 (affirming court’s modification of custody on the basis that father, by moving out of the country with child surreptitiously and denying mother visitation, had “created a significant change in circumstances which may well affect the welfare of the child” and prevented the court from exercising its jurisdiction to protect the child’s best interests); Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 13, 17, 33 (finding attempts by mother, who moved with child from Maryland to Colorado with court permission, to discontinue father’s visitation by filing a restraining order; claiming child was ill and couldn’t fly to Maryland for visitation; and ultimately absconding surreptitiously with child to a women’s shelter in California under an assumed name created material change in circumstances that justified custody modification to protect child’s best interests).
But even if the court did rely on Mother’s withholding of visitation as a change in circumstances, there was no conclusion that the change was material. Put differently, neither the record nor the Emergency Custody Order reflects a determination that by withholding visitation, Mother had created a change in circumstances that affected S’s best interests. We don’t dispute that by withholding visitation, Mother deprived Father of his right to see his child under the Custody Order. And the court appeared to view the custody modification under the Emergency Custody Order as a remedy for this deprivation. With regard to the modification requiring Mother to pick up S from Father’s residence in New Jersey rather than in College Park, the court remarked that Father was not “going to spend any more money on this back and forth.” The court also appeared to be concerned with Father’s contention that Mother “just continually files, and files and files protective orders and then violations of protective orders” against him. To this end, the court stated, “I just don’t believe [Mother’s allegations] to be true. . . . This happens all the time. When you can’t get your way, you start saying things like this. It’s criminal really, making these false allegations.” But “‘[t]o justify a change in custody, a change in conditions must have occurred which affects the welfare of the child and not of the parents.’” Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md.
App. 394, 398 (1989) (quoting Jordan, 50 Md. App. at 443). Without a finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred that affected S’s welfare, not just Father’s, the inquiry should have ended. See Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 28. And even if the court had reached such a conclusion, we would be required to vacate the Emergency Custody Order all the same because the court did not determine either on the record or in the order that, based on the FL § 9-201(a) factors, modification of custody served S’s best interest. See FL §§ 9-201(b), 9-202(a) (2025 Cum. Supp.).5
As the party moving for a modification of custody, Father had the burden of proving a material change in circumstances that justified a modification of custody to protect S’s best interests. See Wagner, 109 Md. App. at 30–31; Shunk, 87 Md. App. at 397–98. At the hearing, though, the circuit court appeared to place the burden on Mother to prove that modification was not warranted. First, after Mother’s counsel explained to the court that a CPS investigation into Father had been ongoing since February 2024 but that CPS had “not reached any conclusions,” the court replied that Mother had not put forward “anything that tells [the court] that in a year [CPS has] taken this seriously enough to investigate right away.” In addition, after Mother’s counsel presented the court with a CPS letter ruling Mother out for abuse
following the April 2024 report about S wandering naked and unattended in a hotel hallway while under Mother’s care, the court responded, “So you managed to get a letter about the allegation about the child in the hallway but not the one saying that yes, [Father] is indicated [for abuse]?” Finally, the court later asked Mother if she’d taken S to a doctor to have her evaluated for sexual abuse, and when Mother replied that she’d informed S’s pediatrician of her concerns, the court responded, “So she hasn’t been to a doctor is the answer. This is outrageous for you to think that I’m going to believe that [CPS] didn’t make a decision by now for a four year old child.... ”
But the burden wasn’t on Mother to prove that the court shouldn’t modify custody to increase Father’s access to S. The burden was on Father to prove to the court that it should modify custody because increasing his access to S was in the child’s best interests. Because the circuit court didn’t consider whether Father had satisfied his burden to show a material change of circumstances such that modification was in S’s best interests, see Shunk, 87 Md. App. at 398, the court erred in modifying the terms of the Custody Order. This error wasn’t harmless, see Elza, 300 Md. at 55, and so we vacate the Emergency Custody Order and remand for further proceedings.
EMERGENCY CUSTODY ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY VACATED. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EVENLY.
FOOTNOTES
1 Mother phrases her Questions Presented as follows:
1. Whether the court erred in scheduling a hearing without service of a summons or complaint.
2. Whether the court erred in entering an emergency custody order without hearing testimony or evidence.
3. Whether the court erred in failing to expand the trial time.
4. Whether the court erred in failing to transfer venue. Father doesn’t state any Questions Presented in his brief.
2 With some narrow exceptions, a party to an action in circuit court may appeal only from a final judgment entered by that court. Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). A final judgment is one that resolves all claims against all parties to the action. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Bowen, 410 Md. 287, 294–95 (2009) (citing County Comm’rs for St. Mary’s County v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 424 (2006)). Here, Mother seeks to appeal from the circuit court’s orders denying her motions to dismiss, to transfer venue, and to postpone trial and expand trial time, none of which are final orders. See City of Dist. Heights v. Denny, 123 Md. App. 508, 514 (1998) (“Because the denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment, it is ordinarily not subject to interlocutory review.”); Lennox v. Mull, 89 Md. App. 555, 559 (1991) (order denying motion for change of venue was neither an appealable final judgment nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine); cf. Blanton v. Equitable Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 61 Md. App. 158, 163 (1985) (“[T]he denial of a continuance is an unappealable interlocutory order.”). This leaves us with the Emergency Custody Order.
3 Father contends that the Emergency Custody Order “is clearly temporary in nature” and that “since it specifically contemplates a further hearing, it clearly was not intended to be, and in fact, is not, a final order.” Accordingly, he asserts that the Emergency Custody Order, like the orders from which Mother appeals, is an unappealable interlocutory order. It’s true that the order is interlocutory, but it’s appealable nevertheless. CJ § 12-303 allows parties to appeal from certain interlocutory orders issued by circuit courts in civil cases. Among these appealable interlocutory orders are those “[d] epriving a parent . . . of the care and custody of [their] child, or changing the terms of such an order.” CJ § 12-303(3)(x). The Emergency Custody Order, which modified the “final” Custody Order to grant Father more frequent visitation (if temporarily), falls squarely within this exception to the final judgment rule. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 10, 17 (1996) (hearing challenge to temporary custody order); Shunk v. Walker, 87 Md. App. 389, 392 (1991) (hearing
appeal from temporary pendente lite custody order); Miller v. Bosley, 113 Md. App. 381, 385 (1997) (appeal of pendente lite custody and visitation order).
4 These “best interest” factors are:
(1) stability and the foreseeable health and welfare of the child;
(2) frequent, regular, and continuing contact with parents who can act in the child’s best interest;
(3) whether and how parents who do not live together will share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child;
(4) the child’s relationship with each parent, any siblings, other relatives, and individuals who are or may become important in the child’s life;
(5) the child’s physical and emotional security and protection from exposure to conflict and violence;
(6) the child’s developmental needs, including physical safety, emotional security, positive self-image, interpersonal skills, and intellectual and cognitive growth;
(7) the day-to-day needs of the child, including education, socialization, culture and religion, food, shelter, clothing, and mental and physical health;
(8) how to:
(i) place the child’s needs above the parents’ needs;
(ii) protect the child from the negative effects of any conflict between the parents; and
(iii) maintain the child’s relationship with the parents, siblings, other relatives, or other individuals who have or likely may have a significant relationship with the child;
(9) the age of the child;
(10) any military deployment of a parent and its effect, if any, on the parent-child relationship;
(11) any prior court orders or agreements;
(12) each parent’s role and tasks related to the child and how, if at all, those roles and tasks have changed;
(13) the location of each parent’s home as it relates to the parent’s ability to coordinate parenting time, school, and activities;
(14) the parents’ relationship with each other, including:
(i) how they communicate with each other;
(ii) whether they can co-parent without disrupting the child’s social and school life; and
(iii) how the parents will resolve any disputes in the future without the need for court intervention;
(15) the child’s preference, if age-appropriate; and
(16) any other factor that the court considers appropriate in determining how best to serve the physical, developmental, and emotional needs of the child.
FL § 9-201(a) (2025 Cum. Supp.).
5 The closest the court got to considering S’s best interests expressly was to note on the record that in light of each parent’s allegation that the other had exposed S to sexually inappropriate behavior, “the right thing to do really is for [the court] to call [CPS] right now and tell them to pick up the child.” This statement doesn’t shed any light on the court’s ultimate decision to increase Father’s visitation, however, or explain why the court found increased visitation with Father to be in S’s best interest.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court vacated the Prince George’s County Circuit Court’s monetary award to wife, which found that certain real property was not marital property. The circuit court’s finding was not supported by any competent evidence in the record and is clearly erroneous.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
property, and both parties were identified as borrowers on the deed of trust. Although neither party testified concerning the total sum of equity that existed in the Hiland property in June of 2008, according to the loan closing information and settlement statement, which were included as part of an admitted exhibit, the property was valued at $350,000.00 at that time. The parties’ mortgage was $262,500.00, resulting in equity of $87,500.00 in 2008.
In April of 2025, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted a judgment of absolute divorce to Charretta Moss (“Wife”) and Keith Moss (“Husband”). As part of the divorce decree, the court assessed and divided the marital property and determined that Wife was entitled to a monetary award. Husband filed the subject appeal, presenting the following issue for our review:1
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a monetary award to Wife. For the reasons to follow, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wife and Husband were married in June of 2008. There was one child born to the marriage, who was fifteen years old at the time of trial. In June of 2024, Wife filed a complaint seeking an absolute divorce. Husband filed a counter complaint seeking an absolute divorce. Both parties asserted that there was marital property to be divided by the court. The matter proceeded to a merits trial in February of 2025. At the trial, the following facts were elicited.
The Hiland Property
In 1994—more than twenty years prior to the marriage— Husband had purchased a house located at Hiland Avenue (“the Hiland property”) with his brother. On June 6, 2008, one week before the parties were married, the parties entered a transaction that removed Husband’s brother from the title to the property2 and added Wife’s name to the title of the property. The parties had a mortgage secured by the
In 2022, the parties discussed refinancing the mortgage secured by the Hiland property. Wife testified that the purpose of refinancing the mortgage was to obtain funds for Husband to pay his personal tax liability. Husband testified that the purpose of the refinance was to remove Wife from the mortgage account and title to the property following Wife’s request for a divorce. The property was refinanced in October of 2022. In that transaction, the mortgage loan was paid in its entirety, and a new loan was obtained that was secured by the property in Husband’s name alone. Prior to the transaction, Wife signed what the parties termed an “equity buyout agreement” in which she agreed to relinquish her interest in any equity in the Hiland property and to grant a quitclaim deed in Husband’s favor after receiving zero dollars in equity. Wife testified that when she signed the document, the information regarding the amount she would receive was left blank and that she anticipated receiving funds from Husband as a result of the refinance; however, Husband did not tender any funds. She testified that she did not understand the meaning of an equity buyout agreement.
Regardless of the circumstances of the equity buyout agreement, a deed to the property was executed that resulted in Wife’s name being removed from the title to the Hiland property. At the time of trial, Husband testified that the mortgage loan balance was $267,264.91, a figure that was supported by a recent mortgage statement produced as an exhibit. Husband acknowledged that the Hiland property had an estimated value from Zillow of $473,000.00. This resulted in total equity of approximately $205,735.09; however, the sum of equity that accrued during the marriage was $118,235.09.3
The Apple Blossom Property
In June of 2023, several months following the retitling and refinancing of the Hiland property, Wife purchased a home on Apple Blossom Court (“the Apple Blossom property”) using assistance from the Maryland Mortgage Program. Wife provided an affidavit to the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development to acquire assistance in purchasing the Apple Blossom property; in the affidavit, indicated that she had not owned a principal residence in
which she resided at any time in the past three years. She further indicated that she did not own any interest “in any land building, houses, or other real property[.]” Wife testified that the program contributed approximately $11,000.00 towards closing costs. Husband did not contribute financially toward the purchase of the Apple Blossom property. At trial, Wife did not provide documentation concerning the value of the Apple Blossom property; however, she testified that she believed it was valued at $400,000.004 and that the mortgage loan balance was $377,000.00.
Other Financial Conditions
Both parties testified that they were employed. Wife testified that she was employed as a school nurse, generating an annual income from her salary of approximately $102,000.00, although her income could increase if she obtained additional vocation opportunities during the summer. Husband worked for an insurance agency, earning approximately $66,987.91. In addition, Husband testified that between late 2022 and November of 2024, he received the sum of $130,000.00 in severance pay from a prior employer, which was paid in monthly increments over twenty-four months.
The parties also provided some evidence of their other financial accounts. Wife testified that she had $94,999.51 in her retirement pension account. Husband testified that his most recent retirement account statement reflected a balance of $4,470.88. Husband testified that his personal checking account reflected a balance of approximately $1,000.00. Although the joint property statement identified an additional retirement account belonging to Wife, as well as checking accounts belonging to Wife, neither party elicited evidence concerning the value of those accounts.
Court Inquiries, Findings, and Order
Following the conclusion of the parties’ testimony, the court indicated that in examining the joint statement, there were “a lot of blanks[.]” The court then began inquiring to determine the value of certain assets, including financial accounts of Wife and the Hiland property.5 The court noted that the property was valued at $477,100.00 and that the mortgage loan balance was $272,000.00. The court inquired how much equity was in the Hiland property at the time of the 2022 refinance, and Wife’s counsel responded that she believed the figure was “somewhere between [$130,000.00] and [$150,000.00].” The court indicated that it would use the $130,000.00 figure from the joint financial statement. The court then determined that there had already been $90,000.00 in equity in the Hiland property at the time of the marriage; using the $130,00.00 equity figure, the court determined that there was $40,000.00 of marital property in the form of equity from the Hiland property in 2022 when Wife’s name was removed from the deed.
The court then addressed the Apple Blossom property, stating the following:
Then we look at whether the Apple Blossom [property] is marital property. While it was accumulated or obtained still during the legal marriage of the parties, . . . the testimony is that
there has been no contribution from [Husband] towards that home. And I believe from the price of the home and what it is worth now, that was . . . a $30,000 difference. But that was all provided by [Wife].
The court then valued the retirement accounts, stating that Husband’s retirement account was valued at $4,470.00 while Wife’s retirement account was valued at $94,999.00.6 When the court began to reiterate its finding regarding the value of the Hiland property, Wife’s counsel contended that Wife was entitled to half the equity that she asserted was taken out of the Hiland property in 2022, in addition to half of the $40,000.00 figure that the circuit court had indicated represented the equity that accrued during the marriage. Following additional assertions that contributions to the upkeep of the property should be accounted for, the court then stated that the sum of equity in the Hiland property was $130,000.00. The court stated that Wife’s share of that sum was $64,000.00 and then indicated that it would consider the $130,000.00 in Husband’s severance pay and Wife’s $95,000.00 retirement account as marital property.
At that point, Wife’s counsel asserted that “[i]n terms of marital property division,” the court should consider the child support Husband paid during the marriage for a child not shared by the parties. Wife’s counsel contended that because Husband paid child support for a child not of the marriage, those funds were not used for household or family purposes. Specifically, Wife’s counsel stated that “[t]he money that [Husband] paid [for] child support was money taken out of the marriage and spent for non-marital purposes.” Wife’s counsel continued, stating that the sums Husband expended in child support constituted “[Wife’s] money. And it should be given back to her.” The court then valued the sums Husband paid in child support to non-marital child, announcing that a sum of $25,650.00 was “income not contributed to the household.”
After a brief interlude addressing child access and support, the court indicated it would then “see who owes what.” The court determined that Wife was entitled to half of $130,000.00 in relation to equity in the Hiland property, as well as half of $130,000.00 in relation to Husband’s 2022 severance pay. The court also found that Husband was entitled to a portion of Wife’s pension. When Husband’s counsel inquired as to the potential impact of the equity buyout agreement, the court noted that Wife received some benefit from being removed from the loan. The court then stated that it would subtract $20,000.00 from Wife’s equity. The court did not indicate the basis for this figure. The court did not value all the marital property; nor did it examine or discuss equitable factors in determining whether retitling marital property was necessary. The court ordered that Husband pay Wife $62,500.00. Because Husband did not have assets to pay the total sum and because he could not afford a payment plan, the court ordered that the Hiland property be sold. There appeared to be agreement that any sale of the home would be stayed until the parties’ son graduated from college. The court requested Wife’s counsel to prepare an order. Wife’s counsel raised a concern that such an order could be dischargeable through bankruptcy, indicating that she was unaware of how
to make the judgment “bankruptcy proof[.]” Hence, the court requested that counsel research that issue.
Entry of Order
Several weeks later, the court conducted a hearing to address the submission of the proposed order, noting that “there were a few paragraphs in the [Wife’s] proposed order that the Court did not set” regarding the marital award. Wife’s counsel explained that she had proposed the addition of the term “Domestic Support Obligation” so that the award would not be dischargeable in any potential bankruptcy. She indicated that the court’s ruling did not specify the basis for the $62,500.00 marital award other than as a “mix of some equity in the house, some past due spousal support[,] [and] [s]ome monies that had been paid for non-marital purposes that were now being pulled back into the award.” The court also inquired regarding changes to the proposed timing of payment of the award to be within thirty days, or sale of the Hiland property within sixty days if Husband was unable to pay. Wife’s counsel indicated that this change was made because Husband was attempting to refinance the Hiland property. The court indicated that it would sign the proposed judgment of divorce submitted by Wife. The final judgment of divorce stated that Husband was required to pay Wife $62,500.00; the order indicated that this sum was “a Domestic Support Obligation and is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.” The order did not identify any equitable factors supporting the marital award.7
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The Circuit Court Erred in Failing to Follow the Three-Step Process for Granting a Marital Award.
A. Party Contentions
Husband contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a marital award. He asserts that the circuit court failed to identify all the marital property and claims that the court erred in determining that the Apple Blossom property was not a marital asset. Husband also posits that the parties’ equity buyout agreement excluded the Hiland property from consideration as a marital asset. Husband further contends that the court erred in declining to accept evidence of the value of marital assets titled in Wife’s name following the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at the hearing on the proposed order. He argues that the court abused its discretion in granting a monetary award without considering and determining which property was marital. Wife contends that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the marital award. She reframes the circuit court’s disposition of the Apple Blossom property as an equitable decision that Husband was not entitled to proceeds from the property, rather than a determination that the property was not marital property. Wife further asserts that the equity buyout agreement was invalid, and the court therefore did not err in determining that the equity in the Hiland property was marital property. Wife posits that Husband bore the burden to prove the value of Wife’s other
financial accounts during the trial, and because he did not meet his burden, the circuit court was correct not to consider the value of those accounts. She claims that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting a monetary award based on the values of marital property it found at trial.
B. Standard of Review
Appellate review of a marital award involves a mixed standard of review. Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 353 (2025). Determining “whether an asset is marital and, if so, its value,” are questions of fact which we review for clear error. Id. at 353 (citing Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 521 (2008)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 354 (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521). Finally, “we review the circuit court’s ultimate decision to grant a monetary award, as well as its amount, for abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 521).
In reviewing whether a circuit court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, we give “due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses[,]” and review whether there was “any competent evidence” in the record to support the trial court’s factual findings. St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 180 (2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion may occur “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 522 n.11 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion may also occur “where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.” Id. (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
C. Analysis
When a party seeks a monetary award in a divorce case, circuit courts are required to follow a three-step procedure: First, for each disputed item of property, the court must determine whether it is marital or non-marital. Second, the court must determine the value of all marital property. Third, the court must determine if the division of marital property according to title will be unfair; if so, the court may make an award to rectify the inequity.
Richards v. Richards, 166 Md. App. 263, 272 (2005) (quoting Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 409 (2002)). This three-step process “is well settled.” Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 405 (2019).
At step one, the trial court must first determine whether property is marital or non-marital. Id. (citing Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519). “Marital property refers to ‘property, however titled, acquired by [one] or both parties during the marriage.’” Id. (quoting Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-201(e)(1) of the Family Law Article (“FL”)). Included in the definition of marital property is “any interest in real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety unless the real property is excluded by valid agreement.” FL § 8-201(e) (2). Excluded from the definition of marital property is any property “(i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by
inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.”
FL § 8-201(e)(3). While property acquired by parties after their divorce is not marital property, “[p]roperty acquired by a party up to the date of the divorce, even though the parties are separated, is marital property.” Sims, 266 Md. at 354–55 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 71 Md. App. 22, 34 (1987)).
At step two, after the court has determined which property is marital, the court must then value the property. Sims, 266 Md. App. at 355. “The party seeking the monetary award has the burden of proving the value of each item of marital property, and the circuit court makes the final determination about each item’s value.” Id. (citing Williams, 71 Md. App. at 36). The court is not required to accept the values presented by the parties. Id. (citing Williams, 71 Md. App. at 36).
Once the court has completed the first two steps, it then must determine whether “‘the division of marital property according to title would be unfair[;]’” if so, it may then “‘make a monetary award to rectify any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.’” Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405–06 (quoting Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519–20) (further citation and quotation marks omitted). A monetary award is intended to be “an addition to and not a substitution for a legal division of the property accumulated during the marriage[] according to title.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519 (quoting Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 339 (1982)). A monetary award “is intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion of that property.” Id. at 519 (quoting Ward, 52 Md. App. at 339) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether to order a monetary award, the circuit court is required to consider the equitable factors listed in FL section 8-205(b). Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405. These factors include:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in [FL § 8-205(a)(2)], was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in [FL § 8-205(a)(2)], or both;
(9) the contribution by either party of [non-marital property defined in FL § 8-201(e)(3)] to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in
property described in [FL § 8-205(a)(2)], or both. FL § 8-205(b). After considering, based on these factors, whether it is necessary to counterbalance any unfairness resulting from the distribution of marital property strictly in accordance with its title, the court may decide whether to grant a monetary award. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 406–07. Because the statutory steps “build on each other,” if there are errors or incompletions at the first two steps, “we normally must vacate the monetary award and remand.” Sims, 266 Md. App. at 356 (citation omitted).
Apple Blossom Property
Husband asserts that the court erred in finding that the Apple Blossom property was not a marital asset. Wife agrees that the Apple Blossom property qualified as a marital asset; however, she contends that the court’s finding with respect to the property qualified as an equitable determination that the property should not be subject to division rather than a finding that the property was not marital. We disagree with Wife’s characterization of the court’s finding. The trial court stated the following in reference to the Apple Blossom property:
Then we look at whether the Apple Blossom [property] is marital property. While it was accumulated or obtained still during the legal marriage of the parties, . . . the testimony is that there has been no contribution from [Husband] towards that home. And I believe from the price of the home and what it is worth now, that was . . . a $30,000 difference. But that was all provided by [Wife].
The court did not mention the property again; when it summarized the marital property later in the hearing, it did not identify the Apple Blossom property. Based on the record before us, it appears that the circuit court determined the Apple Blossom property was not marital property.
“Marital property refers to ‘property, however titled, acquired by [one] or both parties during the marriage.’” Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405 (quoting FL § 8-201(e)(1)). The undisputed evidence presented by both parties was that the Apple Blossom property was acquired by Wife during the marriage. Moreover, neither party presented evidence that the property was acquired using any exception identified in FL section 8-201(e)(3). Therefore, the circuit court’s finding that the Apple Blossom property was not marital is not supported by any competent evidence in the record and is clearly erroneous. See St. Cyr, 228 Md. at 180.
We note that even if we were to entertain Wife’s assertion that the trial court’s disposition of the Apple Blossom property was premised on the third step of the marital award process, the court’s finding would nonetheless be in error. After a court has assessed the value of all the marital property, it must determine, based on the equitable factors identified in FL section 8-205(b), whether an adjustment of equities is necessary. Sims, 266 Md. App. at 355. This can include a decision to exclude certain property from the equitable distribution; however, such a calculation stems from the understanding that the trial court first identifies which property is marital. Id. at 358–59 (discussing Alston
v. Alston, 331 Md. 496 (1993) and Ware v. Ware, 131 Md. App. 207 (2000)). Further, excluding marital property from equitable distribution requires the trial court to consider all the mandatory factors identified in FL section 8-205(b), even if certain factors are particularly applicable. Ware, 131 Md. App. at 217–18.
Here, even if we were to accept Wife’s interpretation of the court’s findings, we would still determine that the circuit court abused its discretion because the court did not consider all the factors identified in FL section 8-205(b). Therefore, we must vacate the marital award and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the circuit court should determine whether the Apple Blossom property is marital based on the evidence in the record. If, following the court’s valuation of all the marital property, the court determines that the Apple Blossom property should not be included in the equitable distribution, the court should explain its decision based on consideration of all the factors identified in FL section 8-205(b).
Hiland Property
Husband asserts that the court erred in determining that the equity associated with the Hiland property was marital because, he contends, the equity was no longer marital property due to its exclusion via a valid agreement. Husband maintains that the circuit court erroneously found that Wife did not knowingly and voluntarily enter the agreement. Wife, on the other hand, asserts that the court correctly found the agreement was not valid.
Excluded from the definition of marital property is any property “acquired before the marriage;” property that is “excluded by valid agreement;” or property that is “directly traceable to any of these sources.” FL § 8-201(e)(3).
Based on the value the trial court assigned to the Hiland property, we cannot discern how the court determined what aspects of the Hiland property constituted marital property. Although the court used the parties’ joint property statement to determine the value and debt attributable to the Hiland property on the date of the hearing, it did not use those sums to determine the equity in the property. Instead, the court accepted the statement of Wife’s counsel that the Hiland property had equity of $130,000.00 at the time of the 2022 refinance. Moreover, while the court initially subtracted $90,000.00 in non-marital equity from the 2022 equity figure, that reduction did not appear at later points in the court’s analysis. Therefore, we cannot discern whether or not the court excluded the $90,000.00 as a pre-marital asset.
As to its discussion of the equity buyout agreement, in our view, the court did not determine whether the agreement was valid; nor did it determine whether the agreement excluded equity that would otherwise have been marital. The court’s findings with respect to the equity buyout agreement are limited to the following statements: [W]hile I don’t think that [the equity buyout agreement] was totally I guess on the up and up for lack of a better word, the [c]ourt does find that [Wife] did get some relief from it because she was able to purchase that home.
I do believe and especially when I look at what she signed on about not having any interest in another place, I think for the last three years. She reaped some benefit of being taken off of that home.
[Husband] definitely benefitted but the [c]ourt does believe [Husband’s] testimony regarding [Wife] asking to be taken off so that she could qualify.
So again, the [c]ourt is going to consider [Wife’s] ability to purchase the separate home. The circuit court did not indicate whether it determined that the equity buyout agreement validly excluded marital property. However, immediately following its statements, the court reduced the sum of the marital award by $20,000.00 without further explanation of that figure. Based on this record, we cannot discern the circuit court’s determination with respect to the equity buyout agreement.
Because we cannot discern what portion of the Hiland property the trial court determined to constitute marital property, we must vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. See Sims, 266 Md. App. at 356. On remand, the court should determine whether the equity buyout agreement is a valid agreement that excludes all or part of the equity in the Hiland property. In addition, it appears that the court found that approximately $90,000.00 of the Hiland property’s equity constituted an asset acquired by Husband before the marriage. This finding was supported by evidence in the record surrounding the 2008 transaction, including the exhibit that demonstrated the value of the property, its mortgage balance, and the sums paid out, which, according to Husband’s testimony, was paid to his brother. If the circuit court determines that the equity buyout agreement is not valid or does not exclude all the Hiland property, the court should determine whether a portion of the equity in the Hiland property was acquired before the marriage or is directly traceable to such a source. See FL § 8-201(e)(3).
Wife’s Unproven Financial Accounts
Husband asserts that the circuit court erred in failing to value several marital assets titled in Wife’s name— specifically, an additional retirement account and Wife’s checking accounts. Although the circuit court was charged with determining the values of each marital asset, “[t]he party seeking the monetary award has the burden of proving the value of each item of marital property, and the circuit court makes the final determination about each item’s value.” Sims, 266 Md. App. at 355. Husband did not elicit evidence at the trial to demonstrate the value of these accounts; nor did the parties provide indicia of their value. There is likewise no suggestion that Husband attempted to provide their value at the post-trial hearing. Because the burden of proving the value of these accounts fell on Husband, and he did not meet that burden, the court did not err in not attributing any value to these accounts.
Other Guidance on Remand
Husband asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a marital award without considering the impact
of the Apple Blossom property or the Hiland property. As indicated supra, we have vacated the marital award. On remand, once the circuit court has correctly identified and valued all the marital property, the court is required to determine whether “the division of marital property according to title would be unfair” and, if so, it may then make
JUDGMENT
a monetary award to rectify any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during marriage was titled. See Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405–06. In evaluating whether the distribution of marital property as titled creates unfairness that must be counterbalanced, the court must consider all of the factors identified in FL section 8-205(b). See id. at 406.
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY VACATED IN PART AND CASE REMANDED FOR DETERMINATION OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
FOOTNOTES
1 Rephrased from:
1. Whether the circuit court erred in finding that Appellee did not waive her equity in the Marital Home?
2. Whether the circuit court erred in finding that Appellant had no marital interest in the Apple Blossom property?
3. Whether the circuit court erred in declining to elicit testimony and consider evidence from the parties with respect to marital bank accounts and Appellee’s 403(b)?
4. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in granting a monetary award to Appellee without properly identifying and valuing all marital property belonging to the parties?
2 At the time of the 2008 transaction, Husband’s brother received a sum equal to half the equity in the house. Husband’s share of the equity remained in the property.
3 This sum is determinable by subtracting the amount of equity in the property in 2008—$87,500—from the equity in the home at the time of trial.
4 We note that this figure is lower than the $416,624.00 value estimated by Wife in the Joint Statement of Parties Concerning Marital and Non-Marital Property.
5 We note that at this phase of the trial, the court asked questions regarding values to which counsel—in particular Wife’s counsel—responded. In addition, whenever the court began making what could be construed as findings, Wife’s counsel would interject and advocate a position. It is therefore unclear from the record when the court’s inquiries ended and where its findings with respect to the division of marital property began.
6 At this point, Wife’s counsel indicated that Husband also had a prior retirement from his prior employment at a bank; however, following clarifying inquiries from the court, it was apparent that Husband’s prior retirement account had been used to fund the commencement of his insurance business. In addition, Husband testified that the pension from the bank had been cashed out in 2012.
7 At the conclusion of the hearing, Husband’s counsel sought to have the court value several financial accounts belonging to Wife that were identified on the parties’ joint Maryland Rule 9-207 statement yet had not been included in the court’s valuing or division of property, and for which the parties had not presented evidence of value. The court declined to revise those items, stating that “I am not doing merits again. This is only here to talk about why the agreed upon order [was not] submitted. The merits hearing has already occurred.” Evidence concerning the value of these accounts was not submitted to the circuit court.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Washington County Circuit Court’s order granting father tie-breaking authority on education and mental health issues. Neither parent agreed with the other’s choice of school, and, despite efforts to resolve their differences, the parties remained deadlocked. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by determining to maintain joint legal custody but grant tiebreaking authority to father on matters related to the education of the children.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
“across the county from [Father’s] established residence[,]” without consulting Father. Father alleged that it was in M.’s best interest to attend the elementary school in Father’s school district (“West Elementary”). Father requested sole legal and physical custody of the children.
Mother filed a cross-motion to modify custody. Mother alleged that the parties were unable to agree as to whether M. (and eventually Z., when Z. reached school age) should attend school “based on the Father’s address or the Mother’s address.” Mother asked the court to order that the children “attend school based on [Mother’s] district[.]”
On October 4, 2022, following an evidentiary hearing, the court entered an order granting Father sole legal custody as to educational matters. Mother moved to alter or amend the order on grounds that there was no evidence of a change in circumstances that affected the children’s welfare. The court denied the motion. Mother filed a notice for en banc review.
Second Modification
A. R. (“Mother”), appellant, and C. R. (“Father”), appellee, are the divorced parents of two minor children, “M.” and “Z.” (jointly referred to as “the children”).1 In this timely appeal, Mother challenges an order of the Circuit Court for Washington County which modified legal custody of the children. She asks2:
1. Whether the trial court’s finding of a material change in circumstances was erroneous.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Father tie-breaking authority on education issues.
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to the Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 5, 2022, the parties were granted joint legal and shared physical custody of the children. At the time the judgment of divorce was entered, M. was seven years old, and Z. was three years old. Legal custody was subsequently modified three times. It is the third modification that is the subject of this appeal.
First Modification
On August 11, 2022, Father filed a motion to modify custody. In support of the motion, Father alleged that Mother enrolled M. in a new school (“East Elementary”),3 which was located
On December 9, 2022, while the en banc review was pending, the parties agreed to the entry of a consent order which restored joint legal custody on all issues, including education, beginning January 24, 2023. The consent order further provided that M. would remain at East Elementary until January 24, 2023, after which M. would begin attending West Elementary.
Third Modification
On August 6, 2024, Father filed a second motion to modify legal custody. As grounds for the motion, Father alleged that he and Mother were “unable to reach an agreement on where to enroll [Z.] in school, which represents a material change in circumstances.” Father requested that the court grant him sole legal custody of the children, or alternatively, sole legal custody over educational matters.
On September 4, 2024, Mother filed a cross-motion to modify legal custody. She alleged several material changes warranting a change in legal custody, including the parties not agreeing on a school for Z., and Father “unilaterally” enrolling Z. in West Elementary. Mother further alleged that M. had “talked” about self-harming himself “due to bullying” at West Elementary and that M. “perform[ed] better” when going to East Elementary. Mother requested that the court grant her sole legal custody over educational and mental health issues for the children. On the same date, Mother filed a petition for contempt based on Father’s unilateral decision to enroll Z. in West Elementary, which she maintained was a violation of the terms of the consent order granting the parties joint legal custody.
Modification/Contempt Hearing
On February 10, 2025, the court held a hearing on the parties’ respective motions to modify custody and Mother’s petition for contempt. At the time of the hearing, M. was eleven years old and in the fifth grade. Z. was six years old and in kindergarten. Both parties were represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. The court also heard testimony from Karen Robbins, the court-appointed parent coordinator, and Jeremy Malloy, Mother’s boyfriend.
Testimony of Karen Robbins
Pursuant to the December 9, 2022 consent order, the parties agreed to hire Ms. Robbins as their parent coordinator and they were ordered to schedule an appointment with her to “discuss access and exchanges” upon M.’s transfer from East Elementary to West Elementary in January of 2023. The parties did not meet with Ms. Robbins, however, until March of 2023, by which time M. had been attending West Elementary for two months. The parties disagreed as to whether M. should remain there “[s]o, the discussion really revolved around whether [West Elementary] was truly the best choice for [M.]”
At the parties’ request, Ms. Robbins spoke with M.’s therapist. Upon speaking with the therapist, Ms. Robbins learned that Mother’s “report that . . . [M.] was not doing well” at West Elementary was “not . . . correct.” Ms. Robbins testified: “what I learned from [the therapist] is that what was reported by [M.] . . . depend[ed] on which parent brought him [to the appointment]. And that the issue is essentially a parent issue and not a [M.] issue.”
After Ms. Robbins spoke with the therapist, she communicated with the parties by email. Mother responded by providing Ms. Robbins with notes from M.’s primary care physician that purported to support that M. was unhappy and was “being bullied” and “physically accosted” at West Elementary. According to Ms. Robbins, the doctor’s notes were “unusual.” She explained: “[t]here were notes that were written by the doctor[,] and then they were lined out and then there were other notes that were typed in and then there were further pieces that were inserted in bold.” When Ms. Robbins asked Mother why the report was “redacted[,]” Mother responded that the notes were “incorrect” and the doctor was asked to amend them.4
In June of 2023, Ms. Robbins and the parties began discussing pre-kindergarten placement for Z. for the 202324 school year. The parties agreed that East Elementary’s “accelerated” pre-kindergarten program was “superior” to the pre-kindergarten program at West Elementary. Ultimately, Z. was enrolled in East Elementary for pre-kindergarten, but there was no agreement as to whether Z. would remain at East Elementary when Z. started kindergarten the following year.
In June of 2024, the parties met with Ms. Robbins concerning the children’s placement for the 2024-25 school year. According to Ms. Robbins, Mother and Father “absolutely disagreed on a fundamental level” and were both “very firm in their points of view.” Father’s position was that M. was “doing well” at West Elementary and that Z. should attend
the same school. Mother wanted both children to attend East Elementary, which she believed was a better school. Mother believed that M. was being bullied at West Elementary, that he was unhappy there, and that he wanted to go back to East Elementary.
Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified that she never wanted M. to attend West Elementary. She agreed to it to regain joint legal custody, rather than wait for a decision to be rendered in her request for en banc review of the first modification order which granted sole legal custody to Father.
According to Mother, M. was not happy at West Elementary. She said, M. “comes crying” about being bullied and “doesn’t want to live anymore, and like every day is a bad day[.]” Mother described several incidents where “bullying has been an issue.” She said that, while M. was using the bathroom, other students “made fun” of M. and kicked in the door of the stall. On one occasion, M. was held down and kicked by another child. In another incident, “a kid held [M.] down and pretended like he was humping [M.]” Mother testified that she “reached out” to M.’s teachers but the teachers either did not respond or “just brushed off” Mother’s concerns about bullying.
Mother testified that M. had “letters” in his bookbag expressing suicidal thoughts and with West Elementary “x’d out everywhere and [M.] holding swords[.]” Mother introduced into evidence a drawing that was found in M.’s bookbag in November of 2023. The drawing depicts three figures composed of rectangular shapes. One figure appears to be holding some sort of weapon. The word “help” is written in a speech bubble above another figure, who appears to be crying. At the bottom of the page, the actual name of the school M. attends is written, over which there are two diagonal lines in the shape of the letter X. Mother showed the drawing to M.’s therapist.
On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that the therapist did not “confirm” the account of bullying when she spoke to Ms. Robbins. Mother “had a problem” with the therapist because she “totally just disregarded the fact that [M.] was being bullied” at West Elementary and “consistently just brought up” the court order providing for M. to attend West Elementary. Mother stopped taking M. to the therapist. She explained: “I feel like [M.] is not able to open up to her as [M.] should in therapy, and I don’t like the fact that a court order is just brought up in [M.’s] face.”
Mother would not agree to send Z. to West Elementary for kindergarten because she did not feel it was in his best interests. According to Mother, Z. was also unhappy at West Elementary. When asked to explain, Mother said that Z. was “[a]cting out[,]” was “disruptive in class[,]” and his grades were not as good as the previous year, when he was in prekindergarten at East Elementary.
When the parties failed to reach an agreement about school choice with the help of Ms. Robbins, Mother hired an attorney, but still no resolution was reached. A few weeks before the 2024-25 school year started, Z. still had not been enrolled in kindergarten. Mother testified that Father enrolled Z. at West Elementary without her knowledge.
Father’s Testimony
Father is remarried and lives with his wife and their young child. Father’s wife also has two school-aged children who live with them. When Father was asked why he enrolled Z. in West Elementary, he replied: Multiple reasons. The main reason being that I wanted [Z.] to attend school with [Z.’s sibling,] [M.] as well as [Z.’s] stepsiblings, who [Z. is] very close with and [Z.’s] half-[sibling] . . . , who would be starting this Fall. . . . [I]t had already been discussed and a Consent Order was signed that [M.] would attend [West Elementary], nothing had changed, and I did not see any reason why they should be [in] separated school districts. One, because it just doesn’t make sense to separate two kids, two [siblings] in their school districts. Two, it’s a logistical nightmare. Both schools start at the same time, both schools have pick up at the same time. So, if one went to one school and one was at the other[,] . . . you have to [have] some kind of after school care set up to make it work[.]
Father denied that he enrolled Z. in West Elementary without telling Mother. The following text messages between the parties were admitted into evidence.
February 26, 2024
[FATHER]: Just reaching out now before the end of summer sneaks up on us. As we discussed with [Ms. Robbins], our parent coordinator, [Z.] attended [East Elementary] for the advanced learning program and will attend [West Elementary] for [k]indergarten. Registration will start end of spring. I will get the forms and pass them along to you to fill out your portion. Also after-school care . . . for both [children], they give a discount for early registration and we both know if fills up quick so we should stay on top of that.
[MOTHER]: Per the parent coordinator she said the issue would need to be addressed.
July 1, 2024
[MOTHER]: [Father,] clearly we have a disagreement in regard to the school issue. There is no prior order[] or agreement that [Z.] would attend [West Elementary]. Please do not put in any applications until we have a chance to discuss this matter. Please let me know when we can discuss.
July 3, 2024
[FATHER]: I’ve read your message and I believe it is factually incorrect based off of our conversations and emails with Ms. Robbins. I don’t have anything else to discuss.
July 24, 2024
[FATHER]: I don’t see what there is to discuss. [M.] is going to [West Elementary]. [Z.] should not be separated. The Parent Coordinator said the same. [FATHER]: I have the application for [West Elementary]. We also need to get . . . set up for after school care.
[MOTHER]: We have joint legal custody and if we can’t agree then we have to have some sort of mechanism in place such as mediation.
[FATHER]: We do . . . that’s what the parent coordinator is.
July 25, 2024
[MOTHER]: The parent coordinator and mediator are two different things.
August 13, 2024
[MOTHER]: Did you register [Z.] for [West Elementary] and if so when did you do that?
[FATHER]: I sent you an email answering this question.
An email dated August 13, 2024, from Father to Mother, and copied to Ms. Robbins, was admitted into evidence. Father wrote:
Since February 26, 2024, I have attempted to work with you to resolve the issue of where [Z.] would be attending this fall, which has included working with our parent coordinator and attorneys. I still do not understand why you want to put our children in different school districts. . . . To move things forward, my attorney filed a Complaint to Modify Legal Custody. [Z.] has already missed out on Kindergarten Day at [West Elementary] on [August 8, 2024]. It is not in [Z.’s] best interest to be kept out of school and miss meet the teacher night. I have turned in the necessary registration forms to allow [Z.] to attend [West Elementary]. I have attached a copy of the forms that I turned in. When asked about his efforts to resolve the issue before enrolling Z. in West Elementary, Father explained: I did everything that I thought I was required to do. I reached out to [Mother] in App Close for us to try and discuss it civilly and figure it out on our own. That clearly didn’t work. So, then I went to the next step that we were ordered to do. And that was get Karen Robbins involved, the Parent Coordinator. We went through that. We agreed for her to talk to the therapist. We signed consent for her to talk to the therapist. She came back with her answers. That didn’t work. So, at that point in time we’re done, we wasted . . . [four] months of time and it was coming up that [Z.] had to be enrolled. I refused to not enroll [Z.] in school and let [Z.] stay in limbo while a court date was decided on and [Z.] miss out on education. There’s no way that was going to happen. So, I reached out to [Mother] again I consulted an attorney. A decision was made. School was coming up. I took it upon myself to file the paperwork based off the fact that we had already talked to the Parent Coordinator. There was a Consent Order in place. Yes, I know [Z.’s] name wasn’t on it but in my mind it only made sense that the kids went to the same school.
Father testified that the children have “good days” and “bad days” at West Elementary, “just like any other elementary
school student.” He said the children’s grades were “good” and there was “nothing out of the norm.” Copies of the children’s report cards for the previous two marking periods were introduced into evidence.
According to Father, M. was not being bullied at school. Father said: “[t]here have been incidents . . . that needed [to be] addressed. They were addressed. And there were some incidents that were brought up that were found not to be what they seemed.” Father added: [T]here has been no bullying reports filed through the school. We’ve had one meeting with the principal and the teacher . . . but there were no signs that [M.] was being bullied. And [M.’s] definition of being bullied was completely miscued as to what was actually happening. Like the bathroom incident. It was a kindergartener that kicked the bathroom stall door in and hit [M.] in the head. . . . It wasn’t a bullying situation. The other incident was on the playground. [M.] got hurt on the playground because a kid stepped on [M.’s] hand on the monkey bars. . . . I don’t believe it was a bullying situation.
Father was asked about the drawing that Mother discovered in M.’s bookbag. He said that it “looks like one of [M.’s] comic book drawings. They look like Minecraft characters because [M.] loves writing movie scripts and story scripts and then acting it out on his iPad[.]” Father never noticed anything that suggested M. wanted to engage in self-harming himself.
Father said that Mother had not been taking M. to therapy “because she doesn’t agree with the therapist.” According to Father, M. appears “happy” and “relieved” after therapy sessions and asks “when [are we] coming back[?]”
Testimony of Jeremy Malloy
Mr. Malloy, who had been dating Mother for two years, testified that he had picked up M. from West Elementary on occasion. When asked to describe M.’s demeanor on those occasions, Mr. Malloy stated, “it varied but . . . there was a little bit of consistency as far as like just kinda down, like, just not happy, you know what I mean. Sometimes [M.] would be chatty, sometimes [M.] wouldn’t.”
Ruling on Modification
The court held a virtual hearing on March 21, 2025 to announce its ruling. The court stated: When the [c]ourt considers a modification of custody matters, it has to look first at whether there is a material change in circumstances. In this case, the parties both seem to concede that there is a material change in circumstance. Namely, that circumstance is there was a fundamental disagreement over where [Z.] would be attending school. When the [most recent] [o]rder . . . was put in place, [Z.] was not yet of school age. . . . [T]here was . . . apparently an agreement made to enter into a Consent Order . . . that [Z.] would attend [East Elementary] for PreK, but the question then became . . . what would happen once [Z.] reached
elementary school age. And obviously [Z.] did that and needed to be enrolled for [k]indergarten, and there was a dispute as to where that would occur. There [were] also some disputes regarding the . . . therapist and who should be providing therapy services to the children, and that created further disagreement. Therefore, the [c]ourt does find, and the parties do seem to concede, that there was a material change in circumstances that would allow the [c]ourt to reach the best interest standards concerning the children.
The court then engaged in an analysis of the custody factors set forth in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986).5
The court found both parties to be fit parents and that there was no evidence that the character and reputation of either parent should have any influence on the custody determination. The court found that the children had a welldeveloped relationship with both parents, and had a good relationship with Father’s wife and their stepsiblings. The court found that both parties were able to maintain a stable and appropriate home for the children and both parents had adequate opportunities for time with the children. The court found there was evidence that the parties generally got along and were able to make shared decisions regarding the children, with the exception of where the children should attend school and the choice of therapists.
In discussing the factor that requires the court to consider the potential disruption of the child’s social and school life, the court stated:
[T]he [c]ourt is concerned that there have been multiple schools for the children in a relatively short period of time. The [c]ourt believes that stability is important at any age of a child’s life, but certainly at a young age, and the [c]ourt is concerned about the children being ping-ponged back and forth between schools. The [c]ourt has reviewed . . . the report cards of the children, and the report cards seem to indicate that the children are generally doing well.
The court found credible Ms. Robbins’s testimony that “[Mother’s] report that [M.] was not doing well at [West Elementary] was incorrect[.]”
Ultimately, the court maintained joint legal custody, but provided that, in the event of an impasse between the parties on education and mental health issues, Father would have tie-breaking authority:
The [c]ourt does not believe it [is] appropriate to award either party sole custody of the children or sole custody for educational and mental health purposes because there has been a demonstration that the parents are active and involved in their children’s education, . . . therapy, and . . . medical care. And the [c]ourt does find that they have the ability to continue to cooperate generally and have the right to be involved in decisions regarding the children’s educational and mental health Therefore, as to a modification of custody, it’s the [c]ourt’s determination that both parents be awarded joint legal custody, with tie-breaking
authority going to [Father] for only educational and mental health purposes, and that the parties’ physical custody arrangements otherwise remain as they are currently.
On April 3, 2025, the court entered an order consistent with its oral ruling. In addition, the court ordered the parties to communicate in good faith on matters related to legal custody:
If there is a disagreement between the parties concerning a legal custody matter, the parties shall first attempt resolution through good-faith communication via AppClose. If the parties are unable to reach a mutual decision after exchanging four (4) messages or within seven (7) calendar days of the initial communication (whichever occurs first) on a matter concerning educational and/or mental health . . . [Father] shall have tie-breaking authority to render a final decision on the disputed educational and/or mental health matter[.]”
The order further provided that Z. shall remain at West Elementary. The court denied Mother’s petition for contempt. This timely appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a case such as this, which has been tried without a jury, we “review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). In doing so, we “give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id
An appellate court applies different standards when reviewing different aspects of a child custody decision: The appellate court will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. To the extent that a custody decision involves a legal question, such as the interpretation of a statute, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally correct, and, if not, whether the error was harmless. The trial court’s ultimate decision will not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion.
A trial court’s finding “‘is not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.’” In re M.H., 252 Md. App. 29, 45 (2021) (quoting Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 628 (1996)). In reviewing the court’s findings, “all evidence contained in an appellate record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.” Lemley, 109 Md. App. at 628.
DISCUSSION
“When presented with a request for a change of, rather than an original determination of, custody, courts employ a two-step analysis.” McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 593-94 (2005). “First, the circuit court must assess whether there has been a ‘material’ change in circumstance.” Id. at 594. “A change in circumstances is ‘material’ only when it affects the welfare of the child.” Id. The rule that a custody award may not be modified absent a material change in circumstances is “intended to preserve stability for the child and to prevent relitigation of the same issues.” Id. at 596. If there is “either no change or the change itself does not relate to the child’s welfare, . . . there can be no consideration given to a modification of custody.” Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 29 (1996).
“If a finding is made that there has been such a material change, the court then proceeds to consider the best interests of the child as if the proceeding were one for original custody.” McMahon, 162 Md. App. at 594. The “determinative factor” in evaluating whether a modification in custody is warranted is ‘“what appears to be in the welfare of the children at the time of the [modification] hearing.’” Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 357 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Raible v. Raible, 242 Md. 586, 594 (1966)), cert. denied, 467 Md. 693 (2020).
I.
Mother sets forth various arguments in support of her claim that the court erred in finding a material change in circumstances. We will address each argument in turn.
First, Mother asserts that the court “relied primarily on its inaccurate belief that the parties conceded that a material change in circumstances was present[.]” The record does not support this contention. The court simply noted that the parties “seem[ed] to concede” the existence of a material change; a reasonable observation given that both parties were requesting a modification of custody based on allegations of a material change in circumstances. It is clear that the court made an independent finding of a material change in circumstances. The court determined that, after entry of the consent order, which re-established joint legal custody and choice of school for M., the parties were unable to reach a shared decision concerning the choice of school for Z. The court further found that the parties could not agree on choice of therapist for M. Based on these findings, the court concluded: “[t]herefore, the [c]ourt does find, and the parties do seem to concede, that there was a material change in circumstances that would allow the [c]ourt to reach the
An abuse of discretion “may occur when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.” Gizzo, 245 Md. App. at 201. The abuse of discretion standard “‘accounts for the trial court’s unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and the credibility of the parties and the witnesses.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 625 (2016)). “The trial judge, who ‘sees the witnesses and the parties, and hears the testimony is in a far better position than the appellate court, which has only a transcript before it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best promote the welfare of the child.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Viamonte v. Viamonte, 131 Md. App. 151, 157 (2000)). ‘“An abuse of discretion should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.’” B.O. v. S.O., 252 Md. App. 486, 502 (2021) (quoting Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 199 (2005)).
best interest standards concerning the children.” (Emphasis added.)
Next, Mother claims that the court “erroneously found that [Z.] starting elementary school, in and of itself, was a material change.”6 The court, however, did not find that the fact that Z. was old enough to start kindergarten was, in itself, a material change. Rather, the court determined that the parties’ inability to reach a shared decision as to a school for Z. and a therapist for M. was a material change.
Mother further claims that the impasse regarding where Z. would attend school did not constitute a material change in circumstances because the parties’ “fundamental disagreement” about where both children would go to school preexisted the entry of the prior order for custody. We are not persuaded. The prior custody order was entered on December 9, 2022. The evidence demonstrated that, in June of 2023, the parties agreed that Z. would attend East Elementary for pre-kindergarten. The parties did not begin discussing kindergarten placement until February of 2024. Because of the ensuing stalemate, Z. remained unenrolled in any school as of mid-August of 2024. In our view, the evidence supports the court’s finding of a material change in circumstances. Moreover, the court did not base its finding of a material change in circumstance solely on the dispute over Z.’s school, but also on the parties’ dispute about a choice of therapist for M. In sum, we conclude that the court did not err in finding that the parties’ fundamental dispute regarding choice of school for Z. and choice of therapist for M. was a material change of circumstances affecting the children’s welfare.
II.
Mother claims that, even if the court’s finding of a material change was not erroneous, the court abused its discretion in granting Father tie-breaking authority on matters related to the children’s education.7 Father asserts that the court’s ruling was an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion. Although joint custody is “often preferable to vesting sole legal custody in one parent,” it may be challenging due to ‘“unresolved marital issues, lingering anger and hurt about the divorce, conflicts with or over new partners, or fruitless power struggles[.]”’ Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 585 (2018) (quoting Shenk v. Shenk, 159 Md. App. 548, 559 (2004)). The “‘most important factor’” in deciding whether joint legal custody is appropriate is “the ‘capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare.’” Santo, 448 Md. at 628 (quoting Taylor, 306 Md. at 304). “[E]ffective parental communication is weighty in a joint legal custody situation because, under such circumstances, parents are charged with making important decisions together that affect a child’s future.” Id. “If parents cannot make those decisions together because, for example, they are unable to put aside their bitterness for one another, then the child’s future could be compromised.”
Id. “Blind hope that a joint custody agreement will succeed, or that forcing the responsibility of joint decision-making upon the warring parents will bring peace, is not acceptable.” Taylor, 306 Md. at 307.
To address the inability of the parents to reach shared decisions, a court may award them joint legal custody with a
tie-breaker. See Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. at 584 (observing that tie-breaking authority “has unquestionably been recognized in Maryland” (cleaned up)). The purpose of the tiebreaker is to “ensure[] each [parent] has a voice in the decision-making process” by “requiring a genuine effort by both parties to communicate[.]” Id. at 585 (cleaned up). “The requirement of good faith communication between the parents helps to ensure the parent with tie-breaking authority does not abuse the privilege of being a final decision-maker.” Santo, 448 Md. at 634 (noting that “a court has the means to sanction a breach of good faith”). Tie-breaking authority “does not eliminate the voice of the parent without that authority. Rather, such measure pragmatically reflects the need for some decision to be made for the child when parents themselves cannot agree. It is the child, after all, whom the court must consider foremost in fashioning custody awards.” Id. at 634-35.
Here, the court found that the parties were generally able to cooperate, were both active and involved in the children’s education, and that both had the right to be involved in decisions regarding education. The evidence, however, showed that neither parent agreed with the other’s choice of school, and, despite efforts to resolve their differences, the parties remained deadlocked. Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion by determining to maintain joint legal custody but grant tie-breaking authority to Father on matters related to the education of the children. That ruling ensured both continued communication concerning decisions related to the children’s education and that the children’s welfare would not be compromised in the parties’ failure to reach a shared decision.
Mother contends that, in modifying legal custody, the court failed to address the preference of the child, specifically, M. See Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 48 (1993) (“When a child is of sufficient age and has the intelligence and discretion to exercise judgment as to his or her future welfare, based upon facts and not mere whims, those wishes are one factor that, within context, should be considered by the trial judge in determining custody.”), abrogated by, Fox v. Wills, 390 Md. 620 (2006). Here, however, there was no evidence that M. possessed the maturity required for his preference to be considered or even had a preference as to which parent should have legal decision-making authority. Mother claims that the drawing found in M.’s bookbag demonstrated that M. was unhappy at West Elementary. Even assuming Mother’s interpretation of the drawing could be viewed as evidence of M.’s preference regarding legal custody, the court found that Mother’s concern that M. was not doing well at West Elementary was unfounded. Because that finding is supported by the testimony of both Father and Ms. Robbins, we cannot say that it is clearly erroneous.
Mother maintains that the court abused its discretion in granting Father tie-breaking authority on education issues as to both children because the parties’ disagreement related only to choice of school for Z. Again, we perceive no abuse of discretion because the court recognized that another “point of friction” between the parties was whether M. should remain at West Elementary. See Shenk, 159 Md. App. at 560 (stating a custody order may include proactive provisions in
anticipation of future disputes).
Mother sets forth additional arguments in support of her claim that the court abused its discretion in granting tie-breaking authority to Father, including: (1) the ruling “reward[ed]” Father for unilaterally enrolling Z. in West Elementary; (2) the ruling was “inconsistent” and not “equitable” because, according to Mother, the first modification order dated October 4, 2022, “punished” Mother for unilaterally enrolling M. in East Elementary by granting Father sole legal custody on education matters;8 and (3) the court ignored evidence that it would have been “much more convenient” for Father to take the children to school at East Elementary than it is for Mother to take the children to school
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
at West Elementary. But the Supreme Court of Maryland has emphasized “in any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best interest of the child.” Taylor, 306 Md. at 303. Here, the court expressed concern for the children’s stability, noting that they had been “ping-ponged” between different schools. At the time of the modification hearing, M. had been attending West Elementary for over two years, Z. had been there for almost a full school year, and the court found that they were generally doing well there. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Father tie-breaking authority on matters related to the children’s education.
FOOTNOTES
1 To protect the identity of the children, we refer to the parties by their initials and to the children by randomly selected letters.
2 Rephrased from:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a material change existed in this matter?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Father tie-breaking authority on educational issues for both the minor children?
3 To further protect the children’s privacy, we have assigned fictitious names to the schools they attended.
4 The doctor’s notes were not offered into evidence.
5 “[F]actors particularly relevant to a consideration of joint custody” include: capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare; willingness of the parents to share custody; fitness of the parents; relationship established between the child and each parent; preference of the child; potential disruption of the child’s social and school life; geographic proximity of parental homes; demands of parental employment; age and number of children; sincerity of parent’s request for custody; financial status of the parents; impact on state or federal assistance; and benefit to parents. Taylor, 306 Md. at 303-11.
6 “‘[B]ecause aging is an inexorable progression prevalent in all custody contests[,]’” the fact that the child is older, without more, is not sufficient to establish a material change in circumstances justifying modification of custody. McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588, 596 (2005) (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 477 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)).
7 Mother does not challenge the court’s decision to grant Father tie-breaking authority on decisions regarding the children’s mental health.
8 The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the hearing that led to the October 4, 2022 order for modification, nor does it include a transcript of the court’s oral ruling.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s order denying husband’s request for a monetary award. Husband did not object to many of the issues he raised on appeal, attempted to reargue or relitigate issues decided by the circuit court or failed to show the circuit court erred.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan’s counsel;
III. Hiding checking account statements and credit card statements from 2022 and information about repayment of Megan’s credit card debts: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan’s counsel;
IV. Furniture and personal property valuation: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan and her counsel;
V. False information about gambling expenditures: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan’s counsel;
VI. False information regarding deposits: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan’s counsel;
VII. Judge erred in finding dissipation of account ending in 4363;
Appellant Scott Latshaw and Appellee Megan Latshaw were married in 2005. One child was born during the marriage on February 23, 2009. The parties separated on July 8, 2022, and on October 21, 2022, Appellee filed a complaint for limited divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Appellant filed a counter-complaint for limited divorce, and Appellee, later, filed an amended complaint for absolute divorce. In December 2022, the parties entered into a partial marital settlement agreement, and they also agreed to details pertaining to the custody of their minor child as set forth in a parenting plan dated March 4, 2023.
A hearing on the merits was held in the circuit court on February 12 and 13, 2024, and the court issued a judgment of absolute divorce in favor of Appellee. The court incorporated, but did not merge into the judgment, the parties’ partial marital settlement agreement, stipulations, and parenting plans. The court denied the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees, ordered Appellant to pay child support in the amount of $1,670 per month, and ordered him to pay an additional $100 per month for child support arrears in the amount of $19,149. The court also denied his request for a monetary award. This timely appeal followed.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant was represented by counsel below, but is proceeding in proper person on appeal, Appellant has set forth, in his informal brief, the following nine issues:
I. False information regarding income: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan’s counsel; II. False information about debt repayments:
VIII. Massive disparity in business valuation by experts: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan’s counsel; and,
IX. Business erroneously listed as marital asset: fraud perpetrated upon the court by Megan and her counsel.
For reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
The issues raised by Appellant primarily concern the circuit court’s decision to deny his request for a monetary award. The parties agreed that certain items of property, including, but not limited to, their retirement assets and Appellant’s business, Latshaw Wealth Management, were marital property. At the time of trial, the marital home had been sold. The parties agreed that the marital home was partially non-marital because Appellee had made a non-marital contribution to acquire it. In light of that, and by agreement of the parties, Appellee received $180,000 of equity in the parties’ beach home in Ocean City, New Jersey. Also, by agreement, Appellee purchased Appellant’s interest in the beach home for $48,000, which was paid from proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The parties agreed that Appellee would pay Appellant $5,000 in exchange for retaining the personal property in the marital home and the beach home, which she did. The beach home and Appellant’s Stifel account ending in 0706, with a balance of approximately $157,000 as of January 31, 2024, resulting from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home, were agreed to be non-marital property.
The Parties’ Testimony
At the time the judgment of absolute divorce was entered, Appellant was fifty-four years old. The parties did not dispute that Appellant began working in the investment field in 1991, was licensed in 1992, and entered into an agreement to work as an independent contractor for Stifel Independent Advisers in 2011. They agreed that Appellant’s business, Latshaw Wealth Management, was marital property.
Appellee was forty-six years old, had a doctorate in environmental health science, and worked as an associate teaching professor at Johns Hopkins University. The parties stipulated that she earned $183,000 per year, or $15,212 per month. Appellee testified that, prior to the separation, she did not have any significant credit card debt.
Appellee acknowledged seeing the parties’ joint tax returns, but not until months after they were prepared. She testified that it took a lot of asking for Appellant to give them to her. According to Appellee, Appellant always told her that he made more money than her, but “with all the deductions that he took he made less” than her. Both before and after their separation, he “would always say that his business – that his book of clients was worth a million dollars and that was his retirement and that’s why he wasn’t saving for a retirement because he was going to sell his book of clients and [they] could live off of that.” Alternatively, he told her that he would “find a partner to manage his book” and then they “could live off … the trails and that would be how he would contribute to our retirement.” On September 20, 2022, Appellant sent Appellee an email in which he tried to convince her to reconcile. In that email, he explained his plan for retirement, stating, in part:
We live off my trails until I pass. We can retire and travel starting 2027 when [our minor child] goes to college. When I die you get 50% trails or a buyout from my partner. The whole time your IRA grows without being touched. Stay with me and inherit everything!!
We can be so financially healthy together!!!
After the parties separated, Appellant stopped paying for half of the family’s expenses. Among other things, Appellee paid the mortgages and expenses for the marital home and the beach house and the private school tuition for the parties’ minor child. Appellant lived in the marital home until it was sold and, thereafter, moved into the beach home until Appellee was able to refinance it.
Appellant testified that he was employed with Stifel Independent Advisors, and that he made “investment selections for [his] clients, primarily in the retirement field.” He stated that his business was doing well when he started it and that his “income peaked right before the [parties’] marriage.” When the parties got married, his income averaged about $130,000. He explained that his income fluctuated because “if the market is dead … there’s no transaction fees.” In addition, “[a]s clients get older there’s fewer and fewer transaction fees because they’ll go from a – as they go from the accumulation phase to the distribution phase during retirement they go from equities to fixed income.” He provided the court with a statement of his “taxed social security earnings” and “taxed Medicare earnings” from 2003 through 2022. Although nothing on the statement indicated
that it was obtained from the official Social Security website, the court admitted the document stating that it would “give it the weight that it deems necessary and have – and when I have to determine what – what his income is for the purposes of support.”
Appellant testified that he did not believe that he could sell his business. He stated that his “client-base,” which was almost all located in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, was “pretty much all from back in the day” and that “everything was kind of done when I was single still.” He further testified that legislation two to three years ago “made it illegal to” advise someone to do a 401(k) rollover into an IRA, which was his “entire business.” His new role was “to only provide advice.” Appellant, who had clients in “26 states or something like that,” contacted his existing clients at various intervals ranging from several times a day to an annual visit, depending on the client. He traveled to client meetings by car or airplane. The value of assets under his management was twenty-five million dollars, but he asserted that “a lot of [his] larger clients are friends and family members” whom he did not charge. He also maintained that five to six million dollars from some very large accounts did not produce anything. He testified that he seeks new clients through networking, but a networking event in his neighborhood did not produce much new business.
After the marital home was sold, Appellant deposited $257,983.78 into his bank account. He testified that the money “went straight into paying off credit cards [and] legal bills.” Specifically, he said he spent $40,000 on legal fees, $160,000 to “pay off our credit cards,” and $30,000 on taxes. He later testified that he had $50,000 in legal fees plus additional costs for his expert, and that he had less than $2,000 in a SEP IRA. He told the court, “I’m broke.” He asked the court to award him sixty percent of Appellee’s retirement accounts.
Appellant testified, as follows, about the September 20, 2022 email that he sent to Appellee:
Q. Okay. And there was testimony about a text message that you sent to [Megan] about not using her retirement. Can you explain to the court why you sent that message?
[Scott Latshaw]: Because we have social security and some of my clients even when we retire even though most of my clients will be dead by then there will be a few and we’ll have an additional 1,000 or 2,000 bucks a month and then you add our two social securities which is 4,000. That’s 10,000 a month, so.
Q. All right.
A. If – if my company would allow me to stay. A lot of times they’ll kick a real old guy out.
Q. And so why did you discuss or make that proposal about the retirement or applying for –
A. I was just saying financially if we split everything up we’re screwed. Whereas, you know, together our combined social security and a little bit of trails that I would have left from my business when [our minor child] graduates college we could start living at the beach and have between social security and maybe a 1,000 or 2,000 from – from my
trails we’d have 10,000 bucks and we could live at the beach. I mean that’s – but if we don’t do that we’re screwed. We’d both have to really max out if we divorce. I was just trying to get her back and say we’re much better together.
On cross-examination, Appellant was questioned about statements from his Stifel investment account. He acknowledged withdrawals in the total amount of $30,000 from the account and corresponding deposits into his bank account. He was later questioned about funds earned from trading in his investment account:
Q. So we looked at your Stifel statement before that showed the transfer and you agree that that would show up in your bank account, correct?
[Scott Latshaw]: Yes.
Q. Okay. So if we look at February 22nd of 2023 and it says Stifel Nicholas credit, $5,000. That’s what we looked at on the prior statement, correct?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And then also on March 3rd there’s another deposit that comes from your Stifel account in the amount of $8,000, correct?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And then on March 24th there’s a deposit from your Stifel investment account in the amount of 5,000 into your account; correct?
A. Yeah, I guess, yeah.
Q. And then on April 4th there’s a smaller deposit of $489.99, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then on June 9th of 2023 is the $25,000 that we looked at before, correct?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. And then on June 26th is another $5,000 that goes in, correct?
A. Yeah, you guys are expensive, yeah.
Q. And then on September 18th there’s a transfer in the amount of $2,000, correct?
A. Yep.
Q. And on September 20th there’s a transfer in the amount of $3,000?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then on September 21st there’s another deposit in the amount of $7,000, correct?
A. Yep.
Q. And then on October 5th there’s a transfer of $2,000, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that’s all from your trading within your investment account, correct? The investment account that –
A. The money from Stifel?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah.
For a “couple of months” in 2023, Appellant engaged in online gambling. He acknowledged that he spent tens of thousands of dollars on gambling and made $3,000 to $4,000:
Q. Do you have any idea how much money you
spent gambling?
A. Last year I think I made 3,000 bucks, 4,000 bucks.
Q. Mm-hmm. If I represented to you that you had spent almost $80,000 on gambling would that surprise you?
A. No, I made – I made money last year.
Q. Look at just – if I looked at just the withdraws.
A. You can’t do that, but yeah, whatever. It goes in and out, but yeah.
Q. It goes in and out.
A. Right.
Q. So there’s money coming in and money going out?
A. Yeah, I made money last year.
Q. Thousands of dollars, correct?
A. What’s that?
Q. That would be – the amount of money that we’re looking at that’s going in and out for gambling we’re talking about tens of thousands of dollars, correct?
A. But it’s –
Q. I understand you might not have netted tens of thousands of dollars.
A. Right. It’s –
Q. But the money is going in and out, correct?
A. Right, but it’s futures betting so you have to like hold them for two months and then you just sell them all and then you make your profit, tiny profit.
Appellant denied that he was holding any bets at the time of trial and stated that he did not think he spent excessively. When asked if he had traveled with girlfriends during the parties’ separation, he acknowledged that he had been to Florida twice and that he purchased an airline ticket for his female racquet partner. He spent $500 on a New Year’s Eve gala in 2022; he went to the Borgata Casino in Atlantic City in January 2023; he stayed at the Ritz Carlton in Virginia in February 2023; he spent $2,000 on tickets for a show at the Borgata Casino; he spent $4,600 on a trip to Florida in March 2023; he stayed at the Waldorf Astoria in Orlando in March 2023; he spent $1,000 for tickets at Universal Studios for himself and his girlfriend, J’kayo; and, he purchased a Gucci bag for J’kayo at a cost of almost $3,000.
Expert Witnesses
With regard to Appellant’s request for a monetary award, the court considered the value of Latshaw Wealth Management. On that issue, each party presented testimony from an expert witness. Appellee’s expert was Richard Wolf, a certified public accountant (“CPA”) and partner in the forensic, valuation, and litigation support group at Gross Mendelsohn & Associates, P.A. He was admitted as an expert in business valuation and forensic accounting. Wolf valued Latshaw Wealth Management at $490,000. Wolf explained that he used a market approach to determine the value of the business. He examined the revenue from 2020 to 2022, took the average revenue, $215,729, and multiplied it by a multiple of revenue of 2.67. That gave him “an indicated market value of invested capital of approximately
$576,000[.]” He then applied a ten percent discount for lack of marketability, divided the $576,000 by ninety percent, and found “an indicated equity value of $640,000.” Wolf explained that marketability “is essentially the ability to be able to convert an ownership interest to cash quickly.” A discount for lack of marketability reflects “the fact that a nonpublic company would take a longer time to potentially consummate a sale and that the market price therefore is less desirable than if it was a publicly traded entity.” Based on tax information for 2019 through 2022, Wolf opined that Scott’s “ongoing income is approximately $175,000.”
Wolf also considered the issue of goodwill. He explained that goodwill has two components. The first is known as enterprise goodwill, which is “the goodwill that is strictly to the entity itself.” The second is personal goodwill, which consists of the “qualities and attributes of a person that cannot be transferred to another entity or to anyone else under any circumstances.” Wolf assigned a value of fifteen percent to personal goodwill.
Appellant’s expert was Michael Goldberg, a member, tax attorney, CPA, and certified valuation analyst at Goldberg Tax Law, LLC. He was admitted as an expert in business valuation and forensic accounting. Goldberg did not offer an opinion on Scott’s income, but he prepared a written report and concluded that the value of Latshaw Wealth Management was $72,000. Goldberg disagreed with Wolf’s reliance on a market analysis and did not believe that Latshaw Wealth Management was “an investable business.” Goldberg opined that the discount for personal goodwill should have been much higher, that not enough consideration was given to the cost of replacing Scott, and the discount for lack of marketability should have been higher. He stated that although there was $82,000 of revenue per year, he viewed that as Scott’s salary. He concluded that Scott had a job and that Latshaw Wealth Management was “not really a business.” According to Goldberg, “[t]he cost of replacing Mr. Latshaw is going to yield no profits.” Goldberg also testified that his research did not reveal any comparable business transactions and that Wolf’s use of a multiplier of 2.67 was wrong. Goldberg’s review of the available transactions confirmed what Scott told him, which was that “most of the businesses don’t really sell unless you have at least $50 million dollars under management[.]”
Goldberg used a simplified version of the multi-attribute utility method (“MUM”) to calculate goodwill. Based on his analysis, Goldberg concluded that an eighty-five percent discount for personal goodwill would be appropriate. After examining attributes associated with Scott and those associated with Latshaw Wealth Management, Goldberg opined that “there’s really very little that’s associated with the business itself” and that “[i]t’s really Scott Latshaw.”
On cross-examination, Goldberg acknowledged that in conducting his simplified MUM analysis, he assigned various attributes, either a zero or one, to indicate that the attribute was either present or not present, but all the attributes were weighted equally, and he did not measure the utility of each attribute as would be done in a full MUM analysis. He also acknowledged that he made an error in his report that, if corrected, would result in a value for the business close to
the value offered by Wolf:
Q. Okay. In the next line you then divide by one for the discount for lack of marketability or .9, correct? Divide by one discount for lack of marketability?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And here you divide by .9 to get an indicated equity value of $639,997, correct?
A. Yep.
Q. If you’re using a corrected discount for lack of marketability of 25 percent as indicated in this column, why wouldn’t you be dividing this number by .75 instead of .9?
A. That would potentially be appropriate, yeah, for that, if that was – if – again, that’s not my opinion of the value, but yes.
Q. And if you had divided by .75 then the indicated equity value would be what $767,996?
A. I don’t – I didn’t do the math, but it would be higher than the 640, yeah.
Q. And then after that you would factor in the 15 percent personal goodwill and then the 25 percent discount for lack of marketability that you have there, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. If I represent to you that that number would bring you almost exactly to $490,000 as Mr. Wolf has indicated in his column, would that be surprising to you?
A. It wouldn’t be surprising to me. I’d have to – I’d have to think about that, but I’ll believe it to the math that you did is correct.
Wolf was called as a rebuttal witness. He testified that Goldberg’s determination of goodwill at eighty-five percent was “exceptionally high” “in any circumstance, particularly in this industry.” Wolf also took issue with Goldberg’s discount of twenty-five percent for lack of marketability, stating:
So I think when looking at 100 percent owned business there are some valuators out there who will argue that for 100 percent controlled businesses there should be no discount for lack of marketability because these businesses are bought and sold all of the time. So I think a ten percent discount for lack of marketability is reasonable. It tends to be in the range of what I use frequently when looking at 100 percent owned businesses.
Wolf also reviewed the simplified MUM analysis employed by Goldberg and opined that it “significantly overstated the personal goodwill percentage.”
Circuit Court’s Decision
After the hearing, the court granted Appellee an absolute divorce based upon a twelve-month separation. The court acknowledged that the parties’ waived any claims to alimony. The court incorporated, but did not merge into the divorce decree, the parties’ partial marital settlement agreement, and held that pursuant to that agreement, “any property in possession of either Party and/or titled in his/her name
that may have been acquired during the marriage is deemed to be that party’s property[.]” The Court ordered that each party was to retain his or her individually owned bank accounts and stock accounts per their stipulation. The court denied Appellant’s claim for a monetary award and both parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. The court approved the parties’ mediated parenting plan tool dated March 4, 2023, and incorporated, but did not merge that agreement into the judgment of absolute divorce. The court granted sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child to Appellee and granted reasonable and liberal visitation to Appellant “at reasonable times as agreed to by the” parties. Appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,670 per month. In addition, the court found that the child support arrearage was $19,149 and the court ordered him to pay an additional $100 per month until the arrearage was satisfied.
The court issued an extensive and detailed written memorandum in support of its judgment of absolute divorce. The court accepted the marital property as agreed upon by the parties in their joint statement. After setting forth the value of each item of property, the court determined that $494,479.57 worth of marital property was in Appellant’s name, $685,992.63 was in Appellee’s name, and the difference between the two was $191,513.06. The court noted that it valued Appellant’s Stifel investment account ending in 4363 in the amount he included on their joint statement, $45.81. The court rejected his claim that he was “broke” and found that his expenditures on travel and extracurricular activities had not changed, and that he did not contribute financially to the family while the parties were separated. The court took note of the fact that he agreed to pay child support in the amount of $2,553 per month. The court also found that although Appellee did not argue dissipation, Appellant “reduced the amount of money in his personal investment account to show that an inequity exist[ed] between the parties.”
The court reviewed the case law and the testimony of both experts with respect to the value of Latshaw Wealth Management. The court found that Wolf’s analysis and report were “more compelling.” The court found that Goldberg’s valuation of Latshaw Wealth Management was “exceptionally low.” The court referenced Appellant’s text message to Appellee in which he “indicate[d] that even he believed his company had valuable [sic] and was sellable.” The court noted that his attorney had asked the court to find the personal goodwill of Appellant’s business to be one hundred percent, which was contrary to Goldberg’s opinion that the personal goodwill was eighty-five percent. Lastly, in considering the issue of child support, the court found Appellant’s average adjusted gross income to be $97,194. The court explained: The adjusted gross income for Mr. Latshaw as reported in Mr. Wolf’s report were $80,309 in 2019, $126,341 in 2020, $104,679 in 2021, and $77,448 in 2022. Mr. Wolf calculated Mr. Latshaw’s average adjusted gross income from 2019 to 2022 to be $97,194. The joint tax returns for the parties for years 2019-2021 along with Defendant’s individual tax return for 2022 were admitted into evidence.
The business income listed in each of the Schedule C’s match the adjusted gross income in Mr. Wolf’s report, this includes gains and losses. While this court certainly appreciates Mr. Wolf’s explanation as to why he does not meet with the litigant in contentious divorce proceedings. [sic] This Court cannot, without more evidence determine that all the expenses deemed personal in nature by Mr. Wolf are in fact personal in nature. There are some which on its [sic] face seem personal in nature. In addition, Defendant[‘s] consent to enter into a temporary agreement to pay Plaintiff $2,553 per month in child support indicates to this Court that his income is higher. However, for the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Latshaw’s average adjusted gross income is $97,194.
We shall include additional facts as necessary in our discussion of the issues presented.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Preliminarily, we note that the issues articulated in Appellant’s informal brief, filed in proper person, are based on his contention that there was fraud perpetrated upon the court by either Appellee or her counsel, both of whom he accuses of giving false and misleading information to the trial judge. Our review of the record reveals that Appellee never lodged in the circuit court an objection on the grounds of fraud or false or misleading information or argument. Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any … issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”). The record makes clear that the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel, had an opportunity to present their cases to the court, including an opportunity to cross-examine each other and the expert witnesses, and both attorneys argued zealously on behalf of their clients. As a result, we decline to address Appellant’s claims of fraud or false or misleading information or argument. We will consider the nine issues he presents generally as challenging the circuit court’s decision to deny his request for a monetary award.
A trial court’s determination of whether an asset is marital or non-marital property is a question of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. Wasyluszko v. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. 263, 269 (2021) (quoting Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 408-09 (2002)) (citation omitted); Md. Rule 8-131(c). We review the trial court’s “ultimate decision to grant a monetary award” and the amount of the award under the abuse of discretion standard. Wasyluszko, 250 Md. App. at 269 (citing Abdullahi v. Zanini, 241 Md. App. 372, 407 (2019)). An abuse of discretion is one which is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[.]” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 (1997) (citation modified) (citation omitted). “Put simply, we will not reverse the trial court unless its decision is ‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court.’” Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620, 626 (2016) (citation omitted). Under the abuse of discretion standard, “we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result[.]” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 521-22 (2008) (quoting Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md. App. 207, 230). However, even under that deferential standard, “a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards.” Id. (quoting Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 (1993)); Accord Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 161 (2006) (“The exercise of such discretion, however, must be made using correct legal standards.”). We take note that, “especially in the arena of marital disputes where notoriously the parties are not in agreement as to the facts . . . we must be cognizant of the court’s position to assess the credibility and demeanor of each witness.” Keys v. Keys, 93 Md. App. 677, 688 (1992).
MONETARY AWARDS
It is well established that “[w]hen the division of marital property by title is inequitable, the chancellor may adjust the equities by granting a monetary award.” Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519. “[T]he purpose of the monetary award . . . is to achieve equity between the spouses where one spouse has a significantly higher percentage of the marital assets titled his name.” Hart, 169 Md. App. at 160 (2006) (quoting Long, 129 Md. App. at 577-78).
There is a three-step process to determine whether to grant a monetary award. Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405. If there is a dispute as to whether certain property is marital property, the first step is for the judge to determine whether each item of disputed property is marital or non-marital. See Fam. Law § 8-203(a); Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519. Marital property is defined as “the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” Fam. Law § 8-201(e)(1). Marital property does not include property “(i) acquired before the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.” Id. § 8-201(e) (3). The second step is for the judge to determine the value of the marital property. Id. § 8-204(a); Sims v. Sims, 266 Md. App. 337, 355 (2025) (“After determining which property is marital, the court must value it.”); Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 255 Md. App. 1, 2 (2022). The party seeking the monetary award has the burden of proving the value of each item of marital property, and the circuit court makes the final determination about each item’s value. Williams v. Williams, 71 Md. App. 22, 36 (1987) (citing Fam. Law § 8-205(a)). “[V]aluation is not an exact science,” and the court is under no compulsion to accept the values the parties present to it. Id. Lastly, the court “may transfer ownership of an interest in property … grant a monetary award, or both, as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded.” Fam. Law § 8-205(a)(1).
The court’s task is to “‘decide if the division of marital property according to title would be unfair,’ and if so, it ‘may make a monetary award to rectify any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.’” Abdullahi, 241 Md. App. at 405-06 (quoting Flanagan, 181 Md. App. at 519-20) (citation modified). Pursuant to Fam. Law § 8-205(b), the court must consider the following factors before making that determination:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;
(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.
DISCUSSION
Appellant first takes issue with portions of the closing argument made by Appellee’s attorney when she addressed the economic circumstances of the parties. He directs our attention to the following argument about deposits to his bank account from his stock account:
[Appellee’s Attorney]: The value of all the property interests of each party. So the 9-207 analysis that I’ve done, Your Honor, shows you what the economic circumstances would be. And on top of that my client is employed and she earns about $180,000 a year. Mr. Latshaw is employed and he is capable of earning about $175,000 a year. That’s what Mr. Wolf’s report says.
Mr. Latshaw is asking this court to find that his business is worth nothing, he makes no money other than however low he can get his – his income down to on his tax return, which is never how we determine in a family law case what anyone’s income is because we need to see – you called it the meat, Your Honor, -- we need to see the meat of that. Where are these receipts? What are these expenses? Where – how can you have no clients, but also is traveling all the time and spending so much money on it? It just doesn’t make any sense. It just doesn’t make any sense.
The reality is that Mr. Latshaw can go back to earning exactly what he was making prior to the
separation as soon as this divorce case is over and he will. If you consider what he’s done in his own investment account in the last year and I can tell Your Honor because I added that for you so that you don’t have to do it yourself, that those deposits equal $64,287.82. That’s income coming from his stock account. It’s income.
So what he’s done through the year of 2023 is he’s worked less and then he supplemented it by trading very wisely in his own account which by the way he can do for his clients, but he’s not. He’s just not. And so if you take that 64 and you add it to I think he said about 127 for his income for 2023, that brings him close to $200,000 a year.
Appellant next points to Appellee’s attorney’s argument about money that flowed in and out of his accounts:
So that would bring his income up to close to $200,000 a year. So he says on the one hand I don’t have any money. He’s got all this other money that he doesn’t bother to talk about. I have to go picking through everything to figure out where all this money is coming from. Because, Your Honor, if you look at the back of what I handed to you I did add in the money that’s going in and out of his account for the entire year. And while he’s claiming that his income was about $127,000 and then less all these expenses, the actual amount is total deposits 356,000,31 – 356,031.75. That’s what went into his Bank of America account.
And I did remove – you can see that there is a number above it, the actual total includes the proceeds from the sale of the homes and I deducted that out because it kind of skews what I actually think is going in and out of Mr. Latshaw’s accounts. So – but then withdraws are even more than that because he spends wildly, wildly.
Lastly, Appellant directs our attention to argument by Appellee’s attorney regarding his gambling:
And when we talked about the . . . gambling, Your Honor, I totaled that also.
… [T]he deposits were $67,000, but the withdraw were like 79,000. So 79,000 of the 356, that’s going to gambling. So he’s got all this money to gamble and he’s got all this money to travel and he’s got all this money to buy $3,000 Gucci bags for a woman he’s seeing before he’s divorced, but he has no money for anything else in this case and comes in here and says that he has nothing.
Mr. Latshaw in one of his text messages says I have unlimited financial resources and I think he says that because he knows that he can look at an account like that, the Stifel account that he owns and he can trade within a month and earn – and generate $25,000 and then transfer that right into his bank account. He’s very good at what he does. And that’s how he sort of is hiding the ball here on the economic circumstances of the parties.
He certainly spends more than my client. I think the evidence shows that. But he doesn’t
have to. And their incomes are not far apart at all. Mr. Wolf says that based on an average which includes the years where Mr. Latshaw was not trying to manipulate his income, his average is about 175. My client made 180. That’s pretty similar.
Appellant contends that Appellee’s attorney’s argument that there were deposits equal to $64,287.82 into his bank account from his investment count was incorrect because the December 1 through 31, 2023 consolidated statement for his Stifel Account ending in 4363, showed a total net gain of only $4,059.82. He further contends that the attorney’s suggestion that he could produce “$25,000 in profits, at any time, within a month from an investment account containing only $80,000 in assets” was “outrageous.” He challenges the idea that trading profit “is income that can be added to [his] regular income” for the purpose of creating “a falsified income level” equal to that of Appellee. On the issue of the parties’ income, Appellant argues that his income is half of Appellee’s, that he has no health insurance or other benefits, that there is “a large disparity in income and benefits[,]” and that Appellee’s “total compensation is greater than twice” his compensation.
We hold that Appellant’s arguments are not properly before us. Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides that ordinarily, we will not decide an “issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.” Md. Rule 8-131(a). Appellant did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the portions of the closing argument he complains of here.
Even if he had, he would fare no better. Appellate review is not an appropriate forum for a party to relitigate its case or to argue the weight of the evidence. See Kremen v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 363 Md. 663, 682 (2001). “The weighing of the evidence and the assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact, not the reviewing court.” Terranova v. Bd. of Trs. of Fire & Police Emps. Ret. Sys. of Balt. City, 81 Md. App. 1, 13 (1989). The trial court was not required to adopt Appellant’s interpretation of the bank or investment account statements or to accept his version of events. During closing argument, both parties’ attorneys were free to state and discuss the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may have been drawn from the facts in evidence, in addition to matters of common knowledge. Sivells v. State, 196 Md. App. 254, 270 (2010). In Sivells, we noted that “such comment or argument is afforded wide range” and that attorneys are “free to use the testimony most favorable to his [or her] side of the argument” and to examine, collate, sift and treat it in his or her own way. Id. Argument by Megan’s attorney pertained to bank and investment account statements, text messages, the parties’ testimony, and expert witness reports and testimony that were admitted in evidence. The judge, as the trier of fact, was free to accept or reject the arguments made by the parties’ attorneys, weigh the evidence, and determine credibility. As a result, even if properly preserved for our consideration, Appellant’s disagreement with the interpretation of evidence argued by Appellee’s attorney would not warrant reversal.
Appellant contends that, “[i]n an effort to falsely claim dissipation of assets,” Appellee’s attorney falsely argued that he did not use the proceeds from the sale of the marital home to pay off the couple’s debts. Specifically, he points to the rebuttal closing argument in which Megan’s attorney argued: When Mr. Latshaw says that he couldn’t contribute to anything because he had to wait for the sale of the property and then he tells the court how he used all those funds, again, we don’t have any of the documentation that supports any of that. Even [Scott’s attorney] references credit card – credit card debts. There’s no credit card statements before the court. There’s no documents that – that the court has in front of it to determine whether anything was paid for a credit card and if so how much?
In support of his argument, he lists numerous payments to banks made from his checking account in January 2023. He claims that the bank records show that after paying off the parties’ debts, he had only $80,000 “in his name to pay for his legal expenses, new furniture etc[.]” We are not persuaded. Preliminarily, Appellant failed to lodge an objection to the argument and, therefore, the issue is not properly preserved for our consideration. Md. Rule 8-131(a). Even if the issue had been preserved, he would fare no better. As the trial court noted, Appellee did not argue dissipation of assets. As such, we reject the suggestion that the argument was made for the purpose of falsely claiming dissipation of assets. At trial, Appellee testified that the parties divided all of their expenses equally and that prior to the parties’ separation, she did not have any significant credit card debt. Although Appellant claims that the couple had debt totaling $165,494, and he points to payments to various banks made from his checking account, there were no credit card statements and no other evidence presented at trial to show that those were joint debts of the couple or to establish the nature or purpose of that debt. The closing argument made by Appellee’s attorney was based on the record evidence, was not erroneous, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting it.
III.
Appellant’s next issue also pertains to credit card debt. Without providing any citations to the record, he asserts that the parties financed home renovations using credit cards, that they first repaid the credit cards that were in Appellee’s name, and that after her credit cards were “paid down,” she “forced” him to pay the credit cards in his name without any contribution from her. According to Appellant, this was a premeditated strategy on Appellee’s part to exit from the marriage while leaving all the debt in his name. He claims that he paid over $3,200 per month on the credit card debt throughout 2022 and ultimately paid off the debt in January 2023. He complains that Appellee’s attorney submitted bank statements only for 2023, and that somehow, she hid his 2022 monthly checking account statements. He claims the attorney accused him of not helping with the cost of the mortgages on the marital home and the beach house and their minor child’s tuition, “but failed to show any proof he
was capable of making payments in 2022.”
Appellant’s argument lacks merit. He failed to lodge any objection to the closing argument made by Appellee’s attorney and, as a result, his complaints about it are not properly before us. Md. Rule 8-131(a). Both parties had an opportunity to present evidence and to present and cross-examine witnesses at trial. If he believed that bank statements from 2022 were useful to proving his version of events, he was free to present that evidence in court. He did not. As a result, the record does not contain a single bank statement to support his assertions.
IV.
Appellant argues that, in the couple’s partial marital settlement agreement, Appellee’s attorney entered the amount of $5,000 as compensation for his share of all the furnishings and personal property from the marriage. He asserts that he was “forced to sign the document on 12/30/22,” the day before settlement for the sale of the marital home took place. He argues that:
[i]n order to facilitate the sale of the couple’s primary residence [he] agreed to sign the document with the promise from [Megan] that an itemized list would be presented at a later date with fair market values for all the furnishings and personal property from the couple’s primary and beach residence.
Appellant maintains that neither Appellee nor her attorney ever provided an itemized list of property as promised and that Appellee maintains possession “of all the furnishings from their 7 bedroom primary residence and their 3 bedroom beach home,” which he asserts had a value in excess of $150,000. Appellant’s argument is not properly before us. At trial, the parties’ signed a partial marital settlement agreement that was entered in evidence. It provided, in pertinent part:
8. PERSONAL PROPERTY
8.2 Prior to the execution of this Agreement, the parties agreed upon a satisfactory division of their tangible personal property, including household furniture, furnishings and chattels. Each party acknowledges that he or she is satisfied as to the division of their tangible personal property. The parties agree that all tangible personal property and household chattels presently located at Wife’s residence and the personal property contained within the marital home and the beach home shall be and remain the sole and exclusive property of Wife, free and clear of any interest of Husband. The parties further agree that all tangible personal property and household chattels that Husband will purchase for his new residence shall be and remain the sole and exclusive property of Husband, free and clear of any interest of Wife.
8.2 As further discussed below; Wife will pay to Husband Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) which shall represent his share of the personal property that Wife will retain.
In part 10.2 of the partial marital settlement agreement, the parties agreed, among other things, that the $5,000 for the
personal property in the marital home and beach home would be paid by Appellee to Appellant at the time of the closing on the sale of the marital home. The parties do not dispute that the money was paid to Appellant as agreed.
Appellant failed to argue or produce any evidence that he was forced to sign the partial marital settlement agreement. In fact, in his brief, he states that he agreed to sign the agreement with the contested provisions included apparently under the mistaken belief that it was necessary to do so in order to facilitate the sale of the marital home. Having failed to raise this issue properly in the circuit court, the issue is not preserved for our consideration. Md. Rule 8-131(a).
V.
Appellant takes issue with questioning by Appellee’s attorney about his gambling and the court’s finding that his bank records reflected “almost $80,000 in withdrawals for gambling.” Appellee’s attorney cross-examined Appellant, in part, as follows:
Q. Do you have any idea how much money you spent gambling?
A. Last year I think I made 3,000 bucks, 4,000 bucks.
Q. Mm-hmm. If I represented to you that you had spent almost $80,000 on gambling would that surprise you?
A. No, I made – I made money last year.
Q. Look at just – if I looked at just the withdraws.
A. You can’t do that, but yeah, whatever. It goes in and out, but yeah.
Q. It goes in and out.
A. Right.
Q. So there’s money coming in and money going out?
A. Yeah, I made money last year.
Q. Thousands of dollars, correct?
A. What’s that?
Q. That would be – the amount of money that we’re looking at that’s going in and out for gambling we’re talking about tens of thousands of dollars, correct?
A. But it’s –
Q. I understand you might not have netted tens of thousands of dollars.
A. Right. It’s –
Q. But the money is going in and out, correct?
A. Right, but it’s futures betting so you have to like hold them for two months and then you just sell them all and then you make your profit, tine profit.
Q. Do you have any that you’re holding right now?
A. No, nothing.
Q. Mr. Latshaw, do you think that you spend excessively?
A. No, no. In fact I have two suits, my golf clubs are 40-years-old and I don’t think I spend excessively. Appellant argues that the representation that he spent $80,000 on gambling was “false.” He maintains that “[w] ithdrawals directly to online sportsbooks totaled $70,965.45 and deposits totaled $67,812.95 for a net withdrawal of
$3,152.50.” He takes issue with the fact that Appellee’s attorney focused only on withdrawals from his checking account and that she never addressed money that was deposited back into the checking account. He suggests that because he made a profit of $3,000 to $4,000, “no money was spent on gambling[.]” He also complains that Appellee’s attorney did not present the court with a profit and loss statement or an account statement from any sportsbook that would show balances and transactions.
Appellant’s arguments are without merit. Again, we note that appellate review is not an appropriate forum for relitigating a case or for arguing the weight of the evidence. Kremen, 363 Md. at 682. Appellant was free to present evidence, including bank statements, profit and loss statements, and account statements from any sportsbook, to counter the claims made by Appellee. The trial court was free to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. Terranova, 81 Md. App. at 13. The court was not required to adopt Appellant’s interpretation of the evidence pertaining to his gambling. Our review of the record shows that the bank statements provided ample support for the court’s finding that there were almost $80,000 in withdrawals for gambling.
VI.
Appellant next challenges the argument by Appellee’s attorney that in addition to the sales proceeds from the marital home, an additional $356,031.75 was deposited into his checking account ending in 2023. He maintains that the only deposits “of new money” into his checking account were the proceeds from the sale of the marital home and his gross business receipts. All other deposits “were simply the repatriation of money ba[c]k into the checking account where it originated” and “money going back and forth between his investment account and sportsbook accounts.” He further asserts that arguments by Appellee’s attorney “biased the judge and made it impossible for [him] to receive a fair trial.” These arguments are without merit.
Again, we note that appellate review is not an appropriate forum for a party to relitigate its case or to argue the weight of the evidence. Kremen, 363 Md. at 682. “The weighing of the evidence and the assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact, not the reviewing court.” Terranova, 81 Md. App. at 13. During closing argument, both parties’ attorneys were free to argue the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may have been drawn from it, to use the testimony most favorable to their side, and to examine, collate, sift, and treat it in his or her own way. Sivells, 196 Md. App. at 270. Argument by Appellee’s attorney pertained to bank and investment account statements that were admitted in evidence. The judge, as the trier of fact, was free to accept or reject those arguments. The judge was not required to adopt Appellant’s interpretation of the bank or investment account statements or to accept his version of events.
Further, his argument that the judge was biased, is not properly before us because he did not argue bias below or ask the trial judge to recuse herself. To “preserve the recusal issue for appeal, ‘a party must file a timely motion’ with the
trial judge that the party seeks to recuse.” Conwell Law LLC v. Tung, 221 Md. App. 481, 516 (2015) (quoting Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 358 (2003)). A timely motion for recusal is one that is filed “as soon as the basis for it becomes known and relevant” and not “one that represents the possible withholding of a recusal motion as a weapon to use only in the event of some unfavorable ruling.” Id. (citation modified)(citations omitted). For that reason, “a litigant who fails to make a motion to recuse before a presiding judge in circuit court … waiv[es] the objection on appeal.” Id. at 51617 (quoting Halici v. City of Gaithersburg, 180 Md. App. 238, 255 n.6 (2008)). As the issue of bias on the part of the judge was neither raised in nor decided by the trial court it is not properly before us. Md. Rule 8-131(a).
VII.
In its written memorandum in support of its judgment of absolute divorce, the trial judge stated, in part: Once the parties separated, [Scott] did not contribute financially to the wellbeing of the family. He did not contribute to their child’s school tuition, support of the minor child, nor towards the mortgage on the marital home or the beach house. In addition to [Scott’s] lack of support after the parties separated, [Scott] depleted his investment account with Stifel. The value of his account ending in 4363 on February 28, 2023, was $89,661.94; it decreased to $5,155.46 on June 30, 2023; and on December 31, 2023, the value decreased again to $3,619.98. On the Joint Statement, [Scott] valued his investment account at $45.81 as of January 31, 2024. [Scott] testified that he was broke, however his expenditures on travel and extracurricular activities did not change, nor did he contribute any finances to the wellbeing of his family while the parties were separated. [Scott] did not contribute until the parties entered a Temporary Consent Order in September of 2023, whereby he agreed to pay $2,553 per month in child support. While [Megan] did not argue dissipation, it is clear to this Court that [Scott] reduced the amount of money in his personal investment account to show that an inequity exists between the parties.
Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in finding that “[w]hile Plaintiff did not argue dissipation, it is clear to this Court that Defendant reduced the amount of money in his personal investment account to show that an inequity exists between the parties.” Without any citation to the record, he asserts that Appellee’s attorney did, in fact, “argue dissipation very extensively.” He maintains that “no money was in [his] name prior to the sale” of the marital home. Pursuant to the partial marital settlement agreement, after the sale, his portion of the sale proceeds belonged to him and, therefore, that money was no longer a marital asset, and it was impossible for him to dissipate it. Appellant also argues that because “most” of the money sent from his investment account ending in 4363 to his checking account ending in 5256 was transferred after discovery had been submitted
in anticipation of the initial September 6, 2023 trial date. He asserts that he had no knowledge that the case would be postponed and that there would be a subsequent round of discovery, and, therefore, it would be wrong to suggest that he drew down the account intentionally.
We disagree and explain. Dissipation of marital property occurs when one party uses marital funds or property for a purpose unrelated to the marriage “at a time where the marriage [wa]s undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.”
Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 651 (2011). The party claiming dissipation bears the burden of proof. Id. at 656. Once the party claiming dissipation establishes the dissipation, the burden shifts to the party who spent the money to show that the expenditures were appropriate. Id. at 653. Maryland’s Supreme Court has recognized that “[p]roof that a spouse made sizable withdrawals from bank accounts under his or her control is sufficient to support the finding that the spouse had dissipated the withdrawn funds.” Id. 657. Once dissipation is established, the trial court “should consider the dissipated property as extant marital property… to be valued with the other existing marital property.” Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md. App. 386, 399 (1984).
Our review of the record makes clear that Appellee did not argue dissipation and did not ask the circuit court to consider any specific amount of money as extant marital property. The court did not find that any specific amount of money was dissipated, and no extant marital property was included on the parties’ 9-207 statement. Instead, Megan introduced evidence to show that from certain funds available to him, Appellant spent frivolously. She argued that his intent in doing this was to increase the likelihood of success with respect to his request for a monetary award. As Appellee points out in her brief, this is the opposite of dissipation. Here, the court found that Appellant, the party requesting the monetary award, had spent down his assets. That finding was supported by the evidence.
Appellant also argues that after the sale of the marital home, $80,000 of the sale proceeds were deposited into his investment account ending in 4363. That money, plus $4,059.82 in capital gains, was transferred to his checking account from which all of his bills, including his taxes and legal bills, were paid. He contends that Appellee’s attorney “intentionally” withheld from evidence his credit card statements showing payments to his attorney’s law firm. He also asserts:
In April 2023, Mr. Latshaw started withdrawing money from the account in April to pay his Federal Tax bill of $20,091.00 and Maryland State Tax bill of $1,364.
Throughout the remainder of the year Mr. Latshaw used the remaining $62,604 to pay larger than normal credit card bills due to legal fees. [Megan’s] counsel submitted [Megan’s] Attorney’s Fees that totaled $73,090(PE-12) into evidence. Mr. Latshaw’s counsel failed to submit a summary of legal fees into evidence for Mr. Latshaw. This should not be held against Mr. Latshaw. In fairness, the court should recognize the remaining $62,640 that was withdrawn from
the investment account ending in 4363 into Mr. Latshaw’s checking as an appropriate allowance for legal work as it is in parity with the amount paid by [Megan].
Appellee’s attorney was not responsible for providing evidence in support of Appellant’s case. That was his responsibility. He was free to offer credit card statements, invoices, receipts for payments made to his attorneys, and tax bills in support of his case, but he did not. Appellant did not ask the circuit court to consider the $62,640 withdrawn from his investment account ending in 4363 as an allowance for legal work. As a result, that issue is not properly before us. Md. Rule 8-131(a).
VIII.
Appellant challenges the circuit court’s decision to accept the business valuation offered by Appellee’s expert, Mr. Wolf. He maintains that
Normally, with such a disparity in valuations by the experts, a prudent person would use a method of averaging the two values. However, because [Megan’s] continuous lies and false narratives biased the court against [him], the court decided to side fully with [Megan’s] expert despite his obvious manipulated valuation.
Once again, we note that it is not our function to retry the case or reweigh the evidence. Kremen, 363 Md. at 682. “The weighing of the evidence and the assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact, not the reviewing court.” Terranova, 81 Md. App. at 13. Both parties were free to produce expert testimony in support of their claim with respect to the value of Latshaw Wealth Management, and both did so. Appellant did not ask the court to average the two values provided by the expert witnesses. In determining that Mr. Wolf’s valuation of Latshaw Wealth Management was “more compelling,” the court specifically took note of the different opinions held by Appellant and his expert witness. Contrary to his expert’s opinion that Appellant’s personal goodwill was eighty-five percent, Appellant asked the court to find that the personal goodwill was one hundred percent. The issue presented by him is not properly before us. Md. Rule 8-131(a).
Appellant’s assertion that the trial judge was biased against him is also not properly before us. As we have already stated, to “preserve the recusal issue for appeal, ‘a party must file a timely motion’ with the trial judge that the party seeks to recuse.” Conwell Law LLC, 221 Md. App. at 516. As the issue of bias was not raised in the circuit court, and he never asked the trial judge to recuse herself, the issue is not properly before us. Md. Rule 8-131(a).
IX.
Appellant contends that his “financial advisory business has been an ongoing, continuous enterprise since the early 1990s” and that its “only value is the relationship he has with his clients whom he has been doing business with since 1992.” He further asserts that the failure of Appellee’s counsel “to provide any form of expert testimony as to the value of [his] business at the time of [the parties’] marriage in 2005 was intentional[,]” biased the court against him, and caused him financial damage because the court assigned the business “as a marital asset to offset any monetary award of the couple’s home equity, cash and retirement assets which he is entitled to by Maryland law.” He argues that the court “must acknowledge any value assigned to [his] client base, as a premarital asset, and return that value to him[.]” We disagree.
In their Joint Statement of the Parties Concerning Marital and Non-Marital Property, filed pursuant to Md. Rule 9-207, both parties agreed that Latshaw Wealth Management was marital property. Even if Appellant had not agreed that Latshaw Wealth Management was marital property, he would fare no better.
In general, marital property is any property, however titled, acquired by either or both of the parties during the marriage. Fam. Law § 8-201(e)(1). It does not include property acquired before the marriage, property acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party, and property excluded by valid agreement, or any property directly traceable to those sources. Id § 8-201(e)(3). “A party [attempting] to demonstrate the nonmarital nature of a particular property must ‘trace the property to a nonmarital source.’” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 428 (2003) (quoting Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md. App. 265, 282 (1993)).
No evidence was presented to establish that Appellant started Latshaw Wealth Management, or that he did business under that name, prior to the parties’ marriage. The fact that he had clients who followed him when he became an independent advisor for Stifel in 2011 was not sufficient to prove the existence of Latshaw Wealth Management prior to that time. Moreover, there was no dispute below that personal goodwill in a business does not constitute marital property. The circuit court weighed the testimony and reports of both experts and determined that Wolf’s application of a fifteen percent discount for personal goodwill was appropriate when valuing Latshaw Wealth Management. The court did not abuse its discretion in treating Latshaw Wealth Management as marital property or in crediting the opinion of Wolf and rejecting the opinion of Goldberg with respect to the discount for personal goodwill.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court dismissed mother’s appeal from the Washington County Circuit Court’s order dismissing her petition for contempt. A party that files a petition for constructive civil contempt does not have a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of that petition.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
state, the Circuit Court for Washington County determined that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the 2019 custody order and future litigation between Mother and Father regarding the child.2
On July 29, 2024, Mother filed a motion to modify custody in which she sought unsupervised shared physical custody and joint legal custody with Father. Mother stated various grounds in support of the motion, including that Father failed to respond to communications regarding visitation, scheduled the child for activities during Mother’s access time, and “failed to facilitate” and improperly interfered with Mother’s court-ordered electronic communication with the child. Mother further alleged that visitation was hampered because the person designated by the court to supervise was not always available. According to Mother, “there no longer exist[ed] any safety concerns that would warrant supervised access” because the child was almost 17 years old and was “fully able to self-protect.”
In this appeal, Sarah Red (“Mother”) challenges an order of the Circuit Court for Washington County which dismissed, as moot, her petition for an order holding Christopher Shaffer (“Father”) in contempt of a child custody order.1 Because this Court has no jurisdiction to review the court’s order, we must dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarized the history of this case in a prior appeal of the underlying custody case:
The child at issue here was born on September 10, 2007. Mother and Father never married and have fought in court over custody of the child since two days after his birth. Mother and Father originally shared joint custody of the child, but in 2017, the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, granted Father sole legal and physical custody of the child.
Red v. Shaffer, No. 729, Sept. Term 2024, 2024 WL 4879724 at *1 (Md. App. November 25, 2024).
In 2019, the Ohio court entered an order which, among other things, granted Mother four hours of supervised parenting time on the second and fourth Sunday of each month. In addition, Mother was granted electronic communication with the child for fifteen minutes at a time up to three occasions per week. In 2021, Mother filed a request to register the Ohio custody order. In October of 2022, after the Ohio court relinquished jurisdiction over the matter and determined that Maryland was the child’s home
On April 8, 2025, while the motion to modify was still pending,3 Mother filed a petition for contempt. Mother alleged that Father failed to obey the existing custody order by failing to allow or facilitate visitation, failing to provide make-up visitation time, interfering with communication or violating communication orders, and failing to give notice of a move.
On May 15, 2025, following an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s motion for modification of custody, the court entered an order which lifted the requirement that Mother’s visitation be supervised, and also provided that “[v]isitation[,] including in person, telephonic or virtual between [Mother] and the [child] shall be at the discretion of [the child].” Pursuant to the terms of the order, Father maintained primary physical and sole legal custody.
The court held a hearing on Mother’s petition for contempt on June 6, 2025. At the commencement of the hearing, the court inquired whether the petition was moot in light of the May 15, 2025 order modifying visitation. Father moved to dismiss the petition because the order at issue had been superseded and a finding of contempt could not compel Father’s compliance with a non-existent order. The court then asked Mother to explain what relief she was seeking. Mother responded: “these behaviors that have happened under the previous order . . . have greatly affected . . . my relationship with our son . . . and also his relationship with his entire family. . . . [S]o I was looking . . . for . . . jail time, for changes in the parenting schedule, custody, [make-up] time. That’s specifically what I was looking for . . . to try and undo some of this damage.”
The court ruled that the petition for contempt was moot, stating: [Make-up] time is not something that is permissible. It’s not appropriate. It’s all about conforming to existing orders. . . .[T]he purpose of contempt is to get the thing done the way it was ordered to be done by the [c]ourt. [A]ny alleged contemptuous behavior on a previous order is moot[.]
On June 9, 2025, the court entered a written order dismissing Mother’s petition for contempt. Mother filed this appeal within thirty days of that order.
DISCUSSION
“[U]nless constitutionally authorized, appellate jurisdiction ‘is determined entirely by statute,’ and therefore, a right of appeal only exists to the extent it has been ‘legislatively granted.’” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. ProVen Mgmt., Inc., 472 Md. 642, 665 (2021) (quoting Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 485, (1997)). “Whether a matter is appealable is a jurisdictional matter and may be raised by an appellate court even if not noted by the parties.” Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546 (2002) (citation omitted). “[P]arties cannot confer jurisdiction on our Court, and we must dismiss a case sua sponte on a finding that we do not have jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Johnson, 423 Md. 602, 606 (2011) (quoting Miller and Smith at Quercus, LLC v. Casey PMN, LLC, 412 Md. 230, 240 (2010)).
The general right of appeal is set forth in section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), which states: “Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” (Emphasis added). CJP section 12-302 provides that the general right of appeal “does not apply to appeals in contempt cases, which are governed by § 12-304 of this subtitle[.]” CJP § 12-302(b).
In turn, CJP § 12-304 states: “[a]ny person may appeal from any order or judgment passed to preserve the power or vindicate the dignity of the court and adjudging him in contempt of court, including an interlocutory order, remedial in nature, adjudging any person in contempt, whether or not a party to the action.” The Supreme Court of Maryland has held that the plain language of CJP section 12-304 “clearly and unambiguously limits the right of appeal in contempt cases to persons adjudged in contempt.” Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 254 (2002). Consequently, “a party that files a petition for constructive civil contempt does not have a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of that petition.” Id. at 246. See also Kadish v. Kadish, 254 Md. App. 467, 508–09 (2022) (holding that a prerequisite to a right to appeal in contempt cases is that the person appealing must have been judged in contempt).
This Court has no jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal from the order dismissing her petition for contempt. Accordingly, dismissal is required.
FOOTNOTES
1 Mother presents the following questions in her brief:
1. Did the circuit court err in holding that Mother’s petition for contempt, which sought incarceration and attorney’s fees, was moot merely because a later custody order changed access terms?
2. Did the trial court violate due process by dismissing after a few-minute hearing where no evidence was received and no witness was sworn?
3. Was it error to find Father in compliance with all orders of the court?
4. Did the court err by enforcing only portions of orders it favored, ignoring other operative provisions?
5. Did the court err by selecting a later discretionary-contact order rather than the order Father violated as the controlling order for contempt?
6. Did the court err by dismissing sua sponte without proper motion or evidence?
2 The determinations of both the Ohio court and the Washington County court with respect to jurisdiction were made pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. See Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 9.5-201 of the Family Law Article (“FL”).
3 Pursuant to the court’s July 31, 2024 order, the matter was stayed pending resolution of a prior appeal filed by Mother. The stay was lifted on October 11, 2024.
In the Maryland Appellate Court: Full Text Unreported Opinions
The Appellate Court affirmed the Baltimore City Circuit Court’s final protective order in Brittany Artis’s favor. Although Jonathan Everett argued the circuit court erred by not admitting Ring camera footage, the court reasonably concluded that since the videos did not show the dispositive moments of alleged physical contact, they lacked sufficient probative value on the central factual dispute.
Ed. note: This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Headnotes are not from the courts but are added by the editors. Page numbers are from slip opinions..
For the reasons that follow, we answer both questions in the negative and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
Appellant and Appellee are the parents of a minor child and were involved in an ongoing custody dispute at the time of the events giving rise to this protective order. In April 2025, an incident occurred near the outside of Appellant’s residence that formed the basis for Appellee seeking a protective order. According to Appellee’s testimony, she arrived at Appellant’s residence followed by her boyfriend, Nathan Futrell, in a separate vehicle.
This appeal arises from a final protective order issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in May 2025, following a hearing in which Petitioner, Brittany Artis (Appellee) sought protection against Respondent, Jonathan Everett (Appellant), who is the father of her child. During the protective order hearing, Appellant, who appeared pro se, challenged the decision of the circuit court not to admit the video ring camera evidence he sought to introduce in his defense and for impeachment purposes. The circuit court denied the request on relevancy grounds and granted the protective order in favor of Appellee. Appellant, through counsel, noted an appeal. Appellee did not file a brief. Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err and deprive Appellant/ Defendant of fundamental fairness by refusing to allow Appellant/Defendant to introduce admissible Ring camera video evidence after repeatedly assuring him that he would have an opportunity to present his Ring camera video evidence for defense and witness impeachment?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Appellant/Defendant’s admissible video evidence by solely relying on Appellee/Plaintiff’s Counsel’s statement the videos don’t show everything, although Appellee/Plaintiff’s Counsel’s [sic] only viewed a snippet of the five videos offered as evidence[?]
When Appellee exited her vehicle to remove the child from his car seat, Appellant asked if someone was waiting for Appellee. After Appellee confirmed that someone was waiting for her, Appellant “became aggressive,” slammed the child’s shoes on the roof of Appellee’s vehicle, and said, “you have the audacity to bring this clown to my house” and started to come towards Appellee. Appellee testified that Appellant then “pushed me out of the way.” Mr. Futtrell, testifying as a witness for Appellee, related that he observed the incident from his vehicle and observed Appellant push Appellee “out of the way to come to or approach my car.” Mr. Futtrell also testified that prior to the push, Appellee was “just doing, like, putting her hands like this and telling somebody, like, stop, don’t go over there.” Appellant denied pushing Appellee or making any physical contact with her. He denied calling Mr. Futtrell a “clown” and denied touching Appellee. During the court’s questioning, Appellant stated: “I did not do that” when asked if he pushed Appellee, and later emphasized, “I never touched her ever.”
At the outset of the protective order hearing, when asked if he had any witnesses, Appellant responded: “No, only electronic and audio[,]” referring to ring camera video evidence belonging to a neighbor who sent it to Appellant electronically. Appellant explained that the five videos would demonstrate that if he had pushed Appellee, “you wouldn’t calmly walk[,]”and that the videos would show “you don’t hear me say anything, no laughter, no chump, none of that.” Appellee noted an objection to the admission of the videos on the grounds that the videos may not have captured the assault. Appellant agreed the videos did not directly show the assault, but moved for its admission, arguing the absence of commotion in the videos proved an assault did not occur: THE DEFENDANT: There was nothing to see because if there is an assault, you should hear— there should be some commotion. No one gets assaulted and pushed and then when you do see them, they walk towards me.
The circuit court engaged in an extended discussion regarding the relevancy and authentication of the video evidence, referencing Mooney v. State, 487 Md. 701 (2024) (determining whether video footage was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence), and surmised that everyone appeared to agree regarding the authentication framework, stating “I think we’re in agreement.” During the hearing, Appellant repeatedly requested the opportunity to present the video evidence. At some point, Appellee’s counsel objected to the admission of the video evidence. In sustaining the objection, the court acknowledged its understanding of the parties’ positions regarding the basis for the objection. Specifically, the court stated:
THE COURT: No, I understand. But counsel— counsel’s point is that you can’t see—I mean, all of this—
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: —two and a half plus hours is about a five second interaction. The court further explained:
THE COURT: And I understand counsel’s point to be that you can’t see the period when you’re standing together for me to determine well, can you see what went down or not. And I don’t—and I hear you to be saying, sort of conceding, you can’t see what went down when the two of you were standing in close proximity. Right?
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, the only close proximity it was was [sic] me putting the shoes on her vehicle and we were standing there talking.
THE COURT: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. And does the video show that?
THE DEFENDANT: No. * * *
THE COURT: There’s already been testimony that [Appellee walked back after the alleged assault] happened. And I don’t understand Ms. Artis to be disputing that, frankly. So to the extent that there’s points to be scored there, I think you’ve made that point.
Ultimately, the circuit court sustained Appellee’s relevance objection, stating:
THE COURT: There’s been testimony as to [the point that nobody gets assaulted and then walks towards the assaulter]. So, I’m going to sustain the objection, not on authentication grounds, but on relevance grounds given that it doesn’t show the relevant portion. That being said, I appreciate the points that you’re making about the types of things that you might be able to prove with this video. But because—I’m sustaining the objection because I think there’s already been testimony for you to sort of score those points, so to speak. Following the hearing, the circuit court issued a final protective order in favor of Appellee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews the decision by the circuit court to grant a protective order under an abuse of discretion
standard. Santo v. Santo, 448 Md. 620 (2016). A circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994).
“Whether evidence is relevant is a legal issue reviewed by appellate courts de novo.” Montague v. State, 244 Md. App. 24, 39 (2019), aff’d, 471 Md. 657 (2020). “If [this Court] determine[s] that the evidence in question is relevant, we proceed to the second step—whether the evidence is inadmissible because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or other countervailing concerns as outlined by Maryland Rule 5-403.” Akers v. State, 490 Md. 1, 25 (2025). “[T]he trial judge’s discretionary ruling of the admissibility of evidence under Rule 5-403—is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles and the ruling violates fact and logic. See Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 667 (2012).
DISCUSSION
I. The Circuit Court Did Not Deprive Appellant of Fundamental Fairness nor Did it Abuse its Discretion in Finding the Videos Were Not Relevant.
Appellant contends that the trial court deprived him of fundamental fairness by refusing to allow the introduction of the video evidence after repeatedly assuring him he would have an opportunity to do so. He argues that he informed the court that he intended to present “electronic and audio” evidence, and after extensive discussion regarding authenticity, it was his understanding that the court agreed to admit the evidence as circumstantial evidence, which Appellant believed was relevant, material and probative.
Maryland Rule 5-401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Even evidence that is relevant may be excluded under Maryland Rule 5-403 if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Authentication is but one threshold requirement for admissibility. Evidence must first be relevant and not subject to exclusion under other rules of evidence. See Md. Rule 5-401; Md. Rule 5-403.
The circuit court’s preliminary discussions with Appellant regarding authentication was not a final ruling on the admissibility of the video evidence. First, the statement from the court regarding authentication—“I think we’re in agreement”—meant that the authentication hurdle could potentially be overcome, not a guarantee the videos would be admitted.
Second, the court’s assurances that Appellant would have an opportunity to present the videos must be understood in context, since the court was engaged in managing the hearing and indicated that Appellant would have a turn to present evidence as a party. However, the court was still entitled to
assess the relevancy and probative value of the videos based on the testimony and evidence previously presented.
Third, and most significantly, the court did not exclude the videos arbitrarily or based on the authentication arguments advanced by Appellee’s counsel. Rather, the circuit court articulated a sound basis for exclusion that was grounded in relevance. The court did not find that the videos captured the critical seconds of interaction between Appellant and Appellee that were the heart of the dispute—the alleged push that constituted assault. The circuit court explicitly noted: THE COURT: And I understand counsel’s point to be that you can’t see the period when you’re standing together for me to determine well, can you see what went down or not. And I don’t— and I hear you to be saying, sort of conceding, you can’t see what went down when the two of you were standing in close proximity. Right?
Importantly, Appellant appeared to concede this point during his colloquy with the court. In response to the court’s question: “And does the video show that?”—referring to the close proximity interaction—Appellant responded, “No.” The court reasonably concluded that since the videos did not show the dispositive moments of alleged physical contact, they lacked sufficient probative value on the central factual dispute. The collateral points Appellant sought to establish through the videos—such as Appellee’s demeanor following the incident and the absence of audible commotion—had already been addressed through testimony. The court stated: “I think there’s already been testimony for you to sort of score those points, so to speak,” and noted that Appellee was not “disputing that, frankly.”
Fourth, the circuit court indicated that Appellant’s objection was sustained “not on authentication grounds, but on relevance grounds given that it doesn’t show the relevant portion” of the incident. This demonstrates that the court applied the appropriate legal framework and rendered a reasoned determination that the probative value of the videos was insufficient given its failure to capture the alleged assault.
While Appellant argues that Appellee’s counsel’s statement that the videos did not “show everything” served as the basis for the court’s exclusion, the record reflects that the circuit court made its own independent assessment. The court engaged in an extended colloquy with Appellant regarding what the videos portrayed and concluded that the video evidence was not relevant because the videos did not capture the alleged assault that served as the heart of the dispute, a conclusion that both parties appeared to agree on. The court’s approach was sensitive to Appellant’s arguments. The court engaged in detailed discussions with Appellant regarding the videos, explained the authentication framework, and allowed Appellant ample opportunity to describe what the videos would show. The court’s evidentiary ruling was exercised within its sound discretion.
Appellant was not denied the opportunity to present a defense. He testified, cross-examined the Appellee and Mr. Futtrell, and highlighted what he perceived to be inconsistencies in their testimony. The exclusion of the video evidence did not rise to the level of a deprivation of
fundamental fairness, particularly given the fact that the video evidence did not capture the dispositive factual issue of whether an assault occurred, and the determination by the court that the testimony by the witnesses provided sufficient evidence from which the circuit court could conclude that the protective order should be granted. Accordingly, we perceive no deprivation of Appellant’s right to a fair hearing and no abuse of discretion in the handling of the video evidence by the court.
II. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding the Videos Because the Court Conducted its Own Independent Assessment.
Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the video evidence “by solely relying on Appellee/ Plaintiff’s statement that the videos didn’t show everything, although Appellee/Plaintiff’s Counsel only viewed a snippet of the five videos offered as evidence.” He asserts that “[t]he statement of Appellee/Plaintiff’s Counsel that the videos don’t show everything is not an evidential basis in Maryland for the court to rely on in excluding otherwise relevant, admissible, material Ring camera video evidence.” Additionally, Appellant contends that “the court impermissibly ceded its own power, authority and obligation to review Appellant/ Defendant’s hearing evidence to private counsel in a pro se custody case without reason and constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion.”
However, as discussed above, the record demonstrates that the circuit court did not defer to opposing counsel’s characterization, but rather conducted its own independent assessment of the relevance and probative value of the videos. The hearing transcript reflects an extended dialogue between the court and Appellant regarding what the videos portrayed. Specifically, the circuit court asked Appellant whether the videos showed the proximity of the interaction between Appellant and Appellee. Appellant acknowledged that they did not. The court thereafter articulated its own reasoning for the exclusion based on a lack of relevance, explaining that the videos did not show “the relevant portion[,]” i.e., the alleged push forming the basis of the assault. The circuit court’s ruling was not limited to the arguments and characterizations by opposing counsel. Rather, the court engaged in the precise type of independent assessment that is required. The court questioned Appellant regarding the content of the videos, considered the factual issues in dispute, evaluated whether the videos would lend meaningful evidence beyond the testimony rendered, and made a reasoned determination about relevance and probative value. The court explicitly indicated that it was making an admissibility ruling “on relevance grounds” since the videos did not show “the relevant portion” regarding whether an assault occurred. Further, we reject any suggestion that the court was obliged to view the videos before denying admission. Where, as here, Appellant acknowledged that the videos did not capture the critical interaction between Appellant and Appellee as it pertains to an alleged assault, and where the court reasonably determined that the collateral points the videos might establish were already in evidence through testimony from the witnesses, the court was not
obliged to view the videos prior to its decision to exclude their admissibility, particularly where the party seeking admissibility concedes that the evidence does not capture the relevant piece of the interaction.
In sum, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in evaluating the relevance and probative value of the video evidence. Appellant received a fair hearing. He was afforded the opportunity to present a defense, and the court
articulated a sound basis for denying the admission of the video evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the admissibility of the Ring camera video evidence and did not deprive Appellant of due process or fundamental fairness.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
